Appendix — Farah v. United States (No. 07-810)

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APPENDIX

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4712

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

INTISAR KHALIF FARAH, a/k/a Intisar Ali,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonard

D. Wexler, Senior District Judge, sitting by

designation. (1:05-cr-00163-LDW).

Argued: May 25, 2007

Decided: August 14, 2007

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Gregory

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and

Judge Niemeyer joined.

ARGUED: Melinda Laverne VanLowe,

GREENSPUN, DAVIS & LEARY, P.C., Fairfax,

Virginia, for Appellant. Jeanine Linehan, Assistant

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Peter D. Gi‘eenspun,

GREENSPUN, DAVIS & LEARY, P.C., Fairfax,

Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United

States Attorney, Edmund Power, Assistant United

States Attorney, Aaron M. Zebley, Assistant United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in

this circuit.

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

Intisar Khalif Farah appeals her conviction for

procuring naturalization unlawfully in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1425(a). She assigns error to several of the

district court's evidentiary rulings and rulings on her

pre-trial and post-trial motions. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm.

Farah, a native of Somalia, entered the United States

for the first time on January 10, 19838, as a non-

immigrant with a student visa. In May 1984, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")

denied her application for an extension of stay and

ordered her to depart the United States by July 13,

1984. Farah left for Mogadishu, Somalia, on July 10,

1984 and, later that summer, became engaged to

marry Yusef Abdi Ali. At some point thereafter,

Farah re-entered the United States, moving to Cape

Giradeau, Missouri, in 1985 and to Alexandria,

Virginia, in 1988.

On February 27, 1989, Farah applied for asylum. She

stated in her application that January 11, 1983, was

the date of her last arrival in the United States. She

also stated that she and her family were members of

the Isaaq clan and, as a result of that membership,

she had been arrested three times, imprisoned, and

tortured in Somaha. Her application was successful,

and in December 1990, a year after receiving asylum,

Farah applied for and was granted lawful permanent

resident status as an asylee eligible for adjustment.

On December 21, 1990, Farah requested refugee

status in Canada, where her husband believed it

would be easier for him to obtain asylum. In making

her request, Farah claimed that she _ feared

persecution in Somalia because she was "Isaac |sic]

[and] the government kills all of our people." J.A.

1871. Farah claimed that she was arrested and

imprisoned in Somalia in August 1989, fled Somalia

in November 1990, and spent one month illegally in

the United States en route to Canada. Farah further

claimed that she was in Ethiopia from June 1988 to

August 1989. Farah denied on two separate Canadian

applications that she had ever applied for refugee

status in any other country.

In June 1991, Farah appeared before the Canadian

Immigration and Refugee Board and testified that

she was Isaaq, that she was arrested in Somalia in

May 1988 for participating in a protest against then-

President Siad Barre, and that she went to Ethiopia

after being released from prison but, upon her return

to Mogadishu in August 1989, was arrested with

other Isaags for being Isaaq. Farah testified that her

boyfriend procured her release from prison and that

she fled Somalia a year later for Canada, stopping

first in the United States to meet her boyfriend. The

Canadian government denied Farah's — refugee

application and ordered her to depart Canada by

October 13, 1992. Farah returned to the United

States. In July 1993, Farah's parents and siblings

were admitted to the United States as refugees

because Farah's father, a member of the Darod clan

in Somalia, had been singled out for persecution as a

high-ranking member of the former Somali

government.

On April 20, 1995, Farah became a United States

citizen. She swore in her application for citizenship,

and again during her interview with the INS, that

her only absence from the United States since

becoming a permanent resident was a visit to Canada

from August 1991 to November 1991. Farah stated

that she was living in Virginia and working in the

District of Columbia from 1990 to 1992.

In December 1996, Farah sponsored her husband's

admission to the United States and, in March 1998,

Farah submitted a declaration to the Executive Office

of Immigration Review on behalf of her husband. In

that declaration, Farah provided details of her

—

background which were inconsistent with the details

she provided in her applications for asylum,

adjustment of _ status, and naturalization.

Investigation into the affairs of Farah's husband

provoked scrutiny of Farah's immigration file and, in

December 1998, an INS official authored an internal

memorandum identifying what the official considered

false statements by Farah that were sufficient to

denaturalize her.

On April 19, 2005, a grand jury indicted Farah for

naturalization fraud. Farah filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to return the indictment within the statute

of limitations: the motion was denied after a hearing.

In August 2005, in response to a court order, the

Government filed a bill of particulars enumerating

the allegedly materially false statements Farah made

in her applications for asylum, lawful permanent

residence, and naturalization. Farah then filed a

renewed motion to dismiss for failure to return the

indictment within the statute of limitations, a motion

to dismiss for prejudicial pre-indictment delay and

vindictive prosecution, and several motions in limine.

After a hearing, the district court denied the motion

to dismiss for prejudicial pre-indictment delay,

stating that it would determine the issue during trial.

The court reserved its decision on the motion

regarding the statute of limitations and the motions

in limine.

At trial in November 2005, the Government

presented documents from the INS, including a copy

of Farah's 1984 plane ticket from the United States to

Somalia, establishing that Farah left the United

States for Mogadishu around July 1984 and returned

to the United States sometime _ thereafter.

Additionally, the Government showed that Farah's

declaration on behalf of her husband states that she

is a member of the Darod clan although she based her

claim for asylum on her membership in the Isaag

clan. Accordingly, the Government presented

evidence confirming that Farah and her immediate

family are Darod, not Isaag. At the time Farah

apphed for asylum, the Department of State

considered members of the Isaaq clan to have a well-

founded fear of persecution by Barre's regime and,

consequently, a basis for being granted asylum in the

United States. The Government therefore argued at

trial that Farah knew a claim to have suffered

mistreatment because she was Isaaqg heightened her

chances of being granted asylum. Also at trial, an

INS officer testified that knowledge of Farah's false

statements about her clan membership and her date

of last entry into the United States would have

resulted in the denial of her asylum apphcation.

