Petitioners Brief — Washington Coach Co. v. National Labor Bd.

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JAN 29 1

CHART IOS ELWc kc

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Octoser Term, 1936.

No. 469.

Wasuinoton, Viroinia aND Marytanp Coacn Company,

Petitioner,

Vv.

_NationaL LasBor Retations Boarp,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

ee

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER.

ee

J e

Rosert E. Lyxcu,

4 Wittum J. Hvueues, Jr.,

Shoreham Building,

Washington, D. C.,

\ Attorneys for Petitioner.

Wuuusm E. Leary,

Reeves R. Hixon,

E. Louise CHAanpier,

Shoreham Building,

Washington, D. C.,

Of Counsel.

,

ssn

erence reeset epee

Parss or Breox 8. Avams, Wasurxeororn, D. O.

WIMION BRLOW .................. 0006: Stee

URISDICTION .... ... eee te a

STATUTE INVOLVED ..1:...........c¢0ceeeeees

JUESTIONS PRESENTED ............ Dg e :

)UTLINE OF ARGUMENT ................ ea nes

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Preliminary: The Board’s Petition, the Order of

the Board and the Decree of the Court Below. .

Charges i in the Board’s Complaint ......... ‘ne dais

Petitioner’s Answer to the Board’s Complaint. .

The Board’s Findings of Fact ................ -

Effect of the Unfair Labor practices Upon Inter-

‘State rangi LP A at ee, ee eeerees

Petitioner’s Contentions in the Court Below......

3ASIS OF DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW. .

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE RELIED ON

ARGUMENT:

PART I: THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUS.

TAIN THE FINDINGS

A. Where a Constitutional Right is Alleged to

Have Been Violated the Federal Courts Can

Make Their Own Independent Determina-

tion of All Questions of Law and Fact......

The Evidence: Preliminary ...............

C. The Practica] Problem of How an Employer

, ‘Can Exercise His Right to Discharge His

Employees About the Time of the Formation

ee 8 ee, Pree e eee ree

w

12

17

Lndex Continued.

. The Right to ‘‘Clean House’”’

. The Data as to the Discharge of Each Indi-

vidual Employee

. The Alleged Efforts of the Management to

’ Prevent the Formation of the Union

PART IIT: UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

. The Act Herein Is Unconstitutional in Its

Entirety .

. Petitioner Has the Necessary Standing to

Argue Inseparability

. The Cases on Inseparability Do. Not Prevent

the Judicial Inquiry Herein Asked

. The Way the Court Below Passed Upon the

Question of Separability

. The Act Shows a Comprehensive Scheme to

Regulate Employer-Employee Relationships

in Local Industry as, Well as.in Interstate

. Summary of the Object of the Act

. If the Object of the Act Was to Enact a Com-

prehensive Scheme. to Regulate Intra-state _

Activities as Well as Inter-state the Act Has

Not Been Misconstrued But is Unconstitu-

H. The Proof That the Act Is Unconstitutional

as to Intra-state Industry

I. Under This Court’s Decisions on Separabil-

ity the Entiré Act Is Unconstitutional

Conclusion

TABLE OF CASES.

. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161

Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,

No. - 365

Austin v. a of Boston, 7 Wall. 694

\

\

Index Continued: ili

res . Page

Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 685 ............... 62

ee OC og abv oe sdodsaessnwkens 48

Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124.F. 246 ........ 25

Bradley Lumber Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Board, 84

i Er rar re Pew a Perr rE 16

Butts v. Mechanics Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126,

MC rls tie conse k bw a saeg ae a aeixe0 +0608 61, 62

ge 8 rrr rr eerie 28

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 998 U. 8.238 ............ 48,44

Civil Rights Cases, 109 2 eee 61

Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land Co., 25 F. 791 .......... 25 .

Coppaye v. Kansas, 236 U.S.1 ..+...... pnneas denies 10

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. &. 22 .........scccccsees 13, 14

Darnell y. Indiana, 226 U. 8. 390 ................... 42

Davis v. Foreman, 3 Ch. 654 (Eng.) 1894 ............ 25

Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370 ............ 42

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264-U. S. 286 ...)..........s0ceee 44

‘ El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott, et al., (U. S. D. C. West-

| Ee a errr er rrr rer 03

Employer’s Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 500-504 ... 60

Federal Trade Com. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S.

ee Mt Weeds hl wakes season chee wan an 4a cakens 10, 12

Foster Bros. Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 85 F. (2d) 984 .......... 10, 11, 45, 46

Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Board, 85 F. (2d) 291 ....... 53

_Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S: 123, 131 ............ 10, 12

muckunm ¥. Comey, 300 U. B. 160... wc ccc ccecccscwcss 42

Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 66, 67 ................ 47,59

[llinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514,529 64.

Jamés v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 140 ................ 63

Kern. River.Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 147, 153-4 ......... — 49

Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. 8. 67°N,.....5.....-. 220 42

Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Fe , 206 U. S. 170 25

Miller v. Warner, 42 App. Div. 208 ................. 25

Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S: 346, 351 ................ 49

National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman—Harry

Marks Clothing Co., 83 F. (2d) 731; 84 F. (2d) 1000 53

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin

a ED ova kccedsdeesctwecessces 53

National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio &

Telegraph Co., Jan. 11, 1937 (unreported) ........ 42

New York ex rel "Hateh v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 i aek 42

Index Continued.

Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 402 ..

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287 .

Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S.

— 589, 600

Prendergast v. New York Telegraph Co., 262 U. S. 43,

50 :

Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S.

330, 369 17, 18, 24, 44, 65

Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J. L. 649, 662

Saint Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38

Schechter v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495

Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Mo., Otis J.)..

Supervisors of Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305 42

Tagg Bros & Moorehead v. U. S., 280 U. S. 420 :

Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 571

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82

Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102

U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1

U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641

U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214

'U. S. v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 97, 98, 99 -..........

Utah Power & T. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 184, 185 ......

Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 241, 340, 342 44, 64

Yazoo & Mississippi V. Railroad Co. v. Jackson Vine-

gar Co., 226 U. S. 217

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

‘Octoser TERM, 1936.

No. 469.

‘Wasuinaton, Viretnia AND Maryianp Coacn Company,

Petitioner, |

V.

NationaL Lasor Retations Boarp,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CiRCUIT.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER.

ne een

OPINION BELOW.

The Opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reported

in 85 F. (2d) 990. It will be found inthe Record at page

589. _! |

JURISDICTION.

The decree of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-

peals for the Fourth Circuit was entered October 8, 1936,

(R. 598). The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed

herein October 17, 1936, and was granted October 26, 1936.

2

(R. 601.) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code as amended, and Sec-

tion 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, (29 U. S.

C. A., Sec. 151).

STATUTE INVOLVED.

The National Labor Relations Act may be found at 29

U. 8. C. A., See. 151; it is before this Court m toto as an

Appendix to Petitiongr’s brief in The Associated Press v.

National. Labor Relations Board, No. 365 of the present

term. . ; ,

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Petitioner is an interstate bus company with eighty (80)

employees. In December of 1935 after noticing growing

» inefficiency, increase in break-downs, disaffection, etc., the

company determines to ‘‘clean house’’ and starts breaking

in new bus drivers. In February of 1936 it finds out that a

professional union organizer, disguised as a workman, has

gotten a job with Petitioner under false pretenses and has

‘‘organized’’ the men. Rumors of sabotage increasing, the

company on March 4, 1936, ‘‘cleans ‘house’’, discharging 18

out of 57 unjpn men, retaining, however, the President of the

Union. The company proves the inefficiency of each indi-

vidual discharged, though the Board refuses to allow the

company to put in evidence their efficiency records. There

is conflicting testimony that the company ‘told several men

they were discharged for union activities. The Board

orders reinstatement with back pay, around $25,000 to date —

—to be paid Union men who haven’t worked. On these

facts the following questions are presented:

1. Is the Act as construed and applied to Petitioner 4

valid regulation of interstate commerce?

2. If the Act is declared unconstitutional as applied to

local industry in the companion cases now before this Court,

is it not unconstitutional as to Petitioner, the Act revealing

a comprehensive plan to regulate all industry, intra-state as

3

well as interstate, and the one application being insep-

arable from the other?

OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT.

Contrary to the decision below, the law is that where,

as here, a constitutional right is involved and the juris-

diction of the Court is at issue, the Courts-can make their

own independent determination of the facts.

On the facts, Petitioner has met the burden pecs’

by the Act (as construed by the Board) and has justified

beyond a reasonable doubt its right to discharge the eighteen

employees.

As to the law, the Act herein is unconstitutional as a

regulation of both intra-state and inter-state commerce.

To avoid burdening the Court, Petitioner will not repeat

the arguments to this effect in the companion cases herein,

but will devote the present Brief to discussing the possi-

bility that the Act may be declared unconstitutional as

to intra-state or local industries in one of. the companion

cases herein, in which event the question arises: if the

Act is unconstitutional as to intra-state or local industries,

is it’s application to Petitioner, an inter-state bus company,

separable or must the entire Act fall. As to this question -

of Inseparability, Petitioner’s argument is:

(1) that it has the necessary standing to argue -Insepar-

ability; (2) that if the Act is unconstitutional as to intra-

state or local industry, it is a nullity, the “Findings and

Policy” and the Act itself disclosing objectives which could

not possibly be achieved or even intelligently sought after,

by application to Petitioner and other inter-state companies

alone. Hence it’s application to Petitioner would be for

a purpose other than intended by the Act itself and the

judgment below should be reversed.

4

STATEMENT OF FAOTS.

Preliminary: The Board’s Petition, the Order of the Board

. and the Decree of the Court Below:

The National Labor Relations Board, respondent herein,

filed a petition in the Court below, the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, (R. 1), or the enforce-

ment of its Order of May 21, 1936, requiring Petitioner

to cease and desist from certain alleged unfair labor prac-

_ tices and further ordering it to take certain affirmative

action, namely, offer re-employment to 18 discharged em- -

ployees and make them whole for any loss of pay they

_ had suffered by reason of the discharge, (R. 4). The Court

below granted Respondent’s Petition, (R. 598), and the

present certiorari followed.

At the outset of the proceedings before the Board, Peti-

tioner appeared specially and filed an objection to the juris-

diction of the Board assérting the unconstitutionality of the

National Labor Relations Act on the same grounds as in the

companion cases herein (R. 26-28) Being overruled Peti-

tioner, without waiving its objection te the Board’s juris-

diction, filed an Answer. to the Board’s , ion 28).

Charges in the Board’s dicanpedee:

The Board’s complaint herein, (R. 19), resulted from a

charge, (R. 9), and a supplemental charge, (R. 14), by Local

No. 1079 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric

Railway and Motor Coach Employees. It allegeggthat Peti-

tioner operates and controls motor bus transportgtion lines

for the transportation of passengers and express from

Washington, D.'C., to various places in Virginia and Mary-

land and return; that in connection therewith it maintained.

a garage and repair shop in Clarendon, Virginia, wherein

the busses are serviced and repaired, in the course of inter-

state transportation of passengers above referred to, (R.

20, Paragraphs 2 and 3) ; that these operations of Petitioner

occurred in the course and current of commerce within the

5)

District of Columbia and among the States and between

the District and the States and are an integral part of the

operations of an instrumentality of such commerce and con-

stitute commerce. among the States and between the Distict

of Columbia and the States, (R. 20-21, Paragraph 4). It is

then alleged that Petitioner discharged 21 employees, bus

drivers and mechanics, and had refused to re-instate them,

for the ‘reason that they joined the labor union in question

and engaged in concerted activities with other employees

for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual

aid and protection, (R. 21, Paragraph 6). By this action

of Petitioner it is alleged Petitioner interfered with, re-

strained and coerced and presently was interfering with,

restraining and coercing its employees in the exercise of

rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and that by such

acts Petitioner did thereby engage in and was thereby

engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of

Section 8, Subdivision 1 of the Act, (R. 22, Paragraph 7).

It is also alleged the discharge of the men and the refusal

to re-instate them constituted discrimination in regard to

the hire and tenure of employment of the-men, and that the

Petitioner did thus discourage membership of the men in

the labor union, and that this was likewise an unfair labor

practice within the meaning of Section 8, Subdivision 3 of

the Act, (R. 22, Paragraph 8).

The following is then alleged :

‘‘The aforesaid unfair labor practices of she respon-

dent have occurred and are occurring in the course and

current of commerce within the District of Columbia

and among the States and between the District of Co-

lumbia and States of the United States and, on the

basis of experience in the motor bus transportation and

other industries, burden and obstruct such commerce

and the free flow thereof, and have led and tend to

lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing such

commerce and the free flow thereof, by impairing the

efficiency, safety and operation of instrumentalities of

such commerce,’’ (R. 23, Paragraph 9.) ,

. é

Petitioner's Answer to the Board’s Complaint:

Without waiving its Constitutional objections asserted

in its special appearance Petitioner in its Answer substan-

tially admitted the allegatians of the Complaint with respect

to the nature of its business. It likewise admitted -that

it had discharged and refused re-instatement to the em-

ployees named in the Complaint but denied that it had done

so because of their membership or activity in the union

being formed, (R. 28-37). It stated that it had noticed

growing inefficiency among the men since September of

1935 about which time a professional union organizer dis-

guised as a workman obtained eniployment and began to

organize the union. From that time on there was disaffec-

tion among the men, and the work did not seem to get done

properly. The management thought that something out of

the ordinary was occurring but was unable to locate what

it was. It tried various remedial measures, but no perma-

nent remedy was fonnd. These conditions continued until

about February 1, 1936, at which time the management

determined that many of the employees were- becoming so

inefficient that it would be necessary to replace them in the

near future. About February 1 it began to ‘‘break in’’

drivers to take the place of the six bus drivers who subse-

quently were discharged; and who are named in the Com-

plaint. The management also held conferences early in

February with a view to weeding out the less efficient em-

ployees in the repair shop. It was not until February 28

that the management discovered that a union was being

formed. About this time a rumor got out that there was

going to be a strike and various patrons telephoned or

called wanting to know whether the service would be dis-°

continued. Reports also were spread about that the brakes

on the busses were faulty and thére was danger that the

drivers would lose control of the busses. Considering the

entire situation the management determined around Feb-.

ruary 28 that drastic action must be taken and so concluded

7

to discharge the six bus drivers above referred to and to

weed out the less efficient men in the repair shop. This was

done.

Petitioner in its Answer reiterated. its objections to the

Constitutionality of the Act already filed with the Board

and alleged that if under the above circumstances it was a

violation of the Act to discharge the men, the Act as con-

strued and applied constituted a deprivation of Petitioner’s

rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment, (R. 28-37).

