Reply Brief — Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff (No. 07-1180)

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FILED

y SUN 3 - 2005

OFFICE OFT

No. 07-1180 |_SUPREWE count h

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE AND SIERRA CLUB,

Petitioners,

¥.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ANDREW J. PINCUS DAN M. KAHAN

CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Counsel of Record

Mayer Brown LLP TERRI-LEI O’MALLEY

1909 K Street, NW Yale Law School

Washington, DC 20006 Supreme Court Clinic

(202) 263-3000 127 Wall Street

New Haven, CT 06511

ROBERT DREHER (203) 432-4800

BRIAN SEGEE

Defenders of Wildlife Counsel for Petitioners

1130 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 772-3225

Counsel for Defenders of Wildlife

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO.., INC. — (202) 769-0086 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

|

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTO iit vicsiscsiinséchscsxceedapndsgpietiaanas il

A. This Court Should Grant Review Now

To Resolve Definitively The Continuing

Controversy Surrounding The

Constitutionality Of The Secretary’s

WH Rita I since Sasi acs cates enzors 2

B. Judicial Review Is An Essential

Element Of The Intelligible Principle

UNM IINE a snaceccoanadesabudnncauneigeinninaaabinaaaince 8

C. The Secretary’s Waiver Is Equivalent

To The Repeal Invalidated In Clinton. .......... 10

COIN LESION sicsesncsccnvsasnasssetseiassatalneeennaeneernengeni 12

ll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Chicago & S., Air Line v. Waterman S.S.

A. ito. FOG CIB se ciccerescnecicncccssssssesecs 9

Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S. 417

SI ic sisicinsk cna aticaleide aebeebiactncaiedsiicecsbexainkyse ch eunekiale 10

County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. 08-0196

(W.D. Tex. filed June 2, 2008)...................0..000 5

Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994)......0....000.0002... 9

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) .0.0................. 10,11

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788

SERIE EIT EON eo Ste EES Pe Te RT 9

Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1993).............. 5

Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1998)...........-.:0e+e00-00--- 9

NLRB vy. United Food & Commercial Workers

Cement GIG TFS, TAD CRBS von nccsnescccceccssacaccosees 9

South Dakota v. Dep’t of Interior,

69 F.34d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated,

Be re sins scccecicsctscicascascciscdiveciausnacs 6

Touby v. United States,

SE I acc cccdcunandensaduntuabicdeatioen T

United States v. Bozarov, 974 F. 2d 1037

Re __ SE RENRMEOeneme ni atoms ett erty Sano Re 7

United States v. Students Challenging Regula-

tory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669............. 9

United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587

(10th Cir. 1990), vacated, 502 U.S. 801

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy

a OEE Ci iacicevacrncecensscovanrecmeundaes 9

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Texas Border Coalition v. Chertoff, No. 08-

00848 (D.D.C. filed May 16, 2008)................... 5

STATUTES:

Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551

I iriiceaiiitncancinacnndbisdcunidbsiinacentecstnecncetiinnis 3

American Indian Religious Freedom Act,

ese 3

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act,

16 U.S.C. § 469 et seq.);

Archeological Resources Protection Act,

16 U.S.C. § 470aa et seq.............. cicidiamieieouoan 3

Arizona Desert Wilderness Act Pub. L.

No.101-628;

| ASE NRE RAED OTE ORT ite RET RI ON PN 3

Is cihticcicsercennschagieds xxcdaipanciaccaokeg aoukiaameime adie 3

I asiacsctcscisssic wscspncaiuicihis das incaidaiintaaiedanceak Mes 3

DO iicietisictsnnshakecicussnspeteleicl cpa luhad bem, aaai noes 3

8 EL TIS LLM TEEN RADNER Th STO 3

| USER RRR SO oa Srey cant nce AR eMC IN eta eaES Fe 9 3

Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. .............c.eeeeee 3

California Desert Protection Act (Pub. L. 103-

Ee i I ip ree soca detncathcas inet 3

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. ......... eee 3

Coastal Zone Management Act , 16 U.S.C. §

Pe ait cencace inane sid iatneredennecasisa’ 3

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act, 42

rae I Oe I crininescticincniebndencnecacccnnennts 3

1V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq.;

the Native American Graves Protection

and Repatriation Act (25 U.S.C. 3001 et

ah i aks acide dasa ice nenalniodadnivccecssicies 3

Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43

Read ee A I aah cx tinecdsvtticensasninsscceasnanss 3

Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §

I a gle lic sickbiedstneciiens 3

Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act,

Re er ee Oe Gierasch raccsspisadisnscniesasisnss 3

California Desert Protection Act, Pub. L. No.

