Appendix — Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission
Supreme Court brief2002
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Supreme Court, U.S.
y a FILED
Supreme Court of the Ginited-Sptates csrx
JAZZ, PHOTO CORPORATION
AND DYNATEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioners,
V
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND FUJI PHOTO FILM Co., LTD.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ~
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JEFFREY I. KAPLAN CARTER G. PHILLIPS*
KAPLAN & GILMAN, LLP STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD
900 Route 9 North MICHAEL S. LEE
Woodbridge, New Jersey 07095 JULIEN. ZAMPA
(732) 634-7634 SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN &
: Woop LLP
Counsel for Jazz Photo Corp. 1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (202) 736-8000
DAVID R. WRIGHT
L. DAVID GRIFFIN Counsel for Petitioners
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER &
SEELEY
1000 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 533-9800
Counsel for Dynatec
International, Inc.
February 6, 2002 * Counsel of Record
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
ZOOPER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A:
Opinion, Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094
(Fed. Cir. 2001) .......:cccseseesecesesesensteeesseneesenseesaees la-25a
APPENDIX B:
Commission Opinion (Public Version), Certain
Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406
(1.T.C. June 28, 1999) 0... cece eeteeseeeeeennees 26a-52a
APPENDIX C:
Excerpts from Final Initial and Recommended
Determinations (Public Version), Certain Lens-
Fitted Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (L.T.C.
Mar. 23, 1999) (Administrative Law Judge)
Cover Page .........csssssessecessseseesserssseesnennenennenees 53a
oceanic 54a-56a
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NN ass) dunsancacsenadanasdnbacasentnean 6la-128a
RR FE TL UD oiisscsncascdnrensesasasaysntcccsorennen 128a-140a
” Additional Findings
YUL -5 ncn eescssessseseeseneecseseesssteenenenenenenenaees 140a-141a
FZ0-21 .....seseceesscsssesrencecsesessscssseneeeteesenenes 141a-142a
TY 29-31 ...eessssssscscessressscnesesenesessesneeseesenenes 142a-143a
GY 36-37 ....n.sesssssssscereesnsreceessnecsesenesesserenens 143a-144a
954-78 ..neceseseseesseseeeeeeeterenenseeseteneneneneneneees 144a-147a
Conclusions of Law..............-+++++ peice nasal 148a-159a
APPENDIX D:
General Exclusion Order, Certain Lens-Fitted
Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (I.T.C. June
DFO siccvscsiienisncsiissomminresictnasaeesaansianninnens 160a-163a
(i)
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
Page
APPENDIX E:
“Order To Cease And Desist, Certain Lens-Fitted
Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (1.T.C. June
2, 1999) (Jazz Photo Corp.).............sssssereees 164a-170a
APPENDIX F:
Order To Cease And Desist, Certain Lens-Fitted
Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (1.T.C. June
2, 1999) (Dynatec International, Inc.).......... 171a-177a
APPENDIX G:
Order On Combined Petitions For Panel Rehear-
ing And Rehearing En Banc, Jazz Photo Corp.
v. ITC, Nos. 99-1431, 99-1504, 99-1595, 99-
1596, 99-1601 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2001)....... 178a-179a
APPENDIX H:
Statutes
89 U.S.C. & USF cites 180a-194a
35 U.S.C. © TRB csciacenenesisanasen 195a-196a
35 USAC. © SEF cance 196a-200a
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Nos. 99-1431, 99-1504, 99-1595, 99-1596, 99-1601
JAZZ PHOTO CORPORATION,
Appellant,
and
DYNATEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Appellant,
and
OPTICOLOR, INC.,
Appellant,
V.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee,
and
FUJI PHOTO FILM Co., LTD.,
Intervenor.
Aug. 21, 2001
Before NEWMAN, MICHEL, and GAJARSA, Circuit
Judges.
PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
In an action brought under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, Fuji Photo Film Co.
charged twenty-seven respondents, including the appellants
Jazz Photo Corporation, Dynatec International, Inc., and
Opticolor, Inc., with infringement of fifteen patents owned by
Fuji. The charge was based on the respondents’ importation of
2a
used “single-use” cameras called “lens-fitted film packages”
(LFFP’s), which had been refurbished ' for reuse in various
overseas facilities. Section 337 makes unlawful “(t]he impor-
tation into the United States . . . of articles that . . . infringe a
valid and enforceable United States patent . . . [or that] are
made, produced, processed, . . . under, or by means of, a
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable
United States patent.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(i)(B). Eight
respondents did not respond to the Commission’s complaint,
ten more failed to appear before the Commission, and one was
dismissed. Eight respondents participated in the hearing, and
three have taken this appeal.
The Commission determined that twenty-six respondents,
including the appellants, had infringed all or most of the
claims in suit of fourteen Fuji United States patents,” and
issued a General Exclusion Order and Order to Cease and
Desist. Jn the Matter of Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages,
Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (int’] Trade Comm’n June 28, 1999).
This court stayed the Commission’s orders during this appeal.
Dynatec Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, No. 99-1504
(Fed.Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (unpublished).
' We use “refurbish” as a convenient neutral term without legal
significance, intended to connote neither “repair” nor “reconstruction” of
the used cameras.
? The patents are: United States Patent No. 4,833,495 (claims 1, 5, 6, 9
and 11) (the ’495 patent); Patent No. 4,855,774 (claims 14 and 15) (the
°774 patent); Patent No. 4,884,087 (claims 1, 7, and 8) (the ’087 patent);
Patent No. 4,954,857 (claims 1, 19 and 22) (the ’857 patent); Patent
No. 4,972,649 (claims 1 and 9) (the ’649 patent); Patent No. 5,235,364
(claims { and 11) (the ’364 patent); Patent No. 5,361,111 (claim 1) (the
"111 patent); Patent No. 5,381,200 (claims 1, 15, 23 and 25) (the ’200
patent); Patent No. 5,408,288 (claims 1 and 7) (the ’288 patent); Patent
No. 5,436,685 (claims | and 28) (the ’685 patent); Patent No. Re 34,168
(claims | and 13) (the RE ’168 patent); Design Patent No. D 345,750 (the
D ’750 patent); Design Patent No. D 356,101 (the D ’101 patent); and
Design Patent No. D 372,722 (the D ’722 patent).
3a
The Commission’s decision rests on its ruling that the
refurbishment of the used cameras is prohibited “recon-
struction,” as opposed to permissible “repair.” On review of
the law and its application, we conclude that precedent does
not support the Commission’s application of the law to the
facts that were found. We conclude that for used cameras
whose first sale was in the United States with the patentee’s
authorization, and for which the respondents permitted
verification of their representations that their activities were
limited to the steps of (1) removing the cardboard cover, (2)
cutting open the plastic casing, (3) inserting new film and a
container to receive the film, (4) replacing the winding wheel
for certain cameras, (5) replacing the battery for flash
cameras, (6) resetting the counter, (7) resealing the outer case,
and (8) adding a new cardboard cover, the totality of these
procedures does not satisfy the standards required by
precedent for prohibited reconstruction; precedent requires,
as we shall discuss, that the described activities be deemed to
be permissible repair.
For those cameras that meet the criteria outlined above, the
Commission’s ruling of patent infringement is reversed and
the Commission’s exclusion and cease and desist orders are
vacated. For all other cameras, the Commission’s orders are
affirmed.
DISCUSSION
Commission factual findings are reviewed in accordance
with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, and
are sustained when they are supported by substantial evi-
dence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Tandon Corp. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019, 4 USPQ2d 1283,
1284-85 (Fed.Cir.1987). The Commission’s legal determi-
nations receive plenary review. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v.
United States Int’l Trade Comm n, 54 F.3d 756, 759-60, 35
USPQ2d 1042, 1045 (Fed.Cir.1995). The application of the
law of repair and reconstruction to fact is treated in precedent
4a
as a legal determination, and is reviewed without deference.
Sans “' *° ebolag v. EJ. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 672, 43
USP 20, 1622 (Fed.Cir.1997).
I
The Patented Inventions
The LFFP is a relatively simple camera, whose major
elements are an outer plastic casing that holds a shutter, a
shutter release button, a lens, a viewfinder, a film advance
mechanism, a film counting display, and for some models a
flash assembly and battery. The casing also contains a holder
for a roll of film, and a container into which the exposed film
is wound. At the factory a roll of film is loaded into the
camera. The casing is then sealed by ultrasonic welding or
light-tight latching, and a cardboard cover is applied to encase
the camera.
LFFPs are intended by the patentee to be used only once.
After the film is exposed the photo-processor removes the
film container by breaking open a pre-weakened portion of
the plastic casing which is accessed by removal of the
cardboard cover. Discarded LFFPs, subsequently purchased
and refurbished by the respondents, are the subject of
this action.
oe
Sa
The parts of an_LFFP are illustrated in Figure 8 of the
’087 patent:
Claim | of the ’087 patent is representative of claims
directed to the entire LFFP:
1. A lens-fitted photographic film package having an
externally operable member for effecting an exposure,
comprising:
a light-tight film casing which must be destroyed to
open the same, having an opening through which said
exposure is made when said externally operable member
is operated;
an unexposed rolled film disposed on one side of
said opening in said light-tight Casing;
a removable light-tight film container having a film
winding spool therein disposed on the opposite side of
said opening in said light-tight casing from said rolled
film, one end of said rolled film being attached to said
film winding spool;
means for winding said rolled film into said
light-tight film container and around said film winding
spool;
6a
and winding control means responsive to opera-
tion of said externally operable member for allow-
ing said film winding spool to rotate so as to enable said
rolled film to be advanced by only one frame after every
exposure; said winding control means including: a
sprocket wheel driven by movement of said rolled film;
and a frame counter driven by said sprocket wheel,
said frame counter being provided with indications
designating a series of frame numbers and means for
disabling said winding control means responsive to said
frame counter indicating there remains on said unex-
posed film no film frame capable of being exposed.
Other patents are directed to various components of the
LFFP. The ’857 patent is directed to a specific film winding
mechanism. The °495 patent is directed to a mechanism
whereby the film in the LFFP is advanced smoothly without
being scratched or gouged, and which prevents the film roll
from becoming loose. The ’774 patent is directed to the film
chambers and film path. The °364 patent claims the LFFP
with a flash unit comprising a circuit board, a capacitor, a
discharge (flash) tube, and a battery. The ’111 patent is
directed to the pushbutton that trips the shutter and has a
protective structure that prevents the pushbutton from
accidentally being depressed. The ’200 patent is directed to
the shutter mechanism, including the shutter mount, shutter
opening, and shutter blade. The ’288 patent claims an LFFP
in which the winding wheel and film cassette are positively
linked through a gear and shaft mechanism requiring the two
to rotate relative to each other, avoiding the loss of usable
film. The ’685 patent is directed to an LFFP assembly that
allows easier recycling of used plastic and metal, in which the
plastic casing including the film path and film chambers is
easily separable from the photo-taking unit containing metal
parts including the shutter mechanism and the winding and
stop mechanisms.
7a
It is not disputed that the imported refurbished cameras
contain all of the elements of all or most of the claims
in suit.
The Accused Activities
The appellants import used LFFPs that have been refur-
bished by various overseas entities (called ‘“remanu-
facturers” in the ITC proceeding). Some of the remanufac-
turers refused discovery entirely or in part, and some
presented evidence that the ALJ found incomplete or not
credible. The Commission explains: “Since so little was
known about the accused infringing processes, the ALJ
considered the common steps that each participating
respondent admitted during the hearing were part of their
processes.” ITC Brief at 15-16. The ALJ summarized these
common steps as follows:
* removing the cardboard cover;
* opening the LFFP body (usually by cutting at least one
weld);
* replacing the winding wheel or modifying the film
cartridge to be inserted; 7.
* resetting the film counter;
* replacing the battery in flash LFFPs;
* winding new film out of a canister onto a spool or into
a roll;
* resealing the LFFP body using tape and/or glue;
* applying a new cardboard cover.
Initial Determination at 108-109. The Commission held that
these activities constitute prohibited reconstruction. In view
of this holding, it was not material to the Commission’s
ruling that the full extent of various respondents’ activities
was not made known, for in all events the importation would
be infringing and unlawful. -
SSE eae ee eer ea
8a
The appellants argue that they are not building new LFFPs,
but simply replacing the film in used cameras. They argue
that the LFFPs have a useful life longer than the single use
proposed by Fuji, that the patent right has been exhausted as
to these articles, and that the patentee can not restrict their
right to refit the cameras with new film by the procedures
necessary to insert the film and reset the mechanism. Unless
these activities are deemed to be permissible, infringement of
at least some of the patents in suit is conceded.
Burden and Standard of Proof
On this appeal there is much argument as to the burden and
standard of proof. The administrative law judge ruled that the
respondents must prove that their remanufactured cameras
meet the criteria of permissible repair by clear and convincing
evidence. The Commission held that this was not the correct
standard, and that the respondents were required to prove the
affirmative defense of permissible repair by no more than a
preponderance of the evidence. However, the Commission
found that this error did not change the correctness of the
ALJ’s conclusion that the respondents’ actions were
impermissible reconstruction of the patented articles.
While it is not disputed that repair is an affirmative defense,
see Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755,
758, 3 USPQ2d 1852, 1854 (Fed.Cir.1987) (characterizing
repair as an affirmative defense of implied license), the parties
disagree as to the order of coming forward with evidence, as
well as the placement of the burden of proving that the accused
activities are infringing reconstruction. The appellants state
that the burden of proving infringement does not leave the
patentee, and thus that the Commission incorrectly placed upon
the appellants the burden of proving noninfringement. The
appellants also argue that Fuji’s unrestricted first sale of the
patented cameras satisfied prima facie the appellants’ burden
on the affirmative defense of repair, for it established that the
patent right had been exhausted; they state that this shifted to
9a
the patentee the burden of proving that the accused activities
were not repair. In support the appellants cite General Electric
Co. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl. 636, 572 F.2d 745, 783 n. 17,
198 USPQ 65, 97 n. 17 (1978), where the court noted that
“Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proof on issues relating
to infringement (including ‘reconstruction’).”
The Commission ruled that “Once Fuji carried its burden
of proof that its claims covered the remanufactured cameras,
it was up to appellants to prove their affirmative defense that
they were only repairing the cameras, not reconstructing
them.” The Commission has correctly described this evi-
dentiary sequence. The initial burden is upon the complain-
ant to establish its cause of action, here patent infringement;
the patentee must present evidence sufficient to establish that
one or more patent claims are infringed. The respond-
ents did not dispute that many or most of the claims in suit
read literally on their refurbished cameras. Thus Fuji met its
initial burden of showing infringement.
The burden of establishing an affirmative defense is on the
“party raising the defense. The Commission correctly held
that the respondents had the burden of establishing this
defense by a preponderance of the evidence, including the
~burden of coming forward with evidence to show that the
activities performed in processing the used cameras con-
stituted permissible repair.
The Law of Permissible Repair and Prohibited
Reconstruction :
The distinction between permitted and prohibited activ-
ities, with respect to patented items after they have been placed
in commerce by the patentee, has been distilled into the terms
“repair” and “reconstruction.” The purchaser of a patented
article has the rights of any owner of personal property,
including the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or
resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of the sale. Thus
patented articles when sold “become the private individual
10a
property of the purchasers, and are no longer specifically
protected by the patent laws.” Mitchell v.. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 544, 548, 21 L.Ed. 322 (1872). The fact that an article
is patented gives the purchaser neither more nor less rights of
use and disposition. However, the rights of ownership do not
include the right to construct an essentially new article on the
template of the original, for the right to make the article
remains with the patentee. :
While the ownership of a patented article does not include
the right to make a substantially new article, it does include
the right to preserve the useful life of the original article. It is
readily apparent that there is a continuum between these
concepts; precedent demonstrates that litigated cases rarely
reside at the poles wherein “repair” is readily distinguished
from “reconstruction.” Thus the law has developed in the
body of precedent, illustrating the policy underlying the law
as it has been applied in diverse factual contexts. Cf
Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150
_ (Ist Cir.1901) (“It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to
attempt to lay down any rule on this subject, owing to the
number and infinite variety of patented inventions.”)
