Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Haywood v. Ferguson

Supreme Count U S.

4

) 011856 AR 2 7 2002

No. COP THE CICA

In THe

Supreme Court of the United States

CLARENCE Haywoopo,

Petitioner,

VS.

FERGUSON, ET AL,

Respondent(s).

On petition for a writ of certiorari to

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CLARENCE HAYWOOD

FERGUSON, WARREN J. Petitioner In Pro Per

United States Courthouse Post Office Box 1262

411 West Fourth Street San Bernardino, CA 92402

Santa Ana, CA 92701 Phone: (909) 889-0401 ext. 210

RULE 14, 1. (A) QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

No. |: Is a Judge immune from liability for non-judicial actions, or

actions not taken in the Judge’s judicial capacity, and is a Judge immune for

actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction?

No. 2: When a judge know that he or she lacks jurisdiction, or acts in

the face of clearly valid statues or case law expressly depriving him or her

of jurisdiction, is judicial immunity lost?

No. 3: Can a Judge be liable for participating in a conspiracy if acts

indicating participation were taken by a judge otherwise than in his or her

judicial role?

No. 4: Is there a question of immunity for a Judge from liability if

Petitioner proves a conspiracy to obstruct justice, and the allegation is

brought under the authority of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 (3) and 1986?

No. 5: Is a Pro se Plaintiff entitled by Federal law to amend his

complaint to sufficiently plead?

No. 6: Does a law violate the Ex Post Facto clause if it:

(1) punishes as criminal an act which was innocent

when committed;

(2) makes a crime’s punishment greater than when the crime

was committed; or

(3) deprives a person of a defense available at the time the

crime was committed?

No. 7: What is the duty of a State Judge when he or she knows that a

state statute violates the United States Constitution?

No. 8: Can state courts apply retrospective law, that it applies to

events occurring before its enactment, and disadvantage the offender

affected by it?

No. 9: Can Congress or any state pass any “Lx Post Facto” law?

No. 10: Is dismissal proper pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12 (b) (6), where there are factual issues in dispute, requiring trial?

LIST OF PARTIES

I. Circuit Judge, The Honorable Warren J. Ferguson

United States Courthouse

411 West Fourth Street

Santa Ana, California 92701

2. Circuit Judge, The Honorable Pamela A. Rymer

United State Court of Appeals Building

125 South Grand Avenue

Pasadena, California 91105-1621

3. Circuit Judge, The Ilonorable Michael Daly I lawkins

United State Courthouse

230 North First Avenue

Phoenix, Arizona 85025

4. Clarence Haywood, in Pro Per

Post Office Box 1262

San Bernardino, California 92402

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 000... cececsceceeeeseeesseeneeees 8

PR Oe FU NS vciicisicatnsenpnninianclsosntensanidabidieaupsecsinitonsinhaidasieh 13

Opinion of the 9" Circuit Court of Appeals

February 27, 2002

Re Se Fel ED: sis civinennsisistniciniphitenianasindpeoiiadibasissismitnadiialisigatecbisia 17

Order and Judgment of the Honorable Christina A. Snyder,

dated October 19, 2000.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This honorable court has jurisdiction given that 9" Circuit Judges, the Honorable

Kozinski, T.G. Nelson and Tallman, on February 27, 2002, ordered that

Appellant's petition for panel rehearing is denied, and stated that no further

filings shall be accepted in this closed appeal. Please see Appendices A and B.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 496 —

504.

2. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (9" Cir. 1986).

3. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990).

4. California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 503

and W. 3 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995).

5. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S.167,

6. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall 386, 390 (1798),

7. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).

8. Michael Wayne Riggs v. California, No. 98 — 5021 (1999).

9. Clark v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary C.A. 4 (Md) (1961) 293 F. 2d 497

Certiorari denied 82 S. Ct. 1149 369 U.S. 877, 8L. Ed 2d 279.

10. Bradley v. Fisher, S.C. 13 Wall 351 - 357.

il. Beard v. Udall, 648 F. 2d 1264 (9" Cir. 1980).

12. Rankin vy. Howard, 633 F. 2d 844 (9" Cir. 1981).

13. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F. 3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000).

14. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (7" Cir. 1988).

15. U.S. v. Ward Baking Co., E. D. Pa 1963 224 F. Supp. 66.

16. US. v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 M.D. Pa. 1958.

17. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971).

18. U.S. v. Bufalino, C.A. N.Y. 1960, 285 F. 2d. 408.

Vv

35.

36.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED

Petibone v. U.S. Idaho, 1983, 13 S. Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L. Ed.

419.

U.S. v. Buck, P.A. 1860 Fed. Case No. 14 — 680.

Randal v. Brigham, 7 Wall, 523, 19 L. Ed. 285.

Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns, 407 — 413, 432.