Likewise, INS testimony established that if Farah

had been truthful about living in Canada _ for

approximately twenty-two months, rather than

merely visiting Canada for three months, her

extended absence from the United States would have

rendered her ineligible to become a_ naturalized

citizen. INS's knowledge that Farah obtained her

lawful permanent resident status through fraud

would have had the same consequence. An INS officer

similarly testified that committing any fraud,

generally, would have rendered Farah ineligible for

adjustment of status.

The November 2005 trial ended in a hung jury. After

a hearing conducted before the new trial, the district

court denied Farah's renewed motion to dismiss for

failure to return the indictment within the statute of

limitations and reserved its decision on her motion to

exclude the testimony of several Government

witnesses. A second trial in March 2006 ended with a

verdict of guilty. The district court then denied all

outstanding motions, including a motion by Farah for

judgment of acquittal, and sentenced Farah to one

month of incarceration and one year of supervised

release. This appeal followed.

{I.

Statute of Limitations

The district court denied Farah's renewed motion to

dismiss for failure to return an indictment within the

statute of limitations, finding that the indictment,

dated April 19, 2005, was returned within ten years

of the date Farah was naturalized, April 20, 1995.

This Court reviews timely objections to an indictment

de novo. United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1062-

63 (4th Cir. 1994).

Farah does not dispute that the offense charged in

the indictment, procuring naturalization unlawfully

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), has a ten-year

statute of l.mitations or that the one-day window the

Government left itself in charging her is sufficient.

Rather, Farah argues that the rule of lenity requires

that the five-year statute of limitations for the offense

of making a false statement in an immigration

matter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1015 be applied to

her case because the Government could have

prosecuted her under that statute instead of under §

1425(a).

The rule of lenity provides that "ambiguity

concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be

resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Bass, 404

U.S. 336, 348 (1971). Farah submits that the

ambiguity in her case arises in Congress's failure to

explain the disparity between the statute of

limitation for § 1425(a) and that for § 1015. The rule

of lenity, however, "serves as an aid for resolving an

ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one." Callanan

v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961). Here,

there is no ambiguity regarding the single statutory

offense with which Farah is charged--violation of §

1425(a)--and the statute of limitations for that

offense. See United States v. Helem, 186 F.3d 449,

455 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that rule does not apply

where statute is not ambiguous). For this reason,

Farah's reliance on United States v. Head, 641 F.2d

174 (4th Cir. 1981), is misplaced. In Head, this Court

applied the rule of lenity when a single conspiracy

count charged the defendant with conspiracy to

commit several different offenses with different

statutes of limitations. Here, by contrast, there is no

confusion among applicable offenses (only one is

charged in the indictment) or applicable statutes of

limitations (only one applies to the offense charged).

The district court properly denied Farah's motion to

dismiss.

The 1998 INS Memorandum

The district court denied Farah's request for

production of the 1998 INS memorandum detailing

the author's belief that Farah made false statements

on immigration applications and that there were

grounds to denaturalize her in an administrative

proceeding. The Government had notified Farah that

it would not produce the memorandum because the

INS had marked it as confidential] attorney work

product. and inad provided the court a copy of the

memorandum for in camera inspection only. We

review a district court's denial of discovery requests

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fowler, 932

F.2d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1991).

As a rule, and pursuant to a discovery order entered

in this case, any defendant may inspect items in the

Government's possession that are “material to

preparing the defense." Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(E)(i). "A showing of materiality must include

‘some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the

disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant

significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his

favor." United States v. Kirk, 877 F.2d 61, 1989 WL

64139, at *2 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (quoting

United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762-63 (Sth Cir.

1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975)).

Farah argues that, in denying her request for

production, the district court improperly focused on

whether the Government was going to use the

memorandum at trial (the Government said that it

would not) and improperly relieved the Government

of its burden to show that the memorandum actually

constituted attorney work product. Cf. In re Grand

Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 750 (4th Cir. 1996)

("The work-product privilege protects the work done

by an attorney in anticipation of litigation."). Farah

also argues that the memorandum was relevant to

her motion to dismiss the indictment for prejudicial

pre-indictment delay and her ability to identify

potential trial witnesses. By the time the court heard

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arguments on Farah's request for production,

however, the Government had filed not only a bill of

particulars but also more than one thousand pages of

discovery in advance of both trials. Cf. Ross, 511 F.2d

at 763 (stating that the "extensiveness of the material

which the Government did produce and _ the

availability of the disputed material from other

sources, including the defendant's own knowledge,

must also be considered" in determining materiality):

United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770

F.2d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the

purpose a of bill of particulars "is to fairly apprise the

defendant of the charges against him so that he may

adequately prepare a defense and avoid surprise at

trial"). Given this evidence, it is not clear that the

memorandum would have significantly altered the

quantum of proof in Farah's favor. Because Farah

cannot make the requisite showing, and because the

Government did not intend to use the memorandum

at trial and the memorandum 1s, on its face, attorney

work product, the district court did not abuse its

substantial discretion to manage the discovery

process by denying Farah's request.

Prejudicial Pre-Indictment Delay

The district court denied Farah's motion to dismiss

the indictment for prejudicial pre-indictment delay,

in which Farah asserted that the Government's delay

of up to seventeen years! * in indicting her deprived

her of testimonial and documentary evidence

' Farah's repeated reference to a delay of ten-to-seventeen

years 1s simply incredible, as any number over ten amounts to

a claim that the Government failed to indict her even before

the date she committed the charged offense, April 20, 1995.

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necessary to her defense. We review timely objections

to an indictment de novo. Darby, 37 F.3d at 1062-63.

The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires

dismissal of an indictment when a_ defendant

establishes actual prejudice resulting from the

Government's delay, and, after balancing the

defendant's prejudice against the Government's

justification for the delay, we find that "the

[Glovernment's action in_ prosecuting after

substantial delay violates ‘fundamental conceptions

of justice' or 'the community's sense of fair play and

decercy.” Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 904 (4th

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Two of Farah's examples

of actual prejudice lack merit. First, Farah claims

that her father, who died in 1996, could have offered

credible, exculpatory testimony about Farah's clan

identification. But Farah's father died two years

before i998, the year she argues she should have

been indicted because the INS memorandum emerged

that year. Even by Farah's timeline, her father never

would have been available to testify. Second, Farah

asserts that her conviction will have drastic

immigration consequences for her family. But had

Farah been indicted at precisely the same moment,

yet acquitted, her family would suffer no immigration

consequences. Thus, Farah's conviction is problematic

for her family, not her delayed indictment.