The principle of the distinction between permissible and
prohibited activities was explained in Wilson v. Simpson, 50
U.S. (9 How.) 109, 13 L.Ed. 66 (1850), where the Court
distinguished the right of a purchaser of a patented planing
machine to replace the machine’s cutting-knives when they
became dull or broken, from the patentee’s sole right to make
or renew the entire machine. The Court observed that the
knives had to be replaced every 60-90 days whereas the
machines would last for several years, explaining, “what
harm is done to the patentee in the use of his right of
invention, when the repair and replacement of a partial injury
are confined to the machine which the purchaser has
bought?” /d. at 123. -
= CC
lla
This principle underlies the application of the law. It was
elaborated by the Court in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5
L.Ed.2d 592 (1961), where the patented combination was a
fabric convertible top and the associated metal support structure.
The Court explained that replacement of the worn fabric top
constituted permissible repair of the patented combination, and
could not be controlled by the patentee. The Court restated the
principles that govern the inquiry as applied to replacement of
unpatented parts of a patented article:
The decisions of this Court require the conclusion that
reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of
unpatented elements, is limited to such a true recon-
struction of the entity as to “in fact make a new article,”
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, [148 F.2d
416, 425 (2d Cir.1945)], after the entity, viewed as a
whole, has become spent. tn order to call the monopoly,
conferred by the patent vant, into play for a second
time, it must, indeed, be a second creation of the
patented entity, as, for example, in American Cotton Tie
Co. v. Simmons, [106 U.S. 89, 1 S.Ct. 52 (1882)]. Mere
replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a
time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different
parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the
owner to repair his property.
365 U.S. at 346, 81 S.Ct. 599.
This right of repair, provided that the activity does not “in
fact make a new article,’ accompanies the article to
succeeding owners. In Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S.
422, 84 S.Ct. 1561, 12 L.Ed.2d 419, 141 USPQ 703 (1964),
the Court dealt with the refurbishing of patented fish-canning
machines by a purchaser of used machines. The Court held
that the fairly extensive refurbishment by the new owner,
including modification and resizing of six separate parts of
the machine, although more than customary repair of spent or
12a
broken components, was more like repair then reconstruction,
for it extended the useful life of the original machine. See id.
at 425, 141 USPQ at 704-05 (“Petitioners in adapting the old
machines to a related use were doing more than repair in the
customary sense; but what they did was kin to repair for it
bore on the useful capacity of the old combination, on which
the royalty had been paid.”)
Precedent has classified as repair the disassembly and
cleaning of patented articles accompanied by replacement of
unpatented parts that had become worn or spent, in order to
preserve the utility for which the article was originally
intended. In General Electric Co. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl.
636, 572 F.2d 745, 198 USPQ 65 (1978), the court held that
the Navy’s large scale “overhauling” of patented gun mounts,
including disassembly into their component parts and
replacement of parts that could not be repaired with parts
from other gun mounts or new parts, was permissible repair
of the original gun mounts. The court explained that the
assembly-line method of reassembly, without regard to where
each component had originated, was simply a matter of
efficiency and economy, with the same effect as if each gun
mount had been refurbished individually by disassembly and
reassembly of its original components with replacement of a
minor amount of worn elements. Jd. at 780-86, 198 USPQ
at 95-100.
Similarly, in Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827
F.2d 755, 3 USPQ2d 1852 (Fed.Cir.1987), the court held that
the “rebuilding” of worn truck clutches, although done on a
commercial scale, was permissible repair. The defendants in
Dana Corp. acquired worn clutches that had been discarded
by their original owners, disassembled them, cleaned and
sorted the individual parts, replaced worn or defective parts
with new or salvaged parts, and reassembled the clutches.
Although the patentee stressed that some new parts were used
and that the rebuilding was a large scale commercial
operation, the activity was held to be repair. Jd. at 759, 827
~
13a
F.2d 755, 3 USPQ2d at 1855. The court also observed that in
general the new parts were purchased from Dana, the original
manufacturer of the patented clutches, and that repair of used
clutches was contemplated by the patentee. The court
rejected the argument that the complete disassembly and
production-line reassembly of the clutches constituted a
voluntary destruction followed by a “second creation of the
patented entity,” invoking the phrase of Aro Manufacturing,
365 U.S. at 346, 81 S.Ct. 599.
“Reconstruction,” precedent shows, requires a more
extensive rebuilding of the patented entity than is exemplified
in Aro Manufacturing, Wilbur-Ellis, General Electric, and
Dana Corp. See also, e.g., Bottom Line Mgmt., Inc. v. Pan
Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352, 56 USPQ2d 1316 (Fed.Cir.2000)
(repair of cooking device by reapplying non-stick coating);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.,
123 F.3d 1445, 43 USPQ2d 1650 (Fed.Cir.1997) (modifying
unused printer cartridges akin to repair); Kendall Co. v.
Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 38 USPQ2d 1917
(Fed.Cir.1996) (replacement of used pressure sleeve in
medical device is repair); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus.,
Inc., 45 F.3d 1575, 33 USPQ2d 1765 (Fed.Cir.1995)
(replacement of inner container for medical waste is repair);
FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 30 USPQ2d
1361 (Fed.Cir.1994) (replacing worn unpatented picking
heads ot harvester is repair); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875
F.2d 300, 10 USPQ2d 1855 (Fed.Cir.1989) (replacement of
entire cartridge containing spent filter is repair); Porter v.
Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 229 USPQ 814
(Fed.Cir.1986) (replacement of disks in tomato harvester
head is repair). In contrast, in Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.,
121 F.3d 669, 43 USPQ2d 1620 (Fed.Cir.1997), recon-
struction was held to apply when a patented drill bit was
“recreated” by construction of an entirely new cutting tip
after the existing cutting tip could no longer be resharpened
and reused. The court explained that it was not dispositive
14a
that the cutting tip was the “novel feature” of the invention,
but that prohibited reconstruction occurred because a “new
article” was made after the patented article, “viewed as a
whole, has become spent.” See also Lummus Indus., Inc. v.
D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 8 USPQ2d 1983 (Fed.
Cir.1988) (jury verdict of reconstruction for cutter wheels that
were material part of patented invention).
Underlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the
principle of exhaustion of the patent right. The unrestricted
sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the
patentee, “exhausts” the patentee’s right to control further
sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under
which it was first sold. In United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265, 278, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942), the
Court explained that exhaustion of the patent right depends
on “whether or not there has been such a disposition of the
article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received
his reward for the use of the article.” See, e.g., Intel Corp. v.
ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568, 27 USPQ2d
1136, 1138 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The law is wellsettled that an
authorized sale of a patented. product places that product
beyond the reach of the patent.”) Thus when a patented
device has been lawfully sold in the United States, subsequent
purchasers inherit the same immunity under the doctrine of
patent exhaustion. However, the prohibition that the product
may not be the vehicle for a “second creation of the patented
entity” continues to apply, for such re-creation exceeds the
rights that accompanied the initial sale.
Fuji states that some of the imported LFFP cameras
originated and were sold only overseas, but are included in the
refurbished importations by some of the respondents. The
record supports this statement, which does not appear to be
disputed. United States patent rights are not exhausted by
products of foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of
the first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must have
occurred under the United States patent. See Boesch v. Graff,
15a
133 U.S. 697, 701-703, 10 S.Ct. 378, 33 L.Ed. 787 (1890) (a
lawful foreign purchase does not obviate the need for license
from the United States patentee before importation into and
sale in the United States). Our decision applies only to LFFPs
for which the United States patent right has been exhausted by
first sale in the United States. Imported LFFPs of solely
foreign provenance are not immunized from infringement of
United States patents by the nature of their refurbishment.
Application of the Law
In the Commission’s Initial Determination the administra-
tive judge, applying the four factors discussed in Sandvik
Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 673, 43 USPQ2d at 1623, held that the
remanufacturers had made a new LFFP after the useful life of
the original LFFP had been spent. Thus, the ALJ ruled that the
remanufacturers were engaged in prohibited reconstruction.
The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions
that the remanufacturers were not simply repairing an article
for which either the producer or the purchaser expected a
longer useful life, pointing out that the purchaser discarded the
camera after use. The Commission ruled that the respondents
were not simply repairing the LFFP in order to achieve its
intended life span, but created a new single use camera that
would again be discarded by its purchaser after use.
Although the Commission’s conclusion is supported by its
reasoning and reflects concern for the public interest, for
there was evidence of imperfections and failures of some
refurbished cameras, precedent requires that these cameras be
viewed as repaired, not reconstructed. In Dana Corp., for
example, the truck clutches had lived their intended lives as
originally produced, yet the court ruled that the “rebuild-
ing” of the used clutches was more akin to repair than to
reconstruction. The activities of disassembly and rebuilding
of the gun mounts of General Electric were similarly
extensive, yet were deemed to be repair. Aro Manufacturing
and the other Supreme Court decisions which underlie
l6a
precedent require that infringing reconstruction be a “second
creation” of the patented article. Although the Commission
deemed this requirement met by the “remanufactured”
LFFPs, precedent places the acts of inserting new film and
film container, resetting the film counter, and resealing the
broken case—the principal steps performed by the remanu-
facturers—as more akin to repair.
The Court has cautioned against reliance on any specific
set of “factors” in distinguishing permissible from prohibited
activities, stating in Aro Manufacturing that “While there is
language in some lower court opinions indicating that ‘repair’
or ‘reconstruction’ depends on a number of factors, it is
significant that each of the three cases of this Court, cited for
that proposition, holds that a license to use a patented
combination includes the right ‘to preserve its fitness for
use. ...” 365 U.S. at 345, 81 S.Ct. 599. Indeed, this
criterion is the common thread in precedent, requiring
consideration of the remaining useful capacity of the article,
and the nature and role of the replaced parts in achieving that
useful capacity. The appellants stress that all of the original
components of the LFFP except the film and battery have a
useful remaining life, and are reused. The appellants state
that but for the exposed roll of film and its container, any
portion of the case that was broken by the photo processor,
and the winding wheel in certain cameras, the refurbished
LFFP is substantially the original camera, for which the
patent right has been exhausted.
The Commission placed weight on Fuji’s intention that the
LFFP not be reused. The ’087 patent specification states that
forming an opening in the film package makes it _
impossible to reuse the film package. Therefore, it will
be impossible to refill a new film into the used film
package in order to reclaim a film package for reuse.
087 patent, col. 6, lines 14-18. However, the patentee’s
unilateral intent, without more, does not bar reuse of the
17a
patented article, or convert repair into reconstruction. See
Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1453, 43 USPQ2d at 1658
(“a seller’s intent, unless embodied in an enforceable
contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a
purchaser to use, sell, or modify a patented product so long as
a reconstruction of the patented combination is avoided”’).
Claim 7 of the ’087 patent is representative of those claims
that specifically recite the film container and unexposed film
roll, elements that are replaced by the remanufacturers:
7. A lens-fitted photographic film package comprising:
a light-tight film casing which must be destroyed to
open the same, having an opening through which an
exposure is made;
\ a light-tight film container having a film winding
spool therein disposed on one side of said opening in
said light-tight film casing;
a rotatable spool disposed on the opposite side of said
opening in said light-tight film casing from said light-
tight film container;
one end of said spool being exposed outside said
light-tight film casing; :
a film roll of unexposed film of which one end is
attached to said film winding spool in said light-tight film
container and which is rolled around said rotatable spool.
The appellants state that the film and its removable container
are commercial items, and that their replacement in a camera
can not be deemed to be reconstruction. As discussed in Aro
Manufacturing, the replacement of unpatented parts, having a
shorter life than is available from the combination as a whole,
is characteristic of repair, not reconstruction. On the totality
of the circumstances, the changes made by the remanu-
facturers all relate to the replacement of the film, the LFFP
otherwise remaining as originally sold.
18a
Several of the Fuji patents in suit are directed to specific
components of LFFPs, including the °495 (film path), ’774
(film chambers and film path), *111 (pushbutton), °200
(shutter mechanism), ’685 (recyclable LFFP body), and
RE ’168 (LFFP body) patents. For example, claim | of the
"111 patent is directed to a LFFP having a pushbutton
designed to avoid inadvertent activation during handling of
the camera:
1. A lens-fitted photographic film unit containing a
photographic film and being adapted to take photo-
graphs, comprising:
at least one plastic pushbutton formed integrally with
a wall of said film unit, only a portion of said pushbutton
being separated from said wall by a slit which surrounds
most but not all of said pushbutton, said pushbutton
being connected to said film unit by an integral bridge,
said pushbutton being adapted to be depressed inwardly
of the wall from an initial position and to move back
outwardly to said initial position when released;
and a barrier formed on an outer surface of said wall
surrounding said pushbutton only partially, said barrier
projecting outwardly relative to an actuating surface of
said pushbutton when said pushbutton is in said initial
position, said barrier terminating in two ends disposed
on opposite sides of said bridge.
The ruling of reconstruction as to these patents is incorrect,
because the remanufacturing processes simply reuse the
original components, such that there is no issue of replacing
parts that were separately patented. If the claimed com-
ponent is not replaced, but simply is reused, this component is
neither repaired nor reconstructed.
License
Fuji alternatively contends that the right to repair the
patented cameras is impliedly limited by the circumstances of
19a
sale, pointing to the instructions and warnings printed on the
covers of the LFFPs, and arguing that these constituted a
license limited to a single use. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709, 24 USPQ2d 1173, 1180
(Fed.Cir.1992) (the conditions of sale of a “single-use”
medical device may contractually restrict further use). The
administrative law judge found that:
A Fuji flash QuickSnap single use camera is in a box
and each of the box and the outer cardboard cover of the
camera has statements instructing the purchaser to not
remove the film and return the camera to the
photoprocessor and further cautioning the purchaser
about the risk of electrical shock if opened by the
purchaser. . . . [The packaging also] instructs the
purchaser that the single use camera will not be returned
to the purchaser after processing. Similar notations are
on [other cameras].
Initial Determination at 141.
A license is governed by the laws of contract. See McCoy
v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920, 36 USPQ2d
1289, 1291 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“Whether express or implied, a
license is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state
contract law.”). It was undisputed that no express conditions
of sale, license terms or restrictions attended the sale of
these cameras. There was no express contractual under-
taking by the purchaser. The administrative judge observed
that any issue of implied contract or license was-mooted by
the finding of infringement based on reconstruction, see
Initial Determination at 165, and made no findings on the
issues of contract or license.
Determinations of express or implied license or contract
are matters of law. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Un-
limited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 USPQ 474, 476
(Fed.Cir.1986). As stated in Hewlett-Packard, “A seller’s
intent, unless embodied in an enforceable contract, does not
20a
create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell, or
modify a patented product as long as a reconstruction of the
patented combination is avoided.” 123 F.3d at 1453, 43
USPQ2d at 1658. We do not discern an enforceable restric-
tion on the reuse of these cameras based on the package
statements. These statements are instructions and warnings of
risk, not mutual promises or a condition placed upon the sale.
See id. at 1447-48, 1453, 123 F.3d 1445, 43 USPQ2d at 1652-
53, 1657 (refusing implicit limit on modification of cartridges
designed to be non-refillable and sold with instructions
warning against reuse or refilling); Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at
1576, 38 USPQ2d at 1922 (holding that instruction meant to
ensure product safety and efficiency did not have contractual
significance).
These package instructions are not in the form of a
contractual agreement by the purchaser to limit reuse of the
cameras. There was no showing of a “meeting of the minds”
whereby the purchaser, and those obtaining the purchaser’s
discarded camera, may be deemed to have breached a
contract or violated a license limited to a single use of the
camera. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417,
424, 116 S.Ct. 981, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996) (“An agreement
implied in fact is ‘founded upon a meeting of minds, which,
although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a
fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.’”’)
(quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 592, 58 Ct.Cl. 709, 43 S.Ct. 425, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1923)).
We conclude that no license limitation may be implied from
the circumstances of sale.
The Process Patent
The °649 patent ciaims two methods for loading LFFPs
with film and a film cartridge. In the method of claim 1, the
film is wound from the cartridge onto a roll in a darkroom;
both the film roll and the empty cartridge are then inserted
2la
into the LFFP and the casing is sealed. In the method of
claim 9, a film cartridge is placed in the LFFP and the film
leader is attached to a spool in the unexposed film chamber;
the casing-is then sealed, and an external apparatus winds the
film into the unexposed film chamber. The administra-
tive law judge found that the procedures of reloading film
into the LFFP shells, in the overseas operations for which
evidence was provided, infringed claims | and 9 of the
649 patent.