The Board’s Findings of Fact:

The Board found after a Hearing ‘that Petitioner had

illegally discharged 18 of the 21 mentioned, 4 being bus

drivers and the remaining 14 mechanics and service em-

ployees, (R. 532, Finding 11 (1 to 18)) the object being to

weed out the employees active in union affairs (R. 539). As

to the shop employees it found that they constituted an

integral part of petitioner’s interstate transportation sys-

tem, (R. 545, Finding 13). The Board found that the dis-

charges constituted a discrimination in regard to the hire

and tenure of employment within the meaning of Section 7

of the Act, and that, therefore, Petitioner was engaged in

unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8, Sub-

divisions 1 and 3 of the Act, (R. 539, Finding 12).

Effect of the Unfair Labor Practices —_ Inter-State

Commerce:

The Board found that the alleged unfair “— practices

occurred in the course and current of inter-state commerce,

(R. 545, Finding 13), and that on the basis of its experi-

ence in motor bus transportation Petitioner’s conduct in _

discharging the 18 employees burdened and obstructed

inter-state commerce, and led and tended to lead to labor

disputes burdening and obstructing such commerce and

the free flow thereof, by impairing the efficiency, safety and

. 8

operation of instrumentalities of commerce, (R. 546, Find-

ing 14). Finally the Board found that Petitioner’s alleged

unfair labor practices affected commerce within the mean-

ing of Section 8, Subdivisions 1 and 3 and Section 2, Sub-

divisions 6 and 7 of the Act, (R. 547, Paragraphs 3 and 4).

The Board’s Order:

The Board ordered Petitioner to cease and desist: (a)

from discouraging membership in the union by discg§nina-

tion in regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any

term or condition of employment; (b) from interfering

with, restraining or coercing its empleyees in the exercise

of their rights as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, (R.

548). | ¥

The Board further ordered Petitionér to offer to the 18

employees reinstatement to their former positions, with all

rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make such

employees whole for any loss suffered by reason of their

discharge, (R. 548).

Petitioner’s Contentions in the Court Below:

In the Court below Petitioner undertook to prove

from the record that every contention made in its An-

swer as to its reasons for discharging the employees in

question was fully substantiated by the Record. It

_ faced the Court with the practical problem of how an

employer could exercise his right to discharge his em.

ployees about-the time of the formation of a labor -union.

It asserted that on the facts in: the present case it had

a right ‘‘to clean house’’ at the time in question, and

that any Act of Congress which was so interpreted by

a Board in Washington that the burden of proof in con-

nection with the discharges of the employees herein was

thrust upon the employer such that he was required to

show that the employees were not discharged because of

their_union activities operated to destroy the employer’s

right to discharge and thus deprived him of a substantial

9

right in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

* Amendment. Petitioner also analyzed the data with re- -

spect to the discharge of each individual employee’ and

~ showed, we contend, ample reason for the discharge of

every single one of them. It showed that only 20 of the 57

members of the union had been discharged, and that the

President of the union Ws still in the Company’s employ.

It also complained of the Board’s refusal to permit it to put

into evidence the efficiency records of the various employees

discharged and to compare these records with the efficiency

records of the employees retained. The reason for the

Board’s refusal to permit this evidence was some sort of a

notion on the part of the Examiner, (a member of the

Board) that the efficiency records did not measure up to

his standard of accuracy, and he did not know whether they

had been kept properly or not. It was pointed out to him

that it made-no difference whether the records were ac-

curate or inaccurate; that if as a result of these records

the Company came to the conclusion that a state of in-

efficiency existed and later acted upon it, they were admis-

sible to overcome the seeming presumption that the men

were discharged because of union activities.

Petitioner also urged that the Act was unconstitutional as

applied to the regulation of intra-state manufacturing activ-

ities and hence was unconstitutional as a whole, revealing

as it did a comprehensive attempt to regulate all industry,

intra-state as well as inter-state, and that thé allegedly Con-

stitutional application of the Act to inter-state commerce

was inseparable from the seemingly unconstitutional appli-

cation to purely intra-state industry.

x

BASIS OF DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW.

The Court below held that while the testimony on behalf

of the employer ‘‘was not without weight’’, rt could not be

said that there was no substantial evidence to support the

Board’s findings, citing

10 |

Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co.,

291 U. S. 67, 73;

Helvering.v. Rankin, 295 U. 8. 123, 131;

to the effect that bearing in mind Section 10 (e) of the Act

provides that findings of the Board as to facts if supported

by evidence shall be conclusive, the above two cases pre-

vented thé Court from considering the testimony anew and

making its own findings (R. 594, 592).

As to Adair v. U. S., 208 U.S. 161, and. Coppage v. Kan.

sas,.236 U.S. 1, urged by Petitioner on the Constitutional

questions, the Court held that these decisions had impliedly

been overruled or distinguished by this Court’s decision in

Texas and New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S.

548 (R. 594-596). As to Petitioner’s contention that the Act

applied not only to inter-state commerce but to local indus-

try and being uncbnstitutional as to the latter was uncon-

stitutional in its-ehtirety, the Court below referred to its —

Opinion handed down the same day as the decision in the ©

present case in Foster Bros. Manufacturing Co. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 85 F.. (2d) 984, wherein it held that

Congress in the Act herein never intended to regulate intra-

state commerce, the power conferred upon the Board in

Section 10 (a) of the Aet to prevent unfair labor practices

being restricted to unfair labor practices ‘‘affecting com-

merce’’. Hence the Court held that there was no ground

for Petitioner’s argument that an important and insepara-

ble part of the Act having been condemned the whole Act

must fall, (R. 597-598). |

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE RELIED ON.

1. The Court erred in sdstaining the National Labor Re-

lations Act as a valid exercise of the power of Congress to

regulate commerce as against Petitioner’s claim it is in

violation of the First and Tenth Amendments.

2. The Court erred in ‘sustaining the constitutionality of

the Act herein as against Petitioner’s contention that the

11

Act was unconstitutional in that it improperly delegated

judicial powers to the National Labor Relations Board.

_ 8. The Court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of

the Act herein as against Petitioner’s contention that as

construed and applied herein it deprives Petitioner of his

liberty and property without Due Process of Law in viola-

tion of the Fifth Amendment. &

4. The Court erred in sustaining the constitutionality of

the Act herein as against Petitioner’s claim that the Act,

being unconstitutional as an attempted regulation of intra-

state commerce, was likewise unconstitutional as a regula-

tion of inter-state commerce, the provisions of the Act.as to

the two types of commerce being inseparable.

5. The Court erred in respect of Error Four above in

holding that no question of separability was presented by

reason of its thebry, announced in Foster Bros. Manufac-

turing Co. v. Board, 85 F. (2d) 984, that Congress never in-

tended the Act to apply to intra-state commerce. ,

6. The Court erred in sustaining the otder of the Board

holding that upon the evidence Petitioner was guilty of an-

unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 of the

Act.

7. The Court erred in sustaining the action of the Board -

in preventing Petitioner from submitting in evidence the

efficiency records of the union men discharged, together

with the efficiency records of the non-union men not dis-

charged in order that a comparison between the two sets

of employees might be made.

8. The Court erred in sustaining the action of the Board

in thrusting upon Petitioner the burden of proof that the

union employees discharged were not discharged for uhion

activities. : Aue

9. The Court érred in sustaining the action of the Board |

in thrusting the burden of proof upon Petitioner thatethe:

union men discharged were discharged for good reasons as

against Petitioner’s claim that Petitioner had a constitu-

tional right to discharge them for no reason at all, in con-

trast to a good reason.

12

10. The Court erred in requiring the re-instatement of

the discharged employees with back pay, thus depriving

Petitioner of its right to trial by jury, in violation of the

Seventh Amendment and requiring Petitioner to offer to

make a contract, for an indefinite period with the employees,

in violation of the equitable principle that Courts cannot

make or require the making of contracts and in any case

will not require the specific performance of a personal ser

vice contract. -

ARGUMENT.

Part I.

The Evidence Does Not Sustain the Findings.

A. Where a constitutional right is alleged to have

been vioJated the federal courts can make their

own independent determination of all

questions of law and fact.

The Court below stated:

‘*Section 10 (e) of the act provides that the findings

of the Board as to facts, if supported by evidence, shall

be conclusive. It is settled that in reviewing the find-

ings of such a body, the ceart will not considerthe tes-

timony anew and make its own findings since the weight

to be given to the evidence and the inferences to be

drawn therefrom are matters for the fact finding body,

and the function of the court in review is merely to re-

verse and modify such findings as have no evidence to

support them and aré clearly impxoper. Federal Trade

Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 73;

Helvering w Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131.”’. (R. 592).

The Court apparently examined the Record from the basis

of the above statement and the cases cited. It stated:

‘‘The testimony on behalf of the employer was not

without weight, but it nevertheless appeared that the

eighteen employees, all of them being union men, were

discharged within a period of ten days after the first |

13

step towards the formation of the union was taken,

and within a week after the offigiais of the company

received information thereof. During this period they

were actively endeavoring to prevent the union move-

ment and to persuade their employees from joining or,

continuing therein. When these efforts failed, the dis-

charges followed. Under these circumstances it cannot

be said that there was no substantial evidence to sup-

port the Board’s findings, and consequently the peti-

tion of the Board cannot be dismissed for failure of

proof.’’ (R. 594.) .

It is submitted that where the action of a partisan Board

composed of laymen is alleged to be in violation of a per-

son’s constitutional rights the power of the Cou to ex-

amine the facts is considerably broader than as stated in

the Algoma Lumber Company case, supra. Thus in Crow- -

ell v. Renson, 285 U. 8. 22, 60 this Court said:

‘*In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights,

the judicial power of the United States necessarily ex-

tends to the independent determination of all ques-

tions, both of fact and law, necessary to the perform-

ance of that supreme function. - The case of confisca-

tion is illustrative, the ultimate conclusion almost in-

variably depending upon the decisions of questions of

fact. This court has held the owner to be entitled to

‘a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judi-

cial tribunal for determination upon its own indepen-

dent judgment as to both law and facts.’ Ohio Valley

Water Co. v. Ben Avon, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. Ed. 908,

P. U. R. 1920E, 814, 40 S. Ct. 527, supra. See also

Prendergast v. New York. Telegraph Co., 262 U. S. 43,

‘50, 67 L. Ed. 853, 858, 43 S. Ct. 466; Tagg Bros. 4d

Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 74 T.- 24,

50 S. Ct. 220, supra; Phillips v. Commissioner of In

ternal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 600, 75 L. Ed. 1289, 2299,

51S. Ct. 608.’’ (Crowell v..Benson, 285 U.S. at 60, 61).

A case of confiscation under the Fourteenth Amendment

is no different in principle from one of outright usurpation

under the Fifth. We know of no reason why, where an Act

aa

14

is constitutionally assailed, utility companies should have a

monopoly upon the Federal Courts’ judicial examination

either of facts tending to show jurisdiction in a Federal

Board initially to act or facts necessary to be found to sus-

tain the Board’s action.'. Certainly, as suggested in Crowell

v. Benson above there can be no question of this Court’s

right to examine the facts in respect of confieeatery rates

in utility cases. As recently as St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.

v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38, this Court reiterated the rule. In that

case the District Court felt that it was bound to accept the

findings of the Secretary of Agriculture on the question of

confiscation, if such findings were supported by substantial .

evidence, and that it was not within the judicial province :

to weigh the evidence and pass upon the issues of fact.

When the case came to be argued in this Court the Gov-

ernment’s chief contention was, not that the District Court ~

was right fit this expression of the law, but that in spite of

what the District Court said it had in fact made an inde- ~-.

pendent examination of the facts. This Court in deciding

the case drew a distinction between the scope of judicial

review where the action assailed is within the scope of legis-

lative authority, and action which transcends the limit of

legislative power. In the.first case the Court naturally does

not sit as a board of revision to substitute its judgment for

that of the Legislature or its agents as to matters within ~

the province of either, and so when it appoints an agent to —

act within the sphere of legislative authority it may endow

the agent with power to make findings of fact which are

conclusive, assuming there is a fair hearing, etc. In such

cases this Court said the judicial enquiry into the facts goes

no further than to ascertain whether there is evidence to

support the findings, the weight of the evidence being a

_ matter for theadministrative Board.

But, this Court said, the rate-making power is limited by

the Constitution, which prohibits the deprivation of prop-

1 Bee cases collected in Mr. ee ee fees See oe

Jeseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. 8. 38.

| : : 15

erty without Due Process of Law. Upon such a charge the

power of the Court.to exfimine the evidence is entirely dif-

ferent. This Court said, and it is a strong and able state-

ment:

‘‘Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications,

work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands.

Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient.

It is not difficult for them to observe the requirements

of law in giving a hearing and receiving evidence. But

to say that their findings of fact may be made conclu-

sive where constitutional rights of liberty and property

are involved, although the evidence clearly establishes

that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights

have been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy

of administrative officials va seriously to impair the

security imherent in our judicial safeguards. That

prospect, with our multiplication of administrative

agencies, is not one to be lightly regarded. It is said

that we can retain judicial authority to examine the

weight of evidence when the question concerns the right

of personal liberty. But if this be so, it is not because

we are privileged to perform our judicial duty in that

case and for reasons of convenience to disregard it in

others. The principle applies when rights either of

person or of property are protected by constitutional

restrictions. Under our system there is no warrant

for the view that the judicial power of a competent

court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrange-

ment designed to give effect to administrative action

going beyond the limits of constitutional authority.

iy . This is the purport of the decisions above cited with

respect to the exercise of an independert judicial judg-

ment upon the facts where confiscation is alleged.’’

(St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38).

We assert, therefore, without any further examination.

of the authorities that the Court below had power to make

its independent examination of the testimony, and this Court

has the same power. In the present case this question is -

not of any great complexity and so the chief objection noted

in Mr. Justice Brandeis’ concurring Opinion in Sf. Joseph

16

Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., swpra, i.e., the magnitude of the

task of judi¢ial re-examination of facts, does not apply.

It may be noted that in Bradley Lumber Co. v. National

Labor Relations Board, 84 F. (2) 97, 100 the Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contrary to the decision

below, specifically held in a case similar to the-present that

the findings of the Board were subject “te a full judicial .

review’’.

