Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moriarty v. Svec

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rN Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

001517 APR - 2 2001

-—

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

THOMAS J. MORIARTY,

Petitioner,

V.

JAMES F. SVEC,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DAVID S. ALLEN *

JACOBS, BURNS, ORLOVE,

STANTON & HERNANDEZ

300 West Washington Street

Suite 1200

Chicago, Illinois 60606-2002

(312) 372-1646

Attorney for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

ee

|: ae

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Should the federal single-employer doctrine displace

State incorporeal-entity-ownership law so an employer can

escape ERISA-delinquent-contribution liability.

2. When attorneys for a prevailing ERISA pension plan

charge the plan reduced attorney’s fees to advance a social

cause, should the district court award that depressed rate or

the higher-market rate.

(i)

i i hs ta ants.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Thomas J. Moriarty is a Trustee of the Local

Union No. 727, I.B.T. Pension Trust and the Teamsters Local

Union No. 727 Health ~nd Welfare and Pension Fund.

Neither employee benefit pian has any parent corporation,

subsidiaries, or affiliates that have issued shares to the public.

Respondent James F. Svec owns two Illinois unincor-

porated businesses—Svec & Sons Funeral Home and West

Suburban Livery.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. ........2:<:cccccccccccsccsesesceceoesese

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

BRIEEs CP PTT RII IID ocscnccescccesesecscesscccsssesesnesscnce

See UIINITED silsishnsestschetieliaciousindahinbinetinnesincensenata

l.

The labor contract, which the Funds interpret

as not requiring contributions for “substantial”

Svec I holds that the Funeral Home and West

Suburban are a “single employer.” ...................+.

James uses the “single employer” doctrine to

escape liability for himself................c.cccccceccecceeee

The lower courts set the market rate for

prosecuting ERISA collection cases at the

depressed rate counsel charge to advance the

a II still nccsinstictiricistanteiiiistiesdusdiitecdanibealbin

COROT E EERE E Eee

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.............0006+

A. Using federal law to alter who owns an Illinois

business cannot be reconciled with this Court’s

holdings that there is no federal-common law...

B. The Seventh Circuit’s relegating prevailing

pension plans to the depressed hourly rate their

attorneys charge based on ideological rea-

sons conflicts with the District of Columbia

IIIS scicrnsnientieninsisnceniiantiinnnnindbadadasdananengilaatiniinpeden

11

14

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

373-381 South Broadway Assoc., 304 NLRB

SWUN C PIED cai teticeticeen ries a) ee tee 9

Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997) ..cccccccossessee 7,9

Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.1992) .... 12

Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.1994)......... 12

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).......... 13

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) ....c.cccceseseee. 13

Board of Trustees of Hotel & Restaurant

Employees Local 25 Health and Welfare Fund

v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir.1998)........ 11, 12,14

Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d 113

(4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906

PRN i Disney idccbichandneeibiatesabidadinigcaipibitats aati ae 12

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742

Ce cistsiesinieninsniiieasinginieiaicers green nde. 6,9

Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101

(D.C. Cir.i995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115

Se rere n er ne eT HR OURAN 11,12

Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).........0... 10

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)... 7

Esmark v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir.1989)...... 9

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)...... 14

Goodman Investment Co., Inc., 292 NLRB 340

CEP D pavicseninssnnrnincenipnne lilies tact ae ok 9

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.

Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) .........cscesecescesessscsees 14

IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker &

Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118 (3rd Cir.

i NE SINR! ea SUSIE MITTEE 9

McCann v. Couglin, 698 F.2d 112 (2nd Cir.

SUID csnrsconsenaptinsdihictinasiectiatiicagat etn ane 12

Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999) .......... 9

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)....c.cccccess0se- 10

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085 (ist Cir.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) ........cccccccceeeeee 9

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)...... 14

Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local

Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service, 380 U.S.

BID COPE cccecereapieinennnnntniinsnnitintniangatinnts 7,9

Redwing Carriers, inc. v. Saraland Apartments,

94 F.3d 1489 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) .0........cccccceeseeeeeees 10

Richmond Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 313

ELAR BOG7 CIGIED ccnnccccenssssstnsnesnsnsqeenupnnenness 9

Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577

(Fs Cae FE scscenencccssesssvmnesstosnsetnneguetentanbanens 9

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel,

857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en

DENIS) «ccssencisensneientiniaiinnenamndan 7, 11, 12, 13

Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v.

