Brief of Respondent — Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.

Supreme Court brief1938

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Brief of respondent...... bay aay ee oe ae aett nee oha a. 1

‘Introductory statement ..... see Moree ter eee See 1

Discussion of pleadings..... RE An Ra rit BeAr Pe 5

Discussion of pertinent facts in relation to pleadings........ 10

Legal question presented........°........................ oa

oe ods ca bs nace eee ok Sew inwiadnnd 12

The original complaint by its language did not indinih the °

phosphate department .....:...:...0.............. ae

I. The decision of the Circuit Court is in accord with ,

© - the decisions of the State of New Jersey...... 18

_ II. The decision of the Circuit Court is in accord with.

the decisions of this Court................... 23

III. The decision of the Cireuit Court is in accord with

the decisions in other jurisdictions and with the

) a vite. ct gat bamsenes ser OE CL Tee 27

Summary of. argument.............. UOT Tre Toy re ee 35

Discussion of petitioner’s brief with respect to the statute of

I Sins See whale aes Che pales cw 6 oka oda wks 36

Petitioner’s brief on this review proceeds beyond the scope of

the single and sole issue relied upon and argued in her peti-

tion for writ of certiorari, and upon which the writ was

granted by this Honorable Court......................... 40

Supplemental brief ............ LE gin fvbTs ia haa ee : 42 °

Discussion of amended pleadings.......................... 42 -

Petitioner.does not contend and cannot contend that the prod-

ucts to which she alleges decedent was subjected are nee

ous, noxious.or inherently dangerous..............-....... Aa

Statement of questions involved.......~.................. 46

Statement of the case............... Orr ea

Argument ............. SY EY LE TET Oe, PTO T EE ies acute -.

I. The trial jeles was correct in heblion that there was

not sufficient knowledge attributable to the defend-

ant company that the products used at its plant were

dangerous and of a nature likely to harm the plain- :

tiff, and that there was no evidence to indieate that.

the deféndant knew or should have known of any

injuries likely to result from the exposure to soda ash “* 77

II. That the plaintiff failed to establish that his illness

was proximately caused by alleged exposure in any

ent of the defendant’s plant or that the al- .

leged exposure was the causa causans of his condition 90

—3730 ‘ . °

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III. That the plaintiff as a matter of law had utterly failed

to produce evidence that he endured any exposure

to soda ash in the phosphate department, where he

* last worked, and since his last exposure in the sili-

cate department was more than two -years prior to

his instituting suit, his action is barred by the statute

ON 26 ac seg ds ture pacoduascganss 97

IV. The proofs were overwhelmingly in favor of-defendant

and ‘requited that a verdict be entered in its favor.. 101

Discussion of petitioner’s brief, with respect to points BandC.. 101

Conclusion ........: gl eawda se weu on eens Wivaewel iiccaee ened) ee

TABLE oF CasES CITED.

_ Alice State Bank v. Houston, 247 U. S. 240, 62 L. Ed. 1096........ - 40

Andrews v. Marsden, 122 Atl, 171..............-. Cll SRY - . 32

Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28, 77 L. Ed.

PO TNT ere Sakae eae A 8 Ia ret Reopree 27

Birkes'v. United Fruit Co., 49 F.-{2d) 656.......-....0..--- (ay 28

Buntin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 744............---: 27

Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 15 P. (2d) DE Lie ca rkknns o 33

‘Canfield v. Iowa Dairy Separator, 172 Iowa 164, 154 N. W. 434. .. 84

Card v. Stowers Pork Packing & Provision Co., 253 Pa. 575, 98 Atl.

| a rere errs Ritea eae g erm er he Peer ee 33

Casavalo v. D’Auria, 12 N. J. Mise. 81, 169 A*l. 520; affd. 113

Wh Be Tec DD. oa ag ach civic knee pans nasser sasseecnecseads re 22.

Chennault v. Stovall, 160 So. 146............. xt su aan nano as 29 |

Chicago City R. Co. v. McMeen, 102 Ill. App. 318......- ee a 39

Corcoran-v. Wanamaker, 185 Pa. 496, 39 Atl. 1108................ 85

D’Allesandro v. United Marine Contracting Corp., 30 F. (2d)

EN Sere err rr rrr errr ete ery ey Se Pee oe 29

Davis v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 116 N. J. L. 103,182 Atl. 850....... _ 87

DiLello v. Manufacturers’ Land and Improve Co.,11 N. J. Mise.

eer (eanececnah aan Ps. I, Wipe rye ere 22

Giant Storage Battery Co. v. DeLay, 87 F. (

Gilmore v. City of Chicago, 224 Ill. 490, 79 N.

Grammer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corpofation, 71 F. (2d)

Be flit bc cen Gan anibt raee wees nee Ae raner pe ran eu, s 82

Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90, 74 L. Ed. 720............-.----- 92

Hester v. Mullin, 12 S. E. 447.............. ee ee a 34

Jamouneau Vv. Wetherill, 98 N. J: L. 80, 118 Atl. 707.............. 14

- Johnson v. Manhattan- Ry. Co., 289 U. S. 479, 77 L. Ed. 1331...... 41

Lane v. Sayre Water.Co., 69 Atl. 1126....:........-.-. 000s sees - °30

LaPorte v.-U. S. Radium Corp., 13 Fed. Supp. 263............... 12,13

Limpert Brothers v. Stitt, 94 N. J. L. 472, 110 Atl. Roe 13

Magliaro v. Modern Homes, Inc., 115 N. J. L. 151, 178 Atl. 733.... 20

Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F. (2d) 840...... aS ea cacees pee 15

INDEX iii

3 Sd ; Page

Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 227 Pa. 18, 75 Atl. 837............ . Bl

N. & G. Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 275 U. S. 431, 72 L. Ed. 354...... 25

O’Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co., 9 N. J. Mise. 345, 154 Atl.

_ 13; affd. 109 N. J. L. 271, 160 Atl. 696 a aaa een geek ee. 8 18

Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658, 45-L. Ed. 361... . 95, 101

Penna. R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 7 L. Ed. 819...... 92

Pennsylvania Pulverizing Co. v. Butler, 61 F. (2d) a ee ad 80

Pinkley v. Chicago & Eastern R. R. ,Co., 246 Ill. 370, 92 N. E. 896. . 85

Prudence Company, Inc., v. Fidelity é Deposit Co. of Maryland, os

297 U. S. 198, 80 L. Ed. Mtaacs cue eceoye. tet ea. anise — Al

Roessler ¢ Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. Peterson, 134 Fed. 789...... «85

Rygiel v. Kanengieset, 114 N. J. L. 311, 176 Atl. 605.............. 19

Salyers v. United States, 257 Fed. 255.......................... * 30

Stevens & Sons Co. v. Daigneault, 4 F. (2d) 53.:......:..... ida 89

Sweany v. Wabash Ry. Co., 80S. W. (2d) 216.............. sere ' $88

Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sweet, 78 Kan. 243, 96 Pac. 657...... WE 32

Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U. 8S. 285, 39 L. Ed..983........... 24, 25

_Umited States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 77 L. Ed.

WT 6cberends nk sud balls fae eeen cape Ee ete 25, 26

Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R. Co., 65 Ns J. L. 383, 47 Atl.

WE kn tanineg nape cedadevebdon tere ee ten ete tan ee 89

Western and Atl. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496, 73 L. Ed. is

ch CEE ET TING PALSY St ie irre LE ti ee 92

Willis & Bro. v. ieniines 94N.J.L. 84, - f Ree 14

Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. 5S. 172, 79 L. Ed. 264... 40

Statute Cirep. i

New Jersey Statute of Ne 3N. J. cep. 8t. 1910, p. 3164,

Section 3; P. L. 1896, P. PS ia ed a4 ce Ree raven st a badaekes 12

<)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs

| OCTOBER TERM, 1937

No. 378

SUSIE MATY, Apministrarer or THE Estate or Groce "

| Mary, Atso Known as Grorcz Marry, .

ek Petitioner,

ie .

GRASSELLI CHEMICAL COMPANY.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT .

OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT.

_ Introductory Statement. f

These proceedings arise out of an action at law insti-

tuted in the United States District Court for the District

of New Jersey by the original plaintiff, George Maty, now

deceased. _He sued the respondent to recover damages for - 8

lung injuries alleged by him to have been caused by expo-

sure to Soda Ash (chemically known as Sodium Carbonate,

2

R. 314, 325 and 331) dust while working as a furnace oper-

ator and general worker in the Silicate Department of

respondent’s plant in Grasselli, New Jersey. The respond-

.ent by its Answer pleaded, among other defenses, that the

cause of action framed by the complaint was barred by the

two year Statute of Limitations of the State of New Jersey.

During the trial plaintiff was permitted to amend the com-

plaint so as to charge the respondent with negligence in its

Phosphate Department as well as in its Silicate Depart-

ment, the said amendment being allowed over objections.

on the part of the respondent predicated upon the Statute

of Limitations of the State of New Jersey both with re-

spect to the cause of action set out in the original complaint

as well.as to the‘new cause of action so created by the

amendment. The trial of the cause resulted in a verdict

for the plaintiff (R. 811). Upon the conclusion of the tak-

_ ing of testimony, responde.:t moved for the direction of

a verdict in its favor upon several grounds (R. 708). After

protracted argument the motion was denied with reserva-

tions-—the trial judge reserving the right to direct a verdict

for the respondent upon further study of the record. In

this connection the trial judge made the” following state-°

ment (R. 722):

“ T am going to let this case go to the jury. because we

have been here so long, but I am telling you, Counsel,

that my view of the matter is that any verdict they

might bring in will have to be set aside by me.’’

Upon application of the respondent, the trial judge granted

a rule to show cause why the verdict in favor of the plain-

tiff should not be set aside and a verdict entered in behalf

of the respondent notwithstanding the verdict for the plain-

tiff, or that in the alternative a new trial be granted (R. 812).

Upon the argument of the Rule to show cause counsel for the

plaintiff stipulated and agreed that in the event the trial

3

.

judge concluded to set aside the verdict of the jury, a di-

. rected verdict be entered for the respondent and that judg-

ment for the respondent follow (R. 757). The argument re-

sulted in the vacating of the order and judgment for the

plaintiff and the entry of a verdict and judgment for the —

respondent (R. 784 and p. 818). The ruling of the trial

" Judge was predicated primarily upon the failure of the

plaintiff to sustain ‘his charge of negligence in that he had

failed to prove knowledge on the part of the respondent,

knowledge of probable injurious effects from the inhalation

of Soda Ash dust being an essential element in seeking to

establish the charge of negligence, and also upon the doubt-

ful proofs as to whether the plaintiff had established that

the negligence charged was the proximate cause of the lung .

condition from which the plaintiff was suffering, and further

‘upon the doubtful proofs as to whether the plaintiff was in

fact exposed to Soda Ash. dust while hé worked in the

Phosphate Department (R. 783 and 784). An appeal was

thereupon taken to the United States Circuit Court of Ap-

-peals for the Third Circuit which affirmed the judgment of

the District Court, but on grounds other than those relied

upon by the trial judge in entering judgment for the re-

spondent (R. 821-823). 89 F. (2d) ‘456. Circuit Judge

Thompson, in speaking for the Circuit Court, said as ‘fol

lows (R. 821 and 822):

‘co * * The learned trial judge * * * concluded -

_ that the plaintiff had failed to prove knowledge on the

part of the defendant, and relying upon our ruling in

Pennsylvania Pulverizing Co. v. Butler, 61 F. (2d) 311,

entered judgment for the defendant.

‘*We do not deem it necessary to review the evidence

‘as to the knowledge of the defendant in view of our con-

clusion that a verdict should have been directed for the

defendant because of the two year statute of limitations.

The original bill of complaint was filed October 1, 1935.

The plaintiff alleged therein that he was employed asa

rnace man i in the silicate a of the defend-

4

' ant’s plant, that the defendant failed to provide him with

a safe place to work, * * *. It was shown that some-

time in 1932 the plaintiff was transferred to the phos-

phate department. The action based upon negligence

in the silicate department was therefore outlawed by

the New Jersey two year limitation period. |

‘‘At the trial the plaintiff undertook to prove that .

his injuries were sustained through the negligence of the

defendant in the conduct of its phosphate department

and obtained leave of court to amend his original bill of

- complaint so as to conform to-the evidence so produced.

We think the court should have refused to allow. the

amendment. The cause of action set forth in the amend-,

ment was a different.cause of action from that set forth

in the original complaint and, therefore, could not be

introduced after the statute of limitations had run.

* * * The negligence alleged in the :amendment in-

volved a different act, different buildings, departments,

conditions and dates of exposure. *. * *”

. Petitioner applied for-a rehearing before the Circuit Court.

and her petition was denied (R. 824). Petitioner thereupon

filed Ker petition with this Court charging that the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. was in error in its

adjudication upon the single question of the applicability

of the Statute of Limitations upon which it passed judgment,

the Circuit Court having held it to be unnecessary to review

the other legal and factual que®tions which were presented ,

_and argued before it upon the@ppeal. The Circuit Court |

. did not therefore in any respects pass upon these other

legal and factual questions. A writ. of certiorari was

granted by this Court upon the petiti6n of petitioner (R.

824). The Statute of Limitations constitutes the sole is-

sue which was presented and argued in petitioner’s petition

for writ of certiorars and brief. It also represents the

single issue upon which the writ was granted by this Honor-

able Court (Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief, pp.

4 and 5).

5

Discussion of Pleadings.

_ A complete understanding of the pleadings is of funda-

mental importance in the consideration of the legal ques-

‘ tion presented upon this review. .

_ his action was commencéd on October 1, 1935. The

summons annexed to the complaint is tested as of that date

(R. 787). The summons and complaint were served off

the respondent on October 3, 1935 (R. 789).

_ Paragraph 1 of the complaint-alleges generally that the

plaintiff was in the employ of the respondent at its plant

in Grasselli, New Jersey in November 1933 and for some-

time prior thereto (R. 788). The respondent by dfs answer

admitted that the plaintiff was for ‘a time employed by it -

at Grasselli, New Jersey, but denied that he was so em-

ployed in November: 1933 (R. 793).

Paragraph 2 of the Complaint alleges that the plaintiff

was employed as a furnace man, operator and general

worker in the Silicate Department of defendant’s plant (R.

__738). In answer to this paragraph, defendant admitted

that plaintiff was ‘‘for a time employed as a furnace man in

_ the silicate department of defendant’s plant, but denies that

he was employed in said department after November 1,

— 1932’? (R. 793).

’ Paragraph 4 of the complaint charges that ‘‘during the

course of his employment in and around the said depart-—

ment’’, plaintiff came into contact with certain substances

to which he was exposed and which he inhaled, and that as

a result of the negligence charged, he became incapacitated

in November 1933 (R. 788). (Italics ours.)

_ Except as clarified in the above respects as to the time,

place and nature of plaintiff’s employment, the respondent’s

answer constituted a general denial, and set up five separate ,

‘ ‘defenses, the Third and Fourth Separate Defenses dealing ‘i

specifically with the Statute of Limitations. Respondent ~

6

specifically pleaded affirmatively that the cause of action

-framed by the complaint which dealt exclusively with the

Silicate Department of the A@Spondent ’s plant at Grasselli,

New Jersey, was barred by the two year Statute of Limita-

tions of New Jersey ae and 794).

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the complaint contain the perti-

nent parts thereof insofar as the present=xeview is con-

cerned (R. 788).° In and by these paragraphs plaintiff set

forth a cause of action charging acts of negligence while he

was employed as a furnace operator in the Silicate Depart-

ment of respondent’s plant at Grasselli, New Jersey. Para-

graph 1 of the complaint is general i in nature and refers to

plaintiff’s employment at the plant of the respondent. Para-

graph 1 in- referring to respondent’s plant is limited by

paragraphs 2 and 4 of the complaint wherejn specific and

particular reference is made to the Silicate Department

wherein plaintiff worked as a furnace operator. The com-

plaint does not by its language cover any other department

of respondent’s plant except the Silicate Department. It

was admitted by plaintiff’s counsel in open court that when

the complaint was prepared by him it was intended to co

the Silicate Department only and not the Phosphate Dep Ais

ment. This will aonce appear from the following colloquy

between plaintiff’s counsel and the trial judge (R. 128) :

‘‘Mr. Turtur: And the only reason why I didn’t want

" to see any other portion except the Silicate Department

was because I didn’t know until’ the day before the de-

positions were taken that this Phosphate room came

into the picture.

‘The C : In other words you didn’t know that

the statu run.

re: : r: No, not until one day before did Mr.

Maty mention the phosphate department.”

The Depositions referred to by counsel-were taken on May |

15, 1936 (R. 1). In connection with the above colloquy, the

’ trial judge said to plaintiff’s counsel (R. 129):

7

‘“‘The Court: You see the conclusion-is inescapable,

that you ‘are composing this phosphate argument to

meet the statute.’’

The distinction between the Silicate Department and the

Phosphate Department becomes important by virtue of

the following facts: While working in the Silicate Depart-

ment, the plaintiff was employed as a furnace operator (R.

