Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Brandt v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (No. 07-289)

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~ Supreme Court, US.

| FILED

() 07-289 AUG 30 2007

No, __OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Gn the

Sunreme Court of the United States

MICHAEL D. BRANDT, REBECCA L. DARUGAR,

and ALDO S. K. VAN ENCK, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated,

Petitioners,

¥

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY

OF CHICAGO, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James L. Bowers IRENE K. DyMKAR

631 NortH CENTRAL AVE. Counsel of Record

Cuicaco, IL 60644 300 W. Apams STREET

(773) 379-9262 Suite 330

Cuicaco, IL 60606-5107

(312) 345-0123

Counsel for Petitioners

August 30, 2007

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, in light of the Court’s decision in Morse v.

Frederick, _ U.S. ____, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (June 25, 2007),

the Seventh Circuit erred in applying the standard in

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) for school-

sponsored speech to petitioner students’ personal non-

disruptive speech protesting the manner in which a school

election had been administered.

\d

ii

RULE 14.1(B) STATEMENT

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose

judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

Plaintiffs-Appellants and Petitioners: Michael D. Brandt,

Rebecca L. Darugar, and Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of

themselves and all others similarly situated. These parties are

no longer minors, so they are not appearing by their parents.

Defendants-Appellees and Respondents: Board of

Education of the City of Chicago, Chris N. Kotis, Janice M.

Rosales, Christine Laughlin, and Mary Clancy.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CTR ET ioc vio.e ve coeur cee ene i

RULE 14.10) STATOMENT .w cc cic uesees ii

TAREE CH CON os oe bv cecnteaesdss . iii

TABLE OP AUTIROUITORS qn cock evcchcdeues v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ....... 1

GS ay era ee l

IC cb. beet iba we 2

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE .. 2

SUATORGINE GE ERUUE GARE oe ita wecterern 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...... 9

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE CONFLICT

BETWEEN THE DECISION OF THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT IN THIS CASE AND THE DECISION

OF THIS COURT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK,

__ US. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (JUNE 25, 2007).

A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Applied

the Kuhimeier Standard to Petitioner Students’

Nondisruptive Political Protest That Occurred

6 ee 10

iV

B. As in Tinker, Petitioner Students Were

Engaged in “Pure Speech,” with the T-shirt

Message Being That the Election Had Been a

PO Wee A CR ea Re ET EO RS

C. Petitioners’ Speech Was Not Disruptive and

Thus Was Protected, According to Zinker. . .

D. School Administrators Had Engaged in

Prohibited Viewpoint Discrimination. .....

E. Petitioners’ Damages Were Quantifiable and

Substantive, Not Minuscule as the Seventh

TRIS SEF oeaeapthi Mer ree SNe ee Panne

I tic tLe a ee te ee

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Order of the 7th Circuit denying

Se Cs ic TE ose a ie ee Cee es

Appendix B: Decision of the 7th Circuit (Feb. 20,

CE ras Sh ee a eee eee

Appendix C: Decision of the U.S. District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois granting in part and

denying in part defendants’ bill of costs (May 8,

ko 5 oe a ce ee a ee a ee 162

Appendix D: Memorandum Opinion and Order of the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

14

15

16

TE: SO OE 5b eed son ee kes 22a

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois v. Doe,

See es PE a bw sw ehce wee ele es 1, 19

City of Watseka v. Ill. Public Action Council,

796 F.2d 1547 (7" Cir. 1986), judgment aff'd 479

Se EE a ke os ae be ee 17, 18

Crue v. Aiken,

Se ee ee tT CM. POO) 6k cc ccc vc ene bees 18

Elrod v. Burns,

ee a ee ED 5k hou 6028 ke CAs ee 17

Giules v. Marineau,

361 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied _iU'S.

__, 127 5. Ch. HO4 Gane @, 2007) .... 11, 15, 17

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,

ee a, Ce oo oo Ko ook ees 9, 10, 11, 12

Morse v. Frederick,

__ US... kar S. CA. 2618 Game 25,

Texas v. Johnson,

ot Be ek a ane ae 12

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comm. Sch. Dist.,

er Rh Ree kc ke bee beeen passim

vi

Virginia v. Black,

Pe <cvneceeeedee Ce eee eee 14

Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

4 NG 8 ee ee eee 15

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

4 RS | Sr rrr eee 2

Eve oh eh ae ee eee eeu eke ee ean 2

fe EE aE ea arte are wet 2

re re Sn ere ae ee 2

Re ee eee ee passim

Src Sc, SE OW OS oo co ee Kea vcetan ewe 2

Rules

Chicago Public School’s Uniform Discipline Code Rule

l

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Michael D. Brandt, Rebecca L. Darugar, and

Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, respectfully request that the United States

Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari, summarily vacate

the opinion and judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and remand the case to said

Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of this Court’s

decision in Morse v. Frederick, U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct.

2618 (June 25, 2007). See, e.g. , Board of Trustees of the

Univ. of Illinois v. Doe, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit, dated April 2, 2007, denying rehearing and rehearing

en banc is reprinted in the appendix herein as App. la.

The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, dated February 20, 2007, is officially

reported as Brandt v. Board of Education of the City of

Chicago, 480 F.3d 460 (7" Cir. 2007), and is reprinted in the

appendix herein at App. 2a - 15a.

The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States

District Court, dated May 8, 2006, regarding costs is not

officially reported and is reprinted in the appendix herein at

App. 16a - 2la.

The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the United States

District Court, dated March 13, 2006, regarding summary

judgment is officially reported as Brandt v. Board of

Education of the City of Chicago, 420 F. Supp. 2d 921

2

(N.D.IH., 2006), 2 ~ ts reprinted in the appendix herein at

App. 22a - 53a.

JURISDICTION

Original jurisdiction in the United States District Court

was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Jurisdiction in

the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was based upon

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s

decision on February 20, 2007. Rehearing and rehearing en

banc by the Court of Appeals was denied on April 2, 2007.

On June 22, 2007, Justice Stevens ordered that the time for

filing this petition for writ of certiorari be extended to August

30, 2007.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

Constitution of the United States, Amendment I:

Congress shall make no law _ respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress

of grievances.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV,

Section I:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

3

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the spring of 2003, petitioners were 14-year-old eighth

graders in the gifted program at Beaubien School, a Chicago

public elementary school that houses approximately 1000

students. The eighth grade class at Beaubien in 2003 consisted

of 72 regular program students and 27 gifted program

students, 24 of whom opted to participate in this class action

lawsuit. R200-16, p63; CA7 App. B-4, #1.' The school has no

history of violence or gang activity and is recognized as one

of the safest schools in the entire Chicago Public School

system. R167-8, p21; R200-16, p63; CA7 App. B-3, #17; CA7

App. B-6, #5.

In February 2003, the annual election for an eighth grade

class shirt was held at Beaubien School. Approximately 30

entries for the contest were hung in a hallway for

consideration. One of the entries was drawn and submitted by

petitioner Michael D. Brandt. Brandt said that his drawing

was intended to be a silly, goofy-looking cartoon kid, making

light fun of the fact that supposedly bright eighth graders were

moving on to higher education. R200-], pp109, 115; CA7

App. B-3, #3.

' In this Petition, “R” refers to the docket documents in the District

Court. “CA7 App” refers to the Appendix originally filed with the

Court of Appeals.

4

Prior to the voting, the gifted class had agreed that they all

liked Brandt’s design, and there was a consensus that they

would all vote for his entry. The gifted students reasoned that,

if they all voted for Brandt’s design and the regular students’

72 votes were split among all 30 entries, there was a high

probability that Brandt’s design would win. The students’

understanding was that the shirt with the most votes would

win. R200-1, pp114-115; CA7 App. B-3, #1.

After the voting was completed, the teacher conducting

the election told the gifted class that the results of the election

were “too close to tell” and that there would have to be a re-

vote between the top three shirts, one being Brandt’s design.

The gifted class was immediately suspicious that the election

process had been subverted, because counting votes and

determining which shirt had won should not be particularly

difficult. Furthermore, the teacher refused to disclose the

actual vote count. After the re-vote, a design other than

Brandt’s was declared the winner. Once again, the vote count

was not disclosed. R200-1, p112-115; CA7 App. B-3, #2.

Within a week of the disputed election, respondent Chris

N. Kotis, the principal, got wind of the fact that the gifted

class was talking about protesting the outcome of the election

by making and wearing a shirt with Brandt’s design on it.

Kotis told Assistant Principal Mary Clancy, also a respondent,

to investigate the situation; she reported back that the gifted

students believed that there had been election improprieties

and that their shirt had won. R200-16, pp44-45, 48-49; CA7

App. B-3, #9. Shortly thereafter, Clancy and Kotis told the

gifted students that making or wearing a shirt with Brandt’s

design would be disrespectful of the principal’s authority and

would result in student suspensions because it was not the

official shirt. R200-1, pp118-120, 124, 136, 140.

5

The eighth grade gifted students decided that they would

go ahead and make a shirt with Brandt’s design as a protest of

the election process. During March 2003, the students

collected the money among themselves to pay for production

of the shirt. Every one of the 27 students in the eighth grade

gifted class purchased a shirt with Brandt’s design. R200-1,

pp123, 136. However, because of the principal’s threats of

suspension, the students decided to wait two weeks, until

April 1, 2003, to wear the shirt for the first time. That date

was picked because it was a schoolwide standardized testing

date. The gifted students’ reasoning was that school

administrators would not be inclined to suspend them on a day

when the administration would benefit from their normally

high test scores. R200-1, p136; CA7 App. B-3, #6.

The main difference between Brandt’s design for the

eighth grade contest and the design of the shirt actually

produced for the April 1, 2003, protest was the addition of

“Gifties 2003" to the back of the shirt. The decision to add

the word “gifties” was not made until immediately before the

shirts were actually produced. The purpose was to adopt and

embrace the nickname that the entire school had long used for

gifted students and to identify the gifted class as the one that

had been cheated in the election. R200-1, pp135, 219-220;

CA7 App. B-3, #5.

On April 1, 2003, 19 of the 27 members of the eighth

grade gifted class wore the shirt with Brandt’s design to

school. R200-1, pp140-14]. Upon learning of the situation,

Principal Kotis told the class that they werc in violation of the

Chicago Public School’s Uniform Discipline Code Rule 2-5,

for “failing to abide by school rules and regulations” and for

“disobeying authority.” R200-1, p143; CA7 App. B-4, #15;

CA7 App. B-10; CA7 App. B-11.

6

As part of the disciplinary process on April 1, 2003, the

assistant principal made conference calls to each of the gifted

students’ parents, advising them of their child’s misconduct

and further advising them that additional violations of the

Uniform Discipline Code would result in an out-of-school

suspension of five - seven days. CA7 App. B-4, #17-19; R200-

3, p7. Between April 1 and May 12, 2003, the students

refrained from wearing the shirt at issue out of fear of the

threatened suspension. On May 12, 2003, 13 of the gifted

students wore the shirt at issue to school for the second time.

Michael Brandt’s mother had been assured by an attorney for

the Board of Education that the students would not be

suspended or punished by being confined to their homeroom

if they wore the shirt. Nevertheless, on that date, all of the

gifted students were again confined to their homeroom for the

entire day by respondents. R166, #99 Response; R200-1,

pp150-152; R200-16, p135.

Between May 12, and May 22, 2003, one or more

students from the gifted class wore the shirt at issue each day.

On each of those days, the entire gifted class was confined to

its homeroom for the entire day and there were additional

penalties as well. Each day the students were confined to their

homeroom, the entire class was deprived of regularly

scheduled physical education classes, science labs and

computer labs, and prohibited from participating in any after-

school programs. CA7 App. B-3, ##11, 12. The gifted

students were required to eat their lunches in their homeroom

instead of the cafeteria with the rest of the school. CA7 App.

