Opposition Brief — Nixon et ux. v. Pennsylvania

No. 00-1353

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

DENNIS E. NIXON and LORIE A. NIXON,

Petitioners,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Pennsylvania

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Davip C. GORMAN

District Attorney

Counsel of Record

Attorney for Respondent

423 Allegheny Street, Suite 421

Hollidaysburg, PA 16648

(814) 693-3010

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

II.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

DOES SHANNON NIXON HAVE A “RIGHT TO

REFUSE MEDICAL CARE” SUCH AS TO TERMI-

NATE OR LIMIT THE PARENTAL DUTY TO PRO-

VIDE THE MOST BASIC OF NEEDS, THAT BEING

THE PROVIDING OF MEDICAL CARE?

DOES THE PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION

OF THE NIXONS INVOLVE THEIR FREEDOM

OF RELIGION EXCEPT AS A CONSEQUENCE

OF THEIR REFUSAL TO PROVIDE MEDICAL

TREATMENT FOR SHANNON NIXON?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review ................05:

Table of Contam. «6.560605 eee ee

Table of Authoetties «is cscsaecoee eee ees

Summary of the Argumeml. ..... sade0 ses iesdeseciaes

Argument . .......ssdsnn cue beens wee eee aes

Reasons for Opposing the Granting of the Writ....

I.

Il.

SHANNON NIXON’S “RIGHT TO REFUSE

MEDICAL CARE” HAS NEVER BEEN RECOG-

NIZED BY THE COURTS OF THIS LAND SUCH

AS TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT THE PARENTAL

DUTY TO PROVIDE THE MOST BASIC OF

NEEDS, THAT BEING THE PROVIDING OF

MEDICAL CARB «iis <casaneuanus oy ees 0e anaes

THE PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION OF

THE NIXONS DOES NOT INVOLVE THEIR

FREEDOM OF RELIGION EXCEPT AS A CON-

SEQUENCE OF THEIR RELIGIOUS REFUSAL

TO PROVIDE MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR

SHANNON TRERUIW 5. 00ha eae cee ce ere eae

Conclusion . . os se sade ne ee

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CasEs

Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,

76 L.Ea.2a@ 157, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983) .............. 6

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 111 L.Ed.2d

OE ss cd aceynseasexsscsds ses 2

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 99

eR ER Ee a a y

Prince 0. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438,

8 a 2s: a ee ee ee 7,8

Troxel v. Granville, 147 Led.2d 49 (2000)............ 2, 3

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 71 L.Ed.2d 127,

SE OO Re cc kode nc eeascehwacridvacs 8

Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112, 763 P.2d

852 (Cal. 1988) cert. denied 491 U.S. 905, 109

>.Ct. 3186, 105 L.Ed.2d 695 (1989) ........:...... 4,9

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 92

er a oe ca ois Gawd a aw 34 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

What is at issue here is not the Nixons’ right to free

exercise of their religion. What is at issue and has been

prosecuted is the consequences of the Nixons’ abdication

of their parental responsibilities. The State is allowed to

limit certain constitutional rights, including the right to

free exercise of religion when a compelling state interest

is involved. There is no greater compelling state interest

than that of the continued health and life of its most

vulnerable citizens, its children. The law established by

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.

645 (1944), has never been overruled but only refined in

the numerous cases which follow it. In this case, where

the life of Shannon Nixon was in obvious jeopardy, the

Nixons had no choice but to seek medical attention or at

the very least notify the authorities concerning the pre-

carious position of their daughter.

¢

ARGUMENT

REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE

GRANTING OF THE WRIT

I. SHANNON NIXON’S “RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDI-

CAL CARE” HAS NEVER BEEN RECOGNIZED BY

THE COURTS OF THIS LAND SUCH AS TO TER-

MINATE OR LIMIT THE PARENTAL DUTY TO

PROVIDE THE MOST BASIC OF NEEDS, THAT

BEING THE PROVIDING OF MEDICAL CARE.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized a

right of privacy. The right has its roots in a number of

various constitutional provisions. As indicated by the

Petitioner’s argument, there are numerous rights guaran-

teed to individual citizens. The right of privacy has been

balanced against the need of the States to ensure that the

children of adults are provided for, especially when those

children are sick or at death’s door. “The State has a

strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young

citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of

judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise

their rights wisely.” Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,

111 L.Ed.2d 344, 366-367, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990).

As stated by Justice Thomas in Troxel v. Granville, 147

L.Ed.2d 49, 70-71 (2000), “The constitutional protection

against arbitrary state interference with parental right

should not be extended to prevent the States from pro-

tecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental

authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the

welfare of the child.”?

