Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Steele v. Beltrami County (No. 07-334)

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(gle | Supreme Court U.S.

(UD 07- 334SEP 14 2007

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO FICE OF THE CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Adam Steele, et al.,

Petitioners,

VS.

The County of Beltrami,

State of Minnesota, et al.,

Respondants.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

This Petition is filed jointly by the following Petitioners,

each of whom is pro se:

1) Adam Steele, P.O. Box 1132, Bemidji, MN 56619

218-759-1162

2) Donnis Solberg, 102 Bemidji Rd., NW, Turtle River,

MN 56601 218-586-2281

3) James A. Ness, 20250 Tepee Hill Lane, Hines, MN

56647 218-835-4250

4) Turtle Creek Saloon, Inc., by Justin Chrz, CEO, 273

Bemidji Rd. NE, Turtle River, MN 56601 218-586-2081

A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does the “Beltrami County Smoke Free

Ordinance for Indoor Public Places and Places of

Work" (“The Ordinance”) address a valid public

purpose?

2. Does The Ordinance, which prohibits smoking

in bars, restaurants, and other privately owned

indoor places, unreasonably violate Constitutional

rights of privacy, and other personal rights as

guaranteed by the Fourth and Ninth Amendments

to the United States Constitution, and including

penumbral privacy rights’ under the Constitution ?

3. Does The Ordinance inappropriately and

unreasonably restrict the ability of a bar or restaurant

owner to contract for a customer's patronage and

business?

4. Does The Ordinance unreasonably restrict the

ability of a customer to privately contract for goods

and hospitality services, including his ability to smoke

during the delivery of said good?

5. Does the ordinance, by strongly diminishing the

value of “goodwill” (an intangible asset, generally

measured by annual gross receipts or profits, which

is a material factor in the worth and selling price of

a business) of a bar or restaurant, constitute a

regulatory “taking”, without just compensation;

which is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 13

'e.g. a “zone of privacy” as defined by Mr. Justice Douglas

in Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 85 S. Ct 1678 (1965)

ee

of the Minnesota Constitution? (The Minnesota

Constitution is more stringent, requiring that the

compensation be first paid or secured.)

6. Did the USDC err in refusing to allow the pro se:

appearance of sole-proprietor Plaintiffs Ness and

Solberg, refusing to let them be heard at the hearing

on Preliminary Injunction, and refusing to recognize

their appearance in writing at the hearing on

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement?

7. Did the U.S. District Court err in granting summary

judgement when there were genuine issues of

material fact to be determined?

B. LIST OF THE PARTIES

The following is the list of parties to the orginal

proceeding in the Federal District Court of the District

of Minnesota, and later before the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the

judgements of which Courts are sought, now, to be

reviewed:

Plaintiffs:

1) ADAM STEELE, an individual;

2) DONNIS SOLBERG, an individual:

3) JAMES A. NESS, an individual;

4) TURTLE CREEK SALOON, INC., a Minnesota

Corporation,

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: There is no parent

corporation of this corporation, nor any publicly-held

corporation owning 10% or more of said

corporation's stock; and

5) (This original Plaintiff does not join in this petition)

CORNER BAR OF BEMIDJI, INC., a Minnesota

Corporation,

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: There is no parent

corporation of this corporation, nor any publicly-held

corporation owning 10% or more of said

corporation's stock;

6) (This original Plaintiff does not join in this petition)

TOBACCO SUPER STORE, INC., a Minnesota

Corporation

— o

Defendants:

1) THE COUNTY OF BELTRAMI, STATE OF MINNESOTA;

2) KEITH WINGER, Sheriff of the County of Beltrami,

State of Minnesota; and

3) other Unnamed persons and entities.

DISINTERESTED PARTIES:

Petitioners name the following as disinterested

parties in this Petition:

Corner Bar of Bemidji, Inc. (Plaintiff 5, ante), for

reason that said Plaintiff has not joined in this Petition.

Tobacco Super Store, Inc. (Plaintiff 6, ante}, for

reason that said Plaintiff has not joined in this Petition.

C. TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Questions presented for review ........ccceee |

B. List of parties to the proceeding ..........ese 3

C. Table of contents and authorities............. 5

D. Citations entered in the COSC .........cseeesees 6

E. Statement of basis of jurisdiction .............06 8

F. Constitutional and statutory provisions ....... 8

G. Statement Of thE COSC ........ssccssserssssscssserseee 9

Be SUNN IT scnrssnik-cisdiabieiniiensnesintanssensuesuisNecpiaionsiis 13

APPENDIX

|. Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals entered in conjunction with

the judgment sought to be reviewed ........... 17

li. Constitutional and statutory provisions ...... 2\

Ill. Other relevant material

Q) The subject Ordinance ........:cessesereeeeees 25

b) Signatories to this Petition ..............cc 34

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Griswold v. State of Connecticut,

Be in TIE IIE cptetiesasccehcsinnesnnceciniacececasvirinaien l

D. CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

REPORTS OF THE OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED

IN THE CASE BY COURTS OR ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES |

1) 12/30/2004 - ORDER denying Motion for TRO .

Signed by Judge Joan N Ericksen on 12/30/2004.

(amg) (Entered: 12/30/2004)

2) 01/26/2005 - ORDER That the Plaintiff's

Application to File Documents Conventionally, is

DENIED, as moot, and the Clerk of Court is directed

to file the Plaintiff's documents conventially. Signed

by Magistrate Judge Raymond L Erickson on 1/26/

05. (JMH) (Entered: 01/26/2005)

3) 05/25/2005 - PRETRIAL NOTICE AND ORDER

Pretriat Conference set for 6/28/2005 09:15 AM In

Chambers Hearing before Magistrate Judge

Raymond L Erickson. Signed by Magistrate Judge

Raymond L Erickson on 5/25/05. (Entered: 05/25/

2005)

4) 06/27/2005 - Minute Entry for proceedings held

before Judge Joan N Ericksen : Motion Hearing held

on 6/27/2005 re MOTION for Summary Judgment filed

by Beltrami, County of, Keith Winger. Court orders

on the record that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED

as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4. and 7 and those counts are

dismissed with prejudice. The remaining counts 5, 6,

8 and 9 are state claims. The Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these four

counts and they are dismissed without prejudice. No

a es

further order will be issued. (Court Reporter Maria

Weinbecky) (slf) (Entered: 06/27/2005)

5) 06/07/2007 - Opinion of USCA as to Notice of

Appeal to 8th Circuit (Chief Judge Loken, Judge

Gruender, Judge Benton): We affirm the decision of

the District Court. (akl) (Entered: 06/08/2007)

6) 06/07/2007 - USCA JUDGMENT as to Notice of

Appeal to 8th Circuit: The judgment of the district

court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with

the opinion of this Court. (aki) (Entered: 06/08/2007)

7) 06/27/2007 - MANDATE of USCA as to Notice of

Appead to 8th Circuit (akl} (Entered: 06/28/2007)

E. BASISF » JURISDICTION

1) The judgment sought to be reviewed was

entered by the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit on June 7, 2007. No rehearing was

sought by any party.

2) Jurisdiction to review, on writ of certiorari, the

judgment is conferred upon the United States

Supreme Court by 28 United States Code Sec. 1254

(1).

F. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Text of key cited provisions is contained in

Appendix, post. .

1) The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution;

2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution;

3) The Ninth Amendment to the United States

Constitution;

4) The Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution;

5) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1981;

6) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1983;

7) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1988;

8) Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, Section 13

G. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. The case herein originated 12/29/04 with the

filing, by Plaintiffs, before the United States District

Court for the State of Minnesota, of a Complaint for

Injunctive Relief, for Declaratory Relief, and for

Damages (“the Complaint"). The Complaint sought

relief, partially on U.S. Constitutional grounds, from

the “Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for

Indoor Public Places and Places of Work" (“The

Ordinance”), passed by the Beltrami, Minnesota

County Board on August 17th, 2004.

The Complaint alleged, as causes of action,

1) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,

and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution;

2) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,

and the “takings” clause of the Fifth Amendment,

and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution;

3) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,

and the “takings” clause of the Fifth Amendment,

and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution;

4) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,

relating to invasion of privacy, and Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;

5) That the vote to pass The Ordinance was

unlawful, per Mirinesota State law because one of

the purported County Commissioners voting on same

was not an inhabitant of Beltrami County at the time

of the vote;

6) That The Ordinance is arbitrary and

unreasonable; |

Ye

7) That said County Board acted without authority

in violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution:

8) That said County Board's action is preempted

by Minnesota State law; and

9) Subterfuge - the County's passage of The

Ordinance was to attain an impermissible purpose.