The question, therefore, before this Court on the present

record is whether, the union being composed of 57 em-

ployees, the discharge of 18 union men under the facts and

circumstances of the case amounted to an unfair labor prac-

tice within the meaning of the Act, and whether the Act as

construed and applied with respect thereto did not amount

to a deprivation of Petitioner’s rights under the Due Pro-

cess Clause. If the present Record shows that the dis-

charge of the 18 union men was not because of any union

activities but a mere exercise of the normal right of dis-

charge it foliows that such discharges cannot constitute an

unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Act, and

hence the Act being construed by the Board and the Court

below to penalize such a discharge has deprived petitioner

of its right of freedom of contract or, in another aspect,

its property right to manage its own business, in violation

of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The

enquiry is, therefore, in this respect a question of fact; in

another respect, namely, as to whether the decision of the

Board and the Court below construing the Act has not oper-

ated to thrust the burden of proof upon the employer to

justify a discharge of union men about the time of the for-

mation of a union, is a question of mixed law and fact which

likewise, under the authorities above cited, i is open to re

examination by this Court.

¢ We proceed, therefore, to an examination of,the evidence.

17

B. The evidence: preliminary:

It ie not even alleged in the Complaint herein that the

discharges herein were for the purpose or intent of inter-

fering with, restraining or coercing the employees in the

exercise of their right of self-organization conferred by

Section 7 of the Act. It is merely alleged that by the dis-

charges Petitioner ‘‘did interfere with, restrain and coerce

and is interfering with, réstraining and coercing its em-

ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section

7 of the National Labor Relations Act’’, (R. 22). Petitioner

objected to the jurisdiction of the Board on this ground

but was overruled on the ground Petitioner was ‘‘quib-

bling’’ (R. 40-42). In other words, the position of the

Board must be that no matter what the intent or pur-

pose of the discharges if in -fact they were detrimental

to the right of self-organization conferred by Section 7

of the Act they may be prohibited. Logically, therefare,

the Board’s gant be that even if the discharges

constituted the al exercise of the right of the

carrier to select its employees or to discharge them’’ as

state@ by this Court in Tezas and New Orleans R. Co. v.

Brotherhood, 281 U. S. 548, 571, still, if the effect of the dis-

charges is to interfere with the right of self-organization,

the employer is forbidden to act. This position seems

clearly at variance with this Court's decision in Texas and

New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood,. supra, and Railroad

Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 369,

wherein the normal exercise of the Fight to hire and dis-

charge was upheld. We feel, therefore, that the burden is

upon the Board to prove, even thodgh it is not alleged, that

the discharges in question wére for the purpose and with

the intent of discouraging the formation of the labor union.

Unless there is proof of such an intent it is submitted the

Statute would be clearly unconstitutional im pénalizing the |

bare acts themselves for this would amount to a clear dimi-

nution of the emnployer’s Constitutional right te hire and

discharge at will.

\

18

C. The practical problem of how an employer can. exercise

his right to discharge his employees about the time of

the formation of a labor union.

The right to hire and fire has been repeatedly upheld in .

. the Courts. (Tezas and N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood, 28)

U. S. 548, 571; Ratlroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co.,

295 U. S. 330, 369.) Even the present Act does not—osten-

sibly at least—take this right away from the employer. The

practical problem however is: Suppose an employer some

time prior to the formation of the union has made up his

mind to ‘‘clean house’’. How is he going to exercise this -

right? In what way can he protect himself in exercising —

his unquestioned right to discharge? If in point of fact

he cannot discharge union men without the burden of proof

being put upon him to show that they were not discharged

because of their union activities, does not the Act, as con-'

strued and applied to his particular case, operate to destroy

his right to discharge and thus deprive him of a substantial

right in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This is precisely the situation in the present case.

Dr. Leiserson, Chairman of the Railway Mediation Board

and the Board’s expert witness in the present case, had a

simple solution of this problem, which was that the em-

ployer was not supposed to know anything about the forma-

tion of the union. (R. 390, 396) As showing the Board’s

attitude, this witness’ construction of the Act is en-

titled to considerable weight by reason of his position,

the fact that he was the Board’s expert witness .and

his long contact with legislation of this character. In

answer to direct questidns he.jndicated that when an em-

ployer discharged men dbout the time of the formation of

a labor union the burden of proof was on the employer to

show that he had not discharged the employees because of

their union activities. (R. 390, 391, 393.) Dr. Leiserson

testified that in discharging any prominent union man ‘‘ob-

viously the purpose is to scare everybody so that there

will be no organization’’. (R. 391.) He admitted that about

é

‘19

the only way the employer could protect himself would

be by Keeping efficiency records which would disclose his

“right”’ to discharge the man in question at that particular

time." \

Mr. Leon Arnold and Mr. England, President and Secre-.

tary of the Company, testified, as to the discharges on

March 4, that the Company had been considering ‘‘cleaning

house’’ for a long time prior thereto. The evidence is un-

contradicted that for a long period of time prior to the dis-

charges the officers of the Company had noticed a growing

inefficiency in, fhe work of the employees dating back to

September of 1935. (Arnold, R. 46, 47, 56, 57.) Arnold,

the President, had heard complaints from: passengers in

regasd to the lack of cleanliness of the buses and delays in

operation. He had talked it over with England, the Secre-

tary, and Wilsey, the foreman of the shop. Wilsey did not

know the reason for it. (R. 46, 48, 56, 58.) aie

Toward the end of November, Mason, a-private investi-

gator who had been employed by the Company over a pe-

riod of years to make periodic investigations of the men,

made a secret investigation, riding on the busses. No

special instructions were given him as to this investigation

or as to any of the previous investigations. (R. 219.) He

reported disloyal conduct on the part of Hall a bus driver;

also: Hall’s wife complained that Hall was running around

with another woman, riding her on the ‘bus beside him.

(R. 292.) Also that drivers West and Magaha had failed

to collect the proper fares on occasion. England, the Secre-

tary of the-Company, considered West and Magaha either

dishonest or careless. (R. 329.) He would have fired West

and Mahaga ata other drivers in December if the weather

had permitted them to break in. new men. (R. 340, 345.)

_ There were complaints against Crissman, a bus driver,

to the effect that he was unreasonable and rude to passen-

+ Yet when Petitioner attempted to put im evidence the efficiency records

of the discharged employees the Examiner ruled them out. See p- 9, Assign.

7, pp. 11, 20, 29 this Brief. ;

20

gers. So much was this so that a passenger himself went

to the Company about it. (R. 399, 406.)

Smith, a bug driver, had had a number of accidents. Eng-

land claimed that he hed a right to take the number of acci-

dents into consideration in firing a man irrespective of

whether the man was to blame for them. (R. 333.) Magaha —

had been involved in twelve accidents in 1935 and ‘one in

1936. (R. 327, 331.)

~Mr. Arnold and Mr. England complained to the shop

foreman, Wilsey, about the increase in break-downs on the

road and about the busses being dirty. (R. 409, 410.) In

December they made up their mind toe do something about it

and started to break in new men to take the places of those

they intended later to discharge. (R. 77, 98,121.) They

continued to break in new men during J anuary and Febru-

ary and had six or seven new drivers ready in January.

(R. 340, 341.) On account of the increase in accidents and

road calls England installed a system of keeping records of

them about December the fifteenth. These records the Peti-

tioner attempted to put in evidence but the Examiner re-

fused to allow them on the ground that he did not under-

stand them and did not know whether they had been kept

properly or not. (See Spec. of Error 7, p. 11, this Brief.) -

It was pointed out to the Examiner that it made no differ-

ence wher the records were accurate or inaccurate; if as

a result of these records the Company came to the conclu-

sion that a state of inefficiency existed and later acted upon

it this was admissible to overcome the seeming presumption

that the men were discharged in March because of their

union activities. (R. 307, 311.) The Examiner, however,

continued in his refusal to allow their admission, which

seriously injured the Petitioner. He did however permit

England to testify of his independent knowledge, without

resorting to the records, that the number of road calls in-

creased from January the first to March the fourth, 1936.

- (R. 307, 312.)

21 ,

Conditions as above described continued during January

and February. In February certain patrons of the Com-

pany told Arnold that they had heard that busses would not

be running subsequent to Saturday, February the twenty-

ninth; that the men were going on strike; also that one

driver had stated that he was going to get off the bus at

the top of Picket’s Hill and let it run wild. (R. 50, 60-63,

69.) About this time one of the drivers told him that a

policeman had stopped him on M Street and said that there

was a report that the brakes on the Arnold busses were in

bad shape. This led to Mr. Storer, the brake Inspector for

the Washington Traffic Bureau, making an inspection. (R.

63, 64.) Storer found circumstances which “were at least

suspicious and so reported. (R. 63, 64, 77-82.)

' As already stated, Arnold had a number of conferences

with England and Wilsey, the shop foreman, relative to the

equipment and operation of the busses and the delays and

road calls from time to time during the months from Octo:

ber on. (R. 60.) There was an exceptionally large number

of road delays and break-down of busses in the latter part

of February. Complaints as to cleanliness were more num-

erous in the four or five months prior to March. (R. 60, 61,

109, 112.) England offered in evidence records of the Com-

pany showing the increase in these break-downs and ser-

vice calls, but the Examiner refused to admit them on the

ground that the Examiner did not understand the various

notations on the records and apparently the records were

not good enough for the Examiner. (R. 114, 115, 117.)

Some time in February the management discovered that

a man named Griffin, a professional labor crganizer who

had secured employment with the Company under the pre-

tense that he was a workman, had beer: organizing the men

into a union some time from September forward. (R. 47-49,

51.) .

As a result of all of these things and the accumulated diffi-

culties from September to February the management deter-

mined to ‘‘clean house’’. (R. 366, 367.) About this time

ee

came the rumors that no busses would be running subse-

quent to February the twenty-ninth, and that one would be

allowed,to run away down hill. (R. 61.) Arnold called in

Wilsey and England and asked Wilsey for a report on his

men. The men that Wilsey- and England recommended to

be dismissed were dismissed, and the new men they had

been breaking in put on the jobs in addition to various men

’ obtained in answer to an advertisement placed in the news-

, paper. (R. 122.)

; Both Arnold, the President of the Company, and Eng-

land denied that the union activities of the men had had

anything to do with their discharge and pointed out that the

Company still had more union men in its employ than it

had discharged. (R. 51, 62, 96, 100.) (Of the eighty em-

ployees, fifty-seven were members of the union, and of these /

only twenty were discharged. The President was not dis-

charged.) The Examiner refused to allow the Petitioner

to show that while some union men had been fired other

union men were still in the employ of the Company, and

that England believed at the time that those continued in-

the employ of the Company were union men. (R. 353, 355.)

This prevented Petitioner from rebutting the ‘‘presump-

tion’’ that because some of the union men were fired about

the time of the formation of the union they were fired be-

cause of the union. It also prevented the Petitioner from

showing the efficiency of the union men retained compared

with the efficiency of the union men discharged.

D. The right to “clean house”.

_ On the basis of the evidence cited under Part I-C we ask

this Court how it can be said that the discharges of the 18

union men under the circumstances stated were so entirely

without any other basis than the men’s union activities that

there must be an irresistible conclusion that they were

discharged because they joined the union. The growing

difficulties from September and October until February, the

lack of efficieucy, increase in road calls, signs of disaffec-

»

23

tion, rumors of sabotage, rumors of a strike, were all mat-

ters which the Company was entitled to take into consider-

ation in leading up to its conclusion to ‘‘clean house’. The

fact that.it determined in December to break in new men.

shows that the discharges were not because of the union

_ for the testimony shows that the officials of the Company

knew nothing about the formation of the union until some

time in February. Further, the conclusive fact appears

that all the union men were not discharged. Nor is there

any testimony to tlie effect that the management singled

out or even knew the ring-leaders of the union. As a mat-

ter of fact, the President of the union is still in Petitioner’s

employ. The Examiner prevented the Petitioner compar-

ing the efficiency records of the union men still employed

with the records of the union men fired, which in itself

seems to Petitioner to be reversible error. But even with-

out this is it so clear to this Court that there was no other

reason for the discharge of these men than the formation

of the union?

We say that if the evidence in this case is sufficient to

raise the inescapable conclusion that the men were fired be-

cause of their union activities then the Act, as construed

and applied herein, throws upon the employer the burden

f proof that in exercising his constitutional right to dis-

’ charge he must be prepared to prove conclusively that the

men discharged were discharged for some reason other

than their union activities. This overlooks the fact that an

employer has a constitutional right to discharge employees

for no reason at all. If the exercise of this right is, by the

present Act, so restricted as to cut down the constitutional

right so that an employer can discharge only for a good

reason, it follows that the right has been curtailed in an

important aspect, and the legislation is, therefore, uncon-

stitutional.

Conceding for the sake of argument that an employer has’

no right to discharge employees for the purpose of destroy-

ing a labor union, though even this we believe is still open

24

to argument on the basis of Railroad Retirement Board v.

Alton R. Co., 2950. 8. 330, 369, and Adair v. United States,

208 U. S. 161, the exercise of this right as any other con-

stitutional right should be prohibited only upon the clear-

est showing. In-a border line case, and we do not concede

that this is one, the! tendency of the Courts should be to

sustam the constitutional right rather than to extend re-

strictions upor it or upon its exercise. After a long period

of difficulties with inefficient employees, the fact that at or

about the time of the formation of a labor union the em-

ployees became so inefficient and the reports of their pro-

posed conduct so serious to a transportation line that one

third of the union employees were discharged, does not

prove their dismissal was due to union activities. Joining

a union carried on, in part, by a vice-president of that union

in the private office of the President of the Transportation

Company, may have been one factor in the case which led

the men to believe that they, and not the directors were

running the.company. Whether the mental attitude cre-

ated by the men joining the union was the cause of their

‘conduct and statements need not be sought out by the exec-

utives of the corporation. Conditions were such, actual

and reported, that a transportation company could not exist

if they continued. Who is to say that Arnold was not justi-

fied, therefore, in taking drastic action when presented with

a drastic state of conditions such as the stoppage of busses

as weil as possible dest:uction thereof. If the threats were

carried out, as reported to Arnold, the damage would have

been done, the losses tremendous and with a company

heavily in debt, it might have proved ‘disastrous. Arnold

was not required to wait until the horse was stolen to lock

the stable door.

We submit to this Court that if this Act is to be inter-

preted to destroy any rough and ready method the em-

ployer has for determining which employees he wants and

which he does not want the Act is clearly unconstitutional —

by imposing a bureaucratic supervision of his constitu-

~

25

tional right to hire and dischary* at will. These questions

are of some interest in the present case as it eannot, by the

farthest stretch of the imagination, be contended that there

were not various reasons for the discharge of the individual

employees herein in addition to the reasons leading up to -

the management’s determination to ‘‘cleen house’’.