a a | - Sey ae a 3

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et

a se ascansiidevinnbaanene 3

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (com-

monly referred to as the Clean Water

I Be as Oe EI, nich cissaes sc seccsersees 3

Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 (Pub. L. 84-

BORE, SO UEC. FES8, OF COG.) vaccecssisscescscsccsccecs 3

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.

i ccc etaenses 3

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-208 § 102, (codified as amended

at 6 UB. © FIGS NOG wisi. ..ccsaccccenes 1, 2, 6, 7, 11

Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et

aici tes i a A kashish gc ciag hc tetaiannteaas onsen 3

Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,

i III bid casicdvaneteanidvnniencencassincenecuass 3

National Environmental Policy Act,

A ee Oe EO i sedi caneitnnsesanncndcions 3

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16

ec sncaccntacscscncncasascosseres 4

National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.

a csenneaesienitcee TRESS eee Te 3

National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978,

I as ci calaanenccnacasasecnanssadecsensess 3

coc aicsaceustsdctcacoevevdxans 3

ick css qansandanandcnecdndoiuis 3

a 5, sata pasanbulinecbaasacesaasaieds 3

National Park Service General Authorities

Act,

16 § U.S.C. 1la-1 et seq............... sanaivinsnnianieaiionas 3

National Park Service Organic Act,

en csacessaciciececcscese 3

National Wildlife Refuge System Administra-

tion Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee.............0.0.... 3

Native American Graves Protection and Repa-

triation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq. ............... 3

Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq................. 3

Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999, Pub.

css. sc cataneostansaicsicandats 2

NESSES ESET ep SO ee 2

as ncanannascansnaccareisenss 2

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.

es ssannssunssicuanccucn 3

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,

ccs cnasmusteansctscscenannnse 3

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et

seq.; the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.

ec cahdiniinecnnuncannnianen 3

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

Secure Fence Act, Pub. L. No. 190-367, § 2(a),

IRIEL SES a 8

Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the

Resource Conservation and Recovery

po aR Ss) PF a ae 3

Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1281

Ratan Cabos Sesanbba bilipbbailoandapnasensuntencesaceed 3

Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. .................... 3

MISCELLANEOUS:

73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr. 8, 2008)...................... ee 3

73 Fed. Reg. 18, 293 (Apr. 3, 2008).......................cee 3

Border Fence Waivers Show Feds’ Arrogance,

The San Antonio Express-News, Apr. 3,

2008, available at http://www.mysan

antonio.com/ opinion/ editorials/ stories/

MYSA040408.010.Fence led.25ff92c.ht

Flattened By The Wall: Fence-Builders Should

Not Be Allowed to Bulldoze Past All

Laws, The (Syracuse) Post-Standard,

Apr. 15, 2008, available at

http://www.syracuse.com/ opinion/ in-

dex.ssf?/ base/ opinion-2/

1208249823169420.xml&coll=1; Op. Ed.......... 4

Michael Chertoff’s Insult, The New York

Times, April 3, 2008, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 04/ 03/

opinion/ 03thu3.html?_r=l&em&

ex=1207368000&en=4c861a0cf3a609a3

&ei=5087%0A &oref=slogin ........ eee eeeeeeeeeeeee 5

Rusty Dornan, Border-fence Dispute Snares

Rare Jaguars, CNN, May 5, 2008,

available at http://www.cnn.com/ 2008/

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)

TECH/ science/ 05/ 05/ jag-

uars.fence/index. html; Op. Ed.................0........ 4

U.S. Wrong to Bypass Laws for Border Fence,

The San Diego Union Tribune, Apr. 3,

2008, available at http://www.signon

sandiego.com/ news/ op-ed/ editorial1/

20080403-9999-lzled3top. html; Op. Ed. ......... 4

Wall Project Must Not Trample Citizens’

Rights, Prerogatives, The Arizona Daily

Star, Apr. 3, 2008, available at

http://www.azstarnet.com/

ne Op.

