Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brandt v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (No. 07-289)
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~ Supreme Court, US.
| FILED
() 07-289 AUG 30 2007
No, __OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Gn the
Sunreme Court of the United States
MICHAEL D. BRANDT, REBECCA L. DARUGAR,
and ALDO S. K. VAN ENCK, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners,
¥
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
James L. Bowers IRENE K. DyMKAR
631 NortH CENTRAL AVE. Counsel of Record
Cuicaco, IL 60644 300 W. Apams STREET
(773) 379-9262 Suite 330
Cuicaco, IL 60606-5107
(312) 345-0123
Counsel for Petitioners
August 30, 2007
Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, in light of the Court’s decision in Morse v.
Frederick, _ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (June 25, 2007),
the Seventh Circuit erred in applying the standard in
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) for school-
sponsored speech to petitioner students’ personal non-
disruptive speech protesting the manner in which a school
election had been administered.
\d
ii
RULE 14.1(B) STATEMENT
A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose
judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Petitioners: Michael D. Brandt,
Rebecca L. Darugar, and Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated. These parties are
no longer minors, so they are not appearing by their parents.
Defendants-Appellees and Respondents: Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, Chris N. Kotis, Janice M.
Rosales, Christine Laughlin, and Mary Clancy.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CTR ET ioc vio.e ve coeur cee ene i
RULE 14.10) STATOMENT .w cc cic uesees ii
TAREE CH CON os oe bv cecnteaesdss . iii
TABLE OP AUTIROUITORS qn cock evcchcdeues v
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ....... 1
GS ay era ee l
IC cb. beet iba we 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE .. 2
SUATORGINE GE ERUUE GARE oe ita wecterern 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 9
I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE DECISION OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT IN THIS CASE AND THE DECISION
OF THIS COURT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK,
__ US. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (JUNE 25, 2007).
A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Applied
the Kuhimeier Standard to Petitioner Students’
Nondisruptive Political Protest That Occurred
6 ee 10
iV
B. As in Tinker, Petitioner Students Were
Engaged in “Pure Speech,” with the T-shirt
Message Being That the Election Had Been a
PO Wee A CR ea Re ET EO RS
C. Petitioners’ Speech Was Not Disruptive and
Thus Was Protected, According to Zinker. . .
D. School Administrators Had Engaged in
Prohibited Viewpoint Discrimination. .....
E. Petitioners’ Damages Were Quantifiable and
Substantive, Not Minuscule as the Seventh
TRIS SEF oeaeapthi Mer ree SNe ee Panne
I tic tLe a ee te ee
APPENDIX
Appendix A: Order of the 7th Circuit denying
Se Cs ic TE ose a ie ee Cee es
Appendix B: Decision of the 7th Circuit (Feb. 20,
CE ras Sh ee a eee eee
Appendix C: Decision of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granting in part and
denying in part defendants’ bill of costs (May 8,
ko 5 oe a ce ee a ee a ee 162
Appendix D: Memorandum Opinion and Order of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
14
15
16
TE: SO OE 5b eed son ee kes 22a
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois v. Doe,
See es PE a bw sw ehce wee ele es 1, 19
City of Watseka v. Ill. Public Action Council,
796 F.2d 1547 (7" Cir. 1986), judgment aff'd 479
Se EE a ke os ae be ee 17, 18
Crue v. Aiken,
Se ee ee tT CM. POO) 6k cc ccc vc ene bees 18
Elrod v. Burns,
ee a ee ED 5k hou 6028 ke CAs ee 17
Giules v. Marineau,
361 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied _iU'S.
__, 127 5. Ch. HO4 Gane @, 2007) .... 11, 15, 17
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,
ee a, Ce oo oo Ko ook ees 9, 10, 11, 12
Morse v. Frederick,
__ US... kar S. CA. 2618 Game 25,
Texas v. Johnson,
ot Be ek a ane ae 12
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comm. Sch. Dist.,
er Rh Ree kc ke bee beeen passim
vi
Virginia v. Black,
Pe <cvneceeeedee Ce eee eee 14
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
4 NG 8 ee ee eee 15
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
4 RS | Sr rrr eee 2
Eve oh eh ae ee eee eeu eke ee ean 2
fe EE aE ea arte are wet 2
re re Sn ere ae ee 2
Re ee eee ee passim
Src Sc, SE OW OS oo co ee Kea vcetan ewe 2
Rules
Chicago Public School’s Uniform Discipline Code Rule
l
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Michael D. Brandt, Rebecca L. Darugar, and
Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, respectfully request that the United States
Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari, summarily vacate
the opinion and judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and remand the case to said
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of this Court’s
decision in Morse v. Frederick, U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (June 25, 2007). See, e.g. , Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Illinois v. Doe, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).
OPINIONS BELOW
The Order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, dated April 2, 2007, denying rehearing and rehearing
en banc is reprinted in the appendix herein as App. la.
The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, dated February 20, 2007, is officially
reported as Brandt v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 480 F.3d 460 (7" Cir. 2007), and is reprinted in the
appendix herein at App. 2a - 15a.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States
District Court, dated May 8, 2006, regarding costs is not
officially reported and is reprinted in the appendix herein at
App. 16a - 2la.
The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States
District Court, dated March 13, 2006, regarding summary
judgment is officially reported as Brandt v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 420 F. Supp. 2d 921
2
(N.D.IH., 2006), 2 ~ ts reprinted in the appendix herein at
App. 22a - 53a.
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction in the United States District Court
was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Jurisdiction in
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was based upon
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s
decision on February 20, 2007. Rehearing and rehearing en
banc by the Court of Appeals was denied on April 2, 2007.
On June 22, 2007, Justice Stevens ordered that the time for
filing this petition for writ of certiorari be extended to August
30, 2007.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
Constitution of the United States, Amendment I:
Congress shall make no law _ respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV,
Section I:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
3
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the spring of 2003, petitioners were 14-year-old eighth
graders in the gifted program at Beaubien School, a Chicago
public elementary school that houses approximately 1000
students. The eighth grade class at Beaubien in 2003 consisted
of 72 regular program students and 27 gifted program
students, 24 of whom opted to participate in this class action
lawsuit. R200-16, p63; CA7 App. B-4, #1.' The school has no
history of violence or gang activity and is recognized as one
of the safest schools in the entire Chicago Public School
system. R167-8, p21; R200-16, p63; CA7 App. B-3, #17; CA7
App. B-6, #5.
In February 2003, the annual election for an eighth grade
class shirt was held at Beaubien School. Approximately 30
entries for the contest were hung in a hallway for
consideration. One of the entries was drawn and submitted by
petitioner Michael D. Brandt. Brandt said that his drawing
was intended to be a silly, goofy-looking cartoon kid, making
light fun of the fact that supposedly bright eighth graders were
moving on to higher education. R200-], pp109, 115; CA7
App. B-3, #3.
' In this Petition, “R” refers to the docket documents in the District
Court. “CA7 App” refers to the Appendix originally filed with the
Court of Appeals.
4
Prior to the voting, the gifted class had agreed that they all
liked Brandt’s design, and there was a consensus that they
would all vote for his entry. The gifted students reasoned that,
if they all voted for Brandt’s design and the regular students’
72 votes were split among all 30 entries, there was a high
probability that Brandt’s design would win. The students’
understanding was that the shirt with the most votes would
win. R200-1, pp114-115; CA7 App. B-3, #1.
After the voting was completed, the teacher conducting
the election told the gifted class that the results of the election
were “too close to tell” and that there would have to be a re-
vote between the top three shirts, one being Brandt’s design.
The gifted class was immediately suspicious that the election
process had been subverted, because counting votes and
determining which shirt had won should not be particularly
difficult. Furthermore, the teacher refused to disclose the
actual vote count. After the re-vote, a design other than
Brandt’s was declared the winner. Once again, the vote count
was not disclosed. R200-1, p112-115; CA7 App. B-3, #2.
Within a week of the disputed election, respondent Chris
N. Kotis, the principal, got wind of the fact that the gifted
class was talking about protesting the outcome of the election
by making and wearing a shirt with Brandt’s design on it.
Kotis told Assistant Principal Mary Clancy, also a respondent,
to investigate the situation; she reported back that the gifted
students believed that there had been election improprieties
and that their shirt had won. R200-16, pp44-45, 48-49; CA7
App. B-3, #9. Shortly thereafter, Clancy and Kotis told the
gifted students that making or wearing a shirt with Brandt’s
design would be disrespectful of the principal’s authority and
would result in student suspensions because it was not the
official shirt. R200-1, pp118-120, 124, 136, 140.
5
The eighth grade gifted students decided that they would
go ahead and make a shirt with Brandt’s design as a protest of
the election process. During March 2003, the students
collected the money among themselves to pay for production
of the shirt. Every one of the 27 students in the eighth grade
gifted class purchased a shirt with Brandt’s design. R200-1,
pp123, 136. However, because of the principal’s threats of
suspension, the students decided to wait two weeks, until
April 1, 2003, to wear the shirt for the first time. That date
was picked because it was a schoolwide standardized testing
date. The gifted students’ reasoning was that school
administrators would not be inclined to suspend them on a day
when the administration would benefit from their normally
high test scores. R200-1, p136; CA7 App. B-3, #6.
The main difference between Brandt’s design for the
eighth grade contest and the design of the shirt actually
produced for the April 1, 2003, protest was the addition of
“Gifties 2003" to the back of the shirt. The decision to add
the word “gifties” was not made until immediately before the
shirts were actually produced. The purpose was to adopt and
embrace the nickname that the entire school had long used for
gifted students and to identify the gifted class as the one that
had been cheated in the election. R200-1, pp135, 219-220;
CA7 App. B-3, #5.
On April 1, 2003, 19 of the 27 members of the eighth
grade gifted class wore the shirt with Brandt’s design to
school. R200-1, pp140-14]. Upon learning of the situation,
Principal Kotis told the class that they werc in violation of the
Chicago Public School’s Uniform Discipline Code Rule 2-5,
for “failing to abide by school rules and regulations” and for
“disobeying authority.” R200-1, p143; CA7 App. B-4, #15;
CA7 App. B-10; CA7 App. B-11.
6
As part of the disciplinary process on April 1, 2003, the
assistant principal made conference calls to each of the gifted
students’ parents, advising them of their child’s misconduct
and further advising them that additional violations of the
Uniform Discipline Code would result in an out-of-school
suspension of five - seven days. CA7 App. B-4, #17-19; R200-
3, p7. Between April 1 and May 12, 2003, the students
refrained from wearing the shirt at issue out of fear of the
threatened suspension. On May 12, 2003, 13 of the gifted
students wore the shirt at issue to school for the second time.
Michael Brandt’s mother had been assured by an attorney for
the Board of Education that the students would not be
suspended or punished by being confined to their homeroom
if they wore the shirt. Nevertheless, on that date, all of the
gifted students were again confined to their homeroom for the
entire day by respondents. R166, #99 Response; R200-1,
pp150-152; R200-16, p135.
Between May 12, and May 22, 2003, one or more
students from the gifted class wore the shirt at issue each day.
On each of those days, the entire gifted class was confined to
its homeroom for the entire day and there were additional
penalties as well. Each day the students were confined to their
homeroom, the entire class was deprived of regularly
scheduled physical education classes, science labs and
computer labs, and prohibited from participating in any after-
school programs. CA7 App. B-3, ##11, 12. The gifted
students were required to eat their lunches in their homeroom
instead of the cafeteria with the rest of the school. CA7 App.