The defense of repair is applicable to process claims, as
well as to apparatus claims, when the patented process was
used in the United States and the patent right has been
exhausted for the articles produced thereby. Cf Hewlett-
Packard, 123 F.3d at 1455, 43 USPQ2d at 1659 (“When a
patentee sells a device without condition, it parts with the
right to enforce any patent that the parties might reasonably
have contemplated would interfere with the use of the
purchased device.”) Thus when the same process was used,
the patent right for that process was exhausted upon the
LFFP’s first sale in the United States. Again, however, for
respondents who refused to provide evidence to show the
methods they were practicing, we have no basis on which to
reverse the Commission’s judgment. -
Summary
The Commission’s ruling of reconstruction was based on
the acknowledged general activities of the remanufacturers,
and thus did not require evidence of whether any specific
additional procedures were performed, for such evidence
would not have affected the Commission’s ruling. How-
ever, a ruling of repair can not be open-ended, for there is
undoubtedly a stage at which permissible repair becomes
prohibited reconstruction. We can not exculpate unknown
22a
processes from the charge of infringing reconstruction.’ Thus
our reversal of the Commission’s decision does not apply to
LFFPs from those remanufacturing facilities for which
discovery was refused or where the evidence offered was
found incomplete or not credible by the ALJ. For those
respondents’ activities that were shown to be limited to those
steps considered by the ALJ, as set forth in the Initial
Determination at 108-109, see supra, and affirmed by the
Commission, we conclude that these activities constitute
permissible repair. For those respondents who refused to
provide discovery or access, or proffered incomplete or
“bench” evidence (a partial display created for litigation
purposes), or presented testimony that the ALJ found to be
not credible or inadequate, it can not be determined from the
record whether their remanufacturing activities are limited to
those considered by the ALJ and on which our ruling of
permissible repair is based. For those respondents, the rec-
ord contains insufficient basis on which to reverse the
Commission’s rulings.
Validity and Enforceability of the 649 Patent
The only patent whose validity or enforceability was
challenged is the ’649 process patent. The appellants argue
that a combination of the reference of Prontor-Werk with
either the Voightlander or Kodak reference renders the ’649
claims invalid on the ground of obviousness. These
references had not been cited in prosecution of the °649
patent, but had been cited in the ’400 patent in suit, and in
another Fuji patent that is not in suit. The ALJ found that
references containing the same teachings as the Prontor-
Werk, Voightlander, and Kodak references were before the
examiner of the ’649 patent. Substantial evidence supports
these findings.
> We take note that one of the original respondents admitted that it was
building new LFFP cameras in China. These imported cameras were held
‘to infringe, and are not part of this appeal.
23a
The ALJ found that there was no suggestion in the prior art
to combine these references to produce the °649 process.
Thus the ALJ ruled, and the Commission agreed, that
the combination of these references did not render obvious
the claimed process. No error in this ruling has been
demonstrated. The ruling that invalidity of the ’649 patent
was not shown is affirmed.
The appellants also argue that the administrative law judge
erred in not holding the ’649 patent unenforceable for
inequitable conduct, stating that the patentee should have
cited these references to the examiner since they were cited in
other patent applications. However, failure to cite cumu-
lative references is not inequitable conduct. The ALJ found
that the subject matter contained in these references was
before the patent examiner in a cited Netherlands patent and
Japanese publication. References cumulative to cited
references do not raise issues of withholding of material prior
art. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 1014-15
(Fed.Cir.1991); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845
F.2d 981, 992, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1609 (Fed.Cir.1988).
The administrative law judge found that the respondents
had “provided no testimony that Fuji or its attorneys
prosecuting the 649 application had any intent to-deceive and
the record is devoid of any such evidence.” The appellants
have not directed us to error in this finding. The simple
absence of a reference from the prosecution record does not
prove deceptive intent; there must be evidence sufficient to
show, clearly and convincingly, the intent to withhold
material information in order to deceive or mislead the
examiner. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 9 USPQ2d 1384, 1389
(Fed.Cir.1988) (en banc) (“Inequitable conduct resides in
failure to disclose material information . . . with an intent to
deceive. ...”).
24a
The findings on the issues of materiality and intent are
supported by substantial evidence, and are affirmed. The
Commission’s ruling that inequitable conduct was not
established is affirmed.
Design Patents
The patented designs depict the exterior shape of the
camera. Figure | from the D ’750 design patent is
illustrative:
FiG. 1
The exterior design is unaffected by the “remanufacturing”
process; it remains in its original form in the outer box and
plastic structure of the LFFP. The respondents do not dispute
that their cameras have the same design as the original
cameras; indeed, their argument is that their cameras are the
original cameras, repaired for reuse.
For original cameras that have been permissibly repaired,
the principle of exhaustion applies to the design patents as
well as to the utility patents. The design patent right, like all
patent rights, is exhausted by unrestricted first sale in the
United States, and is not infringed by the importation and
resale of the repaired articles in their original design. The
- —_— Pe
25a
judgment of infringement of the design patents is reversed,
for those cameras for which the United States patent right was
exhausted as discussed herein.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of patent infringement is reversed with
respect to LFFPs for which the patent right was exhausted by
first sale in the Unite 1 States, and that were permissibly
repaired. Permissible repair is limited, as discussed herein, to
the steps of removing the cardboard cover, cutting open the
casing, inserting new film and film container, resetting the
film counter, resealing the casing, and placing the device in a
new cardboard cover. Included in permissible repair is
replacement of the battery in flash cameras and the winding
wheel in the cameras that so require. For these products the
Commission’s orders are vacated.
LFFPs whose prior sale was not in the United States, or
LFFPs remanufactured by procedures more extensive than
those we hold to constitute repair, or whose remanufacturing
procedures were withheld or insufficiently disclosed to the
Commission, remain subject to the Commission’s orders. For
these products the Commission’s orders are affirmed.
Any further proceedings in implementation of our decision
shall be taken to the Commission. By motions recently filed,
Fuji has asserted circumventions of the Commission’s orders;
this matter is appropriately considered by the Commission
on remand. In addition, Dynatec states that it has sold its
business, although no formal notice of substitution was
provided. Our ruling applies only to the entities who have
placed themselves before us.
This court’s stay of the Commission’s orders is lifted.
The parties shall bear their costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED); STAY LIFTED.
26a
APPENDIX B
PUBLIC VERSION
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20436
[Filed June 28, 1999]
Inv. No. 337-TA-406
In the Matter of
CERTAIN LENS-FITTED FILM PACKAGES
COMMISSION OPINION
INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 1999, the presiding administrative judge
(ALJ) issued his final initial determination (ID) in the above-
captioned investigation. He found a violation of section 337
by 26 respondents in the importation and sale of lens-fitted
film packages (LFFPs), products more commonly known as
disposable, or single use cameras. He found that each
respondent infringed six or more of the claims of the 12
utility patents at issue, but that complainant had failed to
carry its burden in proving that respondents had infringed the
three design patents at issue.
On April 19, 1999, the Commission determined to review
portions of the ID. Specifically, the Commission determined
to review (1) the standard of proof applied by the ALJ in
deciding whether respondents had engaged in infringing
reconstruction rather than permissible repair, (2) the ALJ’s
determination that complainant had failed to carry its bur-
den in proving design patent infringement, and (3) the
Ley a ee
27a
ALJ’s determination on utility patent infringement insofar
as necessary to correct certain clerical errors in the ID’s
infringement findings and conclusions of law. 64 Fed. Reg.
20324 (April 26, 1999). The Commission also requested and
received written submission on the issues of remedy, the
public interest, and bonding.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
A. The Products
The products at issue in this investigation are inexpensive,
disposable, single use cameras, technically referred to as
“lens-fitted film packages” or “LFFPs.” LFFPs are generally
constructed of a shell made of a plastic material such as
polystyrene. They are equipped with a button-activated
shutter, a lens, a viewfinder, a film advance mechanism, and
optional flash units and buttons. An outer cardboard cover,
containing printed information such as branding and instruc-
tions, encases the shell. LFFPs are preloaded with film and a
film cartridge. When pictures are taken, the exposed film
winds into the film cartridge. After taking pictures, a typical
consumer brings the entire LFFP to a film processor to have |
the film developed and receives back only negatives and
prints, not the LFFP shel! and its contents.
Two broad categories of cameras were at issue in this
investigation: (1) newly-manufactured LFFPs made by re-
spondent Achiever Industries Limited (Achiever), an entity
located in Hong Kong, and imported by respondent P.S.lI.
Industries, (PSI); and (2) “remanufactured” LFFPs supplied
by several Asian firms and imported by domestic respondents
other than PSI. The remanufactured LFFPs are made using
LFFP shells that were manufactured by Fuji or its licensees,
Eastman Kodak Company and Konica Corporation, and
obtained from film processors after the original film was
developed.
i
28a
B. Procedural History
This investigation was instituted on March 25, 1998, based
on a complaint by Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. (Fuji) of Tokyo,
Japan. 63 Fed. Reg. 14474. Fuji’s complaint alleged unfair
acts in violation of section 337 in the importation and sale of
certain LFFPs. The complaint alleged that 27 respondents
had infringed one or more claims of 15 patents held by Fuji,
viZ.—
(1) claims 1, 5, 6, 9, or 11 of U.S. Letters Patent
4,833,495 (the ’495 patent);
(2) claims 14 or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,855,774 (the
°774 patent);
(3) claims 1, 7, 8, or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,884,087
(the ’087 patent);
(4) claims 1, 19, and 22 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,954,857
(the ’857 patent);
(5) claims 1 or 9 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,972,649 (the
649 patent); ;
(6) claims 14 or 16 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,063,400 (the
400 patent);
(7) claims 1 or 11 or U.S. Letters Patent 5,235,364 (the
°364 patent);
(8) claim 1 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,361,111 (the ’111
patent);
(9) claims 1, 15, 23, or 25 of US. Letters Patent
5,381,200 (the ’200 patent);
(10) claims 1 or 7 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,408,288 (the
°288 patent);
(11) claims 1 or 28 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,436,685 (the
’685 patent);
29a
(12) claims 1 or 13 of U.S. Letters Patent Re 34,168 (the
Re ’168 patent);
(13) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 345,750 (the
D’750 patent);
(14) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 356,101 (the
D’101 patent); and
(15) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 372,722 (the
D’722 patent).
The Commission determined to institute an investigation of
Fuji’s complaint and referred the complaint to an ALJ for an
evidentiary hearing, the issuance of an ID on violation, and a
recommended determination (RD) on remedy and bonding.
On October 23, 1998, the Commission determined that
eight respondents (Boshi Technology Ltd., Fast Shot, Haichi
International, Innovative Trading Company, Labelle Time,
Inc., Linfa Photographic Ind. Co. Ltd., Forcecam, Inc., and
Rino Trading Co. Ltd.) were in default for failure to respond
to the complaint and notice of investigation. An evidentiary
hearing was held November 2-13, 1998. Ten respondents
that had filed responses to the complaint and notice of
investigation (Ad-Tek Specialties Inc., AmerImage, Inc,
d/b/a/_ Rainbow Products, Boecks Camera LLC, BPS
Marketing, E.T. Trading d/b/a Klikit, Penmax, Inc. PhilmEx
Photographic Film, T.D.A. Trading Corp., Vantage Sales,
Inc., and Vivitar Corp.) failed to appear at the hearing.
Eight respondents (the participating respondents) appeared
at the evidentiary hearing, viz., Achiever, Argus Industries
(Argus), China Film Equipment (China Film), Dynatec Inter-
national Inc. (Dynatec), Jazz Photo Corp. (Jazz), OptiColor
Camera (OptiColor), P.S.I., and Sakar International, Inc.
(Sakar). On December 4, 1998, the Commission deter-
~ mined not to review an ID granting complainant Fuji’s oral
motion to withdraw claim 16 of the °400 patent from: the
investigation. 63 Fed. Reg. 67918 (Dec. 9, 1998).
30a
On February 24, 1999, the ALJ issued his final ID, finding
a violation of section 337 by 26 of the 27 named
respondents.' The ALJ also issued his RD on remedy and
bonding.” Petitions for review of the ID were filed by
complainant Fuji, the Commission investigative attorney
(IA), and the participating respondents. On April 19, 1999,
the Commission determined to review the issues of (1)
whether the ALJ had applied the proper standard for the
burden of proof on the repair/reconstruction issue, (2)
whether the ALJ had correctly determined the issue of design
patent infringement, and (3) other infringement issues insofar
as necessary to make certain technical corrections. 64 Fed.
Reg. 20324 (April 26, 1999). The remainder of the ID
became the Commission’s determination pursuant to Com-
mission rule 210.42(h), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h). The Commis-
sion requested and received written submissions on the issues
of remedy, the public interest and bonding.
IV. Violation Issues Under Review
A. Standard of Proof on the Repair/Reconstruction Issue
1. The ID
The ID stated at page 96:
The doctrine of permissible repair is an affirmative
defense, see Dana Corporation v. American Precision
Company, 827 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The
party asserting an affirmative defense must prove the
facts that establish that defense by clear and convincing
evidence, see RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Says.,
Inc. 221 USPO 385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
Symbols Tachs v. Option, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1580
'Fuji admitted at closing argument that one named respondent,
Opticam Inc, was not violating section 337.
? The ALJ issued his RD on remedy and bonding under Commission
rule 210.42(a)(1)(ii), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(a)(i (ii), as part of his final ID.
3la
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus respondents involved in the
alleged “remanufacture” have the burden to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that their actions
are a permissible repair rather than an impermissible
reconstruction.?
In holding respondents to the standard of clear and
convincing evidence in order to show permissible repair, the
ALJ relied on two cases, RCA Corp. and Symbols Tachs, that
involved the affirmative defense of patent invalidity.
Because of the statutory presumption of validity contained in
35 U.S.C. § 282, the facts establishing the affirmative defense
of invalidity must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. S.S.1.H. SA v. USITC, 718 F.2d 365, 375. How-
ever, we are aware of no cases that impose the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof in license defense
cases. To the contrary, Technical Development Corp. v.
United States, 597 F.2d 733, 746 (Ct. Cl. 1979), holds that an
infringer bears the burden of proving a license defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we determine
that respondents were required to carry their burden by a
preponderance of the evidence.
The ALJ, however, did not rule against respondents merely
because they had failed to carry their burden of proof on
permissible repair. Rather, the ID contains detailed findings
on the activities of some of the remanufacturing respondents’
suppliers, and concluded that those respondents “are effec-
tively recreating the patented single use camera of complain-
ant and its licensees, and hence are involved in impermissible
reconstruction.” ID at 164. Thus, the ALJ affirmatively
found that those respondents were engaged in impermissible
reconstruction of a patented good. He found that the other
remanufacturing respondents were infringing Fuji’s patents
because they obtained their LFFPs from factories where Fuji
> The ID repeated this standard at page 164.
32a
was not allowed to inspect their remanufacturing processes.
ID at 133. Since there was insufficient information in the
record about the processes employed by their suppliers, id.,
those respondents failed to carry their burden of proof,
regardless of the standard of proof that was imposed.
Accordingly, we determine that application of the correct
standard of proof to the ALJ’s findings does not affect his
conclusions on the repair/reconstruction issue.*
-~
B. Infringement of Design Patents
1. The ID
The ALJ found that Fuji had not sustained its burden of
establishing that the three design patents in issue are infringed
by respondents. ID at 81. His determination was based on
(1) his interpretation of the case law to require evidence from
someone other than an expert, and (2) the fact that the
accused LFFPs are sold with outer cardboard covers that in
some instances have a private label, and in other instances
identify the source. /d. He found it significant that the
purchaser never removes the outer cardboard cover. /d.
The ALJ acknowledged the testimony of Fuji’s expert, Mr.
Bellows, who compared the ornamental design illustrations of
the D’750 patent with a sample of the imported Type 1 LFFP
without flash, and found them to be substantially identical.°
He compared the ornamental design illustrations of D ’101
with samples of the Type | LFFPs with flash, and found them
* The Commission did not review the ALJ’s findings and conclusions
of law on the repair/reconstruction issue. Hence, the ALJ’s findings and
conclusions of law on that issue became part of the Commission’s final
determination under Commission rule 210.42(h), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h).
* There were many models of accused LFFPs in this investigation. The
remanufactured models that use Fuji shells were referred to as Types 1-5.
LFFP Type 6 were newly-manufactured by respondent Achiever. LFFP
Types 7 and 7A were remanufactured using Kodak shells, and LFFP
Types 8 and 8A were remanufactured using Konica shells.
