Appendix — Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission

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Text

Supreme Court, U.S.

y a FILED

Supreme Court of the Ginited-Sptates csrx

JAZZ, PHOTO CORPORATION

AND DYNATEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioners,

V

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

AND FUJI PHOTO FILM Co., LTD.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit ~

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JEFFREY I. KAPLAN CARTER G. PHILLIPS*

KAPLAN & GILMAN, LLP STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD

900 Route 9 North MICHAEL S. LEE

Woodbridge, New Jersey 07095 JULIEN. ZAMPA

(732) 634-7634 SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN &

: Woop LLP

Counsel for Jazz Photo Corp. 1501 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

LARRY R. LAYCOCK (202) 736-8000

DAVID R. WRIGHT

L. DAVID GRIFFIN Counsel for Petitioners

WORKMAN, NYDEGGER &

SEELEY

1000 Eagle Gate Tower

60 East South Temple

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 533-9800

Counsel for Dynatec

International, Inc.

February 6, 2002 * Counsel of Record

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

ZOOPER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A:

Opinion, Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094

(Fed. Cir. 2001) .......:cccseseesecesesesensteeesseneesenseesaees la-25a

APPENDIX B:

Commission Opinion (Public Version), Certain

Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406

(1.T.C. June 28, 1999) 0... cece eeteeseeeeeennees 26a-52a

APPENDIX C:

Excerpts from Final Initial and Recommended

Determinations (Public Version), Certain Lens-

Fitted Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (L.T.C.

Mar. 23, 1999) (Administrative Law Judge)

Cover Page .........csssssessecessseseesserssseesnennenennenees 53a

oceanic 54a-56a

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NN ass) dunsancacsenadanasdnbacasentnean 6la-128a

RR FE TL UD oiisscsncascdnrensesasasaysntcccsorennen 128a-140a

” Additional Findings

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FZ0-21 .....seseceesscsssesrencecsesessscssseneeeteesenenes 141a-142a

TY 29-31 ...eessssssscscessressscnesesenesessesneeseesenenes 142a-143a

GY 36-37 ....n.sesssssssscereesnsreceessnecsesenesesserenens 143a-144a

954-78 ..neceseseseesseseeeeeeeterenenseeseteneneneneneneees 144a-147a

Conclusions of Law..............-+++++ peice nasal 148a-159a

APPENDIX D:

General Exclusion Order, Certain Lens-Fitted

Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (I.T.C. June

DFO siccvscsiienisncsiissomminresictnasaeesaansianninnens 160a-163a

(i)

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued

Page

APPENDIX E:

“Order To Cease And Desist, Certain Lens-Fitted

Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (1.T.C. June

2, 1999) (Jazz Photo Corp.).............sssssereees 164a-170a

APPENDIX F:

Order To Cease And Desist, Certain Lens-Fitted

Film Packages, Inv. 337-TA-406 (1.T.C. June

2, 1999) (Dynatec International, Inc.).......... 171a-177a

APPENDIX G:

Order On Combined Petitions For Panel Rehear-

ing And Rehearing En Banc, Jazz Photo Corp.

v. ITC, Nos. 99-1431, 99-1504, 99-1595, 99-

1596, 99-1601 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2001)....... 178a-179a

APPENDIX H:

Statutes

89 U.S.C. & USF cites 180a-194a

35 U.S.C. © TRB csciacenenesisanasen 195a-196a

35 USAC. © SEF cance 196a-200a

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Nos. 99-1431, 99-1504, 99-1595, 99-1596, 99-1601

JAZZ PHOTO CORPORATION,

Appellant,

and

DYNATEC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Appellant,

and

OPTICOLOR, INC.,

Appellant,

V.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee,

and

FUJI PHOTO FILM Co., LTD.,

Intervenor.

Aug. 21, 2001

Before NEWMAN, MICHEL, and GAJARSA, Circuit

Judges.

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

In an action brought under section 337 of the Tariff Act of

1930 as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, Fuji Photo Film Co.

charged twenty-seven respondents, including the appellants

Jazz Photo Corporation, Dynatec International, Inc., and

Opticolor, Inc., with infringement of fifteen patents owned by

Fuji. The charge was based on the respondents’ importation of

2a

used “single-use” cameras called “lens-fitted film packages”

(LFFP’s), which had been refurbished ' for reuse in various

overseas facilities. Section 337 makes unlawful “(t]he impor-

tation into the United States . . . of articles that . . . infringe a

valid and enforceable United States patent . . . [or that] are

made, produced, processed, . . . under, or by means of, a

process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable

United States patent.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(i)(B). Eight

respondents did not respond to the Commission’s complaint,

ten more failed to appear before the Commission, and one was

dismissed. Eight respondents participated in the hearing, and

three have taken this appeal.

The Commission determined that twenty-six respondents,

including the appellants, had infringed all or most of the

claims in suit of fourteen Fuji United States patents,” and

issued a General Exclusion Order and Order to Cease and

Desist. Jn the Matter of Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages,

Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (int’] Trade Comm’n June 28, 1999).

This court stayed the Commission’s orders during this appeal.

Dynatec Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, No. 99-1504

(Fed.Cir. Sept. 24, 1999) (unpublished).

' We use “refurbish” as a convenient neutral term without legal

significance, intended to connote neither “repair” nor “reconstruction” of

the used cameras.

? The patents are: United States Patent No. 4,833,495 (claims 1, 5, 6, 9

and 11) (the ’495 patent); Patent No. 4,855,774 (claims 14 and 15) (the

°774 patent); Patent No. 4,884,087 (claims 1, 7, and 8) (the ’087 patent);

Patent No. 4,954,857 (claims 1, 19 and 22) (the ’857 patent); Patent

No. 4,972,649 (claims 1 and 9) (the ’649 patent); Patent No. 5,235,364

(claims { and 11) (the ’364 patent); Patent No. 5,361,111 (claim 1) (the

"111 patent); Patent No. 5,381,200 (claims 1, 15, 23 and 25) (the ’200

patent); Patent No. 5,408,288 (claims 1 and 7) (the ’288 patent); Patent

No. 5,436,685 (claims | and 28) (the ’685 patent); Patent No. Re 34,168

(claims | and 13) (the RE ’168 patent); Design Patent No. D 345,750 (the

D ’750 patent); Design Patent No. D 356,101 (the D ’101 patent); and

Design Patent No. D 372,722 (the D ’722 patent).

3a

The Commission’s decision rests on its ruling that the

refurbishment of the used cameras is prohibited “recon-

struction,” as opposed to permissible “repair.” On review of

the law and its application, we conclude that precedent does

not support the Commission’s application of the law to the

facts that were found. We conclude that for used cameras

whose first sale was in the United States with the patentee’s

authorization, and for which the respondents permitted

verification of their representations that their activities were

limited to the steps of (1) removing the cardboard cover, (2)

cutting open the plastic casing, (3) inserting new film and a

container to receive the film, (4) replacing the winding wheel

for certain cameras, (5) replacing the battery for flash

cameras, (6) resetting the counter, (7) resealing the outer case,

and (8) adding a new cardboard cover, the totality of these

procedures does not satisfy the standards required by

precedent for prohibited reconstruction; precedent requires,

as we shall discuss, that the described activities be deemed to

be permissible repair.

For those cameras that meet the criteria outlined above, the

Commission’s ruling of patent infringement is reversed and

the Commission’s exclusion and cease and desist orders are

vacated. For all other cameras, the Commission’s orders are

affirmed.

DISCUSSION

Commission factual findings are reviewed in accordance

with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, and

are sustained when they are supported by substantial evi-

dence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Tandon Corp. v. United States

Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1019, 4 USPQ2d 1283,

1284-85 (Fed.Cir.1987). The Commission’s legal determi-

nations receive plenary review. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v.

United States Int’l Trade Comm n, 54 F.3d 756, 759-60, 35

USPQ2d 1042, 1045 (Fed.Cir.1995). The application of the

law of repair and reconstruction to fact is treated in precedent

4a

as a legal determination, and is reviewed without deference.

Sans “' *° ebolag v. EJ. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 672, 43

USP 20, 1622 (Fed.Cir.1997).

I

The Patented Inventions

The LFFP is a relatively simple camera, whose major

elements are an outer plastic casing that holds a shutter, a

shutter release button, a lens, a viewfinder, a film advance

mechanism, a film counting display, and for some models a

flash assembly and battery. The casing also contains a holder

for a roll of film, and a container into which the exposed film

is wound. At the factory a roll of film is loaded into the

camera. The casing is then sealed by ultrasonic welding or

light-tight latching, and a cardboard cover is applied to encase

the camera.

LFFPs are intended by the patentee to be used only once.

After the film is exposed the photo-processor removes the

film container by breaking open a pre-weakened portion of

the plastic casing which is accessed by removal of the

cardboard cover. Discarded LFFPs, subsequently purchased

and refurbished by the respondents, are the subject of

this action.

oe

Sa

The parts of an_LFFP are illustrated in Figure 8 of the

’087 patent:

Claim | of the ’087 patent is representative of claims

directed to the entire LFFP:

1. A lens-fitted photographic film package having an

externally operable member for effecting an exposure,

comprising:

a light-tight film casing which must be destroyed to

open the same, having an opening through which said

exposure is made when said externally operable member

is operated;

an unexposed rolled film disposed on one side of

said opening in said light-tight Casing;

a removable light-tight film container having a film

winding spool therein disposed on the opposite side of

said opening in said light-tight casing from said rolled

film, one end of said rolled film being attached to said

film winding spool;

means for winding said rolled film into said

light-tight film container and around said film winding

spool;

6a

and winding control means responsive to opera-

tion of said externally operable member for allow-

ing said film winding spool to rotate so as to enable said

rolled film to be advanced by only one frame after every

exposure; said winding control means including: a

sprocket wheel driven by movement of said rolled film;

and a frame counter driven by said sprocket wheel,

said frame counter being provided with indications

designating a series of frame numbers and means for

disabling said winding control means responsive to said

frame counter indicating there remains on said unex-

posed film no film frame capable of being exposed.

Other patents are directed to various components of the

LFFP. The ’857 patent is directed to a specific film winding

mechanism. The °495 patent is directed to a mechanism

whereby the film in the LFFP is advanced smoothly without

being scratched or gouged, and which prevents the film roll

from becoming loose. The ’774 patent is directed to the film

chambers and film path. The °364 patent claims the LFFP

with a flash unit comprising a circuit board, a capacitor, a

discharge (flash) tube, and a battery. The ’111 patent is

directed to the pushbutton that trips the shutter and has a

protective structure that prevents the pushbutton from

accidentally being depressed. The ’200 patent is directed to

the shutter mechanism, including the shutter mount, shutter

opening, and shutter blade. The ’288 patent claims an LFFP

in which the winding wheel and film cassette are positively

linked through a gear and shaft mechanism requiring the two

to rotate relative to each other, avoiding the loss of usable

film. The ’685 patent is directed to an LFFP assembly that

allows easier recycling of used plastic and metal, in which the

plastic casing including the film path and film chambers is

easily separable from the photo-taking unit containing metal

parts including the shutter mechanism and the winding and

stop mechanisms.

7a

It is not disputed that the imported refurbished cameras

contain all of the elements of all or most of the claims

in suit.

The Accused Activities

The appellants import used LFFPs that have been refur-

bished by various overseas entities (called ‘“remanu-

facturers” in the ITC proceeding). Some of the remanufac-

turers refused discovery entirely or in part, and some

presented evidence that the ALJ found incomplete or not

credible. The Commission explains: “Since so little was

known about the accused infringing processes, the ALJ

considered the common steps that each participating

respondent admitted during the hearing were part of their

processes.” ITC Brief at 15-16. The ALJ summarized these

common steps as follows:

* removing the cardboard cover;

* opening the LFFP body (usually by cutting at least one

weld);

* replacing the winding wheel or modifying the film

cartridge to be inserted; 7.

* resetting the film counter;

* replacing the battery in flash LFFPs;

* winding new film out of a canister onto a spool or into

a roll;

* resealing the LFFP body using tape and/or glue;

* applying a new cardboard cover.

Initial Determination at 108-109. The Commission held that

these activities constitute prohibited reconstruction. In view

of this holding, it was not material to the Commission’s

ruling that the full extent of various respondents’ activities

was not made known, for in all events the importation would

be infringing and unlawful. -

SSE eae ee eer ea

8a

The appellants argue that they are not building new LFFPs,

but simply replacing the film in used cameras. They argue

that the LFFPs have a useful life longer than the single use

proposed by Fuji, that the patent right has been exhausted as

to these articles, and that the patentee can not restrict their

right to refit the cameras with new film by the procedures

necessary to insert the film and reset the mechanism. Unless

these activities are deemed to be permissible, infringement of

at least some of the patents in suit is conceded.

Burden and Standard of Proof

On this appeal there is much argument as to the burden and

standard of proof. The administrative law judge ruled that the

respondents must prove that their remanufactured cameras

meet the criteria of permissible repair by clear and convincing

evidence. The Commission held that this was not the correct

standard, and that the respondents were required to prove the

affirmative defense of permissible repair by no more than a

preponderance of the evidence. However, the Commission

found that this error did not change the correctness of the

ALJ’s conclusion that the respondents’ actions were

impermissible reconstruction of the patented articles.

While it is not disputed that repair is an affirmative defense,

see Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827 F.2d 755,

758, 3 USPQ2d 1852, 1854 (Fed.Cir.1987) (characterizing

repair as an affirmative defense of implied license), the parties

disagree as to the order of coming forward with evidence, as

well as the placement of the burden of proving that the accused

activities are infringing reconstruction. The appellants state

that the burden of proving infringement does not leave the

patentee, and thus that the Commission incorrectly placed upon

the appellants the burden of proving noninfringement. The

appellants also argue that Fuji’s unrestricted first sale of the

patented cameras satisfied prima facie the appellants’ burden

on the affirmative defense of repair, for it established that the

patent right had been exhausted; they state that this shifted to

9a

the patentee the burden of proving that the accused activities

were not repair. In support the appellants cite General Electric

Co. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl. 636, 572 F.2d 745, 783 n. 17,

198 USPQ 65, 97 n. 17 (1978), where the court noted that

“Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proof on issues relating

to infringement (including ‘reconstruction’).”

The Commission ruled that “Once Fuji carried its burden

of proof that its claims covered the remanufactured cameras,

it was up to appellants to prove their affirmative defense that

they were only repairing the cameras, not reconstructing

them.” The Commission has correctly described this evi-

dentiary sequence. The initial burden is upon the complain-

ant to establish its cause of action, here patent infringement;

the patentee must present evidence sufficient to establish that

one or more patent claims are infringed. The respond-

ents did not dispute that many or most of the claims in suit

read literally on their refurbished cameras. Thus Fuji met its

initial burden of showing infringement.

The burden of establishing an affirmative defense is on the

“party raising the defense. The Commission correctly held

that the respondents had the burden of establishing this

defense by a preponderance of the evidence, including the

~burden of coming forward with evidence to show that the

activities performed in processing the used cameras con-

stituted permissible repair.

The Law of Permissible Repair and Prohibited

Reconstruction :

The distinction between permitted and prohibited activ-

ities, with respect to patented items after they have been placed

in commerce by the patentee, has been distilled into the terms

“repair” and “reconstruction.” The purchaser of a patented

article has the rights of any owner of personal property,

including the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or

resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of the sale. Thus

patented articles when sold “become the private individual

10a

property of the purchasers, and are no longer specifically

protected by the patent laws.” Mitchell v.. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16

Wall.) 544, 548, 21 L.Ed. 322 (1872). The fact that an article

is patented gives the purchaser neither more nor less rights of

use and disposition. However, the rights of ownership do not

include the right to construct an essentially new article on the

template of the original, for the right to make the article

remains with the patentee. :

While the ownership of a patented article does not include

the right to make a substantially new article, it does include

the right to preserve the useful life of the original article. It is

readily apparent that there is a continuum between these

concepts; precedent demonstrates that litigated cases rarely

reside at the poles wherein “repair” is readily distinguished

from “reconstruction.” Thus the law has developed in the

body of precedent, illustrating the policy underlying the law

as it has been applied in diverse factual contexts. Cf

Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 150

_ (Ist Cir.1901) (“It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to

attempt to lay down any rule on this subject, owing to the

number and infinite variety of patented inventions.”)

The principle of the distinction between permissible and

prohibited activities was explained in Wilson v. Simpson, 50

U.S. (9 How.) 109, 13 L.Ed. 66 (1850), where the Court

distinguished the right of a purchaser of a patented planing

machine to replace the machine’s cutting-knives when they

became dull or broken, from the patentee’s sole right to make

or renew the entire machine. The Court observed that the

knives had to be replaced every 60-90 days whereas the

machines would last for several years, explaining, “what

harm is done to the patentee in the use of his right of

invention, when the repair and replacement of a partial injury

are confined to the machine which the purchaser has

bought?” /d. at 123. -

= CC

lla

This principle underlies the application of the law. It was

elaborated by the Court in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.

Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5

L.Ed.2d 592 (1961), where the patented combination was a

fabric convertible top and the associated metal support structure.

The Court explained that replacement of the worn fabric top

constituted permissible repair of the patented combination, and

could not be controlled by the patentee. The Court restated the

principles that govern the inquiry as applied to replacement of

unpatented parts of a patented article:

The decisions of this Court require the conclusion that

reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of

unpatented elements, is limited to such a true recon-

struction of the entity as to “in fact make a new article,”

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, [148 F.2d

416, 425 (2d Cir.1945)], after the entity, viewed as a

whole, has become spent. tn order to call the monopoly,

conferred by the patent vant, into play for a second

time, it must, indeed, be a second creation of the

patented entity, as, for example, in American Cotton Tie

Co. v. Simmons, [106 U.S. 89, 1 S.Ct. 52 (1882)]. Mere

replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a

time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different

parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the

owner to repair his property.

365 U.S. at 346, 81 S.Ct. 599.

This right of repair, provided that the activity does not “in

fact make a new article,’ accompanies the article to

succeeding owners. In Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S.

422, 84 S.Ct. 1561, 12 L.Ed.2d 419, 141 USPQ 703 (1964),

the Court dealt with the refurbishing of patented fish-canning

machines by a purchaser of used machines. The Court held

that the fairly extensive refurbishment by the new owner,

including modification and resizing of six separate parts of

the machine, although more than customary repair of spent or

12a

broken components, was more like repair then reconstruction,

for it extended the useful life of the original machine. See id.

at 425, 141 USPQ at 704-05 (“Petitioners in adapting the old

machines to a related use were doing more than repair in the

customary sense; but what they did was kin to repair for it

bore on the useful capacity of the old combination, on which

the royalty had been paid.”)

Precedent has classified as repair the disassembly and

cleaning of patented articles accompanied by replacement of

unpatented parts that had become worn or spent, in order to

preserve the utility for which the article was originally

intended. In General Electric Co. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl.

636, 572 F.2d 745, 198 USPQ 65 (1978), the court held that

the Navy’s large scale “overhauling” of patented gun mounts,

including disassembly into their component parts and

replacement of parts that could not be repaired with parts

from other gun mounts or new parts, was permissible repair

of the original gun mounts. The court explained that the

assembly-line method of reassembly, without regard to where

each component had originated, was simply a matter of

efficiency and economy, with the same effect as if each gun

mount had been refurbished individually by disassembly and

reassembly of its original components with replacement of a

minor amount of worn elements. Jd. at 780-86, 198 USPQ

at 95-100.

Similarly, in Dana Corp. v. American Precision Co., 827

F.2d 755, 3 USPQ2d 1852 (Fed.Cir.1987), the court held that

the “rebuilding” of worn truck clutches, although done on a

commercial scale, was permissible repair. The defendants in

Dana Corp. acquired worn clutches that had been discarded

by their original owners, disassembled them, cleaned and

sorted the individual parts, replaced worn or defective parts

with new or salvaged parts, and reassembled the clutches.

Although the patentee stressed that some new parts were used

and that the rebuilding was a large scale commercial

operation, the activity was held to be repair. Jd. at 759, 827

~

13a

F.2d 755, 3 USPQ2d at 1855. The court also observed that in

general the new parts were purchased from Dana, the original

manufacturer of the patented clutches, and that repair of used

clutches was contemplated by the patentee. The court

rejected the argument that the complete disassembly and

production-line reassembly of the clutches constituted a

voluntary destruction followed by a “second creation of the

patented entity,” invoking the phrase of Aro Manufacturing,

365 U.S. at 346, 81 S.Ct. 599.

“Reconstruction,” precedent shows, requires a more

extensive rebuilding of the patented entity than is exemplified

in Aro Manufacturing, Wilbur-Ellis, General Electric, and

Dana Corp. See also, e.g., Bottom Line Mgmt., Inc. v. Pan

Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352, 56 USPQ2d 1316 (Fed.Cir.2000)

(repair of cooking device by reapplying non-stick coating);

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.,

123 F.3d 1445, 43 USPQ2d 1650 (Fed.Cir.1997) (modifying

unused printer cartridges akin to repair); Kendall Co. v.

Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570, 38 USPQ2d 1917

(Fed.Cir.1996) (replacement of used pressure sleeve in

medical device is repair); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus.,

Inc., 45 F.3d 1575, 33 USPQ2d 1765 (Fed.Cir.1995)

(replacement of inner container for medical waste is repair);

FMC Corp. v. Up-Right, Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 30 USPQ2d

1361 (Fed.Cir.1994) (replacing worn unpatented picking

heads ot harvester is repair); Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875

F.2d 300, 10 USPQ2d 1855 (Fed.Cir.1989) (replacement of

entire cartridge containing spent filter is repair); Porter v.

Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 229 USPQ 814

(Fed.Cir.1986) (replacement of disks in tomato harvester

head is repair). In contrast, in Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.,

121 F.3d 669, 43 USPQ2d 1620 (Fed.Cir.1997), recon-

struction was held to apply when a patented drill bit was

“recreated” by construction of an entirely new cutting tip

after the existing cutting tip could no longer be resharpened

and reused. The court explained that it was not dispositive

14a

that the cutting tip was the “novel feature” of the invention,

but that prohibited reconstruction occurred because a “new

article” was made after the patented article, “viewed as a

whole, has become spent.” See also Lummus Indus., Inc. v.

D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 8 USPQ2d 1983 (Fed.

Cir.1988) (jury verdict of reconstruction for cutter wheels that

were material part of patented invention).

Underlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the

principle of exhaustion of the patent right. The unrestricted

sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the

patentee, “exhausts” the patentee’s right to control further

sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under

which it was first sold. In United States v. Masonite Corp.,

316 U.S. 265, 278, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942), the

Court explained that exhaustion of the patent right depends

on “whether or not there has been such a disposition of the

article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received

his reward for the use of the article.” See, e.g., Intel Corp. v.

ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568, 27 USPQ2d

1136, 1138 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The law is wellsettled that an

authorized sale of a patented. product places that product

beyond the reach of the patent.”) Thus when a patented

device has been lawfully sold in the United States, subsequent

purchasers inherit the same immunity under the doctrine of

patent exhaustion. However, the prohibition that the product

may not be the vehicle for a “second creation of the patented

entity” continues to apply, for such re-creation exceeds the

rights that accompanied the initial sale.

Fuji states that some of the imported LFFP cameras

originated and were sold only overseas, but are included in the

refurbished importations by some of the respondents. The

record supports this statement, which does not appear to be

disputed. United States patent rights are not exhausted by

products of foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of

the first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must have

occurred under the United States patent. See Boesch v. Graff,

15a

133 U.S. 697, 701-703, 10 S.Ct. 378, 33 L.Ed. 787 (1890) (a

lawful foreign purchase does not obviate the need for license

from the United States patentee before importation into and

sale in the United States). Our decision applies only to LFFPs

for which the United States patent right has been exhausted by

first sale in the United States. Imported LFFPs of solely

foreign provenance are not immunized from infringement of

United States patents by the nature of their refurbishment.

Application of the Law

In the Commission’s Initial Determination the administra-

tive judge, applying the four factors discussed in Sandvik

Aktiebolag, 121 F.3d at 673, 43 USPQ2d at 1623, held that the

remanufacturers had made a new LFFP after the useful life of

the original LFFP had been spent. Thus, the ALJ ruled that the

remanufacturers were engaged in prohibited reconstruction.

The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions

that the remanufacturers were not simply repairing an article

for which either the producer or the purchaser expected a

longer useful life, pointing out that the purchaser discarded the

camera after use. The Commission ruled that the respondents

were not simply repairing the LFFP in order to achieve its

intended life span, but created a new single use camera that

would again be discarded by its purchaser after use.

Although the Commission’s conclusion is supported by its

reasoning and reflects concern for the public interest, for

there was evidence of imperfections and failures of some

refurbished cameras, precedent requires that these cameras be

viewed as repaired, not reconstructed. In Dana Corp., for

example, the truck clutches had lived their intended lives as

originally produced, yet the court ruled that the “rebuild-

ing” of the used clutches was more akin to repair than to

reconstruction. The activities of disassembly and rebuilding

of the gun mounts of General Electric were similarly

extensive, yet were deemed to be repair. Aro Manufacturing

and the other Supreme Court decisions which underlie

l6a

precedent require that infringing reconstruction be a “second

creation” of the patented article. Although the Commission

deemed this requirement met by the “remanufactured”

LFFPs, precedent places the acts of inserting new film and

film container, resetting the film counter, and resealing the

broken case—the principal steps performed by the remanu-

facturers—as more akin to repair.

The Court has cautioned against reliance on any specific

set of “factors” in distinguishing permissible from prohibited

activities, stating in Aro Manufacturing that “While there is

language in some lower court opinions indicating that ‘repair’

or ‘reconstruction’ depends on a number of factors, it is

significant that each of the three cases of this Court, cited for

that proposition, holds that a license to use a patented

combination includes the right ‘to preserve its fitness for

use. ...” 365 U.S. at 345, 81 S.Ct. 599. Indeed, this

criterion is the common thread in precedent, requiring

consideration of the remaining useful capacity of the article,

and the nature and role of the replaced parts in achieving that

useful capacity. The appellants stress that all of the original

components of the LFFP except the film and battery have a

useful remaining life, and are reused. The appellants state

that but for the exposed roll of film and its container, any

portion of the case that was broken by the photo processor,

and the winding wheel in certain cameras, the refurbished

LFFP is substantially the original camera, for which the

patent right has been exhausted.

The Commission placed weight on Fuji’s intention that the

LFFP not be reused. The ’087 patent specification states that

forming an opening in the film package makes it _

impossible to reuse the film package. Therefore, it will

be impossible to refill a new film into the used film

package in order to reclaim a film package for reuse.

087 patent, col. 6, lines 14-18. However, the patentee’s

unilateral intent, without more, does not bar reuse of the

17a

patented article, or convert repair into reconstruction. See

Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1453, 43 USPQ2d at 1658

(“a seller’s intent, unless embodied in an enforceable

contract, does not create a limitation on the right of a

purchaser to use, sell, or modify a patented product so long as

a reconstruction of the patented combination is avoided”’).

Claim 7 of the ’087 patent is representative of those claims

that specifically recite the film container and unexposed film

roll, elements that are replaced by the remanufacturers:

7. A lens-fitted photographic film package comprising:

a light-tight film casing which must be destroyed to

open the same, having an opening through which an

exposure is made;

\ a light-tight film container having a film winding

spool therein disposed on one side of said opening in

said light-tight film casing;

a rotatable spool disposed on the opposite side of said

opening in said light-tight film casing from said light-

tight film container;

one end of said spool being exposed outside said

light-tight film casing; :

a film roll of unexposed film of which one end is

attached to said film winding spool in said light-tight film

container and which is rolled around said rotatable spool.

The appellants state that the film and its removable container

are commercial items, and that their replacement in a camera

can not be deemed to be reconstruction. As discussed in Aro

Manufacturing, the replacement of unpatented parts, having a

shorter life than is available from the combination as a whole,

is characteristic of repair, not reconstruction. On the totality

of the circumstances, the changes made by the remanu-

facturers all relate to the replacement of the film, the LFFP

otherwise remaining as originally sold.

18a

Several of the Fuji patents in suit are directed to specific

components of LFFPs, including the °495 (film path), ’774

(film chambers and film path), *111 (pushbutton), °200

(shutter mechanism), ’685 (recyclable LFFP body), and

RE ’168 (LFFP body) patents. For example, claim | of the

"111 patent is directed to a LFFP having a pushbutton

designed to avoid inadvertent activation during handling of

the camera:

1. A lens-fitted photographic film unit containing a

photographic film and being adapted to take photo-

graphs, comprising:

at least one plastic pushbutton formed integrally with

a wall of said film unit, only a portion of said pushbutton

being separated from said wall by a slit which surrounds

most but not all of said pushbutton, said pushbutton

being connected to said film unit by an integral bridge,

said pushbutton being adapted to be depressed inwardly

of the wall from an initial position and to move back

outwardly to said initial position when released;

and a barrier formed on an outer surface of said wall

surrounding said pushbutton only partially, said barrier

projecting outwardly relative to an actuating surface of

said pushbutton when said pushbutton is in said initial

position, said barrier terminating in two ends disposed

on opposite sides of said bridge.

The ruling of reconstruction as to these patents is incorrect,

because the remanufacturing processes simply reuse the

original components, such that there is no issue of replacing

parts that were separately patented. If the claimed com-

ponent is not replaced, but simply is reused, this component is

neither repaired nor reconstructed.

License

Fuji alternatively contends that the right to repair the

patented cameras is impliedly limited by the circumstances of

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sale, pointing to the instructions and warnings printed on the

covers of the LFFPs, and arguing that these constituted a

license limited to a single use. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.

Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709, 24 USPQ2d 1173, 1180

(Fed.Cir.1992) (the conditions of sale of a “single-use”

medical device may contractually restrict further use). The

administrative law judge found that:

A Fuji flash QuickSnap single use camera is in a box

and each of the box and the outer cardboard cover of the

camera has statements instructing the purchaser to not

remove the film and return the camera to the

photoprocessor and further cautioning the purchaser

about the risk of electrical shock if opened by the

purchaser. . . . [The packaging also] instructs the

purchaser that the single use camera will not be returned

to the purchaser after processing. Similar notations are

on [other cameras].

Initial Determination at 141.

A license is governed by the laws of contract. See McCoy

v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920, 36 USPQ2d

1289, 1291 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“Whether express or implied, a

license is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state

contract law.”). It was undisputed that no express conditions

of sale, license terms or restrictions attended the sale of

these cameras. There was no express contractual under-

taking by the purchaser. The administrative judge observed

that any issue of implied contract or license was-mooted by

the finding of infringement based on reconstruction, see

Initial Determination at 165, and made no findings on the

issues of contract or license.

Determinations of express or implied license or contract

are matters of law. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Un-

limited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 USPQ 474, 476

(Fed.Cir.1986). As stated in Hewlett-Packard, “A seller’s

intent, unless embodied in an enforceable contract, does not

20a

create a limitation on the right of a purchaser to use, sell, or

modify a patented product as long as a reconstruction of the

patented combination is avoided.” 123 F.3d at 1453, 43

USPQ2d at 1658. We do not discern an enforceable restric-

tion on the reuse of these cameras based on the package

statements. These statements are instructions and warnings of

risk, not mutual promises or a condition placed upon the sale.

See id. at 1447-48, 1453, 123 F.3d 1445, 43 USPQ2d at 1652-

53, 1657 (refusing implicit limit on modification of cartridges

designed to be non-refillable and sold with instructions

warning against reuse or refilling); Kendall Co., 85 F.3d at

1576, 38 USPQ2d at 1922 (holding that instruction meant to

ensure product safety and efficiency did not have contractual

significance).

These package instructions are not in the form of a

contractual agreement by the purchaser to limit reuse of the

cameras. There was no showing of a “meeting of the minds”

whereby the purchaser, and those obtaining the purchaser’s

discarded camera, may be deemed to have breached a

contract or violated a license limited to a single use of the

camera. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417,

424, 116 S.Ct. 981, 134 L.Ed.2d 47 (1996) (“An agreement

implied in fact is ‘founded upon a meeting of minds, which,

although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a

fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the

surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.’”’)

(quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261

U.S. 592, 58 Ct.Cl. 709, 43 S.Ct. 425, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1923)).

We conclude that no license limitation may be implied from

the circumstances of sale.

The Process Patent

The °649 patent ciaims two methods for loading LFFPs

with film and a film cartridge. In the method of claim 1, the

film is wound from the cartridge onto a roll in a darkroom;

both the film roll and the empty cartridge are then inserted

2la

into the LFFP and the casing is sealed. In the method of

claim 9, a film cartridge is placed in the LFFP and the film

leader is attached to a spool in the unexposed film chamber;

the casing-is then sealed, and an external apparatus winds the

film into the unexposed film chamber. The administra-

tive law judge found that the procedures of reloading film

into the LFFP shells, in the overseas operations for which

evidence was provided, infringed claims | and 9 of the

649 patent.