B-3, #12. In addition, students were required to cover the
shirts, turn them inside out, or take them off to go to the
washroom. R200-1, pp206-207; R200-16, p99. Disciplinary
charges unrelated to the t-shirt controversy were brought in
retaliation against some of the students and petitioner Brandt
faced a disciplinary hearing that resulted in a two-day
7
suspension. R200-1, p96; R200-16, pp136, 147-149, 157-158;
R200-17, p29.
At the District Court level, petitioners spent a
considerable amount of time and resources defusing
respondent Kotis’ false allegations that he had repeatedly
confined the gifted students for entire school days because he
was concerned for the safety of the gifted students at the
hands of the regular students. Petitioners’ position has always
been that the principal’s fabrication of a safety issue out of
whole cloth for the purpose of allowing him to punish
students he believed were defying his authority was itself
evidence of the principal’s knowing violation of the law, such
that he should not be entitled to qualified immunity.
Despite his claims of a serious ongoing safety situation at
the school, the principal had never notified or involved the
counselors, social workers or psychologist, who had offices
in the school. CA7 App. B-3, #15. The school psychologist
testified that he was aware of no issues between the gifted and
regular programs at Beaubien. CA7 App. B-3, #19. The
principal admitted he had never held any school assemblies to
address any of the claimed problems with the students
themselves (CA7 App. B-3, #28) and that he had made no
effort to identify any particular students that might be prone
to violence. R200-18, p13. The Department of Safety and
Security, which had an officer at the school, had not been put
on notice of any issue of student safety. R167-8, ppll, 21,
26. Finally, no student safety issues had ever been brought to
the attention of the parents or the Local School Council,
which met monthly and was attended by many parents.
Appendix B-3, ##16, 28, 29; Appendix B-6, ##8-10, 17.
Based on the principal's allegations of a serious safety
situation, his supervisor, respondent Janice M. Rosales,
8
decided to call in the Crisis Intervention Team. R200-19, p89.
The team had been to Beaubien twice before when there had
been deaths at the school. R200-17, p7. The team came to the
school on May 21, 2003, and within ten minutes of talking to
each class determined that there was absolutely no safety
problem at Beaubien. R167-10, pp58, 74; CA7 App. B-3, #18;
CA7 App. B-9. The Crisis Team confirme- what the parents
and students had been saying all along, and, after their visit,
the students were allowed to wear their shirts without
restriction or incident. CA7 App. B-5, ##14, 15.
This case was filed in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois on February 5, 2004, alleging
violation of the students’ First Amendment right to freedom
of speech, requesting declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
damages. The case was subsequently certified as a class
action. On March 13, 2006, the District Court granted all
defendants’ motions for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds, after finding that there was sufficient
proof of a First Amendment violation. On May 8, 2006, costs
were taxed against the plaintiffs in the amount of $10,556.20.
An appeal was filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit of both the summary judgment and the
judgment of costs. The judgments of the District Court were
affirmed on February 20, 2007, on the ground that there was
no First Amendment violation, but also with a finding that
there was no substantiation in the record of any safety issue.
Petitioners’ motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was
subsequently denied.
9
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE DECISION OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT IN THIS CASE AND THE DECISION OF
THIS COURT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK, _U.S. __,
127 S. Ct. 2618 (JUNE 25, 2007).
This is a student speech case. The medium of
communication was the display of a student-designed and
student-made t-shirt protesting the school administrators’
manipulation of a school election process. App. 4a. The
message was intended to comment on a political (small “p”)
and social issue important to the eighth grade petitioners. The-
message was directed at school administrators and fellow
students, an audience that the District Court found would
understand the communication. App. 36a - 37a. The shirt did
not contain any profane or inappropriate language or images.
The shirt did not cause any disruption of the school
environment, nor was there any reasonable fear of a
disruption. App. 3a, 13a. Despite the innocuous nature of the
message, the student protestors were severely punished over
an extended period by confinement, deprivation of regular
instruction and school activities, and suspensions.
This Court, in Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __, 1278S.
Ct. 2618 (June 25, 2007), recently reaffirmed the viability of
the long-standing Tinker doctrine that school speech may not
be suppressed unless there is reasonable evidence that the
speech will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). The facts of
this case, as Summarized above, demand a Tinker application.
The Seventh Circuit erroneously used a Kuhimeier analysis
10
for school-sponsored speech in this case instead. See
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Of additional
concern, the Seventh Circuit broadened Kuhlmeier’s
suppressive reach beyond “legitimate pedagogical concerns”
to a realm that includes all “inappropriate” speech, as
determined by the school authorities’ “exercise of discretion.”
App. 12a.
This is a simple case that demands a Tinker analysis.
When student speech is suppressed and punished for no
legitimate reason, the effects ripple far and wide to those who
merely observe the controversy and absorb the lesson to be
quiet in the face of authority. This case should be summarily
reversed and remanded to the Seventh Circuit for review
consistent with the Court’s opinion in Morse.
A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Applied the
Kuhimeier Standard to Petitioner Students’
Nondisruptive Political Protest That Occurred on
School Premises.
This Court held in Morse that Kuhlmeier did not control
that case “because no one would reasonably believe that
Frederick’s banner bore the school’s imprimatur.” Morse,
127 S. Ct. at 2627. The same principle applies here. No one
to whom the teen-aged students’ message was directed could
have reasonably believed that the shirt was school-sponsored.
The students designed and paid for the shirts themselves,
outside of school. The entire school knew it was not the
official class shirt, and the banning the t-shirt by respondents
because it was not an “official” shirt implicitly proves that
they too did not consider the shirt to be school-sponsored.
Kuhlmeier applies only to the regulation by administrators
of school-sponsored speech. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627, 2637
11
(ALITO, J., concurring); Giules v. Marineau, 361 F.3d 320,
325 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
3054 (June 29, 2007). The Kuhlmeier Court upheld the
authority of a principal to bar the school’s newspapers from
publishing articles about divorce and teenage pregnancy.
Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at 266. The speech in Kuhimeier was the
paradigm of school-sponsored speech: the newspaper was part
of a curriculum, it was funded by the school district, its
articles were subject to pre-publication review, and the
principal could fairly be regarded as its publisher. Jd. at 262-
263.
The Kuhlmeier Court explained the difference between the
speech in Tinker and the articles in Kuhlmeier:
The question whether the First Amendment requires
a school to tolerate particular student speech - the
question we addressed in Tinker - is different from the
question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular school
speech. The former question addresses educators’
ability to silence a student’s personal expression that
happens to occur on the school premises. The latter
question concerns educators’ authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and
other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school.
Id. at 270-271 (emphasis added).
Because Kuhimeier is not applicable to the case at hand,
the Seventh Circuit should not have engaged in a discussion
of the school’s “basic educational mission.” Relying on
Kuhimeier, however, the Seventh Circuit stated that “a school
12
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with the
‘basic educational mission.’” The Seventh Circuit said
further: “Prohibiting children from wearing to school clothing
that contains ‘inappropriate’ words or slogans places
appropriately broad limits on the school authorities’ exercise
of discretion to maintain a proper atmosphere.” App. 12a.
Thus, not only is the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Kuhimeier
misplaced, but the Court also expanded the definition of “a
basic educational mission” to exclude anything that school
administrators deem to be inappropriate.
“A basic educational mission” cannot be defined so
broadly that it prohibits any speech that is at odds with
opinions of school officials. The basic educational mission
argument “can be manipulated in dangerous ways.” Morse,
127 U.S. at 2637 (ALITO, J., concurring). Some public
schools have defined their educational missions as including
the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held
by the public officials and school administrators, which gives
public school authorities “a license to suppress speech on
political and social issues based on disagreement with the
viewpoint expressed,” thus striking at the very heart of the
First Amendment. /d.
B. As in Tinker, Petitioner Students Were Engaged in
“Pure Speech,” with the T-shirt Message Being That
the Election Had Been a Fraud.
This Court found that the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” sign was a
“cryptic” message. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624. However,
there was never any doubt the Court was dealing with speech.
In the case at hand, the District Court, applying Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-405 (1989), found that (1) the
symbolic t-shirt contained a particularized message, that is, a
protest of the t-shirt design election, and (2) it was likely that
13
the message would be understood by its viewers, that is, the
other students and the school administration, and was
therefore speech. App. 33a - 37a. Only the Seventh Circuit
found that this case did not involve speech at all, stating:
“The t-shirt is not protected speech, and we are doubtful that
it became so by being a vehicle for eighth graders to protest
the outcome of a t-shirt contest.” App. 13a.
Considering how the school administration viewed
petitioners’ message, it seems ironic that the symbol of the
shirt was powerful enough to elicit strong sustained response
from the school administration, yet the Seventh Circuit panel
held that the shirt was devoid of meaning sufficient to be
protected by the First Amendment. Had this truly been a shirt
that was devoid of meaning, the administration would have
ignored it and not spent three-and-a-half months in a show-
down with the teen-agers, disciplining them, banning the
shirt, suspending the protest leader, and disrupting the routine
and schedule of a substantial number of teachers and students
in the entire school.
As in Tinker, the teen-aged petitioners here were engaged
in “pure speech.” The context of the expression is important.
The medium of communication in Tinker, after all, was only
“a band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide.”
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. In and of itself, the black piece of
cloth contained no message. The wearing of the cloth as an
armband, however, with the understanding of its meaning and
message by those who wore the cloth and those who
witnessed the wearing, was a powerful symbol of protest of
the Vietnam War. Similarly here, wearing the t-shirt that had
won the election to protest the shady circumstances of the
vote and re-vote and the nondisclosure of the vote tally
projected a clear message of protest that the rest of the school,
including the school administrators, understood.
14
Petitioners further assert that their t-shirt warranted
protection because this was not merely speech, but political
speech. Even the Seventh Circuit recognized that the
designing and wearing of the shirt was “to protest what they
considered a rigged election” (App. 4a), an inherently
political statement. This Court affirms in Morse that political
speech is “at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626, quoting
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). In their
concurring opinion in Morse, Justices Alito and Kennedy state
that they join in the opinion of the Court on the understanding
that the opinion “provides no support for any restriction of
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issues.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636.
C. Petitioners’ Speech Was Not Disruptive and Thus
Was Protected, According to Tinker.
The Tinker Court took care to acknowledge “the special
characteristics of the school environment,” by permitting
school officials to prohibit student speech if that speech
“would substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.” 393 U.S. at 509.
In order to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule,
the Court cautioned that, “in our system, undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right.” Jd. at 508; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
The Seventh Circuit in the case at hand agreed with
petitioners that the teen-agers’ passive protest did not result in
any danger or disruption at Beaubien School, other than the
administrators’ overreaction to the protest. The opinion
brushes aside the argument of school administrators that there
was a potential of danger occasioned by the t-shirt
controversy, stating: “The gravity of those tensions [between
15
students at Beaubien] is not revealed by the record.” App. 3a.
Also: “[Tjhe evidence of tensions between the two groups of
student [sic] was not developed, and so cannot be a ground
for upholding the defendants’ action.” App. 13a. Of note,
after three months of controversy, the Board called in a Crisis
Intervention Team (as a face-saving maneuver, petitioners
contend), that concluded in short order that there was no
safety issue. Thereafter, the students were finally allowed to
wear the shirts without punishment. App. 4a - Sa. No
disruption ensued. Because petitioners’ protest speech was not
disruptive, then, pursuant to the holding in Tinker, it was
protected. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d at 330.
