Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tripati v. United States (No. 07-807)

| U.S.

ne Supreme Court,

6) 07-807 JUN 2- 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT, GUNN £McKAY; DEAN

CHATFIELD; DONALD CONRAD; MARICOPA

COUNTY ATTORNEY; COUNTY OF MARICOPA;

TERRY BLAKE; RONALD HARRIS; DICK MESH;

GERALD GRANT; RICHARD M. ROMLEY; TERESA

ARCHULETA; VINCENT H. TOLINO; ESTATE OF

TERESA ARCHULETA; ED KING; BETSEY

BAYLESS; TOM RAWLES; DON STAPLEY; MARY

ROSE WILCOX; DORA SCHRIRO, ADOC

DIRECTOR; TERRY GODDARD ATTORNEY

GENERAL ARIZONA; MICHAEL MUKASEY,

ATTONEY GENERAL UNITED STATES

Respondents,

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI

P.O. BOX 70662,

PASADENA, CA 91117

(626)796-2231,

PETITIONER PRO PER

3

QUESTION PRESENTED

This court has since McNabb v United States,

318 U.S. 332 (1948) exercised it’s Supervisory

Powers over Federal Courts when the Federal

Courts have failed to apply proper standards. When

Federal Courts fail to review the record on appeal

and bar submission of petitions for rehearing or

suggestion for rehearing or suggestion for hearing

EN BANC, does McNabb require this Court to

exercise its Supervisory Powers?

a.

Can a Federal Judge request a Rule 50

motion be made and grant that motion

during the final pre trial conference?

Does Heck v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994) bar claims regarding property not

listed in the return to a search warrant

which property respondent’s deny seizing?

Are 801(D)(2) statements admissible as

substantive evidence? Must other evidence

corroborate 801(D)(2) admissions?

Does St.Paul Mercury Indem Co. v Red

Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 295-296 (1938) in a

diversity action allow a federal Court to

disregard the uncontroverted affidavit as

to the value of the property submitted by

the petitioner and consider the argument

of the Counsel in finding the amount in

controversy was not satisfied?

2. Carey v Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653 (2006)

authorizes habeas relief when the issues do not

implicate an “open question” in this Court’s

jurisprudence. Does the Rule in Carey authorize

habeas relief when a habeas petitioner demonstrates

a violation of principles as established in Brady vu

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963); Pyle v Kansas, 317

U.S. 213(1942); Napue v Illinois, 360 U.S. 264

(1959); Alcorta v Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) and

Vasquez v Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)?

a. Does Miller-EL v Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)

allow the Circuit Court to deny the request for

a Certificate of Appealability to an

incontestably actually innocent prisoner

without reviewing the application for a

certificate?

b. Can the Circuit deny due process by directing

the denial shall not be reexamined by way of

rehearing or suggestion for hearing EN

BANC?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED...............ccccecccsseeees 1,

py Ba ee ty 3 Sr erry ern me ili

SPARE CIE BCT TERRES Eins csntenccnasanensnessicacness vi

PARTIES TO PROCEEDING................cssceeecceess 1

SPe REGED ocinasat sundunaaueanenddsnanicanacusnsabenatananelie 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................08. 2

I STATEMENT OF THE CASE................ 3

LEW 5 Ra as BAP ioihxs shadenndsanvacshensvbes uta 3

A. POST CARD DENIALS BY THE

NINTH CIRCUIT AND ITS

REFUSAL TO REVIEW - THE

APPELLATE RECORD........00000000+.

B. PETITIONER'S CIVIL CASE..........

C. PETITIONER'S HABEAS APPEAL

D. NINTHCIRCUITS SYSTEMIC

REFUSAL TO REVIEW RECORD

ET OE 1

I. 9 ARGUMENT...0....csccssscsceesssesseesseesseee: 14

lil

THE NINTH CIRCUITS

PROCEDURE OF NOT REVIEWING

RECORD AND AFFIRMING

DECISIONS CONSTITUTES

SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURE FROM

THE USUAL COURSE OF

JUDICIAL PROCEDURES

MANDATING THIS COURT

EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY

Ps nenktsnanenatnhhi pins pataecnisandes 16

THE DECISION THAT A RULE 50

MOTION CAN BE GRANTED BY A

JUDGE WITHOUT A JURY IS

STRUCTURAL ERROR................. 20

WHEN THE RETURN TO THE

SEARCH WARRANT SHOWS THAT

THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE WAS

NOT LISTED IN THE INVENTORY,

HECK DID NOT BAR THOSE

CL ATID nc ccacvcccesss iueenbiceresnekaecoian 22

ADMISSIONS MADE PURSUANT

TO RULE 801(d)(2) OF THE

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

ARE SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE 23

CONSIDERATION OF DEFENSES

IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF

PROPERTY IS CONTRARY TO ST.

PTA iaetinnitiskiisnnscaldccabedeoaieas 24

iv

THE NINTH CIRCUIT BY NOT

REVIEWING THE RECORD

BEFORE DENYING THE

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

HAS ABRIDGED THE RIGHT TO

FEDERAL, HABMAS....1..<-s0sc0sseeees 25

THE REPEATED REFUSAL BY THE

NINTH CIRCUIT TO ALLOW THE

FILING OF EN BANC PETITIONS

AND MOTIONS TO RECALL

MANDATES OUTLINING

EGREGIOUS DEPARTURE FROM

THE USUAL COURSE OF

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS A

TOOL TO REDUCE ITS WORKLOAD

MANDATES EXERCISE OF THE

SUPERVISORY POWER............... 29

CONCLUSION ....ccccccccesecceceseecee: 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ALCORTA V. TEXAS, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) .... 28

ANDERSON V. LIBERTY LOBBY INC., 477 U.S.