City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153 (8th

Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986) .. 12

South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int.’l

Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800

(IDFR) GP CR cccreesemerseemnmniiinaniin 9

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)..... 10

United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16

(RGR) ccecssscszesessesessenencntasaneaninivengemsanmesiaisianaias 9

Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 486 (4th Cir.1995) (per

CUTER) ccnevceeeesceeneeegengiennmnnnnnainannitanat 9

Vernon v. Schuster, 179 T1l.2d 338, 228 Ill. Dec.

195, 688 N.E.2d 1172 (1997)... : 8

Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)............ 10

Codes

BB UBL, © TSG ID ceccencenseninsrsiatesincscttencimiidiiainn 9

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)........ nocnnncnetonsunntonepntensian 1

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

29 UBL. § USDA) aaceccoscccersccececccscecseseteceses oe

i | EEN Re 9

Congressional materials

126 Cong. Rec. 23,038 (1980) (Rep. Thomp-

STB). nsecascccsnnesessentecessoscsnnetinenstasnesseqnesensccnntnentumnsees 8

Staff of Senate Committee on Labor and Human

Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 1076: The

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act

of 1980: Summary and Analysis of Consid-

eration (Comm. Print 1980)... .....cccceccsseseeees 8, 13

Miscellaneous

Court says principal owner not an employee, 5

Death Care Business Advisor No. 11 (LRP

Publications Dec. 13, 2000), available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Stories

OD wesiiinessinectnneatinscheneiiniah aii 10

Andrew P. Sutor, IV, Note, Covington v. District

of Columbia: Judicial clouding of a once clear

burden of proof in awards of attorney fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 825

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

THOMAS J. MORIARTY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JAMES F. SVEC,

Respondent. —

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeais

for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas J. Moriarty petitions this Court to issue a writ of

certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit to review that court’s judgment.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Seventh Circuit’s opinions are reported at 233 F.3d

955 and 164 F.3d 323. Pet. App. 3a-47a. The United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued

several unreported decisions and orders, and one reported

decision at 994 F. Supp. 963. Pet. App. 48a-94a.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on November 27,

2000. That court denied a timely petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc on January 3, 2001. Pet.

App. la-2a. Moriarty invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), provides in pertinent

part:

(2) In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary

for or on behalf of a plan to enforce section 1145 of this

title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded,

the court shall award the plan—

(A) the unpaid contributions,

(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,

(C) an amount equal to the greater of—

(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the

plan in an amount not in excess of 20 percent

(or such higher percentage as may be

permitted under Federal or State law) or the

amount determined by the court under

subparagraph (A),

(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the

action, to be paid by the defendant, and

(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court

deems appropriate.

Section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, provides:

Every employer who is obligated to make contri-

butions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the

plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained

agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law,

make such contributions in accordance with the terms

and conditions of such plan or such agreement.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of facts

This case involves the lower court’s using the single-

employer doctrine to create federal-common law to decide

who owns an Illinois sole proprietorship so it can escape

ERISA delinquent-contribution liability. Although the district

court rejected the employer’s using that doctrine this way, the

Seventh Circuit created a new, revenue-based-federal rule for

who owns incorporeal entities.

This case also concerns the court’s awarding prevailing

pension plans reasonable attorney’s fees. Although the

plan’s attorneys depressed their rates to advance the “union

movement,” the Seventh Circuit held that they were not

entitled to full-market rates unless they first inflated—and

then lowered—their rates.

1. The labor contract, which the Funds interpret as not

requiring contributions for “substantial” owners.

The Funeral Directors Services Association of Greater

Chicago—an employer association of funeral homes and

livery services—represents its constituents in collective

bargaining with I.B.T. Local 727. Pet. App. 95a-96a 4 1, 4.

The 1985-1988 funeral directors’ labor contract required

Association members to contribute to the Health and Welfare

and Pension Funds for their full-time and _ trainee

“employees,” a term the contract defined as “[a]Jny member of

the Union who is in the employ of an employer member who

is licensed to and who does embalming and/or funeral

directing ....” Pet. App. 108a-110a, 122a. But this contract

did not require pension contributions during a trainee’s first

year. Pet. App. 109a.

Besides the contract’s express exclusion, the Funds’

trustees interpret its requiring contributions for “employees”

as excusing owners from contributing for themselves. Pet.

