Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moriarty v. Svec
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rN Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
001517 APR - 2 2001
-—
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
THOMAS J. MORIARTY,
Petitioner,
V.
JAMES F. SVEC,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DAVID S. ALLEN *
JACOBS, BURNS, ORLOVE,
STANTON & HERNANDEZ
300 West Washington Street
Suite 1200
Chicago, Illinois 60606-2002
(312) 372-1646
Attorney for Petitioner
* Counsel of Record
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
ee
|: ae
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Should the federal single-employer doctrine displace
State incorporeal-entity-ownership law so an employer can
escape ERISA-delinquent-contribution liability.
2. When attorneys for a prevailing ERISA pension plan
charge the plan reduced attorney’s fees to advance a social
cause, should the district court award that depressed rate or
the higher-market rate.
(i)
i i hs ta ants.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner Thomas J. Moriarty is a Trustee of the Local
Union No. 727, I.B.T. Pension Trust and the Teamsters Local
Union No. 727 Health ~nd Welfare and Pension Fund.
Neither employee benefit pian has any parent corporation,
subsidiaries, or affiliates that have issued shares to the public.
Respondent James F. Svec owns two Illinois unincor-
porated businesses—Svec & Sons Funeral Home and West
Suburban Livery.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED. ........2:<:cccccccccccsccsesesceceoesese
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
BRIEEs CP PTT RII IID ocscnccescccesesecscesscccsssesesnesscnce
See UIINITED silsishnsestschetieliaciousindahinbinetinnesincensenata
l.
The labor contract, which the Funds interpret
as not requiring contributions for “substantial”
Svec I holds that the Funeral Home and West
Suburban are a “single employer.” ...................+.
James uses the “single employer” doctrine to
escape liability for himself................c.cccccceccecceeee
The lower courts set the market rate for
prosecuting ERISA collection cases at the
depressed rate counsel charge to advance the
a II still nccsinstictiricistanteiiiistiesdusdiitecdanibealbin
COROT E EERE E Eee
iV
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.............0006+
A. Using federal law to alter who owns an Illinois
business cannot be reconciled with this Court’s
holdings that there is no federal-common law...
B. The Seventh Circuit’s relegating prevailing
pension plans to the depressed hourly rate their
attorneys charge based on ideological rea-
sons conflicts with the District of Columbia
IIIS scicrnsnientieninsisnceniiantiinnnnindbadadasdananengilaatiniinpeden
11
14
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
373-381 South Broadway Assoc., 304 NLRB
SWUN C PIED cai teticeticeen ries a) ee tee 9
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997) ..cccccccossessee 7,9
Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.1992) .... 12
Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.1994)......... 12
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).......... 13
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) ....c.cccceseseee. 13
Board of Trustees of Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 25 Health and Welfare Fund
v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir.1998)........ 11, 12,14
Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113
(4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
PRN i Disney idccbichandneeibiatesabidadinigcaipibitats aati ae 12
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
Ce cistsiesinieninsniiieasinginieiaicers green nde. 6,9
Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101
(D.C. Cir.i995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115
Se rere n er ne eT HR OURAN 11,12
Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).........0... 10
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)... 7
Esmark v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.1989)...... 9
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)...... 14
Goodman Investment Co., Inc., 292 NLRB 340
CEP D pavicseninssnnrnincenipnne lilies tact ae ok 9
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.
Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) .........cscesecescesessscsees 14
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker &
Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118 (3rd Cir.
i NE SINR! ea SUSIE MITTEE 9
McCann v. Couglin, 698 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir.
SUID csnrsconsenaptinsdihictinasiectiatiicagat etn ane 12
Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999) .......... 9
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)....c.cccccess0se- 10
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085 (ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) ........cccccccceeeeee 9
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)...... 14
Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local
Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service, 380 U.S.
BID COPE cccecereapieinennnnntniinsnnitintniangatinnts 7,9
Redwing Carriers, inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) .0........cccccceeseeeeeees 10
Richmond Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 313
ELAR BOG7 CIGIED ccnnccccenssssstnsnesnsnsqeenupnnenness 9
Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577
(Fs Cae FE scscenencccssesssvmnesstosnsetnneguetentanbanens 9
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,
857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en
DENIS) «ccssencisensneientiniaiinnenamndan 7, 11, 12, 13
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v.