Bs SY A cktehindidensdanaskses seneccavecustecveenss 21

ANDERSON V. UNITED STATES, 318 U.S. 350,

I a de vnncusbascuncuceuncks Gisdseunuesvecasuccensse 22

ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE, 499 U.S. 279, 309

SED banndcaws tinaes enenacenwans soesdbouhetnhesdendiccinads 20

ARIZONA V. YOUNGBLOOD, 488 U.S. 51

Snes stb uohsnd oon dccnuissscbinkeséedunqnssbabachontonces 28

AUTO-OWNERS INS. CO V. JENSEN, 667 F. 2D

ey Fae Ee Cle Cote ine canccnccsssiccascasns. 23

BALLARD V. UNITED STATES, 329 U.S. 187,

193,195

net Ate tO ec te er ae 18

BOUSLEY VY. UNITED STATES, 523 U.S. 614

SSG idauues das sihdctnheusandadunencgudseddacseusistennes 26

BRACY V. GRAMLEY, 520 U.S. 899 (1997). 25, 26

CASTRO V. UNITED STATES, 540 U.S. 375

Tube cubtiecandaiacrcl nas ccuiens jualtbaeencewbatics 17

v1

DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES, 530 U.S. 428,

IE EE Sina kadadesissssusadisadtaisinbtennctiehealaonan 16

DRETKE V. HALEY, 541 U.S. 386 (2004)...... 27

DOUGLASS V. EATON CORP, 956 F. 2D 1339, 1344

COREE Cie Bie racsecesccccncsnvencsxsseonsnnianssnns 23

GRUNEWALD V. UNITED STATES, 353 U.S. 391,

ERE GRUNT Pin bcos cn vendcnedesnunscdadespacnonsnyecewancsone 19

HECK V. HUMPHREY, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) .... 22

HERRERA V. COLLINS, 506 U.S..390 (1993)... 27

JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES, 318 U.S. 189,

CR Richncches nccckscsscakanctaxacteauoassalensahaniaahines 17

MAHLANDT V. WILD CANID SURVIVAL &

RESEARCH CTR, 588 F. 2D 626, 630 (8TH CIR.

Me PO nckdusicunscsdubancaacéqavebisnesusidutaseladabineiens 23

MAPP V. OHIO, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1962)......... 17

MARSHALL V. UNITED STATES, 360 U.S. 310

CRED Swkacvche suckbineabadedeavnnseakesabeslaeueunsansminakens 19

MAYBERRY V. PENNSYLVANIA, 400 U.S. 45

ERIE e BPivdscaverdsatncdaccucahesssnsssbedaveumeaubensenséseauade 3

McCARTHY V. UNITED STATES, 349 U.S. 459,

GE AES iia sikiniscbncavianiccienensacnsceniuaseaians 17

Vil

McNABB V. UNITED STATES, 318 U.S. 332

McSHERRY V. CITY OF LONG BEACH, ET-AL.,

423 F. 3D 1015 (OTH CIR. 2008)...........sseccsccesees 22

MILLER-EL V. COCKRELL, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 29

MOONEY V. HOLOHAN, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) 27

TAPUE V. ILLINOIS, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)........ 28

NGUYEN V. UNITED STATES, 539 U.S. 69, 81

Cae cna tances snnesccnasnasccsessnseiessaperaacamnabaenee 16

ORTEGA-RODRIGUEZ V. UNITED STATES, 507

U.S. 234, 244-62 (290G)...0..scssscsscveccacnancesvei 19

PYLE V. KANSAS, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)............ 28

REEVES V. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS

INC., 5390 U-S. 133, 150 (2000) ....ccccccscssesecsse 21

ROSALES LOPEZ V. UNITED STATES, 451 USS.

RBZ, BOO-DE CEE onan ascsisnnte std tideresepssianavanade 18

SAVARESE V. AGNISS, 833 F. 2D 1194, 1200

PO Gee GE. Bona ciiaines sonccswesancsasednoavaan 23

SLACK V. McDANIEL, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) 25

SOUTH CENTRAL BANK V. CITICORP CREDIT

SERVICES, 863 F. SUPP. 635, 646 N. D. 111

Vill

SIT TENGE pa baad ee dcdsscctoescceccessesccecsscoeese 23

ST. PAUL MERCURY INDEMN CO. V. RED CAB

CO. 303 U.S. 283, 295-290 (1938).............cceeeee. 24

STRICKLER V. GREENE, 527 U.S. 2633 (1999) 27

TAYLOR V. LOUISIANA, 419 U.S. 522, 525-26

ETc a sybdesacscccescceccccce cccccsccecee: 18

THIEL V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO, 328 U.S. 217

eis cactnedus csccccccocce sec cccccccceccecee 17

TRIPATI V. SCHRIRO 541 U.S. 1039 (2004)... 8

UNITED STATES V. HALE, 422 U.S. 171

haa bd saKass cece Sapdebbeescsesescen sesceccccces 20

UNITED STATES V. MATLOCK, 415 U.S. 164, 172

er aissehssisscesas ss SUMEAARBEahebes dhecen ses ececes 23

UNITED STATES V. PAYNER, 447 U.S. 727, 736-3

aka se cs caccccccccacccccesccecescescecese 2

VASQUEZ V. HILLERY, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)25

WATERS V. YOUNG ET-AL., 100 F. 3D 1437 (9TH

eco ccccunccnescescescceccccecsccss 22

WEEKS V. UNITED STATES, 232 U.S. 383, 398

TE Es depbeencaceccesccceseccccccnsccccccosecces 17

WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)...... 29

WILL V. UNITED STATES, 389 U.S. 90, 95

CRI 8 Poca cncccccsoncassennessccsaannsbbidssasebasbueneueasenenenten 28

YOUNG V. UNITED STATES EX REL VUITTON

EL.AL., 481 U.S. 787, 808-09 (1981)............ 17, 22

PARTIES TO PROCEEDING

“ALL PARTIES APPEAR IN THE CAPTION”

OPINIONS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s decision not to recall the

mandate filed on March 9», 2007 is set forth at

Appendix pp 1. The mandate was issued on January

11%, 2007. Pertinent orders of the Ninth Circuit are

set forth at Appendix pp. 3 and pp. 4. The District

Court’s pertinent orders are set forth at Appendix

pp. 9 through Appendix pp. 146. On June 12, 2007

the Ninth Circuit denied Mandamus relief.