Doc and Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F. 3d 1026 to 1029

(9 Cir. 2001).

Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,

446 U.S. 719 (1980).

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343.

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).

Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 — 06 (2000).

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F. 3d 1143, 1153 9" Cir. (2000).

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, [112 S. Ct. 266, 116 L. Ed 2d 9].

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 [87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed 2d 288 (1967)].

vi

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED

Balistrei v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F. 2d 696, 699 (9" Cir. 1988).

Fredericksburg v. Contra County Dept. of Health Services, 172 F. 3d

1176, 1179 — 1181 (9" Cir. 1999).

Pryer v. Seyforth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson, 212 F. 3d 976,

979 — 980 (7" cir. 2000).

Flyn v. Sandahl, 58 F. 3d 283 (7" Cir. 1995).

Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25.

ore v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F. 2d 1211, 1216

(9" Cir. 1980).

Spencer v, Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967).

McDonald v. Massachusetts, Supreme Court Reporter 178 — 181 at

pages 389 to 390 (1900).

FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES

Federal

28 U.S.C. Sections 2254, 2253, 2244(D), 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981,

1983, 1985(3) and 1986.

State

Penal Code Sections 667, 1170, 12, 667.5, subdivision (C) 1192.7

subdivision (C).

Vii

ARTICLES

l. ExPostfacto Clause of the 10" Section of Article 1.

2. Supremacy Clause of Article 6.

2N * THE CASE

Petitioner filed in the 9" Circuit Court of Appeals for a request for

authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. section 2254 habeas

corpus petition in the United States District Court, Central District of California.

Circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins took 3'/2 months to deny

Petitioner’s request. i

Please see 28 U.S.C. sections 2244(D). “The Court of Appeals shall

grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application no

later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.” Petitioner brought suit against

circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins for violating Petitioner's rights

to due process and equal protection of the American laws, please sec the 5", 8"

and 14" amendments to the federal constitution, and please see 28 U.S.C.

sections 2244(D).

Petitioner brought his action under the authority of Bivens v, Six

Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, pages 496 — 504.

The government argues that Petitioner’s suit is barred by the doctrine

of judicial immunity, that judges are absolutely immune from suit. The

government cites Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (9" Cir. 1986) as

the basis in support of their argument.

The government did not challenge Petitioner's Original Complaint, and

only challenged Petitioner's First Amended Complaint, where Petitioner

challenged California’ stitutional Three Strikes Legislation. Petitioner

alleged in his First Amended Complaint that the retroactive application of 667

of the California Penal Code, California Three Strikes Legislation, violates

the ex post facto clause of the 10" section of Article 1, and the supremacy

clause of Article 6 of the federal constitution. Please see Collins v. Youngblood,

497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990); and California Department of Corrections v. Morales,

514 U.S. 499, 503 and N.3 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1600 — 01, 1603 and n.3 (1995).

A law violates the ex post facto clause only if it: (1) punishes as criminal

an act which was innocent when committed; (2) makes a crime’s punishment

greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a person of a

defense available at the time the crime was committed. Please see Collins v

Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167; legislatures

may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or INCREASE THE

PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL ACTS. Please sec Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.

386, 390 (1798); and Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937). In

Lindsey the United States Supreme Court established the proposition that the

constitution “forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime

already consummated,” 301 U.S., at 401.

United States Supreme Court Justice, the Honorable Clarence Thomas,

delivered the opinion in the Morales matter and said: “Article |, section 10 of

the constitution prohibits the states from passing any ‘ex post facto law.’” In

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,41 (1990), WE REAFFIRMED that the

EX POSTFACTO CLAUSE incorporated “a term of art with an established

meaning at the time of the framing of the constitution.” In accordance with

this original understanding, we have held that the clause is aimed at laws that

retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for

criminal acts. Id., at 43 (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391 — 392 (1798); Beazell

v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 — 170 (1925). California Department orrections

vy. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 503 and N.3, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 01, 1603 and n.3

(1995).

THE HONORABLE JUSTICE STEVENS’ OPINION IN THE

MORALES MATTER: “In light of the importance that the FRAMERS

PLACED ON THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE, we have always enforced

the prohibition against the retroactive enhancement scrupulously. Any statute

that authorizes an increased term of imprisonment for a past offense is invalid.”

Please see Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), (unaniinous opinion), and

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).

The constitution provides that “NO STATE shall pass any ex post facto

law” Article 1, section 10. The Framers viewed the prohibition on ex post

facto legislation as one of the fundamental protections against arbitrary and

oppressive government, The Federalist no. 44, p. 282 C. Rossiter, Ed 1961).

Similarly, Hamilton counted the prohibition on ex post facto laws among the

three protections that he described as greater securities to liberty and

republicanism “than any the Constitution contains.” Id. No. 84, at 511; and

please see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390.