5). Plaintiff testified that he worked in this Department

until the Winter of 1932 when he was transferred to the

Phosphate Department (R. 30). The original shop records

of respondeng establish that the transfer was made on No-

vember ¥ (R: 592). The Phosphate Départment is

located in& separate and independent building located about

five hundred feet from the Silicate‘Department. He had

different bosses there (R..61). After this transfer to the —

Phosphate Department, plaintiff never returned to the Sili-

cate Department (R. 61). While employed in the Phosphate

Department plaintiff worked as a general worker. He testi-

fied that he worked outdoors three days a week and indoors

two days a week and that his work was of a wholly different |

character from that in the Silicate Department (R. 31).

’ Since the plaintiff left the Silicate Department on Novem-_ |

* ber 1, 1932; any cause of action charging negligence as to >.

* that Department was barred by the Statute of Limitations

. of New Jersey on and after November 2, 1934. The suit:in

this cause was instituted on October 1, 1935,—almost a year

after any action with respect to that Department was barred

by the Statute of Limitations. In other words, the cause

of action framed by the complaint and in fact intended by

plaintiff’s counsel to be framed and covered by the com-

plaint had been barred almost a year before the suit was (a

commenced. The plaintiff himself ‘testified that he did not "ee

get sick in the Phosphate Department (R. 36). . Pe

The complaint alleged generally that plaintiff was em-

ployed in respondent’s plant until November 1933, and al: .

ae)

« _ _ 7 . %>

8

leged specifically in paragraphs"2 and 4 that while em-

ployed at respondent’s plant, he wasyemployed as a furnace

operator in its Silicate Department (R. 788). Respondent

g by its apswer specifically and particularly stated that plain-

tiff was not employed in the Silicate Departmént after

November 1, 1932, and by its Third and Fourth Separate

Defenses set-up the two year ‘Statute of Limitations and

* thereby gave particular notice that the cause of action set

forth in the complaint was barred. on the very day the suit

was commenced (R. 793 and 794). Plaintiff filed his reply

denying the allegation of the respondent’ s answer and join-

ing issue thereon (R. 795).

_ A trial of this cause was commenced on May 19, 1936,

but after a day of testimony was terminated by a mistrial

in order to allow other cases of shorter duration to be

tried. The trial judge at first limited the proofs to the

Silicate Department, but subsequently allowed the plaintiff

to amend his complaint so as to include the Phosphate

' Department. Ne formal amendments to the complaint

were filed (R. 89 and 90). In anticipation of a new trial

on June 9, ~1936, respondent gave plaintiff notice of a

motion to limit tle proofs during the trial to the Silicate

Department on tWe grounds set forth in the notice (R. 810

and 811). The motion of respondent to limit proofs was

_originally granted. The trial judge held, that paragraph 1

of the complaint was limited by Paragraph 2 thereof ( R.

95 and 96). Plaintiff thereupon applied for leave to amend |

the complaint so as to include the Phosphate Department.

Considerable argument ensued during the course of which .

the trial judge said xi 118 and 119) :

‘“‘The Court: eas personally question the

- good faith of your + aoe I think it is made simply

“. to avoid the Statute; but teaving that out of considera-

tion, you have the legal situation of charging negli- ©

gence in one department, whichturns out to be barred

oo

\

\

- - ,

ill . i=s a a ee mae toe

by the Statute, and wish to’amend and charge negli-

‘ gence in another department and under different con- .

‘ditions. * * * - |

The Court: No, I would like to seé any case that

would "permit such a radical departure from the origi-

-nal-eause of action.’’ |

The amendment of the complaint was allowed with reser-

vations and serious doubts on the part of the trial judge

in the correctness of pis ruling (R. 107-143).

By virtue of the motions made with respect to amend-

awents to she complaint, an amended complaint was filed

by plaintiff (R. 803-805). Plaintiff alleged in paragraph 2

that he was employed as a ‘furnace man, operator and

general worker in the Silicate. Department and Phosphate

Department of the respondent’s plant, and in Paragraph 4

he alleged that ‘‘during the course of his employment in

and around the said department and/or departments’’, he

suffered certain injuries. It is to be noted that even after

being allowed to amend his complaint, the plaintiff. pleads

with mental reservations. He does not charge negligence

in any absolute and out and out terms in both the Silicate

and Phosphate Departments, but refers to ‘‘the said depart-

ment and/or departments.”’ (Italics ours.) At that late

stage plaintiff expresses great uncertainty in his pleadings

_with respect to whether he was injured in one department

or in the other department. The plaintiff himsel€-insisted

and testified that he got sick in the Silicate Department

and not in the Phosphate Department (R. 36).

Respondent filed an answer to the complaint as amended -

- (R. 805-808). It expressly reserved all objections and ex-.

ceptions taken by it during the course of the trial with

respect to the amendments to th® complaint. It admitted -

that plaintiff was employed as a furnace worker in the

Silicate Department until November’ 1, 1932, and that

thereafter he was employed inhe Phosphate Department

ry

Ae

Sovew~ ats

aad

- 10

ee

until October 23, 1933. Respondent pleaded affirmatively

_ the Statute of Limitations (R. 806, 807).

Discussion of Pertinent Facts in Relation to Funtime.

Plaintiff worked iff the Silicate Department as ‘a furnace

operator until November 1, 1932 (R. 592). He was trans-

ferred on that date to the Phosphate Department where

he worked until’ he terminated his employment in October

1933. The Phosphate Department i is located in a building

entirely separate and independent from the building wherein

the Silicate Department is located, and about five ‘hundred.

feet away (R61). After this transfer, plaintiff never re-

turned to the Silicate Department:(R. 61). While in the

“Phesphate Department he worked. as a general laborer

(R. 591-597). In the Silicate Department he operated fur-

facture of silica glass. This product is manufactured out

of Soda Ash (Sodium Carbonate) and silica sand. In the

Phosphate Department, he worked four: days on the. out-

side near the water front and one day a week indoors .

_ (R. 594 and 625). The plaintiff himself testified that_he

worked outdoors three days a week and two days a week

of

- naces and took various steps in connection with the manu- .

indoors (R. 72). While working in the Phosphate Depart- .

ment, the plaintiff did not handle Soda Ash at all. In this

Department Soda Ash is used on the other side of the build:

ing from where he worked (R. 592 and 594). In discussing

the product Soda Ash (Sodium Carbonate) it is well to

understand that we are not dealing with a chemical which

is dangerous, poisonous or noxious in character. Soda Ash

is an entirely harmless product which has no substantially,

greater effect on the human system when inhaled than

ordinary street dust. It is a mild alkali and is somewhat

stronger‘in alkalinity than Sodium Bicarbonate. It is not

in fact or even. considered to be,a caustic product (R. 314,

_ 325, 330-340 ; 350-358).

z

By

On October 1, 1935, plaintiff commenced this action

against respondent charging it withenegligence i in the Sili-

cate Department. » He had left that department on Novem-

ber 1, 1932. e respondent pleaded affirmatively that the

cause of action set forth in the complaint ‘was barred by the -

Statute of Limitations, and réspondent further gave plain-

tiff particular notice by paragraph 2 of its answer that his

employment in thesSilicate Department had .terminated on

November 1, 1932. The cause of action framed by the com- ©

plaint was barred by the Statute of Limitations almost -a

year prior to the date on which the suit was commenced.

The complaint covered only alleged exposure in the Silieate

Department and was intended to.cover only that department

-when it was prepared.. That fact. was admitted*by counsel

in open court. Plaintiff terminated his employment in the

2 Phosphate Department in October, 1933. On June 10, 1936,

plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint ‘by setting

up a new cause of action relating to the Phosphate Depart-

ment. Any cause of action whiclr plaintiff might have had ©

. as to the Phosphate Department was barred on or about_

November 1, 1935. The result of all the foregoing is that

on June 10, 1936, the plaintiff was permitted to resurrect .

by amendment a cause of action with respect to the Silicate

Department which was barred on November. 2, 1934, by

amending the complaint i in an action commenced on October

i, 1935, and further to resurrect by amendment a cause of

action with respect to the Phosphate Department which was

_ barred on or about October 24, 1935, by amending the com-

~plaint in an action predicated upon the Silicate Department .

alone commenced on October 1, 1935. Recapitulating, -

pertinent dates are: ,

November 1, 1932—last date of alleged exposure in Sili-

cate Department. —

October 23, 1933—last date of employment i in Phosphate

—-

Pd

SEE

Tem

> . 12

October 1, 1935—date of filing suit see on Silicate

Department.

June 10, 1936—date of amendment " iets the Phos- —

phate Department.

Legal Question Presented.

Had the trial judge under the facts and circumstances

_ presented the legal right to allow the plaintiff to amend his -

complaint on June 10, 1936, so as to include the Phosphate

Department and: thereby resurrect a. cause of action both

as to the Silicate Department which was outlawed on the

date suit was commenced and as to the Phosphate Depart-

mert which was outlawed on Octeber 24, 1935? The trial

judge on several occasions held that he had no such legal

right. He finally did allow the amendment with serious

doubts and reservations. The Circuit Court of Appeals for _

the Third Circuit coneluded. not to considgr the several —

legal arid factual questions presented onthe appeal, and

held that the trial judge committed legal error in allowing

the amendment, and on that ground alone the judgment in

behalf of the respondent should be affirmed.

Argument.

The applicable part of the New Jersey Statute of Lim}-

tations reads as follows:

‘All actions hereafter ousreing for injuries%o per-

sons caused by the wrongful act, negléct or default of

any * * * cdrporation or corporations within this

State, shall be commenced and instituted within two

years next after the cause of sych action shall have

accrued and not after.’’ (3 N. J. Comp. St. 1910, P.

3164, Section 3; P. L. 1896, p. 119.)

Perhaps the most excellent decision on the applicability

of this statute locally is found in LaPorte v. U. S. Radtm

4 ‘

18

2 S

-Corp., 13 Fed. Supp. 263, D. C. of N. J. 1935), decided by

District Judge Forman. This case raised the question as

to whether the plaintiff in‘an action at law for damages

caused by injuries to the plaintiff’s intestate is entitled to

an injunction restraining the defendant from pleading the .

Statute of Limitations .as a bar to the plaintiff’s alleged

cause of action on the ground of equitable fraud. On page

272 District J udge Forman, after setting out the above

statute, said as follows:

‘*TIn Thorpe v. Corwin, 20 N. J. Law, 311, 317, the Couft

said: ‘The Statute of Limitations makes the” ‘lapse of

time a positive and legal bar. When once it-has begun

to“run against a person under né6 legal disability, it

pursues its course uninterrupted by any subsequent

events; and when the period prescribed-by the statute |

has elapsed, the bar is complete, and its force can

neither be strengthened nor impaired by anything that

has happened in the meantime. * * * The statute

the rights of the parties, by. the giant. force of the

_ statute.’

That is law today in New Jersey. a v. Con-

over, 95 N. J. Law, 89, 112 A. 324.’’ Rosey

Statutes of limitation are statutes of quiet, and they are

beneficent in that they put an end to disputed claims, pre- --

vent litigation, and give rest and repose. No matter what

may be the criticism of the casuist, in the eyes of the law

these statutes are no longer regarded as- harsh, but furnish

a defense as meritorious as any other. In Limpert Brothers

v. Stitt, 94 N. J. L. 472, 110 Atl. 832 (E. & A., 1920), Mr.\Jus-

tice Parker, in dealing with the Statute of ay gan said

on page 473 (N. J. L.):

“As to ‘defendant hot being peaietiesh, ‘statutes. of

limitation are in the interest of terminating litigation;

defendants are entitled to .rely on them, and would be

legally prejudiced by ‘their non-enforcement. a

leaves nothing for presumption. Time alone. settles —

| 14

Notwithstinding the formal diana in procedure pre-

scribed by the new Practice Act of New Jersey, the classi-

fication of actions at common law and their substantial dis-

tinctions as a basis of remedial law still continues. Willis

_ & Bro, v. Gaventa, 94 N. J. L. 84, 110 Atl. 120 (Sup. Ct., |

1920); Jamounegu v. Wetherill, 98 N. J. L. 80, 118 Atl. 707

Sup. Ct., 1922). 6

In discussing the facts of the cause at bar and the appli-

eability thereto of cases decided in various jurisdictions

and the general statements of law therein contained. touch-

ing upon the legal question of the right to amend a com-

plaint after the Statute of Limitations has run so as to. bar

the action, regard must be had to the unequivocal fact that

in all of these cases the original cause of action declared

in the complaint: was not barred at the time of the commence-

ment thereof so that the answer filed by the defendant did not

set up as a defense the Statute of Limitations, and the

Statute of Limitations became available as a defense only on

‘the date when an amendment to the complaint was‘presented

and offered. In the instant.case the situation is entirely dif-

ferent and is entirely unlike the facts‘presented in any other

reposted case. In the present case which was commenced on >

October. 1, 1935, the cause of action set forth in the complaint

had been barred on.N ovember 2, 1934, and the respondent

by its answer affirmatively declared that the plaintiff did

not work in the Silicate Department after November 1,

1932, and that as a consequence the cause of action declared

in the complaint was barred by the Statute of Limitations

and the Statute was specifically and affirmativety pleaded.

The amendment introducing the Phosphate Department |

and setting up a new cause of action as to that’ Depart-

- ment was presented and allowed on June 10, 1936, and over

phate Department .had been barred by the Statute.- Mae_ _

two years after the gause of action even as tothe Phos-

cause of action as to the Phosphate Department. was harred

15

on October 24, 1935. The original complaint did not in fact

or in law cover any department other than the Silicate

'- Department and coungel for the plaintiff admitted in open

%

court that it was not intended to cover any other depart-

ment.

". This distinction is so fundamental as to be dispositive of

the legal issues presented. It goes to the very crux of the

case. It presents neither the legal situation of a-bad com-

plaint corrected by a good amé*dment, nor a bad amend-

ment incorporated i in.a good complaint. It is, so far as the

Statute of Limitations is concerned, a bad complaint plus

a bad amendment, with the surprising and entirely illogical

interpretation advanced by the — that as a result

both are good. :

In examining the

ted, it will at once appear

that none of them are h respect to this fundamental

legal question. Br and frequently misleading general

statements of law will be found, but.such statements must

be carefully scrutinized because they are helpful only in

relation to the particular facts before the Court in these

cases.

Circuit Judge Sanborn made a very pertinent statement

in the case of Manhattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F. (2d) 840

(Highth Cireuit, 1934). He said on page 843:

“‘Manifestly, if a cause of action is actually barred

by the statute of limitations it cannot be resurrected by

inserting it, through amendment, into 4 petition which

states an entirely different cause of an. °° 7

The Original Complaint by ite Language Did Not Include

the Phosphate Department.

‘fe and by paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the —wr 4 plain-

. tiff set forth a cause of action charging acts of negligence

- while he was employed a8 a furnace operator in the Silicate

| ' Sn of respondent’s plant. ee 1 is gen-

16

_ eral in nature and refers to plaintiff’s employment at the

plant of the respondent, but is limited by paragraphs 2

, and 4 wherein specific and particular reference is made to

the Silicate Department. In paragraphet plaintiff charged

that “‘dusing the course of his employment in and arownd

the said department’’ (referring to the Silicate Depart-

ment particularly mentioned in paragraph 2 as the par-

ticular place of: plaintiff’s employment), he came irito con-

tact with the substances which he says caused his’ illness,

‘‘all of which was the result of the negligence of the de-

fendant.’’ In paragraph 5 of the complaint plaintiff under-

took to particularize with respect to the acts of negligence

‘with which he says the defendant was chargeable in and

’ around the Silicate Department. The complaint does not

by its language cover any other department of respondent’s

plant except the Silicate Department: It is not sufficiently -

broad and comprehensive by its language from a legal or ©

even theoretical point of view to include the Phosphate -

Department. To suggest that the complaint as framed in-

cludes the Phosphate Department as well as the Silicate

Department is to suggest that the complaint as framed in-.

cludes every other one or more of the numerous departments

of respgndent at its plant in Grasselli, New Jersey. All

of these departments have different operations, involve

different products, different buildings and many other dif-

ferent facts and circumstances. this connection it must

be borne in mind that the resperdent’s answer specifically

stated that plaintiff was not employed in the Silicate De-

Se after November 1, 1932 (R..793): ‘Some of the

other departments of the respondent’s plant are the follow-

185) ; Sulphide (R..197) ; Lithepon (BR. 205) ; Glanber’s Salts

(R. 210); Barium Products (R. 219); Barium Chloride (R.

219); C. & R. Department (R. 220). There are other

°

’ ing: Shipping (R. 155); Sulphate (R. 162); Sulphur (R. ©

ee

numerous departments which are not specifically referred

to in the Record.

The complaint when prepared was not intended to cover

any department of the respondent’s plant other than thé\__

‘Silicate Department. The allegations: Of negligence of

which the plaintiff complained, wlien ane considers the

proofs offered to sustain sueh allegations, related selely

to the Silicate Department, and dealt with inadequate

ventilation, ‘‘puffing’’ of furnaces, holes in the conveyor,

ete. The proofs offered with respect to the Phosphate

Department were entirely different because plaintiff hati-~

dled only liquids or wet materials while working indoors

one day a week, and he worked in several general capacities

. as a laborer outdoors and near the water-front four days

a week. The Phosphate Department was contained in a

building over five hundred feet away from the Silicate De-

partment, The allowance of the amendment whereby the

Phosphate Department was added to and béctme part of

the complaint constituted an unqualified change in the gist

of the original cause of action in a most material respect.