[Appendix pp. 617]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its

orders refusing to recall the mandate on March 9th,

2007. [Appendix pp. 1-2] On June 12, 2007 the Ninth

Circuit denied mandamus relief [Appendix pp. 624-

625]. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1254 (1).

As the petitioner does demonstrate judicial

usurpation of power by the Ninth Circuit, this

exceptional circumstance warrants Mandamus relief.

Petitioner does not have any adequate relief in any

other form or forum. 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a) and 1251

confer jurisdiction. By this letters dated June 7, 2007

[Appendix pp. 641], August 14, 2007 [Appendix pp.

643], and then finally on October 16, 2007 [Appendix

pp. 645] the Court granted petitioner until December

15, 2007 to file this petition.

Be

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Several “Persons of Interest” at the Attorney

General’s Office are being protected and want NO

HEARING and NO DISCOVERY in this matter; —

Documentation shows a _ cover-up by

groups/members of Maricopa County Judges with

the assistance and support of the Arizona Attorney

General’s Office; [Appendix pp. 637]

Maricopa County Judges Reinstein, Schwartz,

and Martin, requested evidence be destroyed.

Additionally, the Attorney General’s Office had the

State of Arizona Prosecutors and Judges create and:

destroy evidence to obtain an unlawful conviction of

the petitioner, while threatening and intimidating

witnesses to testify falsely or face criminal

prosecution. These witnesses later exposed this

fraud on the court, perpetrated by the Arizona

Attorney General, Prosecutors Office, and Arizona

Courts, as set forth in their affidavits herein;

[Appendix pp. 455 through Appendix pp.505]

Petitioner remains incarcerated at the

Arizona [ADOC-Douglass] State prison since 1992

for the underlying convictions, currently serving a

fifty-two and one-half year sentence with an

estimated release date approximately of 2040.

INTRODUCTION

Whether the trial is federal or state, the

concern of due _ process is with the fair

administration of justice. At times a Judge has not

been the image of “the impersonal authority of law”

but has become so personally embroiled” as to make

the Judge unfit to sit in Judgment.” Mayberry vu

Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (internal citation,

text omitted) though Mayberry is not on point it is

instructive for the facts of this case show petitioner

has been blackballed by the courts as he has pushed

to hold Judges and public officials be held

accountable; see www.corruptarizonacourts.com

Petitioner requests this Court grant, vacate, and

remand this matter. [Appendix pp. 583]

A. POST CARD DENIALS BY THE NINTH

CIRCUIT AND ITS REFUSAL TO

REVIEW APPELLATE

Both, when Petitioner is represented by

counsel or in Pro Per, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals has continually affirmed the District Court

without reviewing the record and has denied

petitioner access to the EN BANC court.

The Ninth Circuit rendered its decision on

November 3", 2006 [Appendix pp. 5]. It did not

review the record nor did it correctly apply the

precedents dictated by this Court as well as the

Ninth Circuit [Appendix pp. 342 through Appendix

pp. 380]. The Court refused to allow Counsel, who is

a sole practitioner, the opportunity to review the

extensive record, and file the petition for rehearing

and suggestion for hearing EN BANC [Appendix pp.

364 through Appendix pp. 378], when the Court

denied the first request to abate time [Appendix pp.

1, Appendix pp. 3]. When these issues were brought

to the attention of the panel by way of a motion to

recall the mandate [Appendix pp. 342], the panel

denied the motion and _ refused to allow the EN

BANC court to consider the motion to recall the

mandate [Appendix pp. 1].

This, however, is not the first such incident.

Another panel on February 24, 2004 without

reviewing the record, reviewing someone else’s

record, denied the Pro Per request for a certificate of

appealability [Appendix pp. 547] and _ barred

petitioner from seeking EN BANC consideration.

The District Court had the record. Petitioner

submitted a request pursuant to the All Writs Act

for EN BANC review to correct the panel error but.

the court refused to file it [Appendix pp. 385] and the

court refused to allow the EN BANC court to

consider it [Appendix pp. 396, 398].

; As set forth by Counsel in the motion to recall

[Appendix pp. 342] and the application for a

certificate of appealability [Appendix 547 590, 591,

592] the panel decision [Appendix pp. 396, 420] is

contrary to the precedents set forth by this Court.

[Appendix 526, to 536]

The United States Department of Justice in

Maryland had the record in Maryland. Another

Ninth Circuit panel on March 30, 2005 without

reviewing that record affirmed the decision and

barred EN BANC review [Appendix pp. 579].

The District Court in Arizona had the record

in another matter. Without that record the Ninth

Circuit on February 28, 2006 affirmed the District

Court and barred EN BANC review [Appendix pp.

591].

On June 12, 2007 a panel denied a Mandamus

petition filed by counsel for the petitioner. [Appendix

pp. 627] Had the panel reviewed the record it would

have found Counsel filed the petition [Appendix pp.

627 to 637]. All these are form denials-post card

orders.

B. PETITIONER’S CIVIL CASE

Respondents executed a search warrant in

California and seized certain items of property

[Appendix pp. 169]. Missing from the inventory of

items seized is the software [Appendix pp. 176]

which is the subject of this case.

The missing items; the software, etc; were not

listed as being seized.

Petitioner filed a diversity action in the

United States District Court For The Central

District of California. Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss which was denied and the matter was

transferred to Arizona [Appendix pp. 36]. Various

stipulations as to discovery were adopted by the

court but defendants did not comply [Appendix pp.

36, Appendix pp. 38]. The Trial Court denied

motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings,

for summary judgment, and held petitioner Heck

barred [Appendix pp. 40, 52, 62, 70, 74]. Petitioner

was ordered to file the Fifth Amended Complaint

[Appendix pp. 86, Appendix pp. 149].

After a status conference [Appendix pp. 134,

Appendix pp. 140] the matter was set for trial. A

final pretrial conference was held and the court

granted directed verdict for the respondents

[Appendix pp. 15].