We say the conduct of this case and of all cases of this

character will inevitably lead the Board into roving inquisi-

tions into the justice or injustice of the discharge of indi-

vidual employees, into questions of policy of employers,

into whether there were good reasons for the discharge of

any particular employee, and thus the freedom of the em-

ployer will be destroyed and his business supervised by .a

Bureau in Washington. It is noted that the Board in its ar-

gument in the Court below makes the point that an order to

restore the employge to duty with back pay does not es-

tablis&®a permanent condition. If it does not it is en-

tirely futile. The ordinary relationship of employer and

employee is substantially a personal service contract.

Courts of equity have always disclaimed any power to issue

mandatory injunctions compelling the specific enforcement

of contracts of personal service. This is substantially

what an order ‘to re-instate the employee amouats to. *It

seems folly too to believe that an order of re-instatement,

virtualiy a command to keep a particular employee em-

ployed or go out of business, can ever be beneficial either

to the employee or to the company. The employee will as-

sume that the company is making up one of Dr. Leiserson’s

favorite efficiency records against him with the object of

discharging him later on after the company has accumu-

‘See Mr. Justice Holmes’ Opinion in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld: \

man, 256 U. 8. 170. See also Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 F. 246;

Union Pacific R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F. 102; Coburn v. Cedar Valley Land Co.,

me 791; Miller v. Warner, 42 App. Div. 208; Davis v. Foreman, 3 Ch. 654,

-), 1894.

One of the reasons is the inequity which follows from the lack of mutuality.

Thua a Court compelling an employer to re-instate the employee would have no

way to compel the employee to continue to work for the employer and so a basic

‘inequity would exist.

i

lated enough good reasons for his discharge to satisfy the

Labor Relations Board in Washington. This one fact seems

proof enough that the employer’s right is being cut down

_ and this too without any corresponding benefit to the em-

ployee. ;

E. ‘The data as to the discharge of each individual employee.

The following information appears as to each individual

employee and should be considered as the Petitioners ‘‘de- |

fense’’ for discharging them when it determined to ‘‘clean

house’’: *

West: Employed two years and eight months as a bus

driver; Financial Secretary of Union; discharged without

any reason being given; no accidents, but Mason, called

‘*spotter’’ by the Board, reported he failed to collect fares.

The Board, in its Findings of Fact, seemed to indicate that

this happened only once. The record, however, showed it

happened three times (R. 293, 294). He was discharged

partly because of the reports about him from Mason and

partly because there were complaints about him (R. 326,

339). There was some trouble also about the Relief Fund

and West had said that ‘‘there won’t be any Relief Fund

in a few days’’. (R. 356, 364.)

We submit that if the management had determined to ©

‘‘clean house’’, which is the uncontradicted testimony, there

was ample reason for deeming West less desirable than

one as to whom there was no complaint or any previous

Hall: Employed two years and five months; Union man;

the investigator Mason heard him complain to passengers

in the bus he was driving about the company using a small

bus; told the passengers to get together and see Arnold

about it so they would not have to stand in the afternoon

when the bus carried mail; said the company put small

busses where large busses should be used and vice versa;

*

27

talked continually on route. This was in December, 1935, -

before any information about the Union came to the Peti-

tioner (R. 292). On another occasion on the same day Hall

continued to complain to the passengers and agitate them

with regard to a larger bus; told the passengers that he,

Hall, had told the supervisor that he was a dirty rat. Hall’s

wife reported to England, the Company’s Secretary, that

Hall was*running around with a woman, riding her on the

front seat of the bus and not collecting any fare from her.

The woman was breaking up her home and Mrs. Hall asked

him to discharge him which might break up the affair.

. England said that he would try to straighten it out with-

out dismissing him but later did dismiss him on the basis

of Magon’s report and on what his wife had said. Prior to

dismissing him he had spoken to Hall about the woman

on several occasions but his warnings did no good. His

wife called Englaril several times about it. He did not

dismiss him in January but. dismissed him with the other

men in March as‘in March he had the new men broken in

(R. 336, 337). .

In the Board’s brief below Hall ’s- irregularities are re-

ferred to as not of a4 serious nature, occurring several

months prior to the discharge. In addition, the Board

complained that ‘he particulars of the “‘spotter’s re-

ports’’ were not specified. This confirms Petitioner’s

contentions that while ostensibly the Board is engaged in

the task of ascertaining whether. the employees were dis-

charged because of the Union, in reality the Board has

slipped into the inevitable error of most Government agen-

cies in a position of authority and is exercising a general

power to review the reasons for the particular discharge,

thrusting the burden of justifying the discharge on the re-

spondent. The Board’s finding as to Hall shows that the

Board is exercising a general power of supervision aver the

Petitioner’s right to discharge. (R. 933-534 )

- _ We submit there was ample reason to discharge Hall as

° ™~ . '

28

between Hall and a pane as to whom there was no diffi-

culty.

Magaha: Bus sperater ‘for two years; no reason giyen

him for discharge. Magaha’s records showed accidents

February ©”, 1936, December 12, 1935, November 18, 1935,

November i, 1935, September 30, 1935, September 21, 1935,

August 21, 1935, A 8, 1935, July 28, 1935, December 3,

1935, January 26, 1935, and January 28, 1935 (R. 329, 331).

Some of these accidents Magaha admitted he was to blame

for. Investigator Mason’s report also showed that on De-

cember 8, 1935, he failed to collect proper fares (R. 327).

England, secretary of the company, testified that he took

the reports and the accidents into considerdtion when he

discharged Magaha (R. 331). In addition, England claimed

‘that he had a right to discharge a man for accidents even

though the accidents were not the man’s own fault; that

the company did not keep drivers with them who had acci-

dents (R. 333-334), the length of time they kept the men

being dependent upon the kind of accident (R. 334).

The right of the Petitionér to discharge Magaha was crit-

icized below by the Board on the ground that Petitioner’s

evidence lacks specification as to the complaints; that the

irregularities wefe not of a serious nature and no particu-

lars were specified. Magaha’s accidents were referred to

with the remark that ‘‘he had had several’’ in the two years

preceding his discharge but none were serious.

We submit that thirteen accidents in two years, guilty or

not guilty, like the three generations of idiots in Mr. Jus-

‘tice Holmes’ opinion in one of the Sterilization Cases,’ ‘tis

a enough’’.

Crissman: Bus driver; employed six and a half years;

Union member; no reason given him at time of discharge.

A passenger, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Rev-

enue named Joy, complained about Crissman’s discourtesy

and general lack of good sense (R. 325, 399, 401). On one

occasion Crissman refused to take a transfer from him and

1 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. 8. 200.

~*~

29

was very loud and discoyrteous: On another occasion he

was again’ discourteous to him about a transfer and made

him feel like a fool (R. 405). On another occasion there was

a rain, a lady got-on the bus, put her fare in the box and

the man with her was abost to get in with a small dog on

a leash. Crissman wouldn’t let the dog in and made both

the man’ and the woman get off the bus in the rain though

there were vacant seats in the bus at the time. On another

occasion he said Crissman made short, snappish and rough

remarks to the passengers. ~ These various incidents re-

garding Crissman were sufficient and numerous enough to

arouse Joy to the point of complaining officially to, the éom-

pany (R. 404, 406). Crissman called up and said he was

sick and could not work the morning after February 29th,

due to his activities the night before (R. 350). This pro-

duced the following revealing comment from the examiner,

Mr. Carmody:

‘‘Mr. Carmody: These bus drivers live in gold fish

bowls, don’t they, in most companies, and not much of

their private life that isn’t brought out by your check-

ers and investigators, and spotters is there?’’ (R. 350)

The Board in its brief below pooh-poohs the complaints

against Crissman, comments on the complaints being eight

months old, states they were of minor importance and com-

plains that there was no specification of the particulars.

We submit that Petitioner had ample reason for dis-

charging Crissman in comparison with a driver against

whom there were no complaints. It must be remembered

as to the above that Petitioner was prevented from com-

Paring the data against the above drivers and against the

other employees discharged, with the records of the various

employees retained. The Examiner refused to allow this

(R. 307,311). ~

The remaining employees discharged were employees in

the garage. To our way of thinking the Petitioner had-con-

30

siderable reason for discharging each one of them. Peti-

tioner is not compelled to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that it was properly exercising its constitutional right to

discharge the men in question. Thus as to Beall, he had

had no heavy duty experience, being a slow worker and

hard to. keep at work. In addition he had some outside diffi-

culty in the way which prevented him staying on the work.

He would leave the job in the afternoon after working in

the morning and generally speaking was a hard man to

keep on the job. On one occasion he had put in a clutch

and they later had to take it out the same day, which cost

the company money (R. 449).

As to Birch he was doing pretty well but he paid very

little attention to anything likely to help him. Wilsey, the

foreman, had to keep after him all the time and watch him

very closely ; he would destroy almost as much as he would

make. ‘41e talked with him a number of times and tried to

help but he did not seem to improve (R. 449).

It is true that neither Beall nor Birch had received a

complaint concerning their work or been reprimanded but

of course at this time there was no general order of the

Board requiring employers to observe this practice. In its

brief below the Board refers to the company’s statements

about Beall and Birch as being ‘‘vague and unsubstan-

tiated allegations of inefficiency’’. This gives us an in-

sight into the Board’s viewpoint. Upon a charge such as

the present the Board evidently will not take at its face

value a company’s observation, from the lips of its shop

foreman that certain mechanics were not as good as they

could be. Such reports must be ‘‘substantiated’’. Sub-

stantiated by what, we ask? We contend that even if the

‘reports were wrong the company is absolved from blame

in discharging the man if in fact it discharged him on the

basis of the reports. ©

Garrison, Moore and Dove were bus washers. -England,

the Petitioner’s assistant general manager, testified that

passengers had complained of soiled clothes in the buses

during the winter; that the company had to pay for clean-

_

31

ing clothes in a number of cases, about a dozen times in

1935; that the fault must have been that of the night bus

washers and accordingly Moore and Garrison were dis-

charged (R. 302-305). Dove was disoharged for the same

reason (R. 348). England had complained-to Wilsey, the

shop foreman, about the dirty busses and Arnold had beeh

‘‘riding him about it’’. Wilsey fired the men for this rea-

son, because of their inefficiency in keeping the buses clean

(R. 348, 448).

Smith: Garage worker. He gassed and oiled the busses,

Wilsey blamed Smith for letting a bus run out of gas ona

couple of occasions. After the morning run the busses would

come in the garage and they would find the gas caps off and

oil over the fenders and down the sides of the hood and oil -

filter caps missing. They had to buy these things by the

dozen. Smith was to blame for it (R. 448).

As to McCauley, a garage employee, he originally had

been a laborer engaged in putting chains on cars. The night

foreman reported to Wilsey, the shop superintendent, that

he was a very poor mechanic. Wilsey replied ‘*Well, Ili

get rid of him and see if I can pick you up a new man’’.

This took place around the 11th of February. (R. 447)

As there is no testimony the management knew anything

about the Union until the end of February it would seem:

that the Petitioner’s defense of its right to discharge Mc-

Cauley should be allowed. .

Atwell: Garage employee. His work had only been satis-

factory in spots. There were complaints about pilot bear-

ings and clutch bearings burning out; the greasing was bad.

He had broken up a grease gun and fittings were lying all

around the place. This seemed to be a constant condition.

Part of it could be attributed:to Atwell, who was respon-

sible for the greasing at night (R. 441, 442). Wilsey had a »

grease record of the man that showed the jobs that were

bad. They kept him on a long while but finally fired him

(R. 441-442).

Miller: A garage employee. The foreman reported to

the superintendent a couple of times that he was not much

32

of a mechanic and that he, the foreman, wanted a better

man (R. 451). |

He was not a first rate mechanic. On a certain job he -

left parts around and acted as no mechanic ordinarily does

(R. 507, 508). Record slips kept by the shop superinten-

dent showed Miller’s lack of ability (R. 508-511). He was

supposed to mark down the time he worked on each bus on

these slips, but did not do so (R. 511). They made up their

mind in the middle of January to discharge him (R. 511).

Miller, when he came to. work would not pick his work up

and the foreman would have to almost take his hands and

lay them on the work (R. 512).

On one occasion a brake job turned cut bad and he blamed

this on Miller (R. 515, 517).

Theodore W. Frederick: Frederick. ¥ was the acting day

foreman. There had been a number of breakdowns as al-

ready shown and these had increased over a period of

months and there was also some foreign substance showing

up in the carburetors which prevented their working prop-

erly (R. 409-511).. The men were continually in huddles

neglecting their work. In part the shop superintendent

Wilsey blamed this condition on Frederick, the day fore-

man, and this was one of the things that led up to his desire

to ‘‘clean house’’ (R. 423, 424, 429, 430). :

Philmore W. Frederick: He was a mechanic’s helper in

the garage employed on the day shift. The shop superin-

tendent stated that the last two or three months he was

‘“becoming kind of dominant and would react against any

orders more or less’’ (R. 442). To be a good mechanic he

- should have had tools and would not buy them, not even a

pair of pliers or a five cent tool. -When he asked him about

this Frederick replied ‘‘You don’t pay enough money: to

buy fools’’ and ‘‘Why don’t you pay enough wages”’ (R.

442, 443). He didn’t think this was the proper way for

Frederick to talk and made the same remark to Frederick’s

brother, the acting day foreman, saying as to Philmore

Frederick ‘‘The boy is feeling his oats’’, He was insolent

33

on another o¢casion. Thére was bickering between them

but he let it go. Frederick seemed to have reached his ca-

pacity as a mechanic the first year he was there. Wilsey took

him off the job of washing cars and put him on the day

crew though he refused the first time to work on the day

crew which was a better job. He did not seem to want to

become a more skilled laborer and reacted against Wilsey’s

effort to make him one. He showed no mechanical improve-

ment thereafter. Seven weeks prior to his discharge they

put him on a spring job in the shop but he got so tangled

and tied wp on the job that the superintendent was dis-

gusted and said to him ‘*Boy, you’ll never be anything but

just a grease ball’’ (R. 443). i = es

' McDonald: A mechanic in the garage. Engaged in body

work; the shop superintendent kept a record of each man.

On McDonald’s record appeared the words ‘‘Stall, lazy

and not neat’’ which referred to his workmanship. The

* inside of the bus should be kept neatly, the moldings and

the weldings smooth. McDonald was a sort of an appren-

tice to Wilsey, the shop superintendent, who was compelled

to explain things to him constantly. He had the habit of .

making a mess all about him which had to be cleaned up

(R. 445, 446). :

Harmon: Working foreman on the night shift. Harmon,

like Theodore Frederick, was held by the management to |

be responsible for the unsatisfactory conditions in the shop

and was discharged on this account. He had been dis-

charged twice before (R. 413, 419).

We contend that on the basis of the information fur-

nished the management by the shop superintendent, Mr.