- It must therefore be takeg as recognized and accepted as

¢

a fuygamental premise tuat the original complaint by its ~

language did not in law and fact and was not intended in

fact to include the Phosphate Department. Petitioner’s

feeble and almost apologetic argumepgsthat it did include

‘the Phosphate Department falls of its own, weight, and is

not \genable particularly in view of plaintiff’s counsel’s ad-

misSion in open court, that he did not in fact contemplate ©

any department other than the Silicate Department when

. he prepared the ¢omplaint (R. 128). We must therefore

_ proceed to a discussion of the judgment of the Circuit Court

that the District Judge committed legal error in allowing |

¢ the amendment. Sena : /

, 2h

: j \

——)

. = St ee:

‘5

18

me The Decision « of the Circuit Court is in Accord With the

_ Decisions of the State of New Jersey.

“In O'Shaughnessy * v. Bayonne News Co., 9 N. J. Mise. -

345,154 Atl. 13 (1931) (affirmed by the Court of Errors

- and Appeals in 109 N. J. L. 271, 160 Atl. 696 (1932), the

_ original complaint alleged that. plaintiff by qhe express

Reser of the defendants became a passenger in the auto-

obile truck owned by one of the defendants ; that the truck

_ was so negligently operated that plaintiff Je aie

- alighting from said automobile truck at or near the intersec-

tion of said G Grove Street with “Bight Street, in said City of

Jersey City” was thrown to the ground and suffered in- _ -

. juries. The accident happened on February 25, 1928. The-

* action was commenced in time. The two year statutory period

~of limitation ran against plaintiff’ s cause of action on

- February 25, 1930, or more than eleven months prior to

plaintiff ’s application to amend his complaint. In advance

of trial plaintiff moved. to amend. his complaint by alleg-

ing that the operator of the truck negligently and without

_ warning started the‘same after the plaintiff had alighted —

. therefrom and while the plaintiff was in the act of crossing

Grove-Street. The amendment was allowed.‘ It was in

connection with these facts and circumstances that Judge

. Ackerson made the i general observations (Mise. i

p. 347) :

‘Tt is quite generally held that if the identity of the

transaction forming the cause of action originally de-

clared upon is adhered to, an amendment @g@ not ordi-

narily regarded as substantially changing Ge ¢)

claim or as stating a new or substantially different

_cause of action. So an amendment will not as a rule

be held to state a new cause of action if the facts

alleged show substantially the same wrong with re- ._

spect to the same transaction, or if it is the same mat-

ter more fully or differently laid, or, if the ‘gist of the

_ action or the subject*of controversy remains the same; |

19

‘and this j is true inal the form of liability asserted,

-or the alleged incidents of the transaction may. be

different. Technical rules: will not be Applied i in deter-

inal and amended pleadings are identical, since in a

strict sense almost any amendment may be said. to

change the original cause of action. 49 C. J. 510, 511.

‘‘Tn a tort action an amendment may vary the state-

ment of the original complaint as to the manner in

which the plaintiff was injured, or as to the manner

of the defendants’ breach of duty, without necessarily

setting up a new cause of action.

‘“Tn the case sub juglice the injury charged in the orig- —

- inal complaint was alleged to have arisen out of the

hegligent operation of defendants’ ‘automobile. The

place where the plaintiff was injured is not the gist

of the cause of action.”’

Z In Rygiel v. rene eee 114 N. J. L. 311, 176 Atl. 605

_ “(H. & A,, 1934), the action was instituted on February 10,

¢ 1932, It was commenced within the statutory period. The

complaint charged the defendant with negligence in the

maintenance of a stairway, as a result of which plaintiff

suffered injuries‘on May 20, 1931.. On November 25, 1933,

and during the trial of the cause the plaintiff was allowed

to amend his complaint to state that his injuries were sus-

@ined on May 21, 1931. The defendant. pleaded the Stat-

ute of Limitations with respect to the cause of action as.

_ amended. The defense’ was sustained and a nonsuit al-

lowed. On appeal, the judgment on the nonsuit was re-

versed. It was in relation to these facts and circumstances

that Mr. Justice » Heher said (N. J. L. p. 312) :

‘‘The. ‘ati decidendi of the cited cases is that an

amendment will not, as a rule, be hel@® to state a new

“> cause of-action, if the facts alleged show substantially

the same wrong with respect to the same transaction,

or if it is the same matter mor fully or differently °

laid, or if the gist of the actiofi or the subject of con:

mining witether the cause of actions stated in the orig-

Vv

aoe

90 «f

troversy remains the same. ‘Gist’ is-the essential

ground or object of the action in point of law, without

which there would be no cause of action; the cause

for which an action will lie; the ground or foundation

of a suit, without which it would not be maintainable;

the essential ground or object of the suit, without _

‘which there is no cause of action.”’ Casavalo v. ‘D'Auria,

supra.

‘‘Wheresa » plaintiff, ‘by amendment, sets up no new

matter or claim, but merely, restates in a different

form, more correctly and specifically, or more clearly

and concisely, the same cause of action declared in the

original complaint, or merely avers that, through mis- -

take, the time is erroneously stated in the complaint,

it is not the statement of a new ‘or.different cause of

action, and the statute will not avail for the period

between the original arid amended pleadings.”’

The case of Magliaro v. Modern Homes, Inc., 115 N. J. L.

151, 178 Atl. 733 (E. & A., 1935), is based upon aii action in

contract. It was instituted within time. In paragraph 1

of his complaint, plaintiff pleaded that he agreed to exca-

- vate, lay sewers, fill and construct a road upon defendant’s

promise to pay to plaintiff 80% of the work completed each

month upon presentation to defendant of the engineer’s —

statement. certifying the amount of work completed, and

performance “generally was alleged. The defendant refused

to pay plaintiff because it disputed the rock removal and ,

the quantity of the earth excavation certified by the engineer,

and therefore pleaded by way of defense that plaintiff failed

to perform his contract with the result that defendant was

obliged to complete the work at a cost exceeding the contract

price. At the trial plaintiff was permitted over objection to

amend paragraph 1 of his complaint by restating it as it

_ was originally, and adding that the payment of the monthly

estimates’was a condition precedent to his proceeding with

the work. The defendant-objected to the amendment on the

ground of that of surprise and that it presented a new cause

* . 21

_ of action after the running of the Statute of Limitations

against the original cause. The amendment was sustained

on appeal. Here again it was in connection with the facts

and circumstances appearing in the case that Chancellor

Campbell quoted with approval the statement hereinabove

set out and taken from the opinion of Judge Ackerson in the

case of O'Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co., supra, and

further said as follows (N. J. L. p. 157):

‘Applying this rule to the case in hand the situation

presented is, as before stated, that the plaintiff pleaded

the terms of his contract so far as was necessary. to

present his cause of action under the independent cove-

nant to pay the installment under the contract; the de-

fendant by its counterclaim asserted a subsequent

breach of the contract by the plaintiff and sought to

recover damages by reason thereof; the plaintiff might

well have stood upon the allegations of his complaint

as to the terms of his contract but saw fit by the amend-

ment in question to.more fully set forth the terms of

such contract so as to. more safely and surely meet the ©

defendant’s cause of action against him under its

counterclaim. By so doing he was not substituting a

new cause of action.: His cause of action remained as

it was originally, upon the contract, for breach of its

independent covenant to pay an installment of the con-

sideration, The plaintiff instead of amending the com-

plaint might. well have moved to amend his reply, or

answer (as it should have been) to the counterclaim by.

asserting the same facts as contained in the amend-

ment in question. This would have met the situation

and certainly no stibstantial complaint could have been

made thereto and still the same protective purpose

would have — accomplished. ’’

The frivegiling cases decided by the court of New Jersey

are relied upon by the petitioner to sustain her contentions

with respect to the propriety of the amendment of the com-

- plaint. In all of these cases and the.cases to follow arising

.

on

as g-

AA

22

out of New Jersey, the cause of action when. originally in-

- stituted was entirely within time and was’ not then barred

by the Statute of Limitations. In the following New Jersey

cases, the courts in considering the legal principles above

set out refused to allow the amendments to the complaint.

In Di Lello v. Manufacturers’ Land and Improvement Co.,

11 N. J. Mise. 164 (1933), the complaint charged the defend-

ant with negligence in permitting to exist in the concrete .

sidewalk a raised and ‘broken ‘condition, and in allowing the

sidewalk to become so raised and broken that it became

dangerous to the public. The plaintiff claims that he suf-

fered injuries on August 20, 1930. His suit was commenced

within. the two year period of the Statute of Limitations. »

More than two years after the alleged accident, plaintiff:

moved to amend his complaint by alleging that the defendant

was negligent in that it carelessly constructed or caused to

be constructed the concrete sidewalk in question by reason

of which the sidewalk-became raised and broken. The

7 “amendment was not allowed. Circuit Court Judge Eldredge

reviewed the authorities in New J ersey generally, including

the case of O’Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co. , supra, and

| . aad as follows (p. 167) : 8

‘‘ Applying this test, we think the siiniaiinl cannot

be allowed. The charge in the amended complaint is

not substantially the same wrong with respect to the

same transaction as that alleged i in the original com-

_ plaint. The wrong in one is failure to repair and main-

tain, while the wrong in the other is failure to properly

construct. Nor is it the same matter more fully and

differently laid, but rather it is a different matter set-

_ ting up a different cause of liability. Neither can it be .

' said that the gist of the action nor the subject of the

controversy is the same.

In Casavalo v. D’ Auria, 12 N. J . Mise. 81, 169 Atl. 520;

- affirmed 113 ‘N. J. L. 328 (1933), the original complaint

gist of the original cause of action had been changed. The

23

charged that the defendants ‘‘negligently and contrary to

their duty in the premises failed to maintain the said stair-

way in a proper, safe condition, and failed to have any

railing on said stairway to protect the ucers from falling

from said stairs into the cellar areaway directly alongside

. - of said stairway, and also failed to properly light the said

stairway, so that the said stairway or stoop was not safe for

the use of persons lawfully using the same.’? The suit was

commenced within time. After the Statute of. Limitations

had run, the trial court allowed an amendment to the com-

plaint charging that ‘‘defendants having undertaken and

having attempted to make the necessary repairs to the stair-

way or stoop leading to said store, did so in a negligent and

careless manner, so that the said stairway or stoop was not —

safe for the use of persons lawfully using the same.’’ It

_was held to be error in permitting the amendment since the

Court said in this regard (Misc. p. 83) :

‘In the instant case; the gravamen of the original

complaint was the breach of an alleged duty to maintain

‘the stairway in a reasonably safe condition, while the

gist.ef the gause of action pleaded in the amended com- -

plaint is t negligent performance of an assumed duty

to make repairs. It therefore follows that there was

error in permitting respondent to amend the complaint

in a manner indicated. si .

In considering the foregoing cases it will at once appear

that had the instant case been considered by the New Jersey

Courts, the amendment would not have been allowed and a

verdict would have been directed for the respondent. .

II. ‘The Detision of the Circuit Court is in Accord With the

Decisions of This Court. 7

3 ‘The Circuit Court of Appeals i in affirming the judgment

of the District Court on the limited ground. that the trial

24

judge should not have allowed the amendment to the com-

plaint held that the cause of action set forth in the amend-

ment was a different cause of action from that set forth in ©

the original. complaint and, therefore, could not be intro-

duced after the Statute of Limitations had run. The Court

‘held that the negligence alleged in the amendment involved

a different act, different buildings, departments, conditions,

and dates of exposure. The Court was unquestionably cor-_

rect in its conclusions in these respects. 89 F. (2d) 456, on

page 821. The Circuit Courg cited and referred to the case

of Union Pacific Railway v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 39 L. Ed.

983 (1895), solely with respect to the general rule of-Jaw.

that an amendment relates back to, the time of the filing of ©

‘the original complaint where the amendment does not create |

a new cause of action, but that where-the cause of action re-

lied upon in the amendment is different from that originally

asserted, the reason of the rule ceases to exist and the rule

no longer applies, with the result that the running of the

Statute of Limitations against the amendment is not ar-

rested. This general rule of law stands unchallenged and

with its original integrity in all the cases decided by this

Honorable Court since the decision in the Wyler case. The —

Circuit Court having correctly held that new cause of action

was created by the amendment, the general rue of law of

relation back to the time of the filing ‘of the original com-

plaint which is-still generally and universally accepted was

not applicable. Furthermore and in this connection, it will

at once be apparent that even the general rule of relation

back to the time of the filing of the original complaint can’ —

avail petitioner nothing for the reason that the cause of

agtion set forth in the original complaint was barred by the

Statute of Limitations-on the day and at the time suit was

commenced. The Wyler case laid down certain tests for

the purpose of determining whether a,new cause of action

was created by the suggested amendment, and these tests

ss

25

were predicated upon the determination of ‘whether the

theory of the action was changed from-fact to fact—repre-

senting a departure from fact to fact—or from law to law--

representing a departure from law to law. Only in the appli-

_cation.of these tests as absolute and invariable tests has the

law enunciated in the Wyler case been in anywise modified.

In other respects the law of that case and the general prin- '

ciples therein enunciated remain and stand.inviolate. This

Will at once appear from the following statement of Mr.

Justice Cardozo in the case of United States, v. Memphis

Cotten Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 77 L.. Ed. 619 (1933), wherein.

he said on page 68 (U.S.) in referring to these tests as laid

down in the Wyler case: |

— - * tow decisions have made it ‘clear that

this test is no longer accepted as one of general validity.

. * *9)

In N. & G. Taylor Company . “Anderson, 275 U. S. 431,

%

72 L. Ed. 354 (1928), N. & G. Taylor Company as a partner-

ship entered into.a contract with the defendant dated

November 1,,1916. On January 31, 1917, the partners or-

ganized a corporation under the same name. On March 7, -

1918, suit was instituted against the defendant by the plain-

tiff in its corporate nathe. In May, 1924, and after the Stat-

ute of Limitations became operative, the plaintiff sought to

amend the complaint by alleging the original contract be:

tween the partnership and the defendant; the acquisition of

all assets including the contract by the partnership, etc. The |

amendment was allowed by- the trial judge. Mr. Justice

Butler held that the amended declaration substituted a new

cause of action which cannot be deemed to relate back to the

commencement of the original action. He relied upon and

specifically referred to the case of Union P. R. Co. v. Wyler,

158 U. S. 285, 39: L. Ed. 983.. The Taylor case was decided —

in 1928 and followed without question the general rule of

26 ° J

law enunciated in the Wyler ‘ease which was decided in

1895.:

The case of United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Com- |

” pany, 288 U. 8, 62, 77 L.-Ed. 619 (1988), arose out of a suit

to recover overpayments of income taxes. It raised the

question as to whether a claim for: 4 taygrefund which has

been seasonably filed, but which fails to state the grounds -.

upon which the refund is demanded, may be amended by

specifying the grounds-at any time before the claim in its

original form has been finally rejected, ‘though it be after

the time when a wholly new claim would be barred by limi- |

tation. Both the Government and the taxpayer invoked

‘analogies suggested by pleadings in a law suit. Mr. Justice

Cardozo referred to the general.rule of law that an amend-

ment of a pleading will take effect by relation and thus

relieve against the bar of an intervening limitation if the

identity of the cause of action is still substantially the same,

“but that the.limitation will prevail if under the guise of

am amendment there is the’ substitution of a new cause. of

action im place of another wholly different.”’. (U.S., p. 67.)

-On page 69 (U. 8.) he said further :

ae 8 Definitions and analogies borrowed teins

pleadings i in a lawsuit will have their place and recog-

~ nition, but in due subordination to the differences of

end and aim. Viewing the problem thus, we’ must say

whether a statement by the taxpayer of supporting ~

facts and reasons is to be agsimilated to a bill of par-

ticulars explanatory of a claim, or is something so

essential a there can be no claim — “.”?

This Court affirmed the action of the lower unk in allow-

ing the amendment principally on’ the basis of administra-

_-tive practice. The claim for the tax refund was filed with

. an administrative department and did not constitute a com- -

plaint or — in a court of law. 2

> xe Se eS ee

ats ze mee . ~ -_ _ - . are - ---——— Bis ’

_ In Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U. 8.

28, 77 L. Ed. 1011 (1933), there was presented the question of a

_ as to whether a claim for a refund of a tax had been pre-

-. ‘sented in such form as to be subj amendment after a

' wholly new claim would be ba by limitation. Here.

. again we have a claim filed with an administrative depart-

ment where the amendment merely clarified a valid claim

‘seasonably fifed, and did not, to borrow by analogy from + —

pleadings in a law suit, create a new cause of action.

In all the foregoing cases, the s&s were commenced or

claims filed in time and before the Statute of Limitations

had run.so as to constitute a bar. It was only when the

amendments were submitted that the Statute of Limita-

tions was asserted and set up as a defense in bar. ~ ~.

III. The Decision of the Circuit Court is in‘Accord With the .

Decisions in Other Jurisdictions and With the © -

Weight of Authority. | ;

_ The case of Buntin v. Chicago, R. I. d P. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. .

744 (W. D. Mo., 1890), involved’ an action for damages

resulting from the Railroad Company for overflowing the

plaintiff’s land. The original petition alleged the construc-

" tion of an embankment, by reason of which the stream was

diverted from its course. Nine years later an amendment

was asked alleging that the construction of a bridge in a 4

negligent mariner had occasioned the overflow. The ‘de- é>

_fendant demurred to the evidence on the®rround of the-

‘statute of nitations with respect to the amendment. Thé ~

demurrer was sustained on fhe ground that the amendment

constituted a new cause of action which was barred by the

_, Statute of Limitations. Jdge Phillips said ig part as fol-

loys (p. 749) : ; pt .