Farah's other examples of actual prejudice have

merit. First, Farah asserts that the delay made it

difficult for her to verify that she was living and

working in the United States and not Canada in 1991

and 1992--a major trial issue. Farah could not locate

leases and bank records that could confirm her

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residence approximately fifteen years ago, and, in the

last ten years, her former employer's business

dissolved. Both her former employer and_ his

accountant destroyed the records that could have

verified her employment during 1991 and 1992, and

her former employer could not independently recall

her dates of employment. Second, Farah asserts that

the delay made it difficult to unearth evidence that

could support statements she made on her asylum

application--also a major trial issue. Two o the

immigration officials who testified at trial about

Farah's 1989 asylum application could not remember

Farah, and her former immigration lawyer destroyed

her asylum file.

These latter claims of prejudice are sincere, but

describe problems--faded memories, lost evidence--

that attend every case brought just barely within the

statute of limitations. Cf. United States v. Marion,

404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (observing "the real

possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended

delay: that memories will dim, witnesses become

inaccessible, and evidence be lost"). Nonetheless, we

assume Farah has shown actual prejudice, and

balance that prejudice against the Government's

justification for its delay.

The Government, arguing that there was no delay,

correctly notes that, although Farah maintains that

the Government knew of her offenses in 1998 and

should have indicted her then, the document on

which she relies is an internal communication

between attorneys at an agency with no authority to

prosecute Farah. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 547(1),(2). The U.S.

Attorney's Office, the only prosecuting authority for

Farah's crime, first learned of Farah's crime in

September 2004, just seven months before the

indictment. Farah does not dispute this fact or argue

that seven months constitutes an unreasonable delay.

Nor, we note, does Farah allege nefarious motives on

the Government's part. See also Automated Med.

Labs., 770 F.2d at 404 (considering it relevant, in

declining to find a due process violation, that "there is

no indication that the Government intentionally

delayed to gain some tactical advantage").

Having balanced the Government's position

regarding its alleged delay against Farah's quite

ordinary claims of prejudice, we cannot say that her

indictment offends "fundamental conceptions" of

justice, fair play, or decency. Jones, 94 F.3d at 904.

We affirm the denial of Farah's motion to dismiss for

prejudicial pre-indictment delay.

Exhibits 1-1 through 1-21

Exhibits 1-1 through 1-21 are documents from

Farah's immigration file, including her applications

for asylum, lawful permanent residence, and

naturalization, her green card and naturalization

certificate, and communications sent to Farah by the

INS. Farah argues that the documents should have

been excluded from evidence for a variety of reasons.

We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion. Gen, Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.

136, 141 (1997).

Farah's myriad protests fail. The documents were

kept in the course of regularly conducted business at

the INS and are therefore admissible as business

records. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Testimony established

(and Farah's appellate brief admits) that Farah

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herself either inscribed directly or supplied indirectly

much of the information in the documents, therefore

many of the statements within the documents are

admissible as party admissions. Fed. R. Evid.

801(d)(2)(A). Finally, even if the stray markings by

INS officials on the applications were nonverbal

conduct intended as assertions and_ therefore

"statements" under the Rules of Evidence, see Fed. R.

Evid. 801(a), as Farah asserts, they fall within the

business records exception to hearsay based on the

testimony of two Government witnesses about the

markings. In sum, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting Exhibits 1-1 through 1-21.

Exhibits 7-1 through 7-9

The district court also did not abusc its discretion in

admitting into evidence Exhibits 7-1 through 7-9,

documents from Farah's Canadian immigration file.

Farah argues that (1) the exhibits do not qualify as

business records, and that (2) the Government

impermissibly offered these exhibits to prove Farah's

bad character (i.e., dishonest) or bad acts committed

in conformity with her character G.e., making false

statements to immigration officials in the United

States).

In challenging the admission of her Canadian

immigration file as a business record, Farah raises

many of the same, unavailing arguments she raised

in challenging the admission of her INS immigration

file. Her additional argument that the Canadian file

is incomplete, preventing the court and the parties

from knowing whether critical information that

would place the exhibits in a different hght, lacks

merit: whether the file qualifies as a business record

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does not depend on whether it includes every

potentially relevant document. Her argument that

the file contains an opinion and order issued by the

Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board when,

under Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1993),

court orders do not fall within the business records

exception to the hearsay rule, is misplaced. Nipper

actually holds that judicial findings of fact are not

“public records" within the meaning of the public

records exception to hearsay found in Federal Rule of

Evidence 803(8)(C). 7 F.3d at 417. Neither party to

this appeal invokes 803(8)(C) and, because the factual

findings in the opinion and order were redacted, none

remain about which to complain.

Farah's classification of Exhibits 7-1 through 7-9 as

character evidence also fails. Under Rule 404(b) of

the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence of other

crimes or wrongs “are admissible if they are (1)

relevant to an issue other than character, (2)

necessary, and (3) reliable." United States v. Rawle,

845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988). Here, the

Government introduced the Canadian immigration

documents as circumstantial evidence that Farah

lived in Canada in 1991 and 1992, and as evidence

that Farah falsely stated on her application for

naturalization in the United States that she had

staved in Canada for less than six months. Where, as

here, evidence “is admitted as to acts intrinsic to the

crime charged, and is not admitted solely to

demonstrate bad character, it is admissible." United

States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1996). Even if,

as Farah additionally claims, the Government

referenced the exhibits in remarking on Farah's

character during its closing argument, we cannot say

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that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting Exhibits 7-1 through 7-9 as_ business

records.

