Reply Brief — AARP v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (No. 07-662)
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FILED
~ FEB 2 9 2008
(5) OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT. U.S.
13¢ No. 07-662
: IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AARP; JACK W. MACMILLAN; FRANK H. SMITH, JR.,
FRANK A. WHEELER; FRED DOCHAT;
GERALD FOWLER; M. ELAINE CLAY,
Petitioners,
Vv.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari To The
United States Court of Appeals
For the Third Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY CHRISTOPHER G. MACKARONIS*
DUKE UNIVERSITY BRICKFIELD, BURCHETTE, RITTS, STONE
SCHOOL OF LAW 1025 Thomas Jefferson St., NW
Box 90360 8th Fl., West Tower
Durham, NC 27708 Washington, DC 20007
(919) 613-7173 (202) 342-0800
LAURIE A. MCCANN
AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION
601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049
(202) 434-2060
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TAB Me OF CONT EITE GS creicvsiccsaceetnssesenssssesesesssensnnseal i
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PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF ...................cceeeeeeeee 1
RTP IAIEETTE 1s tscssstivniisintimaeingeee 1
1. Contrary to the Respondent’s Claim, the
Challenged Exemption is not “Narrow”
Sis RO TEE oodtissiasceciecon eae 1
2. The Very Premise for the Challenged
BORNEO 8 TED secs ecidsstavotiesnbacrsercncenes 2
3. The Respondent Ignores the Sharp
Conflicts Presented by the Third
COE SII aii inteicsentncncccacstencokcce 3
a. All Agency Action is Governed
by Chevron and Section 706(2)(A)
OF CE Be xtiienicin cee 3
b. The Third Circuit’s Decision -
Negates Clear Congressional
BOG io daiviccncinvissoscerasiatieaumaannee 5
ii
c. The EEOC’s Extreme View of
its Exemption Authority
Underscores the Constitutional
Conflict that the Court Should
Tn shidadbabsinn 7
i soueiiewiiot 9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
American Maritime Officers v. Hart,
No. 99-1054, 1999 WL 33839612
Neen ee casaatiion 4
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat] Res. Def.
~ Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .... 3,4,5,7,8
General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) ................ssccsecceees 6
Quinn v. New York State Electric &
Gas Corp., 569 F. Supp. 655 (N.D.
Eel RE 4
STATUTES
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. § T06(2A) .ccccccccssescessseesesseeseseseee 4,8
Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA),
IT EMOSIND ocsccvcaseorssosesnnnstisesnersevevansnece 3
iil
28 U.S.C. § G2SIDUNBIGD .......2000ccccccccccocsesess 7
ie 5
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990 (OWBPA),
Pub. L. 101-433, 104 Stat 978
I eal 6,7
l
PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF
The fundamental issue raised by the Petition is
whether the EEOC has the authority to issue a
regulation that authorizes employers to eliminate
health care benefits to more than ten million retirees
nationwide aged sixty-five and older, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that Congress unambiguously
prohibited that very form of age discrimination. In an
effort to avoid review, the Respondent seriously
understates the true nature of the regulatory
exemption at issue. Respondent’s opposition, however,
underscores the conflicts presented by the extreme
(and unprecedented) position urged by the EEOC in
this rulemaking challenge.
ARGUMENT
1. Contrary to the Respondent’s Claim, the
Challenged Exemption is not “Narrow” In Any Respect.
The rulemaking record shows that as many as ten
million individuals are directly affected by the
challenged rule. Pet. at 4-5. The challenged rule
permits employers to arbitrarily eliminate a// health
care benefits for those individuals at age 65,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the employer
cost for coverage drops precipitously at age 65 precisely
because of the availability of Medicare. See Pet. at 3-4.
The scope of the exemption is broad and complete.
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sid
isi
fa
2
2. e Very Premise for the Ch
is Unsupported. The EEOC suggests that the premise
for the challenged rule was that “many
employers...followed a long-standing practice” of
discontinuing health care benefits at age 65 (Opp. at 2;
emphasis added), notwithstanding the fact that such
a practice admittedly was in direct violation of the
ADEA. It is simply not true that “many employers”
were long engaged in the discriminatory practice of
eliminating health care benefits at age 65. In
discovery in the district court, the EEOC conceded that
it had no knowledge of how many employers did, or did
not, comply with Congress’ command of non-
discriminatory health care benefits. See Pet. C.A. Br.
at 47 & n. 6.