33a
to be substantially identical. Mr. Bellows also compared the
ornamental design illustrations of the D’722 patent with
samples of the imported Type 4 LFFPs with flash and found
them to be substantially identical. Mr. Bellows concluded
that the Type | LFFPs with flash of respondents Ad-Tek, Fast
Shot, and Linfa are substantially identical to the claim of the
D’101 patent; and that the Type 4 LFFPs with flash of
respondents Boecks, China Film, Dynatec, Forcecam, Jazz,
Klikit, OptiColor, Penmax, PhilmEx, Rino, and Sakar are
substantially identical to the claim of the D’722 patent. Mr.
Bellows testified that he compared the ornamental design
illustrations of D’750 with a sample of the Type | LFFP
without flash, and found them to be substantially identical.
ID at 80.
The ALJ correctly state? that, under ODDzOn Products,
Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.2d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
design patent infringement is a question of fact that the patent
holder must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. He
also noted that the requisite similarity between the patented
design and the accused article is determined by the ordinary
observer test, which the Supreme Court first articulated over
a hundred years ago in Gorham M.G. Co. v. White, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) 511 (1872). He interpreted Gorham to hold that
identity cannot be tested through the eyes of an expert, but
must be tested by an “ordinary observer,” quoting:
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such
attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are
substantially the same, and if the resemblance is such as
to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase
one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is
infringed by the other. [81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528].
Thus, the ALJ interpreted Gorham to require that the
comparison between the accused and patented designs must
be made not by an expert, but by an ordinary observer. Since
Mr. Bellows was an expert in mechanical engineering,
34a
camera manufacturing, and camera design, the ALJ found
that he was not “an ordinary observer” and, therefore, that
Fuji failed to carry its evidentiary burden. ID at 81. 9
We believe that the ALJ erred in his interpretation of
Gorham M.G. Co. v. White. The Supreme Court stated
in Gorham:
Experts therefore are not the person to be deceived.
Much less than that which would be substantial identity
in their eyes would be indistinguishable in the eyes of
men generally, of observers of ordinary acuteness,
bringing to the examination of the article upon which the
design has been placed the degree of observation which
men of ordinary intelligence give. It is persons of the
latter class who are the principal purchasers of the
articles to which designs have given novel appearance,
and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is
not the article they suppose it to be . . . the patentees are
injured, and the advantage of the market that the patent
was granted to secure is destroyed.
Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wail.) at 528.
Thus, the Supreme Court did not state that expert testimony
cannot be usedto prove infringement, but rather that expert
testimony, which is a more exacting level of proof, is not
required to prove design patent infringement. Accordingly,
we determine that the burden of proof on design patent
infringement can be carried by expert testimony.
The analysis of design patent infringement first requires the
fact-finder to determine whether the patented design as a
whole is substantially similar in appearance to the accused
design. ODDzOn Prod. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.2d at
1405. Mr. Bellows testified that he reviewed the drawings of
the D’750, D’101, and D’722 patents and compared them to
the accused cameras, and determined that the designs were
substantially identical. His testimony was not challenged by
35a
respondents. Indeed, respondents have never disputed sub-
stantial similarity of design, either before the ALJ or in their
submissions to the Commission. To the contrary, respond-
ents’ counsel admitted on the record at the pretrial conference
that respondents were using Fuji LFFP shells that were
covered by the asserted design patents.°
—We have compared the accused LFFPs with the designs
claimed in the asserted design patents and have determined
that the accused Type | LFFPs with flash (e.g., CPX 173,
CPX 195, CPX 204) are substantially identical to the design
claimed in D’101, that the accused Type 4 LFFPs with flash
(e.g., CPX 186, CPX 187, CPX 188) are substantially
identical to the design claimed in D’722, and that Linfa (CX
266) and Vantage (CX 487C) sales brochures depict LFFPs
that are substantially identical to the design patent claimed in
D’750.’ See Avia Group Int’l. Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
853 F.2d 1557, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(affirming a trial court
holding that “one needs only to look at the two . . . [products ]
to see that infringement exists.”)
We also determine that, as a matter of law, respondents
cannot avoid infringement by affixing a different design or
logo to the cardboard cover of the LFFP or by packaging their
LFFP in an outer carton. Under L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
“{djesign patent infringement relates solely to a patented
design and does not require proof of unfair competition in the
marketplace [citation omitted], or allow avoidance of
infringement by labeling.” Furthermore, the drawings in the
D’101, D’722, and D’750 patents show that each of the
claimed designs consists of a rectangular body with certain
camera features (e.g., lens, viewfinder) in particular locations.
6 See Prehearing Tr. 130-35, 141-46 (November 2, 1998).
7? Commissioner Crawford did not base her determination on a
comparison of the accused LFFPs and the designs claimed in the asserted
Jesign patents.
36a
There is no feature in the patented designs that is not visible
in respondents’ reloaded Type | and Type 4 LFFPs, even
with the cardboard cover in place. Thus, the cardboard
covers on respondents’ LFFPs do not cover over the claimed
design.
Based on our own observation of the accused LFFPs, the
testimony of Mr. Bellows, and the failure of respondents to
contest the allegations of design patent infringement, we
determine that Fuji has carried its burden of proof in estab-
lishing infringement of its three design patents.® Accord-
ingly, we reverse the ALJ’s contrary finding.
C. Clarification of Certain Aspects of the ID
There were a few technical mistakes in the ID, which we
determine to correct on review. Based on the stipulation
between respondent Achiever, Fuji, and the IA,’ we find-that
Achiever Type 6 LFFPs infringe claim 15 of the ’087 patent.
We find no infringement of claim 16 of the ’400 patent, given
that Fuji withdrew claim 16 of the 400 patent from the
investigation during the evidentiary hearing.” Finally, we
find respondents Labelle and Innovative in violation of
section 337. The ALJ omitted making a conclusion of law
concerning whether these respondents, who had been found
in default, had violated section 337. The ALJ’s findings of
fact support a finding of violation, ID at pp. 218-19, 221-23,
FF 18, 27, 28, 33, 34, and we accordingly conclude that
Labelle and Innovative have violated section 337.
* Based on the testimony of Mr. Bellows and the failure of respondents
to contest the allegations of design patent infringement, Commissioner
Crawford determines that Fuji has carried its burden of proof.
* §X-1, p. 5,9 12
'° Notice of Commission Determination Not to Review an Initial
Determination Amending the Complaint and Notice of Investigation
(December 4, 1998).
37a
V. Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding
When the Commission finds a violation of section 337, as
it has here, it must consider the issues of remedy, the public
interest, and bonding. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), (f), and (j)(3).
A. Remedy
1. General Exclusion Order
The ALJ recommended that we issue a general exclusion
order in this investigation. We adopt that recommendation.!'
The Commission has long held that a general exclusion order
is appropriate when there is proof of (1) a widespread pattern
of unauthorized use of the patented invention, and (2) certain
business conditions from which one might reasonably infer
that foreign manufacturers other than respondents to the
investigation may attempt to enter the U.S. market with
infringing products. Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-90, USITC Pub.1199
at 17 (1981) (Spray Pumps). In 1994, statutory standards for
issuance of general exclusion orders were codified in section
337(d);- which provides:
(2) The authority of the Commission to order an
exclusion from entry of articles shall be limited to
persons determined by the Commission to be violating
this section unless the Commission determines that—
(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is
necessary to prevent circumvention of an exclusion
order limited to products of named persons; or
(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section
and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing
products.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see also Commission rule 210.50(c).
These statutory standards “do not differ significantly” from
the Spray Pumps standards. Certain Neodymium-Iron-Boron
'' We also adopt the ALJ’s findings in support of his recommendation.
38a
Magnets, Inv. No. 337-TA-372, Commission Opinion,
USITC Pub. No. 2964 at 5 (1996)(Magnets).
The Commission has established the following factors as
relevant in demonstrating whether there is a “widespread
pattern of unauthorized use”—
(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized impor-
tation into the United States of infringing articles by
numerous foreign manufacturers;
(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based
upon foreign patents which correspond to the domestic
patent at issue; and
(3) other evidence which demonstrates a history of
unauthorized foreign use of the patented invention.
Spray Pumps, USITC Pub. 1199 at 31-32.
Based on the record in this investigation, we determine that
there has been a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of
Fuji’s patents. There have been imports or sales by 26 of
the 27 respondents named in Fuji’s complaint. ID at 208,
FFs 6-53. Respondents identified over ten suppliers located
in Korea and China. ID at 208, FF 347, FF 348. In addition
to the 26 respondents in the business of importing, exporting,
or selling infringing LFFPs and the ten LFFP manufacturers
and remanufacturers in Korea and China, Fuji’s complaint
named an additional 16 companies believed to be in the
business of selling infringing LFFPs, but for which there was
insufficient evidence of importation for them to be named as
proposed respondents when the complaint was filed. ID at
209, FF 349, FF 351. The volume of imported infringing
products and the number of entities involved in importation
has increased greatly over the last few years. ID at 209, FF
352, FF 353. Moreover, it is often difficult to trace the origin
of the imported LFFPs because imported LFFPs often do not
identify the manufacturer on their packaging. ID at 209,
FF 350.
39a
The Commission has established the following factors as
relevant in establishing “certain business conditions” —
(1) an established market for the patented product in the
U.S. market and conditions of the world market;
(2) the availability of marketing and distribution net-
works in the United States for potential foreign
manufacturers;
(3) the cost to foreign entrepreneurs of building a
facility capable of producing the patented article;
(4) the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities
could be retooled to produce the patented article; and
(5) the cost to foreign manufacturers of retooling their
facility to produce the patented article.
Spray Pumps, USITC Pub. 1199 at 31-32.
In this investigation, substantial sales of LFFPs in the
United States clearly demonstrate an established market for
the patented product in the U.S. market, and in fact,
throughout the world. ID at 209, FF 337, FF 352, FF 354.
The success of respondents in distributing their LFFPs in the
premium and retail markets demonstrates the availability of
marketing and distribution networks in the United States for
potential foreign manufacturers. ID at 209, FF 352, FF 353.
Furthermore, we determine that additional LFFP remanufac-
turing facilities can be set up at minimal cost. ID at 209,
FF 355, FF 356.
We deny Fuji’s request that the general exclusion order
and/or cease and desist orders include a requirement that all
persons importing LFFPs into the United States who contend
that their products do not infringe the asserted claims of the
utility patents in issue be required to report this fact to the
Commission and to the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) at
the time of seeking entry, along with an analysis of why the
LFFPs sought to be imported do not infringe Fuji’s patents.
40a
Such a provision is unprecedented and may be beyond the
Commission’s authority under section 337, which authorizes
only the exclusion of imported products found in “violation
of this section,” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). In any case, Fuji has
not demonstrated a need for such a provision or explained
how it would benefit Fuji. In our view, requiring such
analyses would impose burdens on the Commission and
Customs that would likely outweigh any benefits to Fuji.
Customs can determine whether imported goods infringe
Fuji’s utility patents by disassembling the imported LFFPs. we
Our decision to issue cease and desist orders to a large
number of domestic respondents, which we discuss below,
will likely reduce the level of imports, and therefore diminish
the burden on Customs of disassembling and examining
imported LFFPs.
Fuji and the IA believe that it is appropriate for the
exclusion order to identify particular types of LFFPs found to
infringe Fuji’s claims as non-limiting examples of infringing
LFFPs. They have identified exhibits depicting diagrams of
LFFPs found to be infringing in this investigation, i.e.,
CX-742 through CX-748, CX-748A, and CX-749. We agree
that it would be helpful to Customs to have this information,
and therefore have attached these diagrams to the general
exclusion order. We emphasize, however, that the examples
are non-limiting and that LFFPs that infringe any of the
claims listed in the general exclusion order are covered by the
general exclusion order.
Fuji requests that the general exclusion order not be limited
to entries for consumption. It contends that even entries for
re-exportation, warehousing, or other purposes injure the
'? We note that Fuji, the IA, and respondents Achiever and PSI
stipulated that one cannot determine whether any claim of any utility
patent asserted by Fuji against respondents Achiever and PSI is or is not
infringed merely by examining the exterior of a camera made by
respondent Achiever in the form in which it is imported into the United
States. (SX-2)
4la
domestic industry, which exports millions of LFFPs per year
to foreign markets. In Certain Devices for Connecting
Computers Via Telephone Lines, Inv. No. 337-TA-360,
Commission Opinion at 11-12 (December 2, 1994), the
Commission determined that section 337 authorizes it to
exclude all types of entries, not just entries for consumption.
However, the Commission also determined that, because it
exercises its authority to exclude in “measured fashion,” it
would not exclude entries other than for consumption in most
cases. The Commission stated:
In future investigations, types of entry other than “entry
for consumption” may be restricted as appropriate in
light of the facts of a given case. A complainant that
seeks exclusion of other types of entry should present
evidence that activities by respondents involving other
types of entry either are adversely affecting it or are
likely to do so.
Id. at 13.
In this case, Fuji has made only generalized allegations of
possible injury to its foreign sales from entries for re-
exportation, transshipment, or other purposes, and has not
provided evidence of any particular adverse effect that is now
occurring or likely to occur in the future. Fuji has not
provided any information regarding the volume of these other
types of entries that are currently occurring or are likely to
occur once a general exclusion order is entered, and does not
identify any country in which its products are suffering from
competition from infringing products that have been shipped
via the United States. Since Fuji has failed to make an
adequate showing that the order should cover entries other
than for consumption, we deny its request.
Finally, Customs has indicated that a provision exempt-
ing LFFPs brought into the United States for personal use
would be important in avoiding potential problems in the
42a
administration of the general exclusion order.'’ Fuji supports
such an exemption.'" Accordingly, the general exclusion
order contains a provision exempting LFFPs brought into the
United States for personal use from coverage by the order.
2. Cease and Desist Orders
Section 337(f) permits the Commission to issue, in lieu of
or in addition to an exclusion order, a cease and desist order
directing persons found to have violated section 337 “to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair methods or acts
involved.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). Cease and desist orders are
warranted with respect to domestic respondents that maintain
commercially significant U.S. inventories of the infringing
product. See, e.g., Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Mono-
hydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC Pub. 2391 at 37-42
(June 1991) (Cefadroxil). Domestic respondents who have
defaulted are presumed to maintain significant inventories of
infringing products in the United States and are likewise
subject to cease and desist orders. Certain Agricultural
Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, Inv. No.
337-TA-380, USITC Pub. 3026 at 32, n.124 (March 1997)
(Tractors). Where respondents have failed to provide con-
trary information, the Commission infers the existence of
commercially significant inventories. Cefadroxil, USITC
Pub. 2391 at 41-42.
The ALJ found that in this investigation several respond-
ents, including at least Amerlmage, Argus, Boecks Camera,
BPS Marketing, China Film, Dynatec, Jazz, OptiColor,
Penmax, PhilmEx, PSI, Sakar, TDA, Vantage, and Vivitar,
provided information as to their inventory levels, all of which
he found to be commercially significant. ID at 210, CX-830.
The remaining respondents were either found in default or did
'S Letter from T. Spence Chubb of the Office of Unfair Import
~ Investigations to the Commission dated May 7, 1999.
'* Letter from Fuji’s counsel to the Commission, dated May 10, 1999.
ses 1A ate
ten te
ei aaa eam
43a
not supply contrary information. Accordingly, the ALJ
recommended that cease and desist orders be issued against
each of the domestic respondents.
Respondent Penmax asks that it not be subject to a cease
and desist order because it no longer has a commercially
significant inventory, having depleted its inventory during the
investigation. Penmax includes an affidavit from its presi-
dent, Mr. Yuan, which states that it has liquidated its stock of
unlicensed LFFPs, has no unlicensed inventory, and has
ceased buying any LFFPs that are not licensed by Fuji.'° The
Commission has traditionally issued cease and desist orders
during the period of Presidential review only to respondents
that have, or can be inferred to have, a commercially
significant inventory. Cefadroxil, USITC Pub. 2391 at 37-42.
We find that Penmax has made a credible showing that it has
no remaining inventory, and therefore will not issue a cease
and desist order against Penmax. Accordingly, we determine
to issue cease and desist orders against the following 20
domestic respondents: Ad-Tek, Argus, Boecks, BPS, Dyna-
tec, Fast Shot, Forcecam, Haichi, Innovative, Jazz, Klikit,
Labelle, OptiColor, PhilmEx, PSI, Rainbow, Sakar, TDA,
Vantage, and Vivitar. '°
'S Affidavit of Mr. Victor Yuan, President, Penmax, Inc., dated
May 5, 1999.