However, the Honorable Justice Stevens misrepresents the facts in

Michael Wayne Riggs v. California, No. 98-5021, where he stated that no

Federal Tribunal has yet addressed the question. Please see Collins v.

Youngblood, Supra; and California Department of Corrections v. Morales,

Supra.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, ican) Viens Bian

California, on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of

California, Fourth Appellate District No. 985021, decided January 19, 1999.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and

JUSTICE GINSBURG join, respecting the denial of the petition for a writ of

2

certiorari.

The Honorable Justice Stevens said: “This pro se petition for certiorari

raises a serious question concerning the application of California’s ‘Three

Strikes Law’,” Cal. Penal code Ann. 667 (West Supp. 1998), to petty offenses.

In 1995, petitioner stole a bottle of vitamins from a supermarket. The

California Court of Appeals described his offense as a petty theft motivated by

homelessness and hunger.

The Honorable Justice Stevens went on to say: “Nevertheless, there

are valid reasons for not issuing the writ in this case, neither the California

Supreme Court nor any federal tribunal has yet addressed the question.”

The Honorable Justice Stevens finally said:

The denial of this petition for certiorari, as always, does not constitute

a ruling on the merits. Moreover, since petitioner is asking us to apply

a settled rule of Eighth Amendment law, rather than to fashion a new

rule, his claim may be asserted in federal court by way of an application

for a writ of habeas corpus.

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction in Petitioner’s case given that

Petitioner has put before the California State Supreme Court, the United States

District Court, Central District of California, and 9" Circuit Court of Appeals,

Petitioner’s challenge to California’s unconstitutional “Three Strikes

Legislation,” alleging that the retroactive application of California Penal Code

section 667, California’s “Three Strikes Legislation,” violates the ex post facto

clause of the tenth section of Article | and the supremacy clause of Article 6.

Please see 28 U.S.C. 2254, and 28 U.S.C. 2253.

Allegations of habeas corpus petition must be accepted as true, for

purpose of appeal from denial with hearing, where neither state nor federal

courts had given hearing on factual issues. Please see Clark v. Warden, Md.,

Penitentiary C.A. 4 (Md.) (1961) 293 F.2d 479, certiorari denied, 82 S. Ct.

1149 369 U.S. 877, 8 L. Ed 2d 279.

Court of Appeals cannot affirm a district court’s judgment dismissing

petition for writ of habeas corpus unless record on appeal shows that district

court reviewed all relevant parts of state court record. Rhinehard v. Gunn,

C.A. 9 (Cal.) 1979, 598 F.2d 557.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 6, OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION:

State courts have not only power but duty to enforce rights secured by

constitution and fews of United States when such issues are involved in

proceedings before them. The supremacy clause of the United States

Constitution, at its textual core, provides that states are bound by federal law,

and nullifies any inconsistent state laws. United States Constitution, Article 6.

The citing of Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (9" Cir. 1986),

by circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins, as the basis of their argument

that they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit, is circuit judges

‘Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins’ attempt to create for themselves a jurisdiction

and discretion not given by law. Please see Bradley v. Fisher, S.C. 13 Wall 351

— 357; Ashelman v. Pope, 769 F.2d 1360 (9™ Cir. 1985); Ashelman v. Pope,

No. 84-1580, cited as 778 F.2d 539, (9" Circuit 1985); Ashelman v. Pope, 793,

F.2d at page 1074, (9" Cir. 1986); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9" Cir. 1981);

and Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9" Cir. 1980); Harvey v. Waldron, 210

F.3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000); and finally please see Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. 219, (7" Cir. 1987). Because Ashelman y, Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9"

Cir. 1986), is a fabricated, falsified, and obstruction of justice citation, and a

product and result of a conspiracy to obstruct justice by circuit judges Ferguson,

Rymer, Hawkins, Browning, Chief Judge Goodwin, Wallace, Sneed, Kennedy,

Anderson, Hug, Tang, Skopil, Schroeder, Fletcher, Farris, Pregerson, Alarcon,

Poole, Nelson, Canby, Boochevcr, Norris, Reinhardt, Beezer, Hall, Wiggins,

and Brunetti.

Because on December 12, 1985 the above named circuit judges came

together with the exception of circuit judges Rymer and Hawkins, to conspire,

one with the other, to overrule the legitimate and lawful holding of the honorable

senior circuit judges Choy, Sneed and Pregerson. Please see Ashelman v. Pope,

769 F.2d 1360 (1985). Now please see Ashelman v. Pope, 7$3 F.2d at page

1074, (9" Cir. 1986), bottom right hand corner, before circuit judges Browning,

Anderson, Skopil, Schroeder, Farris, Alarcon, Poole, Nelson, Beezer, Hall,

and Wiggins. Please see 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 (3) and 1986; U.S. v. Ward

Baking Co., E.D. Pa. 1963 224 F.Supp. 66; and United States v. Gilboy, 160

F.Supp. 442 M.D. Pa. 1958; and finally please see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401

U.S. 371, 380 (1971).