Exhibits 2-1 through 2-6

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Exhibits 2-1 through 2-6, documents from

the immigration file of Farah's father. The court

admitted the documents under Federal Rule of

Evidence 803(6), the business records exception to

hearsay, and Rule 804(b)(4), the exception for

statements of an unavailable declarant concerning

the declarant's or a relative's personal or family

history. Under the latter rule, because Mr. Farah was

unavailable at trial (he was deceased), his statements

concerning his and his family's clan membership are

excepted from the hearsay rule. Farah's assertion

that clan membership in Somalia is not as straight-

forward and mechanical as facts concerning dates of

birth, marriage, and the like allowed under Rule

804(b)(4) is not sufficient to disturb the district

court's decision to admit Mr. Farah's statements

under the rule.

Farah's final argument that the admission of Mr.

Farah's file violates her rights under the

Confrontation Clause is also unavailing. The

Confrontation Clause bars the "admission of

testimonial statements of a witness who did not

appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify,

and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-

examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

53-54 (2004). Mr. Farah's statements were not

testimonial because the "primary purpose" (any

future purpose is irrelevant) of Mr. Farah's

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interrogation, liberally assuming his immigration

interviews can even be called that, was not "to

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to

later criminal prosecution." Davis v. Washington, 126

S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). The primary purpose was to

determine Mr. Farah's eligibility for an immigration

benefit. Our highly deferential standard of review

leads us to affirm the district court's decision here as

well.

Authentication of Exhibits in Groups 1 and 2

Farah asserts that Exhibits 1-1 through 1-21 and 2-1

through 2-6, documents from her and her father's

immigration files were not properly authenticated

because, according to Farah, the Government alleged

only that she and her father signed the documents.

The Government argues that for purposes of

authentication, the documents were public records

under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(7) and did not

require handwriting authentication. We_ review

decisions of the’ district court regarding

authentication for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Patterson, 277 F.3d 709, 713 (4th Cir).

The parties agree that, under Rule 901(a), the

"requirement of authentication or identification as a

condition precedent to admissibility 1s satisfied by

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what the proponent claims."

Fed. R. Evid. 90i(a). "To meet the threshold

established by Rule 901(a), the party seeking to

introduce physical evidence must provide a basis for

the jury to resolve the authenticity question in favor

of that party." Patterson, 277 F.3d at 713 (quotation

marks omitted). Rule 901(b)(1) provides that a

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witness with knowledge may authenticate a piece of

evidence by testifying that a matter is what it is

claimed to be. A party need not rely on "nonexpert

opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting" to

authenticate or identify a document, so long as

another method of conforming with Rule 901(a) is

used.

Here, the INS record custodian had knowledge of

documents kept by the INS and testified that the

documents in the Farahs' files are what the

Government claims. Cf. United States v. Hernandez-

Herrera, 952 F.2d 342, 344 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We find

that the testimony of Wheeler, an INS agent familiar

with the record keeping practices of the INS

regarding Exhibits 1-4, establishes the authenticity of

these exhibits under Rule 901(b)(7)."). Further,

contrary to what Hernandez-Herrera suggests, it is

not necessary for the Government to invoke Rule

901(b)(7) for authentication; testimony pursuant to

Rule 901(b)(1) sufficed.

The Expert Testimony of Dr. Lee Cassinelli

The Government called Dr. Lee Cassinelli, a

researcher of Somali culture, to establish that clan

identity in Somalia is patrilineal and to elicit his

opinion that, based on her father's clan identity,

Farah is Darod, not Isaag. Farah argues that Dr.

Cassinelli's testimony should have been excluded

under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because it was

not reliable (he did not interview Farah, her family,

or her friends), it did not aid the jury in determining

a fact in issue (what Farah phrases as her _ belief

about her clan identity), and it was generally more

prejudicial than probative. We review the district

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court's decisions regarding the admission of expert

testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 622 (4th Cir. 2003).

"Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert

is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including

those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or

observation." Daubert v. Merrell Dow _Pharma., Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). Dr. Cassinelli, therefore,

did not need personal knowledge of Farah's clan

identity or a personal interview with Farah to opine

about her clan identity. His testimony about Somali

clan structure was relevant, a fact Farah concedes,

and Farah had the opportunity on cross-examination

to show the jury that, although Dr. Cassinelli

believed he knew what clan Farah belongs to, there

would be no way for him to know what clan she

believes she belongs to. Accordingly, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr.

Cassinelh's expert testimony.

The Expert Testimony of Mary von Briesen, et al.

Farah argues that the district court improperly

allowed Mary von Briesen, Edward Newman, Michael

Comfort, and Stanford Knight, all lay witnesses, to

offer what amounted to expert testimony about the

asylum, lawful permanent residence, or

naturalization process. We review for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Hassouneh, 199 F.3d 175,

182 (4th Cir. 2000).

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides that a lay

witness may express opinions that are "(a) rationally

based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a

clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the

determination of a fact in issue, and not based on

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scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of Rule 702 [on testimony by expert

witnesses]." The rule "permits lay witnesses to offer

an opinion on the basis of relevant historical or

narrative facts that the witness has _ perceived."

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London _ v.

Sinkovich, 232 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 2000)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Newman, Comfort, and Knight, former INS

immigration examiners, and von Briesen, an officer

at the Department of State, explained’ the

requirements for obtaining asylum, lawful permanent

resident status, or naturalization, and the applicant's

duty to be truthful. The four witnesses expressed

opinions based on relevant facts that they perceived

in completing departmental functions. Their opinions

about the consequences for an applicant who makes

an untruthful statement on an application were

based on firsthand knowledge of department protocol

that is not overly technical or particularly specialized

in nature. In addition, although the Government

conceded that Comfort could be certified as an expert

and that "it [was] certainly sufficient for someone

with this man's amount of experience to say this is

how they were trained, this is our procedure, this is

the law, and this is why the statements are material,"

we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion in allowing Comfort, any more than it did

von Briesen, Newman, and Knight, to testify as a lay

witness rather than as an expert witness. J.A. 1252-

53.