‘We adopt the findings made by the ALJ in support of his
recommendation regarding cease and desist orders.
Fuji’s complaint named an entity called Fast Shot at 7250 Harwill Dr..
Suite O, Houston, Texas 77036. On March 18, 1998, the Commission
served a copy of the complaint on an entity named Fast Shot by certified
mail at the address listed in the complaint. Although the Commission
received a signed return receipt for delivery of the complaint, it did not
receive a response to the complaint from an entity named Fast Shot.
Accordingly, on August 20, 1998, the ALJ issued an order to an entity
named Fast Shot directing it to show cause why it should not be found in
default. The show cause order was served by certified mail at the address
listed in the complaint. The Commission received a signed return receipt
44a
The cease and desist orders prohibit the twenty domestic
respondents from importing, selling, marketing, advertis-
ing, distributing, offering for sale, transferring (except for
exportation), or soliciting U.S. agents or distributors for
certain LFFPs, in violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The orders require
respondents to report the quantity in units and the value in
dollars of foreign-made LFFPs that they have imported and
sold in the United States during a one year reporting period,
and the quantity and value of covered LFFPS that remains in
inventory at the end of the reporting period. The report-
ing requirement continues in force until the respondent
has truthfully reported, in two consecutive timely filed
reports, that it has no inventory of covered LFFPS in the
United States.
B. REQUESTS FOR STAY OF THE COMMISSION’S
REMEDIAL ORDERS
The participating respondents asked that the Commission
stay any remedy order pending the outcome of the anticipated
appeal of the Commission’s determinations to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). Re-
for delivery of the show cause order, but no response to the order.
Accordingly, the Commission found an entity named Fast Shot in default
on October 23, 1998.
On May 6, 1999, the Commission received a letter from an entity
named Fastcam Enterprise Corp. at 7250 Harwin Dr., Suite N, Houston,
Texas 77036, stating that it believes it may be the same entity referred to
as Fast Shot in Fuji’s complaint. While the name and address for Fastcam
and Fast Shot are similar, Fastcam was not named in the complaint and
was not properly served with the complaint or the show cause order->
Since the Commission strictly adheres to proper procedures before
holding an entity in default, we did not find Fastcam in default or issue a
cease and desist order to Fastcam. Nevertheless, since an entity named
Fast Shot was properly found in default, the Commission determined to
issue a cease and desist order to an entity named Fast Shot at 7250
Harwill Dr., Suite O, Houston, Texas 77036.
on er oe eV) | Par ee ee eS
2 te) As
4Sa
spondents Jazz and Dynatec argue that a stay is justified
under Standard Havens Products Inc. v. Gencor Industries,
Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512 (Fed.Cir. 1990). Respondents Argus,
China Film, and Sakar do not rely on the Standard Havens
analysis but simply contend that the Commission should
allow importation and market presence by the remanu-
facturers “until and unless the appellate court(s) determine in
favor of any wholesale removal of” the remanufactured
LFFPs."’ Respondent PSI requests “temporary relief’ from
any cease and desist order for a period of six months so that it
can dispose of its inventory. In its reply submission,
OptiColor joined in PSI’s request for a temporary stay.
Under Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit considers the
following factors in determining whether to stay a remedial
order pending appeal: (1) whether the stay applicant has made
a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a
stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure
the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where
the public interest lies. While all factors must be considered,
they need not be given equal weight. Jd. The Commission
has the authority to stay its remedial orders under 5 U.S.C.
§ 705. The Commission has adopted the basic framework set
forth in Standard Havens for considering whether to stay the
effectiveness of its orders. Certain Agricultural Tractors
Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, Inv. No. 337-
TA-380, Commission Opinion Denying Respondent's Petition
for Reconsideration and Motion for Relief Pending Appeal at
9-10 (April 24, 1997) (Tractors Opinion Denying Motion for
'” The arguments of Argus, China Film, and Sakar on remedy, the
public interest, and bonding are based upon the proposition that the
Commission erred in adopting the ALJ’s determination that the
respondent remanufacturers’ activities constituted impermissible recon-
struction rather than permissible repair. Respondents made these
arguments in their petitions for review, and we find them no more
persuasive now.
46a
Relief Pending Appeal). However, rather than requiring a
showing of likelihood of success on appeal, the Commission
determined that it need only find that it has ruled on “an
admittedly difficult legal question.” /d. at 10.
Jazz argues that it has demonstrated a strong likelihood of
success on the merits in its petition for review of the ID
where it pointed out errors it believes were made by the ALJ
in deciding the repair/reconstruction issue. Dynatec submits
that the likelihood of success factor supports and justifies a
stay because the repair/reconstruction issue is an issue of law
that the Federal Circuit will review de novo, and because
“when harm to the applicant is great enough, a court will not
require a ‘strong showing’ that the applicant is ‘likely to
succeed on the merits.’” Standard Havens, 897 F.2d at 513.
Only Jazz contends that it will be irreparably harmed
unless the Commission stays its remedial orders pending
appeal, arguing that if the exclusion order is not stayed, its
business is likely to become “extinct.” It notes that in
Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit found that a movant
demonstrates irreparable harm where enforcement of an order
pending appeal would result in employee layoffs, immediate
insolvency, and possible extinction> Standard Havens, 897
F.2d at 515.
Jazz argues that the harm to Fuji if a stay were granted
cannot be considered irreparable since Fuji’s own witnesses
testified that Fuji has been aware of the reloading activity
since the early 1990s. Given that fact, Jazz argues that a
stay pending appeal would not substantialiy harm Fuji.
Respondent Dynatech similarly submits that a stay is justified
in this case because Fuji admitted that it knew that its
cameras were being reloaded years ago. Since Fuji delayed
for years before bringing this action, and allowed the
reloading industry to grow, Dynatech argues, Fuji should not
be heard to complain that the period of appeal will result in
any significant prejudice.
SS
47a
OptiColor’s submission on remedy argues that there would
be no significant injury to Fuji if the orders are not imposed
before Federal Circuit review of the Commission’s deter-
mination and that Fuji’s own conduct is incompatible with
any claim that it will be significantly harmed if the sale of
recycled LFFPs is not immediately halted. OptiColor states
that Fuji has watched the recycled LFFP industry grow to
major size and significance since 1992, but took no legal
action to stop it until 1998. OptiColor observes that since the
reloading industry began, there has been steady growth in the
volume of recycled LFFPs, [ ].
Jazz argues that the public has become accustomed to a
choice between new LFFPs and lower-priced used LFFPs,
both of which have been available for nearly ten years. It
contends that since Fuji allowed the remanufacturing to go on
for so long, thousands of U.S. jobs are at stake. Thus, Jazz
contends that the public interest will be harmed by excluding
the remanufactured LFFPs before the Federal Circuit can
consider the issue on the merits. It also argues that the public
interest in preserving the environment is served by allowing
the remanufacturers to continue to recycle used LFFPS.
Dynatech argues that the public interest is served by allowing
consumers an opportunity to purchase legally repaired items.
We deny respondents’ requests for a stay of the Com-
mission’s remedial orders pending appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Such a stay would be unprecedented and unwar-
ranted under the Standard Havens analysis, which the
Commission adopted in Tractors. Respondents have failed to
demonstrate that there is “an admittedly difficult legal
question” involved in this investigation. As indicated by the
Commission’s decision not to review the ALJ’s finding on
the repair/reconstruction issue, we believe that the ALJ’s
decision on that issue is correct. The ALJ’s determination on
repair/reconstruction is based on two leading decisions by the
Federal Circuit, Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Company, 121
48a
F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, US. _, 118
S.Ct. 1337 (1998); Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type, 123
F.3d 1445, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, US. _,
118 S.Ct. 1304 (1998). Those cases, as well as earlier
Supreme Court precedent, were considered by the ALJ who
found that the facts of this investigation are more closely
akin to reconstruction cases like Sandvik than to repair cases
like Hewlett-Packard. Although resolution of the repair/
reconstruction issue presents a question of law that the
Federal Circuit will review de novo, Sandvik, 121 F.3d at
672, its resolution is highly dependent on the facts of the
particular case.
As for the irreparable harm factor, only Jazz contended that
it would be irreparably harmed, absent a stay pending appeal.
However, Jazz cited no evidence to support its assertion that
it would become “extinct” during the appeal process. While
Jazz clainis that thousands of jobs will be lost, it has cited no
evidence to support its statement. We note that the imported
LFFPs are manufactured or remanufactured in Asia and that
the domestic respondents’ sales and warehousing operations
require relatively few employees. Moreover, the domestic
respondents may be able to continue their operations, if they
wish, with non-infringing goods.
Opticolor’s submission [ ]. Fuji has
suffered the loss of these sales, and has also suffered from
price erosion caused by respondents’ lower-priced LFFPs.
We reject respondents’ argument that a stay will not cause
significant harm to Fuji because of Fuji’s purported delay in
seeking relief from imported LFFPs. Rather, Fuji will be
irreparably injured by a stay that denies its patents the full
term to which they are entitled. See Tractors Opinion Deny-
ing Motion for Relief Pending Appeal Tractors at 16 (“{a]
stay pending appeal prejudices the complainant by depriving
it, in this case potentially for a year or more, of the relief to
which it is statutorily entitled under section 337”).
49a
The public interest generally favors the protection of
intellectual property rights. /d. at 17 (citing and quoting from
S. Rep. No. 100-71 at 128-29 (1987)). The fact that a large
number of suppliers and dealers have been successful in the
businesses of importing and selling cheap, infringing remanu-
factured LFFPs does not outweigh the public interest in
protecting the intellectual property rights that are being
infringed by those goods. While respondents argue that
recycling activities benefit the public, their argument does not
compel a finding that the public policy favoring recycling
should override the public policy favoring protection of
intellectual property rights. In any case, Fuji and its licensees
recycle LFFP parts in the United States, and respondents fail
to explain why their suppliers’ recycling activities, which
take place in Asia, are more in keeping with the public
interest than the recycling efforts of Fuji and its licensees.
Furthermore, the remedial orders are directed to new
infringing LFFPs, as well as remanufactured LFFPs.
PSI asserts that the unique nature of its “Message Camera,”
which uses double image film to present messages such as
“Happy Birthday” along the bottoms of developed photo-
graphs, justifies a six month postponement in the enforcement
of the cease and desist order against its products. Because the
“Message Camera” is an occasional novelty item, most often
sold in speciality retail stores such as party and card stores,
PSI submits that it does not directly compete with Fuji’s or its
licensees’ traditional single-use cameras, and that allowing
PSI to deplete its current inventory will have a de minimis
effect on Fuji and its licensees. PSI maintains that its request
is fair given that there are other single use camera distributors
in the United States that were not named as respondents in
this investigation by Fuji, and therefore will not be subject to
specific cease and desist orders. It argues that continued sales
by such nonrespondent companies will more significantly
affect Fuji’s market share than any transitional depletion of
non-competing cameras by PSI.
50a
We reject PSI’s argument that its Message Camera does
not compete with Fuji’s products. As Fuji points out, if a
consumer buys a “Message Camera,” he is in fact choosing
not to buy a “traditional” single use camera. More impor-
tantly, allowing a transitional period to deplete inventory is
contrary to the Commission’s policy of issuing cease and
desist orders to prevent sales from inventory. Providing a
transitional period to deplete inventory may also encourage
respondents to import heavily during the period of Commis-
sion investigations. Respondents have been on notice since at
least the filing of the ALJ’s RD on February 24, 1999, that
the issuance of remedial orders was a distinct possibility.
Respondents could have taken protective steps to avoid
having large inventories. See Tractors Opinion Denying
Motion for Relief Pending Appeal Tractors, at 14 n.7.
C. The Public Interest
Under sections 337(d) and (f), the Commission must
provide a remedy if it has found a violation of section 337
unless, after considering the effect of any remedy on (1) the
public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the
U.S. economy, (3) the U.S. production of articles that are like
or directly competitive with those which are the subject of the
investigation, and (4) U.S. consumers, it finds that a remedy
should not be issued. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(e) and (f). There
have been only three investigations in which consideration of
the public interest factors has prevented issuance of a remedy.
The Commission denied relief in Certain Automatic Crankpin
Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 (1979),
because it found an overriding national policy in maintaining
and increasing the supply of fuel efficient automobiles and
that the domestic industry was unable to supply domestic
demand. In Certain Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes,
Inv. No. 37-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (1980), the Com-
mission denied relief because of the overriding public interest
in continuing basic atomic research with the imported
i
- Sla
acceleration tubes, which were deemed to be of higher quality
than the domestic industry’s product. In Certain Fluidized
Supporting Apparatus, Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, USITC
Pub. 1667 (1984), relief was denied because the domestic
producer could not supply demand for hospital beds for burn
patients within a reasonable time, and there were no
therapeutically comparable substitutes available.
We do not believe that respondents have raised any public
_interest concerns that should prevent the issuance of remedial
orders in this investigation. We do not find that the general
health and welfare are implicated in the distribution of
LFFPs, and there is no evidence that the U.S. demand for
LFFPs could not be supplied by Fuji or its licensees. The fact
that some retailers and consumers may have to pay a higher
price for LFFPs does not justify a determination that the
public interest in protecting intellectual property rights is in
any way outweighed. See, e.g., Certain Telecommunications
Chips, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-337, Comm’n Op. at 40-41,
USITC Pub. 2670 (August 1993); Cefadroxil at 40-41,
USITC Pub. 2391 at 46-47.
B. Bonding
Section 337(j) provides for the entry of infringing articles
and sales of such articles from inventory upon the payment of
a bond during the 60-day Presidential review period. The
bond is to be set at a level sufficient to “protect complainant
from any injury” during the Presidential review period.
19 U.S.C. § 1337). See also 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(a)(3)
(1998). The ALJ found that the compilation of price infor-
mation based on answers to interrogatories received from
respondents as of October 27, 1998 (CX-830), indicated that
the accused LFFPs have a wide price range. Evidence cited
by the ALJ supports his finding. ID at 212-213. The ALJ
found that, in view of the price variations, it was impossible
to calculate what level of bond based on price differentials
will protect complainant from any injury. Therefore, he
; 52a
recommended a bond of 100 percent of entered value, citing
Magnets, USITC Pub. No. 2964 at 15 (May 1996)(“[where] it
is impossible . . . to calculate what level of bond based on
price differentials will protect a complainant from any injury,
it is appropriate to issue a bond of 100 percent of entered
value . . . of the goods in question”). We adopt the ALJ’s
recommendation that bond during the period of Presidential
review be set at 100 percent of entered value as well as his
findings in support of his recommendation.
We reject respondents’ various proposals that the bond be a
lump sum payment based upon a royalty rate Fuji receives
from a particular licensee. We find that this royalty rate
would not protect Fuji from “any injury.” Moreover, since
the record contains adequate pricing information, we see no
reason to resort to royalty rates in setting the bond rate. Cf
Acid-Washed Denim Garments and Accessories, Inv. No.
337-TA-324 (1992) (bond rate based on royalty rate where
complainant did not object, and the record did not contain
adequate pricing information). In any case, a lump sum bond
is inappropriate where there is no way of knowing what the
volume of infringing importations and sales will be during the
60-day Presidential review period. We also reject Fuji’s
proposal that bond be set at 300 percent. That proposal is
apparently based on the lowest reported sales prices for
infringing LFFPs.
53a
APPENDIX C
PUBLIC VERSION
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C.
[Filed Mar. 23, 1999]
Investigation No. 337-TA-406
In the Matter of
CERTAIN LENS-FITTED FILM PACKAGES
[Cover Page; Abbreviations; Sections I-IV, VII, XII-XIII;
Additional Findings 4 1-5, 20-21, 29-31, 36-37, 54-78:
Conclusions of Law]
Final Initial and Recommended Determinations
Pursuant to the Notice of Investigation (63 Fed. Reg.
14474, 14475), this is the administrative law judge’s final
initial determination, under Commission rule 210.42. The
administrative law judge, after a review of the record
developed, finds that a violation of section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1337) by certain
respondents has occurred.
This is also the administrative law judge’s recommended
determination on remedy and _ bonding, pursuant to
Commission rule 210.42(a)(1)(ii). The administrative law
judge recommends that the Commission issue cease and
desist orders directed to certain domestic respondents and a
general exclusion order and further recommends a bond of
100% of entered value during Presidential review.