“Tt is true that courts will allow amendments with

liberality, in order to prevent the — of the

7 >.

i

i ry

j

’

]

o*

3S

statute of limitations; but this indulgence cannot go

to the extent, in order to avoid the statute, of permit-

ting the plaintiff to substitute an entirely new. ground

of recovery, requiring entirely different evidence, so

~ .as to recover thereon, when he could not have done so

if this amefided petition were an original petition. .

Unquestionably, had this amended petition been filed,

at the time it was, as an original petiffon, it would have

- been subject to demurrer, for the reason that the causp

of action was barred by the statute of ses -

3..—

And farther (p. 750):

“If the parfy introdpces a new claim, it presents a

new issue; and, as that i is the firs} time the defendant

has had an opportunity to interpose the plea of fhe

bar, it must follow that his right cannot be taken away

bythe doctrine of relation, which goes back to the first

act,—the filing of the original petition; otherwise, the

» party might perpetuate indefinitely-a cause of action

by suing for one thing, and, after the lapse of the stat-

-utory period o? limitation, go back to the cause of ©

_action already barred, and revive it under the caguee,

of an amendment.’’ ; ;

The case of Birkes v. United Fruit Co., 48 F. (2d) 656

(D. C., 8. D. N. Y. 1930), arose out of a motion to dismiss

_ the second amended complaint on the ground that the cause

of action therein alleged was barred by the statute of lim-

itations. The first amended complaint charged. that the

crew of a vessel owned and operated by the defendant-wil-

- fully and wantonly stabbed and assaulted plaintiff’s intes-

tate, the master. The second- amended complaint alleged

that the defendant failed to. provide a seaworthy ship, in.

that among the crew there Were men of vicioys and crim-

inal propensities to the imminent danger vf the passengers

and other members of the crew. Judge Bondy in sustain-

ing the defense of the statute of limitations as to the second.

amended aaa set said on page 657:

~ | Corp., 30 F. (2d) 718 (D. C. E. D. N. ¥°1928).

"© - 99 -

sapere ie am “The original cdmplaint apparently was

based on the right to recover for the willful miscon- &

duct of the crew in assaulting the master. Basing the es Fo

‘amended complaint on unseaworthiness or on negli-

gence in providing a crew among whom were men of |

felonious and criminal propensities, or in providing a |

_ ship that was improperly . construtted, constitutes in

* Jegal effect a change in the cause of action. 7 e on

See also D’Allesandro v. United Marine Contracting

In Chennault v. Stovall, et al., 160 So. 146 (1935), whére

is found a situation on all fours with the instant -one, in

that an action in tort was brought-against . the defendant,

alleging a conspiracy to have oceulTéd | on February 1,

1932, suit was brought on January 16, 1934. Faced by .

one year statute, which-clearly eliminated his claim, plain-,

/ tiff attempted to amend by changing the date of the last

; conspiracy to February, 1933, which tender was refused =

by the Court." The language is as follows:

4 - “The orfginal petition, as it ‘stood, filed in 1934 upon

a tort alleged to have been.cpmmitted in 1932, without

any showing of delayed knowledge, was upon an action, ve

on the face of the pleadings, forever barred by the pre-

scription of one year, and therefore set forth no cause ¢

or right of action. In the amended ‘petition it is al-

Teged that, owing to-a clerical error, the year 1932 was

written instead of 1933. Granting this to be true, nev-

ertheless the action on its face was barred. -

‘In the case of National Park: Rank +. Conperdia

Land & Tjmber Company, 159 La. 86, 105,S0. 234, 240,.

the rule is stated’as follows: © ‘The authorities are

_numerous to the effect that where ‘he original bill of a

complaint, or petition, is brought before the prescrip- oj

_ tive periéd has expired, or petition is amended after . :

the expiration of the prescriptive period so as to state

a cause of action, the amendment will relate back ta the |

time of. filing thé original pleading and save the action

from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, but that

t}

Cine

Ee ee ®

>

a?

300 aa

. al ° - “ ;

‘it (the amendment) will not relate back to the time of

the filing the original pleadings so as to save the action |

from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, where the

original pleading fails to state. any cause. of action

whatever.’ ’’

The case of Salyers v. United pure Fed. 255 (Highth

Circuit, 1919), was cited with appfoval by this. Court

-inN.€G. Taylor Company v. Anderson, supra. The plain-

tiff had several causes of action and merely alleged one

of them in his complaint, and the Court refused to allow

an:amendment after the statute had run as to the amended

claim. The language follows (p. 259) : :

‘‘But we have here an instance where the plaintiff

having two causes of action has stated but one of them

in his original petition, although the amount demanded

is large enough to cover both of his causes. of action,

- and then seeks by amendment to set up facts vital to

and constituting the second cause of action. An amend-—

ment setting up such new and second cause of action

- will not relate back to the date of the original petition,

. but will be governed by its own date, and if the bar

, of the Statute of Limitations or a bar to the right to

- maintain such new cause of action has intervened,

the new cause of action must fail.’’

- Pennsylvania, in the case of Sane v. Sayee Water Co.,

69 Atl, 1126 (1908), held that an amendment tendered after

’ the statute had run should be refused and accordingly

refused to correct’ a | defective pleading by saying as fol-

lows: | é

‘

‘‘Tt was held that a new sail of action cannot be:

introduced, or new parties brought in or new subject-

matter be presented, or a fatal and material defect in-

_ the pleadings be corrected after the Statute of Limi- -

- tations has become a bar. That there was a fatal and

material defect in the original pleadings was decided |

by this Court when: the case was here before, and we

31

are > not familiar wih any authority that would permit

an amendment which in effect introduces ‘a new cause

of-action and cures a fatal and material defect i in the

pleadings after it is pointed out by this Court on appeal

and when the Statute of Limitations has become a bar.

There should be a finality to all litigation, and the judg- -

- ment entered by this Courtswhen the case was ‘béfore

us three years ago was final on ‘all questions raised by *

the. original pléadings. | The Statute of Limitations is

‘bar to a recovery on-any new suit subsequently

brought, or, what amounts to the same thing, ‘an attempt

to institute a new action by amending the original

pleadings. , , '

th Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co, 227 Pa. 18, 15 Atl. 837

(1910), the accident-occurred on tine 21,°1904. The

original statement of claim was filed on November 2, 1904.

The negligence was that the car was running at an exces-

sive rate of speed and that there was no headlight on the

car, and that no-bell was rung or gong: sounded as the car

approached the crossing ; and that the decedent ‘suffered

‘ injuries while attempting to cross a _ public street. On Sep-

tember 4, 1906, plaintiff sought to amend the statement-of

claim by alleging that the decedent, an intending passenger,

signalled the car to stop which it did, and while in the act

_ of boarding the car, and before he was securely on it, the

car suddenly started and threw him to, the ground and un-

der the car.. Fhe Supreme Court on appeal | held that the

amendment should not have been allowed because the Stat- .

ute of Limitations had become a bar. Mr. Justice Elkin

in speaking for the Court said (Atl., p. Dacula

wie 3 5 | therefore, a case of adding to or

amplifying the original statement wjthin the rule recog-

nized in-some of our-cases, but, on/ the contrary, a dif-

ferent theory is relied-on, new grounds are set up,

sand other acts of negligence entirely different are al-

leged. * @ @ “4

9

— ——

4

32

7 /

In Gilmore v. City of Chicago, 224 Ill. 490, 79 N. E. 596

(1906), plaintiff filed her complaint alleging that she sus-

tained personal injuries by stepping into a hole in a side:

walk. She charged that the defendant had control of a

certain public. sidewalk on the north side of a certain pub-

lie street, called Thirty-Eighth Street -at or near the inter-

_ section of Thirty-Kighth Street with Princeton Avenue, and

'. between Princeton Avenue and Shields Avenue. She later ;

amended the’complaint by striking out the words ‘‘Prince-

ton Avenue”? wherever the same occurred in the =

and inserting in lieu thereof the words ‘‘Stewart Avenue.’

Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations to the com-

plaint:as amended, and this defense -was sustained on the

ground that a new cause of action was stated in the amended

complaint.

In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sweet, 78 Kan. 243, 96 Pac. 657

| (1908), the original petition charged the railroad with set-

- . ting out a fire-on or adjacent to its right of way in the Town

of Wakeeny. During the trial, the plaintiff sought to amend -

his petition by charging the railroad with setting out a

fire at the time mentioned in the petition at. a point about

five miles from Wakeeny. The amendment was allowed

after thé defendant had pleaded the Statute of Limitations.

This was held to be error since the new cause of action set

forth in the amended petition was barred.

The case of Andrews v. Marsden, 122 Atl. 171 (1923

Penna.), arose out of an action to recover goods alleged to

have been illegally seized under a distress warrant. The

plaintiff originally alleged that the defendant ‘‘with. force

and arms’”’ seized and carried away personal property of the

plaintiff’s. At the trial eight years later, the plaintiff at-

tempted to amend to show that he was a tenant of the defend-

ant’s and that the levy was madé under a landlord’s warrant.

and that it was illegal. He also asked to amend the date of

the wrongful distraint from March 5, 1912 to February 2,

33

1912. ‘The Court refused both fhe amendments and entered

a nonsuit from which the plaintiff appealed. Said the aes

(p. 171):

‘‘The fale is well settled that after the Statute of

Limitations has run plaintiff shall not be permitted by ~

amendment to ‘shift his ground of complaint, introduce

a ne use of action, cure a fatal defect in the plead-

—ings, change his cause from a common-law to a statu-

tory proceeding, or deprive the defendant of any valua-

ble right.’’’ Card v. Stowers Pork Packing @. on <

vision Co., 253 Pa. 575, 579, 98 Atl. 729.

And further (p: 172):

“The evidence offered by the plaintiff was bial.

sible under the pleadings, as it failed to sustain the |

cause of claim. A non-suit, accordingly, was properly

entered. The offer to amend came too late, inasmuch as

the proposed amendment set forth a new cause of

action, barred by the Statute of Limitations.’’. e

The case of Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Company, 15

Pac. (2d) 943 (Wash. 1932), i is very similar to the instant

case on the facts. In this case, suit was started in Septem-.

ber, 1931. The plaintiff worked in the glue room of the de:

_ fendant company from April 20, 1926, until on or about

the middle of May, 1928. This room was not ventilated

in accordance with the statutes of the State. He worked

» from the middle of May, 1928, until November 17, 1928, in

another room which was properly ventilated. .On page 946

the Court said: |

‘<* * * Under the allegations * * * that Claude

Calhoun worked for respondent in and about the glue

room from on or about April 20, 1926, until en or about

the-middle of May, 1928, and from the middle of May,

' 1928, worked in another room, nat alleged to have been |

improperly. ventilated in violation of the Factory Act,

until November 17, 1928, it is manifest that any injuries~*

Sh | / a ©.

: i | ; \ _ :

*.

‘ *34

a

received from violation of the Factory Act by respond-

_ ent, culminated and accrued about the middle of May,

1928, His action was not commenced until September, |

1931, which was more than three years after the in-

juries had accrued under the ee Act and ‘would

have been berred- a ile Sie

In this group of cases we ‘also have the situation where °

the original suits were commenced if time and before the

Statute of Limitations had run so as to constitute a bar.

It was. only when the amendments were submitted that the

Statute of Limitations was. asserted and set up as a defense

in bar. :

In the case of Seer v. Mullin, 12 8, Ki. 447 (N. C., 1890),

an action was brought to recover damages for slander, and .

presented the following facts. A complaint was filed on

January 20, 1889, alleging slanderous words uttered in

April 1888. To this the defendant answered and pleaded

the statute of limitations. Faced with a.six months statute

of limitations that barred his claim, plaintiff, at the trial on

April 18, 1890, offered’to amend, which was granted. He

then filed an amended complaint setting up a caise of action

. for other words uttered by the defendant on another occa-

sion, to wit: on September 14, 1888. The defendant filed his

answer to the complaint as thus amended and set up the

statute of limitations. The trial court held that upon the

amended complaint the plea of. the statute should be

sustained. Upon a non-suit being entered'in favor of the

° ‘defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court -

affirmed his action, stating as follows (p. 447):

‘‘ Amendments in this respect must be such, and only

such, as are necessary to promote the completion of the

action begun. In the present case the action begun, as

‘set out in the first complaint, was for words spoken in

April, 1888. The amended complaint sets out a new and

distinct cause of action for other words spoken in Sep-

EA RPI RE een

tember, 1888, and, as to the latter, new and distinct.

- cause of action, the amended complaint must-be treated

.. as the begimning of the action. Ely v. Early, 94 N. C.1;.

State v. Turner, supra; Robbins v. Harris, 96 N. C. 557,

2S. E. Rep. 70; and the ¢ cases cited in them. There i is

no error.’’

Here for the first time is presented a case where the Statute

of Limitations was pleaded as a defense in bar to the origi-_

. nal cause of action set forth in the original complaint and

the defense was sustained as a good defense. An amend-

ment, was thereupon offered with respect to other words

uttered at a date subsequent to the date referred to in the

- original complaint, and the amendment was denied by the

trial judge and his ruling affirmed on appeal. This case

presents the closest case available on the facts to the case

at-bar, and sustains unqualifiedly the judgment of the Cir-

cuit aie of . Ane in the instant case.

Summary: of Argument.

It is respectfully urged as 8elf-evident, that the gravamen

or gist of the allegations of negligence with respect to venti-

lation under allegedly hazardous conditions in the Silicate

‘Department is a different cause of action from that of

_ similar conditions in the Phosphate Department, located, as

it was, in a building at least five hundred feet away from the

Silicate Department. The exposure was different; the.

plaintiff’s employment was different, and was with liquids;

the ventilation was different, it was in a different building,

and with the majority of the work performed out-of-doors. .

.. Certainly had the transfer of the plaintiff on November 1,

_ 1932, been to a plant in another State, there could be no

-- identity of “‘gist”’; ; yet, this is not a hypothesis more extreme

under the circumstances. When the limits of the negligence,

as alleged, are reached, it is submitted that it makes no

difference how far or how near the — may be—if he

36

is in fact removed. from the effects of that negligence as

alleged. The injury here is alleged as a result of certain .

conditions; the specific acts of negligence or omissions

amounting to negligence are perhaps the most important

. factors i in the complaint and it is submitted that an amend-

ment, allowing proof of an entirely different exposure, ~

should not be allowed.

It is respectfaNy urged that the fact that the statute had

run on the exposure in the Silicate Department must be

taken to be established, both as a matter of local law and

general authority.

Discussion of,Petitioner’s Brief With Respect to the Stat-

ute of Limitations (Point A, Petitioner’s Brief, pp: 10-19).

Petitioner seeks to contend that the amendment to the

complaint sg as to include the Phosphate Department con-

stituted an entirely immaterial addition ‘to the Complaint,

and further that the original complaint was entirely ade-

quate to include the Phosphate Department without any

amendment whatsoever. The argument of the petitioner to

sustain these inconsistent contentions is most labored and

illogical, and overlooks the pertinent facts that the Com-

plaint when prepared by plaintiff’s counsel was not intended

in act and in law to relate to or include any department other

than the Silicate Department (R. 128), and that when plain- ,

‘tiff’s counsel and his architect-expert made a physical in-

spection at respondent’s plant on May 11, 1936 (R. 695)

they inspected only the Silicate Department. In this con-

nection it will be recalled that suit herein~was commenced

on October 1, 1935 (R. 787), and the trial of this cause was

commenced on June 9, 1936 (R. 89).

An examination of the original Complaint establishes

that the plaintiff attempted thereby to allege and the Com-

plaint did in fact allege only the following facts (R. 788) ;

That plaintiff was employed at the defendant’s plant until

37

November 1933 ; that during sotne part of the time (the exact .

time is not fixed in the Complaint) he was employed as a .

furnace operator in the Silicate Department, and that dur-

ing: the course of his employment in said Department he

came in contact with certain substances due to the negligence

of the defendant which caused him to become incapacitated

in November 1933. The complaint does not specifically

allege continuous employment until November 1933 in the

Silicate Department; it alleges only that he was employed

_ at the defendants’ plant unti] November, 1933, and that the

defendant was guilty of the negligence as charged only

while he was employed in the Silicate Department. The .

- allegation in Paragraph 4 of the complaint that the plaintiff

became incapacitated in November{*1933, does not directly

or inferentially charge continuous negligence until Novem-_

ber,.1933 ; if charges only. that as a result of the defendant’s

alleged negligence ‘‘in and aro the said department’’

(referring to the Silicate Departenal which is referred to

specifically in paragraph 2 of the complaint) without men-

tioning the exact’ period of time employed in that depart-

ment, he became incapacitated in November 1933. In this

connection it will be recalled that defendant by its answer :

stated that plaintiff was not employed in the Silicate De-

. partment after November 1, 1932 (R. 793), and the cause

went to trial on the issues as thus framed. As hereinbefore

argued, to suggest that the complaint as framed includes

the Phosphate Department as well as the Silicate Depart-

ment is to suggest that the complaint includes every other

‘one or more of the numerous departments of respondent’s

plant, and this where all of these departments involve dif-

ferent operations, different products, different buildings, :

and many -other material facts: and circumstances. The ' Fe

essential elements of negligence charged and sought to be

proved as to the Silicate Department were entirely different

©

- 38

in “material: thease town those sought to be pene as to

the Phosphate Department.