The EEOC’s faulty factual premise exposes the
fundamental illogic of the rule itself. Rather than
identifying and targeting the employers who, prior to
the exemption, were still not in compliance with the
ADEA (Opp. at 3-4), the rule allows all employers —
including all those who have been providing non-
discriminatory health care benefits — to engage in
arbitrary age discrimination against individuals aged
65 and older. The EEOC’s logic is akin to permitting
the Environmental Protection Agency to exempt from
the Clean Air Act all factories nationwide on the
ground that an unknown minority may not yet be in
compliance. Thus, contrary to the claim that the
challenged rule is consistent with the ADEA’s primary
purpose of “protecting older workers,” the record
demonstrates that quite the opposite is true. Indeed,
none of the ADEA’s three articulated purposes set
3
forth in 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) are served by the challenged
rule. Pet. at 28-30.
the Petitioners seenaraiad (Pet. at 12- 16), until the
Third Circuit’s decision in this case, every circuit court
faced with a challenge to an agency rule has applied
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat] Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), to the substantive provisions of the
statute at issue to determine “if the intent of Congress
is clear.” The Third Circuit’s unprecedented approach
rejects Chevron, subverts plain congressional intent,
and permits an executive agency to unconstitutionally
veto unambiguous statutory proscriptions. The
EEOC’s response to the Petition — which mentions
Chevron exactly once in passing (Opp. at 8) -—
underscores the fundamental conflicts that have arisen
as a result of the Third Circuit’s decision.
a. § AllAgency Action is Governed by Chevron
and Section 706(2)(A) of the APA. Respondent argues
that a reviewing court literally can ignore Chevron —
and with that the substantive clarity of the ADEA —
because the statute contains “express statutory
exemption authority.” Opp. at 8. The novelty of the
EEOC’s approach, and its stark conflict with more
than two decades of decisions by all the circuits
applying Chevron, highlight the need for review by this
Court.
According to the EEOC, the Third Circuit was
correct in disregarding the substance of the ADEA
because the agency had more than “ordinary
4
‘rulemaking authority.” Opp. at 8. The EEOC argues
that as long as it announces that an “exemption” is
“necessary and proper in the public interest,” Opp. at
11, anyexemption is lawful — regardless of its scope or
the clarity of congressional intent to prohibit the
particular discriminatory practice at issue. Like the
circuit court (Pet. at 16), the EEOC does not cite one
case that would justify this abject disregard of
Chevron. On the other hand, there is precedent for the
routine application of Chevron to the EEOC’s
exemption authority, as well as to the statutory
exemption authority permitted other agencies.’
Equally problematic, the EEOC never addresses
the circuit conflict that it’s approach creates under
section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
As the Petitioners demonstrated (Pet. at 21-24), the
plain language of section 706(2)(A) requires courts to
set aside “agency action” that is “otherwise not in
accordance with law.” And every circuit applying the
“not in accordance with law” standard has looked to
the substance of the statute in a manner that mimics
the universal application of Chevron. The EEOC’s
novel theory that the APA review provisions do not
See Quinn v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 655, 661 (N.D. N_Y. 1983) (in successful challenge to EEOC
regulation “exempting” apprenticeship programs from the ADEA,
court states in dicta that the regulation would be unlawful even
if issued as an “exemption” as it was contrary to the substance of
the ADEA); American Maritime Officers v. Hart, No. 99-1054,
1999 WL 33839612 (D.D.C. 1999) (setting aside action by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to “exemption” authority under the
Service Contract Act as contrary to the substance of the statute).
5
apply to “agency action” that takes the form of an
“exemption” is contrary to the plain language of the
APA, and in conflict with numerous circuit decisions.