City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153 (8th
Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986) .. 12
South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int.’l
Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800
(IDFR) GP CR cccreesemerseemnmniiinaniin 9
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)..... 10
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16
(RGR) ccecssscszesessesessenencntasaneaninivengemsanmesiaisianaias 9
Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 486 (4th Cir.1995) (per
CUTER) ccnevceeeesceeneeegengiennmnnnnnainannitanat 9
Vernon v. Schuster, 179 T1l.2d 338, 228 Ill. Dec.
195, 688 N.E.2d 1172 (1997)... : 8
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)............ 10
Codes
BB UBL, © TSG ID ceccencenseninsrsiatesincscttencimiidiiainn 9
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)........ nocnnncnetonsunntonepntensian 1
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
29 UBL. § USDA) aaceccoscccersccececccscecseseteceses oe
i | EEN Re 9
Congressional materials
126 Cong. Rec. 23,038 (1980) (Rep. Thomp-
STB). nsecascccsnnesessentecessoscsnnetinenstasnesseqnesensccnntnentumnsees 8
Staff of Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 1076: The
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
of 1980: Summary and Analysis of Consid-
eration (Comm. Print 1980)... .....cccceccsseseeees 8, 13
Miscellaneous
Court says principal owner not an employee, 5
Death Care Business Advisor No. 11 (LRP
Publications Dec. 13, 2000), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Stories
OD wesiiinessinectnneatinscheneiiniah aii 10
Andrew P. Sutor, IV, Note, Covington v. District
of Columbia: Judicial clouding of a once clear
burden of proof in awards of attorney fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 825
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
THOMAS J. MORIARTY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
JAMES F. SVEC,
Respondent. —
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeais
for the Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Thomas J. Moriarty petitions this Court to issue a writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit to review that court’s judgment.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Seventh Circuit’s opinions are reported at 233 F.3d
955 and 164 F.3d 323. Pet. App. 3a-47a. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued
several unreported decisions and orders, and one reported
decision at 994 F. Supp. 963. Pet. App. 48a-94a.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on November 27,
2000. That court denied a timely petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc on January 3, 2001. Pet.
App. la-2a. Moriarty invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), provides in pertinent
part:
(2) In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary
for or on behalf of a plan to enforce section 1145 of this
title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded,
the court shall award the plan—
(A) the unpaid contributions,
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,
(C) an amount equal to the greater of—
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the
plan in an amount not in excess of 20 percent
(or such higher percentage as may be
permitted under Federal or State law) or the
amount determined by the court under
subparagraph (A),
(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the
action, to be paid by the defendant, and
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, provides:
Every employer who is obligated to make contri-
butions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the
plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained
agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law,
make such contributions in accordance with the terms
and conditions of such plan or such agreement.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of facts
This case involves the lower court’s using the single-
employer doctrine to create federal-common law to decide
who owns an Illinois sole proprietorship so it can escape
ERISA delinquent-contribution liability. Although the district
court rejected the employer’s using that doctrine this way, the
Seventh Circuit created a new, revenue-based-federal rule for
who owns incorporeal entities.
This case also concerns the court’s awarding prevailing
pension plans reasonable attorney’s fees. Although the
plan’s attorneys depressed their rates to advance the “union
movement,” the Seventh Circuit held that they were not
entitled to full-market rates unless they first inflated—and
then lowered—their rates.
1. The labor contract, which the Funds interpret as not
requiring contributions for “substantial” owners.
The Funeral Directors Services Association of Greater
Chicago—an employer association of funeral homes and
livery services—represents its constituents in collective
bargaining with I.B.T. Local 727. Pet. App. 95a-96a 4 1, 4.
The 1985-1988 funeral directors’ labor contract required
Association members to contribute to the Health and Welfare
and Pension Funds for their full-time and _ trainee
“employees,” a term the contract defined as “[a]Jny member of
the Union who is in the employ of an employer member who
is licensed to and who does embalming and/or funeral
directing ....” Pet. App. 108a-110a, 122a. But this contract
did not require pension contributions during a trainee’s first
year. Pet. App. 109a.
Besides the contract’s express exclusion, the Funds’
trustees interpret its requiring contributions for “employees”
as excusing owners from contributing for themselves. Pet.