D. School Administrators Had Engaged in Prohibited
Viewpoint Discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit failed to recognize that the school
administrators were engaging in viewpoint discrimination
when they banned the message of the shirt. Viewpoint
discrimination occurs when “the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement
with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In Morse, this Court reaffirmed
Tinker’s warning that schools may not prohibit student speech
because of “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an _ unpopular
viewpoint.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626, citing Tinker, 393
U.S. at 508, 509. Suppressing speech based on the viewpoint
expressed “strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.”
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (ALITO, J., concurring).
In the case at hand, once the design lost the vote (or so
respondent school officials said) and the protest was being
planned and executed around the design, the design was
forbidden. The Beaubien principal created a rule specifically
16
targeting petitioners’ design because of the protest and in
doing so was intentionally suppressing the students’ message
that the election was a fraud and their design should have
won. The principal knowingly violated the students’ First
Amendment rights because he disagreed with their message.
His action was viewpoint discrimination.
.
E. Petitioners’ Damages Were Quantifiable and
Substantive, Not Minuscule as the Seventh Circuit
Held.
This Court in Morse painstakingly and seriously analyzed
the First Amendment rights of Joseph Frederick without
minimizing or trivializing his damages. In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit in the case at hand held that the damages of
the 24 teen-agers in this case are “minuscule to the point of
nonexistent,” and consequently there was no violation of the
First Amendment. App. 7a.
This conclusion of the Seventh Circuit ignores the fact
that, because of summary judgment, petitioners were never
given the opportunity to fully develop at trial the damages
aspect of their case, where an expert, a school administrator,
and the school psychologist would have testified that
respondents’ actions adversely affected the students’ entire
learning process for half of a school year. Petitioners were
barred from making and wearing their t-shirt for more than
three months, from respondents’ first threats of suspension in
the middle of February 2003, until May 23, 2003, when the
students were finally allowed to wear their shirts without fear
of punishment. R200-17, p16. During that period, they were
barred from protesting school policy and their free speech was
curtailed. This Court has held that “the loss of First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods\of time,
17
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).’
The injury in this case is quantifiable. In addition to the
stifling of free speech, all members of the class were charged
with and penalized for violation of the Board of Education’s
Uniform Discipline Code; all members of the class were
confined to their homeroom on at least 10 separate days,
depriving them of computer labs, science labs and physical
education instruction, and all after-school activities, as well as
denying access to bathrooms and the cafeteria; all members
of the class were regularly ridiculed, demeaned and
intimidated for daring to stand up to authority; various
members of the class were defamed through issuance of false,
retaliatory, and back-dated incident reports; and the leader of
the protest, petitioner Brandt, was suspended on false charges
in retaliation for his role in the protest. CA7 App. B-3, ##11,
12; CA7 App. B-1; R200-1, p96.
In City of Watseka v. Ill. Public Action Council, 796 F.2d
1547, 1559 (7 Cir. 1986), judgment aff'd 479 U.S. 1048
* The Seventh Circuit said that since only “a particular means of
protest” was forbidden, there was no constitutional violation. App.
10a - lla. To suggest that appeals to the principal to change his
decision were a reasonable substitute for an attempt to inform the
entire school of the unfairness of the election process misses the
point, not to mention the fact that other routes to communication
were also suppressed. Petitioners were told that if they continued
circulating their petitions regarding the shirt among students, they
would be suspended, and so would the students signing the
petitions. App. 26a - 27a; CA7 App. B-3, #10. The Second Circuit
in Guiles v. Marineau, rejected a “no harm, no foul contention” of
the school administrators resulting from censorship of part of the
student’s t-shirt message. 361 F.3d at 331.
18
(1987), a First Amendment case, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that deprivation of a
particular right in particular circumstances is a compensable
injury that might justify “substantial money damages.” This
Court has not limited compensatory damages, “even in cases
where the monetary value of the particular injury is difficult
to ascertain.” Jd. In Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 677 (7"
Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court
decision, which included an award of $1000 to each plaintiff,
plus attorneys’ fees, against the school for barring plaintiffs
from discussing the Chief Illiniwek controversy with potential
student athletes.
19
CONCLUSION
Petitioners Michael D. Brandt, Rebecca L. Darugar, and
Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, respectfully request that the United States
Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari, summarily vacate
the opinion and judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and remand the case to said
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of this Court’s
decision in Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
2618 (June 25, 2007). See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Illinois v. Doe, 119 §. Ct. 2016 (1999).
Respectfully submitted,
Irene K. Dymkar
Counsel of Record
300 West Adams Street, Suite 330
Chicago, IL 60606-5107
(312) 345-0123
James L. Bowers
631 North Central Ave.
Chicago, IL 60644
(773) 379-9262
Counsel for Petitioners
August 30, 2007
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 06-1999, 06-2573
[Filed April 2, 2007]
MICHAEL D.:BRANDT, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Vv.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY
OF CHICAGO, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
Before Hon. Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge. Hon. Kenneth
F. Ripple, Circuit Judge. Hon. Ann Claire Williams, Circuit
Judge.
ORDER
On March 19, 2007, plaintiffs-appellants filed a petition
for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc. All the
judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition,
and none of the active judges has requested a vote on the
petition for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore
DENIED.
2a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 06-1999, 06-2573
[Filed February 20, 2007]
MICHAEL D. BRANDT, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY
OF CHICAGO, et al.,
)
)
)
)
v. )
-.
)
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
POSNER, Circuit Judge. This class action suit was brought
on behalf of 24 eighth graders at a Chicago public school
called the Beaubien Elementary School. They were
disciplined for conducting a protest that they claim is
privileged by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment,
held applicable to state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The suit was dismissed on the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, so we state the facts as favorably to the
plaintiffs as the record permits.
Every year the eighth graders choose a class T-shirt.
Among the designs submitted for the 2003 contest was
3a
plaintiff Michael Brandt’s; his mother is the plaintiffs’ lead
counsel. Brandt was in the school’s program for gifted
students. The program draws from all over Chicago. The
other students in the school, the ones who are not in the gifted
program, are local. There are some tensions between the
“gifties,” as the students in the gifted program call
themselves, and the “tards,” a derogatory term (short for
“retards”) sometimes applied by gifties to the other students.
The gravity of those tensions is not revealed by the record.
The gifties had agreed to vote en bloc for Brandt’s T-shirt
design, and when it Icst they smelled a rat, and submitted a
protest to the principal. Some 30 designs in all had been
submitted. There were 27 gifties and 72 other students in the
eighth grade; and so if the 27 voted en bloc for one design
and the votes of the 72 other students were scattered across
the 29 other designs, the gifties’ design would be almost
certain to obtain a plurality of the votes. Yet when the ballots
were counted, the teacher in charge of the contest announced
that the vote was too close to call. She ordered a revote
limited to three of the designs, one of them Brandt’s; and with
only two competing designs, the gifties’ bloc-voting scheme
failed. The teachers’ practice, it turned out, was to conduct a
revote among the top three contenders if the initial vote did
not produce a winner with a majority, not merely a plurality,
of the votes cast. The winning design unfortunately is not in
the record, but apparently it was inoffensive, with an animal
and a cap depicted on the front of the shirt and the names of
all the eighth graders listed on the back.
The gifties were indignant. When the teacher refused to
explain her runoff system or how the votes had been counted
and what the tally had been, Brandt added the words “Gifties
2003” to the back of his T-shirt design; shirts incorporating
the design were produced; and the gifties wore those shirts in
4a
school instead of the T-shirt that had won the contest. (A
photocopy of the shirt is appended to this opinion.) They did
this both to protest what they considered a rigged election and
because they thought that Brandt’s design represented the
gifties better than the winning (and therefore the official) class
T-shirt did.
In wearing the Brandt shirt, the gifties were acting in
defiance of the principal of the Beaubien school, who having
gotten wind of their plan had told them that wearing the shirt
would show disrespect for him and create a risk to the good
order of the school, presumably because it might offend the
students who had voted for the winning T-shirt, although he
did not make this point explicitly. An assistant principal
warned that if they wore the shirt the gifties would be
violating a provision (since changed) of the Chicago Public
Schools’ Uniform Discipline Code that prohibited students
from wearing clothing with “inappropriate words or slogans,”
and would be punished.
Despite this warning, the gifties went ahead with their
plan. But, craftily, they first wore the forbidden shirt on the
day when city-wide tests were administered to public school
students. They figured the schoo! would not take disciplinary
action against them on that day, lest that lower the school’s
average test scores (they are gifties, after all). But on each of
nine subsequent days, the shirt was worn by at least one gifty,
and each time all the gifties were punished by being confined
to their homeroom, as a result missing gym, science lab,
computer lab, and after-school activities. Eventually the
school summoned a “Crisis Intervention Team” from the
Board of Education, and it investigated and decided that the
wearing of the Brandt T-shirt by the gifties was not a safety
problem (that is, would not lead to violent altercations with
Sa
the other eighth graders), so the gifties were permitted to
resume wearing the shirt.
The plaintiffs seek both equitable relief and damages.
Originally they sought an injunction against the “inappropriate
words or slogans” rule and an order that the school expunge
any record of the disciplinary action taken against the gifties.
Not only were the gifties ultimately permitted to wear the
Brandt T-shirt, but the rule has been changed; and so the
plaintiffs have dropped their request for an injunction. In any
event, they’re all now in high school, having graduated from
the eighth grade years ago; their quest to enjoin the rule is
therefore moot. Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs,
420 U.S. 128, 129, 95 S. Ct. 848, 43 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1975)
(per curiam); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318-19,
94S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974) (per curiam); Stotts
v. Community Unit School District, 230 F.3d 989, 991 (7th
Cir. 2000). They could not invoke the exception, to the
normal rule of mootness, for claims that are “capable of
repetition, yet evading review,” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
124-25, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), because it
requires that the claim be repeatable by the same plaintiff.
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49, 96 S. Ct. 347,
46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975) (per curiam); Murphy v. Hunt, 455
U.S. 478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982)
(per curiam); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir.
2003); Stotts v. Community Unit School District, supra, 230
F.3d at 991; Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School Board,
336 F.3d 211, 216-18 (3d Cir. 2003)—a condition rarely
satisfied other than in abortion and election cases, though it
could be satisfied in a school case, see Jones v. Illinois Dep’t
of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F.2d 724, 727-28 (7th Cir.
1982), if for example the suit was over something that had
happened at the end of one school year but could happen
again at the end of the next year and the plaintiff would still
6a
be in school then. But the condition is impossible to satisfy in
this case, as none of the plaintiffs will ever again be gifties or
subject to the superseded clothing rule.
The school has retained no records of the discipline meted
out to the gifties over the T-shirt incident, which would seem
to moot the other equitable claim, the claim that the record of
their discipline be expunged. But they are asking that the
school authorities be forbidden to tell anyone that the gifties
were punished for wearing the Brandt T-shirt. There is a
touch or irony in the claim, since by filing this suit the
plaintiffs have spread far and wide the information concerning
their conduct and the school’s response to it; the suit has
attracted a fair amount of publicity. See www.google.com/
search?hl = en&q = gifties + beaubien + brandt, visited Jan. 26,
2007. There is further irony in requesting in a suit based on
freedom of speech an order curtailing the defendants’ freedom
of speech. Suppose the principal of Beaubien Elementary
School decided to write a memoir in which he planned to
discuss the T-shirt brouhaha— maybe it was the most exciting
episode in his career as a school administrator. Should he be
enjoined from doing that? He could be enjoined, as it is a
myth that all injunctions against free speech are barred by the
First Amendment as “prior restraints,” see, e.g., Madsen v.
Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-66, 114 S.
Ct. 2516, 129 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1994); Snepp v. United States,
444 U.S. 507, 510 n. 3, 100 S. Ct. 763, 62 L. Ed. 2d 704
(1980) (per curiam); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90, 93
S. Ct. 2553, 37 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1973); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 715-16, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931);
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979), but
only if there was evidence that the defendants were likely to
conduct a vendetta against the gifties—were trying to block
Ta
their access to college or to good jobs by spreading the word
that they had been punished for wearing an unofficial T-shirt.
The plaintiffs do not claim to have any evidence of so
improbable a plot.
Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Any defendants
who in a spirit of vengeance spread the word that the gifties
were disciplined will be vulnerable, at least in principle, to a
suit for defamation unless they make clear that the discipline
that they imposed had been disapproved by the Board of
Education’s Crisis Intervention Team. Conceivably they
would be vulnerable to being sued for committing other torts
as well, such as depicting a person in a false light or
interfering with his actual or prospective contracts, for
example with a possible employer. Of course no college or
employer would be likely to be much concerned with mild
discipline meted out to an eighth grader. An air of unreality
clings to every aspect of this litigation.
But we must trudge on, and consider the plaintiffs’
damages claim. Even multiplied by 24 (the number of
members of the plaintiff class), the damages sustained by an
eighth grader as a consequence of missing phys ed and labs on
nine days out of an entire school year are minuscule to the
point of nonexistent; and de minimis non curat lex (the law
doesn’t concern itself with trifles) is a doctrine applicable to
constitutional as to other cases. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 674, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977); United
States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2005);
Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1992);
Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763, 767-68 (7th
Cir. 1972). It is true that nominal damages can be awarded
for a constitutional violation, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
266-67, 98S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978); Calhoun v.
DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2003), as is
8a
sometimes true for other intentionally tortious conduct as
well. E.g., Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d
644, 693 N.E.2d 510, 514, 230 Ill. Dec. 381 (Ill. App.
1998); Sanchez v. Clayton, 117 N.M. 761, 877 P.2d 567, 573
(N.M. 1994). But such an award presupposes a violation of
sufficient gravity to merit a judgment, even if significant
damages cannot be proved; and this is not such a case. In any
event there has been no constitutional violation.
The plaintiffs do not argue that the Brandt T-shirt is itself
protected speech. They are right not to make such an
argument. Although freedom of speech and of the press—the
relevant terms in the First Amendment—are often loosely
paraphrased as “freedom of expression,” and clothes are
certainly a way in which people express themselves, clothing
as such is not—not normally at any rate—constitutionally
protected expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507-08, 89 S. Ct.
733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969); Blau v. Fort Thomas Public
School District, 401 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2005) (12-year-
old “Amanda Blau’s desire to wear clothes she ‘feel[{s] good
in,’ aS opposed to her desire to express ‘any particular
message’ “ held not to be protected speech). Self-expression
is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or opinions and
thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace. Nor is the
kind of “message” that clothing normally sends—“I am rich,”
“I am sexy,” “I have good taste,” and so forth— intended to
contribute to competition in that marketplace.
Of course there can be speech printed on clothing,
political symbols such as a swastika or a campaign button
affixed to clothing, and masks and costumes that convey a
political or other message. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989),
and cases cited there. Merely wearing clothes inappropriate
9a
to a particular occasion could be a political statement. For that
matter, parading in public wearing no clothing at all can,
depending on the circumstances, convey a political message.
White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 460-61 (4th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise,
230 F.3d 649, 658-59 (3d Cir. 2000); Huffman v. United
States, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 470 F.2d 386, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). But the picture and the few words imprinted on
the Brandt T-shirt are no more expressive of an idea or
opinion that the First Amendment might be thought to protect
than a young child’s talentless infantile drawing which
Brandt’s design successfully mimics. Otherwise every T-shirt
that was not all white with no design or words, with not even
the manufacturer’s logo or the owner’s name tag, would be
protected by the First Amendment, and schools could not
impose dress codes or require uniforms without violating the
free speech of the students, a proposition sensibly rejected in
the Blau case.
The plaintiffs argue, however, that when worn as part of
a protest against the election to choose the official class shirt,
the Brandt T-shirt became protected expression. That is not a
ridiculous argument. If Irish people were forbidden to wear
green on St. Patrick’s Day, a natural form of protest would be
to wear green on that day. Cf. Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 303-05, 104 S. Ct.
3065, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984). But the importance of context
cuts both ways. The protesters in this case are schoolchildren.
They are privileged schoolchildren in a school that contains
a majority of nonprivileged children. They insist that unless
their T-shirt is adopted by the entire eighth grade, they will as
it were secede, and flaunt their own T-shirt. They do not
recognize the principal’s authority or the legitimacy of the
school’s procedures for determining the winner of contests.
10a
We have our doubts whether the constitutional privilege
to engage in protest demonstrations in the name of free speech
extends to eighth graders. The plaintiffs’ lawyer told us at
argument that the clause extends at least as far down the
maturity ladder as a 10-year-old (a proposition in profound
tension with Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School,
98 F.3d 1530, 1538-39 (7th Cir. 1996), and Baxter by Baxter
v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736-38 (7th Cir.
1994), and cases cited there), and that the object of the protest
is irrelevant. It could be, she acknowledged, a protest against
the brand of ketchup served in the school cafeteria. She insists
that the school’s authority to prevent or punish such protests
must be decided by a jury asked to strike the balance between
free speech and school order. If she is right, then from now
on public school policies and practices will be determined in
this circuit by juries rather than by school authorities. Cf.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273,
108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988).
But we need not go so far as to deny that eighth graders
have any First Amendment rights, for it is plain that the
school did not violate the amendment by attempting, albeit
with distinctly limited success because of the decision of the
Crisis Intervention Team, to exclude the Brandt T-shirt from
the school. We must be precise about the right that the
plaintiffs sought to vindicate by protesting. It is the right to an
explanation by the school for how the election to pick an
official eighth-grade T-shirt was conducted. We do not think
eighth graders have such a right. For the school to hold an
election for class T-shirt and rig the results, as the plaintiffs
suspect happened, is probably not a recommended educational
practice, but it is not an infringement of any legal right.
in any event, it was not the protest as such that was
forbidden, but merely a particular means of protest. The
lla
gifties were free to protest in more conventional, less
potentially disruptive, ways than by the wearing of the Brandt
T-shirt. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 293, 120
S. Ct. 1382, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000) (plurality opinion);
One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu,
76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1996). They did so—they
petitioned the principal and made a presentation to the Local
School Council at the principal’s urging and were not
punished for doing so. Their parents amplified the gifties’
voices of protest. With many routes of communication open
to the gifties, the closing of the T-shirt route inflicted the most
minimal of possible injuries, if injury at all (as we doubt), to
the First Amendment.
Public schools have an interest of constitutional dignity in
being allowed to manage their affairs and shape their destiny
free of minute supervision by federal judges and juries.
Academic freedom, “a special concern of the First
Amendment.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
602, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967), is not just the
freedom of teachers, school authorities, and to an extent
students to express ideas and opinions. “It includes the
authority of the university to manage an academic community
and evaluate teaching and scholarship free from interference
by other units of government, including the courts.” Hosty v.
Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30, 123 S. Ct. 2325,
156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003); Regents of University of Michigan
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S. Ct. 507, 88 L. Ed. 2d
523 (1985); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District
515, 759 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1985). Most of the cases
that honor that interest involve colleges and universities, but
their principle applies with equal if not greater force to lower
schools as well, see, e.g., Chicago Board of Education v.
Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2003), and
12a
implies that the principals of those schools have discretion to
regulate students’ conduct in order to maintain an atmosphere
conducive to learning. E.g., Vernonia School District 47] v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d
564 (1995); Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp.,
supra, 26 F.3d at 737. Just weeks ago we held that an
elementary-school teacher has no “constitutional right to
introduce his own views on the subject but must stick to the
prescribed curriculum—not only the prescribed subject
matter, but also the prescribed perspective on that subject
matter.” Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474
F.3d 477, 2007 WL 162833 at *1 (7th Cir. 2007). So if,
contrary to what we said earlier, the Brandt T-shirt is
“speech,” still we must not ignore the Supreme Court’s
admonition that “a school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’ “
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at
266.
Prohibiting children from wearing to school clothing that
contains “inappropriate” words or _ slogans places
appropriately broad limits on the school authorities’ exercise
of discretion to maintain a proper atmosphere. Tighter limits,
expressed in precise rules, would prevent them from
responding to novel challenges well illustrated by the present
case. Whatever the Crisis Intervention Team may have
thought with the benefit of hindsight, the principal of the
Beaubien school had to decide before the T-shirt protest, and
therefore with less information than the Crisis Information
Team had, whether to permit the gifties to protest the election
results by flouting the official T-shirt. After having reasonably
decided not to permit such conduct, he had to decide whether
to allow the gifties to defy his prohibition, and he again
reasonably decided that the imposition of mild discipline was
necessary in order to affirm his authority and maintain order.
13a
He may, of course, have been wrong. But the existence of
discretion implies a license to make mistakes. An exercise of
Official discretion is reversible by a court only when the
official can be said to have abused his discretion, implying
conduct not merely mistaken in retrospect but unreasonable.
E.g., Zhou v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 677, 679-80
(7th Cir. 2002); Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.
1996). The principal (himself an alumnus of the eighth grade
at Beaubien Elementary School) did not abuse his discretion.
We do not accept all the arguments that the defendants
press on us. They say that the Brandt T-shirt had to be banned
because it ridicules students with disabilities—the right hand
of the cartoon figure is deformed. It is more likely that Brandt
simply can’t draw very well. Nevertheless the principal would
have been justified in banning the wearing of the shirt had he
reasonably believed that it would be offensive to disabled
children. But that was not his ground. The defendants also
contend that there was a danger that the non-gifted children
would be incensed by the gifties’ refusal to accept the result
of the election, and violence might result; there apparently
had been a shoving incident between a “gifty” and a “tard” a
week before the gifties started wearing the Brandt T-shirt. But
the evidence of tensions between the two groups of student
was not developed, and so cannot be a ground for upholding
the defendants’ actions.
There is, however, ground enough, as we have explained.
The T-shirt is not protected speech, and we are doubtful that
it became so by being a vehicle for eighth graders to protest
the outcome of a T-shirt contest. If protected at all, it was not
immune from reasonable regulation by the school authorities.
The plaintiffs argue finally that the district judge should
not have ordered them to pay the defendants’ costs. There is
14a
no possible merit to the argument. They have made the
defendants jump through a number of costly hoops in this
protracted litigation and must bear the usual consequences of
failed litigation.
AFFIRMED.
15a
[SEE FOLDOUT PAGES FOR
7TH CIRCUIT OPINION
EXHIBITS A AND B]
16a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
No. 04 C 904
[Filed May 8, 2006] .
Brandt )
)
vs. )
)
Board of Education )
)
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
Defendant’s Bill of Costs is granted in part and denied in part.
The Court awards the Board $10,556.20 in costs.