B-3, #12. In addition, students were required to cover the

shirts, turn them inside out, or take them off to go to the

washroom. R200-1, pp206-207; R200-16, p99. Disciplinary

charges unrelated to the t-shirt controversy were brought in

retaliation against some of the students and petitioner Brandt

faced a disciplinary hearing that resulted in a two-day

7

suspension. R200-1, p96; R200-16, pp136, 147-149, 157-158;

R200-17, p29.

At the District Court level, petitioners spent a

considerable amount of time and resources defusing

respondent Kotis’ false allegations that he had repeatedly

confined the gifted students for entire school days because he

was concerned for the safety of the gifted students at the

hands of the regular students. Petitioners’ position has always

been that the principal’s fabrication of a safety issue out of

whole cloth for the purpose of allowing him to punish

students he believed were defying his authority was itself

evidence of the principal’s knowing violation of the law, such

that he should not be entitled to qualified immunity.

Despite his claims of a serious ongoing safety situation at

the school, the principal had never notified or involved the

counselors, social workers or psychologist, who had offices

in the school. CA7 App. B-3, #15. The school psychologist

testified that he was aware of no issues between the gifted and

regular programs at Beaubien. CA7 App. B-3, #19. The

principal admitted he had never held any school assemblies to

address any of the claimed problems with the students

themselves (CA7 App. B-3, #28) and that he had made no

effort to identify any particular students that might be prone

to violence. R200-18, p13. The Department of Safety and

Security, which had an officer at the school, had not been put

on notice of any issue of student safety. R167-8, ppll, 21,

26. Finally, no student safety issues had ever been brought to

the attention of the parents or the Local School Council,

which met monthly and was attended by many parents.

Appendix B-3, ##16, 28, 29; Appendix B-6, ##8-10, 17.

Based on the principal's allegations of a serious safety

situation, his supervisor, respondent Janice M. Rosales,

8

decided to call in the Crisis Intervention Team. R200-19, p89.

The team had been to Beaubien twice before when there had

been deaths at the school. R200-17, p7. The team came to the

school on May 21, 2003, and within ten minutes of talking to

each class determined that there was absolutely no safety

problem at Beaubien. R167-10, pp58, 74; CA7 App. B-3, #18;

CA7 App. B-9. The Crisis Team confirme- what the parents

and students had been saying all along, and, after their visit,

the students were allowed to wear their shirts without

restriction or incident. CA7 App. B-5, ##14, 15.

This case was filed in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois on February 5, 2004, alleging

violation of the students’ First Amendment right to freedom

of speech, requesting declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and

damages. The case was subsequently certified as a class

action. On March 13, 2006, the District Court granted all

defendants’ motions for summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds, after finding that there was sufficient

proof of a First Amendment violation. On May 8, 2006, costs

were taxed against the plaintiffs in the amount of $10,556.20.

An appeal was filed in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit of both the summary judgment and the

judgment of costs. The judgments of the District Court were

affirmed on February 20, 2007, on the ground that there was

no First Amendment violation, but also with a finding that

there was no substantiation in the record of any safety issue.

Petitioners’ motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was

subsequently denied.

9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE CONFLICT

BETWEEN THE DECISION OF THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT IN THIS CASE AND THE DECISION OF

THIS COURT IN MORSE V. FREDERICK, _U.S. __,

127 S. Ct. 2618 (JUNE 25, 2007).

This is a student speech case. The medium of

communication was the display of a student-designed and

student-made t-shirt protesting the school administrators’

manipulation of a school election process. App. 4a. The

message was intended to comment on a political (small “p”)

and social issue important to the eighth grade petitioners. The-

message was directed at school administrators and fellow

students, an audience that the District Court found would

understand the communication. App. 36a - 37a. The shirt did

not contain any profane or inappropriate language or images.

The shirt did not cause any disruption of the school

environment, nor was there any reasonable fear of a

disruption. App. 3a, 13a. Despite the innocuous nature of the

message, the student protestors were severely punished over

an extended period by confinement, deprivation of regular

instruction and school activities, and suspensions.

This Court, in Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __, 1278S.

Ct. 2618 (June 25, 2007), recently reaffirmed the viability of

the long-standing Tinker doctrine that school speech may not

be suppressed unless there is reasonable evidence that the

speech will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and

discipline of the school.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). The facts of

this case, as Summarized above, demand a Tinker application.

The Seventh Circuit erroneously used a Kuhimeier analysis

10

for school-sponsored speech in this case instead. See

Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Of additional

concern, the Seventh Circuit broadened Kuhlmeier’s

suppressive reach beyond “legitimate pedagogical concerns”

to a realm that includes all “inappropriate” speech, as

determined by the school authorities’ “exercise of discretion.”

App. 12a.

This is a simple case that demands a Tinker analysis.

When student speech is suppressed and punished for no

legitimate reason, the effects ripple far and wide to those who

merely observe the controversy and absorb the lesson to be

quiet in the face of authority. This case should be summarily

reversed and remanded to the Seventh Circuit for review

consistent with the Court’s opinion in Morse.

A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Have Applied the

Kuhimeier Standard to Petitioner Students’

Nondisruptive Political Protest That Occurred on

School Premises.

This Court held in Morse that Kuhlmeier did not control

that case “because no one would reasonably believe that

Frederick’s banner bore the school’s imprimatur.” Morse,

127 S. Ct. at 2627. The same principle applies here. No one

to whom the teen-aged students’ message was directed could

have reasonably believed that the shirt was school-sponsored.

The students designed and paid for the shirts themselves,

outside of school. The entire school knew it was not the

official class shirt, and the banning the t-shirt by respondents

because it was not an “official” shirt implicitly proves that

they too did not consider the shirt to be school-sponsored.

Kuhlmeier applies only to the regulation by administrators

of school-sponsored speech. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627, 2637

11

(ALITO, J., concurring); Giules v. Marineau, 361 F.3d 320,

325 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.

3054 (June 29, 2007). The Kuhlmeier Court upheld the

authority of a principal to bar the school’s newspapers from

publishing articles about divorce and teenage pregnancy.

Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at 266. The speech in Kuhimeier was the

paradigm of school-sponsored speech: the newspaper was part

of a curriculum, it was funded by the school district, its

articles were subject to pre-publication review, and the

principal could fairly be regarded as its publisher. Jd. at 262-

263.

The Kuhlmeier Court explained the difference between the

speech in Tinker and the articles in Kuhlmeier:

The question whether the First Amendment requires

a school to tolerate particular student speech - the

question we addressed in Tinker - is different from the

question whether the First Amendment requires a

school affirmatively to promote particular school

speech. The former question addresses educators’

ability to silence a student’s personal expression that

happens to occur on the school premises. The latter

question concerns educators’ authority over school-

sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and

other expressive activities that students, parents, and

members of the public might reasonably perceive to

bear the imprimatur of the school.

Id. at 270-271 (emphasis added).

Because Kuhimeier is not applicable to the case at hand,

the Seventh Circuit should not have engaged in a discussion

of the school’s “basic educational mission.” Relying on

Kuhimeier, however, the Seventh Circuit stated that “a school

12

need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with the

‘basic educational mission.’” The Seventh Circuit said

further: “Prohibiting children from wearing to school clothing

that contains ‘inappropriate’ words or slogans places

appropriately broad limits on the school authorities’ exercise

of discretion to maintain a proper atmosphere.” App. 12a.

Thus, not only is the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Kuhimeier

misplaced, but the Court also expanded the definition of “a

basic educational mission” to exclude anything that school

administrators deem to be inappropriate.

“A basic educational mission” cannot be defined so

broadly that it prohibits any speech that is at odds with

opinions of school officials. The basic educational mission

argument “can be manipulated in dangerous ways.” Morse,

127 U.S. at 2637 (ALITO, J., concurring). Some public

schools have defined their educational missions as including

the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held

by the public officials and school administrators, which gives

public school authorities “a license to suppress speech on

political and social issues based on disagreement with the

viewpoint expressed,” thus striking at the very heart of the

First Amendment. /d.

B. As in Tinker, Petitioner Students Were Engaged in

“Pure Speech,” with the T-shirt Message Being That

the Election Had Been a Fraud.

This Court found that the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” sign was a

“cryptic” message. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624. However,

there was never any doubt the Court was dealing with speech.

In the case at hand, the District Court, applying Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-405 (1989), found that (1) the

symbolic t-shirt contained a particularized message, that is, a

protest of the t-shirt design election, and (2) it was likely that

13

the message would be understood by its viewers, that is, the

other students and the school administration, and was

therefore speech. App. 33a - 37a. Only the Seventh Circuit

found that this case did not involve speech at all, stating:

“The t-shirt is not protected speech, and we are doubtful that

it became so by being a vehicle for eighth graders to protest

the outcome of a t-shirt contest.” App. 13a.

Considering how the school administration viewed

petitioners’ message, it seems ironic that the symbol of the

shirt was powerful enough to elicit strong sustained response

from the school administration, yet the Seventh Circuit panel

held that the shirt was devoid of meaning sufficient to be

protected by the First Amendment. Had this truly been a shirt

that was devoid of meaning, the administration would have

ignored it and not spent three-and-a-half months in a show-

down with the teen-agers, disciplining them, banning the

shirt, suspending the protest leader, and disrupting the routine

and schedule of a substantial number of teachers and students

in the entire school.

As in Tinker, the teen-aged petitioners here were engaged

in “pure speech.” The context of the expression is important.

The medium of communication in Tinker, after all, was only

“a band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide.”

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. In and of itself, the black piece of

cloth contained no message. The wearing of the cloth as an

armband, however, with the understanding of its meaning and

message by those who wore the cloth and those who

witnessed the wearing, was a powerful symbol of protest of

the Vietnam War. Similarly here, wearing the t-shirt that had

won the election to protest the shady circumstances of the

vote and re-vote and the nondisclosure of the vote tally

projected a clear message of protest that the rest of the school,

including the school administrators, understood.

14

Petitioners further assert that their t-shirt warranted

protection because this was not merely speech, but political

speech. Even the Seventh Circuit recognized that the

designing and wearing of the shirt was “to protest what they

considered a rigged election” (App. 4a), an inherently

political statement. This Court affirms in Morse that political

speech is “at the core of what the First Amendment is

designed to protect.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626, quoting

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). In their

concurring opinion in Morse, Justices Alito and Kennedy state

that they join in the opinion of the Court on the understanding

that the opinion “provides no support for any restriction of

speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any

political or social issues.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636.

C. Petitioners’ Speech Was Not Disruptive and Thus

Was Protected, According to Tinker.

The Tinker Court took care to acknowledge “the special

characteristics of the school environment,” by permitting

school officials to prohibit student speech if that speech

“would substantially interfere with the work of the school or

impinge upon the rights of other students.” 393 U.S. at 509.

In order to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule,

the Court cautioned that, “in our system, undifferentiated fear

or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the

right.” Jd. at 508; Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.

The Seventh Circuit in the case at hand agreed with

petitioners that the teen-agers’ passive protest did not result in

any danger or disruption at Beaubien School, other than the

administrators’ overreaction to the protest. The opinion

brushes aside the argument of school administrators that there

was a potential of danger occasioned by the t-shirt

controversy, stating: “The gravity of those tensions [between

15

students at Beaubien] is not revealed by the record.” App. 3a.

Also: “[Tjhe evidence of tensions between the two groups of

student [sic] was not developed, and so cannot be a ground

for upholding the defendants’ action.” App. 13a. Of note,

after three months of controversy, the Board called in a Crisis

Intervention Team (as a face-saving maneuver, petitioners

contend), that concluded in short order that there was no

safety issue. Thereafter, the students were finally allowed to

wear the shirts without punishment. App. 4a - Sa. No

disruption ensued. Because petitioners’ protest speech was not

disruptive, then, pursuant to the holding in Tinker, it was

protected. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d at 330.