If one has knowledge of the conspiracy and with that knowledge

intentionally does some act or thing in furtherance thereof he may be held

liable. If so, he adopts as his own the past and further acts of all his conspirators.

No formal agreement is necessary, a tacit understanding is sufficient and it is

not essential that each conspirator have knowledge of the details of the

conspiracy or the means to be used. United States v. Gilboy, 160 F.Supp. 442

M.D. Pa. 1958.

CONSPIRACY: Evidence of the same intent or knowledge is required

to convict defendants for conspiracy to obstruct justice and commit perjury as

would be required to convict them of the substantive offenses U.S. v. Bufalino,

C.A. N.Y. 1960, 295 F.2d 408.

KNOWLEDGE OF INTENT ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE: The rule

that ignorance of penal laws is no defense to an indictment for their violation

has no application in a prosecution for obstructing justice, for the intent to

obstruct the administration of justice can only be present when there is

knowledge that justice is being administered. Please see Petibone v. U.S. Idaho,

1983, 13 S.Ct. 542, 148 U.S. 197, 37 L.Ed. 419; U.S. v. Buck, P.A.1860 Fed.

Cas. No.14,680.

CONCLUSION

If the alleged trespasser be a judge of a court of record, the only question

is: Was the act done a judicial act within his jurisdiction? Of this he is not the

judge. If it was not, and he has acted without his jurisdiction, he has ceased to

be a judge. Please see Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall.523, 19 L.Ed. 285; Yates v,

Lansing, 9 Johns, 407 — 413, 432.

No court can create a jurisdiction for itself by its own statement of

facts put on the record without any proceeding as the basis of such record.

Please see Ashelman v. Pope, 778 F.2d 539, (9" Cir. 1985); and Ashelman v,

Pope, 793 F.2d at page 1074, (9" Cir. 1986); and finally please see Doe and

Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026 to 1029 (2001).

Willful abuse of power, corrupt exercise of office, express malice toward

an individual and working intentional injury to him by means of false entries

made by a judge on the record of a court of general jurisdiction are not judicial

acts and not within the discretion of the judge; and satisfactory proof of those

facts is admissible in evidence in actions to usurp the wrong done by such

acts; to show that in the particular case the judges attempted to create for

themselves a jurisdiction and discretion not given by law. Please see Bradley

v. Fisher, S.C. 13 Wall. 335 — 357; Ashelman v. Pope, 778 F.2d 539, (9" Cir.

1985); and Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d at page 1074, (9" Cir. 1986); and

finally please see Doe and Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d

1026 to 1029 (2001).

l ; ENT

Ashelman is African American; Petitioner is African American, the

Honorable Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas is African American; and

the Honorable Senior Circuit Judge Choy, is a minority person; it appears to

Petitioner, from what Petitioner has observed and experienced, that judges

and prosecutors in the states of Arizona and California; district court judges;

in the states of Arizona and California; and the 9" Circuit Court of Appeals

would rather commit a crime before they permit an African American to win

or prevail. Please see Ashelman v. Pope, 778 F.2d 339, (9 Cir. 1985); and

Ashelman v. Pope, 793 at page 1074, (9" Cir. 1986); Doe and Associates Law

Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026 to 1029 (2001); Rankin v. Howard, 633

5

F.2d 844 1980 (9" Circuit); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9" Circuit) 1981;

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers

‘Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719 (1980); Harvey v. Waldron, 210

F.3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000); and finally please see Forrester v. White, 484

U.S. at 219; and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.

Please make judicial note that in, Ashelman v. Pope, 778 F.2d 339, (9"

Cir. 1985), the circuit judges cited as the basis to proceed, RULE 25; Rule 25

attaches and has to do only with Filing and Service. And also at the bottom of

the page in a footnote as the basis for the authority for their ORDER the court

said: “The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without argument

pursuant to 9" Circuit Rule 778 F.2d-14.” 778 F.2d-14 is Road Sprinkler Fitters

L.U. No. 669 v. N.L.R.B., 778 F.2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 1985); has to do with

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS.

Also please make judicial note that California State Attorney General

Daniel Lungren was one of the attorneys that argued the cause for the state of

California before the United States Supreme Court; where the United States

Supreme Court and the 9" Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in the Morales

matter, CLARIFYING that EX POST FACTO challenges to STATE LAW are

to be evaluated under the analytical framework set forth in Collins v.