The defense of repair is applicable to process claims, as

well as to apparatus claims, when the patented process was

used in the United States and the patent right has been

exhausted for the articles produced thereby. Cf Hewlett-

Packard, 123 F.3d at 1455, 43 USPQ2d at 1659 (“When a

patentee sells a device without condition, it parts with the

right to enforce any patent that the parties might reasonably

have contemplated would interfere with the use of the

purchased device.”) Thus when the same process was used,

the patent right for that process was exhausted upon the

LFFP’s first sale in the United States. Again, however, for

respondents who refused to provide evidence to show the

methods they were practicing, we have no basis on which to

reverse the Commission’s judgment. -

Summary

The Commission’s ruling of reconstruction was based on

the acknowledged general activities of the remanufacturers,

and thus did not require evidence of whether any specific

additional procedures were performed, for such evidence

would not have affected the Commission’s ruling. How-

ever, a ruling of repair can not be open-ended, for there is

undoubtedly a stage at which permissible repair becomes

prohibited reconstruction. We can not exculpate unknown

22a

processes from the charge of infringing reconstruction.’ Thus

our reversal of the Commission’s decision does not apply to

LFFPs from those remanufacturing facilities for which

discovery was refused or where the evidence offered was

found incomplete or not credible by the ALJ. For those

respondents’ activities that were shown to be limited to those

steps considered by the ALJ, as set forth in the Initial

Determination at 108-109, see supra, and affirmed by the

Commission, we conclude that these activities constitute

permissible repair. For those respondents who refused to

provide discovery or access, or proffered incomplete or

“bench” evidence (a partial display created for litigation

purposes), or presented testimony that the ALJ found to be

not credible or inadequate, it can not be determined from the

record whether their remanufacturing activities are limited to

those considered by the ALJ and on which our ruling of

permissible repair is based. For those respondents, the rec-

ord contains insufficient basis on which to reverse the

Commission’s rulings.

Validity and Enforceability of the 649 Patent

The only patent whose validity or enforceability was

challenged is the ’649 process patent. The appellants argue

that a combination of the reference of Prontor-Werk with

either the Voightlander or Kodak reference renders the ’649

claims invalid on the ground of obviousness. These

references had not been cited in prosecution of the °649

patent, but had been cited in the ’400 patent in suit, and in

another Fuji patent that is not in suit. The ALJ found that

references containing the same teachings as the Prontor-

Werk, Voightlander, and Kodak references were before the

examiner of the ’649 patent. Substantial evidence supports

these findings.

> We take note that one of the original respondents admitted that it was

building new LFFP cameras in China. These imported cameras were held

‘to infringe, and are not part of this appeal.

23a

The ALJ found that there was no suggestion in the prior art

to combine these references to produce the °649 process.

Thus the ALJ ruled, and the Commission agreed, that

the combination of these references did not render obvious

the claimed process. No error in this ruling has been

demonstrated. The ruling that invalidity of the ’649 patent

was not shown is affirmed.

The appellants also argue that the administrative law judge

erred in not holding the ’649 patent unenforceable for

inequitable conduct, stating that the patentee should have

cited these references to the examiner since they were cited in

other patent applications. However, failure to cite cumu-

lative references is not inequitable conduct. The ALJ found

that the subject matter contained in these references was

before the patent examiner in a cited Netherlands patent and

Japanese publication. References cumulative to cited

references do not raise issues of withholding of material prior

art. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genen-

tech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 1014-15

(Fed.Cir.1991); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845

F.2d 981, 992, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1609 (Fed.Cir.1988).

The administrative law judge found that the respondents

had “provided no testimony that Fuji or its attorneys

prosecuting the 649 application had any intent to-deceive and

the record is devoid of any such evidence.” The appellants

have not directed us to error in this finding. The simple

absence of a reference from the prosecution record does not

prove deceptive intent; there must be evidence sufficient to

show, clearly and convincingly, the intent to withhold

material information in order to deceive or mislead the

examiner. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.

Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872, 9 USPQ2d 1384, 1389

(Fed.Cir.1988) (en banc) (“Inequitable conduct resides in

failure to disclose material information . . . with an intent to

deceive. ...”).

24a

The findings on the issues of materiality and intent are

supported by substantial evidence, and are affirmed. The

Commission’s ruling that inequitable conduct was not

established is affirmed.

Design Patents

The patented designs depict the exterior shape of the

camera. Figure | from the D ’750 design patent is

illustrative:

FiG. 1

The exterior design is unaffected by the “remanufacturing”

process; it remains in its original form in the outer box and

plastic structure of the LFFP. The respondents do not dispute

that their cameras have the same design as the original

cameras; indeed, their argument is that their cameras are the

original cameras, repaired for reuse.

For original cameras that have been permissibly repaired,

the principle of exhaustion applies to the design patents as

well as to the utility patents. The design patent right, like all

patent rights, is exhausted by unrestricted first sale in the

United States, and is not infringed by the importation and

resale of the repaired articles in their original design. The

- —_— Pe

25a

judgment of infringement of the design patents is reversed,

for those cameras for which the United States patent right was

exhausted as discussed herein.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of patent infringement is reversed with

respect to LFFPs for which the patent right was exhausted by

first sale in the Unite 1 States, and that were permissibly

repaired. Permissible repair is limited, as discussed herein, to

the steps of removing the cardboard cover, cutting open the

casing, inserting new film and film container, resetting the

film counter, resealing the casing, and placing the device in a

new cardboard cover. Included in permissible repair is

replacement of the battery in flash cameras and the winding

wheel in the cameras that so require. For these products the

Commission’s orders are vacated.

LFFPs whose prior sale was not in the United States, or

LFFPs remanufactured by procedures more extensive than

those we hold to constitute repair, or whose remanufacturing

procedures were withheld or insufficiently disclosed to the

Commission, remain subject to the Commission’s orders. For

these products the Commission’s orders are affirmed.

Any further proceedings in implementation of our decision

shall be taken to the Commission. By motions recently filed,

Fuji has asserted circumventions of the Commission’s orders;

this matter is appropriately considered by the Commission

on remand. In addition, Dynatec states that it has sold its

business, although no formal notice of substitution was

provided. Our ruling applies only to the entities who have

placed themselves before us.

This court’s stay of the Commission’s orders is lifted.

The parties shall bear their costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED); STAY LIFTED.

26a

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC VERSION

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL

TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20436

[Filed June 28, 1999]

Inv. No. 337-TA-406

In the Matter of

CERTAIN LENS-FITTED FILM PACKAGES

COMMISSION OPINION

INTRODUCTION

On February 24, 1999, the presiding administrative judge

(ALJ) issued his final initial determination (ID) in the above-

captioned investigation. He found a violation of section 337

by 26 respondents in the importation and sale of lens-fitted

film packages (LFFPs), products more commonly known as

disposable, or single use cameras. He found that each

respondent infringed six or more of the claims of the 12

utility patents at issue, but that complainant had failed to

carry its burden in proving that respondents had infringed the

three design patents at issue.

On April 19, 1999, the Commission determined to review

portions of the ID. Specifically, the Commission determined

to review (1) the standard of proof applied by the ALJ in

deciding whether respondents had engaged in infringing

reconstruction rather than permissible repair, (2) the ALJ’s

determination that complainant had failed to carry its bur-

den in proving design patent infringement, and (3) the

Ley a ee

27a

ALJ’s determination on utility patent infringement insofar

as necessary to correct certain clerical errors in the ID’s

infringement findings and conclusions of law. 64 Fed. Reg.

20324 (April 26, 1999). The Commission also requested and

received written submission on the issues of remedy, the

public interest, and bonding.

DISCUSSION

I. Background

A. The Products

The products at issue in this investigation are inexpensive,

disposable, single use cameras, technically referred to as

“lens-fitted film packages” or “LFFPs.” LFFPs are generally

constructed of a shell made of a plastic material such as

polystyrene. They are equipped with a button-activated

shutter, a lens, a viewfinder, a film advance mechanism, and

optional flash units and buttons. An outer cardboard cover,

containing printed information such as branding and instruc-

tions, encases the shell. LFFPs are preloaded with film and a

film cartridge. When pictures are taken, the exposed film

winds into the film cartridge. After taking pictures, a typical

consumer brings the entire LFFP to a film processor to have |

the film developed and receives back only negatives and

prints, not the LFFP shel! and its contents.

Two broad categories of cameras were at issue in this

investigation: (1) newly-manufactured LFFPs made by re-

spondent Achiever Industries Limited (Achiever), an entity

located in Hong Kong, and imported by respondent P.S.lI.

Industries, (PSI); and (2) “remanufactured” LFFPs supplied

by several Asian firms and imported by domestic respondents

other than PSI. The remanufactured LFFPs are made using

LFFP shells that were manufactured by Fuji or its licensees,

Eastman Kodak Company and Konica Corporation, and

obtained from film processors after the original film was

developed.

i

28a

B. Procedural History

This investigation was instituted on March 25, 1998, based

on a complaint by Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. (Fuji) of Tokyo,

Japan. 63 Fed. Reg. 14474. Fuji’s complaint alleged unfair

acts in violation of section 337 in the importation and sale of

certain LFFPs. The complaint alleged that 27 respondents

had infringed one or more claims of 15 patents held by Fuji,

viZ.—

(1) claims 1, 5, 6, 9, or 11 of U.S. Letters Patent

4,833,495 (the ’495 patent);

(2) claims 14 or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,855,774 (the

°774 patent);

(3) claims 1, 7, 8, or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,884,087

(the ’087 patent);

(4) claims 1, 19, and 22 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,954,857

(the ’857 patent);

(5) claims 1 or 9 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,972,649 (the

649 patent); ;

(6) claims 14 or 16 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,063,400 (the

400 patent);

(7) claims 1 or 11 or U.S. Letters Patent 5,235,364 (the

°364 patent);

(8) claim 1 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,361,111 (the ’111

patent);

(9) claims 1, 15, 23, or 25 of US. Letters Patent

5,381,200 (the ’200 patent);

(10) claims 1 or 7 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,408,288 (the

°288 patent);

(11) claims 1 or 28 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,436,685 (the

’685 patent);

29a

(12) claims 1 or 13 of U.S. Letters Patent Re 34,168 (the

Re ’168 patent);

(13) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 345,750 (the

D’750 patent);

(14) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 356,101 (the

D’101 patent); and

(15) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 372,722 (the

D’722 patent).

The Commission determined to institute an investigation of

Fuji’s complaint and referred the complaint to an ALJ for an

evidentiary hearing, the issuance of an ID on violation, and a

recommended determination (RD) on remedy and bonding.

On October 23, 1998, the Commission determined that

eight respondents (Boshi Technology Ltd., Fast Shot, Haichi

International, Innovative Trading Company, Labelle Time,

Inc., Linfa Photographic Ind. Co. Ltd., Forcecam, Inc., and

Rino Trading Co. Ltd.) were in default for failure to respond

to the complaint and notice of investigation. An evidentiary

hearing was held November 2-13, 1998. Ten respondents

that had filed responses to the complaint and notice of

investigation (Ad-Tek Specialties Inc., AmerImage, Inc,

d/b/a/_ Rainbow Products, Boecks Camera LLC, BPS

Marketing, E.T. Trading d/b/a Klikit, Penmax, Inc. PhilmEx

Photographic Film, T.D.A. Trading Corp., Vantage Sales,

Inc., and Vivitar Corp.) failed to appear at the hearing.

Eight respondents (the participating respondents) appeared

at the evidentiary hearing, viz., Achiever, Argus Industries

(Argus), China Film Equipment (China Film), Dynatec Inter-

national Inc. (Dynatec), Jazz Photo Corp. (Jazz), OptiColor

Camera (OptiColor), P.S.I., and Sakar International, Inc.

(Sakar). On December 4, 1998, the Commission deter-

~ mined not to review an ID granting complainant Fuji’s oral

motion to withdraw claim 16 of the °400 patent from: the

investigation. 63 Fed. Reg. 67918 (Dec. 9, 1998).

30a

On February 24, 1999, the ALJ issued his final ID, finding

a violation of section 337 by 26 of the 27 named

respondents.' The ALJ also issued his RD on remedy and

bonding.” Petitions for review of the ID were filed by

complainant Fuji, the Commission investigative attorney

(IA), and the participating respondents. On April 19, 1999,

the Commission determined to review the issues of (1)

whether the ALJ had applied the proper standard for the

burden of proof on the repair/reconstruction issue, (2)

whether the ALJ had correctly determined the issue of design

patent infringement, and (3) other infringement issues insofar

as necessary to make certain technical corrections. 64 Fed.

Reg. 20324 (April 26, 1999). The remainder of the ID

became the Commission’s determination pursuant to Com-

mission rule 210.42(h), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h). The Commis-

sion requested and received written submissions on the issues

of remedy, the public interest and bonding.

IV. Violation Issues Under Review

A. Standard of Proof on the Repair/Reconstruction Issue

1. The ID

The ID stated at page 96:

The doctrine of permissible repair is an affirmative

defense, see Dana Corporation v. American Precision

Company, 827 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The

party asserting an affirmative defense must prove the

facts that establish that defense by clear and convincing

evidence, see RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Says.,

Inc. 221 USPO 385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also

Symbols Tachs v. Option, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1580

'Fuji admitted at closing argument that one named respondent,

Opticam Inc, was not violating section 337.

? The ALJ issued his RD on remedy and bonding under Commission

rule 210.42(a)(1)(ii), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(a)(i (ii), as part of his final ID.

3la

(Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus respondents involved in the

alleged “remanufacture” have the burden to prove

by clear and convincing evidence that their actions

are a permissible repair rather than an impermissible

reconstruction.?

In holding respondents to the standard of clear and

convincing evidence in order to show permissible repair, the

ALJ relied on two cases, RCA Corp. and Symbols Tachs, that

involved the affirmative defense of patent invalidity.

Because of the statutory presumption of validity contained in

35 U.S.C. § 282, the facts establishing the affirmative defense

of invalidity must be supported by clear and convincing

evidence. S.S.1.H. SA v. USITC, 718 F.2d 365, 375. How-

ever, we are aware of no cases that impose the clear and

convincing evidence standard of proof in license defense

cases. To the contrary, Technical Development Corp. v.

United States, 597 F.2d 733, 746 (Ct. Cl. 1979), holds that an

infringer bears the burden of proving a license defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we determine

that respondents were required to carry their burden by a

preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ, however, did not rule against respondents merely

because they had failed to carry their burden of proof on

permissible repair. Rather, the ID contains detailed findings

on the activities of some of the remanufacturing respondents’

suppliers, and concluded that those respondents “are effec-

tively recreating the patented single use camera of complain-

ant and its licensees, and hence are involved in impermissible

reconstruction.” ID at 164. Thus, the ALJ affirmatively

found that those respondents were engaged in impermissible

reconstruction of a patented good. He found that the other

remanufacturing respondents were infringing Fuji’s patents

because they obtained their LFFPs from factories where Fuji

> The ID repeated this standard at page 164.

32a

was not allowed to inspect their remanufacturing processes.

ID at 133. Since there was insufficient information in the

record about the processes employed by their suppliers, id.,

those respondents failed to carry their burden of proof,

regardless of the standard of proof that was imposed.

Accordingly, we determine that application of the correct

standard of proof to the ALJ’s findings does not affect his

conclusions on the repair/reconstruction issue.*

-~

B. Infringement of Design Patents

1. The ID

The ALJ found that Fuji had not sustained its burden of

establishing that the three design patents in issue are infringed

by respondents. ID at 81. His determination was based on

(1) his interpretation of the case law to require evidence from

someone other than an expert, and (2) the fact that the

accused LFFPs are sold with outer cardboard covers that in

some instances have a private label, and in other instances

identify the source. /d. He found it significant that the

purchaser never removes the outer cardboard cover. /d.

The ALJ acknowledged the testimony of Fuji’s expert, Mr.

Bellows, who compared the ornamental design illustrations of

the D’750 patent with a sample of the imported Type 1 LFFP

without flash, and found them to be substantially identical.°

He compared the ornamental design illustrations of D ’101

with samples of the Type | LFFPs with flash, and found them

* The Commission did not review the ALJ’s findings and conclusions

of law on the repair/reconstruction issue. Hence, the ALJ’s findings and

conclusions of law on that issue became part of the Commission’s final

determination under Commission rule 210.42(h), 19 C.F.R. § 210.42(h).

* There were many models of accused LFFPs in this investigation. The

remanufactured models that use Fuji shells were referred to as Types 1-5.

LFFP Type 6 were newly-manufactured by respondent Achiever. LFFP

Types 7 and 7A were remanufactured using Kodak shells, and LFFP

Types 8 and 8A were remanufactured using Konica shells.

