Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Steele v. Beltrami County (No. 07-334)
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(gle | Supreme Court U.S.
(UD 07- 334SEP 14 2007
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO FICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Adam Steele, et al.,
Petitioners,
VS.
The County of Beltrami,
State of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondants.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
This Petition is filed jointly by the following Petitioners,
each of whom is pro se:
1) Adam Steele, P.O. Box 1132, Bemidji, MN 56619
218-759-1162
2) Donnis Solberg, 102 Bemidji Rd., NW, Turtle River,
MN 56601 218-586-2281
3) James A. Ness, 20250 Tepee Hill Lane, Hines, MN
56647 218-835-4250
4) Turtle Creek Saloon, Inc., by Justin Chrz, CEO, 273
Bemidji Rd. NE, Turtle River, MN 56601 218-586-2081
A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does the “Beltrami County Smoke Free
Ordinance for Indoor Public Places and Places of
Work" (“The Ordinance”) address a valid public
purpose?
2. Does The Ordinance, which prohibits smoking
in bars, restaurants, and other privately owned
indoor places, unreasonably violate Constitutional
rights of privacy, and other personal rights as
guaranteed by the Fourth and Ninth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, and including
penumbral privacy rights’ under the Constitution ?
3. Does The Ordinance inappropriately and
unreasonably restrict the ability of a bar or restaurant
owner to contract for a customer's patronage and
business?
4. Does The Ordinance unreasonably restrict the
ability of a customer to privately contract for goods
and hospitality services, including his ability to smoke
during the delivery of said good?
5. Does the ordinance, by strongly diminishing the
value of “goodwill” (an intangible asset, generally
measured by annual gross receipts or profits, which
is a material factor in the worth and selling price of
a business) of a bar or restaurant, constitute a
regulatory “taking”, without just compensation;
which is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 13
'e.g. a “zone of privacy” as defined by Mr. Justice Douglas
in Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 85 S. Ct 1678 (1965)
ee
of the Minnesota Constitution? (The Minnesota
Constitution is more stringent, requiring that the
compensation be first paid or secured.)
6. Did the USDC err in refusing to allow the pro se:
appearance of sole-proprietor Plaintiffs Ness and
Solberg, refusing to let them be heard at the hearing
on Preliminary Injunction, and refusing to recognize
their appearance in writing at the hearing on
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement?
7. Did the U.S. District Court err in granting summary
judgement when there were genuine issues of
material fact to be determined?
B. LIST OF THE PARTIES
The following is the list of parties to the orginal
proceeding in the Federal District Court of the District
of Minnesota, and later before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the
judgements of which Courts are sought, now, to be
reviewed:
Plaintiffs:
1) ADAM STEELE, an individual;
2) DONNIS SOLBERG, an individual:
3) JAMES A. NESS, an individual;
4) TURTLE CREEK SALOON, INC., a Minnesota
Corporation,
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: There is no parent
corporation of this corporation, nor any publicly-held
corporation owning 10% or more of said
corporation's stock; and
5) (This original Plaintiff does not join in this petition)
CORNER BAR OF BEMIDJI, INC., a Minnesota
Corporation,
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: There is no parent
corporation of this corporation, nor any publicly-held
corporation owning 10% or more of said
corporation's stock;
6) (This original Plaintiff does not join in this petition)
TOBACCO SUPER STORE, INC., a Minnesota
Corporation
— o
Defendants:
1) THE COUNTY OF BELTRAMI, STATE OF MINNESOTA;
2) KEITH WINGER, Sheriff of the County of Beltrami,
State of Minnesota; and
3) other Unnamed persons and entities.
DISINTERESTED PARTIES:
Petitioners name the following as disinterested
parties in this Petition:
Corner Bar of Bemidji, Inc. (Plaintiff 5, ante), for
reason that said Plaintiff has not joined in this Petition.
Tobacco Super Store, Inc. (Plaintiff 6, ante}, for
reason that said Plaintiff has not joined in this Petition.
C. TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Questions presented for review ........ccceee |
B. List of parties to the proceeding ..........ese 3
C. Table of contents and authorities............. 5
D. Citations entered in the COSC .........cseeesees 6
E. Statement of basis of jurisdiction .............06 8
F. Constitutional and statutory provisions ....... 8
G. Statement Of thE COSC ........ssccssserssssscssserseee 9
Be SUNN IT scnrssnik-cisdiabieiniiensnesintanssensuesuisNecpiaionsiis 13
APPENDIX
|. Opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals entered in conjunction with
the judgment sought to be reviewed ........... 17
li. Constitutional and statutory provisions ...... 2\
Ill. Other relevant material
Q) The subject Ordinance ........:cessesereeeeees 25
b) Signatories to this Petition ..............cc 34
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Griswold v. State of Connecticut,
Be in TIE IIE cptetiesasccehcsinnesnnceciniacececasvirinaien l
D. CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL
REPORTS OF THE OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED
IN THE CASE BY COURTS OR ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES |
1) 12/30/2004 - ORDER denying Motion for TRO .
Signed by Judge Joan N Ericksen on 12/30/2004.
(amg) (Entered: 12/30/2004)
2) 01/26/2005 - ORDER That the Plaintiff's
Application to File Documents Conventionally, is
DENIED, as moot, and the Clerk of Court is directed
to file the Plaintiff's documents conventially. Signed
by Magistrate Judge Raymond L Erickson on 1/26/
05. (JMH) (Entered: 01/26/2005)
3) 05/25/2005 - PRETRIAL NOTICE AND ORDER
Pretriat Conference set for 6/28/2005 09:15 AM In
Chambers Hearing before Magistrate Judge
Raymond L Erickson. Signed by Magistrate Judge
Raymond L Erickson on 5/25/05. (Entered: 05/25/
2005)
4) 06/27/2005 - Minute Entry for proceedings held
before Judge Joan N Ericksen : Motion Hearing held
on 6/27/2005 re MOTION for Summary Judgment filed
by Beltrami, County of, Keith Winger. Court orders
on the record that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED
as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4. and 7 and those counts are
dismissed with prejudice. The remaining counts 5, 6,
8 and 9 are state claims. The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these four
counts and they are dismissed without prejudice. No
a es
further order will be issued. (Court Reporter Maria
Weinbecky) (slf) (Entered: 06/27/2005)
5) 06/07/2007 - Opinion of USCA as to Notice of
Appeal to 8th Circuit (Chief Judge Loken, Judge
Gruender, Judge Benton): We affirm the decision of
the District Court. (akl) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
6) 06/07/2007 - USCA JUDGMENT as to Notice of
Appeal to 8th Circuit: The judgment of the district
court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with
the opinion of this Court. (aki) (Entered: 06/08/2007)
7) 06/27/2007 - MANDATE of USCA as to Notice of
Appead to 8th Circuit (akl} (Entered: 06/28/2007)
E. BASISF » JURISDICTION
1) The judgment sought to be reviewed was
entered by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit on June 7, 2007. No rehearing was
sought by any party.
2) Jurisdiction to review, on writ of certiorari, the
judgment is conferred upon the United States
Supreme Court by 28 United States Code Sec. 1254
(1).
F. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Text of key cited provisions is contained in
Appendix, post. .
1) The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution;
2) The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution;
3) The Ninth Amendment to the United States
Constitution;
4) The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution;
5) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1981;
6) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1983;
7) United States Code, Title 42, Section 1988;
8) Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, Section 13
G. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The case herein originated 12/29/04 with the
filing, by Plaintiffs, before the United States District
Court for the State of Minnesota, of a Complaint for
Injunctive Relief, for Declaratory Relief, and for
Damages (“the Complaint"). The Complaint sought
relief, partially on U.S. Constitutional grounds, from
the “Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for
Indoor Public Places and Places of Work" (“The
Ordinance”), passed by the Beltrami, Minnesota
County Board on August 17th, 2004.