App. 96a-97a §§ 9-10. Before 1993, the Fund relieved

4

“significant” or “substantial” owners from having to

contribute, evaluating employers on a case-by-case basis to

see if their owners met the significant or substantial threshold.

Pet. App. 96a-97a 4 9.

2. Svec & Son Funeral Home and West Suburban Livery.

James Svec and his sister Sharon own Svec & Sons Funeral

Home and West Suburban Livery, which he operates as two

sole proprietorships. Pet. App. 9a n.2, 23a, 97a-98a JJ 12-13,

18. Before his death on June 29, 1987, their father—Elmer

Svec—owned the Funeral Home, while Elmer and James

owned West Suburban. Pet. App. 97a-98a 7 13, 18.

The Funeral Home was a contributing employer to the

Funds; West Suburban was not. Pet. App. 98a ¥ 16. James

was a funeral director at the Funeral Home and a Union

member. Pet. App. 97a-98a 4§ 11, 15.

3. Svec I holds that the Funeral Home and West

Suburban are a “single employer.”

Funds’ trustee Moriarty sued James under ERISA to

collect delinquent contributions for work: (1) James

performed at the Funeral Home; and (2) West Suburban’s

employees performed.

In Svec J, the district court held—and the Seventh Circuit

affirmed—that both businesses were a “single employer,”

making James liable for contributions for West Suburban’s

employees. Pet. App. 37a-44a, 90a-93a.

4. James uses the “single employer” doctrine to escape

liability for himself.

On remand from Svec /, the parties’ dispute focused on

James’s liability for work he did at the Funeral Home during

the six months before his father’s death. Although James

didn’t own the Funeral Home during that time, he asked the

district court to use the single-employer doctrine to lump the

5

Funeral Home and West Suburban’s ownership together to

make him own both. Owning the integrated enterprise, James

reasoned, entitled him to invoke the Funds’ substantial owner

exception so he could escape ERISA liability.

Although the district court rejected this argument, the

Seventh Circuit held that James could use the rule to make

himself an owner of the combined Funeral Home/West

Suburban integrated enterprise to invoke the Funds’

ownership exclusion. Pet. App. 9a-10a, 13a, 62a-63a. The

Seventh Circuit directed the district court to measure James’s

ownership by the Funeral Home and West Suburban’s annual

revenues; according to the court, this is the standard “the

NLRB uses in its applications of the single employer

doctrine.” Pet. App. 10a.

~ 5. The lower courts set the market rate for prosecuting

ERISA collection cases at the depressed rate counsel

charge to advance the union movement.

After successfully prosecuting this action, Moriarty asked

the district court for attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(2)(D). Although his attorneys charged him $165

per hour to subsidize the union movement, Moriarty sought

hourly rates between $250 and $345. Pet. App. 123a 4 2,

127a ¥ 8, 132a | 2. The district court received evidence

showing:

e after successfully defending another funeral home

against Moriarty’s collection lawsuit, Jenner & Block

revealed that they charge employers in the $300/hour

range for defending such cases;

e@ Vedder Price Kaufman & Kammbholz bills multi-

employer plans between $245 and $310/hour;

e James’s attorneys’—Seyfarth Shaw—charged him $270

for a nineteen-year partner and $160 for a third-year

associate; and

6

e@e two other Chicago union-side law firms charge

multiemployer pension plans $160 per hour to advance

the union movement.

Pet. App. 126a-127a J 7, 135a 9 5, 136 9 5, 137a ¥ 6, 138a

q 6, 140a q 4, 142 ¥ 2, 143 q 2.

Although the district court did not question Moriarty’s

lawyers’ altruistic motives in setting their rates, it held that

$165 is “the market rate for attorneys prosecuting ERISA

collection actions ....” Pet. App. 56a. The Seventh Circuit

agreed, noting that “[i]f an attorney charges most clients a

high fee, and then represents a client pro bono or for a

reduced fee, the attorney’s presumable market rate in the pro

bono or reduced-fee case is still the attorney’s normal high

rate.” Pet. App. 16a. This was not such a case, the court held,

because Moriarty’s counsel “does not have a high, regular

rate from which it deviates to make gifts to unions.” /d.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents two important, specific ERISA issues:

first, should federal or State law define who owns an ERISA

employer; and second, when a pension plan prevails in a

delinquent-contribution case, should its attorney’s fees be

based on its cost—the depressed rate its attorneys charge the

plan—or the market rate for similarly situated attorneys.