D. School Administrators Had Engaged in Prohibited

Viewpoint Discrimination.

The Seventh Circuit failed to recognize that the school

administrators were engaging in viewpoint discrimination

when they banned the message of the shirt. Viewpoint

discrimination occurs when “the government has adopted a

regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement

with the message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In Morse, this Court reaffirmed

Tinker’s warning that schools may not prohibit student speech

because of “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and

unpleasantness that always accompany an _ unpopular

viewpoint.” Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626, citing Tinker, 393

U.S. at 508, 509. Suppressing speech based on the viewpoint

expressed “strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.”

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (ALITO, J., concurring).

In the case at hand, once the design lost the vote (or so

respondent school officials said) and the protest was being

planned and executed around the design, the design was

forbidden. The Beaubien principal created a rule specifically

16

targeting petitioners’ design because of the protest and in

doing so was intentionally suppressing the students’ message

that the election was a fraud and their design should have

won. The principal knowingly violated the students’ First

Amendment rights because he disagreed with their message.

His action was viewpoint discrimination.

.

E. Petitioners’ Damages Were Quantifiable and

Substantive, Not Minuscule as the Seventh Circuit

Held.

This Court in Morse painstakingly and seriously analyzed

the First Amendment rights of Joseph Frederick without

minimizing or trivializing his damages. In contrast, the

Seventh Circuit in the case at hand held that the damages of

the 24 teen-agers in this case are “minuscule to the point of

nonexistent,” and consequently there was no violation of the

First Amendment. App. 7a.

This conclusion of the Seventh Circuit ignores the fact

that, because of summary judgment, petitioners were never

given the opportunity to fully develop at trial the damages

aspect of their case, where an expert, a school administrator,

and the school psychologist would have testified that

respondents’ actions adversely affected the students’ entire

learning process for half of a school year. Petitioners were

barred from making and wearing their t-shirt for more than

three months, from respondents’ first threats of suspension in

the middle of February 2003, until May 23, 2003, when the

students were finally allowed to wear their shirts without fear

of punishment. R200-17, p16. During that period, they were

barred from protesting school policy and their free speech was

curtailed. This Court has held that “the loss of First

Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods\of time,

17

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).’

The injury in this case is quantifiable. In addition to the

stifling of free speech, all members of the class were charged

with and penalized for violation of the Board of Education’s

Uniform Discipline Code; all members of the class were

confined to their homeroom on at least 10 separate days,

depriving them of computer labs, science labs and physical

education instruction, and all after-school activities, as well as

denying access to bathrooms and the cafeteria; all members

of the class were regularly ridiculed, demeaned and

intimidated for daring to stand up to authority; various

members of the class were defamed through issuance of false,

retaliatory, and back-dated incident reports; and the leader of

the protest, petitioner Brandt, was suspended on false charges

in retaliation for his role in the protest. CA7 App. B-3, ##11,

12; CA7 App. B-1; R200-1, p96.

In City of Watseka v. Ill. Public Action Council, 796 F.2d

1547, 1559 (7 Cir. 1986), judgment aff'd 479 U.S. 1048

* The Seventh Circuit said that since only “a particular means of

protest” was forbidden, there was no constitutional violation. App.

10a - lla. To suggest that appeals to the principal to change his

decision were a reasonable substitute for an attempt to inform the

entire school of the unfairness of the election process misses the

point, not to mention the fact that other routes to communication

were also suppressed. Petitioners were told that if they continued

circulating their petitions regarding the shirt among students, they

would be suspended, and so would the students signing the

petitions. App. 26a - 27a; CA7 App. B-3, #10. The Second Circuit

in Guiles v. Marineau, rejected a “no harm, no foul contention” of

the school administrators resulting from censorship of part of the

student’s t-shirt message. 361 F.3d at 331.

18

(1987), a First Amendment case, the Supreme Court affirmed

the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that deprivation of a

particular right in particular circumstances is a compensable

injury that might justify “substantial money damages.” This

Court has not limited compensatory damages, “even in cases

where the monetary value of the particular injury is difficult

to ascertain.” Jd. In Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 677 (7"

Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court

decision, which included an award of $1000 to each plaintiff,

plus attorneys’ fees, against the school for barring plaintiffs

from discussing the Chief Illiniwek controversy with potential

student athletes.

19

CONCLUSION

Petitioners Michael D. Brandt, Rebecca L. Darugar, and

Aldo S. K. Van Enck, on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated, respectfully request that the United States

Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari, summarily vacate

the opinion and judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and remand the case to said

Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of this Court’s

decision in Morse v. Frederick, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.

2618 (June 25, 2007). See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the

Univ. of Illinois v. Doe, 119 §. Ct. 2016 (1999).

Respectfully submitted,

Irene K. Dymkar

Counsel of Record

300 West Adams Street, Suite 330

Chicago, IL 60606-5107

(312) 345-0123

James L. Bowers

631 North Central Ave.

Chicago, IL 60644

(773) 379-9262

Counsel for Petitioners

August 30, 2007

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 06-1999, 06-2573

[Filed April 2, 2007]

MICHAEL D.:BRANDT, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY

OF CHICAGO, et al.,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

)

Before Hon. Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge. Hon. Kenneth

F. Ripple, Circuit Judge. Hon. Ann Claire Williams, Circuit

Judge.

ORDER

On March 19, 2007, plaintiffs-appellants filed a petition

for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc. All the

judges on the original panel have voted to deny the petition,

and none of the active judges has requested a vote on the

petition for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore

DENIED.

2a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 06-1999, 06-2573

[Filed February 20, 2007]

MICHAEL D. BRANDT, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY

OF CHICAGO, et al.,

)

)

)

)

v. )

-.

)

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

)

POSNER, Circuit Judge. This class action suit was brought

on behalf of 24 eighth graders at a Chicago public school

called the Beaubien Elementary School. They were

disciplined for conducting a protest that they claim is

privileged by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment,

held applicable to state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The suit was dismissed on the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, so we state the facts as favorably to the

plaintiffs as the record permits.

Every year the eighth graders choose a class T-shirt.

Among the designs submitted for the 2003 contest was

3a

plaintiff Michael Brandt’s; his mother is the plaintiffs’ lead

counsel. Brandt was in the school’s program for gifted

students. The program draws from all over Chicago. The

other students in the school, the ones who are not in the gifted

program, are local. There are some tensions between the

“gifties,” as the students in the gifted program call

themselves, and the “tards,” a derogatory term (short for

“retards”) sometimes applied by gifties to the other students.

The gravity of those tensions is not revealed by the record.

The gifties had agreed to vote en bloc for Brandt’s T-shirt

design, and when it Icst they smelled a rat, and submitted a

protest to the principal. Some 30 designs in all had been

submitted. There were 27 gifties and 72 other students in the

eighth grade; and so if the 27 voted en bloc for one design

and the votes of the 72 other students were scattered across

the 29 other designs, the gifties’ design would be almost

certain to obtain a plurality of the votes. Yet when the ballots

were counted, the teacher in charge of the contest announced

that the vote was too close to call. She ordered a revote

limited to three of the designs, one of them Brandt’s; and with

only two competing designs, the gifties’ bloc-voting scheme

failed. The teachers’ practice, it turned out, was to conduct a

revote among the top three contenders if the initial vote did

not produce a winner with a majority, not merely a plurality,

of the votes cast. The winning design unfortunately is not in

the record, but apparently it was inoffensive, with an animal

and a cap depicted on the front of the shirt and the names of

all the eighth graders listed on the back.

The gifties were indignant. When the teacher refused to

explain her runoff system or how the votes had been counted

and what the tally had been, Brandt added the words “Gifties

2003” to the back of his T-shirt design; shirts incorporating

the design were produced; and the gifties wore those shirts in

4a

school instead of the T-shirt that had won the contest. (A

photocopy of the shirt is appended to this opinion.) They did

this both to protest what they considered a rigged election and

because they thought that Brandt’s design represented the

gifties better than the winning (and therefore the official) class

T-shirt did.

In wearing the Brandt shirt, the gifties were acting in

defiance of the principal of the Beaubien school, who having

gotten wind of their plan had told them that wearing the shirt

would show disrespect for him and create a risk to the good

order of the school, presumably because it might offend the

students who had voted for the winning T-shirt, although he

did not make this point explicitly. An assistant principal

warned that if they wore the shirt the gifties would be

violating a provision (since changed) of the Chicago Public

Schools’ Uniform Discipline Code that prohibited students

from wearing clothing with “inappropriate words or slogans,”

and would be punished.

Despite this warning, the gifties went ahead with their

plan. But, craftily, they first wore the forbidden shirt on the

day when city-wide tests were administered to public school

students. They figured the schoo! would not take disciplinary

action against them on that day, lest that lower the school’s

average test scores (they are gifties, after all). But on each of

nine subsequent days, the shirt was worn by at least one gifty,

and each time all the gifties were punished by being confined

to their homeroom, as a result missing gym, science lab,

computer lab, and after-school activities. Eventually the

school summoned a “Crisis Intervention Team” from the

Board of Education, and it investigated and decided that the

wearing of the Brandt T-shirt by the gifties was not a safety

problem (that is, would not lead to violent altercations with

Sa

the other eighth graders), so the gifties were permitted to

resume wearing the shirt.

The plaintiffs seek both equitable relief and damages.

Originally they sought an injunction against the “inappropriate

words or slogans” rule and an order that the school expunge

any record of the disciplinary action taken against the gifties.

Not only were the gifties ultimately permitted to wear the

Brandt T-shirt, but the rule has been changed; and so the

plaintiffs have dropped their request for an injunction. In any

event, they’re all now in high school, having graduated from

the eighth grade years ago; their quest to enjoin the rule is

therefore moot. Board of School Commissioners v. Jacobs,

420 U.S. 128, 129, 95 S. Ct. 848, 43 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1975)

(per curiam); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318-19,

94S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974) (per curiam); Stotts

v. Community Unit School District, 230 F.3d 989, 991 (7th

Cir. 2000). They could not invoke the exception, to the

normal rule of mootness, for claims that are “capable of

repetition, yet evading review,” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

124-25, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), because it

requires that the claim be repeatable by the same plaintiff.

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49, 96 S. Ct. 347,

46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975) (per curiam); Murphy v. Hunt, 455

U.S. 478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982)

(per curiam); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir.

2003); Stotts v. Community Unit School District, supra, 230

F.3d at 991; Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School Board,

336 F.3d 211, 216-18 (3d Cir. 2003)—a condition rarely

satisfied other than in abortion and election cases, though it

could be satisfied in a school case, see Jones v. Illinois Dep’t

of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F.2d 724, 727-28 (7th Cir.

1982), if for example the suit was over something that had

happened at the end of one school year but could happen

again at the end of the next year and the plaintiff would still

6a

be in school then. But the condition is impossible to satisfy in

this case, as none of the plaintiffs will ever again be gifties or

subject to the superseded clothing rule.

The school has retained no records of the discipline meted

out to the gifties over the T-shirt incident, which would seem

to moot the other equitable claim, the claim that the record of

their discipline be expunged. But they are asking that the

school authorities be forbidden to tell anyone that the gifties

were punished for wearing the Brandt T-shirt. There is a

touch or irony in the claim, since by filing this suit the

plaintiffs have spread far and wide the information concerning

their conduct and the school’s response to it; the suit has

attracted a fair amount of publicity. See www.google.com/

search?hl = en&q = gifties + beaubien + brandt, visited Jan. 26,

2007. There is further irony in requesting in a suit based on

freedom of speech an order curtailing the defendants’ freedom

of speech. Suppose the principal of Beaubien Elementary

School decided to write a memoir in which he planned to

discuss the T-shirt brouhaha— maybe it was the most exciting

episode in his career as a school administrator. Should he be

enjoined from doing that? He could be enjoined, as it is a

myth that all injunctions against free speech are barred by the

First Amendment as “prior restraints,” see, e.g., Madsen v.

Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-66, 114 S.

Ct. 2516, 129 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1994); Snepp v. United States,

444 U.S. 507, 510 n. 3, 100 S. Ct. 763, 62 L. Ed. 2d 704

(1980) (per curiam); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh

Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90, 93

S. Ct. 2553, 37 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1973); Near v. Minnesota,

283 U.S. 697, 715-16, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931);

United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.

Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979), but

only if there was evidence that the defendants were likely to

conduct a vendetta against the gifties—were trying to block

Ta

their access to college or to good jobs by spreading the word

that they had been punished for wearing an unofficial T-shirt.

The plaintiffs do not claim to have any evidence of so

improbable a plot.

Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Any defendants

who in a spirit of vengeance spread the word that the gifties

were disciplined will be vulnerable, at least in principle, to a

suit for defamation unless they make clear that the discipline

that they imposed had been disapproved by the Board of

Education’s Crisis Intervention Team. Conceivably they

would be vulnerable to being sued for committing other torts

as well, such as depicting a person in a false light or

interfering with his actual or prospective contracts, for

example with a possible employer. Of course no college or

employer would be likely to be much concerned with mild

discipline meted out to an eighth grader. An air of unreality

clings to every aspect of this litigation.

But we must trudge on, and consider the plaintiffs’

damages claim. Even multiplied by 24 (the number of

members of the plaintiff class), the damages sustained by an

eighth grader as a consequence of missing phys ed and labs on

nine days out of an entire school year are minuscule to the

point of nonexistent; and de minimis non curat lex (the law

doesn’t concern itself with trifles) is a doctrine applicable to

constitutional as to other cases. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

651, 674, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977); United

States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2005);

Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1992);

Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763, 767-68 (7th

Cir. 1972). It is true that nominal damages can be awarded

for a constitutional violation, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

266-67, 98S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978); Calhoun v.

DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 2003), as is

8a

sometimes true for other intentionally tortious conduct as

well. E.g., Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d

644, 693 N.E.2d 510, 514, 230 Ill. Dec. 381 (Ill. App.

1998); Sanchez v. Clayton, 117 N.M. 761, 877 P.2d 567, 573

(N.M. 1994). But such an award presupposes a violation of

sufficient gravity to merit a judgment, even if significant

damages cannot be proved; and this is not such a case. In any

event there has been no constitutional violation.

The plaintiffs do not argue that the Brandt T-shirt is itself

protected speech. They are right not to make such an

argument. Although freedom of speech and of the press—the

relevant terms in the First Amendment—are often loosely

paraphrased as “freedom of expression,” and clothes are

certainly a way in which people express themselves, clothing

as such is not—not normally at any rate—constitutionally

protected expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507-08, 89 S. Ct.

733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969); Blau v. Fort Thomas Public

School District, 401 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2005) (12-year-

old “Amanda Blau’s desire to wear clothes she ‘feel[{s] good

in,’ aS opposed to her desire to express ‘any particular

message’ “ held not to be protected speech). Self-expression

is not to be equated to the expression of ideas or opinions and

thus to participation in the intellectual marketplace. Nor is the

kind of “message” that clothing normally sends—“I am rich,”

“I am sexy,” “I have good taste,” and so forth— intended to

contribute to competition in that marketplace.

Of course there can be speech printed on clothing,

political symbols such as a swastika or a campaign button

affixed to clothing, and masks and costumes that convey a

political or other message. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491

U.S. 397, 404, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989),

and cases cited there. Merely wearing clothes inappropriate

9a

to a particular occasion could be a political statement. For that

matter, parading in public wearing no clothing at all can,

depending on the circumstances, convey a political message.

White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 460-61 (4th

Cir. 2005); United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise,

230 F.3d 649, 658-59 (3d Cir. 2000); Huffman v. United

States, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 470 F.2d 386, 399 (D.C.

Cir. 1971). But the picture and the few words imprinted on

the Brandt T-shirt are no more expressive of an idea or

opinion that the First Amendment might be thought to protect

than a young child’s talentless infantile drawing which

Brandt’s design successfully mimics. Otherwise every T-shirt

that was not all white with no design or words, with not even

the manufacturer’s logo or the owner’s name tag, would be

protected by the First Amendment, and schools could not

impose dress codes or require uniforms without violating the

free speech of the students, a proposition sensibly rejected in

the Blau case.

The plaintiffs argue, however, that when worn as part of

a protest against the election to choose the official class shirt,

the Brandt T-shirt became protected expression. That is not a

ridiculous argument. If Irish people were forbidden to wear

green on St. Patrick’s Day, a natural form of protest would be

to wear green on that day. Cf. Clark v. Community for

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 303-05, 104 S. Ct.

3065, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984). But the importance of context

cuts both ways. The protesters in this case are schoolchildren.

They are privileged schoolchildren in a school that contains

a majority of nonprivileged children. They insist that unless

their T-shirt is adopted by the entire eighth grade, they will as

it were secede, and flaunt their own T-shirt. They do not

recognize the principal’s authority or the legitimacy of the

school’s procedures for determining the winner of contests.

10a

We have our doubts whether the constitutional privilege

to engage in protest demonstrations in the name of free speech

extends to eighth graders. The plaintiffs’ lawyer told us at

argument that the clause extends at least as far down the

maturity ladder as a 10-year-old (a proposition in profound

tension with Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School,

98 F.3d 1530, 1538-39 (7th Cir. 1996), and Baxter by Baxter

v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736-38 (7th Cir.

1994), and cases cited there), and that the object of the protest

is irrelevant. It could be, she acknowledged, a protest against

the brand of ketchup served in the school cafeteria. She insists

that the school’s authority to prevent or punish such protests

must be decided by a jury asked to strike the balance between

free speech and school order. If she is right, then from now

on public school policies and practices will be determined in

this circuit by juries rather than by school authorities. Cf.

Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273,

108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988).

But we need not go so far as to deny that eighth graders

have any First Amendment rights, for it is plain that the

school did not violate the amendment by attempting, albeit

with distinctly limited success because of the decision of the

Crisis Intervention Team, to exclude the Brandt T-shirt from

the school. We must be precise about the right that the

plaintiffs sought to vindicate by protesting. It is the right to an

explanation by the school for how the election to pick an

official eighth-grade T-shirt was conducted. We do not think

eighth graders have such a right. For the school to hold an

election for class T-shirt and rig the results, as the plaintiffs

suspect happened, is probably not a recommended educational

practice, but it is not an infringement of any legal right.

in any event, it was not the protest as such that was

forbidden, but merely a particular means of protest. The

lla

gifties were free to protest in more conventional, less

potentially disruptive, ways than by the wearing of the Brandt

T-shirt. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 293, 120

S. Ct. 1382, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000) (plurality opinion);

One World One Family Now v. City & County of Honolulu,

76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1996). They did so—they

petitioned the principal and made a presentation to the Local

School Council at the principal’s urging and were not

punished for doing so. Their parents amplified the gifties’

voices of protest. With many routes of communication open

to the gifties, the closing of the T-shirt route inflicted the most

minimal of possible injuries, if injury at all (as we doubt), to

the First Amendment.

Public schools have an interest of constitutional dignity in

being allowed to manage their affairs and shape their destiny

free of minute supervision by federal judges and juries.

Academic freedom, “a special concern of the First

Amendment.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,

602, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967), is not just the

freedom of teachers, school authorities, and to an extent

students to express ideas and opinions. “It includes the

authority of the university to manage an academic community

and evaluate teaching and scholarship free from interference

by other units of government, including the courts.” Hosty v.

Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30, 123 S. Ct. 2325,

156 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2003); Regents of University of Michigan

v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S. Ct. 507, 88 L. Ed. 2d

523 (1985); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District

515, 759 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1985). Most of the cases

that honor that interest involve colleges and universities, but

their principle applies with equal if not greater force to lower

schools as well, see, e.g., Chicago Board of Education v.

Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2003), and

12a

implies that the principals of those schools have discretion to

regulate students’ conduct in order to maintain an atmosphere

conducive to learning. E.g., Vernonia School District 47] v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d

564 (1995); Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp.,

supra, 26 F.3d at 737. Just weeks ago we held that an

elementary-school teacher has no “constitutional right to

introduce his own views on the subject but must stick to the

prescribed curriculum—not only the prescribed subject

matter, but also the prescribed perspective on that subject

matter.” Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474

F.3d 477, 2007 WL 162833 at *1 (7th Cir. 2007). So if,

contrary to what we said earlier, the Brandt T-shirt is

“speech,” still we must not ignore the Supreme Court’s

admonition that “a school need not tolerate student speech that

is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’ “

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, supra, 484 U.S. at

266.

Prohibiting children from wearing to school clothing that

contains “inappropriate” words or _ slogans places

appropriately broad limits on the school authorities’ exercise

of discretion to maintain a proper atmosphere. Tighter limits,

expressed in precise rules, would prevent them from

responding to novel challenges well illustrated by the present

case. Whatever the Crisis Intervention Team may have

thought with the benefit of hindsight, the principal of the

Beaubien school had to decide before the T-shirt protest, and

therefore with less information than the Crisis Information

Team had, whether to permit the gifties to protest the election

results by flouting the official T-shirt. After having reasonably

decided not to permit such conduct, he had to decide whether

to allow the gifties to defy his prohibition, and he again

reasonably decided that the imposition of mild discipline was

necessary in order to affirm his authority and maintain order.

13a

He may, of course, have been wrong. But the existence of

discretion implies a license to make mistakes. An exercise of

Official discretion is reversible by a court only when the

official can be said to have abused his discretion, implying

conduct not merely mistaken in retrospect but unreasonable.

E.g., Zhou v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 677, 679-80

(7th Cir. 2002); Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.

1996). The principal (himself an alumnus of the eighth grade

at Beaubien Elementary School) did not abuse his discretion.

We do not accept all the arguments that the defendants

press on us. They say that the Brandt T-shirt had to be banned

because it ridicules students with disabilities—the right hand

of the cartoon figure is deformed. It is more likely that Brandt

simply can’t draw very well. Nevertheless the principal would

have been justified in banning the wearing of the shirt had he

reasonably believed that it would be offensive to disabled

children. But that was not his ground. The defendants also

contend that there was a danger that the non-gifted children

would be incensed by the gifties’ refusal to accept the result

of the election, and violence might result; there apparently

had been a shoving incident between a “gifty” and a “tard” a

week before the gifties started wearing the Brandt T-shirt. But

the evidence of tensions between the two groups of student

was not developed, and so cannot be a ground for upholding

the defendants’ actions.

There is, however, ground enough, as we have explained.

The T-shirt is not protected speech, and we are doubtful that

it became so by being a vehicle for eighth graders to protest

the outcome of a T-shirt contest. If protected at all, it was not

immune from reasonable regulation by the school authorities.

The plaintiffs argue finally that the district judge should

not have ordered them to pay the defendants’ costs. There is

14a

no possible merit to the argument. They have made the

defendants jump through a number of costly hoops in this

protracted litigation and must bear the usual consequences of

failed litigation.

AFFIRMED.

15a

[SEE FOLDOUT PAGES FOR

7TH CIRCUIT OPINION

EXHIBITS A AND B]

16a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

No. 04 C 904

[Filed May 8, 2006] .

Brandt )

)

vs. )

)

Board of Education )

)

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Defendant’s Bill of Costs is granted in part and denied in part.

The Court awards the Board $10,556.20 in costs.

STATEMENT

On March 13, 2006, the Court granted Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment lawsuit. As such, Defendant Board of Education

for the City of Chicago is a prevailing party. Before the Court

is the Board’s Bill of Costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d). Defendant seeks a total of $10,688.40,

which constitutes subpoena fees, court reporting transcription

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fees, and photocopying expenses. For the following reasons,

the Court awards the Board $10,556.20 in costs.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that “costs

other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the

prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). Recoverable costs include: (1) clerk

and marshal fees; (2) fees for necessary transcripts obtained

for use in the case; (3) witness fees and expenses; (4) fees for

copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5)

docket fees; and (6) compensation for court-appointed experts

and interpreters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; see also Weeks v.

Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd. , 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir.

1997). There is a strong presumption in favor of awarding

costs to the prevailing party under Rule 54(d). Majeske v. City

of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court,

in its discretion, may tax costs against the non-prevailing

party when the cost imposed is recoverable and the amount

assessed is reasonable. /d.

Plaintiffs first take umbrage with the fact that the Bill of

Costs was filed only by Defendant Board of Education and not

the other Defendants in this lawsuit. As the Board explains,

the other Defendants did not file a Bill of Costs because they

did not incur costs. Further, the Board elucidates via affidavit

that the costs were incurred by the Board alone. As such,

Plaintiffs’ argument is baseless. The Court thus turns to the

Board’s Bill of Costs.

I. Depositions Costs - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)

At the outset, the Court acknowledges that the Board

provided photocopies of all deposition transcripts to Plaintiffs

at their request saving Plaintiffs substantial court reporter

fees. Presently, the Board requests deposition costs in the

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amount of $9,723.60 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). In

support of this request, the Board has submitted a detailed

itemization of these costs and the related invoices.

Plaintiffs argue that certain depositions were not submitted

in connection with any motion, and therefore, these costs

cannot be taxed. Deposition charges, however, may be

awarded if the deposition appears reasonably necessary in

light of the facts known at the time of the deposition. See

Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir.

2003); Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445,

455 (7th Cir. 1998). Further, the introduction of a deposition

at trial is not a prerequisite for a finding that it was necessary

to take a deposition. Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d

526, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). The two deponents at issue were

identified by plaintiffs as persons with knowledge relevant to

the complaint. One of the deponents was a class member.

Accordingly, these depositions were reasonably necessary in

light of the facts known at the time of the depositions.

Under the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 54.1(b),

the costs of the transcript or deposition shall not exceed the

regular copy rate established by the Judicial Conference of the

United States. The applicable rate pursuant to the Judicial

Conference for depositions conducted after February 28,

2003, is $3.30 per page per ordinary transcript. See Vigortone

Ag Prods., Inc. v. PM Ag Prods. Inc., No. 99 C 7049, 2004

WL 1899882, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2004).

Here, although none of the taxed depositions cost over

$3.30 per page, Plaintiffs contend - without citation to any

legal authority - that the attendance and overtime fees should

be disallowed. Plaintiffs’ argument fails because the Court has

discretion to award attendance fees under Section 1920(2) as

part of the reasonable and necessary costs in obtaining a

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deposition transcript. See Held v. Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1002

(7th Cir. 1998). Further, overtime charges that were incurred

to accommodate the schedules of Plaintiffs and their witnesses

are proper. See Finchum, 57 F.3d at 534. Last, Plaintiffs have

made no showing that these itemized costs are not reasonable.

During the course of this litigation, the Court granted

Defendants’ motion to take more than the ten depositions

allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(A). Now

Plaintiffs request that the Court reduce the depositions costs

because the Board has submitted a Bill of Costs including

fourteen transcripts. The Court declines Plaintiffs’ request,

especially in light of the fact that the Board provided

photocopies of all deposition transcripts to Plaintiffs saving

Plaintiffs substantial court reporter fees.

In sum, the Court awards $9,723.60 under Section

1920(2) because these costs are allowable and reasonable. See

Majeske, 218 F.3d at 824.

Il Subpoena Fees - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)

The Board also seeks costs associated with the subpoena

fees for Steven Herzog, Jerry Schecter, and Diane Haak

pursuant to Section 1920(1). Service fees may not exceed

amounts charged by the United States Marshal Service which

is $45.00 per hour and $0.365 per mile. See Collins v.

Gorman, 96 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 28

C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3). Here, the costs were under $45.00 per

person, and thus are reasonable. Plaintiffs, however, contend

that Defendants Laughlin and Clancy issued these subpoenas

and the Board did not respond to this assertion. Accordingly,

it appears that these subpoena costs were not incurred by the

Board, and thus are not recoverable under the circumstances.

TA,

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I11.Photocopying Costs - 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)

Next, the Board seeks $832.60 in photocopying costs

under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), which allows a judge to tax as

costs “[flees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Courts interpret this

section to mean that photocopying charges for discovery and

court copies are recoverable, but charges for copies made for

attorney convenience are not. See Mcliveen v. Stone

Container Corp., 910 F.2d 1581, 1584 (7th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiffs object to this award because the Board is seeking

$.20 per page. This rate is within the reasonable rate range of

$.10 to $.20 per page. See Harkins v. Riverboat Serv., Inc.,

286 F.Supp.2d 976, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see also Helzing v.

Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 02 C 9408, 2004 WL 2608287,

at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.16, 2004); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v.

Karsten Mfg. Corp. , No. 99 C 2785, 2003 WL 1720066, *11

(N.D. Ill. March 31, 2003); Figueroa v. City of Chicago, No.

97 C 8861, 2000 WL 1036019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 20,

2000).

The Board has also submitted the charge of $66.00 for the

transcription of a court hearing on May 16, 2004. See SK

Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 852 F.2d 936, 944

n. 9 (7th Cir. 1988) (costs of pretrial proceeding transcripts

are taxable as costs under Rule 54(d)). Plaintiffs contend that

the Board has failed to attach an invoice for these charges. As

the cancelled check attached to the Bill of Costs reflects, this

transcription was done by this Court’s court reporter, Joseph

Rickhoff. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ argument as to this cost fails.

In sum, the Court, in its discretion, awards the Board

$832.60 in photocopying costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).

21a

IV. Conclusion

Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that because

this case was “close” and “difficult,” the Board’s costs should

be denied. See Association of Mexican-American Educators v.

California, 231 F.3d 572, 592 (9th Cir. 2000). As the Board

correctly asserts, Plaintiffs brought an Amended Complaint

against five Defendants and lost on all counts. Further,

Plaintiffs’ “difficult” argument is not supported by the law of

this Circuit.

The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that because

they are minors, there is a great economic disparity between

the parties. As Plaintiffs are well aware, the parents of minor

Plaintiffs Michael Brandt, Rebecca Darugar, and Aldo Van

Enck filed the Amended Class Action Complaint on behalf of

their children and all others similarly situated against the five

Defendants. Finally, Irene Dymkar, one of the lead attorney

for the Plaintiffs, is the mother of one of the minor Plaintiffs.

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APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 04 C 0904

{March 13, 2006]

MICHAEL D. BRANDT, minor, by his parent,

STEPHEN M. BRANDT; REBECCA L.

DARUGAR, minor, by her parent, LORI

DARUGAR; ALDO S. K. VAN ENCK, minor,

by his parent, SARA KATAYANAGI VAN

ENCK;; on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY

OF CHICAGO; CHRIS N. KOTIS, individually

and officially; JANICE M. ROSALES,

individually and officially; CHRISTINE

LAUGHLIN individually and officially;

MARY CHANCY, individually and officially,

Defendants.

ee ee ee ee ne ee oe ae ee ee ee a ee, ee,

23a

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

The parents of minor Plaintiffs Michael Brandt, Rebecca

Darugar, and Aldo Van Enck filed the present Amended Class

Action Complaint on behalf of their children and all others

similarly situated against Defendants Board of Education of

the City of Chicago, Chris Kotis, Janice Rosales, Christine

Laughlin, and Mary Clancy. In their Amended Complaint,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their First

Amendment right to free speech. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Before the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Partial

Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rules

When determining summary judgment motions, the Court

derives the background facts from the parties’ Northern

District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 statements. The Local

Rules provide parties with specific details as to how litigants

in the Northern District of Illinois should approach summary

judgment motions and responses. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)

requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material

facts as to which the moving party contends there is no

genuine issue.” Local Rule 56. 1(b)(3) requires the nonmoving

party to admit or deny every factual statement proffered by

the moving party and to concisely designate any material facts

that establish a genuine dispute for trial. The parties’

statements must contain short numbered paragraphs including

24a

references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other

supporting materials. Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs.,

Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004); Malec v. Sanford,

191 F.R.D. 581, 583-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

It is not appropriate to set forth additional facts in a Rule

56.1(b)(3) response statement, instead, the parties must

include any additional facts in a separate Rule 56.1 statement.

See Ammons, 368 F.3d at 817. Responses that are not

contested are deemed admitted. Brengeticy v. Horton, 423

F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680,

683 (7th Cir. 2003). Statements and responses that do not

properly cite to the record are subject to the Court’s

discretion as to their admissibility. See Brasic v. Heinemann’s

Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court also

reminds the parties that when citing to the record in their legal

memoranda, they are required to cite to the numbered

paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1 Statements and not to the

underlying record. See Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 586. With these

principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this

case.’

' In their Reply Brief, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ use of their

Joint Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Facts in response to Plaintiffs’

Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is prohibited by the local

rules. Plaintiffs have not cited any legal authority supporting this

argument and the Court has found none. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’

allegation that they cannot adequately respond to Defendants’ Joint

Rule 56.1 Statement in this context is disingenuous because

Plaintiffs have already responded to Defendants’ statement in detail.

(See R. 166-1, Pls.” Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt.)

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II. Relevant Facts

A. Parties

Plaintiffs are a certified class of 24 of the 27 students who

were in the eighth grade class in the Regional Gifted Center

Program at Jean Baptiste Beaubien Elementary School

(“Beaubien School”) in Chicago, Illinois, during the 2002-03

school year. (R. 134-1, Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. P 1; R. 140-1,

Defs.’ Joint Rule 56.1 Stmt. P 2.)

Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago

(“Board”) is a body politic and corporate in charge of

overseeing the management and operations of a system of free

schools known as the Chicago Public Schools. (Pis.” Stmt. P

2.) Defendant Chris Kotis is the Principal of Beaubien

Elementary School and was the Principal during the relevant

time period. (/d. P 3; Defs.’ Stmt. P 3.) The Board of

Education has adopted a rule that specifically authorizes

principals to exercise control over the school in all areas

authorized by Illinois statute. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 9.) The Uniform

Discipline Code (“UDC”), a series of rules and regulations

that categorize different types of rule infractions and prescribe

a range of consequences for each type of infraction, further

defines Principal Kotis’ role. (Defs.” Stmt. P 10.) For

example, the UDC requires students to dress in a manner that

neither disrupts the educational process nor poses a safety

hazard. (Jd. PP 13, 22; R. 160-1, Pls.” Stmt. Add’] Facts P

30.)

Defendant Mary Clancy was the Gifted Program

Coordinator at Beaubien School during the 2002-03 school

year. (Pls.’ Stmt. P 6; Defs.’ Stmt. P 4.) Defendant Christine

Laughlin was the Assistant Principal at Beaubien School

during the 2002-03 school year. (Pis.’ Stmt. P 5; Defs.’ Stmt.

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P 5.) Defendant Janice Rosales was the Chicago Public

Schools Area Instructional Officer (“AIO”) for Region One,

Area One, which encompassed Beaubien School during the

2002-03 school year. (Pls.’ Stmt. P 4; Defs.’ Stmt. P 6.)

B. The T-Shirt

Beaubien School held an annual contest among the eighth

grade students to determine the design for the class T-shirt.

(R. 35-1, Am. Compl. P 32.) In the second semester of

school year 2002-03, students submitted twenty designs for

the Class of 2003 T-shirt election. (Jd. P 33; Defs.’ Stmt. PP

55, 57, 59.) The eighth grade students did not choose Plaintiff

Michael Brandt’s T-shirt design for the official class T-shirt.