The Complaint alleged, as causes of action,
1) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution;
2) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,
and the “takings” clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution;
3) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,
and the “takings” clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution;
4) Deprivation of Civil Rights under 42 USC § 1983,
relating to invasion of privacy, and Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;
5) That the vote to pass The Ordinance was
unlawful, per Mirinesota State law because one of
the purported County Commissioners voting on same
was not an inhabitant of Beltrami County at the time
of the vote;
6) That The Ordinance is arbitrary and
unreasonable; |
Ye
7) That said County Board acted without authority
in violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution:
8) That said County Board's action is preempted
by Minnesota State law; and
9) Subterfuge - the County's passage of The
Ordinance was to attain an impermissible purpose.
The Plaintiffs also filed, on 12/29/04, a Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, and a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction; both to restrain and enjoin
enforcement of The Ordinance. The affidavits filed
by each Plaintiff with said motions stated that they
would suffer irreparable damage were The
Ordinance to be allowed to take effect on January
Ist, 2005.
On 12/30/04, U.S. District Court Judge Joan N.
Ericksen denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order.
On 01/21/05, Plaintiffs filed a new Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, which was heard by U.S. District
Court Judge Joan N. Ericksen on 03/07/05, and
denied.
At said hearing, March 7th, 2005, Plaintiffs Solberg,
Ness, Steele, and Justin Chrz, CEO of and for Turtle
Creek Saloon Inc., had driven the 225 miles to St.
Paul to appear at the hearing, before Judge
Ericksen, on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. But
Ericksen denied Solberg, Ness, and Chrz their “day
in court" and would not hear from them on grounds
that 1) they had not filed a memorandum! ; 2) Turtle
Creek Saloon, Inc. was a corporation and could not
be represented by Chrz; and 3) per Judge Ericksen,
Ness and Solberg were “entities” because they
owned, as their businesses, the sole proprietorships
of Hillcrest Supper Club and The Other Place,
respectively, and so, Ericksen ruled, could not appear
pro se to argue the damage to their businesses
caused by the subject smoking ordinance.
Judge Ericksen further refused to allow Plaintiff
Adam Steele, who was permitted to argue his case,
to call Solberg, Chrz, or Ness as witnesses.
Judge Ericksen thusly denied the Preliminary
Injunction without the benefit of the argument or
testimony of these damaged Plaintiffs (Solberg, Ness
and Chrz) who were not allowed to speak at the
hearing. |
On-5/11/2005, Defendants moved for Summary
Judgement, which was heard and granted by Judge
Ericksen on 06/27/05.
With said grant of summary judgement Her Honour
dismissed Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, fourth and
seventh causes of action with prejudice, and
dismissed the fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth causes as
state claims on which the Court declined to exercise
'This was done notwithstanding that all of the Plaintiffs had,
on 12/29/04, jointly filed a Memorandum is Support of Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Mofion for Preliminary
Injunction; and that on February 23, 2005, Plaintiffs STEELE, NESS,
SOLBERG, and TURTLE CREEK SALOON, INC. filed a joint reply
to Defendants’ response, stating that they were, and aft all
times had been, in agreement with the Memorandum in
Support of Preliminary Injunction filed by STEELE 01/21/05. Each
of the Plaintiffs had also filed, on 01/21/05, their own Affidavits
in Support of Preliminary Injunction.
me
supplemental jurisdiction; thusly dismissing and finally
disposing of all of the ciaims of Plaintiffs.
On 07/23/05, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal,
appealing, to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, the summary judgement and
dismissals of 06/27/05.
On 06/07/2007 said Court of Appeals issued its
opinion affirming the judgement of the District Court,
followed by its mandate on 06/27/07.
2. The basis for jurisdiction of the Court having
original jurisdiction (i.e. the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota) in this matter is United
States Code, Title 28, Section 1331. Venue was proper
under United States Code, Title 28, Section 1391 (b).
«44
H. ARGUMENT
1. This case is unique in that, for the first time, it
asks that the U.S. Supreme Court determine whether
statutes and ordinances prohibiting smoking in
private places are Constitutional.