a ns inasenaaccnnte 4

Skirting of Rules Shows Hypocrisy of Govern-

ment, The Yuma Sun, Apr. 2, 2008,

available at http://www.yumasun.com/

opinion/ rules_40766___article.htm]/

OREN RIE inc sisceendcieciniasnxesnsnoscnnsoneses 4

The government strives mightily to depict the

Secretarys Section 102(c) waiver authority as a

commonplace measure indistinguishable from prior

delegations of legislative power and prior waiver

provisions upheld by this Court. That argument ig-

nores reality, including:

e The three amicus briefs that confirm the con-

tinuing importance of the constitutional ques-

tions presented in the petition as well as the

waiver authority’s constitutional defects;

e The Secretary's new, and extremely broad,

April 2008 waivers—not even discussed by the

government—that have engendered very sub-

stantial controversy, including new lawsuits

challenging the validity of Section 102(c)

waivers;

e The government’s inability to point to even a

single decision by this Court relying on the in-

telligible principle standard to uphold a stat-

ute against a delegation challenge where the

exercise of the delegated authority was not

subject to some form of judicial review for

compliance with the congressional standard.

The district court rulings on which the gov-

ernment relies thus have no support in this

Court’s decisions.

Only this Court can dispel the profound and per-

sistent state of uncertainty that attends the Secre-

tary’s continuing issuance of waivers and the associ-

ated continued stream of litigation. “There are of

course no court of appeals decisions” (Opp. 9 n.4)

permitted under the truncated jurisdictional provi-

sions at issue. District court decisions, by their na-

ture, cannot generate binding precedent even within,

2

much less across, particular districts. Until this

Court addresses these issues, therefore, there will be

no authoritative answers to the important constitu-

tional questions posed by the Secretary's extraordi-

narily broad waiver authority—and its insulation

from judicial review for compliance with Congress's

standard—that is at issue in this case.

The government opposes certiorari on the ground

that further review would frustrate the goal of expe-

dition reflected in the “special statutory framework”

(Opp. 10) that eliminates court of appeals review and

bars consideration of nonconstitutional claims any-

where. But the newly-filed litigation over Section

102(c), combined with the truncated review provi-

sions and the short time-frame for the proposed con-

struction of the fence, make immediate review by

this Court imperative. Contrary to the government's

claim, the Secretary’s “statutory obligation to achieve

operational control over the Nation’s borders within

a matter of months” (Opp. 11) is not a reason to deny

certiorari; rather, it is a reason to grant review and

then to expedite this Court’s consideration of the

case, a procedure petitioners would welcome.

A. This Court Should Grant Review Now

To Resolve Definitively The Continuing

Controversy Surrounding The Constitu-

tionality Of The Secretary’s Waiver Au-

thority.

The government opposes certiorari on the ground

that “there is no split of authority” concerning the

constitutionality of Section 102(c) of IIRIRA (Opp. 9).

This attempt to force-fit the “circuit conflict” tem-

plate onto the petition ignores the principal grounds

presented for granting certiorari: the persistent state

of legal controversy that will attend the continuing

3

exercise of the Secretary’s waiver authority; the divi-

sion in the lower courts with respect to the role of ju-

dicial review in nondelegation analysis; and the in-

ability of district courts to abate such controversy.

1. Any doubt regarding the continuing impor-

tance of the legal issues presented here is eliminated

by the Secretary’s issuance in April 2008 of two new

waivers, one of 27 laws covering 22 miles of fencing

in Hidalgo County, Texas, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,077 (Apr.

8, 2008), the other wiping out over 35 laws with re-

spect to more than four hundred seventy miles of

fence in four states, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,293 (Apr. 3,

2008).!

1 The broader waiver applies to the following federal statutes,

as well as “all federal, state or other laws, regulations, and legal

requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject” of

these laws: National Environmental Policy Act, (42 U.S.C.§

4321 et seq.)); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et

seq.)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly re-

ferred to as the Clean Water Act) (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.)); the

National Historic Preservation Act 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.));

the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq.); the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; the Archeological Re-

sources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa et seq.; the Safe

Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.; the Noise Control

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq.); the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as

amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42

U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.; the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et

seq.; the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act, 16

U.S.C. § 469 et seq.; the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et

seq.); the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act, 16

U.S.C. § 461 et seq.); the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1281 et seq.; the Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §

4201 et seq.; the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §

1451 et seq.; the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.; the

Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et

4

The scope and diversity of the abrogated laws is

breathtaking. Cast aside are not just every signifi-

cant environmental protection and land use statute

but also laws protecting Native American graves and

religious practices as well as freedom of religion gen-

erally. The Secretary has waived the organic act of

one executive agency (the National Park Service) in

its entirety. He has even eliminated protection of the

bald eagle, the symbol of our Nation.

