Reply Brief — AARP v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (No. 07-662)

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FILED

~ FEB 2 9 2008

(5) OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

13¢ No. 07-662

: IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AARP; JACK W. MACMILLAN; FRANK H. SMITH, JR.,

FRANK A. WHEELER; FRED DOCHAT;

GERALD FOWLER; M. ELAINE CLAY,

Petitioners,

Vv.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari To The

United States Court of Appeals

For the Third Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY CHRISTOPHER G. MACKARONIS*

DUKE UNIVERSITY BRICKFIELD, BURCHETTE, RITTS, STONE

SCHOOL OF LAW 1025 Thomas Jefferson St., NW

Box 90360 8th Fl., West Tower

Durham, NC 27708 Washington, DC 20007

(919) 613-7173 (202) 342-0800

LAURIE A. MCCANN

AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION

601 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20049

(202) 434-2060

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

we

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF ...................cceeeeeeeee 1

RTP IAIEETTE 1s tscssstivniisintimaeingeee 1

1. Contrary to the Respondent’s Claim, the

Challenged Exemption is not “Narrow”

Sis RO TEE oodtissiasceciecon eae 1

2. The Very Premise for the Challenged

BORNEO 8 TED secs ecidsstavotiesnbacrsercncenes 2

3. The Respondent Ignores the Sharp

Conflicts Presented by the Third

COE SII aii inteicsentncncccacstencokcce 3

a. All Agency Action is Governed

by Chevron and Section 706(2)(A)

OF CE Be xtiienicin cee 3

b. The Third Circuit’s Decision -

Negates Clear Congressional

BOG io daiviccncinvissoscerasiatieaumaannee 5

ii

c. The EEOC’s Extreme View of

its Exemption Authority

Underscores the Constitutional

Conflict that the Court Should

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i soueiiewiiot 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

American Maritime Officers v. Hart,

No. 99-1054, 1999 WL 33839612

Neen ee casaatiion 4

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat] Res. Def.

~ Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .... 3,4,5,7,8

General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.

Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) ................ssccsecceees 6

Quinn v. New York State Electric &

Gas Corp., 569 F. Supp. 655 (N.D.

Eel RE 4

STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

5 U.S.C. § T06(2A) .ccccccccssescessseesesseeseseseee 4,8

Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA),

IT EMOSIND ocsccvcaseorssosesnnnstisesnersevevansnece 3

iil

28 U.S.C. § G2SIDUNBIGD .......2000ccccccccccocsesess 7

ie 5

Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of

1990 (OWBPA),

Pub. L. 101-433, 104 Stat 978

I eal 6,7

l

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

The fundamental issue raised by the Petition is

whether the EEOC has the authority to issue a

regulation that authorizes employers to eliminate

health care benefits to more than ten million retirees

nationwide aged sixty-five and older, notwithstanding

the undisputed fact that Congress unambiguously

prohibited that very form of age discrimination. In an

effort to avoid review, the Respondent seriously

understates the true nature of the regulatory

exemption at issue. Respondent’s opposition, however,

underscores the conflicts presented by the extreme

(and unprecedented) position urged by the EEOC in

this rulemaking challenge.

ARGUMENT

1. Contrary to the Respondent’s Claim, the

Challenged Exemption is not “Narrow” In Any Respect.

The rulemaking record shows that as many as ten

million individuals are directly affected by the

challenged rule. Pet. at 4-5. The challenged rule

permits employers to arbitrarily eliminate a// health

care benefits for those individuals at age 65,

notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the employer

cost for coverage drops precipitously at age 65 precisely

because of the availability of Medicare. See Pet. at 3-4.

The scope of the exemption is broad and complete.

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sid

isi

fa

2

2. e Very Premise for the Ch

is Unsupported. The EEOC suggests that the premise

for the challenged rule was that “many

employers...followed a long-standing practice” of

discontinuing health care benefits at age 65 (Opp. at 2;

emphasis added), notwithstanding the fact that such

a practice admittedly was in direct violation of the

ADEA. It is simply not true that “many employers”

were long engaged in the discriminatory practice of

eliminating health care benefits at age 65. In

discovery in the district court, the EEOC conceded that

it had no knowledge of how many employers did, or did

not, comply with Congress’ command of non-

discriminatory health care benefits. See Pet. C.A. Br.

at 47 & n. 6.