2. Contrary to what the adverse parties have
raised, this action does not purport to create any
new rights. If does not, for instance, attempt to
create any "right to smoke” not already enumerated
by the United States Constitution. It is based wholly
upon existing rights to
Q) privacy within one's private business;
b) the right of the owner of that business, solely,
to regulate what lawful conduct is permitted therein
(that is, Plaintiffs accede that an owner could not
permit an uniawful substance such as marijuana to
be used; but maintain that he has a right, within
privacy, to permit, if he chooses, any substance to
be used which would not be otherwise unlawful to
use in private, or outside, and would not be unlawful
except for the nature of the owner's business and
premises);
Cc) the right of said owner to, in effect, contract
with his customer that in exchange for the customer's
patronage and transaction, that said customer may
use, occupy, and have quiet enjoyment of the
owner's premises, including smoking thereon; and
d) the right of the owner to not have the goodwill
and value of an existing business diminished or
destroyed by regulation that drives its customers
away, without just compensation first paid. (The Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires just
Ss
compensation; Section 13 of Article 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution requires that it be first paid
or secured - i.e. before the property is taken.)
These rights should, and must, be upheld.
3. The “Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance
for indoor Public Places and Places of .Vork” (“the
ordinance”) is, as a purported protection of public
health and safety, unreasonable.
Firstly, there is no conclusive proof that "secona-
hand smoke” causes the mortality or disease as
claimed by the ordinance. There is research that
goes both ways. The very comprehensive Enstrom/
Kabat report which documents the cumulative
effects (or lack of same) of exposure over a 39-year
period, submitted by Plaintiffs (Exhibit 8B
accompanying the Complaint - Case 0:04-cv-05109-
JNE-RLE Document 11-2 Filed 12/29/2004) not only
found that second-hand smoke did not cause
certain diseases or mortality as stated in the
ordinance, but also cited and defined the statistical
errors in other studies which reported that it did.
Although the health effects of second-hand
smoke remain a matter of public conjecture, they
are not sufficiently shown as to warrant
encroachment of fundamental Constitutional rights
to keep people from being exposed fo it.
Secondly, any exposure is voluntary. No one is
forced to go into a smoking establishment. There are
many establishments which, by policy of their owners,
are non-smoking, so that a customer, concerned
about exposure, need not do his business at a
smoking establishment. Prior to the ordinance, many
restaurants had both smoking and non-smoking
x =
areas to suit the preferences of its clientele. A
proprietor, left to his own devices, will normally tend
to allocate space in proportion to thai of his clientele
which do, or don't smoke; that yields the best profit.
Normal market forces in a competitive free-
enterprise system are a far better and more proper
remedy to concerns about exposure to second-
hand smoke than regulation which infringes
Constitutional rights. If Constitutional rights are to be
forsaken in order to protect people from the
consequences of risky behaviour, skydiving should
certainly be prohibited, as should non-marital
physical romance; at least the jeopardy resultant of
these activities is known, proven, and demonstrable;
as concerns second-hand smoke, it is nof.
Thirdly, even as concerns employees, working at
asmoking establishment is a matier of choice. Many
employees work there because they are active
smokers and it is one of the few places where they
can smoke on the job. Others assume the risks, if any,
of the job much as if they worked at a sawmill, as a
law enforcement officer, or on any other job which
entails risk. In practice, again, a competitive free
market generally ensures a choice, so that people
who smoke can work at smoking establishments and
those who object to smoke can work at non-smoking
ones.
Fourthly, there is no law precluding a self-
employed sole proprietor - an individual - from
representing himself, and including his sole proprietor
business interests, before the United States District
Court. Legally, the individual and his sole proprietor
business are one and the same.
Fifthly, at time of summary judgement, there
«ih.
remained genuine issues of fact to be determined
thought discovery and trial. One key issue is whether
there exists enough incontrovertible, verified, and
authenticatable evidence to render a prohibitive
smoking ordinance a valid public purpose, and not
an arbitrary exercise of authority. This issue would
have been examined through discovery and at trial,
but was not due to the issuance of summary
judgement. The Defendants have claimed that
evidence supports their actions, but the Plaintiffs
have not been afforded the opportunity to examine,
conduct investigation and discovery upon, or cross-
examine that claimed evidence.
Sixthly, this matter is not rendered moot by the
passage of the Minnesota “Freedom To Breathe Act
of 2007" ("the State act"), which goes into effect
October 1st, 2007, and purports to impose, statewide,
restrictions similar to those of the ordinance.