33a

to be substantially identical. Mr. Bellows also compared the

ornamental design illustrations of the D’722 patent with

samples of the imported Type 4 LFFPs with flash and found

them to be substantially identical. Mr. Bellows concluded

that the Type | LFFPs with flash of respondents Ad-Tek, Fast

Shot, and Linfa are substantially identical to the claim of the

D’101 patent; and that the Type 4 LFFPs with flash of

respondents Boecks, China Film, Dynatec, Forcecam, Jazz,

Klikit, OptiColor, Penmax, PhilmEx, Rino, and Sakar are

substantially identical to the claim of the D’722 patent. Mr.

Bellows testified that he compared the ornamental design

illustrations of D’750 with a sample of the Type | LFFP

without flash, and found them to be substantially identical.

ID at 80.

The ALJ correctly state? that, under ODDzOn Products,

Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.2d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997),

design patent infringement is a question of fact that the patent

holder must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. He

also noted that the requisite similarity between the patented

design and the accused article is determined by the ordinary

observer test, which the Supreme Court first articulated over

a hundred years ago in Gorham M.G. Co. v. White, 81 U.S.

(14 Wall.) 511 (1872). He interpreted Gorham to hold that

identity cannot be tested through the eyes of an expert, but

must be tested by an “ordinary observer,” quoting:

if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such

attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are

substantially the same, and if the resemblance is such as

to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase

one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is

infringed by the other. [81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 528].

Thus, the ALJ interpreted Gorham to require that the

comparison between the accused and patented designs must

be made not by an expert, but by an ordinary observer. Since

Mr. Bellows was an expert in mechanical engineering,

34a

camera manufacturing, and camera design, the ALJ found

that he was not “an ordinary observer” and, therefore, that

Fuji failed to carry its evidentiary burden. ID at 81. 9

We believe that the ALJ erred in his interpretation of

Gorham M.G. Co. v. White. The Supreme Court stated

in Gorham:

Experts therefore are not the person to be deceived.

Much less than that which would be substantial identity

in their eyes would be indistinguishable in the eyes of

men generally, of observers of ordinary acuteness,

bringing to the examination of the article upon which the

design has been placed the degree of observation which

men of ordinary intelligence give. It is persons of the

latter class who are the principal purchasers of the

articles to which designs have given novel appearance,

and if they are misled, and induced to purchase what is

not the article they suppose it to be . . . the patentees are

injured, and the advantage of the market that the patent

was granted to secure is destroyed.

Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wail.) at 528.

Thus, the Supreme Court did not state that expert testimony

cannot be usedto prove infringement, but rather that expert

testimony, which is a more exacting level of proof, is not

required to prove design patent infringement. Accordingly,

we determine that the burden of proof on design patent

infringement can be carried by expert testimony.

The analysis of design patent infringement first requires the

fact-finder to determine whether the patented design as a

whole is substantially similar in appearance to the accused

design. ODDzOn Prod. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.2d at

1405. Mr. Bellows testified that he reviewed the drawings of

the D’750, D’101, and D’722 patents and compared them to

the accused cameras, and determined that the designs were

substantially identical. His testimony was not challenged by

35a

respondents. Indeed, respondents have never disputed sub-

stantial similarity of design, either before the ALJ or in their

submissions to the Commission. To the contrary, respond-

ents’ counsel admitted on the record at the pretrial conference

that respondents were using Fuji LFFP shells that were

covered by the asserted design patents.°

—We have compared the accused LFFPs with the designs

claimed in the asserted design patents and have determined

that the accused Type | LFFPs with flash (e.g., CPX 173,

CPX 195, CPX 204) are substantially identical to the design

claimed in D’101, that the accused Type 4 LFFPs with flash

(e.g., CPX 186, CPX 187, CPX 188) are substantially

identical to the design claimed in D’722, and that Linfa (CX

266) and Vantage (CX 487C) sales brochures depict LFFPs

that are substantially identical to the design patent claimed in

D’750.’ See Avia Group Int’l. Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,

853 F.2d 1557, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(affirming a trial court

holding that “one needs only to look at the two . . . [products ]

to see that infringement exists.”)

We also determine that, as a matter of law, respondents

cannot avoid infringement by affixing a different design or

logo to the cardboard cover of the LFFP or by packaging their

LFFP in an outer carton. Under L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom

McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993),

“{djesign patent infringement relates solely to a patented

design and does not require proof of unfair competition in the

marketplace [citation omitted], or allow avoidance of

infringement by labeling.” Furthermore, the drawings in the

D’101, D’722, and D’750 patents show that each of the

claimed designs consists of a rectangular body with certain

camera features (e.g., lens, viewfinder) in particular locations.

6 See Prehearing Tr. 130-35, 141-46 (November 2, 1998).

7? Commissioner Crawford did not base her determination on a

comparison of the accused LFFPs and the designs claimed in the asserted

Jesign patents.

36a

There is no feature in the patented designs that is not visible

in respondents’ reloaded Type | and Type 4 LFFPs, even

with the cardboard cover in place. Thus, the cardboard

covers on respondents’ LFFPs do not cover over the claimed

design.

Based on our own observation of the accused LFFPs, the

testimony of Mr. Bellows, and the failure of respondents to

contest the allegations of design patent infringement, we

determine that Fuji has carried its burden of proof in estab-

lishing infringement of its three design patents.® Accord-

ingly, we reverse the ALJ’s contrary finding.

C. Clarification of Certain Aspects of the ID

There were a few technical mistakes in the ID, which we

determine to correct on review. Based on the stipulation

between respondent Achiever, Fuji, and the IA,’ we find-that

Achiever Type 6 LFFPs infringe claim 15 of the ’087 patent.

We find no infringement of claim 16 of the ’400 patent, given

that Fuji withdrew claim 16 of the 400 patent from the

investigation during the evidentiary hearing.” Finally, we

find respondents Labelle and Innovative in violation of

section 337. The ALJ omitted making a conclusion of law

concerning whether these respondents, who had been found

in default, had violated section 337. The ALJ’s findings of

fact support a finding of violation, ID at pp. 218-19, 221-23,

FF 18, 27, 28, 33, 34, and we accordingly conclude that

Labelle and Innovative have violated section 337.

* Based on the testimony of Mr. Bellows and the failure of respondents

to contest the allegations of design patent infringement, Commissioner

Crawford determines that Fuji has carried its burden of proof.

* §X-1, p. 5,9 12

'° Notice of Commission Determination Not to Review an Initial

Determination Amending the Complaint and Notice of Investigation

(December 4, 1998).

37a

V. Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding

When the Commission finds a violation of section 337, as

it has here, it must consider the issues of remedy, the public

interest, and bonding. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), (f), and (j)(3).

A. Remedy

1. General Exclusion Order

The ALJ recommended that we issue a general exclusion

order in this investigation. We adopt that recommendation.!'

The Commission has long held that a general exclusion order

is appropriate when there is proof of (1) a widespread pattern

of unauthorized use of the patented invention, and (2) certain

business conditions from which one might reasonably infer

that foreign manufacturers other than respondents to the

investigation may attempt to enter the U.S. market with

infringing products. Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and

Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-90, USITC Pub.1199

at 17 (1981) (Spray Pumps). In 1994, statutory standards for

issuance of general exclusion orders were codified in section

337(d);- which provides:

(2) The authority of the Commission to order an

exclusion from entry of articles shall be limited to

persons determined by the Commission to be violating

this section unless the Commission determines that—

(A) a general exclusion from entry of articles is

necessary to prevent circumvention of an exclusion

order limited to products of named persons; or

(B) there is a pattern of violation of this section

and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing

products.

19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see also Commission rule 210.50(c).

These statutory standards “do not differ significantly” from

the Spray Pumps standards. Certain Neodymium-Iron-Boron

'' We also adopt the ALJ’s findings in support of his recommendation.

38a

Magnets, Inv. No. 337-TA-372, Commission Opinion,

USITC Pub. No. 2964 at 5 (1996)(Magnets).

The Commission has established the following factors as

relevant in demonstrating whether there is a “widespread

pattern of unauthorized use”—

(1) a Commission determination of unauthorized impor-

tation into the United States of infringing articles by

numerous foreign manufacturers;

(2) the pendency of foreign infringement suits based

upon foreign patents which correspond to the domestic

patent at issue; and

(3) other evidence which demonstrates a history of

unauthorized foreign use of the patented invention.

Spray Pumps, USITC Pub. 1199 at 31-32.

Based on the record in this investigation, we determine that

there has been a widespread pattern of unauthorized use of

Fuji’s patents. There have been imports or sales by 26 of

the 27 respondents named in Fuji’s complaint. ID at 208,

FFs 6-53. Respondents identified over ten suppliers located

in Korea and China. ID at 208, FF 347, FF 348. In addition

to the 26 respondents in the business of importing, exporting,

or selling infringing LFFPs and the ten LFFP manufacturers

and remanufacturers in Korea and China, Fuji’s complaint

named an additional 16 companies believed to be in the

business of selling infringing LFFPs, but for which there was

insufficient evidence of importation for them to be named as

proposed respondents when the complaint was filed. ID at

209, FF 349, FF 351. The volume of imported infringing

products and the number of entities involved in importation

has increased greatly over the last few years. ID at 209, FF

352, FF 353. Moreover, it is often difficult to trace the origin

of the imported LFFPs because imported LFFPs often do not

identify the manufacturer on their packaging. ID at 209,

FF 350.

39a

The Commission has established the following factors as

relevant in establishing “certain business conditions” —

(1) an established market for the patented product in the

U.S. market and conditions of the world market;

(2) the availability of marketing and distribution net-

works in the United States for potential foreign

manufacturers;

(3) the cost to foreign entrepreneurs of building a

facility capable of producing the patented article;

(4) the number of foreign manufacturers whose facilities

could be retooled to produce the patented article; and

(5) the cost to foreign manufacturers of retooling their

facility to produce the patented article.

Spray Pumps, USITC Pub. 1199 at 31-32.

In this investigation, substantial sales of LFFPs in the

United States clearly demonstrate an established market for

the patented product in the U.S. market, and in fact,

throughout the world. ID at 209, FF 337, FF 352, FF 354.

The success of respondents in distributing their LFFPs in the

premium and retail markets demonstrates the availability of

marketing and distribution networks in the United States for

potential foreign manufacturers. ID at 209, FF 352, FF 353.

Furthermore, we determine that additional LFFP remanufac-

turing facilities can be set up at minimal cost. ID at 209,

FF 355, FF 356.

We deny Fuji’s request that the general exclusion order

and/or cease and desist orders include a requirement that all

persons importing LFFPs into the United States who contend

that their products do not infringe the asserted claims of the

utility patents in issue be required to report this fact to the

Commission and to the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) at

the time of seeking entry, along with an analysis of why the

LFFPs sought to be imported do not infringe Fuji’s patents.

40a

Such a provision is unprecedented and may be beyond the

Commission’s authority under section 337, which authorizes

only the exclusion of imported products found in “violation

of this section,” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d). In any case, Fuji has

not demonstrated a need for such a provision or explained

how it would benefit Fuji. In our view, requiring such

analyses would impose burdens on the Commission and

Customs that would likely outweigh any benefits to Fuji.

Customs can determine whether imported goods infringe

Fuji’s utility patents by disassembling the imported LFFPs. we

Our decision to issue cease and desist orders to a large

number of domestic respondents, which we discuss below,

will likely reduce the level of imports, and therefore diminish

the burden on Customs of disassembling and examining

imported LFFPs.

Fuji and the IA believe that it is appropriate for the

exclusion order to identify particular types of LFFPs found to

infringe Fuji’s claims as non-limiting examples of infringing

LFFPs. They have identified exhibits depicting diagrams of

LFFPs found to be infringing in this investigation, i.e.,

CX-742 through CX-748, CX-748A, and CX-749. We agree

that it would be helpful to Customs to have this information,

and therefore have attached these diagrams to the general

exclusion order. We emphasize, however, that the examples

are non-limiting and that LFFPs that infringe any of the

claims listed in the general exclusion order are covered by the

general exclusion order.

Fuji requests that the general exclusion order not be limited

to entries for consumption. It contends that even entries for

re-exportation, warehousing, or other purposes injure the

'? We note that Fuji, the IA, and respondents Achiever and PSI

stipulated that one cannot determine whether any claim of any utility

patent asserted by Fuji against respondents Achiever and PSI is or is not

infringed merely by examining the exterior of a camera made by

respondent Achiever in the form in which it is imported into the United

States. (SX-2)

4la

domestic industry, which exports millions of LFFPs per year

to foreign markets. In Certain Devices for Connecting

Computers Via Telephone Lines, Inv. No. 337-TA-360,

Commission Opinion at 11-12 (December 2, 1994), the

Commission determined that section 337 authorizes it to

exclude all types of entries, not just entries for consumption.

However, the Commission also determined that, because it

exercises its authority to exclude in “measured fashion,” it

would not exclude entries other than for consumption in most

cases. The Commission stated:

In future investigations, types of entry other than “entry

for consumption” may be restricted as appropriate in

light of the facts of a given case. A complainant that

seeks exclusion of other types of entry should present

evidence that activities by respondents involving other

types of entry either are adversely affecting it or are

likely to do so.

Id. at 13.

In this case, Fuji has made only generalized allegations of

possible injury to its foreign sales from entries for re-

exportation, transshipment, or other purposes, and has not

provided evidence of any particular adverse effect that is now

occurring or likely to occur in the future. Fuji has not

provided any information regarding the volume of these other

types of entries that are currently occurring or are likely to

occur once a general exclusion order is entered, and does not

identify any country in which its products are suffering from

competition from infringing products that have been shipped

via the United States. Since Fuji has failed to make an

adequate showing that the order should cover entries other

than for consumption, we deny its request.

Finally, Customs has indicated that a provision exempt-

ing LFFPs brought into the United States for personal use

would be important in avoiding potential problems in the

42a

administration of the general exclusion order.'’ Fuji supports

such an exemption.'" Accordingly, the general exclusion

order contains a provision exempting LFFPs brought into the

United States for personal use from coverage by the order.

2. Cease and Desist Orders

Section 337(f) permits the Commission to issue, in lieu of

or in addition to an exclusion order, a cease and desist order

directing persons found to have violated section 337 “to cease

and desist from engaging in the unfair methods or acts

involved.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). Cease and desist orders are

warranted with respect to domestic respondents that maintain

commercially significant U.S. inventories of the infringing

product. See, e.g., Certain Crystalline Cefadroxil Mono-

hydrate, Inv. No. 337-TA-293, USITC Pub. 2391 at 37-42

(June 1991) (Cefadroxil). Domestic respondents who have

defaulted are presumed to maintain significant inventories of

infringing products in the United States and are likewise

subject to cease and desist orders. Certain Agricultural

Tractors Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, Inv. No.

337-TA-380, USITC Pub. 3026 at 32, n.124 (March 1997)

(Tractors). Where respondents have failed to provide con-

trary information, the Commission infers the existence of

commercially significant inventories. Cefadroxil, USITC

Pub. 2391 at 41-42.

The ALJ found that in this investigation several respond-

ents, including at least Amerlmage, Argus, Boecks Camera,

BPS Marketing, China Film, Dynatec, Jazz, OptiColor,

Penmax, PhilmEx, PSI, Sakar, TDA, Vantage, and Vivitar,

provided information as to their inventory levels, all of which

he found to be commercially significant. ID at 210, CX-830.

The remaining respondents were either found in default or did

'S Letter from T. Spence Chubb of the Office of Unfair Import

~ Investigations to the Commission dated May 7, 1999.

'* Letter from Fuji’s counsel to the Commission, dated May 10, 1999.

ses 1A ate

ten te

ei aaa eam

43a

not supply contrary information. Accordingly, the ALJ

recommended that cease and desist orders be issued against

each of the domestic respondents.

Respondent Penmax asks that it not be subject to a cease

and desist order because it no longer has a commercially

significant inventory, having depleted its inventory during the

investigation. Penmax includes an affidavit from its presi-

dent, Mr. Yuan, which states that it has liquidated its stock of

unlicensed LFFPs, has no unlicensed inventory, and has

ceased buying any LFFPs that are not licensed by Fuji.'° The

Commission has traditionally issued cease and desist orders

during the period of Presidential review only to respondents

that have, or can be inferred to have, a commercially

significant inventory. Cefadroxil, USITC Pub. 2391 at 37-42.

We find that Penmax has made a credible showing that it has

no remaining inventory, and therefore will not issue a cease

and desist order against Penmax. Accordingly, we determine

to issue cease and desist orders against the following 20

domestic respondents: Ad-Tek, Argus, Boecks, BPS, Dyna-

tec, Fast Shot, Forcecam, Haichi, Innovative, Jazz, Klikit,

Labelle, OptiColor, PhilmEx, PSI, Rainbow, Sakar, TDA,

Vantage, and Vivitar. '°

'S Affidavit of Mr. Victor Yuan, President, Penmax, Inc., dated

May 5, 1999.