STATEMENT
On March 13, 2006, the Court granted Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment lawsuit. As such, Defendant Board of Education
for the City of Chicago is a prevailing party. Before the Court
is the Board’s Bill of Costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d). Defendant seeks a total of $10,688.40,
which constitutes subpoena fees, court reporting transcription
17a
fees, and photocopying expenses. For the following reasons,
the Court awards the Board $10,556.20 in costs.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that “costs
other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). Recoverable costs include: (1) clerk
and marshal fees; (2) fees for necessary transcripts obtained
for use in the case; (3) witness fees and expenses; (4) fees for
copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5)
docket fees; and (6) compensation for court-appointed experts
and interpreters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; see also Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd. , 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir.
1997). There is a strong presumption in favor of awarding
costs to the prevailing party under Rule 54(d). Majeske v. City
of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court,
in its discretion, may tax costs against the non-prevailing
party when the cost imposed is recoverable and the amount
assessed is reasonable. /d.
Plaintiffs first take umbrage with the fact that the Bill of
Costs was filed only by Defendant Board of Education and not
the other Defendants in this lawsuit. As the Board explains,
the other Defendants did not file a Bill of Costs because they
did not incur costs. Further, the Board elucidates via affidavit
that the costs were incurred by the Board alone. As such,
Plaintiffs’ argument is baseless. The Court thus turns to the
Board’s Bill of Costs.
I. Depositions Costs - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)
At the outset, the Court acknowledges that the Board
provided photocopies of all deposition transcripts to Plaintiffs
at their request saving Plaintiffs substantial court reporter
fees. Presently, the Board requests deposition costs in the
18a
amount of $9,723.60 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). In
support of this request, the Board has submitted a detailed
itemization of these costs and the related invoices.
Plaintiffs argue that certain depositions were not submitted
in connection with any motion, and therefore, these costs
cannot be taxed. Deposition charges, however, may be
awarded if the deposition appears reasonably necessary in
light of the facts known at the time of the deposition. See
Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir.
2003); Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445,
455 (7th Cir. 1998). Further, the introduction of a deposition
at trial is not a prerequisite for a finding that it was necessary
to take a deposition. Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d
526, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). The two deponents at issue were
identified by plaintiffs as persons with knowledge relevant to
the complaint. One of the deponents was a class member.
Accordingly, these depositions were reasonably necessary in
light of the facts known at the time of the depositions.
Under the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 54.1(b),
the costs of the transcript or deposition shall not exceed the
regular copy rate established by the Judicial Conference of the
United States. The applicable rate pursuant to the Judicial
Conference for depositions conducted after February 28,
2003, is $3.30 per page per ordinary transcript. See Vigortone
Ag Prods., Inc. v. PM Ag Prods. Inc., No. 99 C 7049, 2004
WL 1899882, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2004).
Here, although none of the taxed depositions cost over
$3.30 per page, Plaintiffs contend - without citation to any
legal authority - that the attendance and overtime fees should
be disallowed. Plaintiffs’ argument fails because the Court has
discretion to award attendance fees under Section 1920(2) as
part of the reasonable and necessary costs in obtaining a
19a
deposition transcript. See Held v. Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1002
(7th Cir. 1998). Further, overtime charges that were incurred
to accommodate the schedules of Plaintiffs and their witnesses
are proper. See Finchum, 57 F.3d at 534. Last, Plaintiffs have
made no showing that these itemized costs are not reasonable.
During the course of this litigation, the Court granted
Defendants’ motion to take more than the ten depositions
allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(A). Now
Plaintiffs request that the Court reduce the depositions costs
because the Board has submitted a Bill of Costs including
fourteen transcripts. The Court declines Plaintiffs’ request,
especially in light of the fact that the Board provided
photocopies of all deposition transcripts to Plaintiffs saving
Plaintiffs substantial court reporter fees.
In sum, the Court awards $9,723.60 under Section
1920(2) because these costs are allowable and reasonable. See
Majeske, 218 F.3d at 824.
Il Subpoena Fees - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)
The Board also seeks costs associated with the subpoena
fees for Steven Herzog, Jerry Schecter, and Diane Haak
pursuant to Section 1920(1). Service fees may not exceed
amounts charged by the United States Marshal Service which
is $45.00 per hour and $0.365 per mile. See Collins v.
Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 28
C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3). Here, the costs were under $45.00 per
person, and thus are reasonable. Plaintiffs, however, contend
that Defendants Laughlin and Clancy issued these subpoenas
and the Board did not respond to this assertion. Accordingly,
it appears that these subpoena costs were not incurred by the
Board, and thus are not recoverable under the circumstances.
TA,
20a
I11.Photocopying Costs - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)
Next, the Board seeks $832.60 in photocopying costs
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which allows a judge to tax as
costs “[flees for exemplification and copies of papers
necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Courts interpret this
section to mean that photocopying charges for discovery and
court copies are recoverable, but charges for copies made for
attorney convenience are not. See Mcliveen v. Stone
Container Corp., 910 F.2d 1581, 1584 (7th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs object to this award because the Board is seeking
$.20 per page. This rate is within the reasonable rate range of
$.10 to $.20 per page. See Harkins v. Riverboat Serv., Inc.,
286 F.Supp.2d 976, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also Helzing v.
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 02 C 9408, 2004 WL 2608287,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.16, 2004); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v.
Karsten Mfg. Corp. , No. 99 C 2785, 2003 WL 1720066, *11
(N.D. Ill. March 31, 2003); Figueroa v. City of Chicago, No.
97 C 8861, 2000 WL 1036019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 20,
2000).
The Board has also submitted the charge of $66.00 for the
transcription of a court hearing on May 16, 2004. See SK
Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 852 F.2d 936, 944
n. 9 (7th Cir. 1988) (costs of pretrial proceeding transcripts
are taxable as costs under Rule 54(d)). Plaintiffs contend that
the Board has failed to attach an invoice for these charges. As
the cancelled check attached to the Bill of Costs reflects, this
transcription was done by this Court’s court reporter, Joseph
Rickhoff. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ argument as to this cost fails.
In sum, the Court, in its discretion, awards the Board
$832.60 in photocopying costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
21a
IV. Conclusion
Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that because
this case was “close” and “difficult,” the Board’s costs should
be denied. See Association of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 231 F.3d 572, 592 (9th Cir. 2000). As the Board
correctly asserts, Plaintiffs brought an Amended Complaint
against five Defendants and lost on all counts. Further,
Plaintiffs’ “difficult” argument is not supported by the law of
this Circuit.
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that because
they are minors, there is a great economic disparity between
the parties. As Plaintiffs are well aware, the parents of minor
Plaintiffs Michael Brandt, Rebecca Darugar, and Aldo Van
Enck filed the Amended Class Action Complaint on behalf of
their children and all others similarly situated against the five
Defendants. Finally, Irene Dymkar, one of the lead attorney
for the Plaintiffs, is the mother of one of the minor Plaintiffs.
22a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 04 C 0904
{March 13, 2006]
MICHAEL D. BRANDT, minor, by his parent,
STEPHEN M. BRANDT; REBECCA L.
DARUGAR, minor, by her parent, LORI
DARUGAR; ALDO S. K. VAN ENCK, minor,
by his parent, SARA KATAYANAGI VAN
ENCK;; on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
OF CHICAGO; CHRIS N. KOTIS, individually
and officially; JANICE M. ROSALES,
individually and officially; CHRISTINE
LAUGHLIN individually and officially;
MARY CHANCY, individually and officially,
Defendants.
ee ee ee ee ne ee oe ae ee ee ee a ee, ee,
23a
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
The parents of minor Plaintiffs Michael Brandt, Rebecca
Darugar, and Aldo Van Enck filed the present Amended Class
Action Complaint on behalf of their children and all others
similarly situated against Defendants Board of Education of
the City of Chicago, Chris Kotis, Janice Rosales, Christine
Laughlin, and Mary Clancy. In their Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their First
Amendment right to free speech. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Before the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rules
When determining summary judgment motions, the Court
derives the background facts from the parties’ Northern
District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Local
Rules provide parties with specific details as to how litigants
in the Northern District of Illinois should approach summary
judgment motions and responses. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)
requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no
genuine issue.” Local Rule 56. 1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving
party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by
the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts
that establish a genuine dispute for trial. The parties’
statements must contain short numbered paragraphs including
24a
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials. Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs.,
Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004); Malec v. Sanford,
191 F.R.D. 581, 583-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
It is not appropriate to set forth additional facts in a Rule
56.1(b)(3) response statement, instead, the parties must
include any additional facts in a separate Rule 56.1 statement.
See Ammons, 368 F.3d at 817. Responses that are not
contested are deemed admitted. Brengeticy v. Horton, 423
F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680,
683 (7th Cir. 2003). Statements and responses that do not
properly cite to the record are subject to the Court’s
discretion as to their admissibility. See Brasic v. Heinemann’s
Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court also
reminds the parties that when citing to the record in their legal
memoranda, they are required to cite to the numbered
paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1 Statements and not to the
underlying record. See Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 586. With these
principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this
case.’
' In their Reply Brief, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ use of their
Joint Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Facts in response to Plaintiffs’
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is prohibited by the local
rules. Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority supporting this
argument and the Court has found none. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’
allegation that they cannot adequately respond to Defendants’ Joint
Rule 56.1 Statement in this context is disingenuous because
Plaintiffs have already responded to Defendants’ statement in detail.
(See R. 166-1, Pls.” Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt.)
25a
II. Relevant Facts
A. Parties
Plaintiffs are a certified class of 24 of the 27 students who
were in the eighth grade class in the Regional Gifted Center
Program at Jean Baptiste Beaubien Elementary School
(“Beaubien School”) in Chicago, Illinois, during the 2002-03
school year. (R. 134-1, Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. P 1; R. 140-1,
Defs.’ Joint Rule 56.1 Stmt. P 2.)
Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago
(“Board”) is a body politic and corporate in charge of
overseeing the management and operations of a system of free
schools known as the Chicago Public Schools. (Pis.” Stmt. P
2.) Defendant Chris Kotis is the Principal of Beaubien
Elementary School and was the Principal during the relevant
time period. (/d. P 3; Defs.’ Stmt. P 3.) The Board of
Education has adopted a rule that specifically authorizes
principals to exercise control over the school in all areas
authorized by Illinois statute. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 9.) The Uniform
Discipline Code (“UDC”), a series of rules and regulations
that categorize different types of rule infractions and prescribe
a range of consequences for each type of infraction, further
defines Principal Kotis’ role. (Defs.” Stmt. P 10.) For
example, the UDC requires students to dress in a manner that
neither disrupts the educational process nor poses a safety
hazard. (Jd. PP 13, 22; R. 160-1, Pls.” Stmt. Add’] Facts P
30.)
Defendant Mary Clancy was the Gifted Program
Coordinator at Beaubien School during the 2002-03 school
year. (Pls.’ Stmt. P 6; Defs.’ Stmt. P 4.) Defendant Christine
Laughlin was the Assistant Principal at Beaubien School
during the 2002-03 school year. (Pis.’ Stmt. P 5; Defs.’ Stmt.
26a
P 5.) Defendant Janice Rosales was the Chicago Public
Schools Area Instructional Officer (“AIO”) for Region One,
Area One, which encompassed Beaubien School during the
2002-03 school year. (Pls.’ Stmt. P 4; Defs.’ Stmt. P 6.)
B. The T-Shirt
Beaubien School held an annual contest among the eighth
grade students to determine the design for the class T-shirt.