It is apparent that a State has an ability to intervene

in the parent-chiid relationship if such is to ensure the

best interests of the child. Such an interest of the State is

no more apparent than when the child is sick or at

death’s door. “Nonetheless, we have recognized that a

State is not without constitutional control over parental

discretion in dealing with children when their physical or

mental health is jeopardized.” Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S.

584, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 118, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (1979) (citations

omitted).

1 The Justice referenced the consequences which a parent’s

decision would have upon the child. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972).

While the Courts have recognized that minors do

have some constitutional rights and are not under the

absolute tyranny of their parents, those rights are

severely limited. Minors, quite simply due to the lack of

maturity and life experiences, do not have free access-toa_ _

everything to which an adult is entitled. A State has a

vital interest in restricting certain activities to adults,

either those over the age of eighteen or twenty-one. Troxel

v. Granville, supra. Among these rights restricted to

adults is the privilege to drive a motorized vehicle, the

right to own and possess a firearm, the right to vote, the

right to enter into contracts, the right to give consent for

medical treatment as well as other health and safety

issues. The list of rights and/or privileges which are

restricted to adults is a long list indeed.

In the criminal law, this is perhaps best exampled by

the fact that a confession made by a juvenile without the

benefit of a parental guardian is presumptively invalid.

This is in recognition of the State’s belief that a minor has

neither the requisite maturity or life experience necessary

to ensure that a minor’s rights are protected. That belief

recognizes that a parent has certain duties and obliga-

tions when it comes to providing for the care of their

children.

One of and the foremost of these parental obligations

or duties is to provide medical care and treatment for a

child. This is especially true when the child is in dire

straights and at death’s door. This is exactly the situation

which was presented to the Nixons at that moment on

Friday morning when Shannon Nixon was in a coma. The

criminal laws, particularly as in this case, the Involuntary

Manslaughter and the Endangering of Welfare of Chil-

dren statutes, lay out the consequences which fall to

someone such as a parent who abdicates this respon-

sibility for whatever reason. Walker v. Superior Court, 47

Cal.3d 112, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.

905, 109 S.Ct. 3186, 105 L.Ed.2d 695 (1989), citing Prince v.

Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645

(1944). The State has such an interest in the minors’ well-

being that it can, should, and does penalize those who

violate their parental duties. The mere fact that the

Nixons exercise their freedom of religion should not

impact upon their parental responsibilities to Shannon

Nixon.

ee?

To quote from Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at pages

652-653:

But the family itself is not beyond regula-

tion in the public interest, as against a claim of

religious liberty. (citation omitted). And neither

rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are

beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general

interest in youth’s well-being, the State as

parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control

by requiring school attendance, regulating or

prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other

ways. Its authority is not nullified merely

because the parent grounds his claim to control

the child’s course of conduct on religion or con-

science. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from

compulsory vaccination for the child more than

for himself on religious grounds. The right to

practice religion freely does not include liberty

to expose the community or the child to commu-

nicable disease or the ladder to ill health or

death. (citation omitted). The catalogue need not

be lengthened. It is sufficient to show, what

indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the State

has a wide range of power for limiting parental

freedom and authority in things affecting the

child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some

extent, matters of conscience and religious con-

viction.

It is apparent that the State’s interest in protecting

the life of Shannon Nixon supercedes the Defendant’s

right to free exercise of their religion. It is apparent that

the law is well settled in this area and that there is no real

reason or basis upon which this Court should grant the

writ.

Finally, the Respondent questions the ability of the

Nixons to raise the constitutional rights of Shannon

Nixon. If Shannon Nixon is a “mature minor” with a right

to refuse medical care pursuant to her right of privacy,

then how do the Nixons raise the constitutional rights of

Shannon Nixon as a shield to absolve themselves of the

consequences of their actions? There is no basis in State

and/or Federal Law which gives another person the right

to assert the rights of a third party. Quite simply, the

Nixons have no standing to raise Shannon Nixon’s consti-

tutional rights, including the right to freedom, as a

defense to the obligations upon them as parents to pro-

vide for the care and well-being of Shannon Nixon.

Il. THE PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION OF THE

NIXONS DOES NOT INVOLVE THEIR FREEDOM

OF RELIGION EXCEPT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF

THEIR REFUSAL TO PROVIDE MEDICAL TREAT-

MENT FOR SHANNON NIXON.