Petitioner moved for change of the judge for

cause and otherwise which was denied [Appendix pp.

10, to Appendix pp. 140}.

The Trial Court did not consider the joint

pretrial order [Appendix pp. 184], it did not allow

petitioner to make a record [Appendix pp. 316], nor

did it consider the misconduct by respondents as

well as motions inliminie it ordered the parties to

file [Appendix pp. 184].

On appeal petitioner argued that the court

had no authority to grant relief by way of Rule 50 as

no jury was impaneled.

Petitioner stated on appeal that as the

missing property was not listed in the inventory, the

claims cannot be Heck barred. It should be noted

that at no time during Petitioner’s criminal case did.

the State have to prove anything remotely related to

the property missing. |

As petitioner relied on admissions made

pursuant to Rule 801(D)(2), Federal Rules Of

Evidence and as respondents relied “exclusively on

arguments of counsel”, petitioner argued there was

sufficient evidence to show the amount in.

controversy [Appendix pp. 364].

Finally, petitioner stated that the Trial Court

should not have made credibility determinations and

in addition to acting as counsel for the respondents,

it should not have decided on the truth of his

allegations to disqualify for cause [Appendix pp. 364

to 377]. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed

what defendants had asserted and affirmed the Trial

Court [Appendix pp. 5, 10]. It refused to afford

petitioner the opportunity to seek rehearing and

declined to Recall the Mandate [Appendix pp. 1,

Appendix pp. 342, Appendix pp. 364].

C. PETITIONERS HABEAS APPEAL

Since his arrest, petitioner has argued the

prosecution manufactured the crimes. Petitioner is

serving a 52.5 year prison sentence for fraud with no

possibility of release in any manner prior to serving

52.5 years. He sought habeas corpus relief [Appendix

pp. 447]. The Magistrate Judge suggested the

petition be denied [Appendix pp. 432] which was

adopted by the District Court [Appendix 28, 30]. A

motion to reconsider [Appendix 70, 74] was also

denied [Appendix pp. 422]. On January 28 2004,

the District Court denied the request for a certificate

of appealability [Appendix pp. 547}.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relying on

some December 3, 2003 document denied

petitioner’s certificate of appealibility and forbade

EN BANC review [Appendix pp. 364]. However,

there is no December 3, 2003 application and the

Ninth Circuit could only consider applications after

the January 28th, 2004 decision [Appendix pp. 398]

which was served on February 3'¢, 2004 [Appendix

pp. 364, 531, 547].

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Writ of

Certiorari [Tripati v. Schriro] and this Court on May

17, 2004, under the mistaken belief that it was a

civil action, ordered the petition not be filed and

declared the petitioner abusive of the system

[Appendix pp. 625].

As this Court did not give petitioner any time

limits to file the petition, petitioner‘s supporters

have now been able to pay for Counsel. Hence, the

Certiorari is timely as to the habeas also.

There is substantial evidence Arizona

authorities manufactured crimes with the active

participation of three Arizona judges [Appendix pp.

459, 461, 464, 465, 475, 477, 479, 483, 492, 497, 499,

515, 517, 519, 521, 524, 526, 530]. Arizona courts,

including those judges whose names are involved in

destroying and manufacturing evidence [Appendix

pp. 485, 492, 497, 517, 524. Without any hearings

and exclusively on ex parte discussions the Arizona

court made findings and decided the issues against

petitioner [Appendix pp. 501, Appendix pp. 503].

Factually and if justice had been served, legally

petitioner is innocent of all allegations made against

him [Appendix 531, Appendix pp. 547].

As the Ninth Circuit did not actually review

the record, a Motion to Recall the Mandate and

Mandamus was filed by the Counsel [Appendix pp.

627 to 637, 380, 385 to 398] but the Court refused to

consider these [Appendix pp. 396, 397, 398}.

The documents captioned in italics below are

from three separate sources and clearly show that

the crimes against the petitioner were manufactured

by the State of Arizona and that the Arizona Courts

refused to give any hearing on the merit.

i. Frank Cotter, a Real Estate Appraiser

sent a letter stating his explanation as to

why he could not provide testimony in

his letter dated July 22, 1993, addressed

to counsel for Mr. Tripati at the criminal

trial, which provided § as _§ follows:

[Appendix pp. 464]

Dear Ms. Vida Zoe Flores:

“I unformed Mr. Conrad and Chatfield that Mr.

Tripati did not ask me to arrive at the $5,000,000

value and that Mr. Tripati did not know the real

estate in Riverside County was not worth $5,000,000.

I also informed them that I made a mistake.”

“They shut off the interview tapes and repeatedly

threatened me with criminal prosecution. Mr.

Conrad told me that if I testified for Mr. Tripati, I

will be prosecuted.”

“T called Mr. Conrad back after we talked and he told

me, I must not come and testify as a witness for you

and once again confirmed that he will prosecute me,

if I testified.”

“Based on these threats by Mr. Conrad, I am unable

to testify as a witness for you. I want you to know

that Mr. Tripati did not know the value fof the

property] was incorrect.”

Sincerely,

FRANK COTTER, Senior Certified Professional

Appraiser

[Appendix pp. 464/

10

ii. Additionally, Robert Fred Girdley, an

alleged victim sent a letter dated April 6,

1995, to the Arizona Attorney General,

which stated as follows: [Appendix pp. 459]

Dear Attorney General:

“‘T received $4,000,000 from John Naughton to post

four bail bonds and informed Mr. Gunn McKay,

Dean Chatfield, Teresa Archuleta and Donald

Conrad of the Maricopa County Attorney as to this

fact. They informed me that if I did not blame Mr.

Anant Kumar Tripati of Legal Research Associates as

the person who hired me and asked me to post the

four bail bonds, I shall be charged with crimes in

Arizona.”

“Once I was granted absolute immunity from

prosecution and told Helen Maureen Jones shall not

be prosecuted, I did what I was asked to do and

blamed Mr. Tripati.”