‘We adopt the findings made by the ALJ in support of his

recommendation regarding cease and desist orders.

Fuji’s complaint named an entity called Fast Shot at 7250 Harwill Dr..

Suite O, Houston, Texas 77036. On March 18, 1998, the Commission

served a copy of the complaint on an entity named Fast Shot by certified

mail at the address listed in the complaint. Although the Commission

received a signed return receipt for delivery of the complaint, it did not

receive a response to the complaint from an entity named Fast Shot.

Accordingly, on August 20, 1998, the ALJ issued an order to an entity

named Fast Shot directing it to show cause why it should not be found in

default. The show cause order was served by certified mail at the address

listed in the complaint. The Commission received a signed return receipt

44a

The cease and desist orders prohibit the twenty domestic

respondents from importing, selling, marketing, advertis-

ing, distributing, offering for sale, transferring (except for

exportation), or soliciting U.S. agents or distributors for

certain LFFPs, in violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of

1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The orders require

respondents to report the quantity in units and the value in

dollars of foreign-made LFFPs that they have imported and

sold in the United States during a one year reporting period,

and the quantity and value of covered LFFPS that remains in

inventory at the end of the reporting period. The report-

ing requirement continues in force until the respondent

has truthfully reported, in two consecutive timely filed

reports, that it has no inventory of covered LFFPS in the

United States.

B. REQUESTS FOR STAY OF THE COMMISSION’S

REMEDIAL ORDERS

The participating respondents asked that the Commission

stay any remedy order pending the outcome of the anticipated

appeal of the Commission’s determinations to the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). Re-

for delivery of the show cause order, but no response to the order.

Accordingly, the Commission found an entity named Fast Shot in default

on October 23, 1998.

On May 6, 1999, the Commission received a letter from an entity

named Fastcam Enterprise Corp. at 7250 Harwin Dr., Suite N, Houston,

Texas 77036, stating that it believes it may be the same entity referred to

as Fast Shot in Fuji’s complaint. While the name and address for Fastcam

and Fast Shot are similar, Fastcam was not named in the complaint and

was not properly served with the complaint or the show cause order->

Since the Commission strictly adheres to proper procedures before

holding an entity in default, we did not find Fastcam in default or issue a

cease and desist order to Fastcam. Nevertheless, since an entity named

Fast Shot was properly found in default, the Commission determined to

issue a cease and desist order to an entity named Fast Shot at 7250

Harwill Dr., Suite O, Houston, Texas 77036.

on er oe eV) | Par ee ee eS

2 te) As

4Sa

spondents Jazz and Dynatec argue that a stay is justified

under Standard Havens Products Inc. v. Gencor Industries,

Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 512 (Fed.Cir. 1990). Respondents Argus,

China Film, and Sakar do not rely on the Standard Havens

analysis but simply contend that the Commission should

allow importation and market presence by the remanu-

facturers “until and unless the appellate court(s) determine in

favor of any wholesale removal of” the remanufactured

LFFPs."’ Respondent PSI requests “temporary relief’ from

any cease and desist order for a period of six months so that it

can dispose of its inventory. In its reply submission,

OptiColor joined in PSI’s request for a temporary stay.

Under Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit considers the

following factors in determining whether to stay a remedial

order pending appeal: (1) whether the stay applicant has made

a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2)

whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a

stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure

the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where

the public interest lies. While all factors must be considered,

they need not be given equal weight. Jd. The Commission

has the authority to stay its remedial orders under 5 U.S.C.

§ 705. The Commission has adopted the basic framework set

forth in Standard Havens for considering whether to stay the

effectiveness of its orders. Certain Agricultural Tractors

Under 50 Power Take-Off Horsepower, Inv. No. 337-

TA-380, Commission Opinion Denying Respondent's Petition

for Reconsideration and Motion for Relief Pending Appeal at

9-10 (April 24, 1997) (Tractors Opinion Denying Motion for

'” The arguments of Argus, China Film, and Sakar on remedy, the

public interest, and bonding are based upon the proposition that the

Commission erred in adopting the ALJ’s determination that the

respondent remanufacturers’ activities constituted impermissible recon-

struction rather than permissible repair. Respondents made these

arguments in their petitions for review, and we find them no more

persuasive now.

46a

Relief Pending Appeal). However, rather than requiring a

showing of likelihood of success on appeal, the Commission

determined that it need only find that it has ruled on “an

admittedly difficult legal question.” /d. at 10.

Jazz argues that it has demonstrated a strong likelihood of

success on the merits in its petition for review of the ID

where it pointed out errors it believes were made by the ALJ

in deciding the repair/reconstruction issue. Dynatec submits

that the likelihood of success factor supports and justifies a

stay because the repair/reconstruction issue is an issue of law

that the Federal Circuit will review de novo, and because

“when harm to the applicant is great enough, a court will not

require a ‘strong showing’ that the applicant is ‘likely to

succeed on the merits.’” Standard Havens, 897 F.2d at 513.

Only Jazz contends that it will be irreparably harmed

unless the Commission stays its remedial orders pending

appeal, arguing that if the exclusion order is not stayed, its

business is likely to become “extinct.” It notes that in

Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit found that a movant

demonstrates irreparable harm where enforcement of an order

pending appeal would result in employee layoffs, immediate

insolvency, and possible extinction> Standard Havens, 897

F.2d at 515.

Jazz argues that the harm to Fuji if a stay were granted

cannot be considered irreparable since Fuji’s own witnesses

testified that Fuji has been aware of the reloading activity

since the early 1990s. Given that fact, Jazz argues that a

stay pending appeal would not substantialiy harm Fuji.

Respondent Dynatech similarly submits that a stay is justified

in this case because Fuji admitted that it knew that its

cameras were being reloaded years ago. Since Fuji delayed

for years before bringing this action, and allowed the

reloading industry to grow, Dynatech argues, Fuji should not

be heard to complain that the period of appeal will result in

any significant prejudice.

SS

47a

OptiColor’s submission on remedy argues that there would

be no significant injury to Fuji if the orders are not imposed

before Federal Circuit review of the Commission’s deter-

mination and that Fuji’s own conduct is incompatible with

any claim that it will be significantly harmed if the sale of

recycled LFFPs is not immediately halted. OptiColor states

that Fuji has watched the recycled LFFP industry grow to

major size and significance since 1992, but took no legal

action to stop it until 1998. OptiColor observes that since the

reloading industry began, there has been steady growth in the

volume of recycled LFFPs, [ ].

Jazz argues that the public has become accustomed to a

choice between new LFFPs and lower-priced used LFFPs,

both of which have been available for nearly ten years. It

contends that since Fuji allowed the remanufacturing to go on

for so long, thousands of U.S. jobs are at stake. Thus, Jazz

contends that the public interest will be harmed by excluding

the remanufactured LFFPs before the Federal Circuit can

consider the issue on the merits. It also argues that the public

interest in preserving the environment is served by allowing

the remanufacturers to continue to recycle used LFFPS.

Dynatech argues that the public interest is served by allowing

consumers an opportunity to purchase legally repaired items.

We deny respondents’ requests for a stay of the Com-

mission’s remedial orders pending appeal to the Federal

Circuit. Such a stay would be unprecedented and unwar-

ranted under the Standard Havens analysis, which the

Commission adopted in Tractors. Respondents have failed to

demonstrate that there is “an admittedly difficult legal

question” involved in this investigation. As indicated by the

Commission’s decision not to review the ALJ’s finding on

the repair/reconstruction issue, we believe that the ALJ’s

decision on that issue is correct. The ALJ’s determination on

repair/reconstruction is based on two leading decisions by the

Federal Circuit, Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Company, 121

48a

F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, US. _, 118

S.Ct. 1337 (1998); Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type, 123

F.3d 1445, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, US. _,

118 S.Ct. 1304 (1998). Those cases, as well as earlier

Supreme Court precedent, were considered by the ALJ who

found that the facts of this investigation are more closely

akin to reconstruction cases like Sandvik than to repair cases

like Hewlett-Packard. Although resolution of the repair/

reconstruction issue presents a question of law that the

Federal Circuit will review de novo, Sandvik, 121 F.3d at

672, its resolution is highly dependent on the facts of the

particular case.

As for the irreparable harm factor, only Jazz contended that

it would be irreparably harmed, absent a stay pending appeal.

However, Jazz cited no evidence to support its assertion that

it would become “extinct” during the appeal process. While

Jazz clainis that thousands of jobs will be lost, it has cited no

evidence to support its statement. We note that the imported

LFFPs are manufactured or remanufactured in Asia and that

the domestic respondents’ sales and warehousing operations

require relatively few employees. Moreover, the domestic

respondents may be able to continue their operations, if they

wish, with non-infringing goods.

Opticolor’s submission [ ]. Fuji has

suffered the loss of these sales, and has also suffered from

price erosion caused by respondents’ lower-priced LFFPs.

We reject respondents’ argument that a stay will not cause

significant harm to Fuji because of Fuji’s purported delay in

seeking relief from imported LFFPs. Rather, Fuji will be

irreparably injured by a stay that denies its patents the full

term to which they are entitled. See Tractors Opinion Deny-

ing Motion for Relief Pending Appeal Tractors at 16 (“{a]

stay pending appeal prejudices the complainant by depriving

it, in this case potentially for a year or more, of the relief to

which it is statutorily entitled under section 337”).

49a

The public interest generally favors the protection of

intellectual property rights. /d. at 17 (citing and quoting from

S. Rep. No. 100-71 at 128-29 (1987)). The fact that a large

number of suppliers and dealers have been successful in the

businesses of importing and selling cheap, infringing remanu-

factured LFFPs does not outweigh the public interest in

protecting the intellectual property rights that are being

infringed by those goods. While respondents argue that

recycling activities benefit the public, their argument does not

compel a finding that the public policy favoring recycling

should override the public policy favoring protection of

intellectual property rights. In any case, Fuji and its licensees

recycle LFFP parts in the United States, and respondents fail

to explain why their suppliers’ recycling activities, which

take place in Asia, are more in keeping with the public

interest than the recycling efforts of Fuji and its licensees.

Furthermore, the remedial orders are directed to new

infringing LFFPs, as well as remanufactured LFFPs.

PSI asserts that the unique nature of its “Message Camera,”

which uses double image film to present messages such as

“Happy Birthday” along the bottoms of developed photo-

graphs, justifies a six month postponement in the enforcement

of the cease and desist order against its products. Because the

“Message Camera” is an occasional novelty item, most often

sold in speciality retail stores such as party and card stores,

PSI submits that it does not directly compete with Fuji’s or its

licensees’ traditional single-use cameras, and that allowing

PSI to deplete its current inventory will have a de minimis

effect on Fuji and its licensees. PSI maintains that its request

is fair given that there are other single use camera distributors

in the United States that were not named as respondents in

this investigation by Fuji, and therefore will not be subject to

specific cease and desist orders. It argues that continued sales

by such nonrespondent companies will more significantly

affect Fuji’s market share than any transitional depletion of

non-competing cameras by PSI.

50a

We reject PSI’s argument that its Message Camera does

not compete with Fuji’s products. As Fuji points out, if a

consumer buys a “Message Camera,” he is in fact choosing

not to buy a “traditional” single use camera. More impor-

tantly, allowing a transitional period to deplete inventory is

contrary to the Commission’s policy of issuing cease and

desist orders to prevent sales from inventory. Providing a

transitional period to deplete inventory may also encourage

respondents to import heavily during the period of Commis-

sion investigations. Respondents have been on notice since at

least the filing of the ALJ’s RD on February 24, 1999, that

the issuance of remedial orders was a distinct possibility.

Respondents could have taken protective steps to avoid

having large inventories. See Tractors Opinion Denying

Motion for Relief Pending Appeal Tractors, at 14 n.7.

C. The Public Interest

Under sections 337(d) and (f), the Commission must

provide a remedy if it has found a violation of section 337

unless, after considering the effect of any remedy on (1) the

public health and welfare, (2) competitive conditions in the

U.S. economy, (3) the U.S. production of articles that are like

or directly competitive with those which are the subject of the

investigation, and (4) U.S. consumers, it finds that a remedy

should not be issued. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(e) and (f). There

have been only three investigations in which consideration of

the public interest factors has prevented issuance of a remedy.

The Commission denied relief in Certain Automatic Crankpin

Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA-60, USITC Pub. 1022 (1979),

because it found an overriding national policy in maintaining

and increasing the supply of fuel efficient automobiles and

that the domestic industry was unable to supply domestic

demand. In Certain Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes,

Inv. No. 37-TA-67, USITC Pub. 1119 (1980), the Com-

mission denied relief because of the overriding public interest

in continuing basic atomic research with the imported

i

- Sla

acceleration tubes, which were deemed to be of higher quality

than the domestic industry’s product. In Certain Fluidized

Supporting Apparatus, Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188, USITC

Pub. 1667 (1984), relief was denied because the domestic

producer could not supply demand for hospital beds for burn

patients within a reasonable time, and there were no

therapeutically comparable substitutes available.

We do not believe that respondents have raised any public

_interest concerns that should prevent the issuance of remedial

orders in this investigation. We do not find that the general

health and welfare are implicated in the distribution of

LFFPs, and there is no evidence that the U.S. demand for

LFFPs could not be supplied by Fuji or its licensees. The fact

that some retailers and consumers may have to pay a higher

price for LFFPs does not justify a determination that the

public interest in protecting intellectual property rights is in

any way outweighed. See, e.g., Certain Telecommunications

Chips, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-337, Comm’n Op. at 40-41,

USITC Pub. 2670 (August 1993); Cefadroxil at 40-41,

USITC Pub. 2391 at 46-47.

B. Bonding

Section 337(j) provides for the entry of infringing articles

and sales of such articles from inventory upon the payment of

a bond during the 60-day Presidential review period. The

bond is to be set at a level sufficient to “protect complainant

from any injury” during the Presidential review period.

19 U.S.C. § 1337). See also 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(a)(3)

(1998). The ALJ found that the compilation of price infor-

mation based on answers to interrogatories received from

respondents as of October 27, 1998 (CX-830), indicated that

the accused LFFPs have a wide price range. Evidence cited

by the ALJ supports his finding. ID at 212-213. The ALJ

found that, in view of the price variations, it was impossible

to calculate what level of bond based on price differentials

will protect complainant from any injury. Therefore, he

; 52a

recommended a bond of 100 percent of entered value, citing

Magnets, USITC Pub. No. 2964 at 15 (May 1996)(“[where] it

is impossible . . . to calculate what level of bond based on

price differentials will protect a complainant from any injury,

it is appropriate to issue a bond of 100 percent of entered

value . . . of the goods in question”). We adopt the ALJ’s

recommendation that bond during the period of Presidential

review be set at 100 percent of entered value as well as his

findings in support of his recommendation.

We reject respondents’ various proposals that the bond be a

lump sum payment based upon a royalty rate Fuji receives

from a particular licensee. We find that this royalty rate

would not protect Fuji from “any injury.” Moreover, since

the record contains adequate pricing information, we see no

reason to resort to royalty rates in setting the bond rate. Cf

Acid-Washed Denim Garments and Accessories, Inv. No.

337-TA-324 (1992) (bond rate based on royalty rate where

complainant did not object, and the record did not contain

adequate pricing information). In any case, a lump sum bond

is inappropriate where there is no way of knowing what the

volume of infringing importations and sales will be during the

60-day Presidential review period. We also reject Fuji’s

proposal that bond be set at 300 percent. That proposal is

apparently based on the lowest reported sales prices for

infringing LFFPs.

53a

APPENDIX C

PUBLIC VERSION

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL

TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C.

[Filed Mar. 23, 1999]

Investigation No. 337-TA-406

In the Matter of

CERTAIN LENS-FITTED FILM PACKAGES

[Cover Page; Abbreviations; Sections I-IV, VII, XII-XIII;

Additional Findings 4 1-5, 20-21, 29-31, 36-37, 54-78:

Conclusions of Law]

Final Initial and Recommended Determinations

Pursuant to the Notice of Investigation (63 Fed. Reg.

14474, 14475), this is the administrative law judge’s final

initial determination, under Commission rule 210.42. The

administrative law judge, after a review of the record

developed, finds that a violation of section 337 of the Tariff

Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1337) by certain

respondents has occurred.

This is also the administrative law judge’s recommended

determination on remedy and _ bonding, pursuant to

Commission rule 210.42(a)(1)(ii). The administrative law

judge recommends that the Commission issue cease and

desist orders directed to certain domestic respondents and a

general exclusion order and further recommends a bond of

100% of entered value during Presidential review.