The Plaintiffs also filed, on 12/29/04, a Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order, and a Motion for

Preliminary Injunction; both to restrain and enjoin

enforcement of The Ordinance. The affidavits filed

by each Plaintiff with said motions stated that they

would suffer irreparable damage were The

Ordinance to be allowed to take effect on January

Ist, 2005.

On 12/30/04, U.S. District Court Judge Joan N.

Ericksen denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order.

On 01/21/05, Plaintiffs filed a new Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, which was heard by U.S. District

Court Judge Joan N. Ericksen on 03/07/05, and

denied.

At said hearing, March 7th, 2005, Plaintiffs Solberg,

Ness, Steele, and Justin Chrz, CEO of and for Turtle

Creek Saloon Inc., had driven the 225 miles to St.

Paul to appear at the hearing, before Judge

Ericksen, on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. But

Ericksen denied Solberg, Ness, and Chrz their “day

in court" and would not hear from them on grounds

that 1) they had not filed a memorandum! ; 2) Turtle

Creek Saloon, Inc. was a corporation and could not

be represented by Chrz; and 3) per Judge Ericksen,

Ness and Solberg were “entities” because they

owned, as their businesses, the sole proprietorships

of Hillcrest Supper Club and The Other Place,

respectively, and so, Ericksen ruled, could not appear

pro se to argue the damage to their businesses

caused by the subject smoking ordinance.

Judge Ericksen further refused to allow Plaintiff

Adam Steele, who was permitted to argue his case,

to call Solberg, Chrz, or Ness as witnesses.

Judge Ericksen thusly denied the Preliminary

Injunction without the benefit of the argument or

testimony of these damaged Plaintiffs (Solberg, Ness

and Chrz) who were not allowed to speak at the

hearing. |

On-5/11/2005, Defendants moved for Summary

Judgement, which was heard and granted by Judge

Ericksen on 06/27/05.

With said grant of summary judgement Her Honour

dismissed Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth and

seventh causes of action with prejudice, and

dismissed the fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth causes as

state claims on which the Court declined to exercise

'This was done notwithstanding that all of the Plaintiffs had,

on 12/29/04, jointly filed a Memorandum is Support of Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order and Mofion for Preliminary

Injunction; and that on February 23, 2005, Plaintiffs STEELE, NESS,

SOLBERG, and TURTLE CREEK SALOON, INC. filed a joint reply

to Defendants’ response, stating that they were, and aft all

times had been, in agreement with the Memorandum in

Support of Preliminary Injunction filed by STEELE 01/21/05. Each

of the Plaintiffs had also filed, on 01/21/05, their own Affidavits

in Support of Preliminary Injunction.

me

supplemental jurisdiction; thusly dismissing and finally

disposing of all of the ciaims of Plaintiffs.

On 07/23/05, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal,

appealing, to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit, the summary judgement and

dismissals of 06/27/05.

On 06/07/2007 said Court of Appeals issued its

opinion affirming the judgement of the District Court,

followed by its mandate on 06/27/07.

2. The basis for jurisdiction of the Court having

original jurisdiction (i.e. the United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota) in this matter is United

States Code, Title 28, Section 1331. Venue was proper

under United States Code, Title 28, Section 1391 (b).

«44

H. ARGUMENT

1. This case is unique in that, for the first time, it

asks that the U.S. Supreme Court determine whether

statutes and ordinances prohibiting smoking in

private places are Constitutional.