“Even though the documents were given to me by Mr.

John Naughten I blamed Mr. Tripati as requested by

Mr. Conrad and Chatfield.”

‘T am informing you that Mr. Tripati did not ask me

to post any bail bonds and any assertions by the state

to the contrary are false. Had I not been threatened

and given immunity I would not have blamed Mr.

Tripati. I did this to save having to pay the county

money for the bonds and to escape criminal

prosecution.”

11

Very Truly,

S/D ROBERT FRED GIRDLEY

[Appendix pp. 459]

iii. Finally, Helen Maureen Jones, a second

victim gave an affidavit under penalty of

perjury, on September 10, 1996, stating in

her declaration as follows: [Appendix pp.

461]

1. Robert Fred Gurdley contacted me via

telephone and advised me that he was the

Managing General Agent of an entity called

Financial Security Assurance Co., Inc

[FSAI]. He asked me to participate with

him in the bail bond business under the

name Bondco. He told me Bondco did not

have to be licensed by the Arizona

Department of Insurance. We proceeded to

post bonds using the name Bondco.

LS)

Mr. Robert Fred Girdley provided me with

the necessary bonding documents as well as

the qualifying power of attorney forms,

wnich I used to post bail bonds with.

£. Mr. Tripati never asked me to post any bail

bonds.

4. Before testifying for the State of Arizona, I

had numerous conversations with Donald

12

E. Conrad and informed him of the above.

I was advised by Mr. Conrad that my

cooperation with the State of Arizona was

necessary in the prosecution of Mr. Tripati.

I was never required to pay the $140,000. I

was not charged by the State of Arizona,

nor was any official action by the State

taken against me that affected me

personally or my bail bond license.

S/D HELEN MAUREEN JONES;

NOTARY PUBLIC ULAH WITHERSPOON signed

and dated

[Appendix pp. 461]

All three of these affidavits Appendix pp. 459,

461, 464], in addition to the testimony of the

deceased Teresa Archuleta [employee at District

Attorney’s Office in Maricopa County] [Appendix pp.

468], under penalty of perjury, from these material

witnesses used by the state of Arizona to prosecute

Petitioner, demonstrate the corruption of the

Arizona Courts, the unlawful conviction of the

Petitioner by way of coerced immunized testimony,

destruction of extrinsic evidence favorable to the

Petitioner, and the criminal conspiracy of the State

of Arizona and Maricopa County courts to deprive

Petitioner of his constitutional liberties and

substantial rights in having a fair hearing.

D. NINTH CIRCUIT’S SYSTEMIC

REFUSAL TO REVIEW RECORD

On March 30%, 2005 the Ninth Circuit found

that a petition for review [which was yet to be filed]

was devoid of merit [Appendix pp. 590]. What is

amazing is that the record was in Maryland and

there is no way that the panel could have known

what the record contained. No facsimile copy or

otherwise was introduced into the case.

The Ninth Circuit Court found another appeal

devoid of merit [Appendix pp. 591]. Just like all prior

decisions, the Ninth Circuit Court did not have the

District Court’s record in their possession when

deciding the case.

On October 9% 1997, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued its mandate [Appendix pp. 600 to

607]. A notice of post conviction relief was filed

within 30 days. It was not “summarily dismissed”

but decided on the merits on February 25%, 1999

[Appendix pp. 596; order of February 25, 1999].

The District Court in error found that the

petition was summarily denied by Arizona Courts

[Appendix pp. 600] order by Judge Robert

Broomfield and hence found the Habeas time-barred.

Apparently, without reviewing the record, the

Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability

[Appendix pp. 592].

14

Il.

ARGUMENT

The Evidence herein affirmatively

demonstrates that the Arizona Courts have

continually denied the Petitioner the right to Due

process and the constitutional liberties afforded in

the United States Constitution. Arizona Courts

coerced immunized witnesses to pro-offer false

testimony, destroy material evidence in favor of the

petitioner, and manufacture evidence to support its

position to unlawfully and unconstitutionally convict

Petitioner of Fraud related causes of action,

sentencing him to more than 50 years in an Arizona

prison. This unlawful and corrupt practice in the

Arizona Courts of Maricopa County must

immediately be enjoined and this court must order a

hearing on this matter, given (1) the Ninth Circuit’s

substantial departure from judicial practice by its

failure to review the record, (2) the Arizona Court’s

decision to make factual findings on a Rule 50

motion without affording the Petition his

constitutional right to a jury, (3) the property at

issue, supplanted by Arizona authorities and used to

obtain a conviction of petitioner, was not listed on

the state’s return to search warrant, (4) the Arizona

court’s failure to recognize that admissions made

pursuant to F.R.C.P. 801(d)(2) are substantive

evidence, (5) the Arizona Court’s failure to allow

Petitioner to present material evidence in support of

his affirmative defenses, and (6) the Ninth Circuit's

failure to review the instant record before denying

the Petitioner's certificate of appealibility which as

abridged Petitioner’s right to Federal Habeas.

15

A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S PROCEDURE

OF NOT REVIEWING RECORD AND

AFFIRMING DECISIONS CONSTITUTES

SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURE FROM THE

USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEDURES MANDATING THIS

COURT EXERCISE IT’S SUPERVISORY

POWERS.

The Supervisory Power of this Court has been

discussed at length by Professor Sara Sun Beale. In

Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory

Power in Criminal Cases; Constitutional and

Statutory Limits on the Authority of the

Federal Court 84 Colum. L.Rev. 1433 (1984),

Professor Beale identifies Article III as the source of

this Court’s Supervisory Power.

Nguyen vs. United States, 539 U.S. 69,

81(2003) states “the authority which Congress has

granted this Court to review judgments of the Court

Of Appeals undoubtedly vests us not only with the

authority to correct errors of substantive law, but to

prescribe the method by which those courts go about

deciding cases before them.” [Internal quotation

omitted].