Petitioners seek a final opinion from the United
States Supreme Court on the Constitutionality of an
ordinance which invades private places and
prohibits tobacco smoking therein, and that opinion
would also bear upon similar laws and ordinances
which are being promulgated nationwide. A
determination and published opinion by the U.S.
Supreme Court on these matters is needed to
provide legal, legislative, and public policy direction,
and finally resolve the issue of whether these types
of laws are within the bounds of the United States
Constitution.
mo:
APPENDIX
|. OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENTERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED:
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-3154
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota.
[UNPUBLISHED]
Adam Steele; Donnis Solberg, doing business as
The Other Place; Corner Bar of Bemidji. Inc., a
Minnesota Corporation, doing business as Corner Bar;
Turtle Creek Saloon, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation,
doing business as Turtle Creek Saloon; James A. Ness,
doing business as Hillcrest Supper Club,
Appellants,
V.
County of Beltrami, State of Minnesota; Keith
Winger, Sheriff of the County of Beltrami, State of
Minnesota; Other Unnamed Persons and Entities,
Appellees.
Submitted: February 15, 2007
Filed: June 7, 2007
«ita
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and
BENTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
On August 17, 2004, the Beltrami County Board of
Commissioners passed the “Beltrami County Smoke
Free Ordinance for Indoor Public Places and Places
of Work" (“the ordinance"). In an effort to protect
public health, the ordinance prohibits smoking in
public places and places of work, subject to a few
exceptions. The ordinance took effect on January
1, 2005, with further “phase-in” exceptions to the
prohibition expiring on January 1, 2007.
On December 29, 2004, Adam Steele, an
individual who smokes tobacco products, and
several restaurants and bars (“plaintiffs”) filed this 42
U.S.C. 1983 complaint against Beltrami County, its
sheriff and other unidentified parties (“Beltrami”) in
an effort to enjoin the implementation of.the
ordinance. The plaintiffs were not represented by
counsel. After the district court! had denied the
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order
and motion for a preliminary injunction, it granted
Beltrami’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing
the plaintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice and their
state claims without prejudice. The plaintiffs appeal,
and we affirm.
The plaintiffs appeal the district court's summary
judgment in favor of Beltrami with respect to three
of their federal claims, which allege that the
ordinance violates their rights under the Fourth, Fifth,
'The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge
for the District of Minnesota.
«Ms
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. "We review a
grant of summary judgment de novo and will affirm
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Ruminer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 483 F.3d 561,
563 (8th Cir. 2007).
The plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive. In
particular, they fail to provide any sound legal
argument or authorities supporting their claimed
constitutional rights to smoke or to control smoking
on premises they have opened to the public, and
we decline their invitation to create such rights. Our
own research has revealed no relevant authority
supporting these rights under any theory, and several
state and municipal smoking regulations have
survived similar challenges under the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., D.A.B.E. Inc. v.
City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that appellants failed to establish that an
ordinance regulating smoking in restaurants and bars
was aregulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment):
Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539,
542-43 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city regulation
prohibiting certain fire department employees from
smoking on or off duty was not irrational or arbitrary
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Players, Inc. v.
City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d 522, 540-43 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that state and municipal smoking bans
did not violate a private social club's Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights). Indeed, Gasper v.
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District dealt with
litigants urging the creation of a constitutional right
to be free from tobacco smoke in state buildings and
held that it is not a right recognized under the First,
s
Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments. 418 F. Supp.
716, 718-22 (E. D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897, 899
(5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e can see no constitutional basis
for injecting the courts and their injunctive powers
into this tobacco-smoking controversy.”). We agree
with the district court in Gasper: '
[T]he United States Constitution does not
provide Judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. For the Constitution to be read to
protect nonsmokers from inhaling tobacco
smoke would be to broaden the rights of the
Constitution to limits heretofore unheard of and
to engage in that type of adjustment of
individual liberties better left to the people
acting through legislative processes.
Id. at 722 (emphasis added). These same principles
apply with equal force to the alleged right to smoke
or to control smoking in a restaurant or bar. For these
reasons and those set forth by the district court, we
affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B7.