Youngblood, California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, —

503 (1995). So therefore Attorney General Daniel Lungren, KNEW that the

United States Supreme Court had decided in the Morales matter that the

retroactive application of 667 of the California Penal Code; California’s “Three

Strikes Legislation” violates the ex post facto clause of the 10" section of

Article 1, and the supremacy clause of Article 6. Please see Collins v

Youngblood, Supra; California Department of Corrections v. Morales, Supra;

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343; Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167; Lindsey v.

Washington, 301 U.S. 397 401 (1937); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987)

and Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798).

After argument before the High Court, Daniel Lungren came on national

television and misled the American public by stating that there were a few

things the State of California had to iron out with regard to California’s Three

Strikes Legislation, or words to that effect.

The California State Legislature then thereafter imposed a sentencing

method on the citizens of the state of California known to be unconstitutional.

Please see the ex post facto clause of the 10" section of Article 1, and the

supremacy clause of Article 6 of the federal constitution; 42 U.S.C. section

1983; and the 5", 8" and 14" amendments to the federal constitution.

Finally, both courts know—state and federal—that California’s

unconstitutional Three Strikes Legislation targets A frican Americans, evidenced

by African Americans being the minority in the state of California, and are the

majority that suffer the horrific effects of California’s unconstitutional Three

Strikes Legislation. Please see 42 U.S.C., sections 1981, 1983,1985(3), and

1986. And please see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232; Ex parte Virginia, 100

U.S. 339, 346 — 347; Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); and finally please

see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800 (1982); federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when

they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers, Bivens v. Six

Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, pages 496 — 504.

Rule 10, Reasons for granting the Petition. The Honorable Justice

Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer’s,

opinions in Michael Wayne Riggs, No. 9850221, on Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District, are

entirely INCONSISTENT with their opinions given in California Department

of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499, 503 and N.3, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1600

— 01, 1603 and n.3 (1995); requiring clarification. And it requires clarification

why the other justices of the United States Supreme Court remained silent in

Michael Wayne Riggs, Supra, in view of your holding in California Department

of Corrections v. Morales, Supra. Please see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405 — 06 (2000); see also Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9" Cir. 2000),

(defining “unreasonable application” as involving situations where the state

court has committed clear error), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 340 (2000). Finally

please see 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1985 (3); 1986.

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired

to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be

committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the

commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful

act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured.

Please see 42 U.S.C. Section 1986.

The Honorable Stephen J. Hillman, reported and recommended to the

Honorable Manual Real, that Petitioner's habeas corpus petition should be

dismissed with prejudice because the petition herein was filed after the president

signed into law the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Please see 28 U.S.C. sections 2254(d), as amended by the act:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS

IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS unless the adjudication of the

claim—{1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

Number |; Petitioner's case was not adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings, the California State Supreme Court issued a silent denial.

Please see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 — 06 (2000). Under the

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ATDPA) federal court first

considers whether the state court's decision was erroneous prior to considering

whether it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.

See 28 U.S.C.A. sections 2254(d), and please see Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212

F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000).

Therefore the Honorable Stephen J. Hillman and the I lonorable Manual

Real knowingly, willingly and deliberately violated a federal statute because

Collins v. Youngblood, Supra, and California Department of Corrections v.

Morales, Supra, qualifies as clearly established federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States. Please see Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405 — 06 (2000); Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9" Cir.

2000); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000); and see United

States v. Ward Baking Co., E.D. Pa. 1963 224 Supp. 66; and U.S. v. Gilboy,

160 F.Supp. 442 M.D. Pa. 1958; and finally please see 42 U.S.C. sections

1981, 1985(3) and 1986, and the 5", 8" and 14" amendments to the federal

constitution.

Number 2; The Honorable Christina A. Snyder acted in the clear and

complete absence of all jurisdiction by dismissing Petitioner's complaint with

prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), in Case No.

CV-00-07569; 9" Circuit Case No. 00-5691 1, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

using as their authority Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9" Cir 1986), claiming

that Petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be given because

circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins are absolutely immune from suit.

Under the authority of Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, the Honorable

Christina A. Snyder, could get away with dismissing Petitioner’s complaint

with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civil P. 12(b) (6) as discretionary judicial

acts, no matter how erroneous or corrupt. Please see Mircles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, [112 S.Ct. 266, 116 L.Ed.2d 9]; and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 [87

S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967)}.

However, Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000),

overrules Ashelman v, Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, (9" Cir. 1986); reinstating Rankin

yv. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980); and Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (1981).

Harvey states in pertinent part:

9

Absolute judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances;

a judge is not immune from liability for non judicial actions, or actions not

taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, and a judge is not immune for actions,

THOUGH JUDICIAL IN NATURE, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, decided by this honorable court from the

5" Circuit Court of Appeals requiring clarification. Please see Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219 (1987); certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 20 years after Pierson v. Ray, Supra, requiring

clarification.