In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,

437 (2000), this Court confirmed its authority over

federal court procedure including its authority

outside the federal rulemaking process. Such clear

authority is well entrenched. Since this court first

claimed this authority in McNabb v. United States,

318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943), it has used its Supervisory

16

Powers through adjudication to set forth a vast array

of procedures binding Federal Courts.

McNabb, supra, is credited widely as being

the first case in which this court exercised its

Supervisory Powers. See Sara Sun _ Beale

Reconsidering Supervisory Power In Criminal

es; Constituti 1 An atutory Limi n

Authority Of The Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L.

Rev 1433 (1984) at 1435. Two weeks prior to

McNabb, this Court utilized its Supervisory Powers

to prohibit commenis on a defendant’s refusal to

testify in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 199

(1943); also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,

398 (1914) was grounded on the Fourth Amendment.

However, some of the Justices in Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643, 678 (1962) stated that Weeks involved the

exercise of the Supervisory Power. On the same day

as McNabb was decided, this Court applied the

McNabb Rule to exclude confessions in Anderson v.

United States, 318 U.S. 350, 355-56 (1943).

McNabb is the first self-conscious exercise by

this Court of its supervisory authority in context of

adjudicating a case. This Court in deciding McNabb

did not rely on any statutory or Constitutional

authority but on an evidentiary policy of its own

making, 318 U.S. at 346-47.

In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co, 328 U.S. 217

(1946), this Court invoking the power it claimed in

McNabb-“power of supervision over the

administration of Justice in the Federal Courts” Id.

at 225 held “systematic and intentional exclusion“ of

daily wage earners from jury duty was forbidden. Id

at 220.

17

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003),

involved a prisoner styled motion “Rule 33 motion

for a new trial.” Without notice to the prisoner, the

District Court called the motion a 2255 petition. This

subjected any subsequent motion under 2255 to the

restrictive conditions that Federal law imposes upon

a “second or successive” (but not upon a first)

Federal habeas motion. Id at 379. Invoking its

supervisory power, this court held though not

mandated by the Constitution, a District Court must

notify a prisoner about its recharacterization and

consequences before converting a motion to one

pursuant to 2255. Id at 382-83.

The appointment of prosecutors with interest

in a contempt finding was forbidden by this court

through the exercise of its supervisory powers. See

Young v. United States Ex-Rel Vuitton ET AL; 481

U.S. 787, 808-09 (1987).

Pursuant to its Supervisory Power, this Court

held in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,

190-92 (1981) that Courts must inquire into racial

prejudices of jurors. McCarthy v. United States, 394

U.S. 459, -463-64 (1969) involved this court using its

Supervisory Powers to require a defendant plead

anew if Rule 11 was not followed.

All these Supervisory Power cases set forth

procedures not mandated by the Constitution or

Congress. Occasionally the rules announced by this

Court pursuant to its Supervisory Powers have been

given Constitutional status by this Court. This

Court, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193,

195 (1946) used its Supervisory Powers to bar

“purposeful and systematic exclusion of women”

from grand and petit juries. In Taylor v. Louisiana,

18

419 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1975), this Court found

exclusion of women from jury duty violated their

Sixth Amendment rights.

Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S.

234, 244-52 (1993) held unreasonable the practice of

the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss appeals by fugitives.

United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736-37

(1980) invalidated a local practice.

“Judicial supervision of the administration of

justice in the Federal Courts implies the duty of

establishing and maintaining civilized standards of

procedures and evidence” McNabb v. United Siates,

318 U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, this Court invoked

its Supervisory Power because the “petition for

certiorari presented serious questions in the

administration of federal criminal justice.” Id at 333.

The McNabb petitioners were _ subjected’ to

procedures by officers assuming functions not

authorized by Congress.

The actions taken by the Ninth Circuit Court

as shown by this petitioner demonstrates the Ninth

Circuit has failed to provide the “learning, good

sense, fairness and courage” standard, Id at 616,

which this court considers essential for the fair

administration of justice. :

This court found in Grunewald v. United

States, 353 U.S. 391, 423, (1957) that the

discretionary evidentiary ruling raised “grave

constitutional overtones...” The ruling at issue was

the probative value of a defendant’s invocation of his

privilege of self incrimination before the grand jury.

In Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310,

(1959), the Court exercised its Supervisory Power to

reverse a conviction. Some Jurors had read articles

19

about excluded evidence and after interviewing the

Jurors, the trial judge found no prejudice. This Court

felt constrained to intervene to “apply proper

standards” Id. at 313.

The Court reversed the admission of

defendant’s silence to impeach pursuant to its

Supervisory Power in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.

171, (1975).

All these cases have a common thread which

is, judicial action interfering with proper standards

of justice in Federal Courts.

They are not subject to harmless error

analysis as they involve “structural defects in the

constitution of the Appellate mechanism, which

defies analysis by harmless-error standards’;

emphasis added Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.

279, 309, (1991). The failure of any Court to perform

the acts required of the Court goes to the essence of

the justice system. It is the Appellate Judge who

must sit as an arbiter, determine after review of the

record, briefs, law and argument what action to take.

This cannot be done without reviewing the record.

As such, the failure of the Appellate Judges to

review the record and take action as is currently

being done by the Ninth Circuit Court is a

“structural defect” in the Appellate process. It

impugns the integrity of the Federal Judicial

Branch.

20

B. THE DECISION THAT A RULE 50

MOTION CAN BE GRANTED BY A

JUDGE WITHOUT A JURY JIS

STRUCTURAL ERROR.

Rule 50(a)(1) provides in part “if during a trial by

Jury.....” Clearly, Rule 50(a) contemplates a jury

trial has begun. Once a jury trial has begun,

defendants may seek dismissal by way of Rule 50.

The rule does not contemplate a Judge trial.

Defendants in this case utilized the

procedures for pre-trial dismissal by way of Rule

12(b)(6) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motion for

judgment on the pleadings by Rule 12(c), summary

judgment by Rule 56 and a series of Heck dismissals.

They did not prevail [Appendix pp. 32 to Appendix

pp. 132].

