Reply Brief — Baker v. Exxon Shipping Co (No. 07-276)

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(> FILED

No. 07-276 OCT 3 - 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

— =

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

GRANT BAKER, ET AL..,

Conditional Cross-Petitioners,

Vv.

EXXON MOBIL CORP. AND EXXON SHIPPING CoO.,

Conditional Cross-Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR CONDITIONAL

CROSS-PETITIONERS

James vanR. Springer David W. Oesting

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP Counsel of Record

1825 Eye Street, N.W. Stephen M. Rummage

Washington, DC 20006-5403 David C. Tarshes

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Brian B. O'Neill DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

FAEGRE & BENSON Suite 800

2200 Wells Fargo Center 701 W. Eighth Avenue

90 South Seventh Street Anchorage, AK 99501-3468

Minneapolis, MN 55402-3901 (907) 257-5300

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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REPLY BRIEF FOR CONDITIONAL

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Plaintiffs’ conditional cross-petition raises a single issue:

whether, if this Court chooses to review the punitive award in

this case, it should be free to decide that the Ninth Circuit

erred in reducing the award from $5 billion to $2.5 billion.’

The cross-petition frames the factual background pertinent to

that question almost exclusively by quoting from and citing

to the findings and analyses of the courts below. In contrast,

Exxon’s response makes clear that its arguments with respect

to the punitive award in this case are entirely fact-bound and

would require this Court to sift through the nearly 8,000

pages of transcript, hundreds of exhibits, and numerous post-

trial filings to ascertain whether Exxon’s cherry-picked

Citations and attacks on the courts’ findings below are

accurate.

Exxon acknowledges that one of its tankers spilled oil

into Prince William Sound. But beyond that, Exxon disputes

virtually every detail of this eighteen-year litigation. Exxon

asserts that Captain Hazelwood was not drunk when the

EXXON VALDEZ ran aground on Bligh Reef; that even if he

were drunk, his drinking did not have anything to do with the

grounding; that even if Hazelwood’s drinking did cause the

grounding, he was not an alcoholic; that even if Hazelwood

were an alcoholic, he hid his excessive drinking from Exxon

executives; that even if Exxon executives knew that

Hazelwood drank excessively, federal law prevented Exxon

from firing him, assigning him to a shoreside position, or

even monitoring him; and that even if Exxon had the ability

to take preventative measures concerning Hazelwood, Exxon

' Plaintiffs will not respond to Exxon’s ad hominem speculation as to

their reasons for filing the cross-petition except to note that the statement

of the case in plaintiffs’ cross-petition adds virtually nothing to the

Statement in their brief in opposition. The argument section of the cross-

petition is two pages. Exxon’s response is 25 pages.

2

executives did closely monitor him. With respect to the oil

spill itself, Exxon suggests that it cleaned up the spill mght

away; that it paid all claimants for their economic injuries

voluntarily, fairly, and promptly; and that the plaintiffs did

no? suffer any harm besides loss of income. Finally, Exxon

contends that the spill was actually a net plus for plaintiffs

and the State of Alaska, triggering an economic “boom” in

the Prince William Sound region. Exxon’s BIO at 7-8.

We have been through all of this several times already.

First, the parties had a trial - an 83-day, multi-phase trial,

culminating in the jury’s being instructed that it should base

any punitive award against Exxon on the degree to which

Exxon’s corporate conduct was reprehensible and on the

extent of the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Pltfs’ BIO App. 11a-18a

(jury instructions). Second, the parties briefed the constitu-

tionality of the size of the punitive award to the district judge

who presided over the trial, in the context of Exxon’s post-

trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or remittitur.

Third, the parties presented the facts on appeal to the Ninth

Circuit in comprehensive filings that the court allowed to be

tens of thousands of words overlength. Fourth, the parties

briefed the constitutionality of the size of the punitive award

on remand to the district court, so as to allow reconsideration

in light of this Court’s intervening BMW and Cooper

decisions. Fifth, the parties again briefed that issue to the

district court, so as to allow reconsideration in light of State

Farm. Sixth, the parties briefed the constitutionality of the

size of the award again to the Ninth Circuit.

During every one of these proceedings, the parties pre-

sented and exhaustively briefed the same factual disputes

Exxon now raises, and Exxon relied on the same portions of

the record it now cites to mount the same attacks on

plaintiffs’ evidence it now presses:

3

@ As to Hazelwood’s drunkenness when the supertanker

ran aground, compare Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br. at 14-15

with Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 11-12, 24-25;

e As to the connection between Hazelwood’s drunken-

ness and the grounding, compare Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br.

at 7, 10-14, 58-62 with Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 14-23;

@ As to Hazelwood’s alcoholism, compare Exxon’s 1997

C.A. Br. at 15-16 with Plitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 27-29;

e As to Exxon’s awareness that Hazelwood had relapsed

and was drinking aboard ships, compare Exxon’s 1997

C.A. Br. at 19-20, 64 & 2004 C.A. Br. at 33-34 with

Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 25-41 & 2004 C.A. Br. at 21-22;

@ As to Exxon’s ability to fire Hazelwood or assign him

to a shoreside position, compare Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br.