App. 96a-97a §§ 9-10. Before 1993, the Fund relieved
4
“significant” or “substantial” owners from having to
contribute, evaluating employers on a case-by-case basis to
see if their owners met the significant or substantial threshold.
Pet. App. 96a-97a 4 9.
2. Svec & Son Funeral Home and West Suburban Livery.
James Svec and his sister Sharon own Svec & Sons Funeral
Home and West Suburban Livery, which he operates as two
sole proprietorships. Pet. App. 9a n.2, 23a, 97a-98a JJ 12-13,
18. Before his death on June 29, 1987, their father—Elmer
Svec—owned the Funeral Home, while Elmer and James
owned West Suburban. Pet. App. 97a-98a 7 13, 18.
The Funeral Home was a contributing employer to the
Funds; West Suburban was not. Pet. App. 98a ¥ 16. James
was a funeral director at the Funeral Home and a Union
member. Pet. App. 97a-98a 4§ 11, 15.
3. Svec I holds that the Funeral Home and West
Suburban are a “single employer.”
Funds’ trustee Moriarty sued James under ERISA to
collect delinquent contributions for work: (1) James
performed at the Funeral Home; and (2) West Suburban’s
employees performed.
In Svec J, the district court held—and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed—that both businesses were a “single employer,”
making James liable for contributions for West Suburban’s
employees. Pet. App. 37a-44a, 90a-93a.
4. James uses the “single employer” doctrine to escape
liability for himself.
On remand from Svec /, the parties’ dispute focused on
James’s liability for work he did at the Funeral Home during
the six months before his father’s death. Although James
didn’t own the Funeral Home during that time, he asked the
district court to use the single-employer doctrine to lump the
5
Funeral Home and West Suburban’s ownership together to
make him own both. Owning the integrated enterprise, James
reasoned, entitled him to invoke the Funds’ substantial owner
exception so he could escape ERISA liability.
Although the district court rejected this argument, the
Seventh Circuit held that James could use the rule to make
himself an owner of the combined Funeral Home/West
Suburban integrated enterprise to invoke the Funds’
ownership exclusion. Pet. App. 9a-10a, 13a, 62a-63a. The
Seventh Circuit directed the district court to measure James’s
ownership by the Funeral Home and West Suburban’s annual
revenues; according to the court, this is the standard “the
NLRB uses in its applications of the single employer
doctrine.” Pet. App. 10a.
~ 5. The lower courts set the market rate for prosecuting
ERISA collection cases at the depressed rate counsel
charge to advance the union movement.
After successfully prosecuting this action, Moriarty asked
the district court for attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2)(D). Although his attorneys charged him $165
per hour to subsidize the union movement, Moriarty sought
hourly rates between $250 and $345. Pet. App. 123a 4 2,
127a ¥ 8, 132a | 2. The district court received evidence
showing:
e after successfully defending another funeral home
against Moriarty’s collection lawsuit, Jenner & Block
revealed that they charge employers in the $300/hour
range for defending such cases;
e@ Vedder Price Kaufman & Kammbholz bills multi-
employer plans between $245 and $310/hour;
e James’s attorneys’—Seyfarth Shaw—charged him $270
for a nineteen-year partner and $160 for a third-year
associate; and
6
e@e two other Chicago union-side law firms charge
multiemployer pension plans $160 per hour to advance
the union movement.
Pet. App. 126a-127a J 7, 135a 9 5, 136 9 5, 137a ¥ 6, 138a
q 6, 140a q 4, 142 ¥ 2, 143 q 2.
Although the district court did not question Moriarty’s
lawyers’ altruistic motives in setting their rates, it held that
$165 is “the market rate for attorneys prosecuting ERISA
collection actions ....” Pet. App. 56a. The Seventh Circuit
agreed, noting that “[i]f an attorney charges most clients a
high fee, and then represents a client pro bono or for a
reduced fee, the attorney’s presumable market rate in the pro
bono or reduced-fee case is still the attorney’s normal high
rate.” Pet. App. 16a. This was not such a case, the court held,
because Moriarty’s counsel “does not have a high, regular
rate from which it deviates to make gifts to unions.” /d.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case presents two important, specific ERISA issues:
first, should federal or State law define who owns an ERISA
employer; and second, when a pension plan prevails in a
delinquent-contribution case, should its attorney’s fees be
based on its cost—the depressed rate its attorneys charge the
plan—or the market rate for similarly situated attorneys.