The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1991

amendment states that Rule 50 motions must be

made “prior to the close of the trial.” In Anderson uv.

Liberty Lobby, Inc; 477 U.S. 242, 250, (1986), this

Court stated in a JMOL the inquiry is “whether the

evidence presents a_ sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of

law.” The trial court applies the same standard as

for summary judgment Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc; 530 U.S. 133, 150, (2000).

In this matter, petitioner presented Federal

Rules of evidence 801(d)(2) evidence to substantiate

his claims and the respondents presented “the same

arguments of prior Counsel which arguments were

previously rejected by the Court” as the only

evidence. As a matter of law the motion should have

been denied.

No jury was impaneled, nor had the trial

begun. Furthermore, the standard for granting a

Rule 50 motion is different and distinct from Rule 56

and Rule 52 motions.

As no jury was impaneled, it was a structural

error On appeal for the Ninth Circuit to uphold the

trial Court’s decision to grant the Rule 50 motions.

Had the panel reviewed the record and

applied Circuit precedent, McSherry vu. City of Long

Beach, et al., 423 F.3D 1015 (9%. Cir 2005), Waters v.

Young, et al., 100 F. 3D 1437 (1996), it would have

arrived at a different result.

C. WHEN THE RETURN TO THE SEARCH

WARRANT SHOWS THAT THE

PROPERTY AT ISSUE WAS NOT LISTED

IN_THE INVENTORY, HECK DID NOT

BAR THOSE CLAIMS.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, (1994) at

footnote 7, states that claims for unlawful search

and seizures may lie if they do not undermine a

conviction. In this case, the return to the search

warrant does not list the missing property [Appendix

pp. 169] which is the software in [Volume Two,

Appendix pp. 176].

The officers stole the property. Petitioner in

this diversity action sought relief under State laws

for the property stolen. That property has nothing to

do with the criminal convictions [Appendix pp. 184].

However, the panel (because it did not review

the record) found that the criminal convictions

22

barred the claims. This conclusion is _ not

contemplated by Heck and not supported by the

record.

D. ADMISSIONS MADE PURSUANT TO

RULE _ 801(d)(2) OF THE FEDERAL

RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE

SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE.

“A statement once -made, is no less a

statement simply because it’s maker has changed his

or her mind”, South Central Bank v. Citicorp Credit

Services; 863 F. Supp 635, 646 (N.D. ILL. 1994) and

this is true even if the statements were not intended

for third parties. Id. These statements are not

subject to cross-examination, Auto-Owners Inc Co. v.

Jensen, 667 F. 2D 714, 722 (8th Cir 1981). As long as

the statement is contrary to the position taken by

defendants, they are admissible, United States v.

Matlock, 416 U.S. 164, 172 (1974), even if the person

who made the statements is dead Savarese v. Agniss,

883 F. 2D 1194, 1200 F.N. 9 (8'¢. Cir 1989). There is

no need for the person to whom the statement was

made to have first hand knowledge of the

statements, Mahlandi v. Wild Canid Survival &

Research Ctr, 588 F. 2D 626, 630 (8. Cir.(1978).

“Even if a District Court believes the evidence is

insufficient to prove the ultimate point for which it is

offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has the

slightest probative value”, Douglass v. Eaton Corp;

956 F. 2d 1339, 1344 (9th Cir. 1994).

Petitioner had presented evidence in the form

of Federal Rules of Evidence 801({d)(2) statements

made by defendant Teresa Archuleta [deceased] and

23

documentary evidence substantiating his claims.

Based on exactly this same evidence, the Court had

denied both the motion for summary judgment and

the motion to reconsider that denial. Using the same

arguments, the Court denied the motions to dismiss

and judgment on the pleadings [Appendix pp. 40,

52].

Prior to the final pre-trial conference, the

same District Judge found the evidence warranted

the matter be submitted to a Jury [Appendix pp. 36

to Appendix pp. 70].

What happened to get the judge to take a 180

degree turn is not known?

As the panel did not review the record but

relied on what Counsel said, it erred in finding that

the Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2) admissions

offered by the plaintiff, was insufficient evidence.

Substantive evidence exists, and had the panel

reviewed the record, it would have found otherwise

[Appendix pp. 184, Appendix pp. 316}.

E. CONSIDERATION OF DEFENSES _IN

DETERMINING THE VALUE OF

PROPERTY IS CONTRARY TO ST. PAUL.

* In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co;

303 U.S. 283, 295-296 (1938), this Court held that

the amount in controversy in a diversity action is not

affected by the defenses raised by a party.

By failing to review the record, the Ninth

Circuit upheld the Trial Court’s consideration of

these defenses. Had the panel reviewed the record, it

24

would have found otherwise [Appendix PP. 184,

Appendix pp. 366].

Petitioner gave his affidavit swearing that the value

of the software stolen by defendants [Appendix pp.

176] and not listed on the inventory [Appendix pp.

169] exceeded $100,000 [Appendix pp. 184].

F. THE NINTH CIRCUIT BY NOT

REVIEWING THE RECORD BEFORE

DENYING THE CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY HAS ABRIDGED THE

RIGHT TO FEDERAL HABEAS

The petitioner must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the District Court’s

assessment of the claims debatable or wrong Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), to. obtain a

certificate of appealability. As stated in Slack, the

petitioner needs to show an encouragement to

proceed further.

According to the evidence, petitioner showed

that Arizona Judges asked and had _ evidence

favorable to petitioner destroyed. These same judges

without any hearings resolved the issues though

they had a vested interest [Appendix pp. 465 to 497].

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) found

when there is “some basis for rendering a biased

judgment, [with] actual motivations-hidden from

review , that decision is void. The Vasquez court

vacated a conviction for racial discrimination in the

Grand jury Process. “When Constitutional error calls

into question the objectivity of those charged with

bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court

25

can neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor

evaluate the resulting harm.”

In the face of the evidence of corruption of the

truth seeking process by the Arizona judges, Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) requires that

petitioner be allowed to conduct discovery. In Bracy,

this court found sufficient evidence as to bribes that

warranted discovery.