(R. 35-1, Am. Compl. P 32.) In the second semester of
school year 2002-03, students submitted twenty designs for
the Class of 2003 T-shirt election. (Jd. P 33; Defs.’ Stmt. PP
55, 57, 59.) The eighth grade students did not choose Plaintiff
Michael Brandt’s T-shirt design for the official class T-shirt.
(Id.) Michael Brandt’s T-shirt design contained the image of
a boy giving a thumbs-up signal with one hand with the other
arm ending in a handless nub from which a leash extended to
a dog labeled the school mascot “Beaubien Bulldog.” (R. 137-
1, Kotis’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2; Am. Compl. P 34.) The boy
is wearing a shirt that says, “Beaubien Class of 2003,” and
pants bearing a grid design. (/d.) After losing the T-shirt
election, Plaintiffs added the word “gifties” to the back of the
shirt. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 5.)
C. The Petition
Principal Kotis prohibited the gifted students’ T-shirt
design as an alternative graduation shirt because a fair vote
was conducted and the alternative T-shirt did not win the
election. (Defs.” Stmt., Ex. A, C. Kotis Dep., at 56.)
Thereafter, the gifted students drafted a petition for the other
students to sign concerning their T-shirt. (Am. Compl. P 38c;
Defs.’ Stmt, Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67-70.) The petition
indicated that the regular students had no objection to anyone
wearing the alternative T-shirt. (Am. Compl. P 38c.) At her
27a
deposition, Rebecca Darugar testified that “the purpose of the
petition was so that we could have and wear these T-shirts.”
(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67.) Rebecca
Darugar also testified that they were going to give the petition
to the Local School Council to show that they had support for
their alternative T-shirt design. (Jd. at 68.)
D. Local School Council Meeting
Also after Principal Kotis prohibited the alternative T-shirt
design, he met with the gifted class and expressed his
concerns about the anger over Michael Brandt’s losing design.
(Defs.’ Stmt. P 70 & Ex. A, Kotis Dep. at 68.) Kotis then
invited the students to address the issue at the Local School
Council meeting scheduled for the following week on
February 19, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 70.) Thereafter, Michael
Brandt addressed the Local School Council. (R. 166-1, Pls.’
Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. P 71.) At his deposition, Michael
Brandt testified that when he addressed the Local School
Council, he stated that his T-shirt design better represented
the gifted students because the T-shirt “was made available
to the gifted students, people who I had spent combined total
of thousands of hours in close contact with. We felt that us
having our own shirt better represented us than having a shirt
shared with people with who [sic] we hardly knew.” (Defs.’
Stmt., Ex. M., M. Brandt’s Dep. at 116-17.) Michael Brandt
also told the Local School Council that the gifted class
thought they had won the T-shirt election and felt frustrated
that the school did not explain to them how the voting was
conducted. (Plis.’ Resp. to Defs.” Stmt. P 71.) In the end, the
Local School Council supported Principal Kotis’ decision to
prohibit the alternative T-shirts. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 75.)
28a
E. Wearing the T-Shirts to School
Despite .the; T-shirt’s prohibition, the gifted students
produced the “gifties” T-shirt and 19 of the gifted students
wore the T-shirts to school on April 1, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P
76; Pls.’ Stmt. P 14.) Gifted student Nicholas Haak testified
that it was “kind of ironic that we were doing it on April
Fools’ Day as an April Fools’ joke.” (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. DD,
N. Haak Dep., at 70-71.) Principal Kotis did not know that
the students were wearing the T-shirts on April 1, 2003 until
the Gifted Program Coordinator Mary Clancy informed him.
(Defs.’ Stmt. P 80.) Principal Kotis told the gifted students
that they were in violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Code
for failing to abide by the schools rules or regulations. (Pls.’
Stmt. P 16.) The rule at issue was Beaubien School Dress
Code No.2, which states in relevant part: “Clothing with
inappropriate words or slogans is not permitted.” (Jd. P 9.)
Thereafter, Kotis told Clancy to contact the students’ parents
to tell them that the students had violated a school disciplinary
code for wearing the “gifties” T-shirts to school. (Defs.’
Stmt. P 71; Pils.’ Stmt. P 18.)
F. Tensions Between Gifted and Regular Students
Sometime between April 1 and April 4, 2003, Principal
Kotis told Area Instructional Officer Rosales that hostilities
existed between the gifted and regular students at Beaubien
School. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 93; Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 14.)
After that, Rosales instructed Kotis to let her know if there
were any further problems. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 94.) Rosales
testified that Kotis “would be monitoring the behavior of the
children and encouraging the children to -- working with the
teachers in order to improve the conditions of safety and
security of the children, because safety was what I was
29a
concerned about.” (Defs.’ Stmt. P 114, Ex B., Rosales Dep.
at 46.)
At their depositions, Kotis, Clancy, and Laughlin also
testified that tensions existed between the gifted and regular
students. (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. R., Kotis Dep. at 9-11; Ex. N,
Clancy Dep. at 41, 47, Ex. O, Laughlin Dep. at 12-14.) Kotis
testified that there had been at least one physical altercation
between a gifted and regular student at Beaubien School.
(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. R., Kotis Dep. at 9-11; Ex. A, Kotis Dep.
at 83.) In addition, Laughlin testified that there had been
incidents after school between gifted and regular students.
(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. O, Laughlin Dep. at 12-14.) Moreover,
Clancy testified that she thought that the gifted students’
design on the T-shirt insulted students with physical
deformities. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 5.)
A number of gifted students wore the T-shirts again on
May 12, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 99.) Shortly thereafter, a
gifted student wrote Rosales a letter about the tension between
the gifted and regular students at Beaubien School. (Defs.’
Stmt. P 104, Ex. C, Rosales Decl. PP 8, 10.)
G. Possible Solutions to T-Shirt Problem
Meanwhile, on May 15, 2003, Kotis and Rosales held a
meeting to work with the parents to create possible solutions
to the T-shirt controversy. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 125.) Rosales
testified that at the end of the May 15 meeting, they presented
choices to the parents and students, including “that they could
have their -- I believe that they could have their T-shirt, keep
it as it was and stay in their classroom and receive all of their
classes, 100 percent of their program in their classroom....”
(Id. P 126; Ex. B, Rosales Dep. at 77.) Rosales further
testified that the students could also cover the word “gifties”
30a
on the T-shirt and then they would have access to anywhere
in the school. (/d.; Ex. B, Rosales Dep. at 77.) The next day,
Rosales presented the options to the gifted class. (Jd. P
126(a)). After that, at least one gifted student wore the banned
T-shirt to school every day until May 23, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt.,
Ex. Z, Darugar Dep. at 42.)
H. Crisis Intervention Team
Consequently, Rosales contacted the Crisis Intervention
Office at the Board of Education’s central office concerning
the T-shirt controversy at Beaubien School. (Defs.’ Stmt. P
127.) The Crisis Intervention Team included a facilitator and
Beaubien School’s counselor, social worker, and
psychologists who worked with both the regular and gifted
students. (/d. P 128.) From May 19 until 23, 2003, the Crisis
Team spoke directly to each of the three eighth grade classes,
including the gifted class. (Id. P 129; R. 167-1, Pls.’
Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report.) The Crisis
Intervention Team’s report stated in pertinent part: “In the
General Education classroom (300, 310) the students were not
concerned that the students in the gifted program were
wearing a shirt different from the class shirt. They were
concerned that a consequence of the T-shirt issue would be
loss of their Eighth Grade Yearbook, loss of their class trip to
Springfield, and potential disruption to graduation.” (R. 167-
1, Pls.” Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report, at 1.) The
report also stated that the crisis team met with Principal Kotis
to convey the sentiments of the students, and consequently
stated that “Mr. Kotis was relieved to find that wearing the T-
shirt with “Giftee” on the back did not appear to jeopardize
student safety. He decided that as long as student safety was
not being compromised, the students could wear the T-shirt
which was in question.” (/d.) Accordingly, after the Crisis
Intervention Team’s evaluation, Principal Kotis allowed the
3la
students to wear the “gifties” T-shirts to school. (Defs.’ Stmt.
P 133.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court
construes all the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of
the party against whom the motion under consideration is
made. Schneider v Sentry Group Long Term Disability Plan,
422 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). The party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ prohibition of the
“gifties” T-shirt denied the gifted students their First
Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiffs further argue that
the relevant school disciplinary and dress codes constituted an
unconstitutional prior restraint of the gifted students’ free
speech. Also, Plaintiffs challenge these codes as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Finally, Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants retaliated against the gifted students for
32a
wearing the “gifties” T-shirts after the school administration
had specifically prohibited the T-shirts.’
The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and
expressive conduct, and generally prevents the government
from proscribing such activities. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.
Ed. 2d 305 (1992). First Amendment protections of speech
and expressive conduct, however, are not absolute. Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d
535 (2003).
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v.
Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 514, 89 S. Ct.
733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). Since the Tinker decision, the
Supreme Court has held that schools cannot punish students
for expressing their personal views at school “unless school
? Plaintiffs have failed to respond to Defendants’ arguments that
their First Amendment retaliation claim is without merit.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have waived their retaliation claim. See
Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”); see also
United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“We have repeatedly made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped
arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent
authority, are waived (even where those arguments raise
constitutional issues)”), Volovsek v. Wisconsin Dep't of Agr. Trade
& Consumer Protection, 344 F.3d 680, 689 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2003)
(complete absence of legal argument waives consideration of
claim).
33a
authorities have reason to believe that such expression will
‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge
upon the rights of other students.’” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.
Ed. 2d 592 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
Furthermore, a school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with the school’s basic educational mission even
though the First Amendment would protect similar speech or
expressive conduct outside of the school setting. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 682, 685, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d
549 (1986)) (public school students’ First Amendment rights
not automatically coextensive with rights of adults in other
settings).
I. Protected Speech
Defendants contend that the gifted students’ wearing of the
T-shirts to school was not an attempt to express any
particularized message, such as a political affiliation or a
protest of social issues, and that the message did not have the
likelihood of being understood by those who viewed it. The
First Amendment protects conduct, symbols, and non-verbal
speech which express ideas or convey a message that would
likely be understood by the viewer. Clark v. Community for
Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104 S. Ct. 3065,
3069, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984); Spence v. State of
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41
L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). For example, in Tinker, the Supreme
Court recognized that the expressive nature of students
wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War was
protected speech. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06. Other
examples of protected expressive conduct include the burning
of the American flag during a political demonstration at the
1984 Republican National Convention, see Texas v. Johnson,
34a
491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989),
and the taping of a peace sign on an American flag in protest
of the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State tragedy. See
Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that regardless of the content of
the design, the T-shirt was made and worn as a symbol of
protest. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the T-shirt conveyed
the message that “we were cheated in the election and this is
the shirt that should have won.” (R. 164-1, Pls.” Mem. In
Opp. to Kotis’ Mot. For Summ. J., at 2.)° Plaintiffs bear the
burden of demonstrating that the First Amendment protects
their expressive conduct. See Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5; Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind.,
377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004). Specifically, “although it
is common to place the burden upon the Government to
justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the
obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly
expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment
even applies. To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that
all conduct is presumptively expressive.” Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.
> Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the T-shirts were “art” and
that “it goes without saying that art is expression protected by the
First Amendment” is waived because Plaintiffs fail to develop their
argument with supporting evidence and pertinent legal authority.
See Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir.
2005) (“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”); see
also United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 536 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“unsupported and undeveloped arguments are waived.”) (citations
omitted).