Not surprisingly, given the impact of the Secre-

tary’s most recent waivers and the immense public

controversy surrounding them,? this case is not the

seq.); the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act,

16 U.S.C. § 668dd-668ee); the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16

U.S.C. § 742a, et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,

16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; the Otay Mountain Wilderness Act of 1999,

Pub. L. No. 106-145; Sections 102(29) and 103 of Title I of the

California Desert Protection Act, Pub. L. No, 103-433, 50 Stat.

1827, the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, 2-

4); the National Park Service General Authorities Act, 16

US.C. §la-1; Sections 401(7), 403, and 404 of the National

Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625; Sections

301(a)-(f) of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No.

101-628; the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403);

the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq.; the Native

American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §

3001 et seq.; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42

U.S.C. § 1996; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000bb; the National Forest Management Act of 1976,

16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., and the Multiple Use and Sustained

Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528-531).

2 See, e.g., Rusty Dornan, Border-fence Dispute Snares Rare

Jaguars, CNN, May 5, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/

2008/ TECH/ science/ 05/ 05/ jaguars.fence/index.html; Op. Ed.,

Flattened By The Wall: Fence-Builders Should Not Be Allowed

to Bulldoze Past All Laws, The (Syracuse) Post-Standard, April

15, 2008, available at http://www.syracuse.com/ opinion/ in-

dex.ssf?/ base/ opinion-2/ 1208249823169420.xml&coll=1; Op.

SE

5

only pending challenge to the Secretary’s actions.

Two new suits have been filed in the last month

alone. See County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. 08-0196

(W.D. Tex. filed June 2, 2008); Texas Border Coallt-

tion v. Chertoff, No. 08-00848 (D.D.C. filed May 16,

2008).

By granting review here, this Court would re-

solve conclusively the issue in those cases; otherwise,

that litigation—and the associated uncertainty—will

continue. Absent review by this Court, moreover,

none of these district court lawsuits will quiet the

controversy surrounding the fence, because none, as

a matter of law, can. It is well established that dis-

trict court decisions do not create binding precedent

for other district courts, either wit®in or across dis-

tricts. See, e.g., Gould v. Bowyer, 11 ©.3d 82, 84 (7th

Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (“[a] district court decision

binds no judge in any other case”). Because Con-

gress, in addition to restricting district court review

Ed., U.S. Wrong to Bypass Laws for Border Fence, The San

Diego Union Tribune, Apr. 3, 2008, available at

http://‘www.signonsandiego.com/ news/ op-ed/_ editoriall/

20080403-9999-lzled3top.html; Op. Ed., Wall Project Must Not

Trample Citizens' Rights, Prerogatives, The Arizona Daily Star,

Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/

altds/pastframe/opinion/232564; Op. Ed., Skirting of Rules

Shows Hypocrisy of Government, The Yuma Sun, Apr. 2, 2008,

available at http://www.yumasun.com/ opinion/

rules_40766___article.html/ hypocrisy_roads.htm]; Editorial,

Border Fence Waivers Show Feds’ Arrogance, The San Antonio

Express-News, Apr. 3, 2008, available at

http://www.mysanantonio.com/ opinion/ editorials/ — stories/

MYSA040408.010.Fenceled.25ff92c.html; Editorial, Michael

Chertoff's Insult, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2008, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/ 04/ 03/ opinion/

03thu3.html?_r=1&em &ex=1207368000&en=4c861 a0cf3a609a3

&ei=5087%0A &oref=slogin.

6

to constitutional challenges, extinguished jurisdic-

tion of the courts of appeals to review decisions chal-

lenging the Secretarys | waivers (IRIRA

§ 102(c)(2)(A)-(C)), the only court that can authorita-

tively resolve the issue presented in this case is this

one. Until that happens, adversely affected parties

will continue to seek legal redress, the federal gov-

ernment will continue to expend the resources neces-

sary to defend the Secretary’s actions, and district

courts will continue to be obliged to render decisions,

for as long as it takes the Government to complete

the border fence.