The EEOC’s faulty factual premise exposes the

fundamental illogic of the rule itself. Rather than

identifying and targeting the employers who, prior to

the exemption, were still not in compliance with the

ADEA (Opp. at 3-4), the rule allows all employers —

including all those who have been providing non-

discriminatory health care benefits — to engage in

arbitrary age discrimination against individuals aged

65 and older. The EEOC’s logic is akin to permitting

the Environmental Protection Agency to exempt from

the Clean Air Act all factories nationwide on the

ground that an unknown minority may not yet be in

compliance. Thus, contrary to the claim that the

challenged rule is consistent with the ADEA’s primary

purpose of “protecting older workers,” the record

demonstrates that quite the opposite is true. Indeed,

none of the ADEA’s three articulated purposes set

3

forth in 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) are served by the challenged

rule. Pet. at 28-30.

the Petitioners seenaraiad (Pet. at 12- 16), until the

Third Circuit’s decision in this case, every circuit court

faced with a challenge to an agency rule has applied

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat] Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837 (1984), to the substantive provisions of the

statute at issue to determine “if the intent of Congress

is clear.” The Third Circuit’s unprecedented approach

rejects Chevron, subverts plain congressional intent,

and permits an executive agency to unconstitutionally

veto unambiguous statutory proscriptions. The

EEOC’s response to the Petition — which mentions

Chevron exactly once in passing (Opp. at 8) -—

underscores the fundamental conflicts that have arisen

as a result of the Third Circuit’s decision.

a. § AllAgency Action is Governed by Chevron

and Section 706(2)(A) of the APA. Respondent argues

that a reviewing court literally can ignore Chevron —

and with that the substantive clarity of the ADEA —

because the statute contains “express statutory

exemption authority.” Opp. at 8. The novelty of the

EEOC’s approach, and its stark conflict with more

than two decades of decisions by all the circuits

applying Chevron, highlight the need for review by this

Court.

According to the EEOC, the Third Circuit was

correct in disregarding the substance of the ADEA

because the agency had more than “ordinary

4

‘rulemaking authority.” Opp. at 8. The EEOC argues

that as long as it announces that an “exemption” is

“necessary and proper in the public interest,” Opp. at

11, anyexemption is lawful — regardless of its scope or

the clarity of congressional intent to prohibit the

particular discriminatory practice at issue. Like the

circuit court (Pet. at 16), the EEOC does not cite one

case that would justify this abject disregard of

Chevron. On the other hand, there is precedent for the

routine application of Chevron to the EEOC’s

exemption authority, as well as to the statutory

exemption authority permitted other agencies.’

Equally problematic, the EEOC never addresses

the circuit conflict that it’s approach creates under

section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.

As the Petitioners demonstrated (Pet. at 21-24), the

plain language of section 706(2)(A) requires courts to

set aside “agency action” that is “otherwise not in

accordance with law.” And every circuit applying the

“not in accordance with law” standard has looked to

the substance of the statute in a manner that mimics

the universal application of Chevron. The EEOC’s

novel theory that the APA review provisions do not

See Quinn v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 569 F.

Supp. 655, 661 (N.D. N_Y. 1983) (in successful challenge to EEOC

regulation “exempting” apprenticeship programs from the ADEA,

court states in dicta that the regulation would be unlawful even

if issued as an “exemption” as it was contrary to the substance of

the ADEA); American Maritime Officers v. Hart, No. 99-1054,

1999 WL 33839612 (D.D.C. 1999) (setting aside action by the

Secretary of Labor pursuant to “exemption” authority under the

Service Contract Act as contrary to the substance of the statute).

5

apply to “agency action” that takes the form of an

“exemption” is contrary to the plain language of the

APA, and in conflict with numerous circuit decisions.