2We also note that the corporate plaintiffs did not challenge
on appea the dismissal of their claims for failure to prosecute.
However, the sole proprietor plaintiffs did challenge the district
court's alleged order requiring them to obtain counsel.
Because their claims were not dismissed on this basis and in
light of our decision on the merits of the claims, we do not
reach this issue.
- 20.
Il. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. The Fourth Amendment fo the United States
Constitution:
“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
B. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution:
“No person shail be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”
C. The Ninth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: Ze
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
o 2] «
D. The Fourteenth Amendment fo the United States
Constitution:
Section 1.: “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws”
Section 5.: “The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”
E. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981
“1981. Equal rights under the law
“(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shail have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
“(b) ‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined. For
purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce
contracts” includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
«2.
conditions of the contractual relationship.
“(c) Protection against Impairment. The rights
protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law.”
F. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983:
“1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
“Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.”
G. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1988:
“1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights
“(a) Applicability of statutory and common law
“The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters
conferred on the district courts by the provisions of
titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry
the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
-23-
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so
far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shail be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party
found guilty.
“(b) Attorney's fees
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20
U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.],
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or
section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
Officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be
held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees,
unless such action was clearly in excess of such
Officer's jurisdiction.
“(c) Expert fees |
“In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection
(b) of this section in any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this
title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert
I~
fees as part of the attorney's fee.”
H. Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, Section 13:
"Sec. 13. PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.
Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or
damaged for public use without just compensation
therefor, first paid or secured.”
Il. OTHER RELEVANT MATERIAL
a) THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE
Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for Indoor
Public Places and Places of Work
Beltrami County Smoke Free Ordinance for indoor
Public Places and Places of Work
The County Board of the County of Beltrami,
Minnesota, ordains:
SECTION 1. PURPOSES AND FINDINGS OF FACT.
The Beltrami County Board finds that:
Tobacco smoke is a leading cause of disease in
nonsmokers and a major source of indoor air
pollution. Secondhand smoke causes heart disease,
lung cancer, respiratory infections, decreased
respiratory function and other health problems.
Secondhand smoke kills an estimated 35,000 to
62,000 Americans each year from heart disease.
secondhand smoke also causes an estimated 3,000
lung cancer deaths in America each year.
These effects are well documented, and
numerous medical and scientific authorities,
including the American Medical Association, the
Surgeon General, the National Institute on
Occupational Safety and Health, the National
Cancer Institute, the Environmental Protection
- 2%.
Agency, the National Academy of Sciences, the
National Toxicology Program and the World Health
Organization have recognized the deadly effects of
exposure to secondhand smoke. The proposed
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, a
global treaty negotiated by more than 190 countries,
declares that "scientific evidence has unequivocally
established that exposure to tobacco smoke causes
death, disease and disability.”
There is no safe level of exposure to tobacco
smoke. Science has been unable to find any level
of dilution at which smoke does not cause cancer.
Neither the separation of smokers and nonsmokers,
nor the introduction of new ventilation systems, can
eliminate the health hazards caused by secondhand
smoke.
Employees in smoky workplaces are at special risk.
One study has estimated that working in a smoky
bar for eight hours is equivalent to smoking 16
cigarettes. Also at special risk are children, elderly
people, and those with cardiovascular disease or
impaired respiratory function, including people with
asthma and those with obstructive airway disease.
Objective evidence does not bear out the fear
that elimination of public smoking will harm a
community's economy or result in a net loss of jobs
in restaurants and bars. On the contrary, many
independent economic studies have shown that the
elimination of smoking has no material economic
impact on a community. These studies are drawn
from the experience of hundreds of communities that
have successfully eliminated smoking in workplaces
and public places. The states of California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, and New York have
- 2
adopted laws ending all smoking in bars, restaurants,
and other public places, as have the nations of
lreland, New Zealand and Norway.
By reducing the exposure of young people to
adult smoking and unhealthy role modeling,
elimination of smoking in public places furthers
Minnesota's goal of reducing youth smoking.
There is no legal or constitutional “right to smoke."
Business owners have no legal or constitutional right
to expose their employees and customers to toxic
chemicals, whether in tobacco smoke or otherwise.