Although it was not interpreting a federal statute, the

Seventh Circuit allowed an employer to use the federal-

single-employer doctrine to realign who owns an Illinois sole

proprietorship so it could escape ERISA delinquent

contribution liability. The Seventh Circuit’s using the single-

employer rule to trump State incorporeal-entity-ownership

law:

e flaunts this Court’s precedent—most recently Burlington

Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-755 (1998)—

that federal courts can’t create federal-common law from

whole cloth;

7

e conflicts with Radio & Television Broadcast Tech-

nicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Service, 380

U.S. 255 (1965) on the correct use of the single-

employer doctrine; and

@ transcends this ERISA delinquent contributions case.

On the second issue, a prevailing pension plan is entitled to

“reasonable attorney’s fees... .”” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D).

Although this pension plan’s attorneys charge a reduced-

hourly fee to advance the “union movement,” the Seventh

Circuit held they were not entitled to full-market rates

because they had never charged those rates. The Seventh

Circuit’s refusing to award public-spirited attorneys full-

market rates:

e directly conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit’s

decision in Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v.

Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc) and its

progeny;

e will spill over to other fee-shifting statutes; and

e will produce the anomalous result Hodel predicted:

either competent, public-spirited counsel will refuse

these cases, or will resort to questionable billing

practices.

A. Using federal law to alter who owns an Illinois

business cannot be reconciled with this Court’s

holdings that there is no federal-common law.

The first problem with the Seventh Circuit’s decision is its

erroneously assuming that federal courts are authorized to

alter who owns an Illinois sole proprietorship so it can escape

ERISA liability. Without a federal statute to interpret—or

some federal interest to vindicate—this Court firmly holds

that “ ‘[t]here is no federal general common law.’ ” Atherton

v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997), quoting, Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). And Hlinois follows the

“well settled” rule “that a sole proprietorship has no legal

8

identity separate from that of the individual who owns it.” ;

Vernon v. Schuster, 179 IUll.2d 338, 347, 228 Ill. Dec. 195, |

199-200, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176-1177 (1997). Under Illinois

law, Elmer Svec owned the Funeral Home and his son James

did not. The Seventh Circuit should have affirmed the district

- court’s hoiding that James could not avail himself of the

“substantial owner” exception.

When it engaged in the metamorphosis of transforming

James Svec from owning none of the Funeral Home to its

quarter owner, the Seventh Circuit didn’t claim to interpret a

federal statute. It identified no federal interest in changing

who owns a business entity created under State law, and we

can’t fathom ene. Congress’s goal in adding ERISA § 515

was to “permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent

contributions efficaciously ... .” 126 Cong. Rec. 23,038,

23,039 (1980) (Rep. Thompson); Staff of Senate Committee

on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,

S. 1076: The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act

of 1980: Summary and Analysis of Consideration, at 43-44

(Comm. Print 1980) (herein “Senate Committee Print”). This

legislative history shows that Congress sought to curb

employers’ failing to “make promised contributions in a

timely fashion” because the costs associated with collecting

them would not only “detract from the ability of plans to

formulate or meet funding standards and adversely affect the

financial health of plans,” but would also harm plans’

participants and beneficiaries through “lower benefits,” and

adversely affect responsible employers through “higher

contribution rates ... .” Using the single-employer doctrine to

alter who owns an Illinois business so it can avoid

contributing to the Funds defeats—rather than furthers—

those interests.

Moreover, there is nothing in the single-employer doctrine

that counsels using it to change who owns a business. That

rule measures if “nominally separate business entities” are

actually one employer because they have _ interrelated

9

operations, common management, centralized labor relations,

and common ownership. Radio and Television Broadcast

Technicians Local 1264, 380 U.S. at 256; see South Prairie

Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int.’1 Union of Operating Eng'rs,

425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam); Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d

486, 490 (4th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Esmark v. NLRB, 887

F.2d 739, 752-754 (7th Cir.1989); 373-381 South Broadway

Assoc., 304 NLRB i108 n. 6 (1991); Goodman Investment

Co., Inc., 292 NLRB 340, 347 (1989). But in none of these

cases have the courts or Labor Board tampered with the

entity’s extant ownership infrastructure. In fact, they have

held that two entities were not an integrated enterprise even

when they shared common ownership. Rogers v. Sugar Tree

Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir.1993), abrogated on

other grounds, Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999); Richmond

Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 313 NLRB 1247, 1249-1250

(1994).