A judge can be liable for participating in a conspiracy if acts indicating

participation were taken by judge otherwise than in his judicial role. Please

see Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (1981).

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) is proper only where there is either

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory.” Ballistrei v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9" Cir. 1988).

There were genuine issues of material facts in dispute that required

trial, precluding summary judgment. Please see Fredricksburg v. Contra County

Dept. of Health Services, 172 F.3d 1176, 1179 — 1181 (9" Circuit 1999); Pryer

y. Seyforth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 979 — 980 (7

Cir. 2000); mid Flyn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283 (7" Cir. 1995).

Circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins failed to meet their burden

of demonstrating that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Please

see Pennzoil v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25; and May Co. Dept. Store v. Graphic

Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211 — 1216 (9" Cir. 1980); and Beard v. Udall, 648

F.2d 1264 (1981).

Number 3: California is the only state in the American union, that their

“Three Strikes Legislation” violates the ex post facto clause of the 10" section

of Article 1; and the supremacy clause of Article 6. Please see Spencer v. Texas,

385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967).

The punishment is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if he is a

habitual criminal. The statute imposing a punishment on none but future crimes

is not ex post facto. Please see McDonald v. Massachusetts, Supreme Court

Reporter 178 — 181, at page 389 to 390 (1900). However, California is the

only state in the American union that pre-dates the enactment of their Three

Strikes Legislation and increases the punishment for prior criminal acts. Please

see Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343; Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167; Lindsey

y. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 1937; Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987);

Weaver v, Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981); finally please see Calder v. Bull, 3

10

Dall. 386, 390, requiring clarification.

When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of

clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial

immunity is lost. Please see Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (1980).

FACTORS CONSIDERED; Petitioner contends: No. |: There is a

conflict between the 5", 7" and 9" Circuit Court of Appeals. Please see Rankin,

Supra. No. 2: There are conflicts between several circuit courts of appeal and

the California Supreme Court. Please see the ex post facto clause of the 10"

section of Article 1. No. 3: The 9" Circuit Court of Appeals has departed

dramatically from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by

obstructing justice in Ashelman v. Pope, 769 F.2d 1360 (9" Cir. 1985); Ashelman

v. Pope, 778 F.2d 539 (9" Cir. 1985); and Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d at page

1074, (9"" Cir. 1986), bottom right hand corner. Please see 42 U.S.C. sections

1985(3) and 1986. No. 4: California State Supreme Court has decided, or failed

to decide, a federal question in conflict with another state court of last resort.

Please see the supremacy clause of Article 6 of the federal constitution. No. 5:

The 9" Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

used by circuit judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins, conflicts with a United

States Supreme Court decision; please see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219

(7"" Cir. 1987); there being an intercircuit split that threatens the consistency of

federal law. Please see the ex post facto clause of the 10" section of Article I

and the supremacy clause of Article 6 of the federal constitution. No. 6: The

California State Legislature has imposed a sentencing method on the citizens

of the state of California known to be unconstitutional. Please see 667, 1170.12,

667.5 subdivision (©) and 1192.7 subdivision (©) of the California Penal Code.

Now please see the ex post facto clause of the 10" section of Article |, and the

supremacy clause of Article 6; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (4" Circuit

2000); 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (1); Van Tran v, Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9" Circuit

2000).

Article | of the United States Constitution provides that neither congress

nor any state shall pass any “ex post facto law. See Article | section 9 C1.1,

section 10 Cl.1. Please see Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 429 (1986).

| California’s “Three Strikes Law” is retrospective in that it applics to

events occurring before its enactment, and disadvantages the offender affected

by it. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 1981; finally please see Calder v. Bull, 3

Dall. 386, 391 — 392 (1798). California’s unconstitutional Three Strikes

Legislation involves an important fedcral question that should be settled by

the United States Supreme Court.

PRAYER

Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment below, and that a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari will be granted.

Diet line. ] 42.0 O&2-

Respectfully submitted,

(¢/ Oe |

CLARENCE HAYWO

Plaintiff in Pro Per

12

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I declare:

I am a resident in the County of San Bernardino, State of California. I

am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within cause; my mailing

address is Post Office Box 1262, San Bernardino, California 92402.

On & ~/9-- 2507 ,1 mailed to the Clerk of the United States

Supreme Court the original and 10 copies of Petitioner’s PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI, by priority mail to U.S. Supreme Court Building,

Washington D.C. 20543.

And a copy to the Honorable Circuit Judges padbiaok Rymer and

Hawkins at their various addresses.

And a copy to the Solicitor General of the United States, Room 5614,

Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W., Washington, D.C.

20530-0001.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of |

California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was

executed on E«fo- ZoCo 2 , at Riverside and San

Bernardino, California.