. Petitioner’ s brief stggests that defendant was hot sur-

3 wet or prejudiced by the proofs with respect to the Phos:

‘phate Department. Petitioner overlooks the fact that de-

fendant by its original Answer filed to the original com-

_ plaint pleaded the Statute of Limitations as to the original

* cause of action.framed by the Complaint, and since that de-

fense. was. definitely available’ and constituted an absolute

bar, defendant had a vested legal right in a dismissal of

the plaintiff’s suit, and had also a vested legal right to have

plaintiff’s application to amend the complaint denied to the

end that an action barred by the Statute of Limitations as

ofvthe date it was. instituted may not’ be resurrected and

brought to life by an amendment. This argumeng of peti-

tioner is best answered by the language of - Mr.. Justice

Parker speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals of

New Jersey in the case of Limpert Brothers vy. Stitt, supra,

In the ease of New Y ork Central & Hudson. River Rail-

road v. Kinney, cited on ‘page 15 of petitioner’s brief,

wherein Mr. Justice Holmes made the general statement that

“' “where a défendant has had notice from the beginning

that: the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim

against it of specified conduct, the reasons for the Statute

of Limitations do not exist’? (U.’S., Pp. 346), he made

this statement only in connection with the facts which

appeared in that case. The original complaint had in

fact stated a cause of action under the Federal Employ-

ers’ Liability Act as well as at common law and under ~

the New York Statutes, so that the amendment alleging that -

the plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate com-

merce at the time of the accident added nothing-to the

complaint as-it originally stood. The general statement of

law is anet therefore applicable to the facts i in the case at bar.

39

The case of Grayson v. Lynch (page 16 of petitioner’s

brief), deals only with the question of variance. Mr. Justice

Brown held in that case that the fact that the Precise

_ place of contracting the disease could not be established

did not bar recovery because the description of the exact

place where roving cattle were infected wifh disease was

wholly immaterial. This situation was wholly unlike that

appearing in the case at bar where were involved ‘‘a dif-

ferent act, different buildings, departments, conditions and

dates of exposure,’’ different operations, products and other

different facts and cireumstances upon which the Circuit |

_ Court relied (R. 820). |

- % In the case of Chicago City R. Co. v. McMeen, 102 Ill.

_ App. Ct. 318 (1902), cited and discussed in petitioner’s brief,

the cause of action set forth in the original complaint had

not been barred when suit was commenced. The Statute of

Limitations was asserted as a defense in bar only when the

amendment was added. Here again the amendment did not

deal with different acts, conditions, operations and other .

material factors, but dealt only with a car standing in the

middle of a street other than the street referred to in the’

original complaint. ‘The ‘same specific acts were charged .

and established under both complaints. .

The case of Seaboard Air Line v. Remm, is relied upon by —

petitioner in her brief on page 18. In that case the original

complaint had alleged that the defendant had operated its

line in Virginia, North Carolina and elsewhere, and had.

therefore alleged interstate commerce without using the

' specific words ‘‘interstate commerce.’’ The amendment

sought only to use these words, and the amendment was

allowed. There was — no change under the circum-

stances. .

o -

: fei Fi ‘ a , “a .

Petitioner’s Brief on This Review Proceeds Beyond the

Scope of the Single and Sole Isf#e Relied Upon and

Ar@ued in heF Petition for Writ of Oertiorari, and Upon

Which the Writ was Granted by This Honorable Court.

In the petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari and brief,

she assigned four specifications of errors on the part of the

E- Circuit Court of Appeals (Pages 4 and 5). Specification

* No. 1 alleged error on the part of the Court in fefraining

; - from reviewing the evidence as to the knowledge of the

_ respondent. The Circuit Court had held that it was. not

‘ hecessary to review the evidence with respect to knowledge

; . in view of its conclusion that a verdict should have been

—, directed for the respondent because of the two-year Statute

bo of Limitations (R. 821). It is most obvious that there was

no need for the Circuit Court to review the several other

legal and factual questions presented and arguéd since its

decision on the question of the Statute of Limitations was

dispositive of the whole case in so far as the judgment of the

District Court was concerned. Specifi¢ations Nos. 2, 3 and

. 4 refer wholly and exclusively to the question of the Statute

_ of Limitations. The Statute of Limitations constitutes the

Be single issue presented and argued in the petition for writ

of certiorari. It represents the sole issue which was dis-

cussed in respondent’s brief in opposition to petition for —

writ of certiorari. It also represents the single issue upon

| which the writ was granted by this Honorable Court.

| : _ In petitioner’s brief on this review she undertakes to

discuss and argue all the legal and factual questions which

| _ “were presented to and argued before the Circuit Court of

; Appeals upon the appeal from the District Court. This

we understand to be contrary to the settled and uniform.

practice of this Honorable Court as declared in the follow-

ing cases: Alice State Bank v. Houston, 247 U. S. 240, 62

\ L. Ed. 1096 (1918) ; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 |

4]

U. 8. 172, 79 L. Ed. 264 (1934) ; Phidence Compony, Inc. v.

Fidelity & Deposit Comipany of Maryland, 297 U. S. 198, °

80 L. Ed. 581 (1936); and Johnson. v. Manhattan Railway

Company, 289 U. S. 479, 77 L. Ed. 1331 (1933). We under-

stand from these cases that upder. the facts Ay circum- .

stances presented in these proceedings on this review the

only question for consideration is that stated in the peti-

tion for writ of certiorari, namely, the Statute\of Limita-

tions, and that the review by-this. Honorable ma os will be 3

limited accordingly, #7 ~ ° 3 |

We are, however, in the unfortunate position of not

being able to determine at this point with complete definite-

ness to what extent, if any, this Honorable Court will hear -

argument upon and consider the issues, other than the Stat-

ute of Limitations, which were presented to and\ argued

before the Circuit Court of Appeals. This represents a

dilemma which has been created by the wholly gratuitous

action of the petitioner in going beyond the scope | \of her

petition for a writ of certiorari, and thereby acting in con-

flict with the settled and uniform practice of this Court.

This situation having thus been created by petitioner and

being one which respondent cannot in anywise control, ‘re-

- spondent has no alternative except to discuss and argue

the several other legal and factual grounds presented to and

argued before the Circuit Court although not considered

by that Court which, in addition'to the ground of the Statute

of Limitations upon which the judgment for the respondent

was “sustained by the. Circuit Court, must result in the

judgment of the District Court being sustained. In other

words, the- judgment of the District Court can readily be

' . sustained on the ground of the Statute of Limitations upon -

which the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment, as well'as. —

_ upon the several other grounds urged i in behalf of respond- |

* entin m the District Court and i in the Circuit Court.

4

42

That part of this brief appearing hereinbefore preceding

this caption was prepared and completed before we were

apprised of the fact that the petitioner was. going to dis-

cuss the other legal grounds argued before but not con-

sidered by the Circuit Court. We have concluded to permit

that part of this brief to4emain in its original form for

reasons of legal propriety and orderly procedure, having

regard to the proceedings leading up to the.granting of the

writ.of certiorari. The affirmance’of the judgment of the

District ‘Court by this Honorable Court upon the ground

of the Statute of Limitations as accepted by the Circuit

Court will make wholly unnecessary a consideration of the

other grounds hereinafter discussed. These other grounds

are similarly adequate and conclusive to affirm the judg-

ment of the District Court in favor of the respondent.

The-discussion which follows can have any relevancy or

purpose only upon the assumption that the trial judge was

correct in allowing the complaint to be amended so as to in-

clude not only the Silicate Department, but the Phosphate

_ Department as well, and that the Circuit Court fell into

error in holding that the trial judge’ committed legal error

‘in allowing the amendment by reason of the operation of

. the Statute of Limitations. The discussion must therefore

take place in the light of the amended complaint, and not

in the light of the original complaint. oe

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF.

ee _ Discussion of Amended Pleadings.

5 Cucaannies 1 and 2of the amended. complaint sins that

plaintiff was employed as a furnace man, operator and gen-

eral worker in the Silicate, Department, Phosphate Depart-

ment.and Dorr Department of the defendant’s plant in

Grasselli, New Jersey in November, 1933, and for some time

prior thereto (R. 803 and 804). Defendant by its answer ad-

43 -

‘mitted that plaintiff was employed as a furnace worker in

its Silicate Department up to November 1, 1932,.and that

he was employed as a laborer in its Phosphate Department

.! from November 1, 1932 until October 23, 1933 (R. 805).

Paragraph 3 of the amended complaint alleges generally

that it was defendant’s duty to use reasonable diligence to

protect the plaintiff from unnecessary dangers or risks, .

and to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work

(R. 804). Defendant answered this paragraph by denying

that it violated any duty which it owed to plaintiff (R. 805).

- Paragraph 4 of the amended complaint charged that the

plaintiff ‘“‘during. the .course of his employment in and

around the said department and/or departments * * *

came into close contact with metallic, mineral, gas and/or

other injurious substances * * * and plaintiff was ex-

posed to and forced to breathe in the said * iy or

stances.’’ (Italics ours.) We again direct the attention of

the Court to the uncertainty i in pleading with respect to the

exact department in which plaintiff contends he suffered his

alleged injuries, and in this connection we also direct the

Court’s attention to the fact that plaintiff testified and in- -

sisted that he became sick in the Silicate Department and not

in the Phosphate Department (R. 36). The allegations of

this paragraph were denied in defendant’s answer (R. 805).

Paragraph 6 alleged that ‘‘defendant had knowledge of

the dangerous effect of the inhaling and breathing in of any

of the said substances aforementioned * * *” (R. 804).

This was denied i in defendant’s answer (R. 806). |

The remaining allegations of the amended complaint are

not of importance for the purposes of this discussion. They

were denied by defendant (R. 804-806). |

Defendant in its*answer set up five separate defenses (R.

806-808). The first defense pleaded the Statute of Limita-

_ tions and other legal questions arising therefrom in connec-

tion with the roling of me trial judge allowing the complaint

44

to be amended so as to include the Phosphate Department.

The second defense presented the defense of assumption of

risk. The third and fourth defenses raised the defense of

the Statute of Limitations. The fifth defense: dealt with the

fellow servant rule.

Petitioner Does Not Contend and Cannot Contend that the

Products to Which She Alleges Decedent was Subjected

are Poisonous, Noxious or Inherently Dangerous.

In the complaint it is charged that the plaintiff had been

subjected to ‘‘metallic, mineral, gas and/or other injurious

substances’’ (R. 788 and 804). This constitutes a general

allegation with respect to the products used, and together

with the facts presently to be suggested establishes that the

suit herein was instituted on a bare chance and without any

idea or hope of ultimate success. The decedent testified that ©

‘he took samples of products from the respondent’s plant

prior to his final leaving in November, 1933. These sam-

ples consisted of silica glass, silica F. Grade, phosphate of

soda, soda ash and metasilicate (R. 36-40). They were de-

livered to decedent’s attorney on October. 4, 1935 (R. 39).

This suit was instituted on October 1, 1935 (R. 787). In

other words, this action was instituted on a chance on Octo-

‘ber 1, 1935, without decedent’s attorney having any knowl-

edge whatsoever of the products which decedent handled or

were being used in the departments where he worked. This

set of facts explains the general and incorrect designation

both in the original and amended complaint of the products

which it is charged caused the decedent’s illness—‘‘ metallic,

mineral, gas and/or other injurious substances.’’ De-

- cedent’s case was predicated upon a theory advanced by Dr.

-- Alexander Gettler, a toxicologist.. The aforementioned sam-

ples were delivered by defendant’s attorney to Dr. Gettler

on October 4, 1935 (R. 247), and he gave his report thereon .

‘ on May 6, 1936 (R. 248). The burden of petitioner’s case

An

is nee upon the contention that soda ash (carbonate of

soda) dust caused the illness of decedent. Dr. Gettler placed

soda ash, phosphate of soda and metasilicate in the same

category because they react the same (R. 241). He testified

that soda ash when coming in tontact with water hydrolizes -

and produces caustic soda which is a very strong corrosive

-- substance—also known as sodium hydroxide (R. 241 and

246). Dr. Gettler’s report to decedent’s attorney, although

not in evidence, was apparently to the same effect (R. 315 ©

and 316).- Dr. Gettler was recalled as a witness several days

after his original testimony and in the face of other testi-

mony of a chemical nature, including the testimony of an _

independent chemist selected by the Trial Judge, was con-

strained to change his testimony and conclusions. His new

and final testimony was that soda ash (carbonate of soda) -

when mixed with water goes through a chemical process of

ionization and forms a substance of mild causticity (R.

360). -All of which caused the following comment of the

Trial Judge (R. 576)-:

‘‘The Court: Well, as 1 tibia it, Dr. Gettler’s

theory was this severe caustic, which collapsed on:ex- .

amination, that theory, and I won’t permit the jury to

consider it, and then your other theory seems to be that

inorganic dust, irrespective of its alkaline qualities,

has this effect.’’

The trial judge so charged the jury — respect to Dr.

Gettler’s testimony (R. 745).

Since soda ash, phosphate of soda, and metasilicate come

under the same general chemical category, and since the

brunt of the plaintiff’s attack during the trial was and in

_ petitioner’s brief is directed to soda ash, we shall proceed

to discuss this product and show that it is entirely harm-

less, and that it does not come within the category of poi-

sonous, noxious or inherently dangerous substances.

The largest manufacturer of soda ash in the United

States is the Solvay Process. Company, which. has one of

its plants in Syracuse, New York (R. 314). Dr. Chaffe,

who has been connected with that plant as medical director

for 35 years, testified for the defendant (R. 308). This ©

company manufactures alkalis,—its main products are car-

bonate, bicarbonate and caustic soda (R. 308). He testified

that soda ash is ‘not a caustic; it is carbonate of soda; that

- caustic soda or sodium hydroxid is a caustic (R. 314). He

further testified—‘‘I have never seen in hundreds of men

working there since I have been there any caustic effect

from the carbonate of soda. I have seen plenty from the

caustic soda, sodium hydroxid, which is strongly caustic

and will destroy skin’’ (R. 316).

. Mr. Davis, a chemist of the respondent, testified that

soda ash is commonly known as sodium carbonate and is

an alkali; that sodium bicarbonate, soda ash and caustic

soda are all general alkalis with — caustic strengths

' (RB. 325 and 326).

The trial judge soba Dr. Wiener of Newark as an

independent chemist (R. 330). His testimony corroborated

the testimony of Dr.-Chaffe and Mr. Davis (R. 330-332)..

Dr. Wiener conducted an experiment in open court to test

the caustic strength of soda ash and sodium hydroxide by

applying it to the skin of his hands. The soda-ash gave no —

' irritating effect whatsoever, but. the sodium hydroxid

caused a small scar (R. 353 and 354).

' The final testimony even of Dr. Gettler agreed with the

foregoing (R. 356).

Statement of denaitinns Involved.

. * The trial court was correct in holding that there was

not sufficient knowledge attributable to the defendant com-

pany that the commodities used at its plant were dangerous. -

and of a nature likely to harm the plaintiff, and there was

47.

no evidence to indicate that the defendant knew or should

have known of any injuries. likely to result from the « ex-

posure to soda ash.

2. The plaintiff failed to establish that his injuries were

proximately caused by the exposure to soda ash in the

“defendant’s plant, or that the exposure was the causa

causans of his condition. :

3. The plaintiff utterly failed to produce evidence that

_ he endured any exposure to soda ash in the Phosphate

Department where he last worked, and since his last ex-

posure in the Silicate Department was more than 2 years

prior to his instituting suit, his action was and is barred

by the Statute of Limitations. : ?

Statement of the Case.

Plaintiff, George Maty, testified that he was-employed by

the defendant in October, 1928 (R. 4), and worked in the

Silicate. Department. That he began to develop an itch

in June or October of 1931, during the warm weather,

’ after which he developed a carbuncle, in December, 1931

(R.15 and 16). His skin was especially bad under his arms,

exuding yellow water (R. 25), and-he was sent to a skin

specialist, Dr. Oleynick, at Elizabeth (R. 28). That in the

winter of 1932 he was transferred to the Phosphate Depart-

- ment where he spent each week, 2 days outside and 3 days

inside (R. 30). * That his-work inside dealt with liquids.

That there was soda ash in the Phosphate Department, .

about 50 feet from where he was working (R. 32).. That in

October, 1933: (R. 32), he was advised. by the company

doctor that he had relaxed rings on his side (R. 34). That

he then told the doctor that he was a sick man and had lost

weight (R. 35). That he had the itch under his arms and

in the region of the groin (R. 41). He further testified that

he then took samples of the chemicals that he worked with

48

in the Silicate Department, but that he did not take any

samples from the Phosphate Department because he did

not get sick in the Phosphate Department (R. 36 and 37).