Of course, this would be a different case if the Seventh

Circuit had interpreted who is the “employer” under ERISA

§ 515. That would not be “federal common law in ‘the

strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts to, not

simply to an interpretation of a federal statute . . ., but, rather,

to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of deci-

sion.’ ” Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 755, quoting,

Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218. When Congress wants federal

courts to tinker with who owns incorporeal abstractions, it

does so expressly, allowing the courts to flesh out the

statutory gaps with federal-common law. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1301(b)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a); see United States v. Vogel

Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); JUE AFL-CIO Pension

Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 123-124

(3rd Cir.1986); PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1094

(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). But the Seventh

Circuit did not decide who the statutory employer is; it ruled

10

who owns that employer using a federal standard. Pet. App.

9a-10a, 13a.

If this were only a dispute over this employer’s need to

contribute to this Fund under ERISA, the court’s error might

not merit review. After all, James will surely point out that

the contributions the Funeral Home might owe for his work

are $2,389. Pet. App. 49a ¥§ A & B. But this issue’s

significance transcends this statute and these parties. The

tension over choosing federal or State law to define who

owns otherwise-state-governed entities generates “significant

disagreement among courts and commentators . . .” in such

substantive areas as the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. United

States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9-(1998); Redwing

Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1498-

1503 (11th Cir.1996). The Seventh Circuit’s supplanting

State law to resolve this case doesn’t respect this Court’s

admonishing lower courts that instances when federal-

common law should displace its State counterpart are “few

and restricted.” Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651

(1963).

Moreover, important issues—requiring this Court’s deci-

sion—don’t necessarily involve high monetary stakes.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other

grounds, Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-331 (1986).

And focusing exclusively on the delinquent contributions is

deceptive: the Seventh Circuit held that the Funds won’t be

allowed any attorneys’ fees if James prevails on this issue.

Pet. App. 12a-14a.

Finally, this case’s importance is reflected in the fact that it

has gained national attention in the funeral-home industry.

Court says principal owner not an employee, 5 Death Care

Business Advisor No. 11 (LRP Publications Dec. 13, 2000),

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Stories file.

Because the industry recognizes that the issue is not limited to

1]

one Chicago funeral home, we believe it appropriate for this

Court to grant certiorari to address it.

B. The Seventh Circuit’s relegating prevailing

pension plans to the depressed hourly rate their

attorneys charge based on ideological reasons

conflicts with the District of Columbia Circuit.

The second problem with the Seventh Circuit’s decision is

that it equates the market rate for awarding attorney’s fees

with the Funds’ cost, even though their attorneys set those

fees at a depressed rate for altruistic reasons. Pet. App. 16a,

123a ¥ 2, 132a | 2. The court set the market rate at this level,

despite the fact that:

@ employers pay their Chicago law firms attorney’s fees in

the $300/hour range to defend the Funds’ lawsuits; and

e Chicago attorneys that don’t base their rates on

ideological goals charge the same rates as employer

firms.

Pet. App. 126a-127a 4 7, 135a4 5, 140aq 4.

The court reasoned that the Funds’ counsel “does not have

a high, regular rate from which it deviates to make gifts to

unions.” Pet. App. 16a. This decision is squarely contrary to

the District of Columbia’s rule that public-spirited

attorneys—including those who prosecute ERISA delinquent-

contributions cases—who depress their rates to advance

social causes are entitled to full-market rates rather than the

depressed rates they charge their clients. Board of Trustees of

Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 25 Health and Welfare

Fund v. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 807 (D.C. Cir.1998);

Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C.

Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996); Save Our

Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524

(D.C. Cir.1988) (en banc).

12

The District of Columbia Circuit’s rule is consistent with

the courts recognizing “that the prevailing market rate and

not the cost of providing legal services is the measure of a

‘reasonable attorney’s fee’” under fee-shifting statutes.

Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 956 (10th Cir.1994) (emphasis

in original); accord Buffington v. Baltimore County, 913 F.2d

113, 129-130 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906

(1991); Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. City of

Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153, 1161 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied,

475 U.S. 1011 (1986); McCann v. Couglin, 698 F.2d 112, 130

(2nd Cir.1983).

The District of Columbia’s rule is not without controversy.