Pet. at 22-24.

b. The Third Circuit’s Decision Negates Clear

Congressional Intent. The EEOC argues that the

Third Circuit was correct in focusing exclusively on the

decision by Congress (in 1967) to grant “exemption”

authority to the enforcing agency.” That authority,

however, was exercised to erase for all employers the

“equal benefit or equal cost” defense explicitly provided

by statute. Opp. at 4-5. The EEOC utterly fails to

explain how its exemption authority permits the circuit

court to ignore the specific intent of Congress which, in

1990, addressed in detail the nuances of age

discrimination in employee benefit plans — without any

hint by Congress that its meticulously crafted

legislation could subsequently be undone by EEOC

rulemaking. It would be difficult to imagine

circumstances in which the intent of Congress could be

more unambiguously expressed, and more flagrantly

disregarded.

The EEOC concedes (as it must) that Congress

addressed “the precise question at issue” in this case.

Pet. at 12 quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. As the

Petitioners showed (Pet. at 2-4), Congress addressed

the precise issue of age discrimination in all employee

benefit plans during its consideration and passage of

2

Other than the statutory language itself, there is no other

evidence of what Congress intended when it passed the grant of

rulemaking authority in section 9 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628.

6

the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub.

L. 101-433, 104 Stat 978 (1990) (“(OWBPA”). Congress

incorporated into the substance of the ADEA

longstanding administrative regulations governing

employee benefits that imposed an “equal benefit or

equal cost” standard for compliance, including health

care benefits.* Pet. at 3. And, commenting directly on

the “precise question at issue,” Congress stated that:

The availability of Medicare benefits

from the federal government will

not justify a reduction in employer-

provided retiree health benefits if

the result is that, taking the

employer-provided and government:

provided benefits together, an older

retiree is entitled to a lesser benefit

of any type (including coverage for

family and/or dependents) than a

similarly situated younger retiree.

S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 21-22 (1990).

8 The EEOC’s reference to the Court's decision in Genera/

Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) (Opp. at 11

n. 3) is curious in this context. The entire premise underlying the

“equal benefit or equal cost” principle enacted by Congress is

recognition of the fact that the cost of some — but not all —

employee benefits increases based on age. The challenged rule is

in derogation of the accommodation carefully calibrated by

Congress to ensure that older individuals were not more expensive

toemploy. Beyond that, the rule ignores the holding in Clinethat

“(t]he Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... forbids

discriminatory preference for the young over the old.” 540 U.S. at

590.

5

In short, the OWBPA and its legislative history

confirm that Congress expressly rejected the type of

exception for “bridge” health care benefits (Opp. at 2)

that the EEOC has attempted to legalize through the

challenged exemption.‘

Petitioners demonstrated, the decision of the circuit

court leads inescapably to a constitutional dilemma.

Pet. at 26-30. Under the Third Circuit’s ruling, the

EEOC’s exemption authority is without boundary; it is

not circumscribed by congressional intent in any way,

and could be used (as it was here) to nullify the specific

intent of Congress.

The EEOC’s opposition sidesteps this grave

constitutional issue by arguing that the ADEA’s

rulemaking delegation provides an “intelligible

principle” needed to satisfy the non-delegation

doctrine. Opp. at 11. But the constitutional clash

presented here is not an inevitable product of the

rulemaking delegation. Rather, it is an unfortunate

result of the circuit court’s holding that (a) Chevron is

inapplicable, and (b) congressional intent on the

“precise question at issue” can be «holly disregarded

in assessing the validity of the challenged rule. Pet. at

7

One of only three exceptions to the “equal benefit or equal

cost” rule enacted in 1990 permits a defined benefit pension plan

to offer social security supplements that terminate on the

attainment of the eligibility age for social security benefits. See

29 U.S.C. § 623()(1)(B)i). This is the only “bridge” benefit that

Congress permitted. See S. Rep. No. 101-263, supra, at 21

(referring to the exception as “bridge payments”).

8

24-30. Those errors, in turn, caused the circuit court

to run afoul of the “not in accordance with law”

standard of section 706(2)(A) of the APA, creating yet

another conflict among the circuits. Pet. at 21-24. The

EEOC opposition does not address the APA conflict

either.

9

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in the Petition, and

those above, the Petition for certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Christopher G. Mackaronis

Brickfield, Burchette, Ritts

and Stone

1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW

8th Fl., West Tower

Washington, DC 20007

Laurie A. McCann

AARP Foundation Litigation

601 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20049

Erwin Chemerinsky

Duke University School of Law

Box 90360

Durham, NC 27708

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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