at 16-18, 20-21, 63-65 & 2004 C.A. Br. at 34-35 with

Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 31 n.20, 113-16, 144-45;

@ As to Exxon’s claim that it monitored Hazelwood,

compare Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br. at 18-20, 65-68 with

Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 29-36;

e As to the efficacy of Exxon’s cleanup effort, compare

Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br. at 4-5, 27, 29 & 2004 C.A. Br. at

5, 32, 41, 50 with Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br. at 47-50 & 2004

C.A. Br. at 36;

e As to the nature, speed and fairness of Exxon’s claims

program, compare Exxon’s 2004 C.A. Br. at 5, 41-43,

46-47 with Pitfs’ 2004 C.A. Br. at 36, 47-50; and

e As to plaintiffs’ non-economic harm, compare Exxon’s

2004 C.A. Br. at 37-38 with Pitfs’ 2004 C.A. Br. at 25-28.

, oe

The sole exception is Exxon’s “economic boom” argument,

which Exxon, not surprisingly, chose not to present to the

4

‘

jury. This argument rests entirely on affidavits that Exxon

submitted eight years after trial, CD 7488, 7489, and Exxon

urged it on the district court only during its due process

reviews on remand. Compare Exxon’s 2002 Renewed Mot.

for Reduction of Punitive Damages Award at 12-13 with

Pltfs’ Opp. to Mot. at 51-54.”

“The precise [punitive] award in any case, of course,

must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the

defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.” State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425

(2003). At every stage of these proceedings, the factfinders

and reviewing courts have rejected Exxon’s version of

events. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The

district judge who presided over this case for a decade

repeatedly rejected Exxon’s efforts to recast the evidence.

See Pet. App. 231a-235a, 240a-246a, 254a-257a (1995 orders

denying Exxon’s motions for judgment and new trial on

punitive damages); Pet. App. 183a-186a, 198a-216a (2002

order on Exxon’s renewed motion for reduction of punitive

damages); Pet. App. 120a-124a, 149a-172a (2004 order on

Exxon’s second renewed motion for reduction of punitive

damages). And the Ninth Circuit, after having the case under

submission in two separate appeals for almost four years,

rejected Exxon’s characterizations of the facts and confirmed

that the corporation acted highly reprehensibly in knowingly

“{p}lacing a relapsed alcoholic in control of a supertanker.”

> All of the parties’ Ninth Circuit briefs, with the exception of Exxon’s

2004 reply brief, are available online. See Pitfs’ 2004 C.A. Br., 2004 WL

3960330; Pitfs’ 1997 C.A. Br., 1997 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 119;

Exxon’s 2004 C.A. Br., 2004 WL 3960031; Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Br., U.S.

9th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 3. Exxon’s 1997 C.A. Reply Br., 1997 U.S. 9th

Cw. Briefs LEXIS 5. Except where noted, the parties’ district court

briefing did not differ materially.

5

See Pet. App. 60a-64a, 86a-91a, 95a-101a (first appeal); 22a-

40a (second appeal).’

This Court does not sit to referee factual squabbles that a

jury and two lower courts have analyzed extensively and re-

solved unanimously. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.

Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949)

(describing “two court rule”); Comstock v. Group of

Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 214 (1948) (same). But if this Court

were to accede to Exxon’s highly unusual request to revisit

the facts in order to evaluate the constitutionality of the size

of the punitive award, it should not foreclose itself from

concluding that the facts as the district court and the Ninth

Circuit found them support a punitive award of more than

$2.5 billion.

CONCLUSION

Should this Court grant Exxon’s petition for a writ of

certiorari, the Court also should grant the conditional cross-

petition for a writ of certiorari.

> To provide just one example: After reviewing the trial record in detail,

the Ninth Circuit explained that the jury “plainly” found that “Hazelwood

took command of the ship so drunk that a non-alcoholic would have

passed out,” Pet. App. 87a, and that “the jury found that the corporation,

not just the employee, was reckless.” Pet. App. 83a. Citing a newspaper

story disguised as part of the record, however, Exxon says that jurors

“told the press they could not determine whether Hazelwood had been

impaired by alcohol” and they based their punitive verdict on

Hazelwood’s recklessness. Exxon’s BIO at !3; see also Exxon Pet. for

Cert. 13 n.5. Exxon knows better; jurors’ post-trial statements do not

have any legal significance, Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), 802, and, as plaintiffs’

prior briefing shows, the record supports the Ninth Circuit’s assessment

of the evidence. In any event, Exxon neglects to inform this Court that

another press report offered a contradictory account of the jury’s

reasoning inside the jury room. See Natalie Phillips, We Did the Right

Thing, ANCHORAGE DAILy News, Sept. 18, 1994, at A6.

Respectfully submitted,

James vanR. Springer

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO LLP

1825 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006-5403

Brian B. O’Neill

FAEGRE & BENSON

2200 Wells Fargo Center

90 South Seventh Street

Minneapolis, MN 55402-3901

October 2007

David W. Oesting

Counsel of Record

Stephen M. Rummage

David C. Tarshes

Jeffrey L. Fisher

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

Suite 800

701 W. Eighth Avenue

Anchorage, AK 99501-3468

(907) 257-5300

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