Wilsey, and coming to tht management from other sources,

coupled with general conditions which had gotten steadily

worse since October, the Petitioner was amply justified in

discharging the various employees mentioned. It may be

that the record may show giifferences of opinion between

the management and the various employees or between the

management and the discharged day and night foremen as.

34

to whether the employees discharged were efficient or in-

efficient. It is submitted, however, that the question before

the Board was, not whether in actual fact the particular

employees discharged were good workers or bad workers

but whether the Petitioner, through its assistant general

manager England or the shop superintendent Wilsey in

fact discharged the employees because of their opinion that

they were inefficient. It might be that some of the men dis.

charged were efficient. Wilsey and England may have

thought otherwise. Certainly the record of each individual

as above shown at least supports the view that compared

with other employees the particular persons discharged

were undesirable looked at from their work in the past. If

the management determined to ‘‘clean house’’ it was per-

missible for it to discharge its least efficient employees or

even, if it saw fit, to take a chance on the new employees

who answered the advertisement. Going back to the Peti-

tioner’s action in so discharging them and attempting to

read into the discharge of 20 Union men an effort to destroy

the Union when the Petitioner retained in its employ more

Union men than it discharged, including the Union’s Presi-

dent, is to throw the burden of proof upon Petitioner to

_ prove a negative fact and this we submit amounts to a de-

privation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to discharge

at will. It is significant that not one word appears in the

record to the effect that in engaging the new men who an-

swered the advertisement any question was asked them as

to whether they were Union or non-Union men or intended -

to join the Union once thay were employed. If there had

been any desire to cripple the Union in firing the old men

it is reasonable to suppose that there would have been a

strong intimation to this effect in engaging the new. The

evidence in this case, no matter what view this Court takes

of the conflicting testimony with regard to Mr. Arnold’s

and Mr. Engiand’s statements about the Union, in the last

analysis is limited to proof that the Petitioner discharged

a certain number of Union employees, without singling out

35

the ringleaders, at about the time a Union was being

_ formed. The Petitioner showed good reason for effecting

a wholesale discharge at around this time. If upon the

evidence in this case Petitioner is to be convicted of having

attempted to destroy the Union by his action we come back

to. the question already asked in this br +: In what way

F. The alleged efforts of the management to Prevent the

formation of the union.

management. The most that the Board could say below is

- that the President of the Petitioner Company ‘‘queried’’

six of the bus drivers as to their membership in tHe Union

and then related certain unpleasant experiences he had

had with the labor Union. (R. 542) Certainly this

36

repealed by the present statute. We do admit, however,

that as construed and applied herein the President of any

company who says anything whatever during the formation

of a labor Union is likely to be unable to overcome the pre-

sumption that he made such a statement to prevent the

Union being formed.

Next, to eke out the proof reference was made below to

the advertisement for help wanted. (R. 531, 532, 541)

There was nothing mysterious or concealed about this

advertisement, and we have no apologies to make for it

except to say that, as counsel for Petitioner, if we had

been consulted about it beforehand we would have ad-

vised the Petitioner that there was very serious danger that

this advertisement, like the President’s very temperate and

decent remarks, might also add to the presumption that it

was part of a general plan to destroy the Union.

Next, the Board in its Findings (R. 531, 532, 541) points

to the circular, described as ‘‘a personal message from

1 It is imteresting to note Dr. Leiserson’s views of an employer's right with

respect to a labor union. He stated on crose-examination:

‘*When you say ‘rights with respect to the labor union’ he has no

basiness with the labor union, and the labor union is a matter of the

employees, and he has no more rights with the labor union than he has,

for example, with an association of people who sell him things.’’ (RB

He also stated in response to counsel’s questions as to how tenderly the em-

ployer must tread as to recognizing the union:

** First, let us begin with—here you have got an organisation, say, of

59 peo and of course if the employer were really following the lee,

he ee ae ey oe they had, and which Were mem-

un

information. * * *

**Q: accidentally? A: Except as told him, because he was

supposed to hs pose out of it.’’ (RB. 896.)

We submit that shows the atmosphere of bureaucratic bumptiousness in which

the present case was heard. As against Dr. Leiserson there is the clear state

ment of the Chairman of the Committee at the Senate Hearings to the effect

that ‘‘there is rio law that can prevent you from discussing the matter amicably

and peaceably with the workers, * * ° nor is there in this Bill anything to —

prevent an employer discussing with his employees the merits or demerits of

the various kinds of organizations’’. Also at the same Hearing Senator

37

_ Leon Arnold the President’’. Even if thie message had .

been put out with the direct object of convincing the men

that it was a bad thing to form the Union we say that the

President had a perfect right under the Constitution to do

this. Again we say that the Act herein does not repeal the

right of Free Speech. The message was so far from co-

ercion that only a mind fixated upon the notion that all

employers are irretrievably bent upon grinding down their

- employees could find anything objectionable in it. We ask

this Court in all seriousness to read this message, which

appears in a footnote below,’ and arrive at its own conclu-

sion as to whether any Congress in its senses intended any

such message to constitute a violation of the Act.

But aside from this the explanation of how the message

came to be sent out March 2, 1936, is so simple that the

effort of the Board to spell out some dark conspiracy in its

appearance at that time indicates either the absurd fixation

already referred to or the entire absence of any substan-

tial evidence such that any mud at all is good mud to throw

at the employer. ‘The fact is, and we challenge this Court

to examine the Record in this respect, the message resulted

from a sort of ‘‘pep’’ service which the Company sub-

scribed to a year in advance. The so-called ‘‘pep’’ talks

were received in a batch. On a page in the beginning of the

book containing on separate sheets the messages in ques-

‘tion there are a series of numbers, not consecutive, but

which indicate the particular messages to be sent out, de-

‘ Footnote.—‘‘A Personal Message From Leon Arnold, Washington, Va.

& Md. Coach Co., Arnold Operated.

antines groups of individuals in a basiness organize themselves into

cliques.

ebster’s definition of a cliqie is, ‘a narrow circle of persons associated

by common interests; a small and exclusive set, or coterie; generally used in

8 bad sense.’

The reason that the word clique is ‘generally used in a bad sense’ is that

the small and exclusive set composing it usually thinks more of promoting

the selfish interests of the clique than the collective interesta of the organi-

zation.

The members are more concerned in serving their own ends than in

serving the customers of the business who provide them with employment

and pay their wages.

sure way to acquire a poor standing, both in position and pay, in a

business organization is to acquire a good standing in a elique.’’ (R. 582)

\Y/

38 rd

pending upon the nature of the business. _ A slip is sent the ©

Company suggesting which particular messages to send out

in rotation. This particular message was sent out in ac-

cordance with the Company’s instructions, exactly as it

turned up in rotation. The Company did not pick out any

particular number each week, and the whole supply was

purchased at once. (R. 55.) The message of March the

first was a routine message which happened to come along

at that time. (R. 290, 291.) This is pilloried by the Board

as a ‘‘coincidence’’ (R. 532, 541.)

Next is the appearance of Joseph Arnold, the President’s

son, at the organization meeting (R. 530, 531, 540), wearing

‘ a driver’s cap. The Board’s idea apparently is that he wore

the driver’s cap to conceal his identity though he worked

every day in the week with the men as a fellow employee

and was well known to’them. Arnold’s explanation was

that he wore the driver’s cap because he had mislaid his

hat. (R. 374-384.) Anticipating the objection that the em-

ployees knew young Arnold, cap or no cap, (he, did not

wear a mask) the Board argued (R. 540) that Clark, the

organizer and a représentative of the National Organiza-

tion, did not know young Arnold even though the men did.

This reduces Arnold’s attempted deception to the infantile —

basis of going to the meeting in a driver’s cap knowing he

. could not. escape recognition by all-his other fellow em-

ployees, but in the hope that he could deceive Clark alone. -

(R. 182-184, 189, 190, 373, 384.) No such theory is possible.

The incident however illustrates the inclination of the Board

to take anything into consideration good, bad or indifferent

_ as evidence against the Petitioner.

We now come to Harmon’s testimony that Wilsey said

that Arnold would put his busses on a lot and burn them —

before he would recognize the Union (R. 139, 140); that

Arnold told Harmon while sitting in his car the night of

, the organization meeting that he would not recognize the

Union; that Frederick had testified that Wilsey said he ©

was not being discharged for joining the Union but because

of the ‘‘ander-handed way’’ he had gone about it (R. 190) ; |

39

that England made a similar statement to him at the time

of his discharge (R. 141) ; that Atwell and Miller testified

that upon being discharged by England the latter said the

Union was at the bottom of the .matter (R. 270, 487);

Bealle’s testimony that when Wilsey discharged him Wil-

sey said the Union was the cause (R. 233); Frederick’s

testimony that Wilsey discharged him because he had a

Union application blank. (R. 241.)

The Board’s comment below on this phase is that

England and Wilsey met this damaging testimony by

unconvincing denials. . *“‘Unconvincing’’ is a mere epithet. ©

England was a witness of the Board which presum-

ably thought he would tell the truth when -it called

him to testify. He is accused of “‘testifying generally’’,

that he did not tell any of the discharged employees that

their discharge was founded on Union activities. (R. 301.)

He added that when the discharged men asked questions

‘the did not answer them’? (R. 301), presumably following

Dr. Leiserson’s probable advice.. Wilsey’s denial that the

- Union activities of the employees had anything to do with

their discharge is referred to sarcastically, like the ‘“Der-

sonal message’’, as a ‘‘coincidence”’. (R. 414.)

This Court will realize that in the situation of these dis-

charges, it is an easy thing for a number of. workmen to out-

Swear one employer. It is a significant feature of the testi-

mony in the present case that not one single alleged state-

ment as to discharge for Union activities was heard by »

more than one employee. It is reasonable to suppose that ©

if there had been a serious effort to prevent the formation

of this Union some substantial effort, some attempt ‘along

the line of a direct threat would have been made. There

would be the usual testimony that the management was en-

gaged in ‘‘boring from within’. There is no such showing

in the present case. The Board’s own witnesses Arnold

and England testified that they made no effort whatever to

discourage the men and their denial ought to stand on a

, higher footing than the obviously interested statements of

€ men relative to their discharge for. Union activities,

which statements are unconvincing, if for no other reason,

than the fact that assuming them to be true they were made -

when it was all too late, and the Union was already formed.

It is too much to argue that after a Union is formed the

Petitioner would discharge twenty out of fifty-seven Union

men on the theory that their discharge would be a lesson to

the remainder. This argument might have some sense if

it were coupled with further testimony that an effort was

then made to get the remainder of the fifty-seven to resign

or otherwise to destroy the Union. But there is no such

testimony in the present case. The management's alleged

efforts to destroy the Union ceased upon the discharge of

the men; their efforts were meaningless or they were not

efforts at all, or did not ooour at all. We believe the latter.

As against this elaborate effort to spell out a conspiracy

to destroy the Union already formed, an effort trenching

on the one hand on-the guarantee of Free Speech, on the

other hand upon plain ordinary common sense, are the

substantial reasons already developed in the present Brief

for the determination to ‘‘clean house’’, and the reasons

supporting the discharge of each particular employee. We

say again that in an exceedingly complex matter of this sort

wherein the-order of the Board is so drastic as to amount

to a question of economic life or death for the Company

this Court ought to be convinced only by the clearest pos-

sible evidence. We ask this Court to consider the ease with

which a change like that herein may be made, the ease with

which a specious proof may be adduced, supported by the

favorite argument of ‘‘ocoincidence’’, and the difficulty. of

the disproof by the Company of these easy charges. We

ask this Court again to consider the matter in the light of

the argument already made that for all practical purposes

the Act, as construed and applied herein, has operated to

thrust the of proving a negative fact, the absence

of any rt to destroy the Union, upon the Petitioner.

viewpoint will reveal the ‘‘clear error’’ referred to

present Chief Justice in Texas and N. O. R. Co. v.

rf

Brotherhood, 281 U. 8. 548.

41

Part II.

Unoonstitutionality.

A. The act herein is unconstitutional in its entirety.

As already stated, Petitioner at the outset of the proceed-

ings before the Board appeared specially and filed an ob-

jection to the jurisdiction of the! Board asserting the un-

constitutionality of the Act on the same grounds as in the

companion cases herein, namely:

1. On the ground that the Act was a delegation of

legislative power to the Board in violatian of Section 1,

Article 1 of the Constitution; :

2. That the Act was a delegation of judicial power

in violation of Section 1 and Section 2, Paragraph 1,

Article 3 of the Constitution on the grgwnd that Sec-

tion 7 of the Act as construed and agytied herein was

in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, the Board

construing ihe said Section 7 to-grant an absolute and

unqualified right of self-organization to employes un- .

restrained by the necessity of the exercise of such right

subject to the rights of Petitioner and the public:

3. On the ground that Section 8, Paragraphs 1 and 3

of the Act in themselves and as construed and applied

deprived Petitioner of its liberty and property with-

out Due Process in violation of the Fifth Amendment ;

4. On the ground that Section 10 as construed and

applied denied Petitioner the right of trial by jury and

the right to have facts so tried examined in a Court

of the United States according to the rules of the com-

mon law in violation of the Seventh Amendment, the

said Section 10 likewise conferring on the Board judi-

cial power in violation of Sections 1 and 2, Article 3

of the Constitution;

5. On the ground that the Board in construing and

applying the Act exercised powers contrary to the res.

ervations of the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution,

(R. 26-28).

Petitioner’s objection to the jurisdiction of the Board on

tte above Constitutional grounds being overruled, Peti-

42

tioner, without waiving its objection to the Roard’s juris-

diction, filed an Answer to the Board’s Complaint, (R. 28).

The above Constitutional objections are likewise reiter-

ated in the Specification of Errors in | the present Brief. (P.

10.)

Inasmuch as the cinatitutienaliiy of the present eet has

been assailed from‘every possible angle in the case immedi-

ately preceding the present and the cases following it,

counsel herein out of deference to the time of the Court will

not repeat the arguments contained in the able Briefs in

these companion cases, but respectfully ask leave to make

them a part of the present Brief by reference.

As the recently unreported decision of the Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in National Labor Rela-

tions Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., (January

11, 1937), may not be made part of the various Briefs herein

we respectfully refer this Court to this decision and speci-

fically rely upon its judgment holding the Act unconstitu-

tional as in violation of the Fifth and Seventh Amendments.

This case, like the present, admittedly involved interstate

commerce.

‘As the present case seems to be the only admittedly inter-

state case counsel for Petitioner will devote the remainder

of the present Brief to questions arising in the present case

alone.