Each decision drew published dissents, questioning a standard

that awards prevailing parties’ counsel more than they

actually charge their clients. JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d at 809-810

(Randolph, J., dissenting); Covington, 57 F.3d at 1112-1115

(Henderson, J., dissenting); Hodel, 857 F.2d at 1525-1534

(Starr, J., dissenting); see Andrew P. Sutor, IV, Note,

Covington v. District of Columbia: Judicial clouding of a

once clear burden of proof in awards of attorney fees under

42 U.S.C. § 1988, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 825, 859-864 (1996). The

Seventh Circuit sided with the District of Columbia’s

dissenting judges that unless counsel charge premium rates,

their clients are never entitled to full-market rates. Pet. App.

16a. The lines are thus drawn for this Court’s authoritative

resolution.

Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, only large law firms

charging premium rates will be able to recover those rates

from delinquent employers. But as Judge Frank Easterbrook

noted in Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th

Cir.1992), “[s]ome lawyers dedicate their professional lives

to causes they find admirable and worthy of support—to legal

services for the poor, to the representation of unions. These

lawyers are making contributions to their favorite causes, not

in money but in time.”

13

The Seventh Circuit’s standard will produce the anomalous

results Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel

predicted: either competent, public-spirited counsel will

refuse these cases or will resort to questionable billing

practices:

Thus, the practitioner outside the large or established

firm may either eschew pro bono representation,

directing those potential clients . . . to the established

firm or legal aid societies if either of those entities is

available and willing to undertake the representation, or

quote fictitious but market-based rates, which neither he

nor the client have any intention of actually seeing

collected in toto unless court-awarded fees are ultimately

available.

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d at

1520.

The Seventh Circuit's standard can’t be reconciled with

this Court’s precedent that under fee-shifting statutes, legal

services should be valued at their market value, regardless of

the attorney-client billing arrangements. Blanchard v.

Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

886, 893-896 (1984). Relegating pension plans to the

depressed actual rates their attorneys charge is also

inconsistent with Congress’s goals in enacting ERISA’s 1980

amendments. The legislative history to these amendments

shows that the legislature sought to “discourage

delinquencies” by making collection less “cumbersome and

costly.” Senate Committee Print at 44. To that end, Congress

in ERISA § 502(g)(2)(D) provided that courts “shall” award

attorney’s fees to prevailing pension plans. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(2)(D). There is no mandatory fee provision for

prevailing employers.

From this statutory structure and legislative history, the

District of Columbia Circuit held that “[{i]f an attorney has

made a public-spirited decision to charge a plan a discounted

1

rate, a delinquent employer should not receive the benefit of

this decision.” JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d at 805.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s standard—limiting pension

plans to their actual costs—transcends this ERISA context.

Although the court recognized that ERISA § 502(g)(2) does

not use the phrase “prevailing party,” it held that “case law

regarding prevailing parties is applicable to this section of

ERISA.” Pet. App. 17a n.4. Because similarly worded fee-

shifting statutes should be similarly construed—in the

absence of contrary legislative intent—the Seventh Circuit’s

standard will infect the hundreds of such statutes. See Fogerty

v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523-525 (1994); Independent

Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758

n.2 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’

Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 (1986). Because

the- Seventh Circuit’s standard has potentially sweeping

implications that will eviscerate Congress’s fee-shifting

goals, we ask this Court to grant review.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit’s displacing State-law ownership rules

for incorporeal entities stands in marked contrast to this

Court’s refusing to create federal-common law in areas the

States have traditionally regulated. It allows employers to

use the single-employer doctrine as a shield to avoid contrib-

uting to multiemployer plans, generating all the evils Con-

gress tackled when it enacted ERISA’s 1980 amendments.

The court’s standard for prevailing pension plan’s

attorney’s fees similarly defeats Congress’s goals of promot-

ing plans’ collecting delinquent contributions “efficaciously,”

and cannot be reconciled with the District of Columbia’s

precedent. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve these

issues, vacate the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remand to

that court for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s

opinion.

;

)

)

15

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID S. ALLEN *

JACOBS, BURNS, ORLOVE,

STANTON & HERNANDEZ

300 West Washington Street

Suite 1200

Chicago, Illinois 60606-2002

(312) 372-1646

Attorney for Petitioner

* Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moriarty v. Svec · 532 U.S. 1066 | Frix