* * * *
ABr
ARBr
JOBr
JORBr
CBr
CFF
CRBr
FF
SBr
SRBr
DBr
DRBr
ACSBr
ACSRBr
PSIBr
SX
CX
CPX
RXPSI
54a
{from Final Initial and Recommended
Determinations pp. viii-x, 1-5]
ABBREVIATIONS
Respondent Achiever Post Hearing Brief
Respondent Achiever Post Hearing Rebuttal i.
Brief !
Respondents’ Jazz & OptiColor Posthearing
Brief
Respondents’ Jazz & OptiColor Rebuttal Brief
Complainant’s Posthearing Brief
Complainant’s Finding Of Fact
Complainant’s Posthearing Rebuttal Brief
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings Of Fact
Staff's Posthearing Brief
Staff's Rebuttal Posthearing Brief
Respondent Dynatec’s Posthearing Brief : :
Respondent Dynatec’s Posthearing Rebuttal
Brief
Respondents’ Argus, Sakar, and ChinaFilm Post
Hearing Brief
Respondents’ Argus, Sakar & ChinaFilm
Post Hearing Rebuttal Brief
Respondent PSI Post Hearing Brief
Staff Exhibit
Complainant Exhibit
Complainant Physical Exhibit
Respondent PSI Exhibit
RPXPSI
RXACH
RPXACH
ROCX
PROCX
RDYNA
RPDYNA
RJZX
RPJZX
Tr.
DFF
DOCFF
CORDFF
DOSFF
CRRDFF
AFF
AOCFF
RJOFF
(RJFF)
JORCFF
55a
Respondent PSI Physical Exhibit
Respondent Achiever Exhibit
Respondent Achiever Physical Exhibit
Respondent Opticolor Exhibit
Respondent Opticolor Physical Exhibit
Respondent Dynatec Exhibit
Respondent Dynatec Physical Exhibit
Respondent Jazz Exhibit
Respondent Jazz Physical Exhibit
Transcript Of Prehearing Conference, Hearing
And Closing Arguments
Respondent Dynatec’s Finding of Fact
Respondent Dynatec’s Objections to Complain-
ant’s Findings of Fact
Complainant Fuji’s Objections to Respondent
Dynatec’s Finding of Fact
Respondent Dynatec’s Objections to Staff
Findings of Fact
Complainant Fuji’s Rebuttal to Respondent
Dynatec’s Finding of Fact
Respondent Achiever’s Finding of Fact
Respondent Achiever’s Objections to Complain-
ant’s Finding of Fact
Respondents Jazz and OptiColor’s Finding of
Fact
Respondents Jazz & OptiColor’s Rebuttal to
Complainant’s Findings of Fact
S6a
CORJFF Complainant Fuji’s Objections to Respondent
Jazz and OptiColor’s Finding of Fact
JORSFF Respondent Jazz & OptiColor’s Rebutal to
Staff's Findings of Fact
CRRJFF Complainant Fuji’s Rebuttal to Respondent Jazz
and OptiColor’s Finding of Fact
RJCL Respondents Jazz and OptiColor’s Conclusions
of Law
RSFF Respondents Sakar, Argus and China Film’s
Finding of Fact
OPINION
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By notice of investigation, which issued on March 18,
1998 and was published in the Federal Register on March 25,
1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 14474, 14475), the Commission instituted
an investigation, pursuant to subsection (b) of section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, to determine whether
there is a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in
the importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation of certain lens-fitted film packages by reason of
infringement of certain claims of certain patents, and whether
there exists an industry in the United States as required by
subsection (a)(2) of section 337. The complaint was filed on
February 13, 1998, under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, on behalf of Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd.
(Fuji) of Tokyo, Japan. A supplement to the complaint was
filed on March 2, 1998.
Order No. 3, which issued on April 16, 1998, set a target
date of March 25, 1999. Order No. 11, which issued on
August 20, 1998, set a new target date of May 25, 1999.
57a
The claims in issue from fifteen patents owned by
complainant (FF 54) were identified ,in the notice of
investigation as follows:
(1) claims 1, 5, 6, 9, or 11 of U.S. Letters Patent
4,833,495 (the '495 patent);
(2) claims 14 or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,855,774 (the
774 patent);
(3) claims 1, 7, 8, or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,884,087
(the ’087 patent);
(4) claims 1, 19, and 22 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,954,857
(the ’857 patent);
(5) claims | or 9 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,972,649 (the
"649 patent);
(6) claims 14 or 16 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,063,400 (the
’400 patent); !
(7) claims | or 11 or U.S. Letters Patent 5,235,364 (the
*364 patent);
(8) claim | of U.S. Letters Patent 5,361,111 (the ’111
patent);
(9) claims 1, 15, 23, or-25 of U.S. Letters Patent
5,381,200 (the ’200 patent);
(i) claims | or 7 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,408,288 (the
*288 patent);
(11) claims | or 28 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,436,685 (the
"685 patent);
(12) claims | or 13 of U.S. Letters Patent Re 34,168 (the
Re *168 patent);
' Order No. 47 which issued on November 9, 1998 was an initial
determination which granted complainant's oral motion to withdraw claim
16 of the ’400 patent. By notice dated December 4, the Commission
determined not to review said initial determination.
58a
(13) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 345,750 (the
750 patent);
(14) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 356,101 (the
101 patent); or
(15) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 372,722 (the
°722 patent)
The respondents identified in the notice were the
following: Achiever Industries Limited (Achiever) of Hong
Kong; Ad-Tek Specialities Inc. (Ad-Tek) of California;
Amerlmage, Inc. d/b/a Rainbow Products (Rainbow) of
Florida, Argus Industries (Argus) of Illinois, Boecks Camera
LLC (Boecks) of California, Boshi Technology Ltd. (Boshi)
of Hong Kong, BPS Marketing (BPS) of Washington State,
China Film Equipment Corp. (China Film) of China,
Dynatec International, Inc. (Dynatec) of Utah, E.T.Trading,
Ltd. d/b/a Klikit (Klikit) of Brooklyn, New York, Fast Shot
(Fast Shot) of Texas, Forcecam, Inc. (Forcecam) of
California, Haichi International Inc. (Haichi) of New York,
Innovative Trading Co. (Innovative) of California, Jazz Photo
Corp. (Jazz) of New Jersey, Labelle Time, Inc. (Labelle) of
Florida, Linfa Photographic Ind. Co. Ltd. (Linfa) of Hong
Kong, Opticam Inc. (Opticam) of California”, OptiColor
Camera (OptiColor) of Washington State, Penmax, Inc.
(Penmax) of California, PhilmEx Photographic Film
(PhilmEx) of California, P.S.I. Industries, Inc. (PSI) of
Florida, Rino Trading Co., Ltd. (Rino) of Korea, Sakar
International, Inc. (Sakar) of New Jersey, T.D.A. Trading
Corp. (T.D.A.) of New York, Vantage Sales, Inc. (Vantage)
of Illinois, and Vivitar Corp. (Vivitar) of California.
? While Opticam is referred to in the notice of investigation and
complaint, complainant at closing argument (Tr. at 4073 to 4075)
admitted that Opticam is not violating section 337. As the notice
indicated, with the exception of Opticam, there are twenty one domestic
respondents of the twenty-six identified respondents.
59a
“The notice of investigation did not identify which
respondent is alleged to infringe which patent in issue.
Moreover while the notice identified fifteen patents in issue
and twenty-six respondents, excluding Opticam, the alle-
gations of complainant in the complaint were not coextensive
with each of the respondents. For example while the notice
identifies claims 1, 7, 8 or 15 of the ’087 patent to be in issue,
respondents Ad-Tek, AmerImage, Boecks, BSP, China Film,
Fast Shot, Forcecam, Innovative, Labelle, Linfa, Penmax,
PhilmEx, Rino, Sakar, T.D.A. and Vantage are alleged to
infringe only claims | and 8. Respondent PSI is alleged to
infringe only claims 1, 7 and 15. Respondents Achiever and
Vivitar are alleged to infringe only claims 7 and 15. Re-
spondents Argus, Boshi, Dynatec, E.T. Trading, Haichi, Jazz
and Opticolor are alleged to infringe claims 1, 7; 8 and 15.
Only respondents Achiever, Argus, China Film, Dynatec,
Jazz, OptiColor, PSI and Sakar participated in the hearing.
The following respondents, while not participating in the
hearing, did file a response to the complaint and notice of
investigation: Ad-Tek, Rainbow, Boecks, BPS, Klikit,
Penmax, PhilmEx, T.D.A., Vantage and Vivitar.
Respondents Boshi, Fast Shot, Haichi, Innovative, Labelle,
Linfa, Forcecam and Rino filed no response to the complaint
and notice of investigation. Order No. 23, which issued on
September 25, 1998, was an initial determination and found
Boshi, Fast Shot, Haichi, Innovative, Labelle and Linfa in
default pursuant to Commission rule 210.16. Order No. 24,
which also issued on September 25, found Forcecam and
Rino in default pursuant to Commission rule 210.16. On
October 23, the Commission determined not to review Order
Nos. 23 and 24.
The prehearing conference and hearing were conducted on
November 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, 1998.
Following the filing of post-hearing submissions, closing
arguments were heard on January 8, 1999.
60a
The matter is now ready for a decision.
These initial and recommended determinations are based
on the record compiled at the hearing and the exhibits
admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge has
also taken into account his observation of the witnesses who
appeared before him during the hearing. Proposed findings
submitted by the parties not herein adopted, in the form
submitted or in substance, are rejected as either not supported
by the evidence or as involving immaterial matter and/or as
irrelevant. The findings of fact included herein have
references to supporting evidence in the record. Such
references are intended to serve as guides to the testimony
and exhibits supporting the findings of fact. They do not
necessarily represent complete summaries of the evidence
supporting said findings.
Il. PRODUCTS IN ISSUE
The products in issue are single use cameras, also known
as “lens-fitted film packages” or “LFFPs.” (FF 1).? Single
use cameras are relatively inexpensive, disposable cameras
which are pre-loaded with film and a film cartridge so that
after use, all of the film has been advanced into the film
cartridge. (FF 1).
lll. PARTIES
See FF 6-53.
[V. IMPORTATION
Each of the respondents that appeared at the hearing
admitted importation of the accused LFFPs into the United
States. (SX-3). Also there is evidence that respondents are
involved in the importation of accused LFFPs into the United
> The terms “LFFP,” single use cameras and one-time-use cameras are
used interchangeably in the initial and recommended determinations.
6la
States. (See FF 6-53). Thus the Commission has in rem
jurisdiction. It also has in personam jurisdiction over at least
respondents Achiever, Argus, China Film, Dynatec, Jazz,
OptiColor, PSI and Sakar who participated at the hearing.
* ** * &
[from Final Initial and Recommended
Determinations pp. 95-165]
VII. Repair-Reconstruction Issue Involving Alleged “Re-
manufactured” Single Use Cameras
Respondents Jazz and OptiColor argued that the “most
important issue in this proceeding is the repair versus
reconstruction issue.” (JOBr at 2). Respondent Dynatec
argued that the “legal issue presented in this case focuses on a
determination as to whether Dynatec’s FunPack cameras are
repaired or reconstructed under governing legal authority.”
(DBr at 3). Respondents Argus, China Film and Sakar argued
that the “principal focus in this case is on recycled,
reconditioned lens-fitted film packages (‘LFFP’) devices sold
into national and international commerce.” (ACSBr at 3).°°
Thus respondents appearing at the hearing, with the exception
of respondent Achiever, have raised the defense of
permissible repair in response to complainant’s allegation of
infringement as to the “remanufactured” single use cameras.
The doctrine of permissible repair is an affirmative
defense, see Dana Corporation v. American Precision
Company, 827 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The party
asserting an affirmative defense must prove the facts that
establish that defense by clear and convincing evidence, see
* For PSI's reloaded SmileTime cameras, PSI adopts the arguments
and authorities “set forth by co-respondents in support of a determination
of non-infringement under the first sale doctrine and by virtue of
permissible repair.” (PSIBr at 1).
62a
RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q.
385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Symbols Techs v. Opticon,
Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus,
respondents involved in the alleged “remanufacture” have the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their
actions are a permissible repair rather than an impermissible
reconstruction.
Respondents Jazz and OptiColor argued, in support of their
affirmative defense of permissible repair, that Jazz and
OptiColor, as subsequent owners of the product, have an
implied license to use the product and that the implied license
includes the right to repair the patented product (JOBr at
24-31); that the evidence shows that the “reconditioning”
processes used by Jazz and OptiColor do not amount to a
second creation of a single use camera but rather shows that
the accused processes are a permissible repair; that a single
use camera has a useful life beyond one roll of film; that the
accused processes are simple, quick, and involve relatively
few steps; and that the nature and design of the single use
camera supports a finding that the actions of respondents
involved in the alleged “remanufacture” are a permissible
repair. (JOBr at 47-93). -
Respondent Dynatec, in support of its affirmative defense
of permissible repair, argued that complainant sold its single
use cameras without any contractual limitation and thus is
precluded from preventing the “legal repair” and subsequent
resale of the single use cameras (DBr at 7); that the single use
cameras have a useable life remaining after certain limited
elements are spent; that a finding of reconstruction cannot be
based upon a change in the patented combination’s
performance or capacity; that allegations of the low quality
condition of repaired products does not establish recon-
struction; that complainant has acknowledged the repair-
ability of its single use cameras; that Dynatec’s process of
disassembly, replacement, and modification of elements of a
63a
single use camera and subsequent reassembly constitutes
permissible repair; and that “remanufacturing” the previ-
ously used single use camera “according to the patentee’s
instructions or procedures” constitutes permissible repair.
(DBr at 7-39).*4
Respondents Argus, China Film and Sakar in support of the
affirmative defense of permissible repair argued that they
have an implied license to use the single use cameras and this
license includes the right to repair the single use camera
(ACSBr at 6); that their processes are inexpensive, efficient
and make no substantial changes to the single use camera;
and that their processes are a permissible repair rather than a
reconstruction. (ACSBr at 6-7).
Complainant argued that no respondent or its suppliers
have any license, express or implied, to do anything, much
less reconstruct the single use cameras (CBr 103-122); that
the nature of the actions of the respondents involved in the
alleged “remanufacture” support a finding that their processes
involve an impermissible reconstruction; that the nature of the
single use camera and how it was designed support a finding
that the alleged “remanufacture” is not a permissible repair;
that the fact that no market for spare parts for single use
cameras has developed supports the finding that the alleged
“remanufacture” is impermissible reconstruction; and that the
intent of complainant supports a finding that the alleged
“remanufacture” in issue is impermissible reconstruction of
the single use cameras. (CBr at 122-134).
** The term “according to the patentee’s instructions or procedures” is
in the subheading for section e (DBr at 16). The administrative law judge
finds nothing in section e (DBr at 16 to 20) which explains the phrase
“according to the patentee’s instructions or procedures.”
” Complainant is the owner by assignment of the patents in issue.
(FF 54).
64a
The staff argued that when complainant and its licensees
sell a single use camera, each end user acquires a license to
use the product until it is spent, and that the single use camera
is spent when the original roll of film is exposed (SBr at 48);
that the actions of the respondents involved in the alleged
“remanufacture” in reconditioning and reloading spent single
use cameras constitute the making of a new article, or
reconstruction, rather than the repair of an unspent article;
and that the fact that the complainant did not intend for its
products to be reloaded is a factor tending to prove that the
alleged “remanufacture” processes are infringing recon-
struction. (SBr at 46-55).
On August 12, 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Hewlett-
Packard Company v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil 123 F.3d 1445
(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998) )
(Hewlett). In Hewlett, the Court concluded that while there is .
no bright-line test for determining whether a modification is a
“reconstruction” sufficient to infringe a patent owned by the
seller of a product, the district court did not err in granting the
motion of the accused infringer Repeat-O-Type Stencil
(ROT) for summary judgement of non-infringement of
certain patents of Hewlett-Packard Company (HP). It found
that HP sold ink jet cartridges without condition or
restriction; that ROT lawfully purchased two types of HP
brand new ink jet cartridges model HP 516525A (known
within HP as the “Kukla” cartridge) and model HP 51608A
(known within HP as the “Stanley” cartridge) and
disregarding HP’s instructions the purchaser ROT modified
them; and that the modification was more akin to permissible
repair than to impermissible reconstruction. Hewlett 123 F.3d
at 1451, 1452, 1454.
On August 7, 1997, the Federal Circuit, five days prior to
its decision in Hewlett, decided Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J.