Although it was not interpreting a federal statute, the
Seventh Circuit allowed an employer to use the federal-
single-employer doctrine to realign who owns an Illinois sole
proprietorship so it could escape ERISA delinquent
contribution liability. The Seventh Circuit’s using the single-
employer rule to trump State incorporeal-entity-ownership
law:
e flaunts this Court’s precedent—most recently Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-755 (1998)—
that federal courts can’t create federal-common law from
whole cloth;
7
e conflicts with Radio & Television Broadcast Tech-
nicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service, 380
U.S. 255 (1965) on the correct use of the single-
employer doctrine; and
@ transcends this ERISA delinquent contributions case.
On the second issue, a prevailing pension plan is entitled to
“reasonable attorney’s fees... .”” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D).
Although this pension plan’s attorneys charge a reduced-
hourly fee to advance the “union movement,” the Seventh
Circuit held they were not entitled to full-market rates
because they had never charged those rates. The Seventh
Circuit’s refusing to award public-spirited attorneys full-
market rates:
e directly conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit’s
decision in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v.
Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc) and its
progeny;
e will spill over to other fee-shifting statutes; and
e will produce the anomalous result Hodel predicted:
either competent, public-spirited counsel will refuse
these cases, or will resort to questionable billing
practices.
A. Using federal law to alter who owns an Illinois
business cannot be reconciled with this Court’s
holdings that there is no federal-common law.
The first problem with the Seventh Circuit’s decision is its
erroneously assuming that federal courts are authorized to
alter who owns an Illinois sole proprietorship so it can escape
ERISA liability. Without a federal statute to interpret—or
some federal interest to vindicate—this Court firmly holds
that “ ‘[t]here is no federal general common law.’ ” Atherton
v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997), quoting, Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). And Hlinois follows the
“well settled” rule “that a sole proprietorship has no legal
8
identity separate from that of the individual who owns it.” ;
Vernon v. Schuster, 179 IUll.2d 338, 347, 228 Ill. Dec. 195, |
199-200, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176-1177 (1997). Under Illinois
law, Elmer Svec owned the Funeral Home and his son James
did not. The Seventh Circuit should have affirmed the district
- court’s hoiding that James could not avail himself of the
“substantial owner” exception.
When it engaged in the metamorphosis of transforming
James Svec from owning none of the Funeral Home to its
quarter owner, the Seventh Circuit didn’t claim to interpret a
federal statute. It identified no federal interest in changing
who owns a business entity created under State law, and we
can’t fathom ene. Congress’s goal in adding ERISA § 515
was to “permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent
contributions efficaciously ... .” 126 Cong. Rec. 23,038,
23,039 (1980) (Rep. Thompson); Staff of Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
S. 1076: The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
of 1980: Summary and Analysis of Consideration, at 43-44
(Comm. Print 1980) (herein “Senate Committee Print”). This
legislative history shows that Congress sought to curb
employers’ failing to “make promised contributions in a
timely fashion” because the costs associated with collecting
them would not only “detract from the ability of plans to
formulate or meet funding standards and adversely affect the
financial health of plans,” but would also harm plans’
participants and beneficiaries through “lower benefits,” and
adversely affect responsible employers through “higher
contribution rates ... .” Using the single-employer doctrine to
alter who owns an Illinois business so it can avoid
contributing to the Funds defeats—rather than furthers—
those interests.
Moreover, there is nothing in the single-employer doctrine
that counsels using it to change who owns a business. That
rule measures if “nominally separate business entities” are
actually one employer because they have _ interrelated
9
operations, common management, centralized labor relations,
and common ownership. Radio and Television Broadcast
Technicians Local 1264, 380 U.S. at 256; see South Prairie
Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int.’1 Union of Operating Eng'rs,
425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam); Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d
486, 490 (4th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Esmark v. NLRB, 887
F.2d 739, 752-754 (7th Cir.1989); 373-381 South Broadway
Assoc., 304 NLRB i108 n. 6 (1991); Goodman Investment
Co., Inc., 292 NLRB 340, 347 (1989). But in none of these
cases have the courts or Labor Board tampered with the
entity’s extant ownership infrastructure. In fact, they have
held that two entities were not an integrated enterprise even
when they shared common ownership. Rogers v. Sugar Tree
Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir.1993), abrogated on
other grounds, Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999); Richmond
Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 313 NLRB 1247, 1249-1250
(1994).