_ That he stopped working in November, 1933, because he

felt sick from his itch, which prevented him from walking

(R. 41.) . That in April, 1934, (after he had left the employ

of the defendant), his itch was getting worse around the

groin and body ‘and his hernia was getting weaker (R. 46

and 47). That he was treating himself for the itch and he

was sick from that and from his rupture, and that he tried

to get it out, going to the Alexian Brothers Hospital at

_ Elizabeth, where he was operated on for the hernia (R. 47),

remaining there 17 days, and that 3 days after his arrival

home he began to cough up bad things and spit (R. 47 and

48). That in -the Phosphate Department, the only dust

came from the phosphate (R. 52). He further testified that .

he was transferred in April or May, 1933, to the Phosphate

Department, which was about 500 feet away from the

Silicate Department, in a different building (R. 61), and

_ that he never returned to the Silicate Department there-

after. That he left the Silicate Department at the end of

1932, when he was transferred to the Phospate Department,

- at which time he worked 3 days outside and 2 days inside

(R. 72 and 73). That it looked like May or April, 1932, that

he went to the Phosphate Department (R. 72). That his

work outside was done in the open about’50 feet from the

river (R. 73). *That on the ifiside, he worked with liquids

ee (R. 73) and that this work continued until he left the job

“a _in November, 1933 (R. 75). That he got sick in the Silicate

Department; he was‘a sick.man in the Phosphate Depart-

ment. That he got sick the first time in the Silicate Depart-

ment, and in the Phosphate Department he had his wrist

turned and received a hernia (R. 77). That when he

worked in the Phosphate Department, in the Dorr plant,

he ground the rock and mixed it with sulphuric acid, mak-

asin ii nd OR i

.

-¢

A

49

_ ing a muddy deposit (R. 78). That there were enough

windows in the Phosphate Department (R. 79). That

in the bin there were no windows, but that. he only worked

there 4 or 5 times (R. 84). That the things he worked,

with in the Phosphate Department were pliosphate rock

’ mixed with sulphuric acid and water (R. 85), and that

the soda ash was on the side but that was not his job (R.

86). That the breaking of the phosphate rock, which was

his job, gave some dust but not so much (R. 87). That his

work with the sulphuric mixture gave off only steam (Re

87). -

The plaintiff produced: as a witness, Paul Messaros, who

worked at the Grasselli Chemical Company; in the Silicate

Department, from February 26, 1931, until September 5,

1934, when he was transferred to the Phosphate Department

(R. 161 and 162), and who testified that Maty only worked

with him two or three weeks in the Phosphate Department

(R. 160). Finally, upon questioning by the Court, he testi-

fied that he did not work with Maty in the Phosphate De-

partment at all (R. 173). On motion of the defendant, all

of this witness’ testimony with respect to the Phosphate

Department was stricken from the record (R. 171-173).

Joseph Laskoti, who worked in the Silicate Department

from October 4, 1922, until February 4, 1929 (R. 183 and

184), testified that he worked both in the mix room (R. 186),

and on the furnace, and that the only time he was absent

from work was once in 1925, when he was sick with a rash

(R. 195). That he was only with Mr. Maty for 2 months,

“uring which time they were both employed i in the Cements

Department (R. )

Tony Chuba, being called for the plaintiff, testified that

he had been employed by the Grasselli Chemical Company

off and on for 18 years (R. 196), and that the only complaint

‘he ever had was a stomach aclie (R. 202). That the only

time he worked in the Phosphate Department was when he

had been sent there from time to time for odd jobs, and

’ that he was in the Silicate Department for the entire period

of his employment, and during the period spent with the

company by the plaintiff (R. 216).

John Andricik testified that he had worked in the Barium

Products Ddpartment of the defendant’s plant; that he had

never worke the Silicate Department. That for a period

of 6 weeks, when the Barium Products Department had been

closed, he worked in the Phosphate Department. That this

was during the summer of 1933.(R. 222), and that while he

worked there, he only saw Maty about two or three times

(R. 223 and 224).

Dr. Stephen Steele, a physician from Linden, New Jersey,

testified that he first saw the plaintiff in 1931, when he com-

plained of headaches and dizziness, but,no mention was

made of a cough. He also treated him for 2 weeks in 1934,

when-he complained of a cough, expectoration and pain in

the side (R. 227). He further testified that he had never

seen a case like ats and that he never had a dust case

(RB. 229), 7

The plainti ead Dr, Alexander Gettler as his chief

witness, testified that he had analyzed the chemitals

submitted to him by the plaintiff on October 4, 1935 (R. 247)

*(Note: After the suit was started), and that he gave his

u report thereon to counsel for the plaintiff on May 6, 1936

i - (R. 248). That he has had no experience with the itihalation

“i of soda ash or phosphate dust in factories (R. 232), and that —

| a he has never had a case where material was inhaled (R. 235).

a "That he never examined a man who had inhaled caustic

powder (R. 235). He further stated that soda ash, tri-

sodium phosphate and sodium silicate react about the same

and that soda ash, when coming in contact with water,

crystallizes and becomes caustic soda, which is a very strong .

i , : a: YR) ee ono ante Re yea et

51

corrosive substance. He added that when caustic soda came

.in contact with any tissue of the body, it produced 3 effects:

(1) Decomposed the proteins.

(2) Decomposed the fats.

(3) Dehydrates the tissue by drawing out the water, with

the result that irritation, corrosion, swelling and edema set .

- in (R, 241).

That these conditions are irritating to the lungs. That soda

ash and phosphate of soda, coming in contact with the lung

tissue, which is a wet substance, dissolves, hydrolyzes and

produces caustic soda, also known as sodium hydroxide (R.

245 and 246). That he has read practically ali of the books

on toxicology, but has never seen a case in the literature in-

volving inhalation of soda ash (R. 248 and 249). That the

greatest effect of the dust particles is due to the change

which occurs when they come in contact with moisture, i.e.,

after. they are hydrolized (R. 252 and 253). That soda ash

would have the same effect if it got into the mouth, provided:

it remained there, and that the only reason # did not cause

such trouble is because the saliva continues running ‘and

“washes the tongue continually (R. 254)..

Dr. Gettler was recalled as a witness by the plaintiff

several days after his original testimony, and experiments

were made in open court by Dr. Gettler and Mr. Davis, a

chemist for the defendant company, as a result of which Dr.

Gettler changed his testimony as follows:

$3 He then testified that water changes and hydrolyzes

_ sodium carbonate, i.e., soda ash, to an alkaline substance, —

and this alkaline substance is ionized sodium hydroxide.

_The Court directed the -witness’ attention on several occa-

sions to the change in the nature of his testimony in this

important respect. The witness further stated that sodium

hydroxide was more caustic than sodium carbonate, and Beit

a

__ Oh O_O

52

_. that either was caustic only when moisture met it. That

sodium hydroxide is more caustic than sodium carbonate,

simply because there are more hydroxyl ions present and

that it is the hydroxyl ions that cause the corrosion, and

that sodium hydroxide was ‘‘very much more powerful be-

cause of the greater concentration,’’ and that the less water.

added, the less ionization. That even bicarbonate of soda

that is taken for the stomach gives hydroxy] ions in coming

-in contact with water, but it is a very weak alkaline. The

doctor further admitted that he did not mention ionization -

in his original testimony, and that his theory was different

from that which he had advocated previously and was then

that any alkali mingled with water forms hydroxy] ions and

. that the number of these ions depended upon the kind of

alkali and that the smallest number is in sodium bicarbo-

_ nate, the next largest number is in sodium carbonate and

- the last and largest number is in sodium hydroxide (R. 335-

348; 356-361).

The testimony of the doctor was entirely dibedited by

the Trial Judge who stated that he would not permit the

jury to consider the same (R. 576) since Dr. Gettler had

withdrawn his original theory, and me jury was so charged

(R. 745). ,

The plaintiff also called Dr. Raphael Pomeranz, who teati-

“fied that he diagnosed the case from the x-ray plates alone

and without any physical examination or other tests as

originally a lung abscess with a probable bronchiectasis

(R. 259-262). |

Dr. John E. Runnells was called by the plaintiff and testi-

fied that he examined the plaintiff on September 25, 1935,

and that his examination revealed a pulmonary abscess.

That. he saw him before the trial and found him progres-

sively. worse (R. 267). That he has had no experience in:

cases of persons who had inlialed soda ash (R. 268), and that

there are many known causes of pulmonary abscesses, and

«88

some unknown causes (R. 269). That he has read the med-

ical journals but has never recalled seeing a case of the

effect of caustic soda on the lungs (R. 270 and 276): That

in his opinion, if you grant* that the plaintiff did inhale

soda ash and that it produced the caustic effect testified to

by the chemist (R. 269), and if this irritation was caused by

caustic soda, that that might be the producing cause of the

abscess, and that anything that would produce a chronic ir-

ritation of the lung, might produce an abscess (R. 271). He

further testified that he could find from the x-rays no sug-

gestion that dust of any sort was the cause of the lung con- ©

dition of the plaintiff (R. 277), and that in the absence of any

irritating effect upon the mouth and the nostrils and the © .

closed respiratory organs, he would be doubtful about the —

‘ inhalation of dust having had.any effect upon the lungs, as

_ it would be neeessary for such dust, being inhaled, to affect

the nostrils and mouth (R. 278-280). The testimony of.

Dr. Runnells that was. predicated upon his hypothesis of

caustic soda or sodium hydroxide, was stricken from the

xecord on the ground that the: testimony of Dr. Gettler to

this effect had been withdrawn (R. 371). Dr. Runnells’ testi-

‘mony disclosed that he based all of his answers upon that

testimony and he stated that ‘‘if soda ash produced the cor-

rosive effect that has been testified, then he would have had

along continued.chronic inflammatory condition of his bron-

chial mucous membrane and his lungs’’ (R. 269). Dr. Run-

nells had testified after Dr. Gettler had given his first testi-

mony and before he had been recalled and changed the effect

of his original testimony.

- Dr. Runnells further testified that an irritating substance .

inhaled into the lungs would enter them bilaterally, unless

there was an obstructiop on either side and the irritating

effects would be disclosed on both sides (R. 654 and 655).

That a person inhaling any irritating ‘substance which af-

fected his lungs would first notice a condition in his nostrils -

o

oe

54

and organs entering into the lungs (R. 660-663) and that

difficulty in light penetration would be found on both sides

of x-ray plates where a substance of irritating nature had ~

been sufficiently inhaled (R. 655)... He also testified that he -

did not attend Mr. Maty, but merely examined him (R. ‘649

- and 653), and that the left lung was clear, with the right

showing evidence of a lung abscess, and that this established

the fact that the left lung contained no obstruction (R. 656).

That the only. condition he found in the left. lung was the

natural fibrosis that everyone has, and that the amount of

fibrosis in the left lung in the x-rays of the on was of

no consequence (R. 658).

‘Dr. I. Edward Gluckman was also called as an i aaa on

behalf of the plaintiff. He testified that he: made one exam-

ination of the plaintiff on October 23, 1935, and that-he

| diagnosed an abscess of the lung (R, 283). He further testi-

fied that he had no experience with soda ash and phosphate

of soda (R. 286). That some people are more susceptible

to irritants than others (R. 287), and that he had never seen

_ in any medical journal or book or anywhere else, a case in

‘which an abscess of the lung occurred from the inhalation

of the phosphate soda dust or soda ash dust, and that this -

was the first time he had ever seen soda ash or phosphate of

soda chemically analyzed and a report given by a man like. .

Dr. Gettler (R. 288). That the plaintiff may have been

hypersensitive and, therefore; he would not necessarily alter

his conclusion that the abscess was due to an inhaled irritant, .

because of the fact that no one alse having been subject to

the dust sustained the same injury (R. 291). He testified

further that it is impossible to state positively what caused

a lung abscess, because of the fact that if you have some. sort

- of an irritant, you have to conclpde that that irritant had:

something to do with the irritation of the lung, and that you

cannot tell positively that it was soda ash or phosphate of

soda or anything else, it being impossible to pin it down

i)

specifically to one particular irritant, unless that irritant

' was present and then they have to suppose that it had some-

thing to do with it (R. 295).

. The testimony of Dr. Gluckman that was predicated upon

his hypothesis of caustic soda or sodium hydroxide as an_

irritant was stricken from the record on the ground that the

testimony of Dr. Gettler had been withdrawn (R. 371). Dr.

Gluckman had testified after Dr. Gettler had given his first

testimony and before he had been recalled and aaa the

effect of his original testimony..

The plaintiff rested after the testimony of Dr. iii.

Defendant moved to strike out certain testimony, and also

moved for a nonsuit which motion was denied and an ex- .

ception taken (RB. 301- 307). The defense then proceeded

with its case. _ : | |

Defendant produced Dr. Ralph W. Chaffe, who testified

that he has been for 35 years the plant physician for the.

_ Solvay Process Company, a company manufacturing alka-

lies, carbonate, bicarbonate, caustic, soda and soda ash.

since 1882. That as such, he has had charge of both the

occupational illnesses and non-occupational illnesses (R.

307-312). That the soda-ash department maintains between.

200 and 300 men daily and that in the caustic soda depart-

ment about-250 men are employed. That the men are in

contact: with dust continually and all have dust on their

clothing (R. 312 and 312). That in the caustic soda depart-

ment very fine particles of caustic dust alight on the skin

and are called mosquitos, because of a slight biting, but

there is none of that in the carbonate of soda or the soda

ash department (R. 313). That in his 35 years of -experi-

ence at the Solvay plant, he has never. found or heard of a

case of lung injury resulting from the inhalation of soda

ash dust (R. 313). That.soda ash is not caustic but that the

caustic soda or sodium hydroxide is a caustic (R. 314), and

that the only irritation that he had ever seen from soda ash

56

was that around the wrists where the arms were rubbed by

the sleeves, which was caused the same as any other dust

would cause an irritation, 1. e.,a mechamical irritation. This

occurred only during the summer when the men are warm,

and that they had never considered it a chemical irritation

(R. 315). That he had only had one case of dermatitis that

had ever been said to be due to soda ash and that this is the ©

only case of external injury he ever heard of (R. 315). He |

testified further that he had never heard of carbonate soda

being called a caustic and had never found it corrosive or

productive of abscesses. That he had never seen, in hun-

dreds of men working there since he had been there, any

caustic effect from the carbonate of soda, but that he had

seen plenty from the caustic soda, which is strongly caustic

-and will destroy skin (R. 316). That the only place res-

pirators are used by the men is in. the store room where

long banks of soda ash are stored that are sometimes pulled

‘down with long-handled poles in. amounts. varying from 10

to 15 tons at a time and that this is only to prevent the men

from filling up their nasal passages, but that in the ordinary:

manufacturing and packing of soda ash, no respirators are

worn. .That soda ash gives off only the same type of irritant

that any form of dust causes (R. 317 and 318). That they

have two men working there who were there when he came

35 years ago and that the labor turnover is very low in.that

department. He further testified that he had never heard

of any respiratory injuries resulting from the inhalation

of soda ash (R. 319).

Charles T. Davis, called by the defendant, testified that

versity and that he was employed by the defendant com-

pany. He stated that no amount of water added to soda

ash will produce a chemical change, and that Dr. Gettler’s

statement to that effect was inaccurate (R. 326). He testified

further that he was foreman in the Silicate Department,

‘he was a chemical engineer, a graduate of Harvard Uni- |

o7 .

commencing Augusf, 1928, that he had an office in that build-

ing ; that he hired Mr. Maty on December 5, 1928, employing |

him as a furnace man (R. 399), and that the workings of.

the Silicate Department were as follows (R. 400-413) :

‘That soda ash was contained in a separate silo and was

_ transported by means of a pneumatic conveying system to

a scale tank where it was weighed and from there it went

to the furnace room by means of a steeloverhead conveyor,

confined in a welded steel housing and that from there it

was charged into:the furnace through a continuous screw

conveyor. That the screws are encased in solid pipe and

that the entire system from the mix room to the screw con-

veyor itself is sealed, and that there was no leakage. Thats -

_a factory, the Silicate Department is very clean and without

dust, and that the question of presénce of dust is entirely

comparative, and that considering this to be a manufacturing

operation, there was no dust there (R. 558 and 559). That

the plaintiff was under his supervision during his entire em-.

ployment with the company (R. 581 and 582). That there

could not be a tremendous amount of loss from dust because

of the fact that the soda ash is an expensive commodity and .

that the amount entering into the product and the amount

analyzed as being existent in the completed product were

compared in order to ascertain the loss by waste (R. 582.

and 583). Dust conditions were never like smoke and were

_ never heavy and dust from the mix room was negligible (R.

584), and there were no holes in the overhead conveyor

(R. 586).

Mr. Davis further testified that the plaintiff’ s * eittes

caused him to spend his time approximately as follows:

10° to 15% on the charging platform, 20% observing the

burners on the sides, 25% on the discharge end-and 5 to

- 10% at the auto-clave (R. 587). He also testified that’ the

ventilation of the entire department was adequate and that

no complaint was ever made by the plaintiff or any other

58 — eh

employee concerning dust, but that he had heard the plain-

tiff complain about the itch (R. 590), and that he had never

* seen any itch on Maty’s exposed parts. That no complaint.

was ever made of a cough, nor did he ever hear Maty cough

(R. 591), but.that Maty requested to be-transferred to an-

other department, because his itch bothered him more

when hé worked around heat, and that a favorite topic of

conversation with him was his itch (R. 591 and 592). That

on November 1, 1932, he, Maty, was transferred to an out-

side job in the Phosphate Department where it would be

cooler. The witness further testified that the plaintiff

never worked with soda ash while in this department, as

‘that was in the other side of the building, and was used |

‘solely for the neutralization of phosphoric acid into disod- _

ium phosphate. That Maty had no contact with soda ash in

this building (R. 592 and 593). That for 4 days of each week

the plaintiff was assigned to a job outside the building ap-

proximately 300 feet from the waterfront and that he worked’

on rocks, which he weighed and dumped, and that there

was no. soda ash there (R. 594 and 596). He further stated.

that when the plaintiff worked on the outside, his job did

not take him on the inside of the building. That following

the 4 days he worked outside, on the 5th day he would work

as a shift breaker on the Abbey Mills and around the tanks

* (R. 594-596) and that he was not allowed to work in the

-. bins or anywhere around heat, in order to keep him as cool

as possible. That all the materials that he worked with in-

. side were. liquid in nature, except the phosphate rock (R.