As previously indicated, the prosecution of the

Nixons and the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court does not penalize the Petitioners’ exercise of their

religious beliefs. The conviction of the Nixons and the

decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court impacts

upon their parental obligations to care for their daughter.

The prosecution does not directly impact upon the exer-

cise of their religion as much as the consequences of that

same religion. More importantly, as previously argued,

what is being penalized is the abdication of the Nixons of

their most basic parental duty to Shannon Nixon. The

Commonwealth can limit the Nixons’ right to free exer-

cise of their religion when this absolute right infringes

upon the well-being of their minor children. The Com-

monwealth has an obligation to step in and ensure that

the only ones who make themselves out to be martyrs are

those adults who have the requisite maturity and life

experiences to make such a critical life decision. Prince v.

Massachusetts, supra; Bob Jones University v. United States,

461 U.S. 574, 76 L.Ed.2d 157, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). As the

Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, supra, pages

180-181 stated, “This Court has long held the Free Exer-

cise Clause of the First Amendment to mean absolute

prohibition against the government regulations of reli-

gious beliefs (citations omitted). As interpreted by this

Court, moreover, the Free Exercise Clause provides sub-

stantial protection for lawful conduct grounded in reli-

gious belief (citations omitted). However, ‘not all burdens

on religion are unconstitutional . . . The state may justify

a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is

essential to accomplish an overriding governmental inter-

est.’ (citations omitted). On occasion, this Court has

found certain governmental interests so compelling as to

allow even regulations prohibiting religiously based con-

duct.” Prince v. Massachusetts, supra.

It cannot be said that there is a more compelling

governmental interest than preventing the death of one of

its minor citizens.

While the Petitioners have a right to raise their chil-

dren in accordance with their beliefs, that same right

carries with it certain duties to ensure that the best inter-

ests of their children are met. The best interests of their

children are surely met by the continued viability of the

children’s lives free from the restraints generated by their

religion. If the parents have a right to raise their child as

they see fit, then they have an obligation and duty to

ensure that they are not abdicating that parental respon-

sibility.

The mere fact that the regulations governing Chil-

dren and Youth Services do not qualify the Nixons’

actions as child abuse, does not preclude a criminal pros-

ecution for those who have put their freedom of religion

above the best interests of the child. The mere fact that

the Children and Youth Services regulations removes the

Nixons’ conduct from the definition of child abuse, does

not make their decisions any less culpable under the

a

criminal law. As previously indicated, a parent is or par-

ents are allowed to make martyrs of themselves. How-

ever, when parents, by the result of their decisions, make

martyrs of their children, then the State has a duty and

obligation to step in and ensure that those children are

protected. Prince v. Massachusetts, supra. This conflict

between the freedom of religion and parental duties is

one which is in continual debate throughout the United

States. However, as stated by United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.

252, 71 L.Ed.2d 127, 132, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982), “The State

may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing

that it is essential to accomplish an overriding govern-

mental interest.” (citations omitted). As previously

stated, when the health and life of a child is at risk, the

Courts have supported this overriding governmental

interest in protecting its citizens. Consequently, when a

parent’s action or inaction endangers the welfare of a

child or children, then that action and/or inaction can be

penalized by the States.

There are limits to every right that one as a citizen

enjoys. However, when the exercise of those rights affects

others, then the State has an obligation and duty to step

in. This is true even if the individual who is exercising

the said right is an adult. If that is true of an adult, then

how can it be that a parent is exempt from that interven-

tion? One cannot imagine a more basic obligation of a

State than the protection of its citizens. When the actions

of an adult or non-action of an adult, whether it be parent j

or guardian, affect and impact upon the health and well-

being of a child, then the State is not only within its rights

but obligated to intervene to ensure the continued health

and well-being of those same children. If, as in this case,

———o———E

the Nixons abdicate those most basic of parental obliga-

tions, then they can indeed suffer the consequences of

that abdication. Walker v. Superior Court, supra. There is

no greater need for the fulfillment of parental duty by the

Nixons then in that moment when Shannon Nixon is in a

coma at death’s door and unable to care for herself. In

fact, it is impossible to tell what Shannon Nixon’s request

would have been on Friday morning when she was in a

coma. There is no greater crystallization of that parental

responsibility than in that moment when Shannon Nixon

cannot take care of herself. The abdication of the Nixons’

responsibility can, notwithstanding the rights to free

exercise of religion, result in criminal prosecution and the

consequences of the same.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Respondent

respectfully pray that the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip C. GORMAN

District Attorney

Attorney for Respondent

423 Allegheny Street, Suite 421

Hollidaysburg, PA 16648

(814) 693-3010