2. Contrary to what the adverse parties have

raised, this action does not purport to create any

new rights. If does not, for instance, attempt to

create any "right to smoke” not already enumerated

by the United States Constitution. It is based wholly

upon existing rights to

Q) privacy within one's private business;

b) the right of the owner of that business, solely,

to regulate what lawful conduct is permitted therein

(that is, Plaintiffs accede that an owner could not

permit an uniawful substance such as marijuana to

be used; but maintain that he has a right, within

privacy, to permit, if he chooses, any substance to

be used which would not be otherwise unlawful to

use in private, or outside, and would not be unlawful

except for the nature of the owner's business and

premises);

Cc) the right of said owner to, in effect, contract

with his customer that in exchange for the customer's

patronage and transaction, that said customer may

use, occupy, and have quiet enjoyment of the

owner's premises, including smoking thereon; and

d) the right of the owner to not have the goodwill

and value of an existing business diminished or

destroyed by regulation that drives its customers

away, without just compensation first paid. (The Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires just

Ss

compensation; Section 13 of Article 1 of the

Minnesota Constitution requires that it be first paid

or secured - i.e. before the property is taken.)

These rights should, and must, be upheld.

3. The “Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance

for indoor Public Places and Places of .Vork” (“the

ordinance”) is, as a purported protection of public

health and safety, unreasonable.

Firstly, there is no conclusive proof that "secona-

hand smoke” causes the mortality or disease as

claimed by the ordinance. There is research that

goes both ways. The very comprehensive Enstrom/

Kabat report which documents the cumulative

effects (or lack of same) of exposure over a 39-year

period, submitted by Plaintiffs (Exhibit 8B

accompanying the Complaint - Case 0:04-cv-05109-

JNE-RLE Document 11-2 Filed 12/29/2004) not only

found that second-hand smoke did not cause

certain diseases or mortality as stated in the

ordinance, but also cited and defined the statistical

errors in other studies which reported that it did.

Although the health effects of second-hand

smoke remain a matter of public conjecture, they

are not sufficiently shown as to warrant

encroachment of fundamental Constitutional rights

to keep people from being exposed fo it.

Secondly, any exposure is voluntary. No one is

forced to go into a smoking establishment. There are

many establishments which, by policy of their owners,

are non-smoking, so that a customer, concerned

about exposure, need not do his business at a

smoking establishment. Prior to the ordinance, many

restaurants had both smoking and non-smoking

x =

areas to suit the preferences of its clientele. A

proprietor, left to his own devices, will normally tend

to allocate space in proportion to thai of his clientele

which do, or don't smoke; that yields the best profit.

Normal market forces in a competitive free-

enterprise system are a far better and more proper

remedy to concerns about exposure to second-

hand smoke than regulation which infringes

Constitutional rights. If Constitutional rights are to be

forsaken in order to protect people from the

consequences of risky behaviour, skydiving should

certainly be prohibited, as should non-marital

physical romance; at least the jeopardy resultant of

these activities is known, proven, and demonstrable;

as concerns second-hand smoke, it is nof.

Thirdly, even as concerns employees, working at

asmoking establishment is a matier of choice. Many

employees work there because they are active

smokers and it is one of the few places where they

can smoke on the job. Others assume the risks, if any,

of the job much as if they worked at a sawmill, as a

law enforcement officer, or on any other job which

entails risk. In practice, again, a competitive free

market generally ensures a choice, so that people

who smoke can work at smoking establishments and

those who object to smoke can work at non-smoking

ones.

Fourthly, there is no law precluding a self-

employed sole proprietor - an individual - from

representing himself, and including his sole proprietor

business interests, before the United States District

Court. Legally, the individual and his sole proprietor

business are one and the same.

Fifthly, at time of summary judgement, there

«ih.

remained genuine issues of fact to be determined

thought discovery and trial. One key issue is whether

there exists enough incontrovertible, verified, and

authenticatable evidence to render a prohibitive

smoking ordinance a valid public purpose, and not

an arbitrary exercise of authority. This issue would

have been examined through discovery and at trial,

but was not due to the issuance of summary

judgement. The Defendants have claimed that

evidence supports their actions, but the Plaintiffs

have not been afforded the opportunity to examine,

conduct investigation and discovery upon, or cross-

examine that claimed evidence.

Sixthly, this matter is not rendered moot by the

passage of the Minnesota “Freedom To Breathe Act

of 2007" ("the State act"), which goes into effect

October 1st, 2007, and purports to impose, statewide,

restrictions similar to those of the ordinance.

Petitioners seek a final opinion from the United

States Supreme Court on the Constitutionality of an

ordinance which invades private places and

prohibits tobacco smoking therein, and that opinion

would also bear upon similar laws and ordinances

which are being promulgated nationwide. A

determination and published opinion by the U.S.