35a
A. Particularized Message
The Court thus evaluates whether the “gifties” T-shirt and
the wearing of the T-shirt had a “particularized message.” See
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296.
Many of the gifted students’ statements about the T-shirt and
their wearing of the shirt to school do not indicate that they
were protesting the T-shirt election. For example, Michael
Brandt, the designer of the T-shirt, stated that the T-shirt was
“supposed to look silly, meaning, it was suppose to look
funny. It’s suppose to be ironic that we were graduating
eighth grade, making [sic] step into higher education and, at
the same time, it’s got a very goofy looking kid -- to have a
very goofy looking kid on the front of a shirt that stands for
the milestone of going into higher education was just ironic.”
(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. M., M. Brandt’s Dep. at 109-10.) Other
gifted students -- Rebecca Darugar and Aldo Van Enck --
testified that the T-shirt was made to represent the gifted
class. (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 114-15;
Defs.’ Stmt, Ex. UU, A. Van Enck Dep. at 17.) Further,
gifted student Nicholas Haak testified that when they wore the
T-shirts for the first time it was “kind of ironic that we were
doing it on April Fools’ Day as an April Fools’ joke.” (Defs.’
Stmt., Ex. DD, N. Haak Dep., at 70-71.)
On the other hand, Rebecca Darugar also testified that the
gifted students wore the T-shirts in protest of Kotis’ decision
that forbade them from wearing the T-shirts to school. (Defs.’
Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 58.) Another gifted
student, Daniel Schmidt, testified that they made and wore the
T-shirts to taunt the administration, although he did not
explain why the gifted students were taunting the
administration in the first instance. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 64, Ex.
CC, D. Schmidt Dep. at 49.) Furthermore, Michael Brandt
told the Local School Council that the gifted class thought
36a
they had won the T-shirt election and felt frustrated that the
school did not explain to them how the voting was conducted.
(Pis.” Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. P 71.)
Although Defendants argue that the students simply wore
the T-shirts in defiance of the administration’s prohibition of
the shirts, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Accordingly,
based on the facts discussed above, especially Michael
Brandt’s complaint to the Local School Board, Plaintiffs have
established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the students wore the T-shirts in protest of the T-shirt
election.
B. Likelihood of Being Understood
The Court next turns to the second half of the relevant
inquiry, namely, whether viewers would understand the T-
-Shirt’s particularized message that the gifted students were
protesting the T-shirt election. See Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296. Plaintiffs have set forth
evidence that the gifted students circulated a petition about the
“gifties” T-shirt, although Plaintiffs never explain what the
petition actually said or provide the Court with a copy of the
petition. (See Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67.)
In any event, Plaintiffs also point to evidence that because the
Gifted Program Coordinator interviewed two regular students
about the T-shirts, other students were aware of the gifted
students’ claim that the election had been unfair. (Pis.’ Stmt.
Add’! Facts P 9.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that because
Defendants confined the gifted students to their home room
whenever anyone in the class wore the T-shirts, other
students knew of the gifted students’ protest. (id. PP 11, 12.)
37a
Again, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court is required
to do at this procedural posture, they have established that
there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the other
students understood the particularized message about the T-
shirt election.
C. Basic Educational Mission
Although there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the wearing of the T-shirts to school expressed a
particularized message understood by its viewers, the Court
must also determine whether the gifted students’ speech was
inconsistent with Beaubien School’s basic educational
mission. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685). Specifically, students “cannot be punished
merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises ... unless school authorities have reason to believe
that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work
of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.’”
Kuhimeier, 484 U.S at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
Evidence in the record suggests that tensions existed
between the gifted and regular students and that some
incidents had occurred between gifted and regular students.
(Defs.’ Stmt. P 93; Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 14.) Also, there
were some safety concerns involved. (/d.) There is also
evidence that the design on the T-shirt may have insulted
students with physical deformities. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P
5.) Furthermore, some of the regular students were upset that
the T-shirt controversy might disrupt their eighth grade
yearbook, their class trip to Springfield, and graduation. (R.
167-1, Pls.” Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report, at 1.)
Based on this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material
fact whether the producing and wearing of the T-shirts to
:
38a
school substantially interfered with the school’s work or
impinged upon the rights of other students.
II. Qualified Immunity
Nevertheless, the individual Defendants assert that the
doctrine of qualified immunity protects them from this
lawsuit. In general, qualified immunity shields government
Officials performing discretionary functions from civil
litigation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The goal of qualified
immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on
summary judgment.” Jd. Denying summary judgment any
time a material issue of fact exists as to the underlying
constitutional claim undermines the goal of qualified
immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct.
2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Accordingly, “where the
defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue
should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and
expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.” Id. at 200.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “if the law did
not put the [public official] on notice that his conduct would
be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is appropriate.” Jd. at 202. When determining
whether qualified immunity shields a public official from a
Section 1983 action, the Court undertakes a two-part inquiry.
Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005). The
Court’s first inquiry is whether the facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that the individual
Defendants violated a constitutional right. /d. (citing Saucier,
533 U.S. at 201). If the facts comprise a constitutional
violation, the Court must determine whether the constitutional
39a
right was clearly established at the time of Defendants’
conduct. Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have established that
Defendants violated their First Amendment right to free
speech because a genuine issue of material facts exists as to
that question, the Court turns to the second qualified
immunity prong because failure to establish either prong is
dispositive. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. Under the
second inquiry, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that
their First Amendment rights were “clearly established.”
Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 742. To do so, Plaintiffs “must
demonstrate either that a court has upheld the purported right
in a case factually similar to the one under review, or that the
alleged misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a
constitutional right.” Id.
Plaintiffs heavily rely on Tinker to demonstrate the second
qualified immunity prong. In Tinker, two high school students
and one junior high student wore black armbands to school
“to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities and
their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and by
their example, to influence others to adopt them.” Jd. at 514.
The school administration subsequently prohibited the
armbands and suspended the students in violation of a school
policy after which the students brought a First Amendment
action in federal court. /d. at 504-05. Because the students’
conduct was not disruptive, more specifically, because there
was nothing in the record that established that the wearing of
the armbands “would substantially interfere with the work of
the school or impinge upon the rights of other students” the
Supreme Court concluded that the school could not prohibit
the students from wearing the armbands. /d. at 509, 514.
40a
Although Plaintiffs contend the facts in Tinker are
sufficiently similar to the case at hand, Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Tinker as clearly established law is not dispositive of the
Court’s inquiry because the Supreme Court has modified the
Tinker holding. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.Ed.2d
592 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). The
Seventh Circuit has articulated that since the Tinker decision,
“the Supreme Court has cast some doubt on the extent to
which students retain free speech rights in the school setting.”
Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir.
1994). Another Seventh Circuit panel recognized that
“Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the
teaching of civility and the inculcation of traditional moral,
social, and political norms may override student expression,
or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order
its educational priorities.” See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse
Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996). Because the
Supreme Court has modified the Tinker holding, Tinker alone
is not dispositive of the Court’s “clearly established” inquiry
as Plaintiffs suggest.
Thus, the Court must determine whether the alleged
misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional
right. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. The Court’s
“relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right
is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable [public official] that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.” See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202
(inquiry “undertaken in light of the specific context of the
case, not as a broad general proposition”); see also Hosty v.
Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). In other
words, the Court looks to whether a reasonable public official
in the individual Defendants’ positions would have understood
4la
that his or her actions were unlawful in the factual situation at
hand. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107
S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (law at time of conduct
must have been “clear in relation to the specific facts
confronting the public official when he acted”); see also
Wernsing, 423 F.3d 742 (“contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right”). Although this is an
objective test, subjective factors are not ignored, such as the
information Defendants possessed at the time they prohibited
the alternative T-shirt. See Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d
692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. at 641).
Here, there is evidence in the record that there were
tensions between the regular students and the gifted students
and that Defendants had safety concerns as a result of these
tensions. (See Defs.’ Stmt. P 114, Ex B., Rosales Dep. at
46.) To remedy the situation, Kotis and Rosales attempted to
address the T-shirt controversy by meeting with the gifted
students and their parents, suggesting that the students talk to
the Local School Board, giving the students options of when
and how they could wear the T-shirts, and consulting a Crisis
Intervention Team. (Defs.’ Stmt. PP 70, 125, 127.) Although
Principal Kotis prohibited the wearing of the T-shirt and
restricted the gifted students to their home room if the
students wore the T-shirt to school, once the Crisis
Intervention Team concluded there were no safety concerns,
Principal Kotis allowed the students to wear the T-shirts
again. (R. 167-1, Pls.’ Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team
Report, at 1; Defs.’ Stmt. P 133.)
Under these circumstances, the contours of the gifted
students’ First Amendment rights would not be sufficiently
clear to a reasonable official that what he or she was doing
42a
violated those rights, especially because Defendants’
restrictions concerning the T-shirts took place in the
nonpublic setting of a school. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537
(“Speech in nonpublic forums is subject to significantly
greater regulation than speech in traditional public forums”).
Moreover, case law regarding student speech under the First
Amendment is nuanced, and thus the law is not as clear cut as
Plaintiffs argue. As the Seventh Circuit recognized “many
aspects of the law with respect to students’ speech, not only
the role of age, are difficult to understand and apply.” See
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739. The Hosty Court further reasoned
that “public officials need not predict, at their financial peril,
how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved.” Jd.
These “constitutional uncertainties” in student speech are
illustrated by Plaintiffs’ confusion over the concept of
imprimatur. In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court held that if
parents, students, and members of the public reasonably
perceive a student’s expressive conduct to bear the imprimatur
of the school, the school could censor the student’s conduct
as long as the school’s actions were reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at
271-73. Plaintiffs argue that Kuhimeier is not controlling
because the school did not sponsor the “gifties” T-shirt. The
relevant inquiry, however, is whether the public, parents, and
other students would perceive that the T-shirt reflected the
school’s imprimatur, that is, that it appeared that the school
approved the T-shirt design. Here, it is undisputed that the
design of the “gifties” T-shirt included the words “Beaubien
Class of 2003" and “Beaubien Bulldog,” and thus the public,
students, and parents might reasonably perceive that the
“gifties” T-shirt was actually approved by the Beaubien
administration. Consequently, the Beaubien administration
was entitled to exercise greater control over this particular
type of student speech. See id. at 271.
43a
Accordingly, under the legal uncertainties concerning
First Amendment rights to free speech in the school setting,
the school administration’s prohibition of the gifted students’
T-shirt was not an obvious violation of the students’ First
Amendment rights. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. In
sum, a reasonable official in the individual Defendants’
position could not have known definitively whether the
prohibition of the T-shirts violated the gifted students’ First
Amendment rights. See Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 750. As such,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing that their
constitutional rights under the particular circumstances of this
case were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
at 640-41. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields
Kotis, Clancy, Rosales, and Laughlin from Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims. The Court’s conclusion is further
supported by the decision in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 319-20, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), in which
the Supreme Court articulated that:
Liability for damages for every action which is
found subsequently to have been violative of a
student’s constitutional rights and to have caused
compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the
school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in
good faith in the course of exercising his discretion
within the scope of his official duties.... Denying any
measure of immunity in these circumstances would
contribute not to principled and fearless decision-
making but to intimidation. The imposition of
monetary costs for mistakes. which were not
unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances
would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious
school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment
independently, forcefully, and in a manner best
44a
serving the long-term interest of the school and the
students.