Farah additionally observes that Newman and

Comfort did not process any of her immigration

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papers or interview her in conjunction with any of her

immigration applications. and Knight reviewed her

application but testified that he could not recall any

details about his review. Accordingly, Farah argues,

their testimony as to what information is material in

determining whether an immigration application

should be granted was mere speculation as to the

information that was actually material to the

immigration officers who did review her applications

and, therefore, their testimony was irrelevant and

inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. For the reasons

just stated, we find this argument, too, unavailing.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing the testimony of von Briesen, Comfort,

Newman, and Knight.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Farah

unsuccessfully moved for judgment of acquittal. She

argued that the Government presented several

witnesses who lacked personal knowledge about her

applications for asylum and naturalization, that it

presented insufficient evidence to prove that she was

not in the United States from January 1991 until

October 1992, and that it never offered evidence

about Farah's personal understanding of her clan

identity or evidence to prove that Farah was _ not

persecuted as she described. We review de novo a

district court's denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216

(4th Cir. 2006). We must "sustain a guilty verdict if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, the verdict is supported’ by

‘substantial evidence." Id. (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable

22a

finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient

to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the hght most favorable to

the Government, substantial evidence--much of it

catalogued earlier in this opinion--supports the jury's

guilty verdict. The Government's case was not

without its weaknesses, but the "jury, not the

reviewing court," fills in the holes as it elects by

"weighling] the credibility of the evidence and

resolvling] any conflicts in the evidence presented."

Id. at 217 (citation omitted). Moreover, even Farah

concedes that she has_ provided “inconsistent

statements" on her immigrations applications and the

question is simply whether her statements were

knowingly false as opposed to something more

benign. We sustain the district court's refusal to

enter a judgment of acquittal.

Motion for a Mistrial

Finally, Farah argues that two statements made by

the Government during closing arguments required

the district court to grant her motion for a mistrial.

Because the "denial of a defendant's motion for a

mistrial is within the sound discretion of the district

court," we will disturb such a denial "only under the

most extraordinary of circumstances." United States

v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 257 (4th Cir. 1997).

Farah first highlights the Government's remark that

defense counsel had not offered a defense to Farah's

alleged false statements and, instead, had merely

"attackled] the government for taking the time" to

investigate and indict Farah. J.A. 1725. Farah

contends that this statement required a curative

23a

instruction, which the district court declined to give,

because it improperly suggested to the jury that

Farah had a burden to present a defense. Second, the

Government surmised to the jury that if it had

indicted Farah any earlier, she would have argued

that the Government "rushed judgment." J.A. 1727.

Farah contends that this statement led the jury to

beheve that the Government had been investigating

her since the date of her crime, a suggestion she could

not rebut because she could not use the 1998 INS

memorandum at trial.

Our test to determine whether alleged incidents of

prosecutorial misconduct warrant reversal asks first,

whether the prosecutor's remarks or conduct was

improper, and second, whether such remarks or

conduct prejudicially "affected the defendant's

substantial rights so as to deprive [her] of a fair

trial." United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 762

(4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Under this test, the

Government's statements, taken as a whole, were

merely argumentative--in the fashion of closing

arguments--and therefore not improper. Further, the

statements did not deprive Farah of a fair trial

because the district court adequately instructed the

jury that the burden of proof remained with the

Government and that closing arguments are not

evidence. On these facts, no mistrial was warranted.

ITI.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the rulings of

the district court.

AFFIRMED

24a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FILED

September 11, 2007

No. 06-4712

1:05-cr-00163-LDW

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

INTISAR KHALIF FARAH, a/k/a Intisar Ali,

Defendant - Appellant

The appellant’s petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc was submitted to this Court. As

no member of this Court or the panel requested a poll

on the petition for rehearing en banc, and

As the panel considered the petition for rehearing

and is of the opinion that it should be denied,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing

and rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for a panel composed of Judge Wilkinson,

Judge Niemeyer, and Judge Gregory.

For this Court.

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

CLERK

MICRASION AND RRFUGEEF SERVICES

SS eee ta. agency] 2A) DIOCEAR OF = wLINOTON

IOSisHESS iP yowt VOLUNTA... AGENCYT AY) BY 4 \)

‘! abs l pioneer oF 210%, WAREFIELD STREET AWA

bese 5 IOCESE. “~ARLINCTON_ EB WAS :

Sp CATE: g Der 1999 ARLINGTON—A— 22204— 5

Se eatatt ATPIDAVIT DF ALLATIONSIIP

(ZONFERENCE! | wpiat: atribavir br 2

SECTION 1: Late filed: w 25

I am filing this Affidavit for the ee person(s) Date of arrival in / ‘/

located in Mh ose Des Ee ake that country: “Jay cif 4

(Country of in overseas)

NAME_AND_A/K/A SEX PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH = RELATION —- PRESENT LOCATION

(underline family nate) (If Known) TO YOU OR ADDRESS "

7 oe kaya) mM aie Ney 3 ac {lao Sore Waite b bend, 7

_aws Ali ky Wed ‘- ern sav Bilis. Wetted ft ey a

Anil @ pest > Faray E Mona, Ctl 760 Site, ! -——_ vu

ALA wes c phils Fecal bh eh a bu A cethe —

ALA ae be ka ok htc ae hoe.f 1} Niko Kot Sees is

meA Gebre Weeki t Parc Wo. a Meri 911938 2 sth non

Red bcle Ke Excel mo i a Hh Rath, ds ee

“Neh ce S cal hi Lt Tera! B= a suts pedis cal —

Mune sachs Porch oo = ! = &, Fie EE a

i pA. leit Vive! SS a ‘Se an 1 a2 r Set, acy

ps on Biche utc k, a aj GAS ni ty eens hs

Mehra A eet teat — — ita este

abit bhi fee My 2 avr i144 Wrpihes ou =

or a hak: toi Khel f Fecal Alien Nuaroer {if applicable) 9 a2 *4olth

(and A/K/A) Your U.S. Immigration Status (Check one):

Date of birth duly 23liGb{ Sex E ( } U.S. Citizen Certificate

Place cf birth (Incluce Country} x Permanent Resident

Ar Aen bo. , bwek is { } Refugee

Current address Wysi Eic, Ci { ) pe (Please plain):

hauand A \ iN

biceS Your Original Case Nunter:

Phone Number (home) You~ ASG. 3Oe%

Country of first asylm WAK

Date you arrived in the U.S. yay iGh%

Your Social Security Number Wy. Xb~ce +4

(work)

Agency Uirough which you came to the United States

I have filed an [-130 (Immigrant Visa Petition) for each of my relative(s) prior to

suomitting this affidavit Yes No. If yes, date submitted:

anc date epproved:

YOU MUSTINCLUDE A COPY OF DOTII SIDES OF YOUR 1-94 OR YOUR PERMANENT

RESIDENT ALIEN CARD (i-191, |-$51, GREEN CARD}. WITHOUT THESE

DOCUMENTS, YOUR AFFIDAVIT IS NOT VALID.