Supreme Court on these matters is needed to

provide legal, legislative, and public policy direction,

and finally resolve the issue of whether these types

of laws are within the bounds of the United States

Constitution.

mo:

APPENDIX

|. OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS ENTERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE

JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-3154

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota.

[UNPUBLISHED]

Adam Steele; Donnis Solberg, doing business as

The Other Place; Corner Bar of Bemidji. Inc., a

Minnesota Corporation, doing business as Corner Bar;

Turtle Creek Saloon, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation,

doing business as Turtle Creek Saloon; James A. Ness,

doing business as Hillcrest Supper Club,

Appellants,

V.

County of Beltrami, State of Minnesota; Keith

Winger, Sheriff of the County of Beltrami, State of

Minnesota; Other Unnamed Persons and Entities,

Appellees.

Submitted: February 15, 2007

Filed: June 7, 2007

«ita

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and

BENTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

On August 17, 2004, the Beltrami County Board of

Commissioners passed the “Beltrami County Smoke

Free Ordinance for Indoor Public Places and Places

of Work" (“the ordinance"). In an effort to protect

public health, the ordinance prohibits smoking in

public places and places of work, subject to a few

exceptions. The ordinance took effect on January

1, 2005, with further “phase-in” exceptions to the

prohibition expiring on January 1, 2007.

On December 29, 2004, Adam Steele, an

individual who smokes tobacco products, and

several restaurants and bars (“plaintiffs”) filed this 42

U.S.C. 1983 complaint against Beltrami County, its

sheriff and other unidentified parties (“Beltrami”) in

an effort to enjoin the implementation of.the

ordinance. The plaintiffs were not represented by

counsel. After the district court! had denied the

plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order

and motion for a preliminary injunction, it granted

Beltrami’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing

the plaintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice and their

state claims without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal,

and we affirm.

The plaintiffs appeal the district court's summary

judgment in favor of Beltrami with respect to three

of their federal claims, which allege that the

ordinance violates their rights under the Fourth, Fifth,

'The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge

for the District of Minnesota.

«Ms

Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. "We review a

grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm

if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Ruminer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 F.3d 561,

563 (8th Cir. 2007).

The plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive. In

particular, they fail to provide any sound legal

argument or authorities supporting their claimed

constitutional rights to smoke or to control smoking

on premises they have opened to the public, and

we decline their invitation to create such rights. Our

own research has revealed no relevant authority

supporting these rights under any theory, and several

state and municipal smoking regulations have

survived similar challenges under the Fourth, Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., D.A.B.E. Inc. v.

City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2005)

(holding that appellants failed to establish that an

ordinance regulating smoking in restaurants and bars

was aregulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment):

Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539,

542-43 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city regulation

prohibiting certain fire department employees from

smoking on or off duty was not irrational or arbitrary

under the Fourteenth Amendment); Players, Inc. v.

City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d 522, 540-43 (S.D.N.Y.

2005) (holding that state and municipal smoking bans

did not violate a private social club's Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights). Indeed, Gasper v.

Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District dealt with

litigants urging the creation of a constitutional right

to be free from tobacco smoke in state buildings and

held that it is not a right recognized under the First,

s

Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments. 418 F. Supp.

716, 718-22 (E. D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897, 899

(5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e can see no constitutional basis

for injecting the courts and their injunctive powers

into this tobacco-smoking controversy.”). We agree

with the district court in Gasper: '

[T]he United States Constitution does not

provide Judicial remedies for every social and

economic ill. For the Constitution to be read to

protect nonsmokers from inhaling tobacco

smoke would be to broaden the rights of the

Constitution to limits heretofore unheard of and

to engage in that type of adjustment of

individual liberties better left to the people

acting through legislative processes.

Id. at 722 (emphasis added). These same principles

apply with equal force to the alleged right to smoke

or to control smoking in a restaurant or bar. For these

reasons and those set forth by the district court, we

affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B7.

2We also note that the corporate plaintiffs did not challenge

on appea the dismissal of their claims for failure to prosecute.

However, the sole proprietor plaintiffs did challenge the district

court's alleged order requiring them to obtain counsel.

Because their claims were not dismissed on this basis and in

light of our decision on the merits of the claims, we do not

reach this issue.

- 20.