Of course, this would be a different case if the Seventh
Circuit had interpreted who is the “employer” under ERISA
§ 515. That would not be “federal common law in ‘the
strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts to, not
simply to an interpretation of a federal statute . . ., but, rather,
to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of deci-
sion.’ ” Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 755, quoting,
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218. When Congress wants federal
courts to tinker with who owns incorporeal abstractions, it
does so expressly, allowing the courts to flesh out the
statutory gaps with federal-common law. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1301(b)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a); see United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); JUE AFL-CIO Pension
Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 123-124
(3rd Cir.1986); PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1094
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). But the Seventh
Circuit did not decide who the statutory employer is; it ruled
10
who owns that employer using a federal standard. Pet. App.
9a-10a, 13a.
If this were only a dispute over this employer’s need to
contribute to this Fund under ERISA, the court’s error might
not merit review. After all, James will surely point out that
the contributions the Funeral Home might owe for his work
are $2,389. Pet. App. 49a ¥§ A & B. But this issue’s
significance transcends this statute and these parties. The
tension over choosing federal or State law to define who
owns otherwise-state-governed entities generates “significant
disagreement among courts and commentators . . .” in such
substantive areas as the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. United
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9-(1998); Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1498-
1503 (11th Cir.1996). The Seventh Circuit’s supplanting
State law to resolve this case doesn’t respect this Court’s
admonishing lower courts that instances when federal-
common law should displace its State counterpart are “few
and restricted.” Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651
(1963).
Moreover, important issues—requiring this Court’s deci-
sion—don’t necessarily involve high monetary stakes.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other
grounds, Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-331 (1986).
And focusing exclusively on the delinquent contributions is
deceptive: the Seventh Circuit held that the Funds won’t be
allowed any attorneys’ fees if James prevails on this issue.
Pet. App. 12a-14a.
Finally, this case’s importance is reflected in the fact that it
has gained national attention in the funeral-home industry.
Court says principal owner not an employee, 5 Death Care
Business Advisor No. 11 (LRP Publications Dec. 13, 2000),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Stories file.
Because the industry recognizes that the issue is not limited to
1]
one Chicago funeral home, we believe it appropriate for this
Court to grant certiorari to address it.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s relegating prevailing
pension plans to the depressed hourly rate their
attorneys charge based on ideological reasons
conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit.
The second problem with the Seventh Circuit’s decision is
that it equates the market rate for awarding attorney’s fees
with the Funds’ cost, even though their attorneys set those
fees at a depressed rate for altruistic reasons. Pet. App. 16a,
123a ¥ 2, 132a | 2. The court set the market rate at this level,
despite the fact that:
@ employers pay their Chicago law firms attorney’s fees in
the $300/hour range to defend the Funds’ lawsuits; and
e Chicago attorneys that don’t base their rates on
ideological goals charge the same rates as employer
firms.
Pet. App. 126a-127a 4 7, 135a4 5, 140aq 4.
The court reasoned that the Funds’ counsel “does not have
a high, regular rate from which it deviates to make gifts to
unions.” Pet. App. 16a. This decision is squarely contrary to
the District of Columbia’s rule that public-spirited
attorneys—including those who prosecute ERISA delinquent-
contributions cases—who depress their rates to advance
social causes are entitled to full-market rates rather than the
depressed rates they charge their clients. Board of Trustees of
Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 25 Health and Welfare
Fund v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 807 (D.C. Cir.1998);
Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C.
Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996); Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524
(D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc).
12
The District of Columbia Circuit’s rule is consistent with
the courts recognizing “that the prevailing market rate and
not the cost of providing legal services is the measure of a
‘reasonable attorney’s fee’” under fee-shifting statutes.
Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 956 (10th Cir.1994) (emphasis
in original); accord Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d
113, 129-130 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
(1991); Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. City of
Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153, 1161 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1011 (1986); McCann v. Couglin, 698 F.2d 112, 130
(2nd Cir.1983).