Tre purpose of this Affidavit is to verify your relationship to refugees overseas.

Failure to provide complete and accurate information may impede the admission of

requestec refugees tc the U.S. If the information is unimon to you, indicate

“unknown”. If enyone uses an alias, provide it. If anyone is deceased or their

oresent location is uimown, please indicate. Besure to include all -elatives as

Specified. anywhere in the orld, Living, deceased or missing. Use the space

marked “Additons/Bolanations” to explain anv unusual relationships including adopted,

halé or S220 relat vec

wit Ve 2 a) reieuives. GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT

(Revised 16/85: 2+]

1:08CRIG3

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EME END A/K/a PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH PRESET LOC:TION/

(If Kroun KrOxn ) ADDRESS (If Knoen) f

\; ' } rf

Your fatter Mook, + th Vaxal, Sura Ney 30/430 __ Nac cob, Moen.

Your moter 4 Mawe fi raed Buses Mey afiiun

Sreo-fatnec

Steo-mounrer

ft 4

Spouse + uses hed; * kes

Date(s) Place i Oo: Marria and/or Divorce {s)

Moy 2o| } $92. sag Vv & a

SOCTION IV:

iist ALL your Children (living, deceased or missing:blood,steo,half or adopted)

NAE and A/K/A SEX PLACE/DATE OF BIRTH PRESENT LOCATION/

(If Known) ADORESS (16 Known

SSCTION V:

inst ALL your Brothers and Sisters (living deceased or missing: blood, steo, half or adopted)

NAME and A/K/A SEX PLACE/OATE OF BIRIH PRESENT LOCATION/

{If known) ADDRESS (If Known)

a VA. pe | _ Farel . Mi qecseh ¢ Dek cine

ere we ae ee R { Fes al. \ & Hh cali Ley |

i \K nclass Keck. { FE aqals " _——— Abest 12 bea" | No, t-

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Mebane ad bck {_ Fede. Ee soe B.A I i. acnaianion

f Anny EBs . r * = s \

Wiel _ Keli Eatak “ Co Hf {1444 L

SECTION VII: NOTARIZED SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

2 swear that the information in this statement is true to the best of my Knowlecge, and

understant that anv false statement could jeooardize my immigration status in the United

States.

\ainsor Foe) Subscribed and sworm to re this

23 dayof No 194

‘ Ox A) in

Starp or Seal of Notary Vn

= ,

My commission expires: 2 ay

SECTION VIII: AGENCY REPRESENTATTVE WHO ASSISTED IN PREPARING THIS AFFIDAVIT

Print Nam Leaibly Signature

| | tere Aperereeé

P REGISTRATION Badge) Bares. Me. Cet eee

| FOR CLASSIFICATION AS -

[. REFUGEE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

| “Section 207 } MM GRATICH AND NATURALIZATION JERVICE Ea

: Immi grotven ond }

_ Matienelity Act |

REGISTRANT TO FURNISH THE FOLLORING INFORMATION (READ NSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE)

TYPE OR PRINT

ar Mp nome try Pew wand e!

Kuster

Ene AH ; ao

|. My preannt e@denee te es

Kompfcek £5) A/E

) | wee bere cm: fem nloer year?

No: 3°-/930 — BURAc

(4. Maighe ve — , tre y bet Come enter

rus £48 ou Chay | hkcww

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| Setlé7 wevr/ds SELICUSLY py a A4 oS

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(Cqeery ae whee er iatng) Cr; JGcirFr

DOA {oe FT

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Ths evidence of oy bmmigueitee states t+ the soqmteg t+ eDied | ow vonising te as a

‘Lod Ae, se Tiehmens Ex ee ware © (eheepe DZLEL

teetee) }

ee! 451. leahomes S fl AEN |

f 8. tay vpacee’s come te © fheditend avenem: aaarare te Be pam, | | Spores © settenett'y te

pede bby AMS fo Cs AY WC au Me So fd | ‘

At. My spews eu me eepommers oe te tbe Wened Bete ba rae Ee eal

= = res Lave ot pie Phase of bine _ [Pov nent eddeene

PENS 56 a oad Ging? i Meus cuz xX

= bareoting or Ceweacte = —

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1826

GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT

1:08CR163

is } hee Delow cll cegantcat OMF, -Oticalas, clube, ohd os ceccatiors, pest @ preesat, in which | Rowe dela mempcr Bip, end the pe leds ang ©

. .*

Dieters OF buch memos ship. (if pew Bere mere Ried @ mrmbe’ cf any ogarisetion, stete sr he |

\ PVoesle_

= ae Y

= ———

DA geht

iad Presta HO

a “

= 7 ;

6. 8 LV tces Ahm. not eee “Rerges with 2 sleistion of toe. (iM you hove ever bean chaiged wih es elelstion of lam, give Geir rnd piece

nd mavwre of each charge and the final reevit!

Pio al E aiciaiawil

17.1 = a ‘ D+ ve been In the Untied States. (HM pow Rows eve” De a dm the Urine? Stctee, chew ie Geice of entry onO Gerarion end

D> putpore Of yp. a ening, Vielior, pormenes resident, ei uéent, sveman, eit. “2 199% vv UW e- Bor kd Fr EXELL VES

| EFT; ie aS iu b.