Il. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

A. The Fourth Amendment fo the United States

Constitution:

“The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

B. The Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution:

“No person shail be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment

or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising

in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in

actual service in time of War or public danger; nor

shall any person be subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.”

C. The Ninth Amendment to the United States

Constitution: Ze

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.

o 2] «

D. The Fourteenth Amendment fo the United States

Constitution:

Section 1.: “All persons born or naturalized in the

United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws”

Section 5.: “The Congress shall have power to

enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of

this article.”

E. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981

“1981. Equal rights under the law

“(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States shail have the same

right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to

the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings

for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed

by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and

exactions of every kind, and to no other.

“(b) ‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined. For

purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce

contracts” includes the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and

«2.

conditions of the contractual relationship.

“(c) Protection against Impairment. The rights

protected by this section are protected against

impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and

impairment under color of State law.”

F. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983:

“1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

“Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall

be considered to be a statute of the District of

Columbia.”

G. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1988:

“1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights

“(a) Applicability of statutory and common law

“The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters

conferred on the district courts by the provisions of

titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the

protection of all persons in the United States in their

civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised

and enforced in conformity with the laws of the

United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry

the same into effect; but in all cases where they are

not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the

-23-

provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and

punish offenses against law, the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and

statutes of the State wherein the court having

jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so

far as the same is not inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States, shail be

extended to and govern the said courts in the trial

and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal

nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party

found guilty.

“(b) Attorney's fees

“In any action or proceeding to enforce a

provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,

and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20

U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.],

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or

section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the

costs, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

Officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be

held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees,

unless such action was clearly in excess of such

Officer's jurisdiction.

“(c) Expert fees |

“In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection

(b) of this section in any action or proceeding to

enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this

title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert

I~

fees as part of the attorney's fee.”

H. Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, Section 13:

"Sec. 13. PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.

Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or

damaged for public use without just compensation

therefor, first paid or secured.”

Il. OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL

a) THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE

Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for Indoor

Public Places and Places of Work

Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for indoor

Public Places and Places of Work

The County Board of the County of Beltrami,

Minnesota, ordains:

SECTION 1. PURPOSES AND FINDINGS OF FACT.

The Beltrami County Board finds that:

Tobacco smoke is a leading cause of disease in

nonsmokers and a major source of indoor air

pollution. Secondhand smoke causes heart disease,

lung cancer, respiratory infections, decreased

respiratory function and other health problems.

Secondhand smoke kills an estimated 35,000 to

62,000 Americans each year from heart disease.

secondhand smoke also causes an estimated 3,000

lung cancer deaths in America each year.

These effects are well documented, and

numerous medical and scientific authorities,

including the American Medical Association, the

Surgeon General, the National Institute on

Occupational Safety and Health, the National

Cancer Institute, the Environmental Protection

- 2%.

Agency, the National Academy of Sciences, the

National Toxicology Program and the World Health

Organization have recognized the deadly effects of

exposure to secondhand smoke. The proposed

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a

global treaty negotiated by more than 190 countries,

declares that "scientific evidence has unequivocally

established that exposure to tobacco smoke causes

death, disease and disability.”

There is no safe level of exposure to tobacco

smoke. Science has been unable to find any level

of dilution at which smoke does not cause cancer.

Neither the separation of smokers and nonsmokers,

nor the introduction of new ventilation systems, can

eliminate the health hazards caused by secondhand

smoke.

Employees in smoky workplaces are at special risk.

One study has estimated that working in a smoky

bar for eight hours is equivalent to smoking 16

cigarettes. Also at special risk are children, elderly

people, and those with cardiovascular disease or

impaired respiratory function, including people with

asthma and those with obstructive airway disease.

Objective evidence does not bear out the fear

that elimination of public smoking will harm a

community's economy or result in a net loss of jobs

in restaurants and bars. On the contrary, many

independent economic studies have shown that the

elimination of smoking has no material economic

impact on a community. These studies are drawn

from the experience of hundreds of communities that

have successfully eliminated smoking in workplaces

and public places. The states of California,

Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, and New York have

- 2

adopted laws ending all smoking in bars, restaurants,

and other public places, as have the nations of

lreland, New Zealand and Norway.