* * * *

ABr

ARBr

JOBr

JORBr

CBr

CFF

CRBr

FF

SBr

SRBr

DBr

DRBr

ACSBr

ACSRBr

PSIBr

SX

CX

CPX

RXPSI

54a

{from Final Initial and Recommended

Determinations pp. viii-x, 1-5]

ABBREVIATIONS

Respondent Achiever Post Hearing Brief

Respondent Achiever Post Hearing Rebuttal i.

Brief !

Respondents’ Jazz & OptiColor Posthearing

Brief

Respondents’ Jazz & OptiColor Rebuttal Brief

Complainant’s Posthearing Brief

Complainant’s Finding Of Fact

Complainant’s Posthearing Rebuttal Brief

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings Of Fact

Staff's Posthearing Brief

Staff's Rebuttal Posthearing Brief

Respondent Dynatec’s Posthearing Brief : :

Respondent Dynatec’s Posthearing Rebuttal

Brief

Respondents’ Argus, Sakar, and ChinaFilm Post

Hearing Brief

Respondents’ Argus, Sakar & ChinaFilm

Post Hearing Rebuttal Brief

Respondent PSI Post Hearing Brief

Staff Exhibit

Complainant Exhibit

Complainant Physical Exhibit

Respondent PSI Exhibit

RPXPSI

RXACH

RPXACH

ROCX

PROCX

RDYNA

RPDYNA

RJZX

RPJZX

Tr.

DFF

DOCFF

CORDFF

DOSFF

CRRDFF

AFF

AOCFF

RJOFF

(RJFF)

JORCFF

55a

Respondent PSI Physical Exhibit

Respondent Achiever Exhibit

Respondent Achiever Physical Exhibit

Respondent Opticolor Exhibit

Respondent Opticolor Physical Exhibit

Respondent Dynatec Exhibit

Respondent Dynatec Physical Exhibit

Respondent Jazz Exhibit

Respondent Jazz Physical Exhibit

Transcript Of Prehearing Conference, Hearing

And Closing Arguments

Respondent Dynatec’s Finding of Fact

Respondent Dynatec’s Objections to Complain-

ant’s Findings of Fact

Complainant Fuji’s Objections to Respondent

Dynatec’s Finding of Fact

Respondent Dynatec’s Objections to Staff

Findings of Fact

Complainant Fuji’s Rebuttal to Respondent

Dynatec’s Finding of Fact

Respondent Achiever’s Finding of Fact

Respondent Achiever’s Objections to Complain-

ant’s Finding of Fact

Respondents Jazz and OptiColor’s Finding of

Fact

Respondents Jazz & OptiColor’s Rebuttal to

Complainant’s Findings of Fact

S6a

CORJFF Complainant Fuji’s Objections to Respondent

Jazz and OptiColor’s Finding of Fact

JORSFF Respondent Jazz & OptiColor’s Rebutal to

Staff's Findings of Fact

CRRJFF Complainant Fuji’s Rebuttal to Respondent Jazz

and OptiColor’s Finding of Fact

RJCL Respondents Jazz and OptiColor’s Conclusions

of Law

RSFF Respondents Sakar, Argus and China Film’s

Finding of Fact

OPINION

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By notice of investigation, which issued on March 18,

1998 and was published in the Federal Register on March 25,

1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 14474, 14475), the Commission instituted

an investigation, pursuant to subsection (b) of section 337 of

the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, to determine whether

there is a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in

the importation into the United States, the sale for

importation, or the sale within the United States after

importation of certain lens-fitted film packages by reason of

infringement of certain claims of certain patents, and whether

there exists an industry in the United States as required by

subsection (a)(2) of section 337. The complaint was filed on

February 13, 1998, under section 337 of the Tariff Act of

1930, as amended, on behalf of Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd.

(Fuji) of Tokyo, Japan. A supplement to the complaint was

filed on March 2, 1998.

Order No. 3, which issued on April 16, 1998, set a target

date of March 25, 1999. Order No. 11, which issued on

August 20, 1998, set a new target date of May 25, 1999.

57a

The claims in issue from fifteen patents owned by

complainant (FF 54) were identified ,in the notice of

investigation as follows:

(1) claims 1, 5, 6, 9, or 11 of U.S. Letters Patent

4,833,495 (the '495 patent);

(2) claims 14 or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,855,774 (the

774 patent);

(3) claims 1, 7, 8, or 15 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,884,087

(the ’087 patent);

(4) claims 1, 19, and 22 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,954,857

(the ’857 patent);

(5) claims | or 9 of U.S. Letters Patent 4,972,649 (the

"649 patent);

(6) claims 14 or 16 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,063,400 (the

’400 patent); !

(7) claims | or 11 or U.S. Letters Patent 5,235,364 (the

*364 patent);

(8) claim | of U.S. Letters Patent 5,361,111 (the ’111

patent);

(9) claims 1, 15, 23, or-25 of U.S. Letters Patent

5,381,200 (the ’200 patent);

(i) claims | or 7 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,408,288 (the

*288 patent);

(11) claims | or 28 of U.S. Letters Patent 5,436,685 (the

"685 patent);

(12) claims | or 13 of U.S. Letters Patent Re 34,168 (the

Re *168 patent);

' Order No. 47 which issued on November 9, 1998 was an initial

determination which granted complainant's oral motion to withdraw claim

16 of the ’400 patent. By notice dated December 4, the Commission

determined not to review said initial determination.

58a

(13) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 345,750 (the

750 patent);

(14) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 356,101 (the

101 patent); or

(15) the claim of U.S. Letters Patent Des. 372,722 (the

°722 patent)

The respondents identified in the notice were the

following: Achiever Industries Limited (Achiever) of Hong

Kong; Ad-Tek Specialities Inc. (Ad-Tek) of California;

Amerlmage, Inc. d/b/a Rainbow Products (Rainbow) of

Florida, Argus Industries (Argus) of Illinois, Boecks Camera

LLC (Boecks) of California, Boshi Technology Ltd. (Boshi)

of Hong Kong, BPS Marketing (BPS) of Washington State,

China Film Equipment Corp. (China Film) of China,

Dynatec International, Inc. (Dynatec) of Utah, E.T.Trading,

Ltd. d/b/a Klikit (Klikit) of Brooklyn, New York, Fast Shot

(Fast Shot) of Texas, Forcecam, Inc. (Forcecam) of

California, Haichi International Inc. (Haichi) of New York,

Innovative Trading Co. (Innovative) of California, Jazz Photo

Corp. (Jazz) of New Jersey, Labelle Time, Inc. (Labelle) of

Florida, Linfa Photographic Ind. Co. Ltd. (Linfa) of Hong

Kong, Opticam Inc. (Opticam) of California”, OptiColor

Camera (OptiColor) of Washington State, Penmax, Inc.

(Penmax) of California, PhilmEx Photographic Film

(PhilmEx) of California, P.S.I. Industries, Inc. (PSI) of

Florida, Rino Trading Co., Ltd. (Rino) of Korea, Sakar

International, Inc. (Sakar) of New Jersey, T.D.A. Trading

Corp. (T.D.A.) of New York, Vantage Sales, Inc. (Vantage)

of Illinois, and Vivitar Corp. (Vivitar) of California.

? While Opticam is referred to in the notice of investigation and

complaint, complainant at closing argument (Tr. at 4073 to 4075)

admitted that Opticam is not violating section 337. As the notice

indicated, with the exception of Opticam, there are twenty one domestic

respondents of the twenty-six identified respondents.

59a

“The notice of investigation did not identify which

respondent is alleged to infringe which patent in issue.

Moreover while the notice identified fifteen patents in issue

and twenty-six respondents, excluding Opticam, the alle-

gations of complainant in the complaint were not coextensive

with each of the respondents. For example while the notice

identifies claims 1, 7, 8 or 15 of the ’087 patent to be in issue,

respondents Ad-Tek, AmerImage, Boecks, BSP, China Film,

Fast Shot, Forcecam, Innovative, Labelle, Linfa, Penmax,

PhilmEx, Rino, Sakar, T.D.A. and Vantage are alleged to

infringe only claims | and 8. Respondent PSI is alleged to

infringe only claims 1, 7 and 15. Respondents Achiever and

Vivitar are alleged to infringe only claims 7 and 15. Re-

spondents Argus, Boshi, Dynatec, E.T. Trading, Haichi, Jazz

and Opticolor are alleged to infringe claims 1, 7; 8 and 15.

Only respondents Achiever, Argus, China Film, Dynatec,

Jazz, OptiColor, PSI and Sakar participated in the hearing.

The following respondents, while not participating in the

hearing, did file a response to the complaint and notice of

investigation: Ad-Tek, Rainbow, Boecks, BPS, Klikit,

Penmax, PhilmEx, T.D.A., Vantage and Vivitar.

Respondents Boshi, Fast Shot, Haichi, Innovative, Labelle,

Linfa, Forcecam and Rino filed no response to the complaint

and notice of investigation. Order No. 23, which issued on

September 25, 1998, was an initial determination and found

Boshi, Fast Shot, Haichi, Innovative, Labelle and Linfa in

default pursuant to Commission rule 210.16. Order No. 24,

which also issued on September 25, found Forcecam and

Rino in default pursuant to Commission rule 210.16. On

October 23, the Commission determined not to review Order

Nos. 23 and 24.

The prehearing conference and hearing were conducted on

November 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, 1998.

Following the filing of post-hearing submissions, closing

arguments were heard on January 8, 1999.

60a

The matter is now ready for a decision.

These initial and recommended determinations are based

on the record compiled at the hearing and the exhibits

admitted into evidence. The administrative law judge has

also taken into account his observation of the witnesses who

appeared before him during the hearing. Proposed findings

submitted by the parties not herein adopted, in the form

submitted or in substance, are rejected as either not supported

by the evidence or as involving immaterial matter and/or as

irrelevant. The findings of fact included herein have

references to supporting evidence in the record. Such

references are intended to serve as guides to the testimony

and exhibits supporting the findings of fact. They do not

necessarily represent complete summaries of the evidence

supporting said findings.

Il. PRODUCTS IN ISSUE

The products in issue are single use cameras, also known

as “lens-fitted film packages” or “LFFPs.” (FF 1).? Single

use cameras are relatively inexpensive, disposable cameras

which are pre-loaded with film and a film cartridge so that

after use, all of the film has been advanced into the film

cartridge. (FF 1).

lll. PARTIES

See FF 6-53.

[V. IMPORTATION

Each of the respondents that appeared at the hearing

admitted importation of the accused LFFPs into the United

States. (SX-3). Also there is evidence that respondents are

involved in the importation of accused LFFPs into the United

> The terms “LFFP,” single use cameras and one-time-use cameras are

used interchangeably in the initial and recommended determinations.

6la

States. (See FF 6-53). Thus the Commission has in rem

jurisdiction. It also has in personam jurisdiction over at least

respondents Achiever, Argus, China Film, Dynatec, Jazz,

OptiColor, PSI and Sakar who participated at the hearing.

* ** * &

[from Final Initial and Recommended

Determinations pp. 95-165]

VII. Repair-Reconstruction Issue Involving Alleged “Re-

manufactured” Single Use Cameras

Respondents Jazz and OptiColor argued that the “most

important issue in this proceeding is the repair versus

reconstruction issue.” (JOBr at 2). Respondent Dynatec

argued that the “legal issue presented in this case focuses on a

determination as to whether Dynatec’s FunPack cameras are

repaired or reconstructed under governing legal authority.”

(DBr at 3). Respondents Argus, China Film and Sakar argued

that the “principal focus in this case is on recycled,

reconditioned lens-fitted film packages (‘LFFP’) devices sold

into national and international commerce.” (ACSBr at 3).°°

Thus respondents appearing at the hearing, with the exception

of respondent Achiever, have raised the defense of

permissible repair in response to complainant’s allegation of

infringement as to the “remanufactured” single use cameras.

The doctrine of permissible repair is an affirmative

defense, see Dana Corporation v. American Precision

Company, 827 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The party

asserting an affirmative defense must prove the facts that

establish that defense by clear and convincing evidence, see

* For PSI's reloaded SmileTime cameras, PSI adopts the arguments

and authorities “set forth by co-respondents in support of a determination

of non-infringement under the first sale doctrine and by virtue of

permissible repair.” (PSIBr at 1).

62a

RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q.

385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Symbols Techs v. Opticon,

Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus,

respondents involved in the alleged “remanufacture” have the

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their

actions are a permissible repair rather than an impermissible

reconstruction.

Respondents Jazz and OptiColor argued, in support of their

affirmative defense of permissible repair, that Jazz and

OptiColor, as subsequent owners of the product, have an

implied license to use the product and that the implied license

includes the right to repair the patented product (JOBr at

24-31); that the evidence shows that the “reconditioning”

processes used by Jazz and OptiColor do not amount to a

second creation of a single use camera but rather shows that

the accused processes are a permissible repair; that a single

use camera has a useful life beyond one roll of film; that the

accused processes are simple, quick, and involve relatively

few steps; and that the nature and design of the single use

camera supports a finding that the actions of respondents

involved in the alleged “remanufacture” are a permissible

repair. (JOBr at 47-93). -

Respondent Dynatec, in support of its affirmative defense

of permissible repair, argued that complainant sold its single

use cameras without any contractual limitation and thus is

precluded from preventing the “legal repair” and subsequent

resale of the single use cameras (DBr at 7); that the single use

cameras have a useable life remaining after certain limited

elements are spent; that a finding of reconstruction cannot be

based upon a change in the patented combination’s

performance or capacity; that allegations of the low quality

condition of repaired products does not establish recon-

struction; that complainant has acknowledged the repair-

ability of its single use cameras; that Dynatec’s process of

disassembly, replacement, and modification of elements of a

63a

single use camera and subsequent reassembly constitutes

permissible repair; and that “remanufacturing” the previ-

ously used single use camera “according to the patentee’s

instructions or procedures” constitutes permissible repair.

(DBr at 7-39).*4

Respondents Argus, China Film and Sakar in support of the

affirmative defense of permissible repair argued that they

have an implied license to use the single use cameras and this

license includes the right to repair the single use camera

(ACSBr at 6); that their processes are inexpensive, efficient

and make no substantial changes to the single use camera;

and that their processes are a permissible repair rather than a

reconstruction. (ACSBr at 6-7).

Complainant argued that no respondent or its suppliers

have any license, express or implied, to do anything, much

less reconstruct the single use cameras (CBr 103-122); that

the nature of the actions of the respondents involved in the

alleged “remanufacture” support a finding that their processes

involve an impermissible reconstruction; that the nature of the

single use camera and how it was designed support a finding

that the alleged “remanufacture” is not a permissible repair;

that the fact that no market for spare parts for single use

cameras has developed supports the finding that the alleged

“remanufacture” is impermissible reconstruction; and that the

intent of complainant supports a finding that the alleged

“remanufacture” in issue is impermissible reconstruction of

the single use cameras. (CBr at 122-134).

** The term “according to the patentee’s instructions or procedures” is

in the subheading for section e (DBr at 16). The administrative law judge

finds nothing in section e (DBr at 16 to 20) which explains the phrase

“according to the patentee’s instructions or procedures.”

” Complainant is the owner by assignment of the patents in issue.

(FF 54).

64a

The staff argued that when complainant and its licensees

sell a single use camera, each end user acquires a license to

use the product until it is spent, and that the single use camera

is spent when the original roll of film is exposed (SBr at 48);

that the actions of the respondents involved in the alleged

“remanufacture” in reconditioning and reloading spent single

use cameras constitute the making of a new article, or

reconstruction, rather than the repair of an unspent article;

and that the fact that the complainant did not intend for its

products to be reloaded is a factor tending to prove that the

alleged “remanufacture” processes are infringing recon-

struction. (SBr at 46-55).

On August 12, 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Hewlett-

Packard Company v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil 123 F.3d 1445

(Fed. Cir. 1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998) )

(Hewlett). In Hewlett, the Court concluded that while there is .

no bright-line test for determining whether a modification is a

“reconstruction” sufficient to infringe a patent owned by the

seller of a product, the district court did not err in granting the

motion of the accused infringer Repeat-O-Type Stencil

(ROT) for summary judgement of non-infringement of

certain patents of Hewlett-Packard Company (HP). It found

that HP sold ink jet cartridges without condition or

restriction; that ROT lawfully purchased two types of HP

brand new ink jet cartridges model HP 516525A (known

within HP as the “Kukla” cartridge) and model HP 51608A

(known within HP as the “Stanley” cartridge) and

disregarding HP’s instructions the purchaser ROT modified

them; and that the modification was more akin to permissible

repair than to impermissible reconstruction. Hewlett 123 F.3d

at 1451, 1452, 1454.

On August 7, 1997, the Federal Circuit, five days prior to

its decision in Hewlett, decided Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J.