= a4 Hae Q ™ or Alten Beglenration numdes ]

Trini star mises me Unice sve OUOER OF Ag VEDELEGR IEA IIA Belt SASES

Re silence Piticel sguecs

- plliéak “Hite Fakhh _DWGHTER use El any eT Aymyas th VA

HB. 1 om Being pens seed by (Glee tome ond afitre se Of Ustive Saree Spencer) YW EM CATH else Co SREn/CE

wes or EARL i Gow 3p 6 WAKE CieLpD Saya a aS4

BO MOT WRITE. BELOW THIS LINE Yes a

7-_

BERG

do swear (alfire) thet | know the "i. ntents of this registration sub

sciibed by me including the altachee documents, that the same ere true to (he aiidinstoail edge. and that cor-

wes signed by me with |

‘

rections. numbered { } lo! ), were made by me or at my request, and that t “a trati

Bax’ f ane ACE

my full, true name

olgporure of regtsirona)

Sebsc:.bed ond sworn le befor: me by the sbove-namec registrant at

i ,

INTCRVIEW

PALS Se

) } PURSUANT 15 cecTi. coc ce |

Tas ee is ee pr pee j

2 SET 5

APPROV

i bg chris MRECTOR,

joa “4 -Li- 53 A LTE JUL 2? 1993 ry | Pee Lok fa0t4 > IU

fecaemnt FF). ERP Loth'S =i TAUT ‘ by 4 fccu, 1

RiT | 6616 Jf} | ee des

“ Officer in Cherge . | - eg

INSTRUCTIONS

| at

o the Officer-in-Charge of the nearest overseas office ol ue? f

Uniied States imm.gration and Naturalization Service. Wher your name ras beer °

This form should te executed, signed anc submitted |

eachec a8 a regis! ran goo ai IZ be

furnished addtional inStructions _"

1. REGISTRATION - A separate Registration Form mus: be executed by each registrant and submitted in ore copy

A Registsasion Form in behalf of a child urder 14 years of age shall be executed by the parert or guarc.an.

2. ASSUNANCES - Assurance Form 1-591 executed by « Un ited States sponsor «

wil. be required Sefore vour relures

Ste'cS maby de Qutbor.zed bul reed not be sudmittec c: this time. ¥

REFUGEE APPLICATION WORKSHEET

LICANT = Mae fags Can riLe: A26-4/7-Yd5

b ihe me

OE up’ AcConPh YING FAMILY: Y/Z PLACE OF BIATH: ety. ke-

DATE DEPARTED: a LAST RESIDENCE: er res

AKRIVAL IN KENYA: 3/s, RELIGION:

TRIGE/CLAN/SUGCLAN: oy eet FOLITICAL GROUP:

ins Officen: Pf yf. ( | TITLE:

. , x

SIGNATURE: Fossil Kg)5 / _ DATE: JUL 2 é 1993 Ns

] Tr c

INTERVIEW NOTES ~

wre eet oticac : ph - den, ( fe one he

fp : :

; (. Gnce | EF. 4, |

fr dled Heo we Soul SMS LA 1461. ‘A Lam

Rag id AG goch ro + Y bra. ppdectt eee (hae lve fi

wr als feu bo lenny Resor! la chict wef go sft flan

Hh CHR he — be Jeloye Gre f kis {’ porte, IZ:

Vreke wu td Q “4! bes u a Cron Ay cled

tA i cov I ~~ fist le

WA DV

a (LtEL GS

a me “ re Lae rere , (hig bee Ybee® Se0-1Z (ais

kre Shel push Killed ps Cir | om pe [4 lrg ber. Ho

Ly flefle: fore ot OM wc use sare foe Ose Hb

. Le po(pancl his Ok he dor aheo 1 ( bewse bbe, hep

The suv t "\ ness: ry re (4 ' ret e| iz Rvs a oe

ah wal oy Me wa Ee ees

—_

2-3

1:05CR163

CASE ANALYSIS

\ f

grat nae Pe re)

1. SUBJECTIVE FEAR: Gal &

2, OBJECTIVE BASIS POR FEAR: (Led ef

3. PERSECUTION GROUND:

RACE RELIGION NATIONALZT INION

4, CONCLUSION: (A) IS THERE PAST PL

(B) IS THERE A WELL TOUNDED FEAR OF FUTURE PERSECUTION?

(1} WAS THE APPLICANT SINGLED OUT?

(2) WAS THE APPLICANT IDENTIFIED WITH A

SIMILARLY SITUATED GROUP?

S, IS THERC A CREDIBLE BASIS FOR CONCERN ABOUT TIE

POSSIBILITY OF PCRSECUTION?

IF YES, CREDIBLE BASIS IS ESTABLISIED BY:

ACTUAL PAST PERSECUTION

ACYS OF PERSECUTION AGAINST

SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS

OTWER: ——$—$<$——

6. IS TEE APPLICANT CREDIBLE: NO

If NO; THERE ARE INCONSISTENCICS SETYICEN THE WRITTEN AND

ORAL ‘TES'TINONY AS FOLLOWS:

paw VOSLINONY IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH Tye CENERAL

THEORMALTLON KNOW ABOUT THE APPLICANT'S COUNTRY AS

FOLLOWS:

OTHER AS FOLLOKS:

THE CASE IS: APPROVED DENIED (REASON FOR DENIAL Of DENZAL

LEYTER IN THE FILE)

JUSTIFICATION

h of

If i

ti ch bes

— ankg blip her

BOL

7 xa :