By reducing the exposure of young people to

adult smoking and unhealthy role modeling,

elimination of smoking in public places furthers

Minnesota's goal of reducing youth smoking.

There is no legal or constitutional “right to smoke."

Business owners have no legal or constitutional right

to expose their employees and customers to toxic

chemicals, whether in tobacco smoke or otherwise.

On the contrary, employers have a common law

duty to provide their workers with a workplace that

is not unreasonably dangerous.

Accordingly, the Beltrami County Board finds and

declares that the purpose of this ordinance is to:

(1) Protect the public health, welfare and safety

by better ensuring the ability of citizens to breathe

safe and uncontaminated air;

(2) Affirm that the right to breathe has priority over

the desire fo smoke; and

(3) Protect vulnerable populations, including

employees, children, the elderly and those with

chronic health conditions.

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.

As used in this ordinance:

(a) “Bar’ means an establishment that has an on-

sale license issued pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

Chapter 340A, as amended from time to time, which

does not serve food or which has a limited food

menu selection as defined by Minnesota Statutes

Section 157.16, subd. 3(d)(1), as amended from time

to time.

(b) “Other person in charge” has the meaning

27 -

specified in the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules,

Minnesota Rules part 4620.0100, subpart 10, as

amended from time to time. |

(c) “Place of work” means any enclosed, indoor

location at which two or more individuals perform

any type of a service for consideration of payment

under any type of employment relationship,

including but not limited to an employment

relationship with or for a private corporation,

partnership, individual, or government agency. This

term includes any location where two or more

individuals gratuitously perform services for which

individuals are ordinarily paid. Enclosed, indoor areas

of private clubs, and rooms used for private meetings

or social functions, are “places of work" if two or more

persons acting under an employment relationship

provide cleaning, catering, food or beverage

service, maintenance or other support services in the

location.

(d) “Proprietor” has the meaning specified by the

Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules, Minnesota

Rules, part 4620.0 100, subd. 13, as amended from

time to time.

(e) “Public place” means any enclosed, indoor

area used by the general public or serving as a place

of work, including, but not limited to, restaurants and

other facilities serving food or alcohol, retail stores,

offices and other commercial establishments, public

conveyances, educational facilities other than

public schools, as defined in Minnesota Statutes §

120A.05, subdivisions 9, 11, and 13, hospitals,

auditoriums, arenas, meeting rooms, and common

areas of apartment buildings, condominiums or

similar buildings.

- 28 -

(f) “Restaurant” has a meaning specified in

Minnesota Statutes Section 157.15, Subd. 12, as

amended from time to time.

(g) “Smoking” means the inhaling, exhaling or

combustion of any cigar, cigarette, pipe, tobacco

product, weed, plant or any other similar article.

“Smoking” includes possessing or carrying a lighted

cigar, cigarette, pipe or any other lighted smoking

equipment. “Smoking” does not include the use of

tobacco by enrolled members of a federally-

recognized Indian tribe as part of a traditional Indian

spiritual or cultural ceremony.

SECTION 3. PROHIBITIONS.

Subd. 1. Except as provided in subdivisions 3 and

4, smoking is prohibited in public places and places

of work.

Subd. 2. To ensure that tobacco smoke does not

enter public places or places of work, and that

persons entering such places are not exposed

involuntarily to tobacco smoke, smoking is prohibited

‘within 10 feet of primary public entrances and exits,

open windows and ventilation intakes of public

places and places of work.

Subd. 3. The provisions of this section do not apply

to:

(a) Private residences, including but not limited to

homes, apartments, condominiums and town

homes.

(6b) Motor vehicles.

(c) Outdoor spaces, except as provided in

subdivision 2.

subd. 4. The provisions of this section do not apply

to:

(a) Guest rooms in hotels and motels.

-29-

(b) Rented or leased cabins at resorts.

(c} Dormitory rooms.

This exception is temporary and expires on January

Ist of 2007. |

Subd. 5. The provisions of this section do not apply

to Bars and Restaurants between the hours of 8:00

p.m. and 3:00 a.m. This exception is temporary and

expires on January 1, 2007.