On the contrary, employers have a common law
duty to provide their workers with a workplace that
is not unreasonably dangerous.
Accordingly, the Beltrami County Board finds and
declares that the purpose of this ordinance is to:
(1) Protect the public health, welfare and safety
by better ensuring the ability of citizens to breathe
safe and uncontaminated air;
(2) Affirm that the right to breathe has priority over
the desire fo smoke; and
(3) Protect vulnerable populations, including
employees, children, the elderly and those with
chronic health conditions.
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this ordinance:
(a) “Bar’ means an establishment that has an on-
sale license issued pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
Chapter 340A, as amended from time to time, which
does not serve food or which has a limited food
menu selection as defined by Minnesota Statutes
Section 157.16, subd. 3(d)(1), as amended from time
to time.
(b) “Other person in charge” has the meaning
27 -
specified in the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules,
Minnesota Rules part 4620.0100, subpart 10, as
amended from time to time. |
(c) “Place of work” means any enclosed, indoor
location at which two or more individuals perform
any type of a service for consideration of payment
under any type of employment relationship,
including but not limited to an employment
relationship with or for a private corporation,
partnership, individual, or government agency. This
term includes any location where two or more
individuals gratuitously perform services for which
individuals are ordinarily paid. Enclosed, indoor areas
of private clubs, and rooms used for private meetings
or social functions, are “places of work" if two or more
persons acting under an employment relationship
provide cleaning, catering, food or beverage
service, maintenance or other support services in the
location.
(d) “Proprietor” has the meaning specified by the
Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules, Minnesota
Rules, part 4620.0 100, subd. 13, as amended from
time to time.
(e) “Public place” means any enclosed, indoor
area used by the general public or serving as a place
of work, including, but not limited to, restaurants and
other facilities serving food or alcohol, retail stores,
offices and other commercial establishments, public
conveyances, educational facilities other than
public schools, as defined in Minnesota Statutes §
120A.05, subdivisions 9, 11, and 13, hospitals,
auditoriums, arenas, meeting rooms, and common
areas of apartment buildings, condominiums or
similar buildings.
- 28 -
(f) “Restaurant” has a meaning specified in
Minnesota Statutes Section 157.15, Subd. 12, as
amended from time to time.
(g) “Smoking” means the inhaling, exhaling or
combustion of any cigar, cigarette, pipe, tobacco
product, weed, plant or any other similar article.
“Smoking” includes possessing or carrying a lighted
cigar, cigarette, pipe or any other lighted smoking
equipment. “Smoking” does not include the use of
tobacco by enrolled members of a federally-
recognized Indian tribe as part of a traditional Indian
spiritual or cultural ceremony.
SECTION 3. PROHIBITIONS.
Subd. 1. Except as provided in subdivisions 3 and
4, smoking is prohibited in public places and places
of work.
Subd. 2. To ensure that tobacco smoke does not
enter public places or places of work, and that
persons entering such places are not exposed
involuntarily to tobacco smoke, smoking is prohibited
‘within 10 feet of primary public entrances and exits,
open windows and ventilation intakes of public
places and places of work.
Subd. 3. The provisions of this section do not apply
to:
(a) Private residences, including but not limited to
homes, apartments, condominiums and town
homes.
(6b) Motor vehicles.
(c) Outdoor spaces, except as provided in
subdivision 2.
subd. 4. The provisions of this section do not apply
to:
(a) Guest rooms in hotels and motels.
-29-
(b) Rented or leased cabins at resorts.
(c} Dormitory rooms.
This exception is temporary and expires on January
Ist of 2007. |
Subd. 5. The provisions of this section do not apply
to Bars and Restaurants between the hours of 8:00
p.m. and 3:00 a.m. This exception is temporary and
expires on January 1, 2007.
Subd. 6. The provisions of this section shall not apply
to that portion of a bar or restaurant, provided that
the following separations are maintained:
(a) The area is separated from the bar or restaurant
on all sides by continuous floor-to-ceiling walls which
are interrupted only by closeable doors, that are
continuously closed, except when a person is
actively entering or exiting the room, and
(b) The area has a ventilation system separated
from the bar or restaurant, with the area maintaining
a negative air pressure in relation to the adjacent
bar or restaurant, and
(c) Minors are not permitted in the area at any
time, and
(d) The area constitutes no more than 30 percent
of the seating for the entire bar or restaurant.