This poge ts. — -ompleted boih MAKE ¥/)-$OS

front and back fos cack person s Interviews! PAGE

ne Ta le Personal History bA_or

Name | Sex(M/F)} Miethdate Rirthplace Reiationship te PA

KHALIe Wady okay m | 14 30 (420 - ip

OCCUPAT ONS, OKK HISTORY _,

AND EDUCATION. Civil SER Vice, AcE

19 eer and : Location

CLciek - fasted Adarsh PULTAN EI ~

= WATER ROE NCY Petra 1996 — 1994 MoU py Sor “

Gtathnd ob WRIER | Co tein

| DEVEL obménT Ab tcr, fe (179

—— LEO LG, duel hegtineot Gr {uy EE

be Lk ku Yrourbn pranbh VLE ee

2 2 | LYAIR Wan ~ Civmhee oF

Apxa

R22 CommE RCE s9H. sayo

3 2 SR ke

m i

2 L Te

4 cxmnqgee J /4 a REASONS FOR ee

SCHOOL Op opt G2 Fe tp Sto ORY bs J a

: PRIMARY : Wr GnEST seHod

SCHOOL ah Wool’ FIMe

LANGUAGE ABILITY [Fiuens] Good | Feir | Poor OTHER Fluen:| Good} Fair | Poor a Lasd ,

- t

ENGLISH Eva ARB) ¢ YW Aiatix f P

[FRENCH a ‘| Tata -

’ FOR WOMEN | Are you pregnant? Ves No pregnant, wha! month do you think the baby wil! be born?

oe —_ — v/Z

YINIC/RE | IGION

ie Mis! ate So , D

‘sake

feast REFERENCE No. FO: COUNTRY = aS¥LUM: _FEAYA

oe Hs! OATE OF ARRIVAL: }

NY R

» APPULCANT/MEAC OF BRM iby *

A. FAMILY NAME: Nnbdrned $. GIVEN NAMES: ‘ f..

k. OTHER NAMES: 0, MAIDEN WANE: *

€. PLACE OF BIRTH F. OAIE OF BIRTH: G. $&x:"°

mt 4 29

4 COUNTRY: So yaa Pe D NOY. } 9 30 MALE) FEMALE ry

vocauirycity: _. Buran

{OAY)

(MONTH)

(YEAR)

“ agl .

“ton iF su, CacntRY OF TORR PAGTIUAT

NATIONALITY:

RESIOENCE?,

1, MARITAL STATUS:*" = SINGLE / ENGAGED A HARRLED)

DIVORCED / WIDOWED / SEPARATED / COMMON-LAW

te 9}

;

ease circle as appropriate

1834

i) 2. MAME OF FATHER: ! x. ETCHC/TRIBAL ORIGIN: Dosad Dhulbaboad:

“YA Mane OF OTHER: Fad jimo Yo Sin Vo aoe:

gs FATHERS?" ALIVE Guns) rornen:** ative ve Gnd) L. aeticion anovon seers — AQ t/t

‘if

"i ; HM, PRESENT AOORESS: “Nauk hemes sf fh HK. REFUGEE STATUS RECOGNISEO BY: ‘

: yi COUNTRY OF ASYLUM ON: ST hinered 952

TELEPHONE: UNHCR ON: =

| 2. Jepie glare FAHILY HEMBERS ANC DEPEWDANIS a) Living with Applicant

PLANHI PRG TO

t}: ¥- No. HAE RELATIONSHIP PLACE OF DATE OF RESEITLE Wits

t TO APPLICANT | BIRTH giATH APPLICANT

“i 5 YES am, a

i '. Applicant ecocecascne | commece wicaves . iaxnamampecan

Ole. ’

eae tel Le wio Kl, hi nall . ube. Rurot Cp Yes

be t

| Aisa Vhale Frank. Dav. |Motadsdi/oigol >

as or 3%

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NeduBlale 2» > ee

$ ; v

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pt Oe > +5 . yee 33 16/4/83 in

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UB|Mobomud 2 9 >» >> po/F/sy os

Ph Adtran willie vr } ay ta sh AOL

Uj TAPE - =T —” 7 :

Paci icable POtRT sd.

GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT

1:0GCR163

~ ¢ - {

, fo." LANGUAGE | ___UlDERS LAND Stk. ACAD YRILE

| rot rot net : not ij

ad aattly | easily } cantly | eastly | aastly | easthy | aaetly eully

i » | cements

I Stmalaf a eee

Su sanenl' i = i —

Pio Erba = i cas ‘me is

woth. Sienna beh de be L- L

6. ENMPLOVINENT RECORD IN COUNTRY OF QAIGIN AND COUN? RY OF ASYLUM OF APPLICANT ANU ALL FAMILY MENBERS/ ~

DEFENDANTS OVER 15 YEARS OF AGE

No.* RAHE AAD ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER TYPE OF WORK R

. Trai a.

/: ' lade Dev ‘Bene Sema . Gereical monater (9F6 1986

——— oh q AS ey Al) 24z2i4u fh 3 2

| ‘ SST TEE TIE

Privodte Kusme oe Bulstess wan. 19S 1763

AFAS HNO Soh: —_ ~ |-

lacie } ‘ 1 SO cag f ere

“priests Sasteess — TIORT TO)

Pru ott Susin as(expard) |

}

S-18

Hol YD 721.

Ro gincos gse3s

= .

TRAVEL ANO/OR LOENILTY DOCUNENIS; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF REFUGEE STAIUS

2o*] TYPE OF DOCUHENTAT ION

NUIIOER

ISSUING AUTHORITY

} ‘

Aiestaom

HA s3|t/s68

Mini SH & fone adten

(3/9

} >

6. COUNTRIES IN Which

APPLICANT WAS STATE, RESTOEO OR TRANSITIED SINCE LEAVING COUNTRY CF ORIGIN

COUNTRY

—

TRON

TRAVEL DOCUIENTS USED

ALIMARKS

a Ska __

———

Prete

Aileidadion

Ket -nd

DOHA LB Ic vel: WT le

pereissTe

| jej| MasrOb: TH

Doe. 28S Son. 4 4993} \s3 Lvs est.

* Use number | for Applicant and numbers 2 ~ 10 cerratponding to the epectfte famliy member in Vtem ta

1835

Ee i

70 APPLICANT BIRTH OLRIN RESAUENLE é

we rs

.. |

=a 8 ms 0

3, RELATIVES of FRLENDS EN OTHER COUNTRIES (WITHIN ANO/OR OUTSICE CONTINENT OF PRESENT RESTOENCE) r ~|

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.