Pet. at 22-24.
b. The Third Circuit’s Decision Negates Clear
Congressional Intent. The EEOC argues that the
Third Circuit was correct in focusing exclusively on the
decision by Congress (in 1967) to grant “exemption”
authority to the enforcing agency.” That authority,
however, was exercised to erase for all employers the
“equal benefit or equal cost” defense explicitly provided
by statute. Opp. at 4-5. The EEOC utterly fails to
explain how its exemption authority permits the circuit
court to ignore the specific intent of Congress which, in
1990, addressed in detail the nuances of age
discrimination in employee benefit plans — without any
hint by Congress that its meticulously crafted
legislation could subsequently be undone by EEOC
rulemaking. It would be difficult to imagine
circumstances in which the intent of Congress could be
more unambiguously expressed, and more flagrantly
disregarded.
The EEOC concedes (as it must) that Congress
addressed “the precise question at issue” in this case.
Pet. at 12 quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. As the
Petitioners showed (Pet. at 2-4), Congress addressed
the precise issue of age discrimination in all employee
benefit plans during its consideration and passage of
2
Other than the statutory language itself, there is no other
evidence of what Congress intended when it passed the grant of
rulemaking authority in section 9 of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 628.
6
the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub.
L. 101-433, 104 Stat 978 (1990) (“(OWBPA”). Congress
incorporated into the substance of the ADEA
longstanding administrative regulations governing
employee benefits that imposed an “equal benefit or
equal cost” standard for compliance, including health
care benefits.* Pet. at 3. And, commenting directly on
the “precise question at issue,” Congress stated that:
The availability of Medicare benefits
from the federal government will
not justify a reduction in employer-
provided retiree health benefits if
the result is that, taking the
employer-provided and government:
provided benefits together, an older
retiree is entitled to a lesser benefit
of any type (including coverage for
family and/or dependents) than a
similarly situated younger retiree.
S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 21-22 (1990).
8 The EEOC’s reference to the Court's decision in Genera/
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004) (Opp. at 11
n. 3) is curious in this context. The entire premise underlying the
“equal benefit or equal cost” principle enacted by Congress is
recognition of the fact that the cost of some — but not all —
employee benefits increases based on age. The challenged rule is
in derogation of the accommodation carefully calibrated by
Congress to ensure that older individuals were not more expensive
toemploy. Beyond that, the rule ignores the holding in Clinethat
“(t]he Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... forbids
discriminatory preference for the young over the old.” 540 U.S. at
590.
5
In short, the OWBPA and its legislative history
confirm that Congress expressly rejected the type of
exception for “bridge” health care benefits (Opp. at 2)
that the EEOC has attempted to legalize through the
challenged exemption.‘
Petitioners demonstrated, the decision of the circuit
court leads inescapably to a constitutional dilemma.
Pet. at 26-30. Under the Third Circuit’s ruling, the
EEOC’s exemption authority is without boundary; it is
not circumscribed by congressional intent in any way,
and could be used (as it was here) to nullify the specific
intent of Congress.
The EEOC’s opposition sidesteps this grave
constitutional issue by arguing that the ADEA’s
rulemaking delegation provides an “intelligible
principle” needed to satisfy the non-delegation
doctrine. Opp. at 11. But the constitutional clash
presented here is not an inevitable product of the
rulemaking delegation. Rather, it is an unfortunate
result of the circuit court’s holding that (a) Chevron is
inapplicable, and (b) congressional intent on the
“precise question at issue” can be «holly disregarded
in assessing the validity of the challenged rule. Pet. at
7
One of only three exceptions to the “equal benefit or equal
cost” rule enacted in 1990 permits a defined benefit pension plan
to offer social security supplements that terminate on the
attainment of the eligibility age for social security benefits. See
29 U.S.C. § 623()(1)(B)i). This is the only “bridge” benefit that
Congress permitted. See S. Rep. No. 101-263, supra, at 21
(referring to the exception as “bridge payments”).
8
24-30. Those errors, in turn, caused the circuit court
to run afoul of the “not in accordance with law”
standard of section 706(2)(A) of the APA, creating yet
another conflict among the circuits. Pet. at 21-24. The
EEOC opposition does not address the APA conflict
either.
9
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Petition, and
those above, the Petition for certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Christopher G. Mackaronis
Brickfield, Burchette, Ritts
and Stone
1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW
8th Fl., West Tower
Washington, DC 20007
Laurie A. McCann
AARP Foundation Litigation
601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049
Erwin Chemerinsky
Duke University School of Law
Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
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