Id. at 319-20 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The
Court thus dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Kotis, Clancy,
Rosales, and Laughlin‘ in their individual capacities.
IfI. Monell Claim
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim against Kotis, Rosales,
Laughlin, and Clancy in their official capacities is a claim
against the Board of Education as a local governmental unit.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct.
3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 121 (1985) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). In other words,
official capacity suits brought against individuals are “another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (citation
omitted). Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual
“ For an individual to be liable under Section 1983, she must have
caused or participated in the alleged constitutional violation. Pepper
v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus,
Plaintiffs must establish that the individual Defendants “acquiesced
in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.”
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability). The record does
not support the proposition that Defendant Laughlin caused or
participated in the prohibition of the “gifties” T-shirt. Thus, the
Court also dismisses Laughlin on the ground that she was not
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.
45a
Defendants in their official capacities are claims against
the Board and thus duplicative, the Court dismisses the
individual Defendants in their official capacities from this
lawsuit.
To state a constitutional claim against the Board, Plaintiffs
must establish that an official custom or policy caused a
deprivation of their First Amendment right to free speech. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; Sornberger v. City of Knoxville,
Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (under
Section 1983 government agency cannot be liable on theory
of respondeat superior). To demonstrate that an official
custom or policy caused the alleged violation of their First
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must establish one of the
following scenarios: (1) the Board has an express policy that,
when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the
Board has a widespread practice that, although not authorized
by written law or express policy, is so permanent and well-
settled that it constitutes custom or usage within the force of
law; or (3) a person with final policymaking authority caused
the constitutional injury. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375,
379 (7th Cir. 2005).
A. Final Policymaking Authority
Plaintiffs argue that Principal Kotis was an individual with
final policymaking authority in the area of school conduct and
discipline, and therefore the Board is liable for Kotis’ conduct
under the third Monell scenario. Under Section 1983, an
individual’s status as a final policymaker is a question of state
or local law. Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765, 771 (7th
Cir. 2004); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). To
identify public officials with final policymaking authority, the
Court reviews state and local law, as well as custom or usage
46a
having the force of law. Killinger, 389 F.3d at 772 (citation
and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs specifically contend that Principal Kotis is an
individual with final “decision making” authority in the area
of school conduct and discipline based on UDC Rule 2-5. (R.
165-1, Pls.” Mem. In Opp. to Board’s M. Summ. J., at 4.).
Plaintiffs, however, confuse “decision maker” with “final
policymaker.” Not every decision a public official makes
involves policymaking as required under the Monell
framework. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482. “The fact that a
particular official -- even a policymaking official -- has
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an
exercise of that discretion.” /d. Instead, the public officer
“must be responsible for establishing final government policy
respecting such activity before the municipality can be held
liable.” Id. at 482-83.
Pursuant to the Board of Education Rules:
Principals of schools are the responsible
administrative heads of their respective schools and
are charged with the organization, supervision,
administration, and discipline thereof. They shall
establish and enforce such regulations, not contrary to
the Rules of the Board of Education, the Uniform
Discipline Code, or the regulations of the General
Superintendent of Schools, as in their judgment may
be necessary for the successful conduct of their
schools.
(Defs.’s Stmt. P 9, Ex. E, Bd. of Educ. Rules, Section 6-12.)
From the unequivocal language of Section 6-12 of the Board’s
Rules, principals in the Chicago Public Schools have the
47a
discretionary authority to make decisions contingent upon the
Board Rules, the UDC, and the regulations of the General
Superintendent of Schools. The Board’s Rules, however, do
not confer the authority for principals to make city-wide
policy decisions. See Killinger, 389 F.3d at 771 (“mere
authority to implement pre-existing rules is not the authority
to set policy”). That authority is left to the School Board. See
105 ILCS 5/10-20.5; see also Duda v. Board of Educ. of
Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-
60 (7th Cir. 1998) (Board of Education has authority to
manage schools and adopt rules and regulations needed for
that purpose); Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical
Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill.2d 389, 404, 113 Ill.Dec. 915,
515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987) (same). Consequently, Principals
Kotis is not a “final policymaker” as Plaintiffs claim.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that because UDC Rule 2-
5 is unconstitutionally overbroad it provides the basis for
Principal Kotis’ policymaking authority. Specifically,
Plaintiffs argue that the disciplinary rule is “effectively and
actually a delegation by the Board of Education of
unconstitutional power and authority to any and all Chicago
Public School principals and administrators.” (R. 165-1, Pls.’
Mem. In Opposition to Boavd’s M. Summ. J., at 4.)° In
> Plaintiffs also argue that the disciplinary and dress codes
constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint of the students’ free
speech. Not only is Plaintiffs’ argument cursory and undeveloped,
Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ conduct constituted viewpoint
discrimination is simply not supported by the record. See Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813, 105
S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (prior restraints in nonpublic
forums permissible when reasonable and viewpoint neutral);
Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006)
48a
general, a plaintiff may challenge rules, regulations, or laws
as facially unconstitutional under two theories -- the
overbreadth doctrine and the void for vagueness doctrine. See
Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 251
F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001). “The overbreadth doctrine
allows a plaintiff to ask that a law be struck down based not
on how it affects the plaintiff but on how it might be applied
to third parties not before the court.” Anderson v. Milwaukee
County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006); see also
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“statute’s very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression” ). “Facial challenges to overly
broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the
litigant, but for the benefit of society -- to prevent the statute
from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not
before the court.” Secretary of State of Maryland. v. Munson,
467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2847, 81 L.Ed.2d 786
(1984). Because of the overbreadth doctrine’s far-reaching
effects, courts must apply it “with hesitation” and “only as a
last resort.” Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d
451 (1999) (citation omitted).
Under the Uniform Discipline Code, there are six groups
of misconduct, including: (1) misconduct that includes
inappropriate student behaviors, such as running in the hall;
(2) misconduct that disrupts the orderly educational process
in school, including leaving the school without permission; (3)
conduct that seriously disrupts the educational process, such
as gambling; (4) conduct that includes assault, extortion,
(same); see, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d
1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996).
49a
vandalism, and other offenses; (5) conduct such as burglary
and gang activity; and (6) conduct such as arson, murder, and
kidnaping. (Defs.” Stmt. P 11, Ex. F, Uniform Discipline
Code at 19-25) At issue is Group 2 misconduct, namely,
conduct that disrupts the school’s educational process. Under
Group 2, the disciplinary code lists ten behaviors that
constitute such disruptive conduct, including defying the
authority of school personnel and failing to abide by school
rules and regulations. (/d.; Pls:’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 37.)
Here, the gifted students failed to abide by the Beaubien
School Dress Code No.2, which states in relevant part:
“Clothing with inappropriate words or slogans is not
permitted.” (Pis.’ Stmt. P 9.)
Plaintiffs argue that UDC Rule 2-5 is overbroad because
it is a rule which states that students cannot violate a rule and
is therefore redundant. The Court disagrees. As the Seventh
Circuit recently instructed “common sense must not be and
should not be suspended when judging the constitutionality of
a rule or statute.” See Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433
F.3d at 978. Under the common sense interpretation of the
disciplinary code, it is evident that Section 2-5 is specifically
directed at student conduct that disrupts the school’s
educational process. “Failing to abide by school rules and
regulations” means that if you fail to follow the school rules,
such as the school dress code, your conduct is considered
disruptive. There is nothing redundant about the code and its
directive is sufficiently narrow and reasonable because it
applies to the school rules and regulations and is limited by
reference to those rules. See id. at 979. The Tinker decision
and its progeny further support this conclusion because speech
in nonpublic forums, such elementary schools, is subject to
significantly greater regulation than speech in traditional
public forums. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537. Thus,
50a
restrictions of speech in nonpublic forums need only be
reasonable. Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d at 980.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that UDC Rule 2-5 and the dress
code are void for vagueness. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that
“with no way of identifying the source of content of the
underlying rules, a student might not even know about the
rules until they were violated. A rule must provide at least
minimal notice so that a student may conform his or her
actions to the rule.” (R. 133-1, Mem. In Support of M. Part.
Summ. J., at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue that the rule is
circuitous and confusing.
“A law is void for vagueness if it fails to give fair warning
of what is prohibited, if it fails to provide explicit standards
for the persons responsible for enforcement and thus creates
a risk of discriminatory enforcement, and if its lack of clarity
chills lawful behavior.” Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433
F.3d at 978 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). For a plaintiff
to succeed on a vagueness claim, she must demonstrate that
the rule is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667 (citation and quotation omitted). In
the context of school disciplinary codes, the Supreme Court
gives the following guidance: “Given the school’s need to be
able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process,
the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a
criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.” Fraser, 478
U.S. at 686.
Although Plaintiffs unequivocally argue that they are
facially attacking the disciplinary rule and dress code, they do
not attempt to show that the that the rules are unconstitutional
in all of their applications as opposed to “as applied” to the
Sla
students themselves. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68; see also
United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 544 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“party seeking to overturn a statute for vagueness on its face
must in essence establish that it is unconstitutionally vague in
at least a substantial number of the cases to which it could
apply”). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ attempt to facially attack
the disciplinary rule and dress code as unconstitutionally
vague simply fails because they do not address the code’s
overall applications. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68.
In short, UDC Rule 2-5 in conjunction with the dress code
is not overbroad or vague and does not confer any policy
making authority to Principal Kotis as Plaintiffs contend.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument based on the third Monell scenario
fails because Principal Kotis did not have final policymaking
authority under the circumstances.°®
B. Express Policy
Plaintiffs also argue that UDC Rule 2-5 and the school
dress code embody an express policy that caused and directly
contributed to the students alleged constitutional deprivation.
® Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Board’s delegation of authority to
the Department of Law and that certain Board members’ inaction
establishes municipal liability are not only undeveloped, but
Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority to support these claims.
Thus, Plaintiffs have waived these arguments. See Estate of
Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”). In fact,
these claims do not fall under the Monell rubric, but instead appear
to be loosely based on the doctrine of respondeat superior which
cannot apply to governmental units such as the Board of Education.
See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006,
1029 (7th Cir. 2006).
52a
This argument relies on the first Monell scenario, namely,
that the Board has an express policy, that when enforced,
deprived the gifted students of their First Amendment right to
free speech.
“The express policy theory applies, as the name suggests,
where a policy explicitly violates a constitutional right when
enforced.” Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 379 (policy must violate
constitutional right “on its face”). Because the Plaintiffs’
claim partially rests on the Beaubien School dress code,
Plaintiffs have not established that there is a Board of
Education policy at issue. See id. at 380. In other words, the
Beaubien School dress code cannot form the basis of liability
under Monell because it is not a Board policy or custom in the
first instance. See Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d
740, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Only those individuals with the
requisite policymaking authority are capable of establishing
‘official policy’ as required by Monell”). As discussed,
because Principal Kotis does not have the requisite policy
making authority under the circumstances, Plaintiffs’ claim
based on the disciplinary code in conjunction with the school
dress code must fail. See id. at 749. The Court thereby
dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the Board.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court grants Defendant
School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
Laughlin’s and Clancy’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant Kotis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Defendant Rosales’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally,
the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Strike as moot.
Dated: March 13, 2006
53a
AMY J. ST EVE
United States District Court Judge
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to hearing before the
Court. The issues have been heard and a decision has been
rendered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [131] is denied.
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (135, 138, and
139] are granted. All other pending motions are denied as
moot. Memorandum Opinion and Order is entered.
Date: 3/13/2006
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