(Id.) Michael Brandt’s T-shirt design contained the image of

a boy giving a thumbs-up signal with one hand with the other

arm ending in a handless nub from which a leash extended to

a dog labeled the school mascot “Beaubien Bulldog.” (R. 137-

1, Kotis’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2; Am. Compl. P 34.) The boy

is wearing a shirt that says, “Beaubien Class of 2003,” and

pants bearing a grid design. (/d.) After losing the T-shirt

election, Plaintiffs added the word “gifties” to the back of the

shirt. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 5.)

C. The Petition

Principal Kotis prohibited the gifted students’ T-shirt

design as an alternative graduation shirt because a fair vote

was conducted and the alternative T-shirt did not win the

election. (Defs.” Stmt., Ex. A, C. Kotis Dep., at 56.)

Thereafter, the gifted students drafted a petition for the other

students to sign concerning their T-shirt. (Am. Compl. P 38c;

Defs.’ Stmt, Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67-70.) The petition

indicated that the regular students had no objection to anyone

wearing the alternative T-shirt. (Am. Compl. P 38c.) At her

27a

deposition, Rebecca Darugar testified that “the purpose of the

petition was so that we could have and wear these T-shirts.”

(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67.) Rebecca

Darugar also testified that they were going to give the petition

to the Local School Council to show that they had support for

their alternative T-shirt design. (Jd. at 68.)

D. Local School Council Meeting

Also after Principal Kotis prohibited the alternative T-shirt

design, he met with the gifted class and expressed his

concerns about the anger over Michael Brandt’s losing design.

(Defs.’ Stmt. P 70 & Ex. A, Kotis Dep. at 68.) Kotis then

invited the students to address the issue at the Local School

Council meeting scheduled for the following week on

February 19, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 70.) Thereafter, Michael

Brandt addressed the Local School Council. (R. 166-1, Pls.’

Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. P 71.) At his deposition, Michael

Brandt testified that when he addressed the Local School

Council, he stated that his T-shirt design better represented

the gifted students because the T-shirt “was made available

to the gifted students, people who I had spent combined total

of thousands of hours in close contact with. We felt that us

having our own shirt better represented us than having a shirt

shared with people with who [sic] we hardly knew.” (Defs.’

Stmt., Ex. M., M. Brandt’s Dep. at 116-17.) Michael Brandt

also told the Local School Council that the gifted class

thought they had won the T-shirt election and felt frustrated

that the school did not explain to them how the voting was

conducted. (Plis.’ Resp. to Defs.” Stmt. P 71.) In the end, the

Local School Council supported Principal Kotis’ decision to

prohibit the alternative T-shirts. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 75.)

28a

E. Wearing the T-Shirts to School

Despite .the; T-shirt’s prohibition, the gifted students

produced the “gifties” T-shirt and 19 of the gifted students

wore the T-shirts to school on April 1, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P

76; Pls.’ Stmt. P 14.) Gifted student Nicholas Haak testified

that it was “kind of ironic that we were doing it on April

Fools’ Day as an April Fools’ joke.” (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. DD,

N. Haak Dep., at 70-71.) Principal Kotis did not know that

the students were wearing the T-shirts on April 1, 2003 until

the Gifted Program Coordinator Mary Clancy informed him.

(Defs.’ Stmt. P 80.) Principal Kotis told the gifted students

that they were in violation of the Uniform Disciplinary Code

for failing to abide by the schools rules or regulations. (Pls.’

Stmt. P 16.) The rule at issue was Beaubien School Dress

Code No.2, which states in relevant part: “Clothing with

inappropriate words or slogans is not permitted.” (Jd. P 9.)

Thereafter, Kotis told Clancy to contact the students’ parents

to tell them that the students had violated a school disciplinary

code for wearing the “gifties” T-shirts to school. (Defs.’

Stmt. P 71; Pils.’ Stmt. P 18.)

F. Tensions Between Gifted and Regular Students

Sometime between April 1 and April 4, 2003, Principal

Kotis told Area Instructional Officer Rosales that hostilities

existed between the gifted and regular students at Beaubien

School. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 93; Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 14.)

After that, Rosales instructed Kotis to let her know if there

were any further problems. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 94.) Rosales

testified that Kotis “would be monitoring the behavior of the

children and encouraging the children to -- working with the

teachers in order to improve the conditions of safety and

security of the children, because safety was what I was

29a

concerned about.” (Defs.’ Stmt. P 114, Ex B., Rosales Dep.

at 46.)

At their depositions, Kotis, Clancy, and Laughlin also

testified that tensions existed between the gifted and regular

students. (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. R., Kotis Dep. at 9-11; Ex. N,

Clancy Dep. at 41, 47, Ex. O, Laughlin Dep. at 12-14.) Kotis

testified that there had been at least one physical altercation

between a gifted and regular student at Beaubien School.

(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. R., Kotis Dep. at 9-11; Ex. A, Kotis Dep.

at 83.) In addition, Laughlin testified that there had been

incidents after school between gifted and regular students.

(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. O, Laughlin Dep. at 12-14.) Moreover,

Clancy testified that she thought that the gifted students’

design on the T-shirt insulted students with physical

deformities. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 5.)

A number of gifted students wore the T-shirts again on

May 12, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 99.) Shortly thereafter, a

gifted student wrote Rosales a letter about the tension between

the gifted and regular students at Beaubien School. (Defs.’

Stmt. P 104, Ex. C, Rosales Decl. PP 8, 10.)

G. Possible Solutions to T-Shirt Problem

Meanwhile, on May 15, 2003, Kotis and Rosales held a

meeting to work with the parents to create possible solutions

to the T-shirt controversy. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 125.) Rosales

testified that at the end of the May 15 meeting, they presented

choices to the parents and students, including “that they could

have their -- I believe that they could have their T-shirt, keep

it as it was and stay in their classroom and receive all of their

classes, 100 percent of their program in their classroom....”

(Id. P 126; Ex. B, Rosales Dep. at 77.) Rosales further

testified that the students could also cover the word “gifties”

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on the T-shirt and then they would have access to anywhere

in the school. (/d.; Ex. B, Rosales Dep. at 77.) The next day,

Rosales presented the options to the gifted class. (Jd. P

126(a)). After that, at least one gifted student wore the banned

T-shirt to school every day until May 23, 2003. (Defs.’ Stmt.,

Ex. Z, Darugar Dep. at 42.)

H. Crisis Intervention Team

Consequently, Rosales contacted the Crisis Intervention

Office at the Board of Education’s central office concerning

the T-shirt controversy at Beaubien School. (Defs.’ Stmt. P

127.) The Crisis Intervention Team included a facilitator and

Beaubien School’s counselor, social worker, and

psychologists who worked with both the regular and gifted

students. (/d. P 128.) From May 19 until 23, 2003, the Crisis

Team spoke directly to each of the three eighth grade classes,

including the gifted class. (Id. P 129; R. 167-1, Pls.’

Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report.) The Crisis

Intervention Team’s report stated in pertinent part: “In the

General Education classroom (300, 310) the students were not

concerned that the students in the gifted program were

wearing a shirt different from the class shirt. They were

concerned that a consequence of the T-shirt issue would be

loss of their Eighth Grade Yearbook, loss of their class trip to

Springfield, and potential disruption to graduation.” (R. 167-

1, Pls.” Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report, at 1.) The

report also stated that the crisis team met with Principal Kotis

to convey the sentiments of the students, and consequently

stated that “Mr. Kotis was relieved to find that wearing the T-

shirt with “Giftee” on the back did not appear to jeopardize

student safety. He decided that as long as student safety was

not being compromised, the students could wear the T-shirt

which was in question.” (/d.) Accordingly, after the Crisis

Intervention Team’s evaluation, Principal Kotis allowed the

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students to wear the “gifties” T-shirts to school. (Defs.’ Stmt.

P 133.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court

construes all the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of

the party against whom the motion under consideration is

made. Schneider v Sentry Group Long Term Disability Plan,

422 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). The party seeking

summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of

any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265

(1986).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ prohibition of the

“gifties” T-shirt denied the gifted students their First

Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiffs further argue that

the relevant school disciplinary and dress codes constituted an

unconstitutional prior restraint of the gifted students’ free

speech. Also, Plaintiffs challenge these codes as

unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Finally, Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants retaliated against the gifted students for

32a

wearing the “gifties” T-shirts after the school administration

had specifically prohibited the T-shirts.’

The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and

expressive conduct, and generally prevents the government

from proscribing such activities. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,

Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.

Ed. 2d 305 (1992). First Amendment protections of speech

and expressive conduct, however, are not absolute. Virginia

v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d

535 (2003).

“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special

characteristics of the school environment, are available to

teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either

students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom

of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v.

Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 514, 89 S. Ct.

733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). Since the Tinker decision, the

Supreme Court has held that schools cannot punish students

for expressing their personal views at school “unless school

? Plaintiffs have failed to respond to Defendants’ arguments that

their First Amendment retaliation claim is without merit.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have waived their retaliation claim. See

Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”); see also

United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“We have repeatedly made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped

arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent

authority, are waived (even where those arguments raise

constitutional issues)”), Volovsek v. Wisconsin Dep't of Agr. Trade

& Consumer Protection, 344 F.3d 680, 689 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2003)

(complete absence of legal argument waives consideration of

claim).

33a

authorities have reason to believe that such expression will

‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge

upon the rights of other students.’” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.

Ed. 2d 592 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).

Furthermore, a school need not tolerate student speech that is

inconsistent with the school’s basic educational mission even

though the First Amendment would protect similar speech or

expressive conduct outside of the school setting. Kuhlmeier,

484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,

478 U.S. 675, 682, 685, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d

549 (1986)) (public school students’ First Amendment rights

not automatically coextensive with rights of adults in other

settings).

I. Protected Speech

Defendants contend that the gifted students’ wearing of the

T-shirts to school was not an attempt to express any

particularized message, such as a political affiliation or a

protest of social issues, and that the message did not have the

likelihood of being understood by those who viewed it. The

First Amendment protects conduct, symbols, and non-verbal

speech which express ideas or convey a message that would

likely be understood by the viewer. Clark v. Community for

Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104 S. Ct. 3065,

3069, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984); Spence v. State of

Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41

L.Ed.2d 842 (1974). For example, in Tinker, the Supreme

Court recognized that the expressive nature of students

wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War was

protected speech. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06. Other

examples of protected expressive conduct include the burning

of the American flag during a political demonstration at the

1984 Republican National Convention, see Texas v. Johnson,

34a

491 U.S. 397, 406, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989),

and the taping of a peace sign on an American flag in protest

of the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State tragedy. See

Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.

Here, Plaintiffs contend that regardless of the content of

the design, the T-shirt was made and worn as a symbol of

protest. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the T-shirt conveyed

the message that “we were cheated in the election and this is

the shirt that should have won.” (R. 164-1, Pls.” Mem. In

Opp. to Kotis’ Mot. For Summ. J., at 2.)° Plaintiffs bear the

burden of demonstrating that the First Amendment protects

their expressive conduct. See Community for Creative Non-

Violence, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5; Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind.,

377 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2004). Specifically, “although it

is common to place the burden upon the Government to

justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the

obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly

expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment

even applies. To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that

all conduct is presumptively expressive.” Community for

Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.

> Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the T-shirts were “art” and

that “it goes without saying that art is expression protected by the

First Amendment” is waived because Plaintiffs fail to develop their

argument with supporting evidence and pertinent legal authority.

See Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir.

2005) (“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”); see

also United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515, 536 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“unsupported and undeveloped arguments are waived.”) (citations

omitted).

35a

A. Particularized Message

The Court thus evaluates whether the “gifties” T-shirt and

the wearing of the T-shirt had a “particularized message.” See

Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296.

Many of the gifted students’ statements about the T-shirt and

their wearing of the shirt to school do not indicate that they

were protesting the T-shirt election. For example, Michael

Brandt, the designer of the T-shirt, stated that the T-shirt was

“supposed to look silly, meaning, it was suppose to look

funny. It’s suppose to be ironic that we were graduating

eighth grade, making [sic] step into higher education and, at

the same time, it’s got a very goofy looking kid -- to have a

very goofy looking kid on the front of a shirt that stands for

the milestone of going into higher education was just ironic.”

(Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. M., M. Brandt’s Dep. at 109-10.) Other

gifted students -- Rebecca Darugar and Aldo Van Enck --

testified that the T-shirt was made to represent the gifted

class. (Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 114-15;

Defs.’ Stmt, Ex. UU, A. Van Enck Dep. at 17.) Further,

gifted student Nicholas Haak testified that when they wore the

T-shirts for the first time it was “kind of ironic that we were

doing it on April Fools’ Day as an April Fools’ joke.” (Defs.’

Stmt., Ex. DD, N. Haak Dep., at 70-71.)

On the other hand, Rebecca Darugar also testified that the

gifted students wore the T-shirts in protest of Kotis’ decision

that forbade them from wearing the T-shirts to school. (Defs.’

Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 58.) Another gifted

student, Daniel Schmidt, testified that they made and wore the

T-shirts to taunt the administration, although he did not

explain why the gifted students were taunting the

administration in the first instance. (Defs.’ Stmt. P 64, Ex.

CC, D. Schmidt Dep. at 49.) Furthermore, Michael Brandt

told the Local School Council that the gifted class thought

36a

they had won the T-shirt election and felt frustrated that the

school did not explain to them how the voting was conducted.

(Pis.” Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. P 71.)

Although Defendants argue that the students simply wore

the T-shirts in defiance of the administration’s prohibition of

the shirts, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable

inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Accordingly,

based on the facts discussed above, especially Michael

Brandt’s complaint to the Local School Board, Plaintiffs have

established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether the students wore the T-shirts in protest of the T-shirt

election.

B. Likelihood of Being Understood

The Court next turns to the second half of the relevant

inquiry, namely, whether viewers would understand the T-

-Shirt’s particularized message that the gifted students were

protesting the T-shirt election. See Community for Creative

Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 296. Plaintiffs have set forth

evidence that the gifted students circulated a petition about the

“gifties” T-shirt, although Plaintiffs never explain what the

petition actually said or provide the Court with a copy of the

petition. (See Defs.’ Stmt., Ex. Z, R. Darugar Dep., at 67.)

In any event, Plaintiffs also point to evidence that because the

Gifted Program Coordinator interviewed two regular students

about the T-shirts, other students were aware of the gifted

students’ claim that the election had been unfair. (Pis.’ Stmt.

Add’! Facts P 9.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that because

Defendants confined the gifted students to their home room

whenever anyone in the class wore the T-shirts, other

students knew of the gifted students’ protest. (id. PP 11, 12.)

37a

Again, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences

in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court is required

to do at this procedural posture, they have established that

there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the other

students understood the particularized message about the T-

shirt election.

C. Basic Educational Mission

Although there is a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether the wearing of the T-shirts to school expressed a

particularized message understood by its viewers, the Court

must also determine whether the gifted students’ speech was

inconsistent with Beaubien School’s basic educational

mission. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Fraser, 478

U.S. at 685). Specifically, students “cannot be punished

merely for expressing their personal views on the school

premises ... unless school authorities have reason to believe

that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work

of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.’”

Kuhimeier, 484 U.S at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).

Evidence in the record suggests that tensions existed

between the gifted and regular students and that some

incidents had occurred between gifted and regular students.

(Defs.’ Stmt. P 93; Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 14.) Also, there

were some safety concerns involved. (/d.) There is also

evidence that the design on the T-shirt may have insulted

students with physical deformities. (Pls.’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P

5.) Furthermore, some of the regular students were upset that

the T-shirt controversy might disrupt their eighth grade

yearbook, their class trip to Springfield, and graduation. (R.

167-1, Pls.” Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team Report, at 1.)

Based on this evidence, there is a genuine issue of material

fact whether the producing and wearing of the T-shirts to

:

38a

school substantially interfered with the school’s work or

impinged upon the rights of other students.

II. Qualified Immunity

Nevertheless, the individual Defendants assert that the

doctrine of qualified immunity protects them from this

lawsuit. In general, qualified immunity shields government

Officials performing discretionary functions from civil

litigation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102

S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The goal of qualified

immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of government and

permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on

summary judgment.” Jd. Denying summary judgment any

time a material issue of fact exists as to the underlying

constitutional claim undermines the goal of qualified

immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct.

2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Accordingly, “where the

defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue

should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and

expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is

dispositive.” Id. at 200.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “if the law did

not put the [public official] on notice that his conduct would

be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is appropriate.” Jd. at 202. When determining

whether qualified immunity shields a public official from a

Section 1983 action, the Court undertakes a two-part inquiry.

Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005). The

Court’s first inquiry is whether the facts, viewed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that the individual

Defendants violated a constitutional right. /d. (citing Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201). If the facts comprise a constitutional

violation, the Court must determine whether the constitutional

39a

right was clearly established at the time of Defendants’

conduct. Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir.

2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs have established that

Defendants violated their First Amendment right to free

speech because a genuine issue of material facts exists as to

that question, the Court turns to the second qualified

immunity prong because failure to establish either prong is

dispositive. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. Under the

second inquiry, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that

their First Amendment rights were “clearly established.”

Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 742. To do so, Plaintiffs “must

demonstrate either that a court has upheld the purported right

in a case factually similar to the one under review, or that the

alleged misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a

constitutional right.” Id.

Plaintiffs heavily rely on Tinker to demonstrate the second

qualified immunity prong. In Tinker, two high school students

and one junior high student wore black armbands to school

“to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities and

their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and by

their example, to influence others to adopt them.” Jd. at 514.

The school administration subsequently prohibited the

armbands and suspended the students in violation of a school

policy after which the students brought a First Amendment

action in federal court. /d. at 504-05. Because the students’

conduct was not disruptive, more specifically, because there

was nothing in the record that established that the wearing of

the armbands “would substantially interfere with the work of

the school or impinge upon the rights of other students” the

Supreme Court concluded that the school could not prohibit

the students from wearing the armbands. /d. at 509, 514.

40a

Although Plaintiffs contend the facts in Tinker are

sufficiently similar to the case at hand, Plaintiffs’ reliance on

Tinker as clearly established law is not dispositive of the

Court’s inquiry because the Supreme Court has modified the

Tinker holding. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.Ed.2d

592 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.

675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). The

Seventh Circuit has articulated that since the Tinker decision,

“the Supreme Court has cast some doubt on the extent to

which students retain free speech rights in the school setting.”

Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir.

1994). Another Seventh Circuit panel recognized that

“Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the

teaching of civility and the inculcation of traditional moral,

social, and political norms may override student expression,

or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order

its educational priorities.” See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse

Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996). Because the

Supreme Court has modified the Tinker holding, Tinker alone

is not dispositive of the Court’s “clearly established” inquiry

as Plaintiffs suggest.

Thus, the Court must determine whether the alleged

misconduct constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional

right. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. The Court’s

“relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable [public official] that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202

(inquiry “undertaken in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition”); see also Hosty v.

Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc). In other

words, the Court looks to whether a reasonable public official

in the individual Defendants’ positions would have understood

4la

that his or her actions were unlawful in the factual situation at

hand. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107

S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (law at time of conduct

must have been “clear in relation to the specific facts

confronting the public official when he acted”); see also

Wernsing, 423 F.3d 742 (“contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right”). Although this is an

objective test, subjective factors are not ignored, such as the

information Defendants possessed at the time they prohibited

the alternative T-shirt. See Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d

692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. at 641).

Here, there is evidence in the record that there were

tensions between the regular students and the gifted students

and that Defendants had safety concerns as a result of these

tensions. (See Defs.’ Stmt. P 114, Ex B., Rosales Dep. at

46.) To remedy the situation, Kotis and Rosales attempted to

address the T-shirt controversy by meeting with the gifted

students and their parents, suggesting that the students talk to

the Local School Board, giving the students options of when

and how they could wear the T-shirts, and consulting a Crisis

Intervention Team. (Defs.’ Stmt. PP 70, 125, 127.) Although

Principal Kotis prohibited the wearing of the T-shirt and

restricted the gifted students to their home room if the

students wore the T-shirt to school, once the Crisis

Intervention Team concluded there were no safety concerns,

Principal Kotis allowed the students to wear the T-shirts

again. (R. 167-1, Pls.’ Appendix, Ex. D, Crisis Team

Report, at 1; Defs.’ Stmt. P 133.)

Under these circumstances, the contours of the gifted

students’ First Amendment rights would not be sufficiently

clear to a reasonable official that what he or she was doing

42a

violated those rights, especially because Defendants’

restrictions concerning the T-shirts took place in the

nonpublic setting of a school. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537

(“Speech in nonpublic forums is subject to significantly

greater regulation than speech in traditional public forums”).

Moreover, case law regarding student speech under the First

Amendment is nuanced, and thus the law is not as clear cut as

Plaintiffs argue. As the Seventh Circuit recognized “many

aspects of the law with respect to students’ speech, not only

the role of age, are difficult to understand and apply.” See

Hosty, 412 F.3d at 739. The Hosty Court further reasoned

that “public officials need not predict, at their financial peril,

how constitutional uncertainties will be resolved.” Jd.

These “constitutional uncertainties” in student speech are

illustrated by Plaintiffs’ confusion over the concept of

imprimatur. In Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court held that if

parents, students, and members of the public reasonably

perceive a student’s expressive conduct to bear the imprimatur

of the school, the school could censor the student’s conduct

as long as the school’s actions were reasonably related to

legitimate pedagogical concerns. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at

271-73. Plaintiffs argue that Kuhimeier is not controlling

because the school did not sponsor the “gifties” T-shirt. The

relevant inquiry, however, is whether the public, parents, and

other students would perceive that the T-shirt reflected the

school’s imprimatur, that is, that it appeared that the school

approved the T-shirt design. Here, it is undisputed that the

design of the “gifties” T-shirt included the words “Beaubien

Class of 2003" and “Beaubien Bulldog,” and thus the public,

students, and parents might reasonably perceive that the

“gifties” T-shirt was actually approved by the Beaubien

administration. Consequently, the Beaubien administration

was entitled to exercise greater control over this particular

type of student speech. See id. at 271.

43a

Accordingly, under the legal uncertainties concerning

First Amendment rights to free speech in the school setting,

the school administration’s prohibition of the gifted students’

T-shirt was not an obvious violation of the students’ First

Amendment rights. See Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 460. In

sum, a reasonable official in the individual Defendants’

position could not have known definitively whether the

prohibition of the T-shirts violated the gifted students’ First

Amendment rights. See Wernsing, 423 F.3d at 750. As such,

Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing that their

constitutional rights under the particular circumstances of this

case were “clearly established” at the time of the alleged

constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

at 640-41. Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields

Kotis, Clancy, Rosales, and Laughlin from Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment claims. The Court’s conclusion is further

supported by the decision in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.

308, 319-20, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), in which

the Supreme Court articulated that:

Liability for damages for every action which is

found subsequently to have been violative of a

student’s constitutional rights and to have caused

compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the

school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in

good faith in the course of exercising his discretion

within the scope of his official duties.... Denying any

measure of immunity in these circumstances would

contribute not to principled and fearless decision-

making but to intimidation. The imposition of

monetary costs for mistakes. which were not

unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances

would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious

school decisionmaker from exercising his judgment

independently, forcefully, and in a manner best

44a

serving the long-term interest of the school and the

students.

Id. at 319-20 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The

Court thus dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Kotis, Clancy,

Rosales, and Laughlin‘ in their individual capacities.

IfI. Monell Claim

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim against Kotis, Rosales,

Laughlin, and Clancy in their official capacities is a claim

against the Board of Education as a local governmental unit.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct.