Dated: 7unc. /0) Zee 2

Respectfully submitted,

SUSAN MELLING

13

APPENDICES

E

fue

Appendix—A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLARENCE HAY WOOD, No. 00-5691 1

Plaintiff-Appellant, DC#CV-00-07569-CAS

Central District of California

V.

ORDER

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge; RYMER,

Circuit Judge; and HAWKINS, Circuit

Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: KOZINSKI, T.G. NELSON and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges

Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing is denied.

No further filings shall be accepted in this closed appeal.

Appendix—A

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-56911

CT/AG#: CV-00-07569-CAS

CLARENCE HAYWOOD

Plaintiff—Appellant

v.

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge; RYMER, Circuit Judge;

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge

Defendants—Appellees

APPEAL FROM the United States District Court for the Central District

of California, Los Angeles.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript of the Record from

the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Los

Angeles and was duly submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOPF, it is now here ordered.and adjudged

by this Court, that the judgment of the said Central Court in this cause be, and

hereby is affirmed.

Filed and entered on July 23, 2001

Appendix—A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLARENCE HAYWOOD, No. 00-5691 1

Plaintiff-Appellant, D. C. No. CV-00-07569-CAS

v.

MEMORANDUM*

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge; RYMER,

Circuit Judge; and HAWKINS, Circuit

Judge,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 9, 2001**

Before: KOZINSKI, T.G. NELSON and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited

to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9" Cir. R. 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Appendix—A

Clarence Haywood appeals pro se the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of his complaint brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) against three

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judges, based upon their denial of his application

to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition.

Because Judges Ferguson, Rymer and Hawkins are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity from Haywood’s suite, dismissal was proper. Ashelman v.

Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 — 76, 1078 (9" Cir. 1986) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

NO. 4

Appendix—B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

CLARENCE HAYWOOD, ) Case No. CV 00-07569-CAS

) (AIJx)

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER GRANTING

) DEFENDANT’S MOTION

VS. ) TODISMISS WITH

) PREJUDICE

FERGUSON, RYMER, and HAWKINS, )

Circuit Judges, )

Defendants. )

)

)

)

The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for decision without

oral argument, and hereby vacates the hearing previously set for October 23,

2000. See Fed. R. Div. P. 78; Local Rule 7.11.

Plaintiff Clarence Haywood, proceeding in propia persona, is or was

previously a prisoner in state custody. On April 16, 1999, plaintiff filed a

document entitled “Complaint for Obstruction of Justice and the Denial of

Plaintiff’s Civil Rights,” under the caption Haywood v. United States, case no.

CV 99-4029-CBM. The Court deemed the complaint to be a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, on the ground

that before a second or successive habeas petition may be filed, the petitioner

must obtain authorization to proceed from the Court of Appeals. Sce 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244 (b) (3) (A).'

Thereafter, on January 3, 2000, plaintiff filed a second “Complaint for

Wrongful Imprisonment and the Denial of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, “ under the

caption Haywood v. State of California, case no. CV 00-00004-DDP. On

' In dismissing the complaint, the Court observed that the plaintiff had filed approximately

eighteen previous federal habeas petitions.

18

February 25, 2000, the Court filed an order dismissing this pleading without

-prejudice on the ground, among others, that the complaint was in effect a second

or successive habeas petition, and therefore the plaintiff was required to obtain

authorization to pursue that petition from the Court of Appeals.

On March 8, 2000, plaintiff filed in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit an application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition.

Plaintiff attached the orders of the district court dismissing the complaints in

case nos. CV 99-04029-CBM and CV 00-00004-DDP. A Ninth Circuit panel

consisting of the Honorable Warren J. Ferguson, Pamela Ann Rymer and

Michael Daly Hawkins denied the application by order filed June 28, 2000.

On July 12, 2000, plaintiff filed the present suit against Judges Ferguson,

Rymer and Hawkins. The complaint, which alleges that defendants violated

plaintiff's civil rights, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Compl. at 1.

It alleges that defendants violated various provisions of the Constitution by

taking approximately three and one-half months to rule on plaintiff's application

to file a successive habeas petition. Id. at 2—3. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b) (3) (D)

provides that the Court of Appeals “shall grant or deny the authorization to file

a second or successive [habeas corpus] application not later than 30 days after

the filing of the motion.” The complaint also asserts that defendants erred in

denying the application, and that defendants conspired with various state and

federal judges “to prevent and obstruct justice, and the due administration of

the American laws.” Id. at 3. In support of the conspiracy allegation, plaintiff

cites a number of California and federal criminal statutes, the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure as a whole, and several provisions of the Constitution.

Plaintiff prays for damages of $1 billion, “for the tortuous mental anguish

caused by the State and Federal courts by their intentional infliction of emotion

distress.” ]d. at 4.

On August 1, 2000, plaintiff filed a “First Amendment to Complaint.”