The District of Columbia’s rule is not without controversy.
Each decision drew published dissents, questioning a standard
that awards prevailing parties’ counsel more than they
actually charge their clients. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d at 809-810
(Randolph, J., dissenting); Covington, 57 F.3d at 1112-1115
(Henderson, J., dissenting); Hodel, 857 F.2d at 1525-1534
(Starr, J., dissenting); see Andrew P. Sutor, IV, Note,
Covington v. District of Columbia: Judicial clouding of a
once clear burden of proof in awards of attorney fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 825, 859-864 (1996). The
Seventh Circuit sided with the District of Columbia’s
dissenting judges that unless counsel charge premium rates,
their clients are never entitled to full-market rates. Pet. App.
16a. The lines are thus drawn for this Court’s authoritative
resolution.
Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, only large law firms
charging premium rates will be able to recover those rates
from delinquent employers. But as Judge Frank Easterbrook
noted in Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th
Cir.1992), “[s]ome lawyers dedicate their professional lives
to causes they find admirable and worthy of support—to legal
services for the poor, to the representation of unions. These
lawyers are making contributions to their favorite causes, not
in money but in time.”
13
The Seventh Circuit’s standard will produce the anomalous
results Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel
predicted: either competent, public-spirited counsel will
refuse these cases or will resort to questionable billing
practices:
Thus, the practitioner outside the large or established
firm may either eschew pro bono representation,
directing those potential clients . . . to the established
firm or legal aid societies if either of those entities is
available and willing to undertake the representation, or
quote fictitious but market-based rates, which neither he
nor the client have any intention of actually seeing
collected in toto unless court-awarded fees are ultimately
available.
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d at
1520.
The Seventh Circuit's standard can’t be reconciled with
this Court’s precedent that under fee-shifting statutes, legal
services should be valued at their market value, regardless of
the attorney-client billing arrangements. Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 893-896 (1984). Relegating pension plans to the
depressed actual rates their attorneys charge is also
inconsistent with Congress’s goals in enacting ERISA’s 1980
amendments. The legislative history to these amendments
shows that the legislature sought to “discourage
delinquencies” by making collection less “cumbersome and
costly.” Senate Committee Print at 44. To that end, Congress
in ERISA § 502(g)(2)(D) provided that courts “shall” award
attorney’s fees to prevailing pension plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(2)(D). There is no mandatory fee provision for
prevailing employers.
From this statutory structure and legislative history, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that “[{i]f an attorney has
made a public-spirited decision to charge a plan a discounted
1
rate, a delinquent employer should not receive the benefit of
this decision.” JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d at 805.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s standard—limiting pension
plans to their actual costs—transcends this ERISA context.
Although the court recognized that ERISA § 502(g)(2) does
not use the phrase “prevailing party,” it held that “case law
regarding prevailing parties is applicable to this section of
ERISA.” Pet. App. 17a n.4. Because similarly worded fee-
shifting statutes should be similarly construed—in the
absence of contrary legislative intent—the Seventh Circuit’s
standard will infect the hundreds of such statutes. See Fogerty
v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523-525 (1994); Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758
n.2 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986). Because
the- Seventh Circuit’s standard has potentially sweeping
implications that will eviscerate Congress’s fee-shifting
goals, we ask this Court to grant review.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s displacing State-law ownership rules
for incorporeal entities stands in marked contrast to this
Court’s refusing to create federal-common law in areas the
States have traditionally regulated. It allows employers to
use the single-employer doctrine as a shield to avoid contrib-
uting to multiemployer plans, generating all the evils Con-
gress tackled when it enacted ERISA’s 1980 amendments.
The court’s standard for prevailing pension plan’s
attorney’s fees similarly defeats Congress’s goals of promot-
ing plans’ collecting delinquent contributions “efficaciously,”
and cannot be reconciled with the District of Columbia’s
precedent. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve these
issues, vacate the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remand to
that court for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s
opinion.
;
)
)
15
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID S. ALLEN *
JACOBS, BURNS, ORLOVE,
STANTON & HERNANDEZ
300 West Washington Street
Suite 1200
Chicago, Illinois 60606-2002
(312) 372-1646
Attorney for Petitioner
* Counsel of Record
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.