Company et. al 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert denied,

ns

65a

118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998) (Sandvik). The Court referred to a

number of factors to consider in determining whether a party

has made a “new” article. Those factors included

the nature of the actions by the alleged infringer;

b. the nature of the device and how it is designed

(namely, whether one of the components of the

patented combination has a shorter useful life than

the whole);

c. whether a market has developed to manufacture or

service “the part at issue”; and

d. objective evidence of the intent of the patentee.*°

Sandvik 121F.3d at 673. The Court concluded that, while

there is no bright line test for determining whether

reconstruction or repair has occurred, under “the totality of

the circumstances” and based on all the facts in the case the

alleged infringer E.J. Company (E.J .) had made a new article,

after the device in issue had become spent, i.e., E.J. was

reconstructing an otherwise spent device when “it retips

Sandvik’s drills” and accordingly that E.J. infringed the

patents in issue Sandvik 121 F.3d at 673, 674.

A. The Sandvik Factors

1. The Nature Of The Actions By The Infringers

_ In each of Hewlett and Sandvik, pertinent to the

conclusions of the Court was the claimed subject matter in

issue and the nature of the actions of the accused infringers.

In the repair-reconstruction portion of Hewlett, the Court

focused on U.S. Patent Nos. 4,827,294 (the ’294 patent)

and 4,931,811 (the ’811 patent). The °294 patent, entitled

*° In setting forth these factors the Court concluded that an analysis

under those factors would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding

in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 365 U.S. 336 (1961).

121 F.3d at 673.

66a

“Thermal Ink Jet Printhead Assembly Employing Beam Lead

Interconnect Circuit,” was directed to an “ink jet pen” (i.e., a

cartridge), which formed an improved electrical connection

between the printhead of the pen and the ink jet printer

carriage in which the pen is mounted.

Claim 3 of the ’294 patent, which was representative, read

as follows:

An ink jet pen including in combination:

(a) a pen body housing having an ink storage

compartment therein and an ink flow port adjacent one

surface thereof and further having outer surfaces thereof

and further having out surfaces which are contoured to

mate with adjacent surfaces of a pen carriage member,

(b) a thin film printhead mounted on said one surface of

said pen body housing and adjacent to said ink flow port

therein for receiving ink from said ink flow port during

an ink jet printing operating, and

(c) a flexible electrical circuit member including a

plurality of beam leads bonded at predetermined

locations on said thin film printhead for supplying

electrical power and signals thereto during an ink jet

printing operation, said flexible electrical circuit being

extended over one of said contoured outer surfaces of

said pen body housing and secured thereto, whereby

electrical conductors in a pen carriage are adapted to

mate with certain ones of the said been leads of said

flexible electrical circuit for supplying power and

electrical drive signals to said beam leads when said pen

body housing is mounted in said carriage.

The °811 patent, entitled “Thermal Ink Jet Pen Having A

Feedtube With Improved Sizing And Operational With A

Minimum Of Depriming,” was directed to an “ink jet pen”

that uses a “standpipe” to improve the connection between

67a

the ink reservoir and the printhead by preventing air bubbles

from impeding the flow of ink to the printhead.*’ Claim 2 of

the ’811 patent, which was representative, read as follows:

2. A thermal ink jet pen including an ink reservoir

therein, and a thin film printhead interconnected to said

reservoir by way of a standpipe, with said standpipe

having an air accumulating section at the ink receiving

end thereof and said thin film printhead including an

orifice plate with a plurality of orifi therein of a know

radius, r subnozzle characterized in that the minimum

acceptable radius, r, of said air accumulating section of

said standpipe satisfies the equation r/r/ subnozzle $100.

Hewlett, 123 F.d at 1447, 1448. The Court, for interpretation

of claim 3 of the ’294 patent and claim 2 of the ’81] patent,

made reference to the following diagram, from the ’811

patent:

[insert diagram]

The Court then stated that as illustrated in the above diagram

the pen body construction includes a pen body housing (10)

and a cap (28); that the pen body also includes a foam storage

material (12) which serves as the ink reservoir, a standpipe

formed by walls (20) and (22), and a printhead (18); and that

the cap (28) has an air vent tube (30) for supplying air to the

ink reservoir as ink is transferred through the standpipe to the

printhead. 123 F.3d at 1448.

In Hewlett, ROT described its cartridge modification in its

own patent, U.S. Patent 5,408,256 (256 patent), entitled

“Refillable Color Ink Jet Cartridge And Methods For Making

Said Cartridge:”

A non-refillable color ink jet cartridge such as the

Hewlett-Packard #51625A can be converted into a

” The presence of the standpipe differentiates the claimed invention of

the ’811 patent over the claimed invention of the 294 patent.

68a

refillable cartridge. The upper portion of this cartridge

contains the three air vent/ink has refill holes, and this

upper portion has a plastic cap capable of being

removed., After placing the body of the plastic cartridge

on a suitable support such as, for example, the edge of a

table, the protective plastic cap covering the upper

portion of the cartridge can be removed by prying it off

. of a cartridge with a sharp instrument such as a knife.

The upper protective cap [26] can now be modified so

that it can be placed snugly back onto the main cartridge

body [12] as often as is necessary to replenish depleted

ink supplies. A variety of methods can be employed to

do this, including placing two adhesive backed pads [36

and 38] at both sides of the longitudinal length of the

upper protective cap.

256 Patent, col. 1, line 56 to col. 2, line 18. ROT sold the

modified refillable ink jet cartridges in kits which also

contained bottles of refillable ink. The refillable ink was not

manufactured or supplied by HP. In addition to modifying

the cartridges, ROT replaced the black ink of HP’s Stanley

cartridges with a variety of color inks and resold them as

color cartridges. 123 F.3d at 1449.

Referring to ROT’s modification, and as seen by the ’256

patent, ROT first removed the cap 28 with a sharp instrument

such as a knife and then, when HP Stanley cartridges were

69a

bought, replaced the black ink of the cartridges.** Thereafter

ROT modified cap 28 so that it could be placed snugly back

onto the new cartridge as necessary, i.e., the cap was made

removable and replaceable so that the new cartridge could be

refilled with ink numerous times.?? * Significantly in

matching ROT’s accused process, which the Court found to

be akin to permissible repair rather than to impermissible

reconstruction, to the claims in issue of the ‘294 patent and

the ’811 patent, ROT did not replace any elements

specifically recited in the claims in issue.*! Moreover in

Hewlett ROT was the original purchaser of a new cartridge.

In Sandvik, the patents in suit were directed to a drill with a

shank portion and a unique carbide tip geometry that had

specially configured cutting edges which resulted in a drill

suitable for high-feed machining with improved cutting

ability especially at its center portion, although the unique

carbide drill tip was not Separately patented. In issue in

*8 The Court pointed out that while the cap was not explicitly recited

in the claims in issue of the 294 and ’811 patents it agreed with HP that

the claims relate to ink jet cartridges, not to specific components within

the cartridges; that the preamble of claim 3 of the ’294 patent and claim 2

of the °811 patent clearly stated that the claims relates to an “ink jet pen

including” the recited limitations; that the claim term “including”

is synonymous with “comprising”, thereby permitting the inclusion of

unnamed components Hewlett 123 F.3d at 1450, 1451. However the

Court later stated that “ROT does not replace any of the elements recited

in the claims; the housing, printhead, standpipe, ink reservoir, and flexible

strip are all original components of the purchased cartridges” and that

“[u]sing the original housing, ROT only changes the way in which the cap

of an unused, new cartridge is connected to the remainder of the

cartridge” /d.

*° While ROT may refill the ink reservoir with ink, the ink is not

recited in the claims in issue.

“ROT in its ’256 patent taught that a variety of methods can be

employed to modify the cap of the new cartridge.

*' See fn. 38, supra.

70a

Sandvik was U.S. Patent No. 4,222,690 (the °690 patent)

(ALJ Ex. 1) and U.S. Patent No. 4,381,162 (the ’162 patent).

Claim | of the 690 patent provided:

A drill comprising a pair of cutting edges each starting at

the center of rotation of the drill and extending

symmetrically with respect to said center and curved

outwardly away from the direction of rotation of the drill

with a greater curvature in the radial inner portion than

in the outer peripheral portion of the drill when viewed

from the bottom of the drill, each of the cutting edges

being formed with a rake face starting at said center of

rotation and having a rake angle approximately equal to

zero at the radial inner portion of said rake face, said

drill having formed in said twister groovers close to said

starting end of each of the cutting edges to provide an

increase in rake face at the inner radial portion of the

cutting edge in the vicinity of said starting end of said

cutting edge.

The ’162 patent, a division of the 690 patent, described

and claimed similar subject matter. For example, claim | of

the ’162 patent claimed a method of drilling a bore using a

drill having “helical grooves and a pair of cutting edges

having a rake face.” Sandvik 121 F.3d at 670.

The Court reproduced the following Figures | and 2 of the

690 patent (ALJ Ex 1):

Tla

It then stated that the claimed drill of the °690 patent has a tip

(1), a shank portion (2), twisted grooves (3), projections (4)

with these projections bending and breaking the chips to

render them smoothly removable and a conical end having a

center point (11) at the apex of the cone and a pair of cutting

edges 10; and that the drill shank (2) is made of medium

carbon steel while the drill tip (1) is made of a more durable

carbide and is brazed to the steel shank (2). Sandvik 121 F.3d

at 671 to 673.

The Court in Sandvik observed that Sandvik manufactured

a commercial embodiment of the patented drill which over

time and use dulls and may require resharpening or

regrinding; that Sandvik expected the drill tip to be

resharpened, which was not contended as an infringement and

in fact issued guidelines explaining how to resharpen the tip;

that the accused infringer E.J. offered a drill repair service

which included resharpening and retipping Sandvik drills:

that E.J. retipped drills at the request of customers, who had

purchased the drills from Sandvik, when the tips could not be

sharpened; that according to E.J.’s vice-president some of

E.J.’s customers elected not to have the drill retipped when it

could not be sharpened any longer; and that Sandvik did not

manufacture or sell replacement drill tips. /d.

While respondents Jazz and OptiColor in their initial post

hearing submission argued that “every element recited in the

patented combination [of the °690 patent] after the word

‘comprising’ in the preamble” (emphasis in Original) was

being made by E.J and that E.J. was “truly making the entire

patented combination from a raw block of carbide,” (JOBr at

12, 13), the facts are to the contrary. Thus, as the Court

pointed out, while the drill shank (2) is made of medium

carbon steel, the drill tip is made of a more durable carbide

and is brazed to the steel shank. Moreover examination of

72a

Figure 2 of the ’690 patent shows that the drill shank while

it is not part of the tip is represented by the following claimed

phrase:

said drill having twisted grooves [(3) which is part of

shank 2] and means defining a cavity [cavities 6 and 7 of

Figs 5 to 8 of the ’690 patent] formed in said twisted

grooves close to said starting end of each of the cutting

edges to provide an increase in rake face at the inner

radial portion of the cutting edge in the vicinity of said

starting end of said cutting edge.

In addition and in further support that the tip made by E.J.

was not the entire patented combination, the °690 patent

(col. 2, lines 27-34) states:

Each of the tips 1 is made for example from cemented

carbide alloy in the form of a plate and attached to the

conical end of the shank 2 by brazing, or any bolt as a

throw-away piece. Instead of attaching the separate tips

to the shank 2, the tips may be formed integrally with the

shank 2.

As each of Sandvik and Hewlett made clear there is no

bright line test for determining whether reconstruction or

repair has occurred. Moreover, as is clear from a reading of

Sandvik and Hewlett, any consideration of a reconstruction-

repair issue is highly fact specific. Based on Sandvik and

Hewlett, both of which cases the Supreme Court denied cert

as reported in 118 S. Ct. 1337 (1998) and 118 S. Ct. 1304

(1998), it is at least necessary for the administrative law judge

to look at the alleged “remanufacture” as it relates to the

claimed subject matter in this investigation.

In each of Sandvik and Hewlett there was no dispute as to

what was being done by the accused infringers. In this

investigation there is a dispute as to what is being done by the

accused infringers because complainant was barred from

obtaining full and free access to the alleged “remanu-

SEE OER EPO ae BA OC

73a

facturing” factories of the respondents’ suppliers. In addition

there are admitted differences among the “remanufacturing”

processes. Moreover there is a variety of original LFFPs

which differ in construction. Compare e.g., Fuji’s Types 1

thru 4 LFFPs (CPX-137 to 144) and the Kodak Max (CPX-

150) and the Kodak FunSaver 35. (CPX-149).

Despite the differences with respect to the original single

use camera used in the alleged “remanufactures” and the

differences in the various accused “remanufacturers” as well

as complainant’s inability to obtain full and free access to the

suppliers’ factories, respondents involved in the “remanu-

facture” have admitted that every element of the claims in

issue of the ’087, ’495, ’774, °857, ’400, 168, ’364, "etl,

°200, °288 and ’685 utility patents are in the accused

cameras. The administrative law judge has further found that

complainant has met its burden in establishing that elements

of the claims in issue of said utility patents are in the accused

cameras as set forth in the infringement section VI A supra.

However, as each of Sandvik and Hewlett has done, it is

necessary to look at what the respondents are specifically

doing in their alleged “remanufacturing” with respect to the

claimed subject matter in issue. It is undisputed that said

respondents are not buying new single use cameras and then

performing actions on said new cameras which was done by

the accused infringer in Hewlett. Rather, said respondents

are using parts of single use cameras, which have been

manufactured by Fuji and its licensees and which have

already been used by the buyer of said cameras, to make

single use cameras that are admittedly covered by claims in

issue of the ’087, ’495, ’774, ’857, ’400, 168, ’364, "111,

°200, ’288 and 685 utility patents.

Although there are differences in the alleged “reman-

ufacturing” processes when each of said processes is looked

at, which differences the administrative law judge finds

significant, respondents involved in the “remanufacturing” at

74a

closing argument admitted to some common elements of said

processes. Thus regarding the nature of those processes the

staff, in its post hearing brief, argued:

From the evidence of the various suppliers’ reloading

processes, some common elements can be derived that

appear to occur during each process. These common

steps (not necessarily in this order) are removing the

cardboard cover, opening the LFFP body (usually by

cutting at least one weld), replacing the winding wheel

or modifying the film cartridge to be inserted, resetting

the film counter, replacing the battery in flash LFFPs,

winding new film out of a canister onto a spool or into a

roll, resealing the LFFP body using tape and/or glue, and

applying a new cardboard cover. The various suppliers

apparently use different versions of the process, . . . most

of which are more elaborate than the common elements

of the basic process would suggest. All and all, however

the Staff submits that to the extent the processes at issue

differ, those differences are not significant with respect

to the overall nature of the actions for purposes of

determining the repair versus reconstruction issue .. .

(SBr at 50-51].”

The respondents involved in the alleged “remanufacturing” at

closing argument agreed with the staff's characterization.

(Tr. at 4034, 4037, 4040).

Looking at only what respondents agreed to as the

elements of the alleged “remanufacturing” processes, and

looking at the claims in issue of the ’087, °495, °774, °857,

°400, °168, °364, ’111, °200, °288 and ’685 utility patents, the

administrative law judge finds that the alleged “remanu-

facturing” processes are not comparable to what was done in

” The staff, at closing argument, represented that it was not intended in

its post hearing brief to state that the details of the various accused

processes were not significant. (Tr. at 4040).

POM MTROCR Ee 6 eee

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75a

Hewlett where the alleged infringer bought a claimed unused

device and modified a cap on the device which Cap was not

specifically recited in the claims in issue. Rather the

administrative law judge finds that the alleged “remanu-

facturing” processes are comparable to what the accused

infringer did in Sandvik. This is shown by reference to

illustrative claims of each of the ’087, 495, 774, °857, °400,

"168, °364, °111, °200, °288 and ’685 utility patents.