B. Petitioner wi the ‘necessary standing to — insepara-

bility:

Petitioner herein is aware of this Court? s decisions in

New York ex rel Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 and other

cases’ to the effect that a party cannot invoke the decision

of this Court in respect x a provision of a Statute which

is not invalid as applied to him. Petitioner, however, is

not in this situation. Petitioner’s argument under this

1 Such as, Supervisors of Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. 8. 8305; Yasoo ¢

Mississippi V. Railroad Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. 8. 217; Austin Vv.

Aldermen of Boston, 7 Wall. 694; Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. 8. 67; Dilliag-

ham Vv. McLoughlin, 264 U. 8. 370; Darnel Vv. Indiana, 226 U. 8. 390; Hicklia

v. Coney, 200 U. 8. 169.

43 .

point is that the Statute shows on its face a comprehensive

scheme to regulate intra-state as well as inter-state activi-

ties, with an object in view which could not be attained

through the regulation of interstate relationships alone.

Hence it appears affirmatively that Congress would never

have passed the Statute to regulate the few remaining lines

of inter-state activity if it could not constitutionally regu-

late labor relations in intra-state industry as well. In this

aspect the question is one of statutory construction, ‘i.e.,

having already in the Railway Labor Act of 1934 regulated

the railroads and allied transportation systems with re-

spect to labor, can it be fairly argued that, the ‘‘compre-

hensive scheme’’ and the ‘fobject’’ of the Act being out-

lawed, Congress intended in the present Act to regulate

the few remaining inter-state activities such as bus com-

panies and communications systems. In this respect the

present case seems somewhat similar to the Trage-Mark

Cases, 100 U. S. 82. ) ee’;

Petitioner feels that when this Court has’ before it a

number of cases involving the intra-state application of the

Act, with the Records in support thereof, it is entirely

proper for the present Petitioner to argue the lack’ of in-

tention on the part of Congress to apply the Act to Peti-

tioner if the Act is held unconstitutional as beyond the

Commerce Clause in an intra-state case. If the present

Petitioner cannot raise this point under the present circum-

stances it seems clear that the question never could be

raised by one in Petitioner’s position and so the Statute

might be misconstrued or applied unconstitutionally, with

no recourse,*

Court is dependent solely upon the constitutionality of the Act. (See See.

10-e of the Act) Not only the litigants in question but the Court itself must

consider the, Act in its constitutional aspect in order to arrive at a finding

' that jurisdiction exists.

—ee

44

O. The cases on inseparability do not prevent the judicial

inquiry herein asked: ;

‘The Separability Clause in Section 15 of the present Act

is not conclusive upon the Courts, but is merely an aid in

determining the legislative intent and not a binding com.

mand:

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238;

Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286;

Railway Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S.

330, 362.

The effect of a separability clause is simply to reverse

the presumption in favor of inseparability and create the

opposite one of separability, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,

supra.

The result is that the presumption must be overcome by

considerations which establish ‘‘the clear probability that

the invalid part being eliminated the Legislature would not

have been satisfied with what remains’’,

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, citing

Wiliams v. Standard Oil Co.; 278 U. S. 235, 241;

— and L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U..S. 165, 184-

As this Court said in Carter v. Carter Coal Company:

‘Whether the provisions of a statute are so inter-

«woven that one being held invalid the others must fall,

presents a question of statutory construction and of

legislative intent, to the determination of which the

statutory provision becomes an aid. ‘But it is an aid

merely; not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kan-

sas, 264 U. S. 286, 290. The presumption in favor of

separability does not authorize the court to give the

_statute ‘an effect altogether different from that sought

by the measure. viewed as a whole.’ Retirement Board

v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. 8. 330, 362. ae

‘‘The. statutory aid to construction in ne way alters

the rule that in order to hold one part of a statute un-

45

constitutional and uphold another part as separable,

they must not be mutually dependent upon one another.

Perhaps a fair approach to a solution of the problem

is to suppose that while the bill was. pending in Con

gress a motion to strike out the labor provisions had

prevailed, and to inquire whether, in that event, the

statutes should be so construed as to justify the oon

clusion that Congress, notwithstanding, probab! y would

not have passed the price-fixing provisions of the

code.’’ (Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra.)

Petitioner accepts the burden of showing the clear proba-

bility that, the comprehensive scheme aside, Congress would

never have passed the present Statue to regulate in a bona

fide manner bus companies and allied lines of activity alone,

and that such an application would, in the words of this

Court in Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., supra, give the

Statute ‘‘an effect altogether different from that sought by

the measure viewed as a whole’’. .

D. The way the court below passed upon the question of

separability: |

The Court below in its Opinion (R. 597) after stating that

Petitioner had attacked the Act upon the ground of insepa-

rability and referring to the Carter Coal Case stated:

‘“‘There would be some basis for the application of -

this line of reasoning in the pending case if the Board’s

construction of the act were tenable, and it were rea-

sonable to interpret the act as applying to intrastate

as well as interstate activities. But as we have en-

deavored to show in an opinion filed this day in Foster

' Bros. Mfg. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, the

' power conferred upon the Board to prevent unfair

labor practices, as set out in Section 10 (a) of the act,

is restricted to unfair labor practices affecting com-

merce, and commerce is defined to mean trade, traffic,

commerce or transportation among the several states

or with foreign countries, Congress therefore did not

intend to regulate intrastate as well as interstate com-

merce, and there is no ground for the argument that

ee

we

an important and inseparable part of the act having

been condemned, the whole act must fall.’’ (Record,

page 597, 598).

The Opinion in Foster Brothers Manufacturing Co. v.

National Labor Relations Board will be found reported in .

85 F. (2d) 984. That case involved a bed manufacturing

company in Baltimore, Maryland. The Board held as in

the present case that the company’s discharge and refusal

to re-instate ten employees was an unfair labor practice.

The Court held that the power of the Board to prevent

unfair labor practices under Section 10 (a&) was restricted

to an unfair labor practice ‘‘affecting commerce’’. Under

the Scheckter and Carter cases it held that the activities

of an intra-state manufacturing concern like the Baltimore

company did not ‘‘affect commerce’’ and hence they were

beyond the power of Congress to regulate. It stated that

it might be immaterial whether the question to be decided

was to be considered one of statutory regulation or of

~ constitutionality, but since it could not be supposed that

Congress intended to pass an unconstitutional law the Court

preferred to rest its decision on the ground that Congress

never intended the Act to apply to the circumstances of

the Foster Brothers case. “4

As will be shown later under the present point it seems

impossible to believe that.Congress did not intend the Act

to apply to the circumstances of the Foster Brothers case,

and so the Court below was in error in resting its decision ~

upon a question of statutory construction rather than un-

‘ constitutionality. We contend that if Petitioner argued

below the question of inseparability, and if the Court below

decided it against Petitioner on the basis of its decision in

the Foster Brothers case, which decision avoided the con-

stitutional question by invoking a doctrine of statutory

construction; Petitioner’s only remedy in the present case

is to show that the Court below was in error on the ques-

tion of statutory construction. In any case, aside from the

47

grounds of the decision below the validity of Petitioner’s

present argument on the question of inseparability will

turn upon the ground upon which this Court rests its

decision in the intra-state cases to be argued with the pres-

ent case. No matter what the basis of the decision of the

Court below, if this Court should hold in the intra-state

cases herein that the Act is unconstitutional, then the pres-

ent Petitioner would seem to have the right to make the

present argument as to inseparability. We proceed then

to this argument. (

E. The act shows a comprehensive scheme to regulate em-

ployer-employee relationships in local industry as well

as in inter-state commerce: ©

The Act shows on its face that it was intended to regu-

late local industry as Well as companies engaged in inter-

state commerce:

(a) The title of the Act is admissible to show the

Congressional intent (Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. 8. 44, 66-

67). The Act is entitled ‘An Act to Diminish the

Causes of Labor Disputes Burdening or Obstructing —

Inter-State and Foreign Commerce, To Create a Na-

tional Relations Board and for Other Purposes.’’ The

Act is not limited to the prevention of disputes aris-

ing in inter-state commerce but covers any labor dis-

pute in any industry which might ‘‘burden”’ or ‘‘ob- .

struct’? commerce, however indirectly.

(b) - Section 8 prohibits employers from engaging in

certain ‘‘unfair labor practices.’’ The Act does not

limit the prohibition to employers while engaged in in-

ter-state commerce but covers all activities. This is

further shown by the definition of employers in Sec-

tion 2 (2) as ‘‘any person acting in the-interest of an

employer, directly or. indirectly.’ The ensuing spe-

cific exceptions are a further indication of the all-

inclusive meaning of eniployers.

(c) Employee is defined by Section 2 (3). to include

all employees with the exception of agricultural labor-

ers, domestic servants, etc. What would be the neces-

4

sity for the exclusion of domestic servants unless the

Act was intended to apply to all others engaged in

local or intra-state labor?

(d) Further proof of the above is found in Section

10 (a) empowering the Board ‘‘to prevent any per-

son from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed

in Section 8) affecting commerce.’’. (Italics ours).

(e) ‘‘Affecting commerce’”’ is not.limited to ‘’»-

curring in. inter-state or foreign commerce’’, which is

defined in Section 2 (6). ‘‘ Affecting commerce”’ is de-

fined in Section 2 (7) to mean:

‘*In commerce, or burdening or obstructing com-

merce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or

tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or ob-

structing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

This means the Board can prevent ‘‘unfair labor prac-

- tices’’ in any local industry if such practice however

indirectly tends to lead to a labor dispute however in-

directly burdening or obstructing commerce.

(f) Section 1 of the Act ‘‘Findings and Policy”

may be resorted to to show: the legislative intent.

Beard v. Rowan, 9 Pet. 301; United States v. Butler,

297 U. S. 1. Note in the ‘‘Findings and Policy’’ that

the denial of the right to organize and the refusal to

accept the procedure of collective bargaining leads to

strikes, that strikes obstruct commerce by ‘‘materially

affecting, restraining or eontrolling the flow of raw

materials or manufactured or processed goods from:

or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such

materials or goods in commerce’’; that strikes cause

diminution of employment and wages in such vol-

ume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for »

goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.

This Section does not restrict ‘‘employers’’ to employ-

ers engaged in inter-state commerce. It does not re-

strict ‘‘strikes’’ to strikes occurring in inter-state com-

merce, and in particular, it does not restrict the effect

of strikes to burdening and obstructing. inter-state

commerce. On the contrary, strikes are apparently held

to burden and obstruct anything and everything. They

cause diminution of employment not-in inter-state com-

merce but anywhere. The whole Section refers not

to disputes in inter-state commerce, but to disputes in

49

local industries ‘‘affecting’’ the flow of goods and imdi-

rectly affecting the flow of goods into the channels of

commerce.

The further finding that the inequality of bargain-

ing power burdens and affects the flow of commerce

and tends to aggravate business depressions by de-

pressing wage rates, ‘‘the purchasing power of wage

earners in industry and by Spt pore. Brin stabiliza-

tion of competitive wage rates and worki g conditions

within and between industries’’ shows that Congress

was not referring to the bargaining power of employ-

ees'in inter-state commerce only. Applied to the pres- -

ent case what possible effect would the inequality of

bargaining power among the employees of bus com-

panies and communications systems, even including all

the stock yards employees and those working on grain

elevators, have upon economic conditions generally in

this country? Excluding railroads what effect has the

purchasing power of employees in the other lines of

inter-state commerce upon a business depression? Fur-

ther, Congress refers to wage rates “‘tmindustry,’’ not

inter-state commerce, as having an effect upon business:

depressions.

(g) The administrative interpretation of the Act is

a guide to its construction (Kern River Co. v. U. 8.,

297 U. S. 147, 153-4; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. 8. 346,

351). The administrative interpretation has been ‘*na-

tion-wide and fancy-free.’” |

1 The following table compiled from the First Annual Report of the National

Labor Relations Board for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1936, shows how

few clear inter-state cases the Board has taken under consideration con-

trasted with the large number of cases involving local manufacturing or

production

Intra-State Cases (Local Manufacturing or Production) : Interstate Cases or Doubtful

Gate City Oottor Mills Mosinee P. Mills Co. Pen vania Greyhound Lines,

Wayne Knitting Mills Gibbs Dedarwae Go. eer Mes Management

Frushauf Trailer Oo. (2 cases) Englander Spring Bed Oo. b

Co., In Wesaunn By wy - nied han Go -

ne e Co.

Roliway Bearing Oo. Inc J & Laughlin Steel Corpo United Aircraft Mfg. Oo.

Bove Mills ‘Co I rnin Bervice Co., I We — ,% ee

.. Ine. . Ane. ew q

Wheeling Steel Co. (represents. United Parlor Peomince ine Mechay eas, and Yutegresh Oc.

tion ) . Standard Lime & Stone Oo. Consumers Ine.

El Paso Electric Co. (2 cases) Allen & Oo., Inc. Alantic Refini

Vegetable Oil Products Oo., Inc. Alabama Mills, Inc. tional Moreantile Ms

Duplex Printing Press Co (rep- Wheeling Steel Corporation tine Co. .

Tesentation ) F. ©. Castelli Oo., Ine National New York Packing &

Duplex Printing Press Oo. Columbia Radiator Oo Shipping Co. .

) International Nickel Oo., Ine Washington, Virginia & Mary-

Athos & Burlap Co., Inc Juneau Gold M Ooach Oo.

eros The W Oo. The Associated Press

50

(h)- As to the interpretation of

practices ‘‘affect-

ing’’ commerce, is it not a strange thing that in every

single solitary published case decided by the Board it

has held that the activities in question ‘‘affected’’ com-

. merce entirely regardless of the business the Company .

was engaged in (See Commerce Clearing House, Labor

Law Service, Paragraphs 15401,. 15564).

(i) The magnitude of the organization created by

Congress and the. enormous funds that it has appro-

priated.to maintain it is an indication that the Act was

never intended to apply merely to inter-state com-

merce (omitting railroads).

We conclude therefore from the above that Congress in-

tended the Act to apply to ‘‘intra-state’’ cases, as the word

is used in the present Brief.

Intra-State Cases (Local Manufacturing or Production)

Ootambias Enameling & Stamp

rie Printing Co

Clinton Cotton Mills Mesta Machine Oo.

Commercial Alcohol Mooresville Cotton Mills

Co.—American D ans Renown Stove Oo.

United States Stamp - Bradley Lumber Oo. (2 cases)

National Casket Oo., , Utterstrom Brothers,

Sands Manufacturing Oo. Cc. G. Conn, a :

Baer Silk es Co., Ine. St. Clair’ Rubber Oo.