2. We explained in the petition (at 15-16) that

the district court’s ruling (and the government’s posi-

tion) conflict with lower court decisions in other

statutory contexts holding that the availability of

statutory judicial review is essential to upholding

delegations of legislative authority under the intelli-

gible principle standard.

The government responds (Opp. 9) that “this

Court vacated the only decisions * * * that invali-

dated statutory provisions on unconstitutional dele-

gation grounds because of the unavailability of judi-

cial review.” But this Court did not reject the princi-

ple that judicial review is a key element of the intel-

ligible principle test. To the contrary, that principle

was reaffirmed in both cases—in South Dakota, the

government voluntarily revised its regulation to au-

thorize judicial review (rather than seeking reversal

3 Although the 14-mile fence segment that was the subject of

the waiver at issue in this action has been substantially com-

pleted, the government concedes (Op. 8-9 n.3) that the continu-

ing possibility of relief to abate violations of law associated with

that fence segment precludes a claim of mootness.

7

of the lower court’s decision on the merits) and

sought a remand for reconsideration (Pet. 15-16 n.5);

and in Widdowson the Court remanded for reconsid-

eration in light of its decision in Touby that the rele-

vant statute provided sufficient judicial review to

satisfy the nondelegation doctrine’s requirement.

The government also fails even to acknowledge

the two appellate decisions in which courts upheld

delegations on the ground that the relevant statutes

provided for judicial review (see Pet. 15). And it ig-

nores the fact that in Bozarov, which the government

characterizes as “the most relevant decision” (Opp.

10), the court of appeals expressly relied on the

availability of some judicial review in upholding the

delegation (see Pet. 16 n.6).

The lower court decisions thus confirm that judi-

cial review is a key part of the intelligible principle

test. Indeed, the government does not point to a sin-

gle lower court decision outside the Section 102(c)

context endorsing its position that judicial review is

irrelevant. The stark contrast between the decision

below and the other lower courts’ decisions address-

ing this issue provides yet another basis for granting

review here.4

4 The government states (Opp. 15) that the legal argument ad-

vanced in the petition was “neither pressed nor passed upon in

the court below * * *.” But the government does not make a

claim of waiver, nor could it. The contention that Section 102(c)

violates the nondelegation doctrine was squarely advanced be-

low, and that argument relied in part on the lack of judicial re-

view. Certainly the government, which frequently modifies in

this Court the legal arguments advanced in lower courts, does

not argue that a party may only advance in this Court the pre-

cise legal argument it advanced below.

8

3. As the government notes, Congress directed

the Secretary to take “all actions the Secretary de-

termines necessary and appropriate,” including the

construction of fences, “to achieve and maintain op-

erational control over the entire” United States bor-

der within an 18-month period. Secure Fence Act,

Pub. L. No. 190-367, § 2(a), 120 Stat. 2638. The gov-

ernment argues that this “statutory obligation to

achieve operational control over the Nation’s borders

within a matter of months” counsels against the

granting of certiorari. Opp. 11.

In fact, exactly the opposite is true. The very

speed with which the Secretary is obliged to complete

the fence—and that he contends impels him to abro-

gate all manner of law in the process—makes it all

the more imperative that this Court grant certiorari

now to resolve the constitutional question defini-

tively

B. Judicial Review Is An Essential Element

Of The Intelligible Principle Standard.

The bulk of the government’s Opposition consists

of arguments on the merits. Put simply, however,

there is no support in this Court’s decisions for the

government’s position (Opp. 11) that existence of an

intelligible principle is the sole consideration of the

nondelegation inquiry and judicial review for compli-

ance with that principle is entirely irrelevant. That

contention turns on its head a fundamental pillar of

separation of powers by arguing that absence of judi-

cial oversight does not implicate constitutional con-

cerns.

The government is unable to cite any case in

which the Court has expressly stated that judicial

review is not required to satisfy the intelligible prin-

9

ciple standard. Indeed, we have not been able to lo-

cate a decision of this Court upholding a delegation

under the intelligible principle standard where the

agency's compliance with the intelligible principle

was not subject to such judicial review.

The cases on which the government relies (Opp.