Company et. al 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert denied,
ns
65a
118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998) (Sandvik). The Court referred to a
number of factors to consider in determining whether a party
has made a “new” article. Those factors included
the nature of the actions by the alleged infringer;
b. the nature of the device and how it is designed
(namely, whether one of the components of the
patented combination has a shorter useful life than
the whole);
c. whether a market has developed to manufacture or
service “the part at issue”; and
d. objective evidence of the intent of the patentee.*°
Sandvik 121F.3d at 673. The Court concluded that, while
there is no bright line test for determining whether
reconstruction or repair has occurred, under “the totality of
the circumstances” and based on all the facts in the case the
alleged infringer E.J. Company (E.J .) had made a new article,
after the device in issue had become spent, i.e., E.J. was
reconstructing an otherwise spent device when “it retips
Sandvik’s drills” and accordingly that E.J. infringed the
patents in issue Sandvik 121 F.3d at 673, 674.
A. The Sandvik Factors
1. The Nature Of The Actions By The Infringers
_ In each of Hewlett and Sandvik, pertinent to the
conclusions of the Court was the claimed subject matter in
issue and the nature of the actions of the accused infringers.
In the repair-reconstruction portion of Hewlett, the Court
focused on U.S. Patent Nos. 4,827,294 (the ’294 patent)
and 4,931,811 (the ’811 patent). The °294 patent, entitled
*° In setting forth these factors the Court concluded that an analysis
under those factors would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
121 F.3d at 673.
66a
“Thermal Ink Jet Printhead Assembly Employing Beam Lead
Interconnect Circuit,” was directed to an “ink jet pen” (i.e., a
cartridge), which formed an improved electrical connection
between the printhead of the pen and the ink jet printer
carriage in which the pen is mounted.
Claim 3 of the ’294 patent, which was representative, read
as follows:
An ink jet pen including in combination:
(a) a pen body housing having an ink storage
compartment therein and an ink flow port adjacent one
surface thereof and further having outer surfaces thereof
and further having out surfaces which are contoured to
mate with adjacent surfaces of a pen carriage member,
(b) a thin film printhead mounted on said one surface of
said pen body housing and adjacent to said ink flow port
therein for receiving ink from said ink flow port during
an ink jet printing operating, and
(c) a flexible electrical circuit member including a
plurality of beam leads bonded at predetermined
locations on said thin film printhead for supplying
electrical power and signals thereto during an ink jet
printing operation, said flexible electrical circuit being
extended over one of said contoured outer surfaces of
said pen body housing and secured thereto, whereby
electrical conductors in a pen carriage are adapted to
mate with certain ones of the said been leads of said
flexible electrical circuit for supplying power and
electrical drive signals to said beam leads when said pen
body housing is mounted in said carriage.
The °811 patent, entitled “Thermal Ink Jet Pen Having A
Feedtube With Improved Sizing And Operational With A
Minimum Of Depriming,” was directed to an “ink jet pen”
that uses a “standpipe” to improve the connection between
67a
the ink reservoir and the printhead by preventing air bubbles
from impeding the flow of ink to the printhead.*’ Claim 2 of
the ’811 patent, which was representative, read as follows:
2. A thermal ink jet pen including an ink reservoir
therein, and a thin film printhead interconnected to said
reservoir by way of a standpipe, with said standpipe
having an air accumulating section at the ink receiving
end thereof and said thin film printhead including an
orifice plate with a plurality of orifi therein of a know
radius, r subnozzle characterized in that the minimum
acceptable radius, r, of said air accumulating section of
said standpipe satisfies the equation r/r/ subnozzle $100.
Hewlett, 123 F.d at 1447, 1448. The Court, for interpretation
of claim 3 of the ’294 patent and claim 2 of the ’81] patent,
made reference to the following diagram, from the ’811
patent:
[insert diagram]
The Court then stated that as illustrated in the above diagram
the pen body construction includes a pen body housing (10)
and a cap (28); that the pen body also includes a foam storage
material (12) which serves as the ink reservoir, a standpipe
formed by walls (20) and (22), and a printhead (18); and that
the cap (28) has an air vent tube (30) for supplying air to the
ink reservoir as ink is transferred through the standpipe to the
printhead. 123 F.3d at 1448.
In Hewlett, ROT described its cartridge modification in its
own patent, U.S. Patent 5,408,256 (256 patent), entitled
“Refillable Color Ink Jet Cartridge And Methods For Making
Said Cartridge:”
A non-refillable color ink jet cartridge such as the
Hewlett-Packard #51625A can be converted into a
” The presence of the standpipe differentiates the claimed invention of
the ’811 patent over the claimed invention of the 294 patent.
68a
refillable cartridge. The upper portion of this cartridge
contains the three air vent/ink has refill holes, and this
upper portion has a plastic cap capable of being
removed., After placing the body of the plastic cartridge
on a suitable support such as, for example, the edge of a
table, the protective plastic cap covering the upper
portion of the cartridge can be removed by prying it off
. of a cartridge with a sharp instrument such as a knife.
The upper protective cap [26] can now be modified so
that it can be placed snugly back onto the main cartridge
body [12] as often as is necessary to replenish depleted
ink supplies. A variety of methods can be employed to
do this, including placing two adhesive backed pads [36
and 38] at both sides of the longitudinal length of the
upper protective cap.
256 Patent, col. 1, line 56 to col. 2, line 18. ROT sold the
modified refillable ink jet cartridges in kits which also
contained bottles of refillable ink. The refillable ink was not
manufactured or supplied by HP. In addition to modifying
the cartridges, ROT replaced the black ink of HP’s Stanley
cartridges with a variety of color inks and resold them as
color cartridges. 123 F.3d at 1449.
Referring to ROT’s modification, and as seen by the ’256
patent, ROT first removed the cap 28 with a sharp instrument
such as a knife and then, when HP Stanley cartridges were
69a
bought, replaced the black ink of the cartridges.** Thereafter
ROT modified cap 28 so that it could be placed snugly back
onto the new cartridge as necessary, i.e., the cap was made
removable and replaceable so that the new cartridge could be
refilled with ink numerous times.?? * Significantly in
matching ROT’s accused process, which the Court found to
be akin to permissible repair rather than to impermissible
reconstruction, to the claims in issue of the ‘294 patent and
the ’811 patent, ROT did not replace any elements
specifically recited in the claims in issue.*! Moreover in
Hewlett ROT was the original purchaser of a new cartridge.
In Sandvik, the patents in suit were directed to a drill with a
shank portion and a unique carbide tip geometry that had
specially configured cutting edges which resulted in a drill
suitable for high-feed machining with improved cutting
ability especially at its center portion, although the unique
carbide drill tip was not Separately patented. In issue in
*8 The Court pointed out that while the cap was not explicitly recited
in the claims in issue of the 294 and ’811 patents it agreed with HP that
the claims relate to ink jet cartridges, not to specific components within
the cartridges; that the preamble of claim 3 of the ’294 patent and claim 2
of the °811 patent clearly stated that the claims relates to an “ink jet pen
including” the recited limitations; that the claim term “including”
is synonymous with “comprising”, thereby permitting the inclusion of
unnamed components Hewlett 123 F.3d at 1450, 1451. However the
Court later stated that “ROT does not replace any of the elements recited
in the claims; the housing, printhead, standpipe, ink reservoir, and flexible
strip are all original components of the purchased cartridges” and that
“[u]sing the original housing, ROT only changes the way in which the cap
of an unused, new cartridge is connected to the remainder of the
cartridge” /d.
*° While ROT may refill the ink reservoir with ink, the ink is not
recited in the claims in issue.
“ROT in its ’256 patent taught that a variety of methods can be
employed to modify the cap of the new cartridge.
*' See fn. 38, supra.
70a
Sandvik was U.S. Patent No. 4,222,690 (the °690 patent)
(ALJ Ex. 1) and U.S. Patent No. 4,381,162 (the ’162 patent).
Claim | of the 690 patent provided:
A drill comprising a pair of cutting edges each starting at
the center of rotation of the drill and extending
symmetrically with respect to said center and curved
outwardly away from the direction of rotation of the drill
with a greater curvature in the radial inner portion than
in the outer peripheral portion of the drill when viewed
from the bottom of the drill, each of the cutting edges
being formed with a rake face starting at said center of
rotation and having a rake angle approximately equal to
zero at the radial inner portion of said rake face, said
drill having formed in said twister groovers close to said
starting end of each of the cutting edges to provide an
increase in rake face at the inner radial portion of the
cutting edge in the vicinity of said starting end of said
cutting edge.
The ’162 patent, a division of the 690 patent, described
and claimed similar subject matter. For example, claim | of
the ’162 patent claimed a method of drilling a bore using a
drill having “helical grooves and a pair of cutting edges
having a rake face.” Sandvik 121 F.3d at 670.
The Court reproduced the following Figures | and 2 of the
690 patent (ALJ Ex 1):
Tla
It then stated that the claimed drill of the °690 patent has a tip
(1), a shank portion (2), twisted grooves (3), projections (4)
with these projections bending and breaking the chips to
render them smoothly removable and a conical end having a
center point (11) at the apex of the cone and a pair of cutting
edges 10; and that the drill shank (2) is made of medium
carbon steel while the drill tip (1) is made of a more durable
carbide and is brazed to the steel shank (2). Sandvik 121 F.3d
at 671 to 673.
The Court in Sandvik observed that Sandvik manufactured
a commercial embodiment of the patented drill which over
time and use dulls and may require resharpening or
regrinding; that Sandvik expected the drill tip to be
resharpened, which was not contended as an infringement and
in fact issued guidelines explaining how to resharpen the tip;
that the accused infringer E.J. offered a drill repair service
which included resharpening and retipping Sandvik drills:
that E.J. retipped drills at the request of customers, who had
purchased the drills from Sandvik, when the tips could not be
sharpened; that according to E.J.’s vice-president some of
E.J.’s customers elected not to have the drill retipped when it
could not be sharpened any longer; and that Sandvik did not
manufacture or sell replacement drill tips. /d.
While respondents Jazz and OptiColor in their initial post
hearing submission argued that “every element recited in the
patented combination [of the °690 patent] after the word
‘comprising’ in the preamble” (emphasis in Original) was
being made by E.J and that E.J. was “truly making the entire
patented combination from a raw block of carbide,” (JOBr at
12, 13), the facts are to the contrary. Thus, as the Court
pointed out, while the drill shank (2) is made of medium
carbon steel, the drill tip is made of a more durable carbide
and is brazed to the steel shank. Moreover examination of
72a
Figure 2 of the ’690 patent shows that the drill shank while
it is not part of the tip is represented by the following claimed
phrase:
said drill having twisted grooves [(3) which is part of
shank 2] and means defining a cavity [cavities 6 and 7 of
Figs 5 to 8 of the ’690 patent] formed in said twisted
grooves close to said starting end of each of the cutting
edges to provide an increase in rake face at the inner
radial portion of the cutting edge in the vicinity of said
starting end of said cutting edge.
In addition and in further support that the tip made by E.J.
was not the entire patented combination, the °690 patent
(col. 2, lines 27-34) states:
Each of the tips 1 is made for example from cemented
carbide alloy in the form of a plate and attached to the
conical end of the shank 2 by brazing, or any bolt as a
throw-away piece. Instead of attaching the separate tips
to the shank 2, the tips may be formed integrally with the
shank 2.
As each of Sandvik and Hewlett made clear there is no
bright line test for determining whether reconstruction or
repair has occurred. Moreover, as is clear from a reading of
Sandvik and Hewlett, any consideration of a reconstruction-
repair issue is highly fact specific. Based on Sandvik and
Hewlett, both of which cases the Supreme Court denied cert
as reported in 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998) and 118 S. Ct. 1304
(1998), it is at least necessary for the administrative law judge
to look at the alleged “remanufacture” as it relates to the
claimed subject matter in this investigation.
In each of Sandvik and Hewlett there was no dispute as to
what was being done by the accused infringers. In this
investigation there is a dispute as to what is being done by the
accused infringers because complainant was barred from
obtaining full and free access to the alleged “remanu-
SEE OER EPO ae BA OC
73a
facturing” factories of the respondents’ suppliers. In addition
there are admitted differences among the “remanufacturing”
processes. Moreover there is a variety of original LFFPs
which differ in construction. Compare e.g., Fuji’s Types 1
thru 4 LFFPs (CPX-137 to 144) and the Kodak Max (CPX-
150) and the Kodak FunSaver 35. (CPX-149).
Despite the differences with respect to the original single
use camera used in the alleged “remanufactures” and the
differences in the various accused “remanufacturers” as well
as complainant’s inability to obtain full and free access to the
suppliers’ factories, respondents involved in the “remanu-
facture” have admitted that every element of the claims in
issue of the ’087, ’495, ’774, °857, ’400, 168, ’364, "etl,
°200, °288 and ’685 utility patents are in the accused
cameras. The administrative law judge has further found that
complainant has met its burden in establishing that elements
of the claims in issue of said utility patents are in the accused
cameras as set forth in the infringement section VI A supra.
However, as each of Sandvik and Hewlett has done, it is
necessary to look at what the respondents are specifically
doing in their alleged “remanufacturing” with respect to the
claimed subject matter in issue. It is undisputed that said
respondents are not buying new single use cameras and then
performing actions on said new cameras which was done by
the accused infringer in Hewlett. Rather, said respondents
are using parts of single use cameras, which have been
manufactured by Fuji and its licensees and which have
already been used by the buyer of said cameras, to make
single use cameras that are admittedly covered by claims in
issue of the ’087, ’495, ’774, ’857, ’400, 168, ’364, "111,
°200, ’288 and 685 utility patents.
Although there are differences in the alleged “reman-
ufacturing” processes when each of said processes is looked
at, which differences the administrative law judge finds
significant, respondents involved in the “remanufacturing” at
74a
closing argument admitted to some common elements of said
processes. Thus regarding the nature of those processes the
staff, in its post hearing brief, argued:
From the evidence of the various suppliers’ reloading
processes, some common elements can be derived that
appear to occur during each process. These common
steps (not necessarily in this order) are removing the
cardboard cover, opening the LFFP body (usually by
cutting at least one weld), replacing the winding wheel
or modifying the film cartridge to be inserted, resetting
the film counter, replacing the battery in flash LFFPs,
winding new film out of a canister onto a spool or into a
roll, resealing the LFFP body using tape and/or glue, and
applying a new cardboard cover. The various suppliers
apparently use different versions of the process, . . . most
of which are more elaborate than the common elements
of the basic process would suggest. All and all, however
the Staff submits that to the extent the processes at issue
differ, those differences are not significant with respect
to the overall nature of the actions for purposes of
determining the repair versus reconstruction issue .. .
(SBr at 50-51].”
The respondents involved in the alleged “remanufacturing” at
closing argument agreed with the staff's characterization.
(Tr. at 4034, 4037, 4040).
Looking at only what respondents agreed to as the
elements of the alleged “remanufacturing” processes, and
looking at the claims in issue of the ’087, °495, °774, °857,
°400, °168, °364, ’111, °200, °288 and ’685 utility patents, the
administrative law judge finds that the alleged “remanu-
facturing” processes are not comparable to what was done in
” The staff, at closing argument, represented that it was not intended in
its post hearing brief to state that the details of the various accused
processes were not significant. (Tr. at 4040).
POM MTROCR Ee 6 eee
iis
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75a
Hewlett where the alleged infringer bought a claimed unused
device and modified a cap on the device which Cap was not
specifically recited in the claims in issue. Rather the
administrative law judge finds that the alleged “remanu-
facturing” processes are comparable to what the accused
infringer did in Sandvik. This is shown by reference to
illustrative claims of each of the ’087, 495, 774, °857, °400,
"168, °364, °111, °200, °288 and ’685 utility patents.