The '087 patent

The administrative law judge finds that, with respect to

claim | of the '087 patent (see claim interpretation section

supra), the respondents in their process of “remanu-

facturing” Types 1-5 and 7-8A LFFPs; which produces the

claimed cameras (see infringement section supra) make a

lens-fitted photographic film package by (1) assembling

the light tight film casing which must be destroyed to open

same through the assembly of the front and rear covers

with the use of tape or glue, which results in the claimed

element “a light tight film casing which must be destroyed

to open same” (element 3 of claim | of the ’087 patent see

CX-732), (2) inserting an unexposed rolled film which

results in the claimed element “an unexposed rolled film

disposed on one side of said opening in said light tight

casing” (element 5 of claim 1 of the ‘087 patent, see CX-

732), (3) inserting a removable light tight container which

results in the claimed element “a removable light tight film

container” (element 6 of claim | of the ’087 patent, see

CX-732), (4) attaching one end of said rolled film to the

film winding spool which results in the claimed element

“one end of said rolled film being, attached to said film

winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’087 patent,

see CX-732), (5S) replacing the winding wheel in certain

instances, which results in the claimed element “means for

winding said rolled film into said light tight film container

and around said film winding spool” (element 9 of claim 1

oh a ee

76a

of the ‘087 patent, see CX-732), (6) enabling the winding

control means by resetting the frame counter which results

in the claimed element:

winding control means responsive to operation of said

externally operable member for allowing said film winding

spool to rotate so as to enable said rolled film to be

advanced by only one frame after every exposure; said

winding control means including” (element 10 of claim |

of the ’087 patent, see CX-732)

and which also results in the claimed element: F

a frame counter driven by said sprocket wheel, said frame

counter being provided with indications desig- é

nating a series of frame numbers and” (element 12 of claim i

1 of the ’087 patent, see CX-732)

and (7) that by resetting the counter the respondents also

enable the means for disabling said winding control which

results in the claimed element “means for disabling said :

winding control means responsive to said frame counter

;

:

indicating there remains on said unexposed film no film

frame capable of being exposed” (element 13 of claim 1 of

the ’087 patent, see CX-732).

The '495 patent

With respect to claim | of the ’495 patent (see claim

interpretation section supra), the respondents in their

process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 LFFPs, which

produces the claimed cameras (see infringement section :

supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film package by (1) 4

assembling the light tight film-casing which must be

destroyed to open same through the assembly of front and

rear covers with the use of glue or tape which results in the

claimed element “which comprises a light tight film case

which must be destroyed to open same” (element 4 of :

claim 1 of the ’495 patent, see CX-730), (2) inserting a ¢

film roll into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed

77a

element “a film in the form of a roll light tightly contained

in said light tight film case” (element 5 of claim 1 of the

"495 patent, see CX-730), and (3) inserting a film container

into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed element

“and a film container in which exposed film is wound”

(element 6 of claim 1 of the ‘495 patent, see CX-730).

The ’774 patent

With respect to claim 14 of the ’774 patent (see claim

interpretation section supra), the respondents in their

process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 and 7-8A LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) assembling the light tight film casing

through the assembly of front and rear covers with the use

of glue or tape which results in the claimed element “a

light tight film case” (element 2 of claim 14 of the ‘774

patent, see CX-731), and (2) inserting a film roll into the

LFFP shell which results in the claimed element “and a

rolled film” (element 4 of claim 14 of the ‘774 patent, see

CX-731).

The ’857 patent

With respect to claim 1 of the ’857 patent (see claim

interpretation section supra), the respondents in their

process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 LFFPs, which

produces the claimed cameras (see infringement section

supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film package by (1)

assembling the light tight film casing through the assembly

of front and rear covers with the use of glue or tape which

results in the claimed element “a light tight casing”

(element 3 of claim 1 of the ’857 patent, see CX-733), (2)

inserting a roll of unexposed film into the LFFP shell

which results in the claimed element:

a roll [of] unexposed film disposed on one side of said

Opening in an unexposed film roll receiving chamber in

iii

78a

said light tight casing with its outermost turn exposed to

side walls of said chamber and its innermost turn

surrounding an empty space; (element 5 of claim | of the

°857 patent, see CX-733),

(3) inserting a light tight film container into the LFFP shell

which results in the claimed element “a removable light

tight film container” (element 6 of claim | of the ’857

patent, see CX-733), (4) attaching one end of the rolled

film to the film winding spool which results in the claimed

element:

having a film winding spool therein disposed on the

opposite side of said opening in said light tight film casing

from said rolled film, one end of said rolled film being

attached to said film winding spool (element 7 of claim 1

of the ’857 patent, see CX-733),

(5) replacing the winding wheel, in certain instances, which

results in the claimed element “means for winding said

rolled film into said light-tight film-container and around

said film winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’857

patent, see CX-733) and (6) enabling the means for

winding the rolled film by resetting the frame counter

which results in the claimed element “means for winding

said rolled film into said light tight container and around

said film winding spool” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’857

patent, see CX-733).

The '400 patent

With respect to claim 14 of the *400 patent (see claim

interpretation section supra), the respondents in their

process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-5 and 7-7A LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make ‘a lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) assembling a light tight film case through

the assembly of front and rear covers by the use of tape or

ee eee

79a

glue which results in the claimed element “a light tight film

case” (element 2 of claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-

735) and which also results in the claimed element “and a

rear case section which is securely fixed to the rear side of

main case section and cannot be disassembled therefrom”

(element 11 of claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735),

(2) inserting a light tight film cartridge into the LFFP shell

which results in the claimed element “a separate empty

light tight film cartridge having a spool therein rotatable

about an axis of rotation” (element 4 of claim 14 of the _

’400 patent, see CX-735) and which also results in the

claimed element “said film cartridge being enclosed in said

light tight film case on one side of said lens” (element 5 of

claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735), and (3) inserting

an unexposed rolled film with one end retained in the film

cartridge into the LFFP shell which results in the claimed

element “an unexposed rolled film with its one end

retained on said spool in said film cartridge” (element 6 of

claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735) and which also

results in the claimed element “said unexposed rolled film

being disposed on the other side of said taking lens with its

outermost turn in contact with said film case” (element 7 of

claim 14 of the ’400 patent, see CX-735).

The Re ’168 patent

With respect to claim 1 of the ’168 patent, the respondents

in their process of “remanufacturing” Types 1-4 and 7-8A

LFFPs, which produces the claimed cameras (see infringe-

ment section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) opening the LFFP body which results in the

claimed element “a main case section which is open at

its front” (element 7 of claim 1 of the ’168 patent, see

CX-741), (2) inserting a roll of unexposed film which

results in the claimed element “and containing light tightly

said roll of unexposed photographic film” (element 10

80a

of claim 1 of the °168 patent, see CX-741), and (3)

reattaching the front cover section with tape or glue which

results in the claimed element:

a front cover section which is attached to said main case

section and closes said open front of said main case section

to cover majority of said taking lens and said shutter means

and said film transporting means (element 11 of claim | of

the ’168 patent, see CX-741).

The ’364 patent

With respect to claim | of the ’364 patent, the respondents

in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) unwinding film from a film cassette and

inserting the roll of film into the LFFP body which results

in the claimed element:

a film roll chamber disposed on the opposite side of said

taking lens from said cassette chamber, said film roll

chamber being adapted to contain a roll of said film which

is pulled out from a film cassette and wound in

a roll (element 9 of claim 1 of the ’364 patent, see

CX-736),

(2) inserting the film cassette into the LFFP body which

results in the claimed element “said cassette chamber

containing said film cassette (element 10 of claim | of the

’364 patent, see CX-736), (3) inserting a battery into the

LFFP body which results in the claimed element “a battery

for charging said main capacitor” (element 16 of claim 1 of

the °364 patent, see CX-736) and which also results in the

claimed element “said battery being disposed between said

cassette chamber and said film roll chamber and extending

in a horizontal direction below said taking lens” (element

17 of claim | of the ’364 patent, see CX-736), (4) attaching

1 = uh ni anne,

8la

the front cover to the LFFP body with tape or glue which

results in the claimed element “a front cover section

attached to a front of said main body section” (element 18

of claim | of the °364 patent, see CX-736), and (5)

attaching a rear cover to the LFFP body with tape or glue

which results in the claimed element “a rear cover section

attached to a rear of said main body section” (element 19

of claim | of the 364 patent, see CX-736).

The ’111 patent

With respect to claim 1 of the ’111 patent, the respondents

in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make a _lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) inserting a roll of film in the LFFP body

which results in the claimed element “a lens fitted

photographic film unit containing photographic film and

being adapted to take photographs” (element | of claim 1

of the ’111 patent, see CX-737).

The '200 patent

With respect to claim 1 of the ’200 patent, the respondents

in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 2-4 LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make a lens-fitted photographic film

package by (1) inserting a roll of film in the LFFP body

which results in the claimed element “a lens fitted

photographic film unit having a pre-loaded photographic

film on which an image is formed” (element | and element

11 of claim | of the ’200 patent, see CX-738).

The ’685 patent

With respect to claim 1 of the ’685 patent, the respondents

in their process of “remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs,

which produces the claimed cameras (see infringement

section supra) make a _lens-fitted photographic film

82a

package by (1) inserting film into the LFFP body which

results in the claimed element “a film supplying chamber

for containing unexposed photographic film” (element 3 of

claim 1 of the ’685 patent, see CX-740),(2) replacing the

winding wheel, in certain instances, which results in “a

film wind up wheel for winding up said film as exposed”

(element 8 of claim | of the ’685 patent, see CX-740), (3)

enabling the film wind up wheel to function properly by

resetting the frame counter which results in the claimed

element “a film wind up wheel for winding up said film as

exposed” (element 8 of claim 1 of the ’685 patent, see CX-

740), (4) enabling the wind up stopping mechanism by f

resetting the frame counter which results in the claimed .

element “a wind up stopping mechanism for preventing

said wind up wheel from rotating after film is fed by one

frame after each exposure by rotation of said wind up

wheel” (element 9 of claim | of the ’685 patent, see CX-

740), and (5) attaching a front cover to the LFFP body with

tape or glue which results in the claimed element “a front

cover secured to said film containing unit in front of said

photo taking unit” (element 14 of claim 1 of the ’685

patent, see CX-740).

The ’288 patent

With respect to claim | of the ’288 patent, respondents Ad-

Tek, Argus, Dynatec and Boshi, in. their process of

“remanufacturing” Type 1-4 LFFPs, which produces

the claimed cameras (see infringement section supra)

makes a lens-fitted photographic film unit by (1) inserting

a roll of film into the LFFP body which results in the

claimed element “in which a body contains photographic

film drawn out in a form of a roll” (element 2 of claim

1 of the ’288 patent, see CX-739), and (2) modifying

the film cassette, in certain instances, so that it mates

83a

with the winding wheel, which results in the following

claimed elements:

a spool in said cassette and thereby said film is wound

back into said cassette, said film unit comprising

(element 3 of claim | of the ’288 patent, see CX-739);

an axial hole formed in one distal end of said spool

(element 4 of claim | of the ’288 patent, see CX-739);

a pair of engaging plates, projected from said axial hole

in a position axially downward inside said axial hole,

and shaped in a rotationally symmetrical fashion at a

straight angle with respect to an axis of said axial

hole (element 5 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent, see

CX-739); and

a key way defined by a plurality of inner teeth formed on

an inside of said axial hole and axially upward from said

engaging plates (element 6 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent,

see CX-739);

wherein said winding wheel includes a drive shaft

integrally formed therewith (element 7 of claim 1 of the

°288 patent, see CX-739); and

said drive shaft includes a plurality of engaging teeth

formed thereabout, arranged at a regular pitch, extended

axially, and respectively engaged with said inner teeth.

(Element 8 of claim 1 of the ’288 patent, see CX-739).

Based on the foregoing, the administrative law judge finds

that the processes of the respondents involved in the alleged

“remanufacture” are more complicated than simply adding

film, battery and paper as argued by Jazz and OptiColor

(JOBr at 13) and also more involved than simply taking a new

claimed cartridge and modifying a cap of that cartridge,

which cap was not specifically claimed, as in Hewlett. The

Court in Sandvik stated “E.J. does not just attach a new part

for a worn part, but rather must go through several steps

84a

involving claims in issue to replace, configure and integrate

the tip onto the shank” 121 F.3d at 673. Based on the

comparison detailed supra, the administrative law judge finds

that the respondents involved in the “remanufacture” also

must go through several steps to “replace, configure and

integrate” the parts of a single use camera to make a

“remanufactured” single use camera; that they do more than

just add film, battery and paper; and that in their “remanu-

facturing” processes, they manipulate a variety of parts of the

single use camera directly reading on claim elements in issue.

In addition, referring to what is known about the processes

used in the alleged “remanufacture” the administrative law

judge finds that the individual processes used by the

respondents further reveal the nature of the alleged

“remanufacturing” processes and supports the finding that

those processes involved a reconstruction and not a

permissible repair.

The Jazz Suppliers

Jazz has four steady suppliers of LFFPs, viz. Peji, Ginfax

Vastfame and Boshi. (FF 218). Boshi supplies about 10% of

respondent Jazz’s reloaded cameras.’ (FF 219). In addition

to the elements of the Boshi process that are common to all of

the respondents’ processes, from what is known only from the

video, the Boshi process includes placing the LFFP camera

body in a machine which appears to be grinding down the

Fuji Film logo on the cowl surrounding the taking lens (FF

258); the side weld next to the film cassette receiving

“? While Fuji’s counsel received one videotape from a Boshi factory

(CPX-470), Fuji had no opportunity to visit the Boshi factory to

corroborate the video or to determine whether any steps were left out of

the video. Moreover the video, for example, gives no insight into how the

single use camera shells are obtained by Boshi nor in what condition they

are in when they are received nor what selection process is used by Boshi

to determine which shells will be used in the “remanufacturing” process.

85a

chamber is cut with a chisel like blade in a hand press (FF

258); the front cover is removed and then the film door on the

film receiving chamber is cut (FF 258); and then the front

cover is reattached with no effort to match the covers with

bodies. (FF 258).

According to the video the next step involves removing the

front cover again (FF 259); inserting a razor blade like tool

under the counter wheel and cutting or prying a mechanism

underneath the wheel (FF 259), Lorenzini testified that he is

not exactly sure what the worker is doing with the razor blade

at this stage, but that the worker is either working the frame

counter or completing the opening of the take up spool area

(FF 225); the front cover is then reattached to the LFFP body

(FF 259); the rear cover is pulled away from the main body at

the corner near the advance wheel and a metal ring is placed

inside the film cassette chamber in order to hold the back

cover apart from the middle section (FF 259); then the flash

unit is tested. (FF 259).

The following step, pursuant to the video, involves

measuring the leader of the film against a block and then

inserting the film into the LFFP body (FF 260); a worker then

manipulates the leader into the gap between the middle and

back sections and removes the metal ring holding the body

open (FF 260); at this stage, if the film door has been lost a

new door is added (FF 260); a worker then clips off the

engaging tabs of the film door (FF 260); then a worker inserts

a small metal hook between the film wheel and the engaging

pawl and pulls the hook back and tapes it down along the

back cover of the LFFP body (FF 260), Bellows testified that

the use of the hook under the film wheel is done in order to

disengage the stopping mechanism in order to reload film in

the one time use camera body. (CX-725, Q&A 103).

“* Jazz’s counsel admitted that an “appropriate cutting tool” is need

[sic] to separate the back cover from the main body. (JORCFF 2031).

86a

Thereafter, according to the video, the process involves the

winding of the film which involves inserting a spindle which

engages the film in the film receiving chamber, then placing

the LFFP body in a dark box and pushing the body against a

machine which winds the film (FF 261); a worker winds the

thumb wheel backward while the film is winding (FF 261);

then a worker removes the spindle while the camera is still in

the dark box and tapes the film receiving door shut. (FF 261).

In the next step a worker inserts a new battery and the flash is

tested and a frame is shot (FF 262), the cardboard inner

covering is then placed around the LFFP and the body is put

in a cellophane wrapper. (FF 262).

The video further shows that the Boshi process also

includes the modification of the film cassette in which a

circular ring is placed around the circumference of the spool,

then a worker uses heated dies to mold the teeth to the inner

circumference of the spool of the film cassette so that it

engages the teeth on the Fuji advance wheel. (FF 263).*°

Regarding the processes used by Jazz’s supplier Peji,

Lorenzini testified that he saw the Peji process and he

described the process as involving (1) the opening of the Fuji

Quicksnap at three points with some sort of tool, (2) placing

the camera in some sort of mechanical fixture and pulling a

lever so that the plastic is cut and the back can be opened, (3)

checking the flash, kicker, shutter and advance mechanism

*° Jazz and OptiColor argued that the respondents’ suppliers do not

manufacture or assemble the overwhelming majority of parts in the LFFP

(RJFF 15); and that respondents’ suppliers use intact, without assembly or

disassembly, the overwhelming majority of the camera and all its parts

originally manufactured. (RJFF 17). It is clear, from an analysis of the

common elements of the respondents’ processes and the elements of

Boshi’s process, that while the respondents’ process does not involve the

manufacture of a majority of the parts of the LFFP, the process involves

the manipulation, configuration and integration of many parts directly

related to the claimed subject matter in issue.

87a

and cleaning the camera, and (4) loading the film in a dark

box where the film is pulled from the cannister then the

canister and film roll are placed back in the camera ‘and the

back cover is put back on with a rub

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Appendix — Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission · 536 U.S. 950 | Frix