602), and that there was no dust (R. 605). The he did

not at any time work with soda ash or meta silicate in

this department (R. 603), and that dust conditions were

extremely good. That there was plenty of ventilation (R.

605), and that no dust arose from the tanks (R. 609), and |

that during his entire period with the company, since 1924

{R.. 605), he has never heard of anyone suffering injuries

59

to the renphontony system while working i in either the Sili-

' cate or Phosphate Departments (R. 605).

Joseph R. Heard, called by the defendant company, testi-

fied that he was a chemist in the employ of the Solvay

Process Company, in Syracuse, New York, and had been

connected with them since 1924 (R. 349). That they were

manufacturers of soda ash, caustic soda and other products,

and that he had been in charge of the chemical phase of all

products manufactured at this plant (R. 350), and that

the department for the manufacturing of soda ash was the

largest. department i in the plant (R. 373). That the dust

_at the Solvay plant was and is so heavy in the soda ash

department that it was plainly visible in the air and had

accumulated on the walls, beams, floors, etc., and that the

men work 8 hours continually and do not wear respirators

(R. 377 and 378). That he had inspected the Silicate De-

partment of the defendant’s plant (R. 375). and that his tes-

timony was that there was more dust at the Solvay plant

than at the plant of the defendant (R. 377). That the dust

was never considered dangerous and he was sure that respi-

rators were never worn (R. 381) and that the only place

involving soda ash where respirators were worn was in

the store rooms where great mounds 20 or 30 feet high

were piled, and that it might happen that a man might dis-

lodge so much soda ash that he would be buried alive and

the respirators were used simply to prevent him from suf-

focating until help could reach him (R. 380 and 381). That

‘in the furnace room they often have sudden discharges of.

soda ash (R. 383 and 384), and that he knew of no case

of a lung injury or any other form of pulmonery disease

arising by reason of the manufacture of soda ash (R. -382).

Dr. William Wiener, of Newark, New Jersey, was called

by the Trial Judge as an independent and. impartial wit-

ness on his own volition, He was considered by the Court

as 8 the atin chemist i in N er and a very distinguished

expert (R. 330). Dr. Wiener testified that there is no chemi-

cal change- when ‘sodium carbonate is added to water, and

this is true regardless of the quantity of sodium carbonate

and of the water. Sodium hydroxide, i. e., caustic soda, is

not and cannot be formed by the combination of water and

sodium carbonate (R..331 and 332). That even assuming

the facts in the. che ical reaction suggested by Dr. Gettler,

soda ash, when it comes in contact with water is an irritant

or alkaline substance ‘‘of just a minor nature, minor ir-

ritating character’’ (R. 340). That sodium hydroxide is

the more destructive combination, ‘much more destructive

than soda ash: (R. 340). In order to test the irritating

nature of the caustic qualities of soda ash as compared with

sodium hydroxide, Dr. Wiener moistened the top of each

hand with water. On his left hand he then rubbed some

sodium hydroxide, and on his right hand be rubbed sodium

carbonate (R: 353 and 354). ‘After a short while, a small

' scar appeared on the left hand where he had rubbed the

sodium hydroxide, but no indication whatsoever appeared

-- on the other hand where he had rubbed sodium carbonate.

The soda ash gave no irritating effect, but the sodium

hydroxide was still burning and to counteract it, Dr. Wiener.

testified he would place acid thereon (R. 368). That he

-would conduct tests and give the Court the benefit of his

testimony with respect to the relative amount of hy-

droxylions in the two substances, i. ¢., soda ash and sodium

hydroxide (R. 369). That in his opinion, the ratio, after

such tests and computations, was one to four, 1. e., that “the

sodium hydroxide had four times the caustic strength of

sodium carbonate (R. 463). ~ | |

_F. A. Abbot, called on behalf of the defendant, testified

that he was a State Inspector of the Labor Department of.

the State of New Jersey (R. 385), and that he had been an

inspector for 9 years and that the plant of the defendant

company was in his district for several years. (R. 386).

61

That his duties were to make an inspection with respect to

ventilation, dust hazards, fire preventions, etc. (R. 388).

That his inspections of the defendant company’s plant, in-

cluding the Silicate and;Phasphate Departments, were satis-

factory and that he found the plant exceptionally clean

with respect to dust conditions. That he found no cause to

report any violation for ventilation conditions (R. 389 and

390). ;

Bessie Hall, called for the defendant, testified that she

had been a graduate nurse tor 20 years, and in 1928 was

employed by the Grasselli Chemical Company, and that at

that time, she personally took the weight of Maty at a

physical examination and found it to be 135 pounds (R.

414-416).

Dr. H. Kessler, called by the defendant, testified that he

was a physician engaged in orthopedic and industrial sur-

- gery and that he saw the plaintiff on March 12, 1934, with

respect to a wrist injury (R. 416). That at that time the

_ plaintiff volunteered the information that his two com-

plaints were the skin itch and the disability to his wrist (R.

417 and 418), and that he made no mention of a cough or a

lung’ condition. |

Dr. H. A. Tarrant, called by the defendant, testified that

he-was a practising physician and was employed at the de-

fendant’s plant between 1932 and 1934 (R. 418 and 419).

That he made a complete physical examination of the ‘plain-

tiff on Oetober 30, 1933 (R. 419). ‘That at that time his

weight was 13034 pounds (R. 419) and that upon examina-

tion of his chest he found no rales, and that his only com-

_ plaints were insomnia and itching, but that he said nothing

about having had a cough or losing weight. That his chest

expansion was 3 inches and that his skin condition was a

fungus infection similar to athlete’s foot (R. 420-422).

During his whole treatment of Maty nothing was,ever said

about any cough or pains in the chest (R. 423). He further

62

stated that he had-had no x-rays taken because the plaintiff

‘had no condition that would indicate the need for an x-ray

. (R. 431 and 432).

Dr. James .A. Novello: called by the defendant, testified

that he was an intern at the St. Alexian Brothers Hospital

and that-he made a physical examination of the plaintiff in

June, 1934, taking his history at that time. That this was

done as a preliminary measure towards conducting a hernia

' operation (R. 434). That his general appearance was that

of a well developed man and that his lungs were clear and

resonant throughout, with no rales, and that he gave no.

history with respect to a cough, chest pains or any lung con-

dition whatsoever, or of any. loss of -weight (R. 434-436).

Dr. Wm. H. McCallion, called. for. the defendant, con-

tinued the testimony as follows:

That he read Dr. Novello’ 8, the previous witness’, re-

port of the physical examination of Maty before operating

on him and that as a result he as‘a staff surgeon of the

hospital performed a herniotomy on the plaintiff at the.

Alexian Brothers Hospital in June, 1934, administering a

general anexthesia, consisting of nitrous oxide and ether.

That there was nothing objegtive with respect to the plain- —

tiff’s condition while he wes in the hospital other than -

‘the hernia, and that there was nothing noticeable about |

/his chest, and that nothing was noticeable with respect to

coughs. That he was discharged as being in good health

and properly cured, on June 26, 1934 (R. 441-445). That

if the history of the plaintiff had disclosed a cough, he

would not have operated upon him (R. 450). ‘That he

made a physical examination of Maty on March 6, 1936

‘(R. 446), and ‘that as a result of the study of the x-rays

and the physical examination, he made a, diagnosis of -~

bronchiectasis, which is an inflammation of the bronchii

of the lungs with the forming of pus or fluid (R. 446-448),

63

and that he had never heard of a lung condition arising

by reason of soda ash or phosphate dust (R. 461).

Dr. Simeon Oleynick, a skin specialist, testified on behalf

of the defendant, that he first saw Maty in March, i

at which time his skin was covered with a rash, with fie

exception of the exposed parts. The arm pits were badly

inflamed, but his face and hands were not affected. That

he made skin tests with the identical chemicals Maty

worked with and which Maty himself brought him, and

that these tests were negative and indicated that there

was no reaction on the part of the plaintiff to them. That

this treatment and test period took place between March

17 and 29, 1933,.and that he treated him locally until April

28, 1933. -That on November 3, 1933, he saw him again,

at which time he examined him around the armpits, genitals

and other ateas which were exposed to friction and per-

spiration. That his tests made in November, 1933, indi-

~ eated that the plaintiff had a pronounced reaction to yeast

fungi or ringworm, for which he subsequently treated —

Maty, and that his final diagnosis was that of a superficial

ringworm infection. That he was impressed by the fact

that there was no eczema on his face and that this was

unusual, because the first place a person working in a

chemical factory would be affected would be on the face

_ and hands, dnd that the absence of irritation here led him

to watch’ the plaintiff carefully for a ringworm infection

. (R. 464-468, and 475).

Dr. Virgil S.. Pollak, called by the defendant, testified

he was a lung specialist since 1906, and was the medical

director of the Hudson County Tuberculosis Sanatorium

and consultant in diseases of the chest in several hospitals

' (R..478). That he-made a physical examination of the.

plaintiff in March, ‘1936 (R. 479), and based upon his

physical examination and a study of the x-rays, he diag-

nosed’the plaintiff’s lung condition as a bronchiectasis

. ——— poe as, <2 .

Wee gc os

. .

~ -

t. "

ys

>

>

; and pneumonitis, which is an inflammation subsequent to

_ bronchiectasis and that bronchiéctasis is a dilatation and

inflammation of the bronchial tubes (R. 480-482). This

condition is caused by many things, as for instance, an

inflammation from previous: diseases such as measles, pneu-

monia and infarcts. That a pulmonary abscess is a gath-

ering of pus in a definite and limited area. That he felt

that it was not an abscess because four or five times at-

tempts have been made to drain or. evacuate the abscess

and have failed. The bronchiéctasis usually takes place

in the bases of the lungs. In Maty’s case it existed in the

right lower lobe (R. 482-490). That the witness believed

that the plaintiff, being under a general anesthetic for a

_ hernia operation, swallowed. some infected material which

entered his bronchial tube, causing an obstruction and

bringing about a bronehiectasis (R. 491 and 492)..- The

doctor further testified: that his experience was ‘very wide

in cases of pneumonoconiosis and that dust would have.

to be inhaled bilaterally, i. ¢., on both sides of the lungs

at the same tigge, and if dust would be so inhaled, it would

be visible in the x-rays, in a bilateral view. That the plain-

tiff’s x-rays gave no evidence of any dust condition and

‘that dust would necessarily be inhaled in both lungs. He

_ further testified that if dust of a corrosive nature is in-

haled, it would necessarily cause a condition in the nostrils

and mouth and give an immediate reaction. A man subject

to it won forced to expectorate and, accordingly, it -

would not into the lungs at all. He could not conjec-

ture any corrosive dust getting into the lungs. If such a .

commodity were inhaled or swallowed, any man would be

sick and would have vomiting and other distressing symp-

toms (R. 493-497). -The doctor further testified that he

had never heard of and there is no case on record of a

person sustaining a lung injury from the inhalation of

soda -ash, phosphate of soda or metasilicate, and that he

65

had tried to get such literature, but found no cases (R. © ae

498). That if an average individual inhaled a corrosive a

dust, he would respond immediately by being taken sick .

and vomiting, and that such symptoms would develop im-

mediately, and that dust would necessarily get into the

mouth and be swallowed, since the mouth is the upper part

of the respiratory tract (R. 499-501). It might be possible

to inhale inorganic dust, which has an irritating quality,

but not one which is of a caustic or corrosive nature (R.

508). The doctor further testified that he had never heard

of bronchiectasis being produced by prolonged exposure to

inorganic dust (R. 510). If the dust is caustic, it mani-

fests itself immediately upon the person who inhales i.

but if not caustic, it can be inhaled over a long period of

time (R. 512). : | . |

Dr. James Fine, a physician called by the defendant, testi- *- . Lo

fied that he was a specialist in diseases of the chest since ~~ \{ ~

1910; was director of the Department of Tuberculosis in the

Newark Board of Health; consultant in tuberculosis at vari--

ous hospitals; and has had a wide experience in cases in- -

volving inhalation of dust and gases (R. 520 and 521).

During his testimony, a stipulation was made on the record

by the court, that plaintiff did not_claim any condition of

fibrosis, and that the ‘x-rays showed no such condition)

(R. 519). He testified that he had examined the x-ray

plates of Maty and that no pathology was found: on the

left. side, but there were conditions noticeable on thé right

(R. 520). That when an individual ‘inhaled a corrosive

dust, the entire mucous membrane from the mouth to the

bronchii becomes inflamed, and the most severe irritation

would occur in the upper respiratory tract. The bronchioles

and the air vesicles of the lung would be the last affected;

and that very little, unless there was a massive introduction

of irritating substances that would immediately knock out -

Sh

~_—

>

¢

66

» the’ patient. That if a person inhaled, an irritating sub-

- gtance which did lung damage, he would first have the in-

flammation and then fibrosis. It wogld have to.show in =

the x-rays. It would be symmetricaY on both sides and you

| would find it on the right side as well as the left, because ©

the bronchii are divided in 2 equal portions. They go to .

| . the bases of both lungs in the same number of bronchioles

and bronchii. That upon inhalation’ ‘there would necessarily

be equal inhalation into both lungs, unless there was an

obstruction on one side, in which ‘event, there would have

to be pathology on that side. “ Assuming a normal lung in

\* the sense of being free from obstruction, the dust is in-

haled equally on both sides, and if the dust which is inhaled

is irritative, there must be evidence thereof in the x- Trays,

because the infiltration causes connective tissue and further

a causes the lung to lose its elasticity, which condition ‘must

appear in the x-rays (R. 521-523). Fibrosis is the result> |

and is.a hardened, non-active material thrown out in the

lung. He was unable to find any in the x-rays of Maty.

The absence of fibrosis in the x-rays ‘indicates »that no

damage was done to Maty’s lung from the alleged inhala-

tion of dust over a long period of time (R. 523). Dr. Fine

did not examine tke plaintiff and stated that it was im-

possible. to tell fro the x-rays whether Maty had a bronchi-

ectasis or a lung abscess. In his opinion, it was impossible

to get a bronchiectasis or a lung abscess from inhalation

_ of dust, and.it has never been found in the medical records.

- The foul smelling odor ‘of the man’s breath might indicate

either a lung abscess, a bronchiectasis or gangrene of the

_ lung, and his exact lung condition cannot be diagnosed

from x-rays; it can only, be decided from special tests. The

x-rays show that there is pathology or damage done to

the. lung, and it is impossible and improbable that the in-

halation of inorganic dust of an irritating nature could

cause any bronchiectasis or abscess or gangrene ef the lung.

SOK eee

That the gradual inhalation of dust causes a fibrosis, ont

where there is a fibrosis there can be no infection. Such

infection can only come from massive and acute inflamma-

tion such as that which might come ‘from an explosion,

- which would come within 20 minutes, like a burn, but it

could never come from the ‘gradual inhalation of dust.

When doctors speak of foreign bodies getting into the lung,

causing an abscess, they do not mean particles of dust

that have been inhaled, but they mean a large substance,

such as a tooth or a nail. Particles of the dust do not come

within the category of foreign substances, A corrosive or °

igritating gust would first inféct the conjunctiva of the

eye, which is the most sensitive part of the human anatomy,

and thence the mucous membrane tract, dewn below to fhe

bronchii and bronchioles and air vesicles. A constant cough

could not cause a bronchiectasis, but is a part of. and an

incident to the same disease (R. 524-531). . That no doctor

would dare to give an ether anesthetic unless he found the

lung absolutely normal (R. 533) and the plaintiff was oper-

ated on with such an anesthetic, having no bad effects from

the ether at all. In his opinion, if the ether anesthetic

would have done any harm, he would have had it within

24 hours. In the doctor’s opinion,:he recovered frorh the

operation, went home, walked around and 3 days later

shot an embolus in his lung, whichis a substance which

comes from the seat of an operation or from anywhere

‘into the circulatory system—fat or catgut from the epera-

tion—or it may be tissue or anything which is carried by

the venous system into the lung, obstructing that part where

the bronchiectasis now exists, cutting off the entire blood .