19-23) all involve delegations not subject to the intel-

ligible principle standard (see Pet. 17-19).5 Thus, in

each of the cases that it cites, the delegation was up-

held without reference to the intelligible principle

standard, either because there was no law to apply

(United Food & Commercial Workers and Lincoln) or

because of the Executive’s inherent authority (Water-

man Steamship Corp. and Knauff).®

Moreover, the government blithely ignores the

repeated statements in this Court’s opinions that ju-

dicial review is an important element of the intelligi-

ble principle standard. Pet. 13-15. While the gov-

ernment understandably prefers formulations that

5 The government conceded below that the constitutionality of

Section 102(c) is governed by the intelligible principle standard.

See Pet. 19. Its assertion that it “possesses independent author-

ity over the subject matter” (Opp. 13-14) is therefore irrelevant.

And it plainly does not possess independent authority over the

subject matter relevant here—the subjects of the waived stat-

utes.

6 The government's reference (Opp. 23) to Students Challenging

Regulatory Agency Procedures is baffling, because the passage

cited involved the district court’s inability to grant interim re-

lief, not a complete preclusion of judicial review. Similarly,

Franklin and Dalton did not involve nondelegation claims.

Moreover, the challenges in Franklin where entirely proce-

dural—there was no assertion that the President failed to com-

ply with the substantive statutory standard—and the statute in

Dalton imposed no constraints on the President’s discretion, the

paradigmatic sitwation in which there is no law to apply.

10

do not mention judicial review, this Court in fact has

referred to the courts’ role in applying the standard.

Finally, the importance of judicial review here is

confirmed by the government's half-hearted attempt

(Opp. 20 n.8) to justify the Secretary’s waiver. If all

that is required for a waiver is that it “allowed the

fence* * * to be constructed more expeditiously,” then

a waiver will be justified in any case in which any

statute may possibly apply to construction of the

fence. If Congress meant to adopt that incredibly le-

nient test, however, it simply would have enacted a

blanket waiver itself and saved the Secretary the

trouble of having to issue individual waivers. Con-

gress intended a more focused inquiry, with the ra-

tionale spelled out by the Secretary—something that

will occur only with statutory judicial review.

C. The Secretary’s Waiver Is Equivalent To

The Repeal Invalidated In Clinton.

To avoid Clinton v. City of New York., 524 U.S.

417 (1998), the government attempts to distinguish

“waiver” from “repeal” on the ground that “waivers”

suspend the application of existing law “in one or

more particular situations, while. leaving them oth-

erwise fully applicable.” Opp. at 24-25. But the Clin-

ton Court stated that the practical effect of the Ex-

ecutive’s action, not the term applied to it, is disposi-

tive. The government’s distinction elevates form over

substance by turning entirely on whether the rele-

vant underlying law is broad or narrow. Waiver of a

statute applicable only along the border, or only to

construction of a border wall, for example, would de-

prive the law of all substantive force and effect, and

be indistinguishable from repeal of such a law in its

entirety.

11

The government also argues (Opp. 24) that the

Secretary's waiver closely resembles the tariff waiver

upheld in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). As we

discuss in the petition (at 21-24), the waiver provi-

sion here is far different from the one before the

Court in Field. The government asserts (Opp. 27-28)

that those differences do not matter, but again it is

unable to point to any precedent of this Court up-

holding under Field a provision with the unprece-

dented characteristics of Section 102(c). Moreover, a

key factor in Field—also central to the Court's de-

termination in Clinton—was whether the Executive's

action is mandatory upon the occurrence of particu-

lar future events, and thus truly represents Con-

gress's legislative decision. 143 U.S. at 693; see also

524 U.S. at 443-44. The discretionary waiver provi-

sion here fails that test. Review is warranted so that

this Court may determine whether Field's rationale

applies in this very different context.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.

ANDREW J. PINCUS DAN M. KAHAN

CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Counsel of Record

Mayer Brown LLP TERRI-LEI O’MALLEY

1909 K Street, NW Yale Law School

Washington, DC 20036 Supreme Court Clinic

(202) 263-3000 127 Wall Street

New Haven, CT 06511

ROBERT DREHER (203) 432-4800

BRIAN SEGEE

Defenders of Wildlife Counsel for Petitioner

1130 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 772-3225

Counsel for Defenders of

Wildlife

JUNE 2008

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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