Fisher Flouring Mills a ae ey Co. of America

: Fn mm t

Beaver Lois Mills pm Cotton Mills

Timken Silent Automatic Oo. Crucible Steel Co. of America

Cleveland Chair Co (representation)

Oe. ie. Marks ‘Clothing Robért H. Foerderer, Inc

, a. & Sons Co. Wholesale Radio Service, Inc.

Gray-Knox Marble Co. (repre

sentation)

Haffelfinger Wall Paper

Kentucky Firebrick Co.

Aluminum Co. of America

Osrlisle Lumber Oo.

Indiana Textile Mills, Inc.

‘Robinson & Golluber

Jeffery DeWitt I * Oo., Atlas Drop Fo Co.

Inc. Louis Hornick a

Bell Oil 4 oe Bemis Brothers Bag Co.

Fashion lece Dye Works Oo., Sanat Knitting Mills

E Tlena Knitting Mills

American Hat Mfg. Oo. Samson Tire & Rubber Corpora

Canvas Glove Mfg. ao Ine. tion

. Anwelt Shoe Mfg. Tucker Oi] Co...

Ansin Shoe Mfg. _ Demarest Silk Co.

Yale Underwear Oo. The Optical Products Oo.

‘Dwight Manufacturing Co Gardner-Denver Co.

Oregon Worsted Boss Manufacturing Co. (2

Canton + i nameling Ri de Xni Mil

2 vers nitting 8

- Co. Aluminum Products Co

Pittsburgh Steel - Trenton Mills. Inc.

— Motor Service Oo., —— -Norwich Silk Mills,

ne

Interstate Cases or Dowbt}

The Associated Press (represe

tation}

American Oil Co.

Agwilines, Inc.

om Inc.

8t. Joseph Stock Yards Co.

D & H Motor Freight Co.

Lykes Brothers—Ripley Stes

ship Co.

;

51

F. Summary of the object of the act:

The doctrine of ‘‘piercing the veil?’ has already been ap-

_ plied by this Court in the Schechter and Carter cases. Any-.

one .reading the present Act and considering the Board’s

application of it will see that its real object is not to regu-

late inter-state commerce but to set up for social and eco-

nomic ends a nation-wide scheme for the assistance of la-

bor and the séttlement of ‘disputes between Labor and

Intra-Btate Oasee (Local Manufacturing or Production) Interstate Oases or Doubtful

Bemis Bros. Bag Co. Auth Electrical Specialty Co.,

Lion Bhoe. Oo. Inc.

Lehman Bros. Inc. J. Freeser & Sons, Inc.

8 & K Knee Pants Oo. Toledo Shipbuilding Oo.. Inc. (2

Mann Edge Tool Oo. (repre- cases

- gentation ) 4 Quidnick Dye Works

Mann “er Tool Co. (complaint) Magnolia Petroleum Co.

Edward E. Oox, Printer, Inc. American Tobacco Oo.

Sunshine Hosiery Mill Whiterock Gasrries, Ine.

Sneath Glass Co. = Fall River Works Oo.

Foster Brothers Manufacturing Fit-Rite Slipper Oo., inc.

an Fuse Tobacco Oo Predentict ee onin « Mills

John Blood & Sons Oo. Memphis Furniture Manufactur-

Wallace Man Oo, ing Co. (2 cases)

Gordon b Clark & Reid

Brown and Williamson Tobacco Atlas Mills

Co. J. W. Sanders Ootton Mills, Inc.

Ward > ee Stanley Works Co.

Pioneer Pearl Button Oo. Richards Wilcox Manufacturing

Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. Co.

Sommervile Manufacturing Oo. Chesapeake Manufacturing Oo.

—Somerset Mfg. Co. Claussner Hosiery Co.

- Gray-Knox Marble Co. Nolan Motor Oo.

Belmont Stamping & Ensmeling Schonfeld & Reis

laint

yertown Burial Casket Co.

Belmont Stamping & Enameling Fisher Bod Corporation

Co Chevrolet Oo,

Internationa! Filter Co. (2

cases)

Of the 180 cases covered by the above tabulation only 20 directly involved

interstate commerce, any doubt being resolved in favor of classification

~ as inter-state commerce. The balance, 160 cases, involve local

" Concerns. Of course, Petitioner does not contend that these latter companies

by Petitioner’s counsel without access‘to the official records, some of the cases

the uaod 88 infra-state may in fact be inter-state cased in the strict emery

Panies, steamship companies, pipe line companies, or communications systems, .

The intra-state companies above referred to are local businesses such as dye

rubber, tools, prin presses, ete.

The administrative interpretation of the Act is therefore overwhelmingly

in favor of Petitioner’s contentions that it was intended to apply to local

man’ oe and production. In truth only such an ee arervtation would

© slightest chance of achieving the broad results te ‘‘ Findings of

and Policy’’ shows it aims at. :

52

Capital. The Act had its inception not in the needs of the

non-railroad branches of inter-state commerce, (it seems _

folly to contend it), but in the chagrin of labor unions when

this Court in the Schechter case held invalid Section 7 (a)

of the NIRA Act. Why not admit that the ultimate object

of the present Act is to fasten the doctrine of labor un-

ionism, like a State Religion, upon every business in the

country with more than two employees? (See Report, Sen-

ate Committee on Education and Labor, May 1, 1935). We

go further and say that the further object of the Act is

even more sinister, namely, compulsory collective bargain-

ing. Section 8 (5) making it an unfair labor practice .to

refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of the

employees is practically the same as compulsory arbitra-

tion. Either ‘‘bargaining’’ means offers back and forth

leading to a contract or it means nothing. The essence of

an offer is that the other party may accept it. If, there-

fore, a series of offers back and forth prove unacceptable

they tend to become progressively lower or more accepta-

‘ ble. As the Act apparently requires the employer to keep

on making or receiving offers it follows that the real ob

ject and achievement of the Act is a form of compulsory

arbitration under the guise of compulsory collective bar-

gaining. It has the added vice of. requiring the parties to

make a contract, for if collective bargaining is not to lead

to a contract it amounts to mére conversation.

G. If the object of the act was to enact a comprehensive

scheme to regulate intra-state activities as well as inter-

state the act has not been misconstrued but is uncon-

stitutional:

It seems almost incredible to Petitioner that in the face

of the plain intention of the Act and its consistent admin-

istrative application the Court below came to the conclv-

- sion that it was not intended to apply to ordinary intra-

state industry and manufacturing concerns. It is signifi-

53

cant that other Courts have held otherwise. Thus in Board

v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 83 F. (2d) 98, a case

exactly similar to the Foster Brothers case, the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impliedly held the

Act unconstitutiona:, making no mention whatsoever of

atiy possible misconstruction of the Act by the Board. To

the seme effect is the decision of the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit in Fruehauf Trailer Co. y.

Board, 85 F. (2d) 391. To the same effect is the decision |

of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in

Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 83 F. (2d)

731 and 84 F. (2d) 1000. The District Courts have like-

wise decided intra-state cases on the basis of unconstitu-

tionality and not construction. Thus in El Paso Electric

Co. v. Elliott, et al (U.S. D. C., Western Dist. Texas) the

Court (Judge Boynton) held the Act unconstitutional in

toto. To the same effect was the decision in Stout v. Pratt, ©

12 F. Supp. 864°(W. D. Mo., Otis, J.), wherein the Court

stated that it was the ‘‘clear intent’’ of the Act to subject

the relations between employers and employees even in

small intra-state companies to the control of the Labor

Relations Board. me : :

The recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for ©

the Ninth Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v.

Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. (January 11, 1937), to

the effect that the Act herein was intended to regulate in-

ter-state commerce: alone seems to beg the question as the

Opinion does not consider whether mining or manufactur-

ing ‘‘affects commerce’’ within the meaning of the Act.

As construed by the Board intra-state manufacturing ac-

tivities having any effect at all, however remote, upon in-

ter-state commerce come within the scope of the Act. The

constitutionality of any Act of Congress does not arise in

vacuo but as the particular Act is construed and applied to

the particular cases. If, therefore, the Board has consist-

ently construed and applied the present Act to cases of

intra-state manufacture on the theory that labor disputes

ae *

54 i

in such industries affect inter-state commerce, the admin-

istrative construction and application of the Act, coupled

with the avowed ends and purposes of the Act revealed by

the Act itself, constitutes a showing that the Act was really

intended to apply to intra-state commerce in the sense that

as construed and applied the Act holds most forms of in-

tra-state commerce really .inter-state commerce.

It would seem from the above that the Board has not

really misconstrued the Act but has taken the plain man-

date of Congress at its face value, which is to regulate all

industry with reference to labor relationships. If so, the

Act has not been misconstrued by the Board but is uncon-

stitutional in respect to the regulation of intra-staté indus-

try.

H. The proof that the act is unconstitutional as to intra-

state industry:

As to this, in order not te burden the Court and du-

_ plicate the arguments of other counsel in the compan-

ion cases herein, counsel for Petitioner respectfully re-

quest the Court to consider as Petitioner’s argument

the various arguments made in the companion cases

herein relative.to the unconstitutionality of the Statute

as applied to intra-state industry. It seems more fit-

ting to counsel ‘that such arguments should be considered

in connection with the concrete facts of the particular

cases which have arisen. We feel confident that, bearing

in mind the late Mr. Justice Holmes’ admonitions in the

_ Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 402, and -the re-

marks of the present Chief Justice in the Schechter Case,

the Commerce Clause can never be extended to cover the

regulation of intra-state industry no matter what ‘‘the

distant repercussions’’ may be.

55

I. Under this court’s decisions on separability the entire act

‘is unconstitutional. :

As already stated the question in the present case may be

viewed from the standpoint either of statutory construction

‘or inseparability. In other words, either the Act was not

intended by Congress to apply to Petitioner if its all-in-—

clusive application to intra-state commerce is destroyed,

.or the Act is unconstitutional in the sense that being un-

constitutional as to intra-state commerce it is unconsti-

tutional as to everything, there being no way to disentangle

one aspect of the Act from the other. From the latter view-

point itis agp that under this Court’s decisions on

separability the Act is unconstitutional as a whole.

At the outset counsel for Petitioner find it difficult to per-

ceive how this Court can ever adapt the machinery of the

Act to a different object than the object revealed by the

Act itself. If, therefore, the object of the Act is the regi-

mentation of all industry, intra-state-as well as inter-state,

with respect to the relationships of employer-enrployee, the

application of the Act by judicial excision to interstate in-

dustry alone constitutes the application of the Act to a dif-

ferent object than that intended by Congress. Thé Statute,

by judicial construction, would be put to a use not intended

by Congress when it was enacted. It is submitted therefore,

initially, that the Courts do no service to Congress by hold-

ing constitutional a Statute piece-meal when the object of

the Statute as a whole is different from the object of the

Statute in its constitutional part. |

Back of every Statute is a purpose. If the purpose of the

present Statute is to regulate industry as a whole, with re-

spect to labor relations, is this purpose effected by ekeing

out through judicial construction a regulation of only a

hundredth part of industry? In this connection, it must

not be forgotten that the object of the Act is not, at least’

ostensibly, to encourage labor unions for the purpose -of

ba

56

preventing strikes, but the prevention of strikes because of

their effect upon the general economics of the country.

Tt is difficult to perceive how the prevention of strikes in

bus companies, even in the additional industries regulated

under the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Grain

Futures Act, would prevent the evils so roundly denounced

in the ‘Findings and Policy’’. In this aspect this Court's

decision in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, seems very

close to the present state of facts. In these cases there

was before the Court a Statute covering the registration

-enerally of trade-marks without being restricted to trade-

marks used in inter-state commerce. An indictment for a

violation of the Statute was before the Court, The Court .

considered the Power of Congress to enact the Statute, trac-

ing it solely to the Commerce Clause. The Court said:

**When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact a

law, which can onl be valid as a regulation of com-

mece, it is hematin, A to expect to find on the face of

the statute, or from its essential nature, that it is a

~ regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among

the several States, or with the Indian Tribes. If it is

not so limited, it is in excess of the ee of Congress.

If tts main — be to establish a regulation a

plicable to all trade, to commerce at all points, esperr-

_ ally if it is — that tt is designed to govern the

commerce wholly betwecn citizens of the same State, it

ts obviously the exercise of a power not confided to

Congress.’” (United States v. Steffens, 100 U. S.,-at—_

page 97. Italic ours). ° | oar

“The Court then held that the Act made no distinction be- _

tween trade-marks used in inter-state commerce and trade-

marks involving intra-state commerce alone. The Court

said:

‘*It is, therefore, manifest that no such distinction 1s

found in the Act, but that its broad purpose was to

establish a universal system of trade-mark registration,

for the fit of all who had already used a trade-

mark, or who wished to adopt one in the future, without

57

regard to the character of the trade to which it was to

be applied, or the locality of the owner.” (United

States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. at page 98. Italics ours).

The'Court then considered the argument of separability,

namely, that even though the: Statute was unconstitutional

as to intra-state trade-marks it could be held constitutional

as to trade-marks used in inter-state commerce. As to this.

the Court said: ”

‘‘While it may be true that when one part of a

statute is valid and constitutional and another part is

unconstitutional and v6id, the court may enforce the

valid part where they are distinctly separable so that

\ each can stand alone, it is not within the judicial prov-

\ ince to give to the words used by Congress a narrower

meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in

order that crimes may be punished which are not das-

cribed in language that brings them within the con-

stitutional power of that bo y.’’ (United States v.

Steffens, 100 U. S. 99).

It is submitted that the quotations above seem applicable

almost word for word to the present Act. The object of

the Trade-Mark Act was, as the Court said, ‘‘to establish a

universal system of trade-mark registration’. Similarly,

the object of the present Act is to establish a universal

system regulating labor relationships throughout the whole

_ country. Just as in the TradéMark cases this Court held

it could not salvage a part of the Act when the universal

application of the Act we&ld be unconstitutional 80 we sub-

mit in the present case it cannot sustain the Act as to the

few remaining branches of inter-state commerce.

Nor is the force of the Trade-Mark decision destroyed by

the fact that the Court was dealing with a criminal offense,

and that, in its own words:

“It is not within the judicial province to give to the

words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they

are manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes

‘may be punished which are not described in language

o ‘

ee

58

that brings them within the constitutional power of that

body.”’

There is no difference in principle between the creation of

civil liabilities.in the present Statute (in the form,of un-

fair labor practices) and the criminal offenses set forth in

the Trade-Mark Statute. If, therefore, in the Trade-Mark

Act this Court could not read into the ‘‘universal system”

a limitation in favor of inter-state commerce it follows that

it cannot read into the ‘‘universal system’’ in the present

Act a limitation in favor of inter-state commerce. The real

’ reason, it seems to us, is that this Court cannot reframe the

object of the Act. In this respect the present Act is far

clearer than the Trade-Mark Act. In the Trade-Mark case

this Court was compelled to glean the ‘‘universal system’’

from the Act itself which was an old-fashioned piece of

legislation without any findings of fact and policy. But in

the ‘‘Findings and Policy’’ of the present Act there is the

clearest possible indication of the universal system the Act

was intended to put into effect.