This document asserts that California’s “three strikes” statutes are

unconstitutional. Attached to the “First Amendment to Complaint” is an order

of the San Bernardino County Superior Court denying plaintiff's petition for

writ of habeas corpus. It appears from this order that plaintiff has been sentenced

under the three strikes law. The “First Amendment to Complaint” makes no

reference to plaintiff's allegations against defendants in this case.

The parties are now before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss

the amended complaint, filed September 22, 2000. A Rule 12(b) (6) motion

. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to this case because defendants are federal, as

opposed to state or local, officials. As defendants acknowledge in their motion to dismiss,

this case is to be treated as an action arising under Bivens v, Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.

388 (1971). See Def.s* Mot. to Dismiss at !.

tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. A court must

not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 — 46 (1957)

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9" Cir. 1996).

In a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), a court must accept as

true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences

to be drawn from them. Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338; NL Indus. Inc., v. Kaplan, 792

F.2d 896, 898 (9 Cir. 1986). The complaint must be read in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9" Cir.

1988). However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Western

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9" Cir. 1981).

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) is proper only where there is either

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9" Cir. 1988).

Furthermore, unless a court converts a Rule 12(b) (6) motion into a motion

for summary judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the

complaint (e.g., facts presented in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials).

Levine v. Diamanthuser, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9" Cir. 1991). A court

may, however, consider exhibits submitted with the complaint and matters

that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Hal

Roach Studios, Inc., v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9"

Cir. 1989); Mack v, South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279 (9" Cir.

1986).

For all of these reasons, it is only under extraordinary circumstances that

dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b) (6). United States v. City of Redwood

City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9" Cir. 1981).

As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed

should be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 1lowever, leave to amend may

be denied “when the court determines that other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib.

v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9" Cir. 1986).

Defendants assert that their Rule 12(b) (6) motion should be granted

with prejudice based upon the fact that they are immune from suit. See Moore

v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240 (9" Cir. 1996) (affirming a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal

based on judicial immunity). Plaintiff has filed no opposition to the motion to

dismiss.

Defendants’ argument that the complaint must be dismissed on the basis

of judicial immunity is correct. Judicial immunity insulates a judge from civil

liability for damages unless the judge (a) acts outside his or her judicial capacity,

‘or (b) though acting in a judicial capacity, acts “in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction,” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 — 12 (1991); see also Harvey v.

Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9" Cir. 2000). As noted above, plaintiff argues

for liability on three grounds: (1) the judges erred in ruling against him; (2) the

judges took too long to rule; and (3) the judges engaged in an unspecified

criminal conspiracy. As to the first ground, a judge’s ruling is an act within his

or her judicial capacity, regardless of whether it is correct or erroneous, see

Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1012. As to the second ground, even if the judges did not

act within the time specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b) (3) (D), they plainly did

not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction in deciding the case after

thirty days. As to the third ground, a criminal conspiracy might not be covered

by judicial immunity, but plaintiff offers no explanation of the purported

conspiracy, and given the judicial act at issue, this Court can conceive of no

set of facts that could support allegations of criminal conspiracy. A plaintiff’s

conclusory allegation that a judge acted outside his or her judicial capacity is

not enough to survive a motion to dismiss. See Lonneker Farms, Inc., v.

Klobucher, 804 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9" Cir. 1986).

Notwithstanding the general rule, a motion to dismiss may be granted

with prejudice where it appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim.

See Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9" Cir. 1988). Dismissal of a suit

against a judge on grounds of judicial immunity fits within this exception. See

Moore, Supra, 96 F.3d at 1243 (affirming denial of motion to amend complaint

against judge where complaint was dismissed, on grounds of judicial immunity,

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted). A disappointed

litigant cannot assert a claim against the judges who ruled against him where

his complaint is simply that they should have ruled otherwise, or ruled against

him sooner. Nor does a conclusory allegation that the judges engaged in criminal

activity show a possibility that plaintiff could state a claim in an amended

pleading. See e.g.. Lonneker Farms, Supra, 804 F.2d at 1096 (affirming

dismissal, based on judicial immunity, of complaint alleging that bankruptcy

judge conspired with bankruptcy trustee in ruling against litigant).

For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint

and First Amendment to Complaint with prejudice is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Appendix—B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

CLARENCE HAYWOOD, ) Case No. CV 00-7569-CAS

) (Ax)

Plaintiff, )

VS. ) JUDGMENT

)

FERGUSON, RYMER, and IIAWKINS, )

Circuit Judges, )

Defendants. )

)

)

Pursuant to the Court’s order dated October 19, 2000, granting defendants’

motion to dismiss the complaint and first amendment thereto with prejudice,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants

shall have judgment against plaintiff, and plaintiff shall take nothing by his

complaint and first amendment thereto.

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

Date:

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE