Appendix — Majors v. South Carolina Securities Commission (No. 07-234)

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Supreme C S.

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07-234 AUG 21 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NED B. MAJORS,

Petitioner,

SOUTH CAROLINA SECURITIES COMMISSION,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FORK WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

NED B. Majors

133A Ivystone Drive

Myrtle Beach,

South Carolina 19588-1284

(843) 446-0280

August 21, 2007 Petitioner Pro Se.

(t)

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS on

Appendix A — Opinion of South Carolina’s Supreme

Court filed April 23, 2007. ..... 0. cece eee eeeee la

Appendix B — Administrative Hearing Officer’s

Report and Recommendation issued Janu-

ary 13, 2004 . ccc ccccccrecscsccecsscceseres 18a

w/attached Petitioner’s “Agency Contract”’

DET ChE swede eveweervvegcerococves 57a

Appendix C — South Carolina’s Supreme Court

Order Denying Petitioner’s Rehearing Re-

quest filed May 25, 2007... 0... cccccccvccccces 63a

Appendix D — Respondent’s “Final Order to Cease

and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities”

issued on February 11, 2004......... eas eee we 65a

Appendix E — Respondent’s (First) “Order to Cease

and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities and

Engaging in Securities Fraud, and Notice of

Right to a Hearing” issued on September 9,

EPO ee RL ELE LEER 89a

Appendix F — Horry County Circuit Court Judge

James E. Lockemy’s Order of October 27,

DEL CLRNOR eS ibe deeKenevevecesveece 10la

Appendix G — Administrative Hearing Officer’s

November 4, 2003 Letter informing parties

of his ex parte, private, meeting with Respond-

ee oe bb ee ee. 106a

Appendix H — Text of South Carolina Code of Law

ET aS 6 u5 es be saéeeevenveseses 108a

Appendix I — Text of South Carolina Code of Law

I en . cos ehiccensedonce 109a

(1)

: Page

Appendix J — Text of South Carolina Appellate

Court Rule (SCACR), Professional Conduct,

Rule 3.5(a) and (b) of Rule 407, and related

CROMNGNEE e ccvc ce etdvte Cet NR Oe Reese lila

Appendix K — Excerpts from Judge Lockemy’s

September 7, 2004 Hearing............+++-. 1lZa

Appendix L — The State of Georgia Securities

Eevaseett ES CEMEG TOROGT oc os ccc cnsvonveaccn li6a

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APPENDIX A

[Filed April 23, 2007]

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.,

Appellants,

South Carolina Securities Commission,

Respondent.

Appeal From Horry County

James E. Lockemy, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 26317

Heard November 14, 2006 — Filed April 23, 2007

AFFIRMED

John F. Beach and John J. Pringle, Jr., both of Ellis,

Lawhorne & Sims, of Columbia, and Ned Majors, of

Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.

Scott E. Hultstrand and Tracy A. Meyers, both of

Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for

Respondent.

2a

JUSTICE WALLER: We certified this case from the

Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 204 (b), SCACR.

The South Carolina Securities Exchange Commission

ordered Appellants, Ned Majors and Tax Lien Agents,

Inc. (collectively TLA), to “Cease and Desist Selling Un-

registered Securities and Engaging in Securities Fraud.”

TLA appeals, contending it is not engaged in the sale of

“securities.” We disagree and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ned Majors is President and sole shareholder of TLA,

a South Carolina Corporation operating in Myrtle Beach

since 1998. TLA’s business centers around the purchase

of tax lien certificates (TLCs) at city and county tax lien

auctions throughout the country. Pursuant to TLA’s

“Agency Contract,’”” TLA is the purchasing agent for its

Principals. TLA Agents make all purchasing decisions,

and they bid competitively for purchases at auctions by

offering to accept a lower interest rate than the statutory

rate to which purchasers would otherwise be entitled.

Pursuant to the contract, the Agency bids on tax liens

which TLA believes have a reasonable prospect of not

being redeemed. The Principal agrees to pay Agent a

“non-refundable agency fee” (between 12-25% of the

principal’s initial tax lien purchase amount) and grants

TLA an inchoate interest of 50% ownership in any

unredeemed TLCs.

For each TLC purchased on a principal’s behalf, the

principal gives the Agent a cashiers check (or a Trust

directive if using a trust) made payable to the “County

Treasurer for Tax Liens.” The TLCs purchased are

listed in the principal’s name. If a TLC is redeemed

before its maturity date (usually 1-3 years), the Prin-

3a

cipal keeps all redemption monies, including interest

and penalties; however, if the TLC is not redeemed, the

Principal agrees to immediately sign papers to assign,

convey and register the property, and to confirm the

Agent has a 50% ownership interest in the net profit

of the TLC and any resultant deed issued. The Prin-

cipal is required (unless agreed upon with the Agent)

to commence good faith efforts to quiet the title and

sell the property. Although Principals have the right

to select closing attorneys and quiet title, etc., they

very seldom do so as the majority are absentee owners

living a considerable distance from the properties; the

majority use TLA’s services to facilitate both the sale

and quieting title. Although TLA represents only one

principal for each TLC purchased, an agent represents

15-20 principals (also referred to as “employers’’) at

each tax sale or as many as 200 “employers” over a two

week period.

if a Principal wishes to sell TLCs, the Agent has first

right of refusal, and if the TLC is sold to any other

party, the third party must agree to the same contract

terms as the Principal. If either party elects, the under-

lying property which was not redeemed may be pur-

chased by paying 50% of the average of three apprisals.

The agency contract also stated that “while there are no

risks in owning government sold and issued TLCs that

are redeemed (paid off), there are potential down side

financial risks if a TLC matures into a property deed

as the underlying property market value could sub-

stantially drop during the tax lien maturity period.”

4a

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2003, the Attorney General, acting as

the South Carolina Securities Exchange Commissioner

(Commissioner), entered an order for Majors and TLA

to “Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities and

Engaging in Securities Fraud’”’ and gave them notice of

a right to a hearing. The Commissioner appointed G.

Marcus Knight as the Administrative Hearing Officer for

the matter, and a public hearing was held on Oct 30-31,

2003. Thereafter, Knight issued a detailed report and

recommendation concluding that 1) the South Carolina

Uniform Securities Act (the Act) applied because TLA

was engaged in the sale of “securities” as defined in that

Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-20 (15) because its contract

constituted an “investment contract.” The Hearing

Officer also rejected TLA and Majors’ contention that

the manner of issuance of the cease and desist order

deprived them of due process, or that their due process

rights were violated by his appointment as Hearing

Officer. The Hearing Officer concluded that the Com-

missioner should order a final Cease and Desist Order,

pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60, due to a violation

of the registration requirements § 35-1-810 of the Act.

However, the Commissioner opined the Final Order

should exclude any reference to TLA making “material

misrepresentations and/or omissions” in connection with

its sale of TLCs, and should not pursue any criminal or

civil penalties.

In February 2004, the Commissioner issued a ‘Final

Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securi-

ties.’” The Commissioner found TLA’s investment oppor-

tunity constituted a “security” under the Act and also

found a violation of the registration requirements § 35-1-

810. TLA and Majors were ordered to cease and desist

5a

from offering or selling the TLC investment opportunity

in or from the State of South Carolina. The final order

did not find TLA was engaged in securities fraud.

Majors and TLA appealed to the circuit court which

ruled 1) the investment opportunity offered was a secur-

ity, 2) the SEC Commission had authority to issue the

original cease and desist order, and 3) Majors and TLA

were afforded due process in the underlying adminis-

trative proceeding.

ISSUES

1. What is the proper standard of review?

2. Did the SEC have authority to issue the initial

cease and desist order?

3. Were Appellants afforded due process in the un-

derlying administrative proceeding?

4. Were Appellants properly ordered to cease and

desist from the sale of unregistered securities in vio-

lation of the S.C. Uniform Securities Act?

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue in this case involves a decision of whether

TLA’s sale of TLCs constitutes the sale of securities. We

find this is a novel question of law, such that we are free

to decide the issue with no particular deference to the

lower court. Baggerly v. CSX Transp. Inc., 370 S.C. 362,

635 S.E.2d 97 (2006); citing J’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.

Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 411, 526 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2000).

2. INITIAL CEASE AND DESIST ORDER

TLA asserts the Commissioner had no statutory auth-

ority to enter the initial Cease and Desist order, such that

6a

the whole proceeding should be voided for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

This issue is not one of subject matter jurisdiction.

Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and

determine cases of the general class to which the pro-

ceedings in question belong. Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314

S.C. 235, 236, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994); State v.

Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005).

In any event, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (2004 Supp),

as it read at the time this matter arose, stated in pertinent

part, “The Securities Commissioner may make, amend,

and rescind those rules, forms, and orders, including cease

and desist orders, as are necessary to carry out the pro-

visions of this chapter...” (emphasis supplied).

As originally written, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60 did

not allow the Commissioner to issue cease and desist

orders. It was amended in 1992 to permit the Commis-

sioner to make, amend, and rescind those rules, forms,

and orders, including cease and desist orders. ..”” 1992

Act No. 451 § 1, eff. June 15, 1992. We find it was

within the Commissioner’s authority to issue the initial

cease and desist order.!

1We note also that, effective Jan. 1, 2006, Chapter 1 of the

South Carolina Uniform Securities Act was repealed and replaced

with a new Chapter 1, to comport with the Uniform Securities

Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on

Uniform State Laws. Section 35-160 has been repealed. In its

place, §§ 35-1-603 and 35-1-604 now govern civil and adminis-

trative enforcement of the Act. Section 35-1-603 permits the

Commissioner to maintain a civil action in the court of common

please. Section 35-1-604 (Supp 2005) states, in pertinent part, as

follows:

a) If the Securities Commissioner determines that a person

has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act,

[footnote continued]

~ alae .

7a

3. DUE PROCESS

TLA and Majors next assert issuance of the cease and

desist order in violated their rights to due process. We

disagree.

The initial cease and desist order, prior to a hearing,

was permissible. See Ross v. MUSC, 328 S.C. 51, 72,

492 S.E.2d 62, 69 (1997) (Article I, § 22, requires an

administrative agency provide notice and an opportunity

to be heard, but does not require notice and an oppor-

tunity to be heard at each level of the administrative pro-

cess. It mandates notice and opportunity to be heard at

some point before the agency makes its final decision).

Moreover, contrary to TLA’s contention, we find no

due process violation in the SEC Commissioner’s role in

this matter.

In Ross v. MUSC, 328 S.C. 51, 492 S.E.2d 62 (1997),

we held the purpose of S.C. Const., Art. I, § 22 is to

ensure adjudications are conducted by impartial adminis-

trative bodies. Partiality exists where an adjudicator

either has ex parte information as a result of prior inves-

tigation or has developed, by prior involvement with the

case, a “will to win.” Ross, 328 S.C. at 69, 492 S.E.2d

practice, or course of business constituting a violation of

this chapter or a rule adopted or order issued under this

chapter or that a person has materially aided, is materially

aiding, or is about to materially aid an act, practice, or

course of business constituting a violation of this chapter

or a rule adopted or order issued under this chapter, the

Securities Commissioner may: (1) issue an order directing

the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act,

practice, or course of business or to take other action neces-

sary or appropriate to comply with this chapter. . .

Clearly, the Commissioner has authority to issue cease and desist

orders prior to commencement of a civil proceeding. ‘

8a

at 72. In Ross, we found no violation of Section 22

where MUSC’s president investigated a tenured profes-

sor’s conduct, terminated the professor, and then testi-

fied against him at a committee hearing. We found no

due process violation because the president did not later

participate as an adjudicator, and he did not improperly

Cunenne ex parte information. /d. at 70, 492 S.E.2d at

72.

In Garris v. Governing Board of S.C. Reinsurance Facil-

ity, 333 S.C. 432, 511 S.E.2d 48 (1998), this Court

recognized, “‘the fact that investigative, prosecutorial,

and adjudicative functions are performed within the same

agency, or even performed by the same persons within an

agency, does not, without more, constitute a violation of

due process.” 333 S.C. 443, 511 S.E.2d at 54. In that

case, Garris was a designated insurance agent for the

South Carolina Reinsurance Facility. The Facility began

investigating Garris, alleging irregularities in his under-

writing practices. After a hearing, the Governing Board

of the Facility voted to revoke Garris’ status as a desig-

nated agent. Garris appealed, contesting the composi-

tion of the Board which revoked his designation. In

Garris, the five Governing board members and one non-

member of the South Carolina Reinsurance Facility

attended one or more committee meetings at which

Garris’ case was discussed extensively in open and execu-

tive sessions, and all six voted to revoke Garris’ status as

a designated agent. Of those six, four were members of

the committees which considered the Garris matter.

2 However, we did find a violation of Section 22 where the

university vice-president investigated the professor’s case, testified

as an adverse witness at a committee hearing, and sat as the inter-

mediate judge in a three-stop disciplinary procedure. /d.

9a

Further, two other Governing Board members attended

committee meetings and the hearing, but did not vote.

We concluded the procedure violated due process, stat-

ing:

we conclude that Governing Board members who

participate in the investigation or prosecution of a

designated agent as a membr or observer at a com-

mittee meeting may not participate as adjudicators

of that agent’s case at a subsequent hearing. Mem-

bers who participate in the investigation or prosecu-

tion of a case must distance themselves from the

adjudicatory process, and should refrain from even

discussing that case with future adjudicators.

333 S.C. at 446, 511 S.E.2d at 55.

Garris and Ross are distinguishable from the present

case. Unlike those cases, the Commissioner did, in this

instance, appoint a Hearing Officer to take evidence and

make a report and recommendation. Further, the Com-

missioner did not personally participate in the gathering

of the evidence before the Hearing Officer, and there is

no evidence he discussed the underlying case with the

Hearing Officer.

Moreover, we find the power of the SEC Commis-

sioner is akin to this Court’s power to issue an order of

interim suspension of an attorney, and then, after an

investigation by the Commission on Lawyer Conduct and

a Report and Recommendation, issue the ultimate sanc-

tion. See Kirven v. Board of Grievances and Discipline,

271 S.C. 194, 246 S.E.2d 857 (1978) (members of Board

of Grievance are officers of this Court commissioned and

charged by this Court with the duty of investigating

alleged acts of professional misconduct on the part of

their fellow members of the bar, and of reporting to this

Court the proceedings of their inquiry, their findings and

10a

recommendation); Matter of Iseman, 356 S.C. 280,

588 S.E.2d 606 (2003).(Supreme Court holds ultimate

authority to sanction attorneys).

We find TLA and Majors have been afforded due pro-

cess in this matter. The initial cease and desist order

provided them with the right to a hearing, which they

requested and were afforded by an independent Hearing

Officer. Thereafter, they were permitted to appeal the

SEC Commissioner’s Final Cease and Desist Order, and

were allowed to post a bond to stay enforcement of that

order pending appeal. The order has further been stayed

by this appeal.

4. SECURITY

Finally, TLA asserts that its sale of TLCs does not

involve the sale of a security, and it is therefore not in

violation of the Act, because it was not required to regis-

ter under S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-810 (1987) (making it

unlawful to sell any security in this state unless it is

either registered or exempt). We disagree. The Commis-

sioner and the circuit court properly held the sale of

TLCs in this case constituted the sale of ‘“‘securities”’

within the meaning of the Act.

S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-20 (12), as it read at time of

the cease and desist order, defined a “‘security”’ as, inter

alia, “any certificate of interest or participation in

any ... investment contract . . . or, in general, any inter-

est or instrument commonly known as a security .. .””

As noted by the Court of Appeals in Garrett v. Sned-

igar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App.

1987), overruled on other grounds, Olson v. Faculty

House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 580 S.E.2d 440

(2003), ‘in construing the state Act, [the Court] may

lla

look for guidance to cases construing its federal counter-

part.” In Garrett, the Court of Appeals recognized that

both our Act and the Federal Act define the word

“security” to include any “‘certificate of interest or par-

ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, [or] invest-

ment contract.” The Court of Appeals cited the semin-

al United States Supreme Court case of Securities and

Exchange Commission v. W.J. Hlowey Co., 328 U.S.

293, reh’g dented, 329 U.S. 819 (1946) in which the

Court defined an investment contract as a “transaction

or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-

mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from

the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” Jd. at

298-299.

Under the Howey test, an investment contract exists

where there has been (i) an investment of money, (ii) in

a common enterprise, (iii) with an expectation of profits

garnered solely from the efforts of others. See Teague v.

Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994). The test isa

flexible one, ‘capable of adaptation to meet the count-

less and variable schemes devised by those who seek the

use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”

Howey, 328 USS. at 299.

We find the Commissioner and the circuit court prop-

erly found TLA’s sale of TLCs constitutes the sale of an

“investment contract,” such that under § 35-1-20 (12),

it constitutes a security and therefore TLA and Majors

were properly ordered to cease and desist from the sale

absent proper registration with the SEC Commission.

a. Investment of Money

An “investment of money” under Howey means the

investor must have committed his assets to the enterprise

12a

in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss.

SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 80 (E.D. NC 1996).

It is indisputable that Principals meet this test. They

paid an up-front, non-refundable agency fee of 12-25%

of their TLC purchase price, they paid all fees and ex-

penses associated with the purchase of the TLCs, as well

as the expenses associated with establishing clear title

to those properties which were not redeemed, and

agreed to pay TLA 50% of the profits from the sale of

any properties which were not redeemed. It cannot

seriously be argued that Principals here did not make

an investment of money.

TLA also asserts Principals were not subject to finan-

cial loss. However, its contract specifically states that,

“while there are no risks in owning government sold and

issued TLCs that are redeemed (paid off), there are

potential down side financial risks if a TLC matures

into a property deed as the underlying property market

value could substantially drop during the tax lien matur-

ity period.” Accordingly, we find the first prong of

Howey is met inasmuch as there is an “investment of

money.”

b. Common Enterprise Test

TLA next contends the Commissioner, and the circuit

court, erred in applying a “strict vertical commonality”

test to determine whether it is engaged in a common

enterprise. We disagree.

In order to meet the “common enterprise’”’ prong of

the Howey test, courts around the country have strug-

gled with discerning whether vertical or horizontal com-

monality, or both, must exist. See Top of lowa Coop-

erate v. Schewe, 6 F.Supp.2d 843, 852 (N.D. lowa

l3a

1998) (noting that the Eighth Circuit had not ruled on

whether either vertical or horizontal commonality or

both are required under the “common enterprise” prong

of Howey, such that the court examined the contracts

for either kind of commonality); see also S.E.C. v. SG

Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing and discus-

sing the different standards in courts across the country);

S.E.C, v. Pinckney, 923 F.Supp. 76, 81 (E.D.N.C. 1996)

(same). As a general guide, vertical commonality requires

only a pooling of the interests of the developer or pro-

moter and each individual investor, while “horizontal

commonality” requires as well a pooling of interests

among the investors. Schewe, 6 F.Supp.2d at 852 (cit-

ing Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp., 24 F.3d 1016,

1017-18 (7th Cir. 1994)). See also SEC v. Alpha Tel-

com, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

the second element of the Howey test can be satisfied by

the existence of either vertical commonality or horizontal

commonality. Vertical commonality is the dependence

of the investors’ fortunes on the success or expertise of

the promoter. Horizontal commonality is the pooling of

investor funds and interests. Citing Brodt v. Bache & Co.,

Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978).)

The courts have further identified two kinds of vertical

commonality: broad vertical commonality and strict

vertical commonality. To establish “broad vertical com-

monality,” the fortunes of the investors need be linked

only to the efforts of the promoter. See Long v. Shultz

Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989).

“Strict vertical commonality” requires the fortunes of

investors be tied to the fortunes of the promoter. Brodt

v. Bache & Co.

l4a

TLA asserts the only proper test is horizontal com-

monality which, by its nature, requires a pooling of

interest among investors. We disagree.

Initially, we note that many courts have applied an

“either/or” test of vertical and horizontal commonality

such that there is a common enterprise if either test is

met. See e.g. Integrated Research Svcs. v. Illinois Sec.

of State, 765 F.E.2d 130 (Ill. 2002); SEC v. Parkersburg

Wireless LLC, 991 F.Supp. 6 (D. Col. 1997); Securities

and Exchange Commission v. R.G. Reynolds Enter-

prises, Inc., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991).

We find the newly revised Uniform Securities Act

lend guidance to resolutionof this issue. The comments

to S.C, Code Ann. § 35-1-102 (29)(D) state, in pertinent

part:

The courts have divided over the interpretation of

the “common enterprise”’ element of an investment

contract. The courts generally recognize that “hori-

zontal” commonality (for example, the pooling of

an investment by two or more investors) is a com-

mon enterprise. A small minority of the federal cir-

cuits will also find a common enterprise in a “vert-

ical” relationship when a single investor is depend-

ent upon the expertise of a single commodities

broker. Since two or more persons do not share in

the profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to

argue that there is a common enterprise. Section

102(29)(D) follows a significantly larger number of

federal circuits and adopts a more restrictive form of

vertical commonality that occurs only when there is

profit sharing between two persons even if, for

example, one is a conventional investor and one is

a promoter. See generally 2 Louis Loss & Joel

Seligman, Securities Regulation 989-997 (3d ed.

Rev. 1999). In interpreting all elements of the

l5a

investment contract, the courts have emphasized

substance, not form.

Clearly, it sppears the Legislature intends a strict vertical

commonality test to apply. Accordingly, we find the

trial court and Commissioner applied the proper test.

TLA and Majors also assert that, even under a strict

vertical commonality test, the Commissioner erred in

finding a common enterprise because the relationship

here is precisely the opposite of that found in cases of

strict vertical commonality. It contends for such a rela-

tionship to exist, there must be a showing that the inves-

tors’ profits are dependent upon the promoter’s profits

whereas, here, TLA’s profits are dependent upon the

profits of the principals. We disagree.

The court in SEC v. TLC Investments, 179 F.Supp. 2d

1149, 1156 (D. CA. 2001), specifically rejected such a

claim, holding that ‘““TLC’s fortunes were inextricably

linked to the fortunes of the individual investors. So long

as the promoter’s gain is contingent on the investor’s

gain, there is a common enterprise.”’

c. Efforts of others

Lastly, TLA asserts that because its Principals have

input into purchasing and sales decisions, they do not

have “an expectation of profits garnered solely from the

efforts of others.’’ We disagree.

As noted by the Court of Appeals in Garrett, the third

prong of Howey has been relaxed. In Garrett, the Court

of Appeals held:

Later cases have eliminated the requirement that

one must expect profits solely from the efforts of

others in order for an interest to be a security. See

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421

l6a

U.S. 837, 852, reh’g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975)

(the touchstone is the presence of an investment in

a common venture premised on a reasonable expec-

tation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-

neurial or managerial efforts of others); O’Quinn

v. Beach Associates, 272 S.C. 95, 105, 249 S.E.2d

734, 739 (1978) (iiivestment contracts may be

found where the investor has duties that are nom-

inal and insignificant or where the investor lacks

any real control over the operation of the enter-

prise).

The key determination is whether the promoters’ ef-

forts, not that of the investors, form the “essential mana-

gerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the

enterprise. Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F.3d at

1201 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,

474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). See also SEC v.

Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (test is whether

the efforts made by those other than the investor are the

undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial

efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-

prise).

We find the test is met here. As noted in the Com-

mission’s order, although TLA’s Principals retained some

contractual rights of control, in practice their control

was very limited. TLA made all of the purchasing deci-

sions, and exercised the majority of control in issues

relative to clearing title, picking closing attorneys, etc.,

because the majority of its investors lived a considerable

distance away. As further noted in the Commissioner’s

order, TLA’s marmeting material indicated “we do all

the work.”

l7a

CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold the SEC Commissioner has auth-

ority to issue initial cease and desist orders prior to a

hearing, so long as a hearing is thereafter afforded. Fur-

ther, we find the procedure utilized here did not violate

TLA’s due process rights, and that the final cease and

desist order was properly issued because TLA’s sale of

tax lien certificates was properly found to be the sale of

“securities” within the meaning of the S.C. Uniform

Securities Act. Accordingly, the order on appeal is

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., MOORE, BURNETT and PLEICONES,

| JJ., concur.

18a

APPENDIX B

[Filed January 13, 2004]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SECURITIES SECTION

IN THE MATTER OF

Ned B. Majors and Tax Liens Agents, Inc.

Respondents

Case No. 03010

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

HEARING OFFICER TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA

SECURITIES COMMISSIONER

This matter arises from the issuance by the South

Carolina Securities Commission (the “Commission’’) of

its Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Secur-

ities and Engaging in Securities Fraud, and Notice of

Right to a Hearing (the “C&D Order’’) to Ned B. Majors

(‘‘Majors’”’) and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. (““TLA”), on Sep-

tember 9, 2003. The parties then apparently engaged in

litigation before the Circuit Court for the State of South

Carolina, the subject of which is not presently germane

to the issues brought before the administrative hearing

officer in this matter. Respondents apparently made

timely request for a hearing in this matter to review the

issuance of the C&D Order and to determine whether a

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final order should be issued. On October 23, 2003, the

South Carolina Attorney General, acting in his statutory

capacity as the State’s Securities Commissioner, appoint-

ed G. Marcus Knight as the administrative hearing officer

for this matter pursuant to Section 35-1-1450 of the

South Carolina Uniform Securities Act (the “Act’’) and

delegated to the hearing officer such authority as is

necessary to conduct the hearing and render this Report

and Recommendation. A public hearing on this matter

was conducted on October 30-31, 2003 pursuant to Sec-

tion 35-1-90 of the Act. Subsequent to the conclusion

of the hearing, the parties submitted briefs and reply

briefs, which were received by the hearing officer not

later than December 5, 2003. A transcript of the hearing,

together with all exhibits submitted during the hearing

and briefs submitted after the hearing, will be delivered

to the Securities Commissioner by the hearing officer

simultaneoulsy with delivery of this Report and Recom-

mendation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

TLA is a South Carolina corporation organized by fil-

ing of its Articles of Incorporation with the South Caro-

line Secretary of State on November 19, 1998. TLA

commenced its business during 1999 and has, from the

inception, operated its business principally from Myrtle

Beach, South Carolina. Majors is a resident of South

Carolina and is the sole shareholder and officer of TLA.

The primary business activity of TLA centers around

the bidding and purchasing of tax lien certificates

(“TLCs”’) at tax lien auctions or sales conducted by the

taxing authorities of city and county governments

throughout approximately 26 states in the United States.

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Purchasers of TLCs bid competitively for their purchase

at auctions conducted by the governmental entity by

offering to accept a lower interest rate than the statu-

torily prescribed rate to which the issuing governmental

entity is entitled. TLSs generally mature under the

applicable states’ laws in periods of one to three years.

Each of the unmatured TLCs may be redeemed by the

owner of the underlying property by paying the past due

taxes, plus penalties and interest at statutorily prescribed

rates, to the issuing governmental entity, which in turn

pays the amount of the TLCs’ purchase price plus the bid

interest rate to the holder of the TLCs. Each of the

matured TLCs which are not redeemed create for the

holder of the TLCs the right to obtain a tax deed or simi-

lar instrument of conveyance for the underlying prop-

erty. The TLCs holder must often undertake legal action

to quiet or clear his title to underlying property of any

other liens or encumbrances on the title which are junior

to the tax lien by which the holder of the TLCs obtains

title. According to Majors’ testimony, all or virtually

all other liens on the underlying property, including bank

mortgages and federal tax liens, are junior to the interest

of the holder of the TLCs, and accordingly can be exting-

uished in the process of quieting title. The stated objec-

tives of the investment in TLCs is to either (x) receive a

return of the original purchase price for the TLCs plus

payment of interest and penalties from the redemption

of unmatured TLCs by the underlying property owner,

or (y) obtain marketable title to and sell at a significant

profit the property underlying matured TLCs.

In conducting this enterprise, TLA serves as a contract

agent for investors (the “Principals’”) who furnish the

funds required to purchase the TLCs. Most of the Prin-

cipals appear to be individual investors or trusts con-

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trolled by individual investors. Many of these Principals

appear to be South Carolina residents or to have been

present in South Carolina when solicited by TLA. TLA

solicotrs Principals pursuant to newspaper advertise-

ments, booths at conventions and expositions, a website,

seminars, and tapes, among other methods. TLA has

published advertisements in newspapers in South Carolina

and conducted seminars and sponsored booths at conven-

tions and expositions in South Carolina in recent years.

Majors’ testimony and the other evidence presented at

the hearing requires the deduction that TLA made offers

and sales of TLCs to considerably more than 25 persons

during the twelve-month period preceding September 9,

2003 in or from the State of South Carolina. The rela-

tionship between the Principals and TLA is governed by

a standard form Agency Contract, substantially in the

form attached to this Report and Recommendation as

Exhibit A.

In its advertising, video tapes, and other promotional

materials, TLA claimed, among other things, that: “We

eliminate all the risk. We do all the work. We never

touch your money.” Transcript of Hearing, p. 149,

lines 5-6. TLA also claimed in its promotional materials

that “‘every investment check . .. [ the Principal] make[s]

will be made directly to the government selling the tax

lien. . . . All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by

the government in your name and address only . . . Ned

Majors, our founder, is the recognized authority on real

estate tax liens. He wrote the book. . . . We can only

make a profit when you receive a property deed and

sell it for more than your total cost. ... We do all the

work... . And .. . we never touch your money.” Tr.

p. 146, l. 21 — p. 147, 1. 9. TLA advertises that Prin-

cipals can expect a “government guaranteed eight to

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_ twenty-five percent . . . annual interest” return on re-

deemed TLCs and an “expectation of a potential yield

of 10,000 percent’’ on the sale of the property un-

derlying matured TLCs. Tr., p. 57, Il. 8-11. In its

promotional materials, TLA claims that “our growth

expectation is not speculative. We don’t have any

speculation in our business.” Tr. p. 96, ll. 23-25. In

TLA’s promotional materials, Majors also emphasiz-

es the importance of TLA’s experience, connections,

and volume leverage in connection with selecting, ne-

gotiating, and engaging attorneys to quiet title to, and

real estate brokers to market and sell, the properties

underlying matured TLCs. See e.g., Tr. at p. 109, 1.

22 — p. 113, 1. 5. Majors testified that these promo-

tional materials were sent to prospective Principals

from TLA’s offices at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina,

and were given to prospective Principals at seminars and

expositions conducted in Myrtle Beach and Charleston,

South Carolina, and other locations in various states.

In the Agency Contract, each of the Principals ap-

points TLA as its agent to bid on and purchase TLCs

in the Principal’s name or in the name of a trust desig-

nated by the Principal. The funding mechanism for

purchase of TLCs under the Agency Contract requires

the Principal to provide TLA with cashier’s checks from

an FDIC insured bank payable to “County Treasurer for

Tax Liens”. The Agency Contract also states that the

TLCs will be “listed” in Principal’s name. . . by the issu-

ing governmental entity . . . with Principal’s address . . .

as the official notification address. The Agency Contract,

further states that if the amounts of the cashiers checks

provided by the Principal for purposes of purchasing

TLCs exceeds the actual cost of the TLCs purchased by

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TLA on behalf of the Principal, then the excess will be

refunded by the governmental entity to the Principal.

Under the Agency Contract, the Principal will be enti-

tled to all interest and penalties paid in connection with

any redemption of TLCs by an underlying property

owner prior to maturity of the TLC. In the event of a

redemption of one of the TLCs, the Agency Contract

provides that TLA will continue to reinvest the redemp-

tion proceeds, at no additional charge for an agency fee,

until the Principal either receives a matured TLC (or tax

deed) or a period of 36 months expires. In return for

TLA’s services under the Agency Contract, the Principal

agrees to pay TLA a “non-refundable agency fee’’ (usu-

ally in the range of several hundred dollars) and grants

an “inchoate interest of 50% ownership” in any TLCs

purchased by agent for the Principal which are not re-

deemed by the underlying property owners within the

statutorily prescribed time, and as a result of which

“go to deed’’. Under the Agency Contract, the Principal

is obligated to convey the 50% interest “in the net profit

of the TLC and in any resultant tax deed’’ to TLA and

the Principal must “promptly thereafter commence

good faith efforts to quiet the title and sell’’ the prop-

erty underlying the matured TLCs. At the Principal’s

request, TLA is obligated to engage legal counsel and

real estate brokers and “‘such other professionals as . . .

[TLA] deems advisable” to complete the process of

selling the property underlying matured TLCs. Upon

the sale of the underlying property, the closing agent is

directed by the terms of the Agency Contract to first

reimburse the Principal for its TLC purchase price and

the direct out-of-pocket costs, second reimburse TLA

for its direct out-of-pocket costs paid on the Principal’s

behalf in connection with the marketing and sale of the

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underlying property, and third divide equally between

the Principal and TLA any remaining net proceeds of the

sale. The Agency Contract also grants to TLA a right

of first refusal should the Principal decide to sell the

TLCs or the underlying property, and requires the

Principal to purchase TLA’s 50% interest at 50% of

the appraised value of the property underlying the

matured TLCs if the Principal desires to keep the prop-

erty. See Tr. at p. 298, ll. 15-25. The Agency Contract

contains an acknowledgement by the Principal that

“while there are no risks in owning government sold

and issued TLC(s) that are redeemed (paid off), there

are potential downside financial risks if a TLC matures

into a property deed as the underlying property market

value could substantially drop during the tax lien matur-

ity period”. See Exhibit A attached hereto.

Accordingly to the testimony at the hearing, TLA

usually conducts it’s business relationship with the Prin-

cipals in substantial conformity to the Agency Con-

tract, with a few notable exceptions. In a number of

cases, the governmental entity conducting the tax lien

sale would not accept checks that were not in the exact

amount of the bid for the TLCs. In these situations,

TLA deposited the checks in the IOLTA attorney trust

account maintained by Majors. Majors testified that in

each instance the Principals were notified of the need

for this deviation from the standard procedure and the

Principals granted permission for the deposit of the

checks into Majors’ attorney trust account. Majors then

wrote checks to the governmental entity in the exact

amount of the bid price for the TLCs and sent refunds

of the balance of each deposit to the Principals from his

attorney trust account. Majors testified, and provided

his bookkeeping evidence to support, that he maintained

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individual accounting records for each Principal whose

funds were deposited into his attorney trust account, and

that while there might have been approximately 400

checks from Principals handled this way, these checks

constitute a very small percentage of TLA’s overall TLC

business. Majors also testified that in some instances, by

mistake, the governmental entity has issued TLCs or sent

redemption payments to TLA, and that in some instances

in the past TLA’s address has been used as the notice

address for the TLCs purchased on behalf of Principals

who were traveling or had other reasons for not using

their own addresses.

Majors testified that while the Agency Contract

grants the Principals the legal right to specify certain

criteria governing the purchase of TLCs and to select

the attorneys, real estate agents, and other professionals

necessary to clear title and sell the property underlying

matured TLCs, that he discourages the exercise of such

rights (Tr. p. 296, ll. 18-22), and that such rights are

rarely exercised by the Principals. In addition, in his pro-

motional video Majors stated that “I can’ tell you right

now where your money — which auction you’re going to

go to or which county, but we know a county treasurer

in every county of all 2,642 counties who sell tax liens.”

Tr. p. 102, ll. 17-22. Majors confirmed that most of his

Principals live a considerable distance from the properties

to which their TLCs apply and that they rarely exercise

their rights to select professionals needed to clear title

and sell the underlying properties. Tr. p. 299, 1. 23 —

p. 300, 1. 12.

TLA’s promotional video, which appears from the

testimony to have been widely distributed to prospec-

tive Principals, also establishes an offer of liquidity in

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the TLCs purchased by TLA for its Principals. In the

video, Majors tells his prospective Principals that ‘“‘if

you go off and buy tax liens [on] your own, there is no

liquidity. Because the tax collector’s not going to give

you your money back. . . . However, with our program, if

you hire us as our agent, and you want to sell your tax

liens, we'll buy them from you. Or we'll have clients

that buy them from you. And usually within a week,

you know, we can handle up to about four or $500,000

a week easily. I get that much back on redemptions al-

most every week. ... After you buy them, we’ll not

only buy them back from you, but we’ll pay you the

eight percent interest a yeai on your money.” Tr. p.

97, Il. 5-23. Majors testified that the main source of

funding for TLA’s compliance with this offer to purchase

the TLCs from Principals was its profits off of its agency

fees and its share of the profits when property under-

lying the matured TLCs are sold. Tr. p. 306, ll. 17-22.

In TLA’s promotional video, Majors stated that TLA’s

50% interest in the underlying properties is “the only

place where I make my money.” Tr. p. 97, Il. 5-23.

The parties stipulated that the video was sent to pros-

pective Principals in South Carolina.

Neither the offers nor the sales of opportunities to

invest in TLCs pursuant to TLA’s Agency Contract and

related services (the “TLC Investment Opportunity’’)

have been registered with the Commission pursuant to

Section 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. No claim that the

TLC Investment Opportunity satisfied the elements of

an exemption from the registration requirements of the

Act was made under Sections 35-1-310 or -320 of the

Act, nor would the testimony and evidence presented at

the hearing tend to support such a claim of an exemp-

tion. No claim that the TLC Investment Opportunity

ty

i

27a

constituted a ‘“‘federal covered security”’ was made under

Sectiond 35-1-810(c) and -1100 of the Act, nor would

the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend

to support such a claim. TLA and Majors were not

registered as broker-dealers or agents under Section

35-1-410 et seg. of the Act. No claim was asserted by

TLA or Majors that an exemption from the broker-dealer

and agent licensing requirements of the Act would apply

to them under Section 35-1-15 of the Act, nor would

the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend

to support such a claim.

In their opening statements and post-hearing briefs, the

parties agreed that the principal issue in this matter is

whether or not the TLC Investment Opportunity con-

stituted a “security” as defined in Section 35-1-20 of

the Act!. If the TLC Investment Opportunity did not

constitute a “‘security”’ as defined by the Act, then the

Act did not apply, the Commission would not have

jurisdiction over this matter, and the C&D Order would

be inappropriate. If the TLC Investment Opportunity

did constitute a “security” as defined for purposes of

the Act, then the Act did apply and this hearing officer

must analyze the potential violations of the Act by the

Respondents.

APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT

The staff of the Securities Section of the Attorney

General’s Office (the “Staff”), as the proponent of the

C&D Order, asserts that the TLC Investment Opportun-

The Respondents also have raised a due process question as

tq the statutory scheme and procedures for issuance and review of

the C&D Order by the Commission, which will be addressed below.

28a

ity constituted a “security” for purposes of the Act

because it constituted either a (1) “investment con-

tract” or (2) a “certificate of interest or participation

in... [a] profit-sharing agreement”. Section 35-1-

20(15) of the Act. Respondents deny that the TLC

Investment Opportunity constituted a “‘security”’ under

either definition. 3

1. Investment Contract. The term “investment con-

tract”, as used in the definition of the term “security”

for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act, has

apparently not been defined in any fashion meaningful

to this matter by the courts of this State. However, it

is well established that the South Carolina courts seek

guidance from the federal courts in interpreting provi-

sions of the Act which parallel federal statutes, such

as the definition of the term “security”. See Carver v.

Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 310, 342 S.E.2d 406, 407

(1986); McGaha v. Moseley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322

S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984); Bradley v. Hullander, 272

S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978). The seminal case for

the definition of the term “investment contract”’ is

SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 66 S. Ct.

1100, 1102-03 (1946). In Howey it is well estab-

lished that the United States Supreme Court defined an

“fnvestment contract” as any arrangement whereby an

investor makes {a} an investment of money (b) in a

common ente*prise (c) with an expectation of profits

solely from the efiorts of the promoter or a third party.

Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1153, 115 S.Ct. 1107 (1995)

(citing Howey, 328 U.S. 299-300, 66 S. Ct. 1103). The

South Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted the Howey

analysis. Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359

S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds

29a

Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 1161,

580 S.E.2d 440 (2003).

(a) Investment of Money. An “investment of mon-

ey”’ means, for purposes of the definition of an “‘invest-

ment contract’’, that the investor must have committed

his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject

himself to financial loss. SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.

76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996). In the instant case, the Prin-

cipals wrote checks to TLA for the non-refundable

agency fee and invested money in TLCs purchased by

TLA on their behalf. Majors testified, that while he

promoted and believed that the TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity was a safe investment, the Principals could lose

some or all of their investment if the underlying prop-

erty had at the time of sale a value less than the amount

of the investment. The terms of the Agency Contract

included a specific acknowledgement by the Principal

that this “‘potential down side financial risk” existed. In

addition, the Principals were required to grant TLA a

“650% inchoate interest” in each TLC that TLA pur-

chases on behalf of the Principal, which is a further

commitment of the Principal’s assets to the enterprise.

Thus, the first element of the Howey test, requiring

an “investment of money” is satisfied in the instant

case. Cf. Pinckney, 923 F.Supp. at 81 (Although the

promoter represented that the investor’s funds would

be under the investor’s control, profits would be gen-

erated by trading of the financial instruments in which

the investment was made. The investor would have

been subject to financial loss by virtue of the trades

to be made.).

(b) Common Enterprise. The Howey definition of

investment contract requires as a second element that

the particular transaction constitute a “common enter-

30a

prise”. In this regard, the Howey analysis contemplates

that the transaction will involve a relationship between

investors. The Howey case, however, does not define pre-

cisely the required nature of the relationship or the re-

quired number of investors that must be involved. As a

result, the courts have subsequently developed three dif-

ferent tests to determine whether the requisite “common

enterprise” element is satisfied: (i) horizontal common-

ality, (ii) strict vertical commonality and (iii) broad

vertical commonality. Morrow K. Monaghan, Note,

An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enter-

prise of Element of Investment Contract Analysts, 63

Fordham L. Rev. 2135, 2152 (1995). While the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled definitely ox

the applicable.test for this element of the Howey anal-

ysys, district courts in the Fourth Circuit have recognized

both horizontal commonality and strict vertical common-

ality as applicable. See e.g., Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at

81-82; see also SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enter., Inc., 952

F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991). This hearing officer

agrees with the cases in the Fourth Circuit recognizing

horizontal commonality and strict vertical commonality

as appropriate tests, and rejects broad vertical common-

ality (which would be relatively easy to demonstrate in

the instant case) for two reasons: (x) the broad vertical

commonality test considers whether the investor’s

realization of profits is inextricably tied to the pro-

moter’s expertise and skill, which overlaps, and renders

superfluous, the third element of the Howey test, which

requires an expectation of profits based on the efforts

of the promoter or other third persons (see Pinckney,

923 F. Supp. at 81-82; Monaghan at 2161); and (y) the

broad vertical commonality test is simply too broad,

potentially bringing within the special regulation of the

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securities laws a wide variety of contracts and other

arrangements between parties that neither require nor

comport with the policies and principles underlying the

securities laws, which could unduly hinder commerce

in the marketplace (see Monaghan at 2162). Accord-

ingly, this hearing officer will review the “common ent-

erprise element” of the Howey analysis in the instant

matter under only the horizontal commonality and

strict vertical commonality tests.

(i) Horizontal Commonality. The horizontal com-

monality test, which is derived principally from the facts

of the Howey case itself, is present when the investments

of multiple investors are pooled and the fortunes of one

investor are linked to the fortunes of other investors.

Specifically, the court will find that horizontal common-

ality exists where investors’ contributions are pooled and

the distributions of profits and losses are experienced

ratably among the investors as a group. See Monaghan

at 2152-57; see also Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. Thus,

the outcome of the investment for each individual

investor is tied both to the success of the enterprise and

to the outcome for the other investors in the enterprise.

In the instant matter, the testimony and evidence suggest

some facts supportive of a finding that horizontal com-

monality existed:

First, in a number of situation, where the gov-

ernmental entity required TLA to deposit the pre-

cise amount of the bid for TLCs, the Principals’

checks were deposited in a single account, namely

Majors’ attorney trust account. While these depos-

its into a single account have certain aspects of a

pooling of the funds of multiple investors, Majors

did, according to his testimony and evidence, main-

tain individual accounting of the funds for each

Principal.

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Second, TLA agents purchased TLCs at each auc-

tion on behalf of multiple Principals by using a rota-

tional process, whereby the TLA agent bids for

TLCs identified as suitable by TLA first for one

Principal and then for each other Principal in order,

on a virtually random basis. This random rota-

tional purchasing suggests that the quality of the

TLCs purchased on behalf of one Principal is linked

to the randomly selected quality of the TLCs pur-

chased on behalf of other Principals at the same

auction. However, the testimony and evidence at

the hearing suggests that TLCs are always bought

for a single Principal at a time, in that Principal’s

name, and that multiple Principals do not share in

the benefits of TLCs purchased for other Principals.

Third, TLA is obligated by the Agency Contract

te purchase replacement TLCs for any Principal

whose TLCs are redeemed by the underlying prop-

erty owner prior to maturity of the TLC. For this

replacement service, TLA does not charge an addi-

tional agency fee, meaning that the benefit of this

replacement obligation to the Principal whose

TLCs are redeemed prior to maturity is at risk for

the continued operational success of TLA, who

will have to fund the costs of pursuing replacement

TLCs out of its own operational resources, which

is necessarily subject to the profitability of the

entire enterprise, and thereby linked to the for-

tunes of the other Principals. However, because of

the volume of business and the number of auctions

routinely attended by TLA agents, and the rela-

tively nominal amount of the non-refundable

agency fee, this risk seems to be minimal.

Fourth, TLA and Majors promote the liquidity of

the TLC Investment Opportunity by marketing

a standing “offer” to the Principals to purchase

TLCs from Principals who wish to dispose of them,

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and if TLA or Majors do not purchase such TLCs,

TLA and Majors offer to help arrange for another

Principal to purchase TLCs. According to the testi-

mony at the hearing, the major source of funding

for this liquidity option are the profits derived by

TLA from its 50% interest in matured TLCs of other

Principals, thereby linking the liquidity alternative

for the Principal wishing to dispose of TLCs to the

profits of other Principals who have sold, or will

sell, matured TLCs. However, this liquidity alter-

native does not appear to be a contractual obliga-

tion in the Agency Contract, and there was no tes-

timony or other evidence presented at the hearing

about whether this liquidity alternative was relied

upon or material to the Principals in making an

investment decision.

Fifth, in TLA’s promotional video, Majors admits

that he buys the second and third liens which attach

to the property underlying the Principal’s TLCs

for the years intervening between the tax lien sale

at which TLA purchases the TLCs for the Principal

at the time at which the Principal’s TLCs mature.

Majors tells his prospective Principals in the video

that he buys such subjsequent tax liens for his

“financial institutions’? because, as Majors says, “‘l

know when you foreclose in three years or sell the

property, you’re going to pay off my financial

institution [on] that lien. ...” Tr. p. 109, ll. 11-

14. These transactions suggest that multiple in-

vestors have mutual, linked lien interests in the same

underlying properties, and that the proceeds of the

sale of such properties are shared or pooled on

some basis between multiple investors (i.e., when

the underlying property is sold, multiple investors

receive shares of the proceeds). However, the evi-

dence is ambiguous as to whom Major’s “financial

institutions” were, how they were solicited, what

34a

contractual terms applied to them, and precisely

how they were related to the Respondents. Nor is

it clear in the records whether the “financial insti-

tutions” and the first lien Principals shared the

potential for profit or loss on a ratable basis. Pre-

sumably, the second and third liens are each pur-

chased for distinct “financial institutions’ and the

Principal acquires no direct interest in such liens.

There was also no evidence presented at the hearing

as to how many such transactions occurred with

Major’s “financial institutions” or when they

occurred, or whether they involved any South

Carolina residents.

Sixth, Majors promotes TLA’s services to facil-

itate IRS Section 1031 tax-free exchanges of prop-

erties underlying the matured TLCs among various

Principals. These services suggest a horizontal

financial linkage among participating Principals who

exchange properties with one another through

TLA’s facilitation. However, these services do

not appear to be constrctual obligations of the

Agency Contract, and there was no testimony or

other evidence presented at the hearing that any

Principals actually took advantage of these ser-

vices, whether these services were relied upon or

material to Principals in making an investment

decision, or whether such exchanges involved any

South Carolina residents.

While the foregoing six aspects of TLA’s relationship

with its Principals are indicative of horizontal common-

ality, none of them seem to fall squarely within the com-

monly recognized view of this test — a pooling of the

investment proceeds and a pro rata distribution of profits

and losses. These aspects suggest degrees of horizontal

(i.e., Principal-to-Principal) economic relationship or

dependency, but either the supporting facts are ambig-

35a

uous or incomplete as presented in the hearing or the law

is not well-developed as applicable to these aspects.

Moreover, since these six aspects of the overall TLA

enterprise are more or less on the periphery of the enter-

prise, and in some instances are exceptions from the

normal course of business, a finding in this matter that

horizontal commonality existed based on these facets

alone would result in a modified C&D Order that simply

prohibits a very limited scope of the conduct at ques-

tion. Thus, reaching conclusions on fine distinctions in

these facts would seem to be unproductive and unnec-

essary, and this hearing officer declines to do so.

(ii) Strict Vertical Commonality. In their post-

hearing briefs and reply briefs, counsel for both the Staff

and the Respondents agreed that the SEC v. Pinckney,

923 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.C, 1996), enunciated the proper

analysis of the strict vertical commonality test. This

hearing officer concurs. In Pinckney, the Court for the

Eastern District of North Carolina held that ‘ta common

enterprise may be established by showing that the inves-

tor’s profits are directly related to the promoter’s pro-

fits”. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this

conclusion, the Court concluded that the often more

restrictive horizontal commonality test is not the ex-

clusive test for the “‘common enterprise” element of the

Howey analysis. To rely exclusively on horizontal com-

monality would be “overly restrictive and not in keeping

with the Act’s remedial goal of preventing . . . [viola-

tions of the securities laws] in connection with an offer

of what would otherwise be a security but for the ab-

sence of multiple investors.” Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.

at 82. Exclusive reliance on horizontal commonality

would “also make the test easy to evade by a disingen-

uous promoter who simply maintains separate bank

36a sic;

accounts or who dissipates the investors’ contributions

immediately”. Monaghan at 2157.

In the instant matter, TLA’s Agency Contract with

its Principals provides expressly for an equal 50/50 shar-

ing between TLA and the Principal of the profits derived

from the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs,

after the Principal and TLA are each reimbursed their

respective out-of-pocket costs. In his testimony, Majors

acknowledged that this was the primary motivation for

TLA undertaking this enterprise and the only source of

profit for TLA, as the relatively nominal non-refundable

agency fee did not cover the costs of operations. Thus,

the Principals’ profits are inceed directly related to TLA’s

profits and vice versa.

In the expert testimony of Attorney Robert A. Singer

offered by the Respondents at the hearing, and in Res-

pondents’ post-hearing briefs, Respondents contend that

because in the instant situation TLA’s revenues are der-

ived from the Principals’ profits, that this is the “exact

opposite of the relationship required . . . to show strict

vertical commonality”. Respondents’ Brief dated Nov-

ember 26, 2003, p. 17. However, in Pinckney, which

was a summary judgment case cited in Respondent’s

_ Briefs, the court concluded that “evidence... that...

[the promoters’] fortunes would be linked to... [the

investor’s] return on the investment and those fortunes

would be derived from a percentage of the [investor’s]

return” was legally sufficient to establish a factual dis-

pute as to the existence of a common enterprise. Pinck-

ney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this conclusion, the

Pinckney court analyze whether an investment in “prime

bank instruments” by a individual investor would satis-

fy the strict vertical commonality test for purposes of

37a

the ‘“‘common enterprise” element oi the Howey anal-

ysis. In Pinckney, the defendants were promoters who

would profit only as a result of commissions or a simi-

lar payments of a percentage of the return received by

the investor. Thus, the Pinckney court reached a con-

clusion that the promoter’s profit being linked to the

investor’s profit has the same impact, for purposes of

strict vertical commonality, as the investor’s profit being

linked to the promoter’s profit. In other words, Pinck-

ney held that it is legally sufficient that the profit of

the investor and the promoter are linked; and it is not

determinative for purposes of the strict vertical com-

monality test whose profits are derivative upon the

profits of whom. This is particularly so in the instant

matter since TLA has from the beginning of the ar-

rangement a 50% inchoate interest in the profits of the

sale of property underlying matured TLCs. Both the

Principals and TLA profit from the sale of the property

in the same fashion and at the same time, and pursuant

to parallel and equal interests. See Reynolds, 952 F.2d

at 1130-31 (“One indicator of vertical commonality,

though by no means the only indicator, is an arrange-

ment to share profits on a percentage basis between the

investor and the... promoter.... In the instant case,

[the promoter] ... told investors he would take a man-

agement fee based on a percentage of profits, thus mak-

ing his own profit contingency on the profit of his

investors”’).

Moreover, that a clever and creative promoter can

develop investment vehicles whereby the promoter’s

profits are derived from the investor’s profits, and not

vice versa, should not eliminate the application of the

securities laws and the availability of the protections of

investors mended to be afforded thereby, especially in

38a

light of Howey’s conclusion that the purposes of the

inclusion of the term “investment contract’’ in the def-

inition of “security” was to provide a flexible term that

will achieve the purposes of the securities laws in a var-

iety of changing situations in a dynamic marketplace.

Monaghan at 2145 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing

Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 64S. Ct. 120 (1943)).

This hearing officer concludes, therefore, that “strict

vertical commonality” is an appropriate test for the

“common enterprise” element of the Howey analysis,

that the Pinckney case analysis is apposite, and that

under the Pinckney analysis, the facts of the instant

matter satisfy the “strict vertical commonality” test for

the “common enterprise”’ element of the Howey anal-

ysis.

(c) Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of

Others. The third element of the Howey analysis is

whether the investor had an expectation of profits

“solely” from the efforts of the promoter or third

party. Monaghan at 2137. This element of the Howey

analysis addresses the degree of control by the investor

over the profit-making aspects of the transaction. Mona-

ghan at 2149. Over the years since the enunciation of

the Howey analysis, the courts have not strictly con-

strued the word “solely” from the efforts of others.

Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920

(4th Cir. 1990); Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. The

later cases after Howey have softened this requirement

by interpreting “‘solely” to mean “‘largely’’ or “‘prin-

cipally”. Monaghan at 2149. This test can still be

met if the most essential functions or duties must be

performed by others and not the investor. Batley, 904

“F.2d at 920; see also Garrett, 359 S.E.2d at 285-86.

Moreover, the court is not required to look exclusively

39a

at the language of the contract. “Rather, it must con-

sider the economic realities of the situation to deter-

mine whether the investor has any real control over the

management of his investment.” Waterman v. Alta

Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.C.

1986); see also Robinson v, Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170

(4th Cir. 2003) (“What matters more than the form of

an investment scheme is the ‘economic reality’ that it

represents”). See generally South Carolina Securities

Statement of Policy 95-2 (membership interests in a

member-managed limited liability company will con-

stitute securities where the “facts and circumstances ren-

der substantially meaningless the managerial powers”

of the members despite the rights of control granted to

members by statute or the operating agreement).

In the Waterman case, the court focused on the pro-

moter’s managerial efforts that could cause the invest-

ment to increase in value, the manager’s special expertise

in selecting items within a particular class of items which

will appreciate at a faster rate than a particular class in

general, and the managerial efforts dcaling with the

property where an investor is unable or not equipped to

do so. In Waterman, the investor had a contractual right

to manage the feeding and care of the cattle in which the

investor invested; however, the court found that the

investor could not have invested in a cattle operation

except through an operation managed in a fashion such

as offered by the promoter. The investor seldom was

able to visit the operation and lacked the expertise or

time to manage the cattle operation. The court con-

cluded that, in looking at the reality of the situation,

the investor did not in fact have any real control over

the maintenance of the investment. In reaching this con-

clusion, the court focused on the promoter’s representa-

40a

tions that it would provide a “turn-key package” and

its advertisements that it “handles everything’ for its

investors. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 805-806. As a

result, the Waterman court found that this third element

of the Howey analysis was satisfied despite the contract-

ual right of the investor to determine when to sell the

cattle. This conclusion was based on the impracticality

of the investor having any real control over the deci-

sions. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 806; see also SEC

v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.

1994).

In the instant situation, this hearing officer reaches

a similar conclusion that the essential functions from

which the profit? is derived were to be performed by

TLA and Majors. The Principals typically have no

input into what TLCs are purchased for them. They

merely sign the Agency Contract and provide the funds

to TLA, relying on TLA to screen the properties, select

the TLCs, attend the auction, conduct the bid, and pro-

cess the paperwork. The selection of TLCs is the essent-

ial step in making a profit — TLA touts its expertise in

selecting TLCs that will mature to permit a sale of the

underlying property for a value greater than the amount

of the investment, and the Agency Contract reserves to

TLA the essential decision-making authority for the

2 It is indisputable that the Principals expect a “profit” from

this investment in TLC. All of TLA’s promotional materials hype

the return on investment that prospective Principals can expect

(see e.g., Tr. p. 57, I. 8-11), and in his testimony, Majors fre-

quently referred to “profits” for investors and TLA from the sale

of the properties underlying the TLCs. The only legitimate ques-

tion, therefore, is whether the Principals were led to expect the

profit from the efforts of others or themselves.

4la

selection of TLCs to purchase. TLA discourages (quite

successfully, it appears) the Principals from setting cri-

teria for the purchase of TLCs by TLA.

Majors and TLA also promote the TLC Investment

Opportunity as one in which the Principals have to do

little or nothing, and tout repetitively that “we do all

the work’, While the Agency Contract technically leaves

to the Principal the right to select legal counsel, real

. estate brokers, and other professionals necessary to quiet

the title and sell the property underlying matured TLCs,

this right is no more than rarely exercised, according

to Majors’ testimony. Moreover, the Principals have no

realistic ability to control the sale of the property under-

lying the matured TLCs. Under the Agency Contract, the

Principals have an obligation to use their best efforts to

sell the property, and if TLA requests, immediately con-

vey to TLA the 50% inchoate interest in the property, or

in the alternative they must buy TLA’s 50% interest in

the property at 50% of its appraised value if the Prin-

cipals wish to retain the property. The Principals must

bear the costs and other burdens of compliance with

these obligations, which TLA offers in its marketing

materials to expertly supervise and minimize using its

experience, connections, and volume leverage. Thus, the

obligations imposed on the Principals by the Agency

Contract create pressure on the Principals to let TLA

“do all the work” to quiet the title and sell the property.

The Principals are most often located far from the prop-

erties. TLA’s marketing program almost ensures that it

will most frequently purchase TLCs for Principals who

are located nowhere near the location of the Principals.

Majors even markets that he does not know, at the time

of a seminar when Principals are solicited and contracted,

where their money will be invested. The Principals have

42a

virtually no input into the selection, identity, character-

istics, or location of the underlying properties at the time

the TLCs are purchased for them, and generally have rela-

tively small units of investment in separate properties

located in various states, which would not justify travel

to, or other long-distance control over, the properties

or the sale process.

Given the volume of properties in the overall enter-

prise, as managed by TLA, and TLA’s heavy promotion

of its expertise, experience, services, and connections

with regard to selecting TLCs and selling the underlying

properties in an efficient, fast, and profitable manner,

the Principals’ technical legal rights to control the sale

process appears to be a little more than window-dressing.

See Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1133-34 (“While the sales

contract gave investors the right to make other arrange-

ments for the refining of their ore, there is no evidence

that a single investor exercised that right. Promotional

materials for the program did not emphasize investors’

legal right to refine the ore themselves but rather . .

[the Promoter’s] commitment to build a new refinery

at which investor’s ore would be processed. Further-

more, since the refining contract was included in the

price paid for the ore, investors would have incurred

unnecessary costs if they had the ore transported and

refined elsewhere.”). The mere existence of contract-

ual rights of control granted in the Agency Contract to

the Principals is not determinative. See Robinson, 349

F.3d at 170 (“Agreements do not annul the securities

laws by retaining nominal powers for investors un-

able to exercise them.”). It is unrealistic to anticipate

that the Principals would incur the cost and hassle

inherent in exercising this right and it is completely

consistent with the realities of the overall situation

43a

to conclude that the efforts of TLA and Majors (e.g.,

the handling of the complicated paperwork for, and

expert attendance at, remote auction sales of TLCs in

a wide variety of locations throughout 26 states, the

selection and purchase of TLCs that are more likely

to mature for sale at values greater than the amount

of investment, the replacement of redeemed TLCs

with new TLCs at no additional charge, the offer and

arrangement of liquidity in the Principals’ investment

in TLCs, the arrangement of Section 1031 exchange

opportunities, and the expert selection and negotiation

with professionals to efficiently, quickly, and profit-

ably sell the underlying properties) are the “undeni-

ably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts

which affect the failure ot success of the enterprise.”

SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,

482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94

S. Ct. 117 (1973). These services are also the empha-

sized core of TLA’s marketing program. By virtue of

the realities of the situation, TLA and Majors have and

will perform all of the essential functions of managing

the TLC Investment Opportunity, and not the Prin-

cipals. 3 See Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82; see also Gar-

rett, 359 S.E.2d at 286.

3s an analogy, Respondent’s expert Attorney Singer testi-

fied that the contractual and statutory rights of general partners

of general partnerships and members of member-managed limited

liability companies to control the management of the business

entity resulted in these investments not satisfying the Howey anal-

ysis, meaning these investments were held not to be “securities’’.

However, the case law and statements of policy to which Attor-

ney Singer referred take exception from the indicated results, and

subject such investments to the securities laws, where it is imprac-

tical or unrealistic that the general partners or members can or will

[footnote continued]

,

;

os

a

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:

44a

Thus, the TLC Investment Opportunity satisfies all

three elements of the Howey analysis, meaning that the

TLC Investment Opportunity is an “investment con-

tract’’ for purposes of the definition of “‘security” under

Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act.

2. Certificate of Interest or Participation in a Profit

Sharing Agreement. Counsel for the Staff also asserts

that the TLC Investment Opportunity constitutes a

“certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing

agreement” under Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act. The

South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled on the definition

of this type of “security” in McGaha v. Moseley, 283

S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984). In the Mc-

Gaha case, the investor was granted by written assign-

ment an interest in the profits that arose under a fran-

chise agreement that the promoter had with a third party.

The court concluded that on its face, the written assign-

ment of an interest in the profits arising under the fran-

chise agreement constituted a “certificate of interest

or participation in a profit-sharing agreement”. McGaha,

322 S.E.2d at 464.

In the instant case, counsel for the Respondents have

asserted through expert testimony of Attorney Singer

and the post-hearing briefs that the TLC Investment

Opportunity does not constitute a “certificate of interest

or participation in a profit sharing agreement” because

the Principals do not depend on the profits of TLA for

their return. In other words, Respondents assert that the

dependency of TLA on the profits to be derived from

the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs owned

by the Principals is the opposite of what would be re-

quired for a “certificate of interest or participation in a

profit sharing agreement” for purposes of the definition

of “security’’ under Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act.

45a

While this hearing officer does not find persuasive this

analysis as asserted in connection with the “common ent-

erprise” element of the Howey analysis by which the

term “investment contract” is defined for purposes

of the Act, this analysis is useful for purposes of the

definition of a “certificate of interest or participa-

tion in a profit-sharing agreement”. The analysis was

inconsistent with the Pinckney case for purposes of

the definition of “investment contract’, but is con-

sistent with the McGaha case for purposes of the defini-

tion of “certificate of interests or participation in a

profit-sharing agreement”’.

In McGaha, the promoter made an assignment to the

investor of the promoter’s profit rights in the franchise

agreement between the promoter and a third party. The

court found this assignment to be sufficient to meet the

definition of a “security”. Moreover, if a mere co-de-

pendency for profits, such as that arising from the equal

50/50 sharing by TLA and the Principals of profits

derived from the sale of property underlying the matured

TLCs, were to be sufficient for purposes of the defin-

ition of “certificate of interests or participation in a

profit-sharing agreement’’, then there would be very lit-

tle distinction between an “investment contract” and a

“certificate of interest or participation in a profit-shar-

ing agreement” for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of

the Act. We must assume that the legislature intended

different things by inclusion of different terms in the

definition; hence, a distinction would seem to be approp-

riate in the definitions of the terms included by the

legislature. Moreover, unlike an “investment contract”,

the term “certificate of interest or participation in a

profit-sharing agreement’’ on its face suggests that the

certificate or interest obtained by the investor must be

46a

granted in the profits of someone other than the inves-

tor in order for this term to have a sensible meaning.

See McGaha, 322 S.E.2d at 464. In the instant case,

TLA derives its profits from the sale by the Principals

of the property underlying the Principal’s matured TLC,

which is a relationship opposite from the McGaha

which is a relationship opposite from the McGaha rela-

tionship. In addition, since there is ample support for

the conclusion that the TLC Investment Opportunity

constituted a “security” for purposes of the Act under

the definition of “investment contract” as described

above, there is no need to determine whether an ex-

pansion on the apparent definition of “certificate of

interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement”

enunciated in McGaha is appropriate, and this hearing

officer declines to do so.

APPLICATION OF THE ACT

The TLC Investment Opportunity offered and sold

by TLA, who was controlled by Majors, is an “invest-

ment contract” under the definition of “security” in

Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act by virtue of application

by the Howey analysis, satisfying all three of the Howey

elements: (i) an investment of money under the Pinck-

ney case, (ii) in a common enterprise under the strict

vertical commonality test set forth in Pinckney, (iii) for

which the Principals expect profit to be derived from

be able to exercise effectively such rights of control. See ¢.g.,

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented,

454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); South Carolina Securities

Statement of Policy 95-2 (“The analytical pattern usually turns,

in essence, upon a qualitative analysis about the meaningful partici-

pation of investors in management of the entity”.).

47a

the efforts of TLA and Majors under the Waterman,

Reynolds, and Garrett cases. This conclusion is sup-

ported by the methods and content of the promotional

materials and activity of TLA and Majors, which tout the

TLC Investment Opportunity as a lucrative, passive,

remote investment, in which TLA and Majors “do all

the work”, The realities of the overall situation and the

nature of TLA’s promotional materials override the

technical rights of control granted to the Principals in

the Agency Contract.

Since the TLCs Investment Opportunity is a “‘secur-

ity” under the Act, then the offer and sale of the TLCs

Investment Opportunity are subject to regulation of the

Act and jurisdiction of the Commission. Respondents

have not sustained the burden of proof under Section

35-1-340 of the Act that an exemption from the regis-

tration requirements is applicable to the transaction.

Moreover, it would appear that no such exemption could

be sustained under the facts as presented at the hearing.

See e.g., Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 807 (“[P]ublic

advertising is incompatibie with the claim of a private

offering”) (quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Intl

Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)).

It is undisputed that neither the TLCs Investment Oppor-

tunity offered and sold by TLA, nor the promoters of

the TLCs Investment Opportunity, have been registered

with the Commission under Sections 35-1-810 et seq.

and -410 et seg. of the Act. Thus, TLA, and Majors as

its controlling person under Section 35-1-1500, have

violated the registration requirements of Sections 35-1-

810 et seg. of the Act* and are subject to enforcement

*The “security” in this matter was the TLC Investment

Opportunity embodied in TLA’s Agency Contract and related ser-

[footnote continued]

48a

action by the Commission for such violations under Sec-

tion 35-1-60 of the Act.

Counsel for the Staff introduced testimony and

other evidence at the hearing of misrepresentations and

omissions by TLA and Majors in connection with the

promotion and sale of TLCs Investment Opportunities.

Majors stipulated to “puffery”. Tr. at p. 248, ll. 23-25.

And the testimony and promotional materials intro-

duced into evidence at the hearing included “puffery”

that would be inappropriate, and omitted disclosures

that would be expected, in a registered securities offer-

ing. It is clear that TLA’s promotional materials would

vices. Thus, TLA is the “issuer” of the security under Section

$5-1-20(10) of the Act. Majors is the sole shareholder and officer

of TLA. The testimony and other evidence presented at the hear-

ing was ambiguous and incomplete (e.g., there was no evidence pre-

sented about how Majors was compensated, if at all, for his services

in soliciting prospective Principals), and the parties’ post-hearing

briefs provided no definitive legal authorities, as to whether either

TLA or Majors were “engaged in the business of effecting transac-

tions in securities for the account of others or for... [their] own

account[s]” within the meaning of Section 35-1-20(3) for pur-

poses of the broker-dealer registration requirements of Section

35-1410 of the Act. Aconclusicn that Respondents violated Sec-

tion 35-1410 of the Act is somewhat derivative upon a violation

of Section 35-1-810 of the Act. Majors would be an “agent” of

the issuer under Section 35-1-20(2) for purposes of Section 35-1-

415 of the Act and would have been entitled to an issuer sales

permit under SC Securities Rule 113-2 (Order 97003, Proposed

Rule 113-201(C)), if the TLC Investment Opportunity were a

registered offering and if he performed substantial other duties

for TLA and was not improperly compensated, etc. The remedial

goals of the Act can be adequately achieved by a conclusion merely

that Respondents violated Sections 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. A

conclusion that Respondents also violated Section 35-1-410 of

the Act is problematic, and to a large degree duplicative. Thus,

this hearing officer declines to rule on whether the Respondents

also violated the broker-dealer or agent registration requirements of

Sections 35-1410 et seq. of the Act.

49a

not satisfy the requirements for a prospectus pursuant

to a registration of the offer or sale of the TLC Invest-

ment Opportunity under Section 35-1-880 of the Act,

and that most of the materials would not be permitted

for use as “advertisement or other sales literature”

under Section 35-1-50 of the Act and South Carolina

Securities Statement of Policy with Respect to Adver-

tising of New Issues (Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) 951,553).

It is not enough for purposes of liability under the anti-

fraud requirements of the Act, however, that there are

simply misrepresentations, omissions, or other “puf-

fery” — the misrepresentations or omissions must be

material. Section 35-1-1210 of the Act.

A finder of fact could infer materiality from the

circumstances. For example, since it appears a likely

opportunity for loss of investor’s funds would be a mis-

handling of the funds by TLA, a finder of fact could

conclude that Respondents’ repetition of the phrase

“we never touch your money” without describing the

exceptions when the Principals’ funds are deposited

into Majors’ attorney trust account, or Respondents’

failure to fully and accurately describe Majors’ disbar-

ment by the Georgia Bar or the receivership of Majors’

prior Tax Lien Acquisitions company in Georgia were

material. Or for sample, since TLA’s promotional mat-

erials tout TLA’s expertise and the Principals are depend-

ent on TLA’s expertise to produce a profit from the

TLC Investment Opportunity, a finder of fact could

conclude that Majors’ representation that he author-

ized and published two definitive books on TLCs that

sold thousands of copies and were “best sellers”, if

not true (and the truth of these representations stretches

credibility when Majors cannot furnish a single copy of

either “best seller” book at the present), were material.

>! ; 7%

me :

ie leper “4 =

50a

There has been, however, no persuasive showing of a

loss or even of unresolved complaints by investors. In

fact, the only evidence about the level of satisfaction of

the Principals with regard to the TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity is admittedly self-serving (but essentially uncon-

troverted) testimony from Majors, a witness with an

acknowledged tendency toward “puffery”, that none

of his investors have complained about the TLC Invest-

ment Opportunity. A finder of fact could certainly

conclude from the absence of testimony by, or other

persuasive evidence of, complaining or disgruntled Prin-

cipals, and Majors’ testimony about his generally favor-

able relationships with his Principals, that TLA’s Prin-

cipals are uniformly satisfied, repeat customers.? To

impose criminal or even civil procedures against a pro-

moter whose investors appear to be satisfied with their

investments would seem to be an odd, and unduly puni-

tive, result.

Moreover, this case turns on a novel legal issue in

South Carolina (i.e., whether the “strict vertical com-

51f this matter results in the disconuation of TLA’s business,

it is not inconceivable to anticipate that TLA’s existing investors

will be disappointed, if in fact, as the testimony and other evidence

suggests, they are indeed satisfied with the TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity. Registration of the TLC Investment Opportunity, if prac-

ticable, will increase the costs of the enterprise, a cost increase

which might be passed on to the investors. However, the policy

underlying the securities laws is that the investing public benefits

from the disclosure and other regulation imposed by the securities

laws, which contribute to more efficient and reliable markets, in

ways exceeding the costs and practical limitations which result

from compliance. See generally Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; Mona-

ghan at 2139-44. This is true even if the particular investors might

prefer to eschew the delays, complications, and costs inherent in

compliance with the securities laws for a specific investment

scheme in which they are presently satisfied.

5la

monality” test is sufficient for purposes of the ‘“tcom-

mon enterprise’ element of the Howey analysis) about

which, in advance of this ruling, reasonable minds could

have drawn differing legal conclusions. If the TLC

Investment Opportunity did not constitute a “‘secur-

ity” under the Act, about which there was uncertainty

prior to this ruling, then in the absence of a loss by

investors, Majors’ puffery and omissions would probably

not be regulated, or at least not actionable.© The deter-

mination that the TLC Investment Opportunity is a

“security” is a close question. In light of all of these

considerations, it would appear inappropriate to penalize

the Respondents for violation of the anti-fraud require-

ments of the Act for misstatements, omissions, or other

“puffery” occurring prior to this ruling. No abuse of

the investing public’s trust in TLA or Majors has been

proven by a demonstration of loss or unresolved com-

plaints. And to accomplish the legitimate objectives of

The anti-fraud provisions of fedcral and state securities

laws create a remedy that is almost unique in the law since proof

of damages is not an element required for a remedy. Outside of

the securities laws, misrepresentations, omissions, or other ‘“‘puf-

fery” by Respondents, in the absence of proof of damages suf-

fered by the Principals, would not ordinarily give rise to a recov-

ery or other remedy, other than perhaps an equitable rescission of

the contract. The securities laws were not intended as a codifi-

cation of common law fraud. They are intended to create a special

type of regulatory scheme that is different from common law

fraud, with broader goals, providing prevention, enforcement, res-

cission, and other remedies even where an investor suffers no loss.

See Monaghan at 2142-45; see also Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 79

(the prospective investor chose not to invest, and therefore suf-

fered no loss; yet the SEC pursued an enforcement action against

the promoters that was upheld on summary judgment). Further

prevention would appear to be the only legitimate goa] in the

instant case, in the absence of a showing of loss or other abuses.

53a

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and legal

conclusions, this hearing officer makes the following

recommendations: |

1. The Securities Commissioner should, pursuant to

Section 35-1-60 of the Act, issue a final Cease and Desist

Order modified from the September 9, 2003 C&D Order

to be consistent with the findings of fact and analysis

and conclusions of law set forth in (or to incorporate by

reference and attached) this Report and Recommenda-

tion, and in particular should: (a) find that the TLC

Investment Opportunity, as offered and sold prior to

September 9, 2003 by TLA, which is controlled by Maj-

ors, is an “investment contract”’ under the definition of

“security” in Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act by virtue of

the Howey case analysis (which has been adopted in

South Carolina in the Garrett case), satisfying all three

of the Howey elements: (i) an investment of money

under the Pinckney case, (ii) in a common enterprise

under the “strict vertical commonality” test set forth

in the Pinckney case, (iii) for which the Principals expect

profit to be derived from the efforts of Respondents

under the Waterman, Reynolds, and Garrett cases; (b)

prohibit the offer and sale of the TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity by Respondents and every successor, affiliate,

control person, agent, servent, or employee of either of

them, and every entity owned, operated, or directly

or indirectly controlled or organized by or on behalf

of either of them, in or from the State of South Carolina

in violation of the registration requirements of Sections

35-1-810 et seg. of the Act; (c) deny and revoke any

exemption from such registration requirements of the

Act which Respondents and such other persons or entities

described above might otherwise have had with respect

54a

to the offer and sale of TLC Investment Opportunity;

and (d) grant Respondents the right to review of the

Order in the proper court for Richland County, South

Carolina, or the county in which the Respondents reside,

by filing within thirty days after entry of the Order a

proper written petition, as required by Section 35-1-

1310 of the Act. As this hearing officer did not con-

clude’ that (i) the TLC Investment Opportunity satis-

fied the “horizontal commonality” test for the defin-

ition of an “investment contract” under Section 35-1-

20(15) of the Act or constituted a “certificate of inter-

est or participation in a profit-sharing agreement,” (ii)

the Respondents violated the broker-dealer or agent

registration requirements of Section 35-1-410 of the Act,

or (ili) the Respondents made material misrepresenta-

tions and omissions in connection with the offer and sale

of the TLC Investment Opportunity, the modified Cease

and Desist Order should exclude any reference to, or

enforcement action based on, such issues.

2. Other than the modified Cease and Desist Order

described in Recommendation 1 above, the Commission

should not pursue criminal or civil penalties against

Respondents {unless subsequent complaints or other evi-

dence are received indicating loss or other violations of

the anti-fraud requirements of the Act) for violation of

the registration requirements of the Act by Respondents

in connection with offering and selling the TLC Invest-

ment Opportunities prior to September 9, 2003 because

7This hearing officer determind that, in this proceeding,

conclusions on these issues were problematic in light of ambiguous

or conflicting evidence or uncertainty in the law, and/or were

unnecessary to achieve the remedial objectives of the Act in this

matter.

55a

this matter turns upon a novel legal issue in South Caro-

lina about which, prior to this ruling, reasonable minds

could reach differing conclusions.

3. The Commission should not pursue criminal or civil

penalties against Respondents (unless subsequently com-

plaints or other evidence are received indicating loss or

other violations of the anti-fraud requirements of the

Act) for the specific instances of potential violations of

the anti-fraud requirements of the Act by Respondents

prior to September 9, 2003, as to which testimony and

other evidence was presented at the hearing, because this

matter turns upon a novel legal issue in South Carolina

about which, prior to this ruling, reasonable minds could

reach differing conclusions.

4. The finding in this Report and Recommendation of

violation of the registration requirements of the Act by

Respondents, and the testimony and other evidence

presented at the hearing of specific instances of potential

violations of the anti-fraud requirements of the Act,

should not alone serve as grounds for denial of an appli-

cation by ILA and Majors to register the TLC Invest-

ment Opportunities (or a future iteration thereof) under

Sections 35-1-810 et seq. of the Act, or qualify for an

exemption from such registration requirements, or to

register themselves as securities broker-dealers or agents

under Sections 35-1410 et seg. of the Act.’ Registra-

8 This hearing officer notes that under specified conditions,

Respondents might not be required to register as broker-dealers

or agents under Sections 35-1-410 et seq. of the Act in connection

with future registered, or certain future exempt, offerings of the

TLC Investment Opportunity. See e.g., Sections 35-1-415(1) and

(3) of the Act; and SC Securities Rule 113-2 (Order 97003, Pro-

posed Rule 113-201(C)).

56a

tion of the offer and sale of the TLC Opportunity, and

the regulation of all of the related promotional activities

and disclosures by Respondents, would seem to accom-

plish the purposes of the Act so long as this proceeding

and the results hereof are adequately disclosed in the sub- ©

ject prospectus or other disclosure document. However,

this recommendation should not be construed as a man-

date that such registrations or exemptiens be granted

if the applications do not comply with all applicable

requirements of the Act and the rules, regulations, and

statements of policies promulgated pursuant to the Act,

or if evidence of violations of the Act or other wrong-

doing by TLA, Majors or their agents other than as des-

cribed in this Report and Recommendation is found to

warrant denial of such registrations or exemptions.

5.No legal conclusion reached or declined in this

Report and Recommendation or the modified Cease and

Desist Order described in Recommendation 1 above shall

prohibit the pursuit by any Principal or other investor of

a private right oi action against Respondents under Sec-

tions 35-1-1490 or -1500 of the Act, if any.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ G. Marcus Knight

G. Marcus Knight

Hearing Officer

Date: January 13, 2004

57a

Exhibit A

AGENCY CONTRACT

This contract is formed to acquire real property Tax

Liens or Tax Lien Certificates, hereafter referred to as

TLCs. The undersigned, TAX LIEN AGENTS, Inc.,

(TLA) an Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent, 1s

hereafter referred to as ‘Agent’ and the other under-

signed, hereafter referred to as ‘Principal’, are the sole

two parties to this two-party employment contract.

Both parties agree to the following terms and conditions:

1. Agent will make all purchasing decisions, subject to

such criteria as may be specified by Principal. Principal

will make all selling decisions. Agent shall pay all ex-

penses of going to TLCs auction sites, searching tax

records, evaluating the properties, bidding (it is under-

stood by Principal that, unless Principal instructs Agent

otherwise, Agent will bid primarily on tax liens that,

in Agent’s exclusive opinion, have a reasonable prospect

of not being redeemed) and purchasing TLC(s) only in

Principal’s name or, in event of a Trust, Principal Trust’s

name. Principal agrees to pay Agent a NON-REFUND-

ABLE AGENCY FEE and grants an inchoate interest of

50% ownership in any unredeemed TLC(s) to Agent for

its valuable service.

2. Principal will give Agent FDIC Insured Bank Cash-

ier’s Checks made payable to “COUNTY TREASURER

FOR TAX LIENS” or, if Principal is using a fiduciary

Trust, will give Principal’s Trust a Trust Investmeit Dir-

ection Authorization for the maximum amount that

Principal wishes Agent to buy in TLC(s). Each TLC

bought will be listed in Principal’s name or Trust’s name

by the issuing governmental entity, hereinafter referred

58a

to as “County”, with Principal’s address or Trust address

as the official notification address. Principal and/or

Trust agree that Agent will be notified when anything

happens concerning the TLC. After each auction, Prin-

cipal and/or Trust should get a receipt or a certificate

from the County which shows the exact cost of the

TLC(s). All monies paid to County in excess of the exact

cost of the TLC(s) should be refunded directly back to

the Principal or Trust by the County according to that

government’s policies.

3. If any original TLC is redeemed before its matur-

ity date, Agent agrees that Principal shall keep all re-

demption monies, including interest and penalties, and

Agent shall not be entitled to any of such amounts. If

Principal provides the necessary funds to reinvest such

proceeds, using the procedures set forth in paragraph

2 above, Agent (without charging any additional agency

fee) shall use its best efforts to purchase replacement

TLC(s) at the next tax lien auction that Agent attends.

Agent further agrees, if Principal so elects, to continue

to reinvest redemption monies, at no additional charge,

until (a) Principal receives a matured tax lien/certificate

or tax deed or (b) thirty six (36) months have passed

from the original date of first TLC purchase.

4,.Agent SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT OF FIRST

REFUSAL should Principal and/or Trust decides to

sell or transfer ownership of the TLC(s) or resultant

property purchased under this contract. If Principal/

Trust sells or otherwise transfers its ownership of a TLC

to any other party, the transferee or purchasing party

is required to become the new Principal party and must

agree in writing to the same terms and conditions as

this contract. If Principal/Trust violates the aforesaid

conditions, Principal/Trust must immediately buy out

59a

Agent’s interest by paying to Agent 50% of the then >

appraised value of the real property that secures each

pertinent TLC. If Principal uses a Trust to acquire and

hold the TLC, it is also agreed that once Agent is noti-

fied of any sale proceeds, if Agent does not file a writ-

ten demand with the Trustee of such Trust for the

amounts due to Agent in accordance with this contract

(with the exception of a transfer condition, for which

no claim against Trustee can be made at any time) with-

in 90 days after payment is received by Trustee, no

future demands or claims for such amounts may be

made against Trustee, and any such demand or claim

must be made by Agent directly to the Principal and

Grantor of the Trust.

5. If not in a fiduciary Trust, once a TLC’s period of

redemption has expired, Principal agrees, upon Agent’s

request, to immediately sign such papers as are legally

required to assign, convey, register and confirm that

Agent has an earned 50% interest in the net profit of

the TLC and in any resultant Tax Deed, Warranty Deed,

Property Deed, Treasurer’s Deed or such other docu-

ments and instruments regarding title to the related real

property that may be issued by the County. Unless

Principal and Agent otherwise agree, once the Govern-

ment issues a tax deed or title to Principal, Principal

shall promptly thereafter commence good faith efforts

to quiet the title and sell such property. Agent, upon

Principal’s request, will contact and negotiate terms with

a third party attorney who Principal can then retain to

prepare documents necessary to arrange for good and

marketable (quiet) title to the property represented by

the TLC(s). If and to the extent that Principal so re-

quests, Agent shall conduct or supervise the listing, nego-

tiation and sale of the property, and shall retain real

60a

estate brokers, agents, and such other professionals as

Agent deems advisable. At closing, the proceeds of the

sale will be applied (1) to repay Principal its purchase

price, including direct out-of-pocket costs, paid for the

TLC, and (2) to reimburse Agent for any actual direct

out-of-pocket costs paid by Agent on Principal’s behalf

in connection with the marketing and sale of the prop-

erty. Thereafter, any remaining net proceeds will be

divided equally between Principal and Agent by the

escrow fiduciary per standard closing procedures. If

a TLC is held by a fiduciary Trust and such Trust cannot

legally hold a deed in that state, then the TLC itself

will be marketed and sold by Principal (or at Principal’s

request, by Agent) as if the TLC is the marketable deed,

and the gross proceeds of the sale, as determined by the

closing fiduciary as final authority, will be transferred

back to Trust to replace the TLC, upon receipt of the

gross proceeds, the Trust will pay Agent its invoice for

actual out-of-pocket costs paid by Agent on Principal’s

behalf and then Agent’s invoice for 50% of the net gain

on sale of the TLC.

6. Once a TLC’s period of redemption has expired, if

either party elects to buy the other party’s 50% interest,

each party will select one certified real estate appraiser,

who in turn will jointly select a third certified appraiser.

The resulting sale price to be paid, either by Principal or

by Agent for the other party’s 50% interest, will be 50%

of the average of all three appraisals.

7.Except for the purchase by Agent of the TLC

itself and the incidental costs of sale per paragraph 5,

no party may obligate the other party to any liabilities

without the written consent of the other party.

6la

8.Princiy understands, while there are no risks

in owning gc‘ ernment sold and issued TLC(s) that are

redeemed (paid off), there are potential down side

financial risks if a TLC matures into a property deed

as the underlying property market value could sub-

stantially drop during the tax lien maturity period.

9. This contract is the full and complete agreement

between the parties. This contract shall be governed by

and construed in accordance with the laws of the State

of South Carolina. Time is of the essence.

NOTICE: COUNTY TAX LIENS ARE SOLD AND REGULAT-

ED BY LAWS OF THE STATE THEY ARE LOCATED IN AND

THIS AGREEMENT IS VOID ONLY WHERE IT CONFLICTS

WITH THOSE LAWS.

(If Principal is a legal resident of California,

use California agency contract)

AGREED this —_ day of - 206...

AGENT

TAX LIEN AGENTS, INC.

by

Print Name

Title

4502 Hwy. 17 Bypass So., Myrtle Beach, SC 29588

Phone 843-293-6307

Fax 843-293-6340

AGREED this ___ day of jain

PRINCIPAL

Print Name

Signature

62a

Address

City IG aicecsiceinnabieinis: MAMI iectatnac

Day Phone

Night Phone

Fax Number

SS# or Fed. ID#

Principal’s Witness Signature Date

Principal’s Witness’ Address and Phone

Agent’s Witness’ Signature Date

FOR AGENT’S USE ONLY |

W9 or W8 ____

Amount of TLC(s) to purchase: $

Fee Paid: $ Referred by:

63a

APPENDIX C

| [Filed May 23, 2007]

[SEAL]

THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Daniel E. Shearouse Brenda F. Shealy

Clerk Of Court Chief Deputy Clerk

Post Office Box 11330

Columbia, South Carolina 29211

(803) 734-1080

FAX (803) 734-1499

May 23, 2007

Mr. Ned Majors

133A lvy Stone Drive

Myrtle Beach,SC 29588

Re: Majors, Ned v. SC Securities Commission

Dear Mr. Majors: '

The Court has issued the following order on your Peti-

tion for Rehearing:

“Petition for rehearing is denied.

s/ Jean H. Toal C.J.

s/ James E. Moore J.

s/ E.C. Burnett III J.

s/ Costa P. Pleicones J.

64a

Justice John H. Waller, Jr., not participating.

May 23, 2007.”

The remittutur is today being forwarded to the lower

court.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Daniel E, Shearouse

CLERK

DES/jjp

cc: John F. Beach, Esquire

John J. Pringle, Jr., Esquite

Scott E. Hultstrand, Esquire

Tracy A. Meyers, Esquire

65a

APPENDIX D

[Filed Feb. 11, 2004]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

SECURITIES COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

Ned B. Majors and

Tax Lien Agents, Inc.

Respondents.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING

FINAL ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST

SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES

Case No. 03010

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arose from the issuance by the South Caro-

lina Securities Commission (the “Commission”) of an

Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities

and Engaging in Securities Fraud (the “C&D Order’’) to

Ned B. Majors (‘‘Majors”) and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.

(“TLA’’), on September 9, 2003. Respondents made a

timely requrest for a hearing to review the issuance of the

C&D Order and to determine whether a final order

should be issued.

On October 23, 2003, the South Carolina Attorney

General, acting in his statutory capacity as the State’s

Securities Commissioner, appointed attorney G. Marcus

Knight as the administrative hearing officer for this mat-

66a

ter pursuant to Section 35-1-1450 of the South Carolina

Uniform Securities Act, S.C. Code Ann. §35-1-10, et.

seq. (the “‘Act”), and delegated to the hearing officer

such authority as is necessary to conduct the hearing

and render a Report and Recommendation. A public

hearing was conducted on October 30 and 31, 2003 pur-

suant to Section 35-1-90 of the South Carolina Uniform

Securities Act, §.C. Code Ann. §35-1-10, et seq. (the

“Act”’), and the following findings of fact and conclusion

of law result.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

TLA is a South Carolina corporation organized by

filing of its Articles of Incorporation with the South

Carolina Secretary of State on November 19, 1998. TLA

commenced its business during 1999 and has, from the

inception, operated its business principally from Myrtle

Beach, South Carolina. Majors is a resident of South

Carolina and the sole shareholder and officer of TLA.

The primary business activity of TLA centers around

the bidding and purchasing of tax lien certificates

(““TLCs”’) at tax lien auctions or sales conducted by the

taxing authorities of city and county governments

throughout approximately twenty-six states in the

United States. Purchasers of TLCs bid competitively

for their purchase at auctions conducted by the gov-

emmental entity by offering to accept a lower inter-

est rate than the statutorily prescribed rate to which

the issuing governmental entity is entitled. TLCs gener-

ally mature under the applicable states’ laws in priods of

one to three years. Each of the unmatured TLCs may

be redeemed by the owner of the underlying property

by paying the past due taxes, plus penalties and interest

at statutorily prescribed rates, to the issuing govern-

67a

mental entity, which in tum pays the amount of the

TLCs’ purchase price plus the bid interest rate to the

holder of the TLCs.

Each of the matured TLCs which are not redeemed

create for the holder of the TLCs the right to obtain a

tax deed or similar instrument of conveyance for the

underlying property. The TLCs holder must often

undertake legal action to quiet o” clear his title to under-

lying property of any other liens or encumberances on

the title which are junior to the tax lien by which the

holder of the TLCs obtains title. According to Majors’

testimony, all or virtually all other liens on the under-

lying property, including bank mortgages and federal

tax liens, are junior to the interest of the holder of the

TLCs, and accordingly can be extinguished in the pro-

cess of quieting title. The stated objective of an invest-

ment in TLCs is to either (1) receive a return of the

original purchase price for the TLCs plus payment of

interest and penalties from the redemption of unma-

tured TLCs by the underlying property owner, or (2)

obtain imarketabl title to and sell at a significant profit

the property underlying matured TLCs.

In conducting this enterprise, TLA serves as a contract

agent for investors (the “Principals”; individually, a

Principal”) who furnish the funds required to purchase

the TLCs. Most of the Principals appear to be individual

investors or trusts controlled by individual investors.

Many of these Principals appear to be South Carolina

residents or to have been present in South Carolina when

solicited by TLA. TLA solicits Principals pursuant to

newspaper advertisements, booths at conventions and

expositions, a website, seminars, and tapes, among other

methods. TLA has published advertisements in news-

papers in South Carolina and conducted seminars and

68a

sponsored booths at conventions and expositions in

South Carolina in recent years. Majors’ testimony and

the other evidence presented at the hearing requires the

deduction that TLA made offers and sales of TLCs to

considerably more than twenty-five persons during the

twelve-month period preceding September 9, 2003, in

or from the State of South Carolina. The relationship

between the Principals and TLA purports to be governed

by document denominated “Agency Contract.”

In its advertising, video tapes, and other promotional

materials, TLA claimed, among other things, that: “We

eliminate all the risk. We do all the work. We never

touch your money.”’ Transcript of Hearing of October

30-31, 2003 (“Tr.’’), p. 149, lines 5-6. TLA also claimed

in its promotional materials that “every investment

check .. . [the Principal] make[s] will be made directly

to the government selling the tax lien ... All tax liens

will be purchased and recorded by the government in

your name and address only . . . Ned Majors, our founder,

is the recognized authority on real estate tax liens. He

wrote the book. . . . We can only make a profit when

you receive a property deed and sell it for more than

your total cost.... We do'all the work... And... we

never touch your money.” Tr. p. 146, 1. 21 — p. 147,

1. 9. TLA advertises that Principals can expect a “‘gov-

ernment guaranteed eight to twenty-five percent .. .

annual interest” return on redeemed TLCs and an “ex-

pectation of a potential yield .of 10,000 percent” on

the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs. Tr.,

p. 57, ll. 8-11. In its promotional materials, TLA claims

that “our growth expectation is not speculative. We

don’t have any speculation in our business.” Tr. p. 96,

Il. 23-25.

69a

In TLA’s promotional materials, Majors also emph-

asizes the importance of TLA’s experience, connections,

and volume leverage in connection with selecting, nego-

tiating, and engaging attomeys to quiet title to, and real

estate brokers to market and sell, the properties underly-

ing matured TLCs. See e.g., Tr. at p. 109,1. 22 — p. 113,

l. 5. Majors testified that these promotional materials

were sent to prospective Principals from TLA’s offices in

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, and were given to pros-

pective Principals at seminar and expositions conducted

in Myrtle Beach and Charleston, South Carolina, and

other locations in various states.

In the Agency Contract, each of the Principals ap-

points TLA as its agent to bid on and purchase TLCs in

the Principal’s name or in the name of a trust designated

by the Principal. The funding mechanism for purchase

of TLCs under the Agency Contract requires the Principal

to provide TLA with cashiers checks from a FDIC insured

bank payable to “County Treasurer for Tax Liens’. The

Agency Contract also states that “each TLC bought will

be listed in Principal’s name . . . by the issuing govern-

mental entity . . . with Principal’s address . . . as the offi-

cial notification address.”” The Agency Contract further

states that if the amounts of the cashiers checks provided

by the Principal for purposes of purchasing TLCs ex-

ceeds the actual cost of the TLCs purchased by TLA on

behalf of the Principal, then the excess will be refunded

by the governmental entity to the Principal.

Under the Agency Contract, the Principal will be

entitled to all interest and penalties paid in connection

with any redemption of TLCs by an underlying property

owner prior to maturity of the TLC. In the event of a

redemption of one of the TLCs, the Agency Contract

provides that TLA will continue to reinvest the redemp-

70a

tion proceeds, at no additional charge for an agency fee,

until the Principal either receives a matured TLC (or tax

deed) or a period of thirty-six months expires. In return

for TLA’s services under the Agency Contract, the Prin-

cipal agrees to pay TLA a “non-refundable agency fee”

(usually in the range of several hundred dollars) and

grants to TLA an “inchoate interest of 50% owner-

ship” in any TLCs purchased by the Agent for the

Principal which are not redeemed by the underlying

property owners within the statutorily prescribed time,

and as a result of which “go to deed”. Under the Agency

Contract, the Principal is obligated to convey the 50%

interest “in the net profit of the TLC and in any result-

ant tax deed” to TLA, and the Principal must “‘prompt-

ly thereafter commence good faith efforts to quiet

the title and sell’ the property underlying the matured

TLC. At the Principal’s request, TLA is obligated to

engage legal counsel and real estate brokers and “‘such

other professionals as . . . [TLA] deems advisable” to

complete the process of selling the property underlying

matured TLCs.

Upon the sale of the underlying property, the clos-

ing agent is directed by the terms of the Agency Con-

tract to first reimburse the Principal for its TLC pur-

chase price and the direct out-of-pocket costs, second

reimburst TLA for its direct out-of-pocket costs paid on

the Principal’s behalf in connection with the marketing

and sale of the underlying property, and third divide

equally between the Principal and TLA any remaining net

proceeds of the sale. The Agency Contract also grants

to TLA a right of first refusal should the Principal decide

to sell the TLCs or the underlying property, and requires

the Principal to purchase TLA’s 50% interest at 50% of

the appraised value of the property underlying the

7la

matured TLCs if the Principal desires to keep the prop-

erty. See Tr. at p. 298, ll. 15-25. The Agency Contract

contains an acknowledgement by the Principal that

“while there are no risks in owning government sold

and issued TLC(c) that are redeemed (paid off), there are

potential downside financial risks if a TLC matures into |

a property deed as the underlying property market value

could substantially drop during the tax lien maturity

period”.

Majors testified that while the Agency Contract grants

the Principals the legal night to specify certain criteria

governing the purchase of TLCs and to select the attor-

neys, real estate agents, and other professionals necessary

to clear title and sell the property underlying matured

TLCs, he discourages the exercise of such rights (Tr. p.

296, ll. 18-22), and that such rights are rarely exercised

by the Principals. In addition, in his promotional video

Majors stated that “I can’t tell you mght now where your

money — which auction you’re going to go to or which

county, but we know a county treasurer in every county

of all 2,642 counties who scll tax liens.” Tr. p. 102, Il.

17-22. Majors confirmed that most of his Principals

live a considerable distance from the properties to which

their TLCs apply and that they rarely exercise their rights

to select professionals needed to clear title and sell the

underlying properties. Tr. p. 299, 1. 23 — p. 300, 1. 12.

TLA’s promotional video, which appears from the

testimony to have been widely distributed to prospective

Principals, also establishes an offer of liquidity in the

TLCs purchased by TLA for its Principals. In the video,

Majors tells his prospective Principals that “if you go off

and buy tax liens [on] your own, there is no liquidity.

Because the tax collector’s not going to give you your

money back . . . However, with our program, if you hire

72a

us as our agent, and you want to sell your tax liens, we’ll

buy them from you. Or we'll have clients that buy them

from you. And usually within a week, you know, we can

handle up to about four or $500,000 a week easily. I

get that much back on redemptions almost every week.

. . » After you buy them, we'll not only buy them back

from you, but we’ll pay you the eight percent interest a

year on your money.” Tr. p. 97, Il. 5-23. Majors testi-

fied that the main source of funding for TLA’s com-

pliance with this offer to purchase the TLCs from Prin-

cipals was its profits off of its agency fees and its share

of the profits when property underlying the matured

TLCs are sold. Tr. p. 306, ll. 17-22. In TLA’s promo-

tional video, Majors stated that TLA’s 50% interest in

the underlying properties is “‘the only place where I make

my money.” Tr. p. 97, ll. 5-23. The parties stipulated

that the video was sent to prospective Principals in

South Carolina.

Neither the offers nor the sales of opportunities to

invest in TLCs pursuant to TLA’s Agency Contract and

related services (singularly the “TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity” and plurally the “TLC Investment Opportuni-

ties’’) have been registered with the Commission pursuant

to Section 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. No claim that the

TLC Investment Opportunity satisfied the elements of an

exemption from the registration requirements of the Act

was made under Sections 35-1-310 or 35-1-320 of the

Act, nor would the testimony and evidence presented at

the hearing tend to support such a claim of an exemp-

tion. No claim that the TLC Investment Opportunity

constituted a “federal covered security” was made under

Sections 35-1-810(c) and 35-1-1100 of the Act, nor

would the testimony and evidence presented at the hear-

ing tend to support such a claim. TLA and Majors were

73a

not registered as broker-dealers or agents under Section

35-1410 et seq. of the Act. No claim was asserted by

TLA or Majors that an exemption from the broker-dealer

and agent licensing requirements of the Act would apply

to them under Section 35-1415 of the Act, nor would

the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend

to support such a claim.

In their opening statements and post-hearing briefs,

the parties agreed that the principal issues in this matter

are (1) whether the TLC Investment Opportunity con-

stituted a “security”’ as defined in Section 35-1-20 of

the Act and (2) whether the Commission’s Cease and

Desist Order should be upheld.

Counsel for the Commission also introduced testimony

and other evidence at the hearing of misrepresentations

and omissions by TLA and Majors in connection with the

promotion and sale of the TLC Investment Opportunities.

Majors stipulated to “‘puffery”. Tr. at p. 248, Il. 23-25.

Ill. CONCLUSION OF LAW

A. THE TLC INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY IS A

SECURITY UNDER THE HOWEY TEST FOR

INVESTMENT CONTRACTS

The TLC Investment Opportunity constitutes a “‘secur-

ity’’ for purposes of the Act because, under the Howey

test, it is an “investment contract.” The term “invest-

ment contract’’, as used in the definition of the term

“security” for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of the

Act, has apparently not been defined in any fashion

meaningful to this matter by the courts of this State.

However, it is well established that the South Carolina

courts seek guidance from the federal courts in inter-

preting provisions of the Act which parallel federal stat-

74a

utes, such as the definition of the term “security”.

Carver. v. Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 310, 342 S.E.2d

406, 407 (1986); McGaha v. Moseley, 283 S.C. 268,

273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984); Bradley v. Hullander,

272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978). The seminal case

for the definition of the term “investment contract” is

SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 66 S. Ct.

1100, 1102-03 (1946). In Howey the United States

Supreme Court defined an “investment contract” as

any arrangement whereby an investor makes (a) an

investment of money (b) in a common enterprise (c)

with an expectation of profits solely from the efforts

of the promoter or a third party. Teague v. Bakker,

35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 1153, 115 S. Ct. 1107 (1995) (citing Howey, 328

U.S. 399-300, 66 S. Ct. 1103). The South Carolina

Court of Appeals has adopted the Howey analysis.

Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285

(Ct. App. 1987), rev’d on other grounds Olson v. Faculty

House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 1161, 580 S.E.2d 440

(2003).

(1) Investment of Money. An “investment of

money” means, for purposes of the definition of an

“investment contract’, that the investor must have

committed his assets to the enterprise in such a manner

as to subject himself to financial loss. SEC v. Pinckney,

923 F. Supp. 76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996). In the instant

case, the Principals wrote checks to TLA for the non-

refundable agency fee and invested money in TLCs

purchased. by TLA on their behalf. Majors testified,

that while he promoted and believed that the TLC

Investment Opportunity was a safe investment, the

Principals could lose some or all of their investment

if the underlying property had at the time of sale a

75a

value less than the amount of the investment. The

terms of the Agency Contract included a specific ac-

knowledgement by the Principal that this “poteatial

down side financial risk’ existed. In addition, the

Principals were required to grant TLA a “50% inchoate

interest” in each TLC that TLA purchases on behalf

of the Principal, which is a further commitment of the

Prinvipal’s assets to the enterprise. Thus, the first ele-

ment of the Howey test, requiring an “investment of

money”’, is satisfied in the instant case. Cf. Pinckney,

923 F. Supp. at 81 (Although the promoter represented

that the investor’s funds would be under the investor’s

control, profits would be generated by trading of the

financial instruments in which the investment was made.

The investor would have been subject to financial loss

by virtue of the trades to be made.).

(2) Common Enterprise. The Howey decision of

investment contract requires as a second element that

the particular transaction constitute a “common enter-

prise”. In this regard, the Howey analysis contemplates

that the transaction will involve a relationship between

investors. The Howey case, however, does not define

precisely the required nature of the relationship or the

required number of investors that must be involved.

As a result, the courts have subsequently developed

three different tests to determine whether the requisite

“common enterprise” element is satisfied: (i) horizontal

commonality, (ii) strict vertical commonality, and

(iii) broad vertical commonality. Maura K. Monaghan,

Note, An Uncommon State of Confuston: The Common

Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis,

63 Fordham L. Rev. 2135, 2152 (1995). While the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled defin-

itely on the applicable test for this element of the Howey

76a

analysis, courts in the Fourth Circuit have recognized

both horizontal commonality and strict vertical com-

monality as applicable and appropriate tests. Pinck-

ney, 923 F. Supp. at 81-82; Bailey v. J.W.J. Properties,

Inc., 703 F. Supp. 478, 492 (W.D.Va. 1989); S.E.C. v.

Dowdell, 202 WL 424595, No. CIV.A. 3:01CV0016,

at *8 (W.D.Va. March 14, 2002); Waterman v. Alta

Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D.N.C.

1986). Because strict vertical commonality exists in

this present case, neither a ruling on whether horizontal

commonality applies to this case nor a holding as to

the legal validity of the broad vertical commonality test

is necessary.

SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.C. 1996),

enunciates the proper analysis of the strict vertical com-

monality test. In Pinckney, the Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina held that “a common enter-

prise may be established by showing that the investor’s

profits are directly related to the promoter’s profits”’.

Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this hold-

ing, the Court concluded that the often more restrictive

horizontal commonality test is not the exclusive test

for the “common enterprise’”’ element of the Howey

analysis. To rely exclusively on horizontal common-

ality would be “overly restrictive and not in keeping

with the Act’s remedial goal of preventing . . . [viola-

tions of the securities laws] in connection with an offer

of what would otherwise be a security but for the ab-

sence of multiple investors.” Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.

at 82. Exclusive reliance on horizontal commonality

would “also make the test easy to evade by a disin-

genuous promoter who simply maintains separate bank

accounts or who disspates the investors’ contributions

immediately”. Monaghan at 2157.

77a

In the instant matter, TLA’s Agency Contract with

its Principals provides expressly for an equal 50/50

sharing between TLA and the Principal of the profits

derived from the sale of the property underlying ma-

tured TLCs, after the Principal and TLA are each reim-

bursed their respective out-of-pocket costs. In his tesi-

mony, Majors acknowledged that this was the primary

motivation for TLA’s undertaking this enterprise and

the only source of profit for TLA, as the relatively nom-

inal non-refundable agency fee did not cover the costs

of operations. Thus, the Principals’ profits are indeed

directly related to TLA’s profits and vice versa.

In the expert testimony of Attorney Robert A. Singer

offered by the Respondents at the hearing, and in Res-

pondents’ post-hearing bricfs, Respondents contend that

because in the instant situation TLA’s revenues are der-

ived from the Principals’ profits, that this is the “exact

opposite of the relationship required . . . to show strict

vertical commonality”. Respondents’ Brief dated Nov-

ember 26, 2003, p. 17. However, in Pinckney, which

was a summary judgment case cited in Respondents’

Briefs, the court concluded that “evidence... that...

[the promoters’| fortunes would be linked to... [the

investor’s] return on the investment and those fortunes

would be derived from a percentage of the [investor’s]

return” was legally sufficient to establish the existence

of a common enterprise. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82.

In reaching this conclusion, the Pinckney court analyzed

whether an investment in “prime bank instruments” by

an individual investor would satisfy the strict vertical

commonality test for purposes of the “common enter-

prise” element of the Howey analysis. In Pinckney, the

defendants were promoters who would profit only as a

result of commissions or similar payments of a percentage

of the return received by the investor.

78a

Thus, the Pinckney court reached a conclusion that

the promoter’s profit being linked to the investor’s profit

has the same impact, for purposes of strict vertical com-

monality, as the investor’s profit being linked to the

promoter’s profit. In other words, Pinckney held that

(1) it is legally sufficient that the profit of the investor

and the promoter are linked and (2) it is not determin-

ative for purposes of the strict vertical commonality test

whose profits are derivative upon the profits of whom.

This is particularly so in the instant matter since TLA

has from the beginning of the arrangement a 50% in-

choate interest in the profits of the sale of property

underlying matured TLCs. Both the Principals and TLA

profit from the sale of the property in the same fash-

ion and at the same time, and pursuant to parallel and

equal interests. SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enter., Inc.,

952 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991) (“One indicator

of vertical commonality, though by no means the only

indicator, is an arrangement to share profits on‘a per-

centage basis between the investor and the . . . pro-

moter. .. In the instant case, [the promoter] .. . told

investors he would take a management fee based on a

percentage of profits, thus making his own profit con-

tingent on the profit of his investors.’’)

Moreover, that a promoter can develop investment

vehicles whereby the promoter’s profits are derived

from the investor’s profits, and not vice versa, should

not eliminate the application of the securities laws and

the availability of the protections of investors intended

to be afforded thereby, especially in light of Howey’s

conclusion that the purpose of the inclusion of the term

“investment contract” in the definition of “security”

was to provide a flexible term that will achieve the

purposes of the securities laws in a variety of changing

79a

situations in a dynamic marketplace. Monaghan at 2145

(citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,

64 S.Ct. 120 (1943)).

Therefore, “strict vertical commonality”’ is an approp-

riate test for the “common enterprise” element of the

Howey analysis, and the Pinckney case analysis is appo-

site. Moreover, under the Pinckney analysis, the facts of

the instant matter satisfy the “strict vertical common-

ality” test for the “common enterprise” element of the

Howey analysis.

(3) Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of

Others. The third element of the Howey analysis is

whether the investor had an expectation of profits

“solely” from the efforts of the promoter or third party.

Monaghan at 2137. This element of the Howey analysis

addresses the degree: of control by the investor over the

profit-making aspects of the transaction. Monaghan at

2149. Over the years since the enunciation of the Howey

analysis, the courts have not strictly construed the word

“solely”. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d

918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990); Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82.

Rather, post-Howey cases have interpreted “solely” to

mean “largely” or ‘‘principally”. Monaghan at 2149.

This test can be met if the most essential functions or

duties must be performed by others and not by the

investor. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 920; see also Garrett,

359 S.E.2d at 285-86. Moreover, the court is not re-

quired to look exclusively at the language of the con-

tract. “Rather it must consider the economic realities

of the situation to determine whether the investor has

any real control over the management of his invest-

ment.” Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 804; see also Robin-

son v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003) (“What

matters more than the form of an investment scheme is

80a

the ‘economic reality’ that it represents.”) See generally

South Carolina Securities Statement of Policy 95-2

(membership interests in a member-managed limited

liability company will constitute securities where the

“facts and circumstances render substantially meaning-

less the managerial powers” of the members despite

the rights of control granted to members by statute or

the operating agreement).

In the Waterman case, the court focused on the pro-

moter’s managerial efforts that could cause the invest-

ment to increase in value, the manager’s special expertise

in selecting items within a particular class of items

which should appreciate at a faster rate than a particular

class in general, and the manager’s efforts in dealing

with the property the investor was not equipped and

unable to manage. In Waterman, the investor had a con-

tractual right to manage the feeding and care of the

cattle in which the investor invested; however, the court

found that the investor could not have invested in a cat-

tle operation except through an operation managed in

a fashion such as offered by the promoter. The investor

seldom was able to visit the operation and lacked the

expertise or time to manage the cattle operation. The

court concluded that, in looking at the reality of the sit-

uation, the investor did not in fact have any real control

over the maintenance of the investment. In reaching this

conclusion, the court focused on the promoter’s represen-

tations that it would provide a “turn-key package”’ and

its advertisements that it “‘handles everything” for its

investors. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 805-806. As a

result, the Waterman court found that this third element

of the Howey analysis was satisfied despite the contract-

ual right of the investor to determine when to sell the cat-

tle. This conclusion was based on the impracticality of

8la

the investor’s having any real control over the decisions.

Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 806; see also SEC v. Euro-

bond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1994).

Similarly, the essential functions from which the

profit! is derived in this present matter were to be per-

formed by TLA and Majors. The Principals typically

have no input into what TLCs are purchased for them.

They merely sign the Agency Control and provide the

funds to TLA, relying on TLA to screen the properties,

select the TLCs, attend the auction, conduct the bid, and

process the paperwork. The selection of TLCs is the

essential step in making a profit — TLA touts its exper-

tise in selecting TLCs that will mature to permit a sale of

the underlying property for a value greater than the

amount of the investment, and the Agency Contract

reserves to TLA the essential decision-making authority

for the selection of TLCs to purchase.

Majors and TLA also promote the TLC Investment

Opportunity as one in which the Principals have to do

little or nothing, and tout repetitively that ‘‘we do all

the work”. While the Agency Contract technically

leaves to the Principal the right to select legal counsel,

real estate brokers, and other professionals necessary

to quiet the title and sell the property underlying

matured TLCs, this right is no more than rarely exer-

cised, according to Majors’ testimony. Moreover, the

Principals have no realistic ability to control the sale of

the property underlying the matured TLCs. Under the

lit is indisputable that the Principals expect a “profit” from

their investment with TLA and Majors. All of TLA’s promotional

materials hype the return on investment that prospective Principals

can expect (see e.g., Tr. p. 57, ll. 8-11), and in his testimony,

Majors frequently referred to “profits” for investors and TLA

from the sale of the properties underlying the TLCs.

82a

Agency Contract, the Principals technically have an

obligation to use their best efforts to sell the property,

and if TLA requests, immediately convey to TLA the

50% inchoate interest in the property, or in the alter-

native they must buy TLA’s 50% interest in the prop-

erty at 50% of its appraised value if the Principals wish

to retain the property. Although the Principals tech-

nically must bear the costs and other burdens of com-

pliance with these obligations, TLA offers in its mar-

keting materials to use its experience, connections,

and volume leverage to contro] and minimize the Prin-

cipals’ technical obligations.

Thus, the obligations imposed on the Principals by the

Agency Contract create pressure on the Principals to let

TLA “do all the work’ to quiet the title and sell the

property. The Principals are most often located far from

the properties. TLA’s marketing program almost ensures

that it will most frequently purchase TLCs for Principals

who are located nowhere near the location of the Prin-

cipals. Majors even markets that he does not know, at

the time of a seminar when Principals are solicited and

contracted, where their money will be invested. The

Principals have virtually no input into the selection,

identity, characteristics, or location of the underlying

properties at the time the TLCs are purchased for them,

and generally have relatively small units of investment in

separate properties located in various states, which would

not justify travel to, or other long-distance control over,

the properties or the sale process.

Given the volume of properties in the overall enter-

prise, as managed by TLA, and TLA’s heavy promotion

of its expertise, experience, services, and connections

with regard to selecting TLCs and selling the underlying

properties in an efficient, fast, and profitable manner,

83a

the Principals’ technical legal right to control the sale

process is specious. See Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1133-

34 (‘‘While the sales contract gave investors the right to

make other arrangements for the refining of their ore,

there is no evidence that a single investor exercised

that right. Promotional materials for the program did not

emphasize investors’ legal night to refine the ore them-

selves but rather .. . [the Promoter’s] commitment to

build a new refinery at which investor’s ore would be

processed. Furthermore, since the refining contract was

included in the price paid for the ore, investors, would

-have incurred unnecessary costs if they had the ore

transported and refined elsewhere.’’). The mere exist-

ence of contractual rights of control granted in the

Agency Contract to the Principals is not determinative.

Robinson, 349 F.3d at 170 (“Agreements do not annul

the securities laws by retaining nominal powers for

investors unable to exercise them.”’).

It is unrealistic to anticipate that the Principals would

incur the cost and hassle inherent in exercising this con-

trol, and it is completely consistent with the realities of

the overall situation to conclude that the efforts of TLA

and Majors (e.g., the handling of the complicated paper-

work for, and expert attendance at, remote auction sales

of TLCs in a wide variety of locations throughout

twenty-six states, the selection and purchae of TLCs

that are more likely to mature for sale at values greater

than the amount of investment, the replacement of

redeemed TLCs with new TLCs at no additional charge,

the offer and arrangement of liquidity in the Principals’

investment in TLCs, the arrangement of Section 1031

exchange opportunities, and the expert selection and

negotiation with professionals to sell the underlying

properties efficiently, quickly, and profitably) are the

84a

“undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial

efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-

prise.” SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d

476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94

S. Ct. 117 (1973). These services are also the emphasized

core of TLA’s marketing program. By virtue of the real-

ities of the situation, TLA and Majors have and will per-

form all of the essential functions of managing the TLC

Investment Opportunity, and not the Principals.? See

Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82; see also Garrett, 359

S.E.2d at 286. Thus, the third element of the Howey

test, requiring an “expectation of profits ‘solely’ from

the efforts of the promoter or third party” is satisfied

in the instant case.

2As an analogy, Respondent’s expert Attorney Singer tes-

tified that the contractual and statutory rights of general partners

of general partnerships and members of member-managed limited

liability companies to control the management of the business

entity resulted in these investments not satisfying the Howey anal-

ysis, meaning these investments were held not to be “securities”.

However, the case law and statements of policy to which Attorney

Singer referred take exception from the indicated result, and sub-

ject such investments to the securities laws, where it is impractical

or unrealistic that the general partners or members can or will be

able to exercise effectively such rights of control. See e.g., William-

son v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 454

U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); South Carolina Securities State-

ment of Policy 95-2 (“The analytical pattern usually turns, in

essence, upon a qualitative analysis about the meaningful partici-

pation of investors in management of the entity”’.).

85a

B. THE ISSUANCE OF A FINAL CEASE AND

DESIST ORDER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTER-

EST FOR THE PROTECTION OF SOUTH

CAROLINA INVESTORS AND CONSISTENT

WITH THE PURPOSES FAIRLY INTENDED BY

THE POLICY AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT.

Testimony and promotional materials introduced into

evidence at the hearing included “‘puffery” that would be

inappropriate, and omitted disclosures that would be

expected, in a registered securities offering. It is clear

that TLA’s promotional materials would not satisfy

the requirements for a prospectus pursuant to a regis-

tration of the offer or sale of the TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity under Section 35-1-880 of the Act, and that most

of the materials would not be permitted for use as “‘ad-

vertisement or other sale literature’? under Section 35-1-

50 of the Act and South Carolina Securities Statement

of Policy with Respect to Advertising of New Issues

(Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) 451,553).

Since it appears that a likely opportunity for loss of

investor’s funds would be a mishandling of the funds by

TLA, Respondents’ repetition of the phrase “‘we never

touch your money” without describing the exceptions

when the Principals’ funds are deposited into Majors’

attorney trust account, Respondents’ failure to fully and

accurately describe Majors’ disbarment by the Georgia

Bar, and the fact of the receivership of Majors’ prior Tax

Lien Acquisitions company in Georgia were all material

matters. Additionally, for example, since TLA’s promo-

tional materials tout TLA’s expertise and the Principals

are dependent on TLA’s expertise to produce a profit

from the TLC Investment Opportunity, Majors’ represen-

tation that he authored and published two definitive

books on TLCs which sold thousands of copies and

were “best sellers”, certainly were material. And given

that Majors cannot furnish a single copy of either “best

seller” book at the present, the truth of these represen-

tations is suspect. 7

C. BECAUSE THE TLC INVESTMENT OPPOR-

TUNITY IS A SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC

INTEREST REQUIREMENT IS MET, A FINAL

CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS APPRO-

PRIATE.

The TLC Investment Opportunity offered and sold by

TLA, which was controlled by Majors, is a “security”

because it is an “investment contract” under Section

35-1-20(15) of the Act. The TLC Investment Oppor-

tunity satisfies all three elements of the Howey analysis

for investment contracts because it is: (i) an investment

of money under the Pickney case, (ii) in a common

enterprise under the strict vertical commonality test

set forth in Pickney, (iii) for which the Principals expect

profit to be derived from the efforts of TLA and Majors

under the Waterman, Reynolds, and Garrett cases. This

conclusion is supported by the methods and content of

the promotional materials and the activity of TLA and

Majors, which tout the TLC Investment Opportunity

as a lucrative, passive, remote investment, in which TLA

and Majors ‘‘do all the work’. The realities of the over-

all situation and the nature of TLA’s promotional mater-

ials override the technical rights of control granted to the

Principals in the Agency Contract.

Since the TLC Investment Opportunity is a “security”

under the Act, then the offer and sale of the TLC Invest-

ment Opportunity are subject to regulation of the Act

87a

and jurisdiction of the Commission. Respondents have

not sustained the burden of proof under Section 35-1-

340 of the Act that an exemption from the registration

requirements is applicable to the transaction. Moreover,

it would appear that no such exemption could be sus-

tained under the facts as presented at the hearing. See

e.g., Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 807 (“[P] ublic advertis-

ing is incompatible with the claim of a private offering”’)

(quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchise,

Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)). It is undis-

puted that neither the TLC Investment Opportunity

offered and sold by TLA, nor the promoters of the TLC

Investment Opportunity, have been registered with the

Commission under Sections 35-1-810 et seg. and -410

et seq. of the Act. Thus, TLA, and Majors as its control-

ling person under Section 35-1-1500, have violated the

registration requirements of Sections 35-1-810 e¢ seq.

of the Act and are subject to enforcement action by the

Commission for such violations under Section 35-1-60

of the Act.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respond-

ents Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. and every

successor, affiliate, control person, director, agent, ser-

vant, or employee either of them, and every entity

owned, operated, or indirectly or directly controlled or

hereinafter organized by or on behalf of either of them

immediately CEASE AND DESIST from offering or

selling the TLC Investment Opportunity in or from the

State of South Carolina.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents Ned

B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. and any successor,

affiliate, control person, director, agent, servant, or

employee of either of them, and every entity owned,

operated, or indirectly or directly controlled or herein-

88a

after organized by or on behalf of either of them CEASE

AND DESIST from offering or selling any other invest-

ment opportunity involving an unregistered security in

or from the State of South Carolina; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any exemption that

Respondents Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.

and any successor, affiliate, control person, director,

agent, servant, or employee of either of them, and every

entity owned, operated, or indirectly or directly con-

trolled or hereinafter organized by or on behalf of either

of them might be otherwise entitled to utilize, be and

hereby is REVOKED, subject only to the limitations

provided in Section 35-1-330 of the Act.

So ORDERED this 11th day of February, 2004.

By: /s/ Henry. McMaster

Henry McMaster

South Carolina Securities Commissioner

89a

APPENDIX E

[Filed Sept. 9, 2003]

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SECURITIES SECTION

IN THE MATTER OF:

Ned B. Majors and

Tax Lien Agents, Inc.

Respondents.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING (FIRST)

ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST

SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES

AND ENGAGING IN SECURITIES FRAUD,

AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO A HEARING

Case No. 03010

The South Carolina Securities Section (“‘Section’’),

under the authority of the South Carolina Uniform

Securities Act (the “Act’’), §35-1-10, et seg., Code of

Laws of South Carolina, issues the following Order

against Respondents for alleged violations of the Act,

as set forth below, and notifies Respondent of their right

to a hearing.

1. Ned B. Majors (‘‘Majors’’) was at all times material

herein both a person resident and doing business in

South Carolina.

90a

Majors’ primary business and the business which

forms the basis for this Order is accomplished

through an entity known as “Tax Lien Agents”’

(“TLA’’).

TLA is a South Carolina corporation with its prin-

cipal place of business in Myrtle Beach, South Caro-

lina.

For service of process, the last known address for

both Majors and TLA is 4052 Highway 17 Bypass

South, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29588.

On or around January 27, 2003, the Section re-

ceived a letter of compliant against Majors and TLA.

The letter indicated:

A. Respondent Majors, on behalf of himself and

TLA, was conducting seminars at which Majors

described the benefits of investigating in his and

TLA’s tax lien program;

B. In connection with the seminars, a video tape

explaining the process and benefits of investing

in tax liens is played;

C. At a seminar attended by a widowed cousin of

complainant, the widow was promised an an-

nual 8 to 24% annual return on money provided

to Majors to purchase tax liens on her behalf;

D. “Finders fees” were being paid in connection

with the investment opportunity; and

E. In connection with the investment opportunity,

Majors makes reference to a book he indicates

he has written on tax liens that is a bestseller,

and yet complainant, a trader and seller of

books, can find no such book.

9la

An investigative file was opened and further inform-

ation sought.

The Section’s investigation revealed that solicita-

tions were made through seminars, newspaper ads,

and one or more web sites.

At the seminars, on tape and through the ads and

written literature, Majors and TLA portray tax lien

investments through them to be both safe and prof-

itable.

Specific representations made by Majors to induce

investment include:

A.

B.

This is an investment plan that always works;

This investment has a government guaranteed

8% to 25% A.P.R. with real expectations for

a 10,000% yield;

This is safer than any CD or any other invest-

ment;

. The investment is purchased in your name by

your Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent,

who never touches your money;

All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by

the government in your name and address only;

Majors is the recognized authority on real estate

tax liens, having written two books on tax lien

investing, one in 1990 and another in 1999;

Majors sold several hundred thousand books on

tax liens, and one of his books on tax liens was

a financial bestseller;

Investment in tax liens offers safety, income,

growth, liquidity, tax shelter, and convenience;

92a

Tax Lien Certificates are a safe way to potent-

ially acquire enormous wealth government

guaranteed; and

“You’re going to make more than a CD and this

is safer than a CD.”

10. Material facts Majors did not tell investors, prior

to or at the time of investment include:

A.

O

Upon Complaint, the Georgia Bar commenced

an investigation of Majors, which resulted in

an August 29, 2002 recommendation that he

be disbarred, and on July 10, 2003, the Sup-

reme Court of Georgia upheld the recommenda-

tion and disbarred Majors;

Majors previously owned and managed a busi-

ness [Tax Lien Acquisitions (“TLAQ”)] which

was operated in the same manner as TLA, and

TLAQ investor money was deposited in Majors’

trust account, in violation of what he told

investors when he induced them to invest;

TLAQ is now in bankruptcy;

Majors previously owned a computer company

which declared bankruptcy;

Majors and TLA’s investment produce has been

the source of inquiries from state and federal

securities regulators;

. In February 2003, the Utah Division of Secur-

ities issued to Majors and TLA an Order To

Show Cause why Majors and TLA should not

be ordered to cease violating the Utah Securities

Act and why they should not have to pay a fine

for earlier violations;

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

i

93a

G. Majors paid “commissions” to unregistered

agents who recruited new investors; and

H. Majors did, in fact, deposit a significant num-

ber of investor checks into his attorney trust

account, though such checks were marked pay-

able to “The County Treasurer for Tax Liens.”

Following solicitation by Majors, interested invest-

ors complete an “agency contract” and send checks

to Majors and TLA.

The checks are titled as follows: one is for a non-

refundable agency fee and is made out to Tax Lien

Agents, Inc. and the second and any others are

for investment and are made out to “County Treas-

urer for Tax Liens.”

According to the terms of the agency contract, Maj-

ors and TLA are to search tax records, evaluate

delinquent properties, and bid on and purchase such

delinquent properties. In return for Majors’ and

TLA’s efforts, the investor agrees to grant TLA a

(post expense) 50% ownership interest in any pur-

chased properties.

In the State of South Carolina, profit sharing

agreements and investment contracts both con-

stitute securities pursuant to South Carolina Code

Section 35-1-20(15).

The investments offered by Majors and TLA are

securities, in the form of participation in a profit

sharing agreement and as investment contracts.

Registration records of the Section were searched

for registrations of Ned Majors or Tax Lien Agents.

No agent or other type securities registration was

located for Majors or TLA, and no issuer registra-

18.

19,

20.

94a

tion was located for either Majors, TLA or the

investment opportunity offered by them.

During the period September 28, 1999 to at least

June 23, 2003, Majors actively promoted, offered

and sold the securities in and from the State of

South Carolina.

The securities were not registered or exempt prior

to sale.

Respondent Majors, acting on behalf of himself and

TLA, in connection with the offer and sale of the

securities above, made the following misrepresen-

tation of fact:

A. This is an investment plan that always works;

B. This investment has a- government guaranteed

8% to 25% A.P.R. with real expectations for a

10,000% yield;

C. This is safer than any CD or any other invest-

ment;

D. The investment is purchased in your name by

your Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent,

who never touches your money;

E. All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by

the government in your name and address only;

F, Majors sold several hundred thousand books on

tax liens, and one of his books on tax liens was

a financial bestseller;

G. Investment in tax liens offers safety, income,

growth, liquidity, tax shelter, and convenience;

H. Tax Lien Certificates are a safe way to poten-

tially acquire enormous wealth government guar-

anteed; and

4 O

ie

95a

“You’re going to make more than a CD and this

is safer than a CD.”

Respondent Majors, acting on behalf of himself and

TLA, in connection with the offer and sale of the

securities above, failed to inform investors of various

material facts concerning their investments, includ-

ing the facts that:

A.

B.

The investments were not registered for sale in

or from this State;

An investment with Majors in tax liens carried

with it a degree of risk of loss of some or all of

the investor’s funds;

Majors was not licensed to effect securities trans-

actions in this State;

. Majors and TLA did not hold and use investor’s

funds in the manner which they stated when

they induced investment;

Majors often deposited investor checks addres-

sed to the “County Treasurer for Tax Liens”

into his attorney trust account;

Titles routinely were issued in the name of

“Attorney Ned Majors Trust Account”’ instead

of investor’s names;

Investor money was not in an investment “safer

than any CD or any other investment.”

Upon complaint, the Georgia Bar commenced

an investigation of Majors, which resulted in

an August 29, 2002 recommendation that he

be disbarred, and on July 10, 2003, the Sup-

reme Court of Georgia upheld the recommenda-

tion and disbarred Majors;

96a

I. Majors previously owned and managed a prior

business [Tax Lien Acquisitions (‘““TLAQ”’)]

which was operated in the same manner as

TLA and that TLAQ investor money was

deposited in Majors’ trust account, in violation

of what he told investors when he induced them

to invest;

a)

TLAQ is now in bankruptcy;

K. Majors previously owned a computer company

which declared bankruptcy ;

L. Majors and TLA’s investment product has been

the source of inquiries from state and federal

securities regulators; and

M. In February 2003, the Utah Division of Secur-

ities issued to Majors and TLA an Order To

Show Cause why Majors and TLA sho

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Appendix — Majors v. South Carolina Securities Commission (No. 07-234) | Frix