Subd. 7. The provisions of this section shall not apply
to residents of a board and care facility licensed by
the State of Minnesota, unless smoking is otherwise
prohibited by the owner or the operator of said
facility.
SECTION 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROPRIETORS.
The proprietor or other person in charge of a public
place or place of work shall:
{a) Post “no smoking” signs that comply with the
Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act Rules, Minnesota
« 30 «
Rules, part 4620.0500, as amended from time to time.
Where smoking is allowed in a portion of a bar or
restaurant smoking room, the proprietor, or other
person in charge, shall conspicuously post a sign at
all entrances to that area of such business stating:
“WARNING: This area contains tobacco smoke,
which causes cancer, heart disease, lung disease,
and can harm you, your unborn baby, and children.”
(6b) Ensure that ashtrays, lighters, and matchbooks
are not provided in any area where smoking is
prohibited; and
(c) Ask any person who smokes in an area where
smoking is prohibited to refrain from smoking and, if
the person does not refrain from smoking after being
asked to do so, ask the person to leave.
SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL PRIVATE PROHIBITIONS.
Nothing in this ordinance prevents the proprietor
or other person in charge of any place, including,
without limitation, any private residence, motor
vehicle or outdoor space, from prohibiting smoking
in any such place.
SECTION 6. RETALIATION PROHIBITED.
No person or employer shall discharge, refuse to
hire, or in any manner retaliate against any
employee, applicant for employment or customer
because the employee, applicant or customer
exercises any right to a smoke-free environment
afforded by this ordinance or other law.
SECTION 7. EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS PRESERVED.
An employee who consents to work in a setting
where an employer allows smoking does not waive
or otherwise surrender any legal rights the employee
may have against the employer or any other party.
SECTION 8. OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS.
- 3] -
This ordinance is intended to complement and go
beyond the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act,
Minnesota Statutes §§ 144.411 to 144.417, as
amended from time to time. Nothing in this
ordinance authorizes smoking in any location where
smoking is prohibited or restricted by other laws.
SECTION 9. VIOLATION AND PENALTIES.
Subd. 1. Smoking Where Prohibited. It is a violation
of this ordinance for any person to smoke in an area
where smoking is prohibited by this ordinance or by
a private policy established by the proprietor or other
person in charge of the area, as authorized by
section 5.
Subd. 2. Proprietors. It is a violation of this ordinance
for the proprietor or other person in charge of any
premises subject to this ordinance to fail to comply
with the requirements of section 4, or to retaliate
against an employee, applicant for employment or
customer, as prohibited by section 6.
Subd. 3. Penalties. A person who violates any
provision of this ordinance shall be guilty of a petty
misdemeanor. A person who violates any provision
of this ordinance within one year after having been
determined to have committed a previous violation
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Each day of
violation constitutes a separate offense.
Subd. 4. Enforcement. This ordinance shall be
enforced by the Local City Police and County Sheriffs
Department or other enforcement agencies
designated by the county.
SECTION 10. SEVERABILITY.
If any portion of this ordinance, or its application
fo any circumstances, is held invalid, the remaining
provisions shall be considered severable, and shall
o 32 «
be given effect to the maximum extent possible.
SECTION 11. REVIEW OF ORDINANCE. In the event
that the Minnesota Legislature enacts a statute
covering the subject matter of this Ordinance, the
Beltrami County Board of Commissioners shall
undertake a review of the provisions of this
Ordinance. Such review shall be in the form
determined by the Board of Commissioners, and shall
be commenced within 60 days of the passage of
such legislation.
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 2005.
SECTION 13. ADOPTION OF ORDINANCE
Passed by the County Board of Commissioners this
17th day of August, 2004.
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b) SIGNATORIES
|join in the filing of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
which is my Petition to the United States Supreme
Court.
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Signature Date signed
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Signature Date signed
Print Name and title, if any
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.