The '087 patent
The administrative law judge finds that, with respect to
claim | of the '087 patent (see claim interpretation section
supra), the respondents in their process of “remanu-
facturing” Types 1-5 and 7-8A LFFPs; which produces the
claimed cameras (see infringement section supra) make a
lens-fitted photographic film package by (1) assembling
the light tight film casing which must be destroyed to open
same through the assembly of the front and rear covers
with the use of tape or glue, which results in the claimed
element “a light tight film casing which must be destroyed
to open same” (element 3 of claim | of the ’087 patent see
CX-732), (2) inserting an unexposed rolled film which
results in the claimed element “an unexposed rolled film
disposed on one side of said opening in said light tight
casing” (element 5 of claim 1 of the ‘087 patent, see CX-
732), (3) inserting a removable light tight container which
results in the claimed element “a removable light tight film
container” (element 6 of claim | of the ’087 patent, see
CX-732), (4) attaching one end of said rolled film to the
film winding spool which results in the claimed element
“one end of said rolled film being, attached to said film
winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’087 patent,
see CX-732), (5S) replacing the winding wheel in certain
instances, which results in the claimed element “means for
winding said rolled film into said light tight film container
and around said film winding spool” (element 9 of claim 1
oh a ee
76a
of the ‘087 patent, see CX-732), (6) enabling the winding
control means by resetting the frame counter which results
in the claimed element:
winding control means responsive to operation of said
externally operable member for allowing said film winding
spool to rotate so as to enable said rolled film to be
advanced by only one frame after every exposure; said
winding control means including” (element 10 of claim |
of the ’087 patent, see CX-732)
and which also results in the claimed element: F
a frame counter driven by said sprocket wheel, said frame
counter being provided with indications desig- é
nating a series of frame numbers and” (element 12 of claim i
1 of the ’087 patent, see CX-732)
and (7) that by resetting the counter the respondents also
enable the means for disabling said winding control which
results in the claimed element “means for disabling said :
winding control means responsive to said frame counter
;
:
indicating there remains on said unexposed film no film
frame capable of being exposed” (element 13 of claim 1 of
the ’087 patent, see CX-732).
The '495 patent
With respect to claim | of the ’495 patent (see claim
interpretation section supra), the respondents in their
process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 LFFPs, which
produces the claimed cameras (see infringement section :
supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film package by (1) 4
assembling the light tight film-casing which must be
destroyed to open same through the assembly of front and
rear covers with the use of glue or tape which results in the
claimed element “which comprises a light tight film case
which must be destroyed to open same” (element 4 of :
claim 1 of the ’495 patent, see CX-730), (2) inserting a ¢
film roll into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed
77a
element “a film in the form of a roll light tightly contained
in said light tight film case” (element 5 of claim 1 of the
"495 patent, see CX-730), and (3) inserting a film container
into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed element
“and a film container in which exposed film is wound”
(element 6 of claim 1 of the ‘495 patent, see CX-730).
The ’774 patent
With respect to claim 14 of the ’774 patent (see claim
interpretation section supra), the respondents in their
process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 and 7-8A LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) assembling the light tight film casing
through the assembly of front and rear covers with the use
of glue or tape which results in the claimed element “a
light tight film case” (element 2 of claim 14 of the ‘774
patent, see CX-731), and (2) inserting a film roll into the
LFFP shell which results in the claimed element “and a
rolled film” (element 4 of claim 14 of the ‘774 patent, see
CX-731).
The ’857 patent
With respect to claim 1 of the ’857 patent (see claim
interpretation section supra), the respondents in their
process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 LFFPs, which
produces the claimed cameras (see infringement section
supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film package by (1)
assembling the light tight film casing through the assembly
of front and rear covers with the use of glue or tape which
results in the claimed element “a light tight casing”
(element 3 of claim 1 of the ’857 patent, see CX-733), (2)
inserting a roll of unexposed film into the LFFP shell
which results in the claimed element:
a roll [of] unexposed film disposed on one side of said
Opening in an unexposed film roll receiving chamber in
iii
78a
said light tight casing with its outermost turn exposed to
side walls of said chamber and its innermost turn
surrounding an empty space; (element 5 of claim | of the
°857 patent, see CX-733),
(3) inserting a light tight film container into the LFFP shell
which results in the claimed element “a removable light
tight film container” (element 6 of claim | of the ’857
patent, see CX-733), (4) attaching one end of the rolled
film to the film winding spool which results in the claimed
element:
having a film winding spool therein disposed on the
opposite side of said opening in said light tight film casing
from said rolled film, one end of said rolled film being
attached to said film winding spool (element 7 of claim 1
of the ’857 patent, see CX-733),
(5) replacing the winding wheel, in certain instances, which
results in the claimed element “means for winding said
rolled film into said light-tight film-container and around
said film winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’857
patent, see CX-733) and (6) enabling the means for
winding the rolled film by resetting the frame counter
which results in the claimed element “means for winding
said rolled film into said light tight container and around
said film winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’857
patent, see CX-733).
The '400 patent
With respect to claim 14 of the *400 patent (see claim
interpretation section supra), the respondents in their
process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 and 7-7A LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make ‘a lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) assembling a light tight film case through
the assembly of front and rear covers by the use of tape or
ee eee
79a
glue which results in the claimed element “a light tight film
case” (element 2 of claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-
735) and which also results in the claimed element “and a
rear case section which is securely fixed to the rear side of
main case section and cannot be disassembled therefrom”
(element 11 of claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735),
(2) inserting a light tight film cartridge into the LFFP shell
which results in the claimed element “a separate empty
light tight film cartridge having a spool therein rotatable
about an axis of rotation” (element 4 of claim 14 of the _
’400 patent, see CX-735) and which also results in the
claimed element “said film cartridge being enclosed in said
light tight film case on one side of said lens” (element 5 of
claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735), and (3) inserting
an unexposed rolled film with one end retained in the film
cartridge into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed
element “an unexposed rolled film with its one end
retained on said spool in said film cartridge” (element 6 of
claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735) and which also
results in the claimed element “said unexposed rolled film
being disposed on the other side of said taking lens with its
outermost turn in contact with said film case” (element 7 of
claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735).
The Re ’168 patent
With respect to claim 1 of the ’168 patent, the respondents
in their process of “remanufacturing” Types 1-4 and 7-8A
LFFPs, which produces the claimed cameras (see infringe-
ment section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) opening the LFFP body which results in the
claimed element “a main case section which is open at
its front” (element 7 of claim 1 of the ’168 patent, see
CX-741), (2) inserting a roll of unexposed film which
results in the claimed element “and containing light tightly
said roll of unexposed photographic film” (element 10
80a
of claim 1 of the °168 patent, see CX-741), and (3)
reattaching the front cover section with tape or glue which
results in the claimed element:
a front cover section which is attached to said main case
section and closes said open front of said main case section
to cover majority of said taking lens and said shutter means
and said film transporting means (element 11 of claim | of
the ’168 patent, see CX-741).
The ’364 patent
With respect to claim | of the ’364 patent, the respondents
in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) unwinding film from a film cassette and
inserting the roll of film into the LFFP body which results
in the claimed element:
a film roll chamber disposed on the opposite side of said
taking lens from said cassette chamber, said film roll
chamber being adapted to contain a roll of said film which
is pulled out from a film cassette and wound in
a roll (element 9 of claim 1 of the ’364 patent, see
CX-736),
(2) inserting the film cassette into the LFFP body which
results in the claimed element “said cassette chamber
containing said film cassette (element 10 of claim | of the
’364 patent, see CX-736), (3) inserting a battery into the
LFFP body which results in the claimed element “a battery
for charging said main capacitor” (element 16 of claim 1 of
the °364 patent, see CX-736) and which also results in the
claimed element “said battery being disposed between said
cassette chamber and said film roll chamber and extending
in a horizontal direction below said taking lens” (element
17 of claim | of the ’364 patent, see CX-736), (4) attaching
1 = uh ni anne,
8la
the front cover to the LFFP body with tape or glue which
results in the claimed element “a front cover section
attached to a front of said main body section” (element 18
of claim | of the °364 patent, see CX-736), and (5)
attaching a rear cover to the LFFP body with tape or glue
which results in the claimed element “a rear cover section
attached to a rear of said main body section” (element 19
of claim | of the 364 patent, see CX-736).
The ’111 patent
With respect to claim 1 of the ’111 patent, the respondents
in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make a _lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) inserting a roll of film in the LFFP body
which results in the claimed element “a lens fitted
photographic film unit containing photographic film and
being adapted to take photographs” (element | of claim 1
of the ’111 patent, see CX-737).
The '200 patent
With respect to claim 1 of the ’200 patent, the respondents
in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 2-4 LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film
package by (1) inserting a roll of film in the LFFP body
which results in the claimed element “a lens fitted
photographic film unit having a pre-loaded photographic
film on which an image is formed” (element | and element
11 of claim | of the ’200 patent, see CX-738).
The ’685 patent
With respect to claim 1 of the ’685 patent, the respondents
in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,
which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement
section supra) make a _lens-fitted photographic film
82a
package by (1) inserting film into the LFFP body which
results in the claimed element “a film supplying chamber
for containing unexposed photographic film” (element 3 of
claim 1 of the ’685 patent, see CX-740),(2) replacing the
winding wheel, in certain instances, which results in “a
film wind up wheel for winding up said film as exposed”
(element 8 of claim | of the ’685 patent, see CX-740), (3)
enabling the film wind up wheel to function properly by
resetting the frame counter which results in the claimed
element “a film wind up wheel for winding up said film as
exposed” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’685 patent, see CX-
740), (4) enabling the wind up stopping mechanism by f
resetting the frame counter which results in the claimed .
element “a wind up stopping mechanism for preventing
said wind up wheel from rotating after film is fed by one
frame after each exposure by rotation of said wind up
wheel” (element 9 of claim | of the ’685 patent, see CX-
740), and (5) attaching a front cover to the LFFP body with
tape or glue which results in the claimed element “a front
cover secured to said film containing unit in front of said
photo taking unit” (element 14 of claim 1 of the ’685
patent, see CX-740).
The ’288 patent
With respect to claim | of the ’288 patent, respondents Ad-
Tek, Argus, Dynatec and Boshi, in. their process of
“remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs, which produces
the claimed cameras (see infringement section supra)
makes a lens-fitted photographic film unit by (1) inserting
a roll of film into the LFFP body which results in the
claimed element “in which a body contains photographic
film drawn out in a form of a roll” (element 2 of claim
1 of the ’288 patent, see CX-739), and (2) modifying
the film cassette, in certain instances, so that it mates
83a
with the winding wheel, which results in the following
claimed elements:
a spool in said cassette and thereby said film is wound
back into said cassette, said film unit comprising
(element 3 of claim | of the ’288 patent, see CX-739);
an axial hole formed in one distal end of said spool
(element 4 of claim | of the ’288 patent, see CX-739);
a pair of engaging plates, projected from said axial hole
in a position axially downward inside said axial hole,
and shaped in a rotationally symmetrical fashion at a
straight angle with respect to an axis of said axial
hole (element 5 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent, see
CX-739); and
a key way defined by a plurality of inner teeth formed on
an inside of said axial hole and axially upward from said
engaging plates (element 6 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent,
see CX-739);
wherein said winding wheel includes a drive shaft
integrally formed therewith (element 7 of claim 1 of the
°288 patent, see CX-739); and
said drive shaft includes a plurality of engaging teeth
formed thereabout, arranged at a regular pitch, extended
axially, and respectively engaged with said inner teeth.
(Element 8 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent, see CX-739).
Based on the foregoing, the administrative law judge finds
that the processes of the respondents involved in the alleged
“remanufacture” are more complicated than simply adding
film, battery and paper as argued by Jazz and OptiColor
(JOBr at 13) and also more involved than simply taking a new
claimed cartridge and modifying a cap of that cartridge,
which cap was not specifically claimed, as in Hewlett. The
Court in Sandvik stated “E.J. does not just attach a new part
for a worn part, but rather must go through several steps
84a
involving claims in issue to replace, configure and integrate
the tip onto the shank” 121 F.3d at 673. Based on the
comparison detailed supra, the administrative law judge finds
that the respondents involved in the “remanufacture” also
must go through several steps to “replace, configure and
integrate” the parts of a single use camera to make a
“remanufactured” single use camera; that they do more than
just add film, battery and paper; and that in their “remanu-
facturing” processes, they manipulate a variety of parts of the
single use camera directly reading on claim elements in issue.
In addition, referring to what is known about the processes
used in the alleged “remanufacture” the administrative law
judge finds that the individual processes used by the
respondents further reveal the nature of the alleged
“remanufacturing” processes and supports the finding that
those processes involved a reconstruction and not a
permissible repair.
The Jazz Suppliers
Jazz has four steady suppliers of LFFPs, viz. Peji, Ginfax
Vastfame and Boshi. (FF 218). Boshi supplies about 10% of
respondent Jazz’s reloaded cameras.’ (FF 219). In addition
to the elements of the Boshi process that are common to all of
the respondents’ processes, from what is known only from the
video, the Boshi process includes placing the LFFP camera
body in a machine which appears to be grinding down the
Fuji Film logo on the cowl surrounding the taking lens (FF
258); the side weld next to the film cassette receiving
“? While Fuji’s counsel received one videotape from a Boshi factory
(CPX-470), Fuji had no opportunity to visit the Boshi factory to
corroborate the video or to determine whether any steps were left out of
the video. Moreover the video, for example, gives no insight into how the
single use camera shells are obtained by Boshi nor in what condition they
are in when they are received nor what selection process is used by Boshi
to determine which shells will be used in the “remanufacturing” process.
85a
chamber is cut with a chisel like blade in a hand press (FF
258); the front cover is removed and then the film door on the
film receiving chamber is cut (FF 258); and then the front
cover is reattached with no effort to match the covers with
bodies. (FF 258).
According to the video the next step involves removing the
front cover again (FF 259); inserting a razor blade like tool
under the counter wheel and cutting or prying a mechanism
underneath the wheel (FF 259), Lorenzini testified that he is
not exactly sure what the worker is doing with the razor blade
at this stage, but that the worker is either working the frame
counter or completing the opening of the take up spool area
(FF 225); the front cover is then reattached to the LFFP body
(FF 259); the rear cover is pulled away from the main body at
the corner near the advance wheel and a metal ring is placed
inside the film cassette chamber in order to hold the back
cover apart from the middle section (FF 259); then the flash
unit is tested. (FF 259).
The following step, pursuant to the video, involves
measuring the leader of the film against a block and then
inserting the film into the LFFP body (FF 260); a worker then
manipulates the leader into the gap between the middle and
back sections and removes the metal ring holding the body
open (FF 260); at this stage, if the film door has been lost a
new door is added (FF 260); a worker then clips off the
engaging tabs of the film door (FF 260); then a worker inserts
a small metal hook between the film wheel and the engaging
pawl and pulls the hook back and tapes it down along the
back cover of the LFFP body (FF 260), Bellows testified that
the use of the hook under the film wheel is done in order to
disengage the stopping mechanism in order to reload film in
the one time use camera body. (CX-725, Q&A 103).
“* Jazz’s counsel admitted that an “appropriate cutting tool” is need
[sic] to separate the back cover from the main body. (JORCFF 2031).
86a
Thereafter, according to the video, the process involves the
winding of the film which involves inserting a spindle which
engages the film in the film receiving chamber, then placing
the LFFP body in a dark box and pushing the body against a
machine which winds the film (FF 261); a worker winds the
thumb wheel backward while the film is winding (FF 261);
then a worker removes the spindle while the camera is still in
the dark box and tapes the film receiving door shut. (FF 261).
In the next step a worker inserts a new battery and the flash is
tested and a frame is shot (FF 262), the cardboard inner
covering is then placed around the LFFP and the body is put
in a cellophane wrapper. (FF 262).
The video further shows that the Boshi process also
includes the modification of the film cassette in which a
circular ring is placed around the circumference of the spool,
then a worker uses heated dies to mold the teeth to the inner
circumference of the spool of the film cassette so that it
engages the teeth on the Fuji advance wheel. (FF 263).*°
Regarding the processes used by Jazz’s supplier Peji,
Lorenzini testified that he saw the Peji process and he
described the process as involving (1) the opening of the Fuji
Quicksnap at three points with some sort of tool, (2) placing
the camera in some sort of mechanical fixture and pulling a
lever so that the plastic is cut and the back can be opened, (3)
checking the flash, kicker, shutter and advance mechanism
*° Jazz and OptiColor argued that the respondents’ suppliers do not
manufacture or assemble the overwhelming majority of parts in the LFFP
(RJFF 15); and that respondents’ suppliers use intact, without assembly or
disassembly, the overwhelming majority of the camera and all its parts
originally manufactured. (RJFF 17). It is clear, from an analysis of the
common elements of the respondents’ processes and the elements of
Boshi’s process, that while the respondents’ process does not involve the
manufacture of a majority of the parts of the LFFP, the process involves
the manipulation, configuration and integration of many parts directly
related to the claimed subject matter in issue.
87a
and cleaning the camera, and (4) loading the film in a dark
box where the film is pulled from the cannister then the
canister and film roll are placed back in the camera ‘and the
back cover is put back on with a rub
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