Subd. 6. The provisions of this section shall not apply

to that portion of a bar or restaurant, provided that

the following separations are maintained:

(a) The area is separated from the bar or restaurant

on all sides by continuous floor-to-ceiling walls which

are interrupted only by closeable doors, that are

continuously closed, except when a person is

actively entering or exiting the room, and

(b) The area has a ventilation system separated

from the bar or restaurant, with the area maintaining

a negative air pressure in relation to the adjacent

bar or restaurant, and

(c) Minors are not permitted in the area at any

time, and

(d) The area constitutes no more than 30 percent

of the seating for the entire bar or restaurant.

Subd. 7. The provisions of this section shall not apply

to residents of a board and care facility licensed by

the State of Minnesota, unless smoking is otherwise

prohibited by the owner or the operator of said

facility.

SECTION 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROPRIETORS.

The proprietor or other person in charge of a public

place or place of work shall:

{a) Post “no smoking” signs that comply with the

Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules, Minnesota

« 30 «

Rules, part 4620.0500, as amended from time to time.

Where smoking is allowed in a portion of a bar or

restaurant smoking room, the proprietor, or other

person in charge, shall conspicuously post a sign at

all entrances to that area of such business stating:

“WARNING: This area contains tobacco smoke,

which causes cancer, heart disease, lung disease,

and can harm you, your unborn baby, and children.”

(6b) Ensure that ashtrays, lighters, and matchbooks

are not provided in any area where smoking is

prohibited; and

(c) Ask any person who smokes in an area where

smoking is prohibited to refrain from smoking and, if

the person does not refrain from smoking after being

asked to do so, ask the person to leave.

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL PRIVATE PROHIBITIONS.

Nothing in this ordinance prevents the proprietor

or other person in charge of any place, including,

without limitation, any private residence, motor

vehicle or outdoor space, from prohibiting smoking

in any such place.

SECTION 6. RETALIATION PROHIBITED.

No person or employer shall discharge, refuse to

hire, or in any manner retaliate against any

employee, applicant for employment or customer

because the employee, applicant or customer

exercises any right to a smoke-free environment

afforded by this ordinance or other law.

SECTION 7. EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS PRESERVED.

An employee who consents to work in a setting

where an employer allows smoking does not waive

or otherwise surrender any legal rights the employee

may have against the employer or any other party.

SECTION 8. OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS.

- 3] -

This ordinance is intended to complement and go

beyond the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act,

Minnesota Statutes §§ 144.411 to 144.417, as

amended from time to time. Nothing in this

ordinance authorizes smoking in any location where

smoking is prohibited or restricted by other laws.

SECTION 9. VIOLATION AND PENALTIES.

Subd. 1. Smoking Where Prohibited. It is a violation

of this ordinance for any person to smoke in an area

where smoking is prohibited by this ordinance or by

a private policy established by the proprietor or other

person in charge of the area, as authorized by

section 5.

Subd. 2. Proprietors. It is a violation of this ordinance

for the proprietor or other person in charge of any

premises subject to this ordinance to fail to comply

with the requirements of section 4, or to retaliate

against an employee, applicant for employment or

customer, as prohibited by section 6.

Subd. 3. Penalties. A person who violates any

provision of this ordinance shall be guilty of a petty

misdemeanor. A person who violates any provision

of this ordinance within one year after having been

determined to have committed a previous violation

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day of

violation constitutes a separate offense.

Subd. 4. Enforcement. This ordinance shall be

enforced by the Local City Police and County Sheriffs

Department or other enforcement agencies

designated by the county.

SECTION 10. SEVERABILITY.

If any portion of this ordinance, or its application

fo any circumstances, is held invalid, the remaining

provisions shall be considered severable, and shall

o 32 «

be given effect to the maximum extent possible.

SECTION 11. REVIEW OF ORDINANCE. In the event

that the Minnesota Legislature enacts a statute

covering the subject matter of this Ordinance, the

Beltrami County Board of Commissioners shall

undertake a review of the provisions of this

Ordinance. Such review shall be in the form

determined by the Board of Commissioners, and shall

be commenced within 60 days of the passage of

such legislation.

SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 2005.

SECTION 13. ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE

Passed by the County Board of Commissioners this

17th day of August, 2004.

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b) SIGNATORIES

|join in the filing of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

which is my Petition to the United States Supreme

Court.

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“Signature Date signed

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Print Name and title, if any

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Signature Date signed

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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