_ supply, causing it either to become gangrenous or causing

pneumonia. In his opinion, this was the cause of this man’s’

condition, because the doctor is impressed with the fact that

the patient walked around after the operation, had a normal —

>

chest éxpansion, that his chest . absolutely regular, be-

A>

68

cause when Mi was operated on, the ether did not affect him,

but suddenly he was taken with a coughing spell and that,

in the doctor’s opinion, shows that he shot an embolus,

which caused an inflammation of the lung, which means the *

blood supply was cut off, infecting the entire spot where

the blood supply had beef cut off, This is a common result

of an_operation’ and, in his opinion, if the patient had been

given ether and had been subject to a bronchiectasis at that —

time, he would have developed pneumonia and may not

have survived the operation, and this.same answer was true

if he had any pathology in his chest. It. would have a

destructive effect upon the. chest and would have resulted

within 24 hours. That in his opinion, the man’s chest was

~ normal before the operation. That there is absolutely no

- relation between silicosis and the condition alleged in this

case, since silicosis is not of a corrogive nature.’ That, in

his opinion, there is no relation whatsoever between the.

present condition of the plaintiff, whether it be a bronchiec-

tasis or an abscess, and his working conditions, but was ~

rather a condition that might have occurred to a gardener ©

or a honsewife. That there is a definite distinction between

_an ether embolus and an embolism after an operation.

-An- embolus from the ether would occur .within 24 hours—— -

to 72 hours (R. 533-536). That the fact that there was

-an absence of fibrosis in the lungs showed emphatically

~a

that no harm had been done to this man through the in-

halation of caustic materials, since he worked for 5 years

in the plant (R. 544).

Dr. Henry Field Smyth, Jr., arg was calles on behalf

of the defendant, testified that he was an instructor in

Sanitary Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, hav-

ing received his degree of Bachelor of Science in Chemical

Engineering in 1925, and his degree of Dr. of Philosophy

in Hygiene in 1934. That his duties consisted of making

dust and vaportests in indugtrial shops; that on May 16, .

an

69

1936, he personally: made dust tests at the plant of the de-

fendant company, and that his tests were made with respect

to soluble alkali dust, in both the Silicate Department and

the Phosphate Department, all of witch tests were made in

the presenceepf Charles Davis, a-former witness (R. 565

and 566, 549). The tests were made at the peak manufac-

turing operations in these two builditigs (R. 549-557).

Tests were also conducted in the mix room, which were

made at the time that soda ‘ash was being introduced into

the drums, which ts the worst condition possible in that

room. The results indicated that’ in the mixing room on

a test using 20 minutes of time, soluble alkali dust repre-

sented 5.15 milligrams per cubic meter of air. That on the

feeding platform of No. 3 furnace, on a test utilizing 30

minutes of elapsed time, the. soda ash dust was .014 milli-

‘grams per cubic meter of air.’ That while a* buggy of

_finished glass was being unloaded in the Silicate Depart-

ment, a test utilizing 5 minutes of time, indicated that the

soluble alkali dust was present to the extent of 714 milli-

grams per cubic meter of air. This actual dumping’ re-

quired only 5 seconds and the dust cloud was no longer

visible at the end. That at the Oliver filter presses in-the

Phosphate Department, on a test utilizing 20 minutes of

elapsed time, the soluble dust was .016 milligrams per cubic

meter of air. That at the Abbey Mill of the Phosphate

Department, tests for séluble alkali dust utilizing 30 min-

utes of elapsed time, showed the presence of: .194 milli-

grams per cubic meter of air-(R. 566-569). The “witness

_ further testified that there is nothing in the literature to

-tndicate the safe concentration for soluble alkali dusts on

the human body, but that the nearest approach that could *

be. found m the literature was for ammonia vapor, which.

has the identical effect on the body, having the same caustic

effect @. 568).

es

f ' ‘ a0 v

70

Dr. Henry F. Smyth, called for the defendant, testified

that hé was a physician and toxicologist, had studied in

’ Vienna and had taken a Public Health,degree in 1921. He

has been teaching hygiene, publi¢ health, industrial hygiene

and has conducted a reSearch laboratory in connection with

his son, the previous witness. That he has investigated

health probleris- for the Industrial Boards for the States

of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as well as for the Na-

tional Safety Council. That during the war he enjoyed

a commission as Chief Assistant Surgeon, controlling indus-

trial health conditions in the munitions industries in this

part of the country (R. 570 and 571). ‘That there were no

figures for the safe concentration of soluble alkali dust,

and that the nearest approach is that for continued expo-

sure te ammonia fumes. That ammonia contains approzi-

mately the same degree of alkalinity and irritation that the

metasilicate.dust possessed, and that the safe concentration

for prolonged exposure to the ammonia fumes is somewhat

over 69 milligrams per cubic meter, and that a workman |

could be cohtinually exposed day in and day out throughout 3

the working day to a continuous concentration to that

extent without suffering harm (R. 571 and 572). That he

has never seen soluble alkali dust in sufficient concentration

to produce definite harm. (R. 574), nor has he ever read

nor heard of a case of injuries to the respiratory organs

arising from the inhalation of metasilicate dust, phosphate

of soda dust or soda ash dust. That he has never seen‘a ’

workman who has suffered any harm from the inhalation

of alkali dust, although he has had quite some ‘expé€nce

—

s

with these cases, having examined individuals numbering ©

into the hundreds, who had been using materials of that

kind, as well as having used the same experimentally on

animals (R. 575-577). That if a person’was expdsed to the

inhalation of an alkali dust of an irritating nature, the first.

effect would be on the conjunctiva of the eye, arid thence

bad .

71

an irritation of the upper air passages of the nose and

throat, which would be intensely irritated. In coming into

the nostril it meets an atmosphere saturated with moisture,

and the individual dust particles would absorb moisture,

- increase in size and weight and, if they were not actually .

dissolvéd in the mucous membranes of the nose and throat,

that they would cause whatever trouble they could on these

passages, and that very little would reach the lung; that if

any did go beyond the nose and throat, it would produce

bronchitis, generally distributed throughout both lungs,

which would cause increased secretion and immediate dilu- -

* tion of the material which would be thrown off in.expectora-

tion. That it would be impossible for alkali dust of an

irritating nature to get into the lungs without affecting the

nose, throat, and other parts of the respiratory organs.

That no experimental work had ever been done witlt a sol-

uble dust to determine the proportion that reaches the lung,

but with insoluble dust, over 50% of the dust particles are

deposited in the nose, from 2 to 10% are swallowed, and ec

_ anywhere from 20 to 40% ultimately reaches. the lungs. . =

“As to soluble dust, much less would reach ‘the lungs (R. :

577-579). That on an inhalation of irritative dust, there

could not be a concentration of the bronchiectasis, as in /)

this case. It would have to be uniformly distributed fe

throughout both lungs. That dilitation at one point implied _ a4

some definite obstruction at.that point, which may not have _

been preceded by any inflammatory infection at all, but

might come from inhalation of some mucous or food par-

ticles after etherization (R. 580). |

Francis Hammond, called on behalf of ‘the defendant, ‘6a

tified that he was a chemist and foreman of the Phos “en

Department of the defendant plant, and, as such,

charge of Maty, the plaintiff, when he worked in that de.

partment. He testified that he was in the vicinity,of Maty

. continually during his emiployment, and that Maty spent-4

: 7 :

_ days out ‘of .each 5 outdoors: and that Maty had no work

‘with any soda ash while i in the Phosphate Department. That

he did not work with métasilicate,’and worked for only a

few days with phosphate of soda, occasionally repacking

phosphate of soda in another building. That. dust condi-

tions were satisfactory in the Phosphate Department, and

that Maty’s work while indoors in the Phosphate Depart-

ment was with liquids (R. 623-626).

Morris Murphy - testified on behalf of the defendant, that

he was a chemist and foreman in the Silicate of Soda De-

partment, and that as such he was Maty’s foreman. while he

worked there. That the conditions the plaintiff worked

under were very good with respect to dust and that the

plaintiff. never complained of dust conditions. Thathe ~

never saw the plaintiff cough, nor did the plaintiff: ever

complain to him about a cough (R. 627-630).

George Sitch, called on behalf of the defendant, testi-

fied that he was‘a fellow-worker with the plaintiff during

his period of employment in the Silicate Department, and

that he had heen employed there for 6. years. ‘That he

worked the same furnace that Maty did during his period

of employment there, and testified that he never saw Maty

cough and that the plaintiff never complained about a

cough to him (R. 664-666). ,

Andrew Reneta, called on belialf of the defendant, testi-.

fied that he worked at the Grasselli Chemical Company for

10 years, in the Phosphate Department, and that he worked

during the period of Maty’s employment there. That he

was on the same shift with him every 3rd week and that

plaintiff never worked with soda ash in that department,

but worked on the opposite side. That-he had never seen

him cough nor had he ever ns of a cough (R. 67-

672).

_ Harold G. High testified that he has worked for the ‘de-

fendant company since 1920 as Personnel Director ale

o~

+

ae

)

=

Safety Supervisor of the defendant company, in charge of

safety, sanitation and personal injuries (R. 673 and 674)

and that he had conferred with the plaintiff with respect

to his ailments (R. 676). That he complained constantly

of an itch under his arms and around the groin, but that

he never complained ‘of_a cough, nor,of a pain in any sec-

tion of his chest. That his only complaint was the itch (R.

676 and 677). That he first heard that the plaintiff -was

goaking a complaint of a lung condition in the summer or

. fall of 1935, but that no complaint had been received prior

\.to that. That the plaintiff left the plant on Ovtober 23,

. 1933 {R. 678). That ‘in his du as a personnel man he

has never had a case of a iung injury or any inury to the

respiratory system, in connection with phosphate of soda,

soda ash or metasilicate. That he has personal knowledge

- of all injury reports, and that he has had cases of irrita-

tion of the hands around the writ where the clothing would

irritate, but cannot r ifzle case where the face was

irritated (R. 679). plaintiff’s itch was originally

diagnosed by the plant physician as occupational in nature

but that was corrected by Dr. Oleynick as positively non-

occupational (R. 682). The Labor Department: further

held that his itch was seh iets ania and non-compensa-

_ blé (R. 683).

- Plaintiff called as a rebuttal witness, Felix Smietana.

He testified that he worked for the defendant company for

27 years and had never experienced any skin ailments in the

Silicate Department. Theat the only irritation he had was

about two years ago when he suffered a skin rash while

working in the Phosphate Department. (This skin rash did

not relate to soda ash (R. 691-694). Charles T. Davis

testified that this rash came from handling trisodium phos-

phate (R. 707).

_ Lauren Pohlman was also called as a rebutta], witness.

"He testified that he was an architect and had-had experi-

é

74

¢v

ence in ventilation. He further testified that in-his opinion

the ventilation in the Silicate Department was inadequate,

although he did not count the number of windows because

there were so many things to see; that there was a consider-

able number of windows in the Silicate Department. He had

inspected only the Silicate Department (R. 695-700).

At the conclusion of the testimony, the defendant moved

for a dirtoted verdict in its favor upon the following

grounds: ~ |

(1) That the plaintiff had failed to establish negligence

on the part of the defendant with respect to the operation of

the Silicate Department or the Phosphate Department; that

as negligence necessarily involves a violation or disregard

of some duty which is known to the person charged there-

with, it follows that knowledge of the facts out of which the

duty arises is an essential element for consideration in

determining whether one has exercised reasonable care or

has ‘been builty of negligence. '

(2) That the plaintiff had failed to establish that his

condition of ill health was proximately caused by the alleged

exposure in any departments of the defendant’s plant or

‘that the alleged exposure was the causa causans of his

condition. |

(3) That the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was ~

exposed to soda ash dust ‘while working in the Phosphate

Department, where he last worked, and that since his last

alleged exposure in the Silicate Department oecurred more

than two years prior to his instituting suit, his action was -

barred by the Statute of Limitationf (R. 708-725).

Protracted argument followed the making of this motion

from which it will readily appear that the tria] judge was

minded to grant the motion, but refrained from doing so’

- solely because the trial of the cause had lasted almost two

_ weeks (R. 708-725). During the course of the argument, the

75

trial judge made the following pertinent and most signifi-

cant statements:

‘“‘The Court: There isn’t a thread of evidence’as.I

have seen that the company had any knowledge that

sodium carbonate was injurious to the lutigs’’ (R. 718).

‘“‘The Court: * * * Now, the fact is that the only

knowledge they had—in the first place, you come into

court with a theory that your own expert cannot sup-

port when any investigation is made‘ef it. Then sec-

ondly, the only knowledge that they had js that this

sodium carbonate material, an alkali, not as you tried+

to pretend a poisonous and corrosive alkali, is irritating

to the skin. Now, for that I am very doubtful that there

is any deduction that it will cause lung abscess’’ (R.

720).

‘The Court: N ot only has there been no evidence of _

any knowledge but I say the proofs in this case from ‘

plaintiff’s own witnesses, that the men who have worked

there for years, have never had a lung i injury, is con-

clusive’’ (R. 721). ‘ °

‘‘The Court: I-am goifig to let this case go to. the

"jury because we have been here so long, but I am telling

you, (ounsel, that my view of the matter is that any ver-

dict they qnay bring in will have to be set aside by me’”’

(R. 782). ; =~

“The Court: Of course, I think it is very question-

able if there is any evidence to sustain a verdict of sub-

jection in the phosphate department’’ (R. 724).

PP Court: * * * I gm very doubtful that plaintiff

d possibly sustain a‘verdict in the Court of Appeals

on either knowledge or having suffered from the negli-

gence of ‘the company in the phqsphate department

* * *” (R. 724 and 725). ;

—— s motion was denied, but wfth diene reserva-

nd doubts on the part of the trial judge. :

hi charge to the jury the ‘trial or said in | part as

fol

“Yon will remember that the chemist, Dr. Gettler, I

felt had one theory when he started and finished up

~~

aw

.

»

the Silicate or Phosphate Departme

7%

w#th another i when we had further testimony

and when I had this ympartial witness. Now I don’t

want to waste either of our times by criticising Dr.

Gettler. He said that he didn’t change his theory, that

we simply were so ‘dumb’ that we didn’t understand—

“he didn ’t use the word ‘dymb’ but thg¢t was the effect

of it, that we didn’t understand the learned’ character

of his theory. It is difficult for me to accept that idea.

He stated that this soda ash when’ brought in contact

with water made sodium hydroxide which admittedly

he stated, is a. very caustic and corrosive substance

- which busns when applied'to-any of the lung tissue. He

afterwards changed that view and admitted that it did

not make sodium hydroxide at all, but that the soda ash

or sodium carbonate when mingled with water was

hydrolized and the hydrolization produced ions of.

hydroxyl which was an entirely. different thing from

sodium hydroxide and not nearly as alkali; in fact the

' testimony of the impartial chemist was that it was as

. one to fopr’’ (R. 745).

The court further charged the j jury: 7

“The plaintiff has offered no proof to the effect that

any employee of the defendant company working, in

: at any time

suffered any injuries fo his respira organs or any

part thereof (R. 746) |

The jury cotmceed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and

defendant company moved for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict or, in the alte~native, a new trial.(R. 812 and

813). The court, upon procuring consent of counsel to such

a procedure (R. 756 and 757), directed a verdict in favor of.

the defendant, placing his decision on the ground that there

was not,sufficient knowledge attributable to the defendant

company (R. 784), although the court indicated that it was

not necessary to go inte the other ‘available grounds to

sustain his decision. In this connection the court said:

77

**Well, my view of the matter is that your plaintiff

hasn’t got a chance of winning in the court of. appeals

in my view of the matter; there isn’t sufficient knowl-

edge attributable to the defendant i in this case, not to

go into any of the other phases of the matter * °* *,

_ apart from the very doubtful question of whether or not

the actual disease. was jem and the other doubtful

where he was cues Pc plant where

he was a" (R. 783 and 784). “

ARGUMENT

I. The trial judge was correct in holding that there was

not sufficient knowledge attributable to the defendant com-

pany that the products used at its plant were dangerous

and of a nature likely to harm the plaintiff, and that there

. should have known of any injuries likely to result

" exposure to soda ash,

in the ‘sole of the defendant’s plant, or in the eat of

the Solvay plant—who are the largest manufacturers of

soda ash in the eountry—had ever sustained a lung injury,

Q in fact; any injury at all from the inhalation of soda ash.

In fact, not a single witness, either expert or otherwise, for

either side, had ever heard of a lung injury or injury to the -

"respiratory tract being produced by the inhalation of this

chemical dust. Plaintiff produced, as experts, Dr. Runnells,

Dr. Gettler and Dr. Gluckman, and all three testified that

they had never Heard or read of such an injpry. The de-

fendant produced Dr. Pollak, Dr. Fine, Dr. Chaffe, Dr.

~.McCallion, and Dr. Smyth, and all-five testified that they

had never, in all their research and experience, heard of,

read 6f, or encountered such a conseqyence. The plaintiff .

produced no workmen from. the defetfiant’s plant who had,

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78

experienced similar injuries—or any injuries—although

many actually testified for other purposes,.and the Court

charged the jury to that effect (R. 746). The only experi-

ence testified to by any witness was an irritation of the skin,

diagnosed by Dr. Chaffe (R. 315), as a mechanical irrita-

tion when rubbed by the clothing, such as would be received

as a consequence of any sane of capi sie d a mechanical

‘factor.

Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is so generally known and |

~ accepted as a harmless product, or to be put m another

way, has had such a satisfactory experience in not caus-

ing injuries of any sort to employees and others engaged

in manufacturing or handling this product that among spec- |

ialists in industrial Hygiene such as Dr. Smyth, Jr. and Dr.

Smyth, Sr., both connected with the Department of Indus-

trial Hygiene of the University of Pennsylvania, soda ash

’ has not been investigated and assigned any safe limits giv-

ing the maximum allowable concentration for prolonged ex-

posure. As a result, these experts

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Brief of Respondent — Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co. · 303 U.S. 197 | Frix