3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444, 121 (1985) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55,

98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). In other words,

official capacity suits brought against individuals are “another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (citation

omitted). Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual

“ For an individual to be liable under Section 1983, she must have

caused or participated in the alleged constitutional violation. Pepper

v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus,

Plaintiffs must establish that the individual Defendants “acquiesced

in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional violation.”

Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003); see

also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc)

(Section 1983 does not create vicarious liability). The record does

not support the proposition that Defendant Laughlin caused or

participated in the prohibition of the “gifties” T-shirt. Thus, the

Court also dismisses Laughlin on the ground that she was not

personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment rights.

45a

Defendants in their official capacities are claims against

the Board and thus duplicative, the Court dismisses the

individual Defendants in their official capacities from this

lawsuit.

To state a constitutional claim against the Board, Plaintiffs

must establish that an official custom or policy caused a

deprivation of their First Amendment right to free speech. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; Sornberger v. City of Knoxville,

Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (under

Section 1983 government agency cannot be liable on theory

of respondeat superior). To demonstrate that an official

custom or policy caused the alleged violation of their First

Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must establish one of the

following scenarios: (1) the Board has an express policy that,

when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the

Board has a widespread practice that, although not authorized

by written law or express policy, is so permanent and well-

settled that it constitutes custom or usage within the force of

law; or (3) a person with final policymaking authority caused

the constitutional injury. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375,

379 (7th Cir. 2005).

A. Final Policymaking Authority

Plaintiffs argue that Principal Kotis was an individual with

final policymaking authority in the area of school conduct and

discipline, and therefore the Board is liable for Kotis’ conduct

under the third Monell scenario. Under Section 1983, an

individual’s status as a final policymaker is a question of state

or local law. Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765, 771 (7th

Cir. 2004); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). To

identify public officials with final policymaking authority, the

Court reviews state and local law, as well as custom or usage

46a

having the force of law. Killinger, 389 F.3d at 772 (citation

and quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs specifically contend that Principal Kotis is an

individual with final “decision making” authority in the area

of school conduct and discipline based on UDC Rule 2-5. (R.

165-1, Pls.” Mem. In Opp. to Board’s M. Summ. J., at 4.).

Plaintiffs, however, confuse “decision maker” with “final

policymaker.” Not every decision a public official makes

involves policymaking as required under the Monell

framework. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482. “The fact that a

particular official -- even a policymaking official -- has

discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,

without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an

exercise of that discretion.” /d. Instead, the public officer

“must be responsible for establishing final government policy

respecting such activity before the municipality can be held

liable.” Id. at 482-83.

Pursuant to the Board of Education Rules:

Principals of schools are the responsible

administrative heads of their respective schools and

are charged with the organization, supervision,

administration, and discipline thereof. They shall

establish and enforce such regulations, not contrary to

the Rules of the Board of Education, the Uniform

Discipline Code, or the regulations of the General

Superintendent of Schools, as in their judgment may

be necessary for the successful conduct of their

schools.

(Defs.’s Stmt. P 9, Ex. E, Bd. of Educ. Rules, Section 6-12.)

From the unequivocal language of Section 6-12 of the Board’s

Rules, principals in the Chicago Public Schools have the

47a

discretionary authority to make decisions contingent upon the

Board Rules, the UDC, and the regulations of the General

Superintendent of Schools. The Board’s Rules, however, do

not confer the authority for principals to make city-wide

policy decisions. See Killinger, 389 F.3d at 771 (“mere

authority to implement pre-existing rules is not the authority

to set policy”). That authority is left to the School Board. See

105 ILCS 5/10-20.5; see also Duda v. Board of Educ. of

Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059-

60 (7th Cir. 1998) (Board of Education has authority to

manage schools and adopt rules and regulations needed for

that purpose); Spinelli v. Immanuel Lutheran Evangelical

Congregation, Inc., 118 Ill.2d 389, 404, 113 Ill.Dec. 915,

515 N.E.2d 1222 (1987) (same). Consequently, Principals

Kotis is not a “final policymaker” as Plaintiffs claim.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend that because UDC Rule 2-

5 is unconstitutionally overbroad it provides the basis for

Principal Kotis’ policymaking authority. Specifically,

Plaintiffs argue that the disciplinary rule is “effectively and

actually a delegation by the Board of Education of

unconstitutional power and authority to any and all Chicago

Public School principals and administrators.” (R. 165-1, Pls.’

Mem. In Opposition to Boavd’s M. Summ. J., at 4.)° In

> Plaintiffs also argue that the disciplinary and dress codes

constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint of the students’ free

speech. Not only is Plaintiffs’ argument cursory and undeveloped,

Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ conduct constituted viewpoint

discrimination is simply not supported by the record. See Cornelius

v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 813, 105

S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (prior restraints in nonpublic

forums permissible when reasonable and viewpoint neutral);

Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006)

48a

general, a plaintiff may challenge rules, regulations, or laws

as facially unconstitutional under two theories -- the

overbreadth doctrine and the void for vagueness doctrine. See

Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 251

F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001). “The overbreadth doctrine

allows a plaintiff to ask that a law be struck down based not

on how it affects the plaintiff but on how it might be applied

to third parties not before the court.” Anderson v. Milwaukee

County, 433 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2006); see also

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908,

37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“statute’s very existence may cause

others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally

protected speech or expression” ). “Facial challenges to overly

broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the

litigant, but for the benefit of society -- to prevent the statute

from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not

before the court.” Secretary of State of Maryland. v. Munson,

467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2847, 81 L.Ed.2d 786

(1984). Because of the overbreadth doctrine’s far-reaching

effects, courts must apply it “with hesitation” and “only as a

last resort.” Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting

Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d

451 (1999) (citation omitted).

Under the Uniform Discipline Code, there are six groups

of misconduct, including: (1) misconduct that includes

inappropriate student behaviors, such as running in the hall;

(2) misconduct that disrupts the orderly educational process

in school, including leaving the school without permission; (3)

conduct that seriously disrupts the educational process, such

as gambling; (4) conduct that includes assault, extortion,

(same); see, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d

1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996).

49a

vandalism, and other offenses; (5) conduct such as burglary

and gang activity; and (6) conduct such as arson, murder, and

kidnaping. (Defs.” Stmt. P 11, Ex. F, Uniform Discipline

Code at 19-25) At issue is Group 2 misconduct, namely,

conduct that disrupts the school’s educational process. Under

Group 2, the disciplinary code lists ten behaviors that

constitute such disruptive conduct, including defying the

authority of school personnel and failing to abide by school

rules and regulations. (/d.; Pls:’ Stmt. Add’l Facts P 37.)

Here, the gifted students failed to abide by the Beaubien

School Dress Code No.2, which states in relevant part:

“Clothing with inappropriate words or slogans is not

permitted.” (Pis.’ Stmt. P 9.)

Plaintiffs argue that UDC Rule 2-5 is overbroad because

it is a rule which states that students cannot violate a rule and

is therefore redundant. The Court disagrees. As the Seventh

Circuit recently instructed “common sense must not be and

should not be suspended when judging the constitutionality of

a rule or statute.” See Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433

F.3d at 978. Under the common sense interpretation of the

disciplinary code, it is evident that Section 2-5 is specifically

directed at student conduct that disrupts the school’s

educational process. “Failing to abide by school rules and

regulations” means that if you fail to follow the school rules,

such as the school dress code, your conduct is considered

disruptive. There is nothing redundant about the code and its

directive is sufficiently narrow and reasonable because it

applies to the school rules and regulations and is limited by

reference to those rules. See id. at 979. The Tinker decision

and its progeny further support this conclusion because speech

in nonpublic forums, such elementary schools, is subject to

significantly greater regulation than speech in traditional

public forums. See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1537. Thus,

50a

restrictions of speech in nonpublic forums need only be

reasonable. Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433 F.3d at 980.

Next, Plaintiffs contend that UDC Rule 2-5 and the dress

code are void for vagueness. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that

“with no way of identifying the source of content of the

underlying rules, a student might not even know about the

rules until they were violated. A rule must provide at least

minimal notice so that a student may conform his or her

actions to the rule.” (R. 133-1, Mem. In Support of M. Part.

Summ. J., at 11.) Plaintiffs also argue that the rule is

circuitous and confusing.

“A law is void for vagueness if it fails to give fair warning

of what is prohibited, if it fails to provide explicit standards

for the persons responsible for enforcement and thus creates

a risk of discriminatory enforcement, and if its lack of clarity

chills lawful behavior.” Anderson v. Milwaukee County, 433

F.3d at 978 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.

104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). For a plaintiff

to succeed on a vagueness claim, she must demonstrate that

the rule is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.

Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667 (citation and quotation omitted). In

the context of school disciplinary codes, the Supreme Court

gives the following guidance: “Given the school’s need to be

able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of

unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process,

the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a

criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.” Fraser, 478

U.S. at 686.

Although Plaintiffs unequivocally argue that they are

facially attacking the disciplinary rule and dress code, they do

not attempt to show that the that the rules are unconstitutional

in all of their applications as opposed to “as applied” to the

Sla

students themselves. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68; see also

United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 544 (7th Cir. 1985)

(“party seeking to overturn a statute for vagueness on its face

must in essence establish that it is unconstitutionally vague in

at least a substantial number of the cases to which it could

apply”). Consequently, Plaintiffs’ attempt to facially attack

the disciplinary rule and dress code as unconstitutionally

vague simply fails because they do not address the code’s

overall applications. See Fuller, 251 F.3d at 667-68.

In short, UDC Rule 2-5 in conjunction with the dress code

is not overbroad or vague and does not confer any policy

making authority to Principal Kotis as Plaintiffs contend.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ argument based on the third Monell scenario

fails because Principal Kotis did not have final policymaking

authority under the circumstances.°®

B. Express Policy

Plaintiffs also argue that UDC Rule 2-5 and the school

dress code embody an express policy that caused and directly

contributed to the students alleged constitutional deprivation.

® Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Board’s delegation of authority to

the Department of Law and that certain Board members’ inaction

establishes municipal liability are not only undeveloped, but

Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority to support these claims.

Thus, Plaintiffs have waived these arguments. See Estate of

Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Perfunctory or undeveloped arguments are waived”). In fact,

these claims do not fall under the Monell rubric, but instead appear

to be loosely based on the doctrine of respondeat superior which

cannot apply to governmental units such as the Board of Education.

See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Illinois, 434 F.3d at 1006,

1029 (7th Cir. 2006).

52a

This argument relies on the first Monell scenario, namely,

that the Board has an express policy, that when enforced,

deprived the gifted students of their First Amendment right to

free speech.

“The express policy theory applies, as the name suggests,

where a policy explicitly violates a constitutional right when

enforced.” Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 379 (policy must violate

constitutional right “on its face”). Because the Plaintiffs’

claim partially rests on the Beaubien School dress code,

Plaintiffs have not established that there is a Board of

Education policy at issue. See id. at 380. In other words, the

Beaubien School dress code cannot form the basis of liability

under Monell because it is not a Board policy or custom in the

first instance. See Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d

740, 748-49 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Only those individuals with the

requisite policymaking authority are capable of establishing

‘official policy’ as required by Monell”). As discussed,

because Principal Kotis does not have the requisite policy

making authority under the circumstances, Plaintiffs’ claim

based on the disciplinary code in conjunction with the school

dress code must fail. See id. at 749. The Court thereby

dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the Board.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Partial

Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court grants Defendant

School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants

Laughlin’s and Clancy’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant Kotis’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and

Defendant Rosales’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally,

the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Strike as moot.

Dated: March 13, 2006

53a

AMY J. ST EVE

United States District Court Judge

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

Decision by Court. This action came to hearing before the

Court. The issues have been heard and a decision has been

rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment [131] is denied.

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (135, 138, and

139] are granted. All other pending motions are denied as

moot. Memorandum Opinion and Order is entered.

Date: 3/13/2006

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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