This petitioner through documentary evidence

had shown that Arizona judges had a vested interest

in this matter and those judges with a vested

interest, to protect their own interest, entered orders

making findings which can only be made after

hearings. By way of example, these judges without

holding hearings, found that evidence incriminating

both the judges and the prosecutors were forged

[Appendix pp. 380]. Such findings can not be made

without a hearing. Both the Arizona Appellate

and Supreme Court issued postcard denials

[Appendix pp. 378].

Additionally, Brady requires discovery on this

issue. The Ninth Circuit by not reviewing the record

denied leave to appeal. Pursuant to Vasquez, the

process was impaired and the Federal Courts “can

neither indulge a presumption of regularity nor

evaluate the resulting harm.”

The affidavits, letters, and documents created

by agents of the State of Arizona all do show that,

the petitioner was convicted of crimes manufactured

by the prosecutor with the help of the three Arizona

judges [Appendix pp. 459, 461, 464, 465 to 476]. All

these materials were concealed by the State of

Arizona [Appendix pp. 459 to 639].

26

In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614

(1998), this Court stated actual innocence is not

legal innocence, but factual innocence. The petitioner

in Bousley contested the validity of his guilty plea.

This Court held if Bousley shows he was factually

innocent, he may have his claims reviewed.

The evidence shows petitioner is “factually

innocent” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).

This evidence is supported by credible evidence

created by the State of Arizona and documents from

the victims. In Herrera ten years after his conviction,

Herrera presented arguments with affidavits

showing he was innocent. This Court found the

evidence showed Herrera was not innocent in any

sense of the word, Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 368

(2004).

Conversely, petitioner, from affidavits by

victims and State-created documents has shown he

is factually innocent.

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 2633 (1999)

states “the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to the accused ... violates due

process where the evidence is material to guilt or to

punishment.” In Strickler, this Court found that

petitioner was unable to show prejudice from the

failure to disclose the Stoltzfus documents for the

documents would not have undermined her

testimony. Unlike Strickler, the documents in this

case show that the prosecutor along with the three

judges manufactured the crimes and had the

evidence destroyed. This evidence undermined the

Jury verdict and resulted in a prison sentence of

more than fifty-two years on petitioner.

This Court stated in Mooney v. Holohan, 294

U.S. 103 (1935), that convictions obtained by the

knowing use of perjured testimony violates due

process. According to the Mooney Court, petitioner

had not sustained his burden and so it denied leave

to file the habeas. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213

(1942) remanded the petition for further proceedings

to afford Pyle the chance to show his conviction was

the product of false evidence.

The Texas prosecutor in Alcorta v. Texas, 355

U.S. 28 (1957) through a witness, Castilleja,

presented false testimony that did not disclose the

affair Castilleja had with Alcorta’s wife. This Court

remanded the matter finding a due process violation.

Likewise, the prosecution’s witness Hamer, in

Napue v. Illinois, 366 U.S. 264 (1959) lied when he

testified he had no immunity. This Court remanded

finding a due process violation. The documents,

affidavits, and letters in this case [Appendix pp. 459

to 639] do all satisfy the Strickler-Mooney-Pyle-

Alcorta-Napue standards. Petitioner should have

been given a hearing.

These Brady materials were destroyed

because of the animus between the parties. Due to

this animus, petitioner was entitled to an

evidentiary hearing as the Arizona v. Youngblood,

488 U.S. 5: (1988) bad faith requirements did not

apply in such cases where the evidence is Brady

material which is destroyed due to an animus.

If the Appellate panel of the Ninth Circuit

would have reviewed the record and followed the law

as decided by this Court, [Appendix pp. 531, pp. 547]

it would have found that the decision of the Arizona

Courts was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

28

application of, clearly established Federal law as

determined by this Court. The panel would have

found Arizona Court's actions constituted an

unreasonable determination of facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State Court proceedings

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).

This miscarriage of justice must immediately

be reviewed and a certificate of appealability must

be issued, pursuant to Miller-EL v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322 (2003)

G. THE REPEATED REFUSAL BY THE

NINTH CIRCUIT TO -ALLOW THE

FILING OF EN BANC PETITIONS AND

MOTIONS TO RECALL MANDATES

OUTLINING EGREGIOUS DEPARTURE

FROM _THE USUAL COURSE OF

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS A TOOL

TO REDUCE ITS WORKLOAD

MANDATES __ EXERCISE OF THE

SUPERVISORY POWER. :

“Maintaining civilized standards of procedure”

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)

mandates this Court exercise its Supervisory

Powers. The procedures utilized by the Ninth Circuit

in this petition constitutes an. egregious departure

from the usual course of judicial proceedings thereby

raising grave constitutional overtones Grunewald uv.

United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423 (1957).

Clearly, the petition for rehearing [Appendix

pp. 364] motion to recall the mandate [Appendix pp.

342] should have been granted as they show the

Ninth Circuit is not applying and maintaining

29

civilized standards of procedure and has egregiously

departed from the usual course of judicial

proceeding. The Ninth Circuit must review the

record and apply Supreme Court precedent.

Ill.

CONCLUSION

Where an appellant pays the full filing fees

and submits a brief in compliance with the rules that

appellants appeal must be heard. Matin «. District

of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1 (1992).

Under the facts of this case, the Ninth Circuit has

denied petitioner meaningful Appellate review.

Arizona Judges have covered up for each other as

petitioner has argued for judicial reform. The

egregious constitutional rights and civil rights

violations demonstrated in this petition mandate the

court exercise its supervisory power and direct the

Ninth Circuit to meaningfully review the record and

follow precedents. When appellate courts act as the

Ninth Circuit herein, it destroys the integrity of the

judiciary. The interest of justice mandates the

immediate review of this appeal after full briefing.

This court must exercise its supervisory power and

direct the Ninth Circuit to meaningfully review the

record and follow precedents therein.

Respectfully submitted,

December 11, 2007

S/D ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI

Petitioner, in Pro Per

30