Similar to the Trade-Mark Cases and cited by this Court

in its decision is United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214,

wherein this Court considered a Statute punishing election

_ Officers for refusing to any person the right to cast his vote

at an election. This.Court held that Congress could only

punish such an offense when the refusal was on account of

race, color or previous condition cf servitude. It was urged

that the more general description of the offense embraced

_ the particular aspect ‘‘on account of race, color, etc.’’, and

that the Section was valid when in fact the denial was on

account of ‘‘race, color, ete.’’. But this Court held other- .

wise, stating :

‘‘We are not able to reject a part which is uncon-

stitutional and retain the remainder, because it is not

—s, to separate that which is constitutional, if

there any such, from that which is not. The

proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out

59

or disregarding words that are in the section, but by

inserting words that are not there now. Each of the

sectiéns must stand as a whole or fall altogether. The

language is plain. There is no room for construction,

unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution. The

question, then, to be determined is, whether we .can

introdnce. words of limitation into a penal statute so

as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general

only. * * * To limit this statute as now asked for |

would be to make a new law, not to enforca an old

one. This is no part of our duty.” (United States v:

Steffens, 100 U. S. at page 99).

As this Court said in the Trade-Mark cases:

“If we should, in the case before us, undertake to

make by judicial construction a law which Congress.

did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if

the matter were now before that body, it would be un-

willing to do, namely: make a trade-mark law which

is only partial in its operation, and which would com-

plicate the rights which parties would hold, in some

instances under the Act of’ Congress, and- in others

under state law. Cooley, Const. Lim., 178, 179; Com.

v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482.’ (United States v. Steffens,

100:U. 8. at page 99). :

The above seems expressly applicable to the present case.

It is no answer to quote the separability provision of

Section 15 of the present Act and to argue that Congress in

this provision indicated its wish that if the Act was un-

constitutional as to intra-state labor relations still it should

_ be held applicable to labor relationships of employers and

employees engaged’ in inter-state commerce. This over-

‘looks, as already said, the object of the Act shown by the

“Findings and Policy’. But in addition, it makes the

> ea

“Findings and Policy”’ repugnant to the Act itself. What

possible reference can Section 1 (c) of the ‘*Findings and

Policy”? to the effect that the denial of collective bargain-

ing materially affects, restrains and controls the flow of

raw materials or manufactured goods in the channels of

60

commerce, have to bus companies devoted entirely to pas-

senger service? Or what can be the relationship of Section

1 (ad) of the ‘‘ Findings and Policy’’ as to the effect that the

refusal to accept the procedure of collective bargaining

causes diminution of employment and wages in such volume

ag substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods

flowing in inter-state commerce? We say nothing further

on the atatement in the ‘‘Findings and Policy’’ that in-

equality of bargaining power (in bus companies, for in-

stance) tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions.

It seems clear from the above that if the separability

argument is to be applied to the present case the Court

must not only prune. away the application of the Act to —

intra-state commerce but physically cut the ‘‘ Findings and

Policy’’ right out of the Act. at

This Court’s decision in Mill v. Wallace, 259 U. 8. 44, 70,

supports Petitioner’s present argument. In that case this

- Court held unconstitutional.Section 4 of the Future Trad-

ing Act imposing a tax upon a Board of Trade failing to

comply with the regulations proscribed under Section 5 of

the Act. The Court held this tax was not in truth a tax

but that it was designed to coerce the Board into compliance

with Section 5 containing the regulations, Although the

Act contained a Separability Clause similar to the present

Act this Court held that the regulations contained in Section

5 fell with the tax contained in Section 4, the one being

‘*tinterwoven’’ with the other. In other words, this Court

held that everything in the Act the object of which was to

subject Boards to regulation by the Secretary of Agri-

culture was unconstitutional. We contend the same reason-

ing is applicable to the present Act; that everything i in it

Genigned to accomplish the broad purposes outlined in its

‘*Findings and Policy’’ is likewise unconstitutional if the

Act, because of its unconstitutional intra-state regulation

is incapable of achieving the object of the Act.

This Court’s decision in the Employers Liability Cases,

207 U. S. 463, 500-504, likewise supports Petitioner’s present

61

argument. In that case the Court was asked to limit the

application of the Act which applied broadly to injuries

_ received in both intra-state and inter-state commerce to the

latter alone. The Court held it could not do this, stating

that it was ‘‘unable to say that the statute would have been

enacted had its provisions been restricted to the limited

relations of that character which it was within power of

Congress to regulate,’ and citing in this connection the

_Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. 8. 82. In the present case it

appears clearly from the ‘‘Findings and Policy’’ of the

Act that Congress would never have passed the Act to

regulate the unregulated portions of inter-state commerce,

such regulation being utterly incapable of achieving the

object of the Act revealed by the Act itself in its ‘‘Findings

and Policy’’.

The test applied by this Court in Butts v: Merchants

Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 133-138, as to whether

the Civil Rights Act, held unconstitutional as to the States,

applied to the coastal waters within the exclusive jurisdic-

tion of the United States was as follows: |

Where the greater part. of a statute is unconstitu-

tional as beyond the power of Congress, the question

for the Court to ‘determine as to the part which is

constitutional is whether it was the intent of Congress

to have that part stand by itself—if not thé whole

statute falls. :

This Court when the case came before it had already

decided the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 holding the Civil

Rights Act unconstitutional as to the States. It was con-

tended in the Butts case that although this was so the Act

applied to the District of Columbia, the territories and the

coastal waters. This Court held that Congress never in-

tended such a limited application of the Act and reached

this conclusion on the basis of the very argument Petitioner

in the present case now puts forward, i.e., on the basis of

_ the object of the Act as set forth in the Act itself. Just

62

as the object of the present Act is entirely incapable of

being attained by restricting the application of the Act to

inter-state commerce so in the Butts case the object of the

Act was likewise entirely incapable of being attained by

restricting it to territory under the exclusive jurisdiction

of the United States. It is significant that in the Butts

case this Court turned to the preamble of the Act as proving

it, quoting it as follows:

‘* Whereas, it is essential (9 just government we -

recognize the equality of all mon before the law, and

hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings

with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to

all, of whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion,

religious or political; and it being the appropriate ob-

ject of legislation to enact great fundamental principles

into law.’’ (Butts v. Merchants Transportation Co.,

. 230 U. 8. 181.)

The only difference betwpen the Civil Rights Act as ap-

plied in the Buttscase and the present Act in the present

case is that in the Butts case there was a geograph-

. ical restriction of the Act whereas in the present case

the restriction relates to a portion of industry, i. e.,

intra-state commerce. This, however, does not constitute —

a difference in principle.

Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S:-678, 685, is likewise in favor

of Petitioner emphasizing, as it does, the difference between

construction and separation. While it concedes the un-

questioned rule that statutes may in part be constitutional

and in part unconstitutional, and the constitutional part

may be enforced if severable from the uncgnstitutional part

it indicates this is not to be achieved by sgparating the two

parts by reading into the statute a construction in favor of .

the so-called constitutional part. This is precisely what

the Government would have this Court do in the present

ease. The Act herein has, strictly speaking, no separable

parts, i.e., one part relating to intra-state cases, and the

other to inter-state. What the Government asks this Court

’ 63

to do is, if the Act is unconstitutional as to intra-state cases,

to construe it to apply to inter-state cases alone. Again

going back to the object of the Act as expressed in the .

‘‘Findings and Policy’’ we say such a construction is un-

warranted, just as unwarranted ag the limited construc-

tion contended for but refused by this Court in United -

States v. Reese, supra, the Trade-Mark Cases, supra, and

Butts v. Merchants Transportation Co., supra.

In James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 140, this Court had

‘before it the question of the constitutionality of a statute

punishing the prevention by bribery of the exercise of the

right of suffrage by a person to whom that right was guar-

anteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. It was contended

that the defendants violated this statute. The Court held

that from the wording of the statute it was only intended

‘to apply to cases arising under the Fifteenth Amendment

and not to elections generally. The Court said:

‘To change this statute, enacted to punish bribery

of persons named in the: Fifteenth Amendment at ail

elections, to a statute punishing bribery of any voter at

certain elections would be in effect judicial legislation.

It would be wresting the statute from the purpose

with which it was enacted and_making it serve another

purpose.’’ (James v. Bowman, 190 U. S., p. 140, Italics

ours. )

This case is important as it shows that: this Court has

always, upon the question of separability, considered the

purpose of the statute. Impliedly this case and others

hold that there can be no judicial announcement of separa-

bility if the enforcement of the constitutional part of the

statute would change the purpose of the statute. Evi-

dently, therefore, this Court considered that it was power-

less, under the guise of separability, to put part of a statute

to a purpose different from the purpose given in the statute

itself even though Congress apparently was willing to take

anything it could get. In other words, this Court repudiated

64

the specious argument that half a loaf would be better than

no bread at all when it turns out, as here, that half a loaf

would not be bread but a stone of altogether different sub.

stance, > |

To the same effect is the decision of this Court in

Minois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 28 U. 8. 514, 529,

holding that an order of Secretary of Agriculture apply-

ing to both inter-state and intra-state commerere could not

be limited to the constitutional application to inter-state

commerce, This Court said:

‘*‘We do not say that the state line might not be

adopted in a prceee case, in the exercise of Federal

authority, if limited in its effect to interstate com-

merce coming from below the line, but that is not the

resent order, and we must deal with it as we find it.

or have we the power to so limit the Secretary’s

order as to make it apply o_ to interstate commerce,

which it is urged is all that is here involved, For

aught that appears upon the face of the order, the

Secretary intended it to apply to all commerce, and

whether he would have made such an order, if strictly

limited to interstate commerce, we have no means of

knowing. The order is in terms single and undivisible.”’

(TNinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. p. 529.)

Williams v. Standard Oil Company, 278 U. S. 340, 341,

342, emphasizes the impossibility of changing the purpose

of a statute. In that case the Court held invalid a portion

of a statute fixing the sale price of gasoline and held that

the remainder of the statute providing for the creation of

a commission, the collection of data, etc., creating mere ad-

juncts to the main purpose of fixing prices was likewise

invalid. This Court quoted with approval Mr. Justice Pit-

ney’s statement in Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J. L. 649, 662

condemning judicial mutilation of a statute and holding

that the preservation of valid parts of an Act was only pos

sible where the removal the unconstitutional featares

would “‘leave the constitutional features and purposes of

the Act substantially unaffected by the process’’.

65

To the same effect is this Court's decision in Railroad

Retirement Board v. Alton Railway Co., 295 U. 8. 330, 362,

wherein this Court referred to the separability provision

in the Act declaring that it merely reverses the usual pre-

sumption. This Court continued :

“But notwithstanding the presumption in favor of

divisibility which arises from the legislative declara-

tion, we cannot rewrite a statute and give it an effect

altogether different from that sought by the measure -

viewed as awhdle.’”’ (Italics ours)

After referring to the unconstitutional provisions this

Court continued :

“They se affect the dominant aim of the whole

statute as to carry it down with them”’.

We submit this is precisely the situation in the present

case: the unconstitutional intra-state provisions go destroy

the dominant aim of the present statute as to leave not

.“*the bone and sinew”’ of the Act but merely minor skeletal

To the same effect as the above cases is United States v.

Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641.

This Court’s decision in Carter vy. Carter Coal Co., supra;

on the question of separability supports the argument above

‘made. In that case there was a far better argument for

separability than in the case of the present Act because the

Bituminous Coal Conservation Act shows a clear dichotétiny _

between the labor provisions of the Act and the price fixing .

provisions. The Act was even physically divided into two ‘

parts, one of which, if the separability argument had any

weight, would have seemed equally as constitutional as the

other was unconstitutional. This Court however applying

the test of legislative intent shown by the-terms of the

Act itself in its preamble and on the basis of the inter-de-

pendence of the meass provided by the Act for achieving

the end contemplated held the provisions of the Act in-

’ fall.

66

4

separable, and hence held the Act unconstitutional. In the

~ present case if the means are unconstitutional with respect

to the Fifth Amendment insofar as so-called intra-state

commerce is concerned they are likewise unconstitutional

insofar as inter-state commerce is concerned: But, fram

the viewpoint of inseparability, it is not so much the means

we are now concerned with: it is the end or object of the

Act disclosed by the Act itself. If that object is™the sup..

pression of evils in so large a part of industry that such

evils ‘‘substantially burden and affect the flow of commerce

and tend to aggravate recurrent business depressions”’,

(Sec. 1), and if the Act is unconstitutional as construed and

applied to nine-tenths of -industry, the question arises

whether it can be held constitutional as applied to the other

one-tenth, or whether the test referred to in the Carter case

and other cases, i.e., whether Congress would have passed

the Act to appl» to bus companies and the few forms of

inter-state commerce other than the railroads, does not |

apply. We submit that if in the Carter case this Court can-

not reconstruct the means to achieve a given end it cannot,

in the present case, sustain the diversion of the Act to

achieve an end entirely different from the end contemplated

by Congress in enacting it. In other words, we contend that

if the Act as applied to the few bus companies, communica-

tions systems, etc., remaining over after the Act has been

eliminated as a regulation of industry in toto would con-

- stitute a mere internal regulation of these companies with-

out any general effect upon inter-state commerce and with-

out achieveing in any way the object of the Act, such

construction is unjustified, and the Act in its entirety must

CONCLUSION.

It is submitted that the judgment below should be re-

versed : op

(1) On the ground that the Record does not sustain the

findings of the Board that Petitioner was guilty of an un-

67

fair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 of the

Act, in which case it becomes.unnecessary for this Court to

consider the constitutional question;

(2) In the event that thé factual question should be

determined adversely it is submitted the Act is unconstitu-

tional as in violation of the First, Fifth and Seventh

and Tenth Amendments as s#pplied to inter-state commerce ;

(3) In the event: that the Act is declared unconstitu-

tional ag to local industry or manufacturing concerns the.

Act is unconstitutional as applied to inter-state commerce,

the latter application being inseparable from the former

according to the object of the Act as shown by the Act

itself.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert E. Lynca,

Wuuusm J. Huones, Je,

Shoreham Building,

Washington, D. C.,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

Wuuum E. Leagy,

Reeves R. Hizto0n,

E. Louise CHANDLER,

Shoreham Building,

Washington, D. C.,

Of Counsel.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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