Appendix — Majors v. South Carolina Securities Commission (No. 07-234)
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Supreme C S.
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07-234 AUG 21 2007
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NED B. MAJORS,
Petitioner,
SOUTH CAROLINA SECURITIES COMMISSION,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FORK WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
NED B. Majors
133A Ivystone Drive
Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina 19588-1284
(843) 446-0280
August 21, 2007 Petitioner Pro Se.
(t)
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS on
Appendix A — Opinion of South Carolina’s Supreme
Court filed April 23, 2007. ..... 0. cece eee eeeee la
Appendix B — Administrative Hearing Officer’s
Report and Recommendation issued Janu-
ary 13, 2004 . ccc ccccccrecscsccecsscceseres 18a
w/attached Petitioner’s “Agency Contract”’
DET ChE swede eveweervvegcerococves 57a
Appendix C — South Carolina’s Supreme Court
Order Denying Petitioner’s Rehearing Re-
quest filed May 25, 2007... 0... cccccccvccccces 63a
Appendix D — Respondent’s “Final Order to Cease
and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities”
issued on February 11, 2004......... eas eee we 65a
Appendix E — Respondent’s (First) “Order to Cease
and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities and
Engaging in Securities Fraud, and Notice of
Right to a Hearing” issued on September 9,
EPO ee RL ELE LEER 89a
Appendix F — Horry County Circuit Court Judge
James E. Lockemy’s Order of October 27,
DEL CLRNOR eS ibe deeKenevevecesveece 10la
Appendix G — Administrative Hearing Officer’s
November 4, 2003 Letter informing parties
of his ex parte, private, meeting with Respond-
ee oe bb ee ee. 106a
Appendix H — Text of South Carolina Code of Law
ET aS 6 u5 es be saéeeevenveseses 108a
Appendix I — Text of South Carolina Code of Law
I en . cos ehiccensedonce 109a
(1)
: Page
Appendix J — Text of South Carolina Appellate
Court Rule (SCACR), Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.5(a) and (b) of Rule 407, and related
CROMNGNEE e ccvc ce etdvte Cet NR Oe Reese lila
Appendix K — Excerpts from Judge Lockemy’s
September 7, 2004 Hearing............+++-. 1lZa
Appendix L — The State of Georgia Securities
Eevaseett ES CEMEG TOROGT oc os ccc cnsvonveaccn li6a
la
APPENDIX A
[Filed April 23, 2007]
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.,
Appellants,
South Carolina Securities Commission,
Respondent.
Appeal From Horry County
James E. Lockemy, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 26317
Heard November 14, 2006 — Filed April 23, 2007
AFFIRMED
John F. Beach and John J. Pringle, Jr., both of Ellis,
Lawhorne & Sims, of Columbia, and Ned Majors, of
Myrtle Beach, for Appellant.
Scott E. Hultstrand and Tracy A. Meyers, both of
Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
2a
JUSTICE WALLER: We certified this case from the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 204 (b), SCACR.
The South Carolina Securities Exchange Commission
ordered Appellants, Ned Majors and Tax Lien Agents,
Inc. (collectively TLA), to “Cease and Desist Selling Un-
registered Securities and Engaging in Securities Fraud.”
TLA appeals, contending it is not engaged in the sale of
“securities.” We disagree and therefore affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ned Majors is President and sole shareholder of TLA,
a South Carolina Corporation operating in Myrtle Beach
since 1998. TLA’s business centers around the purchase
of tax lien certificates (TLCs) at city and county tax lien
auctions throughout the country. Pursuant to TLA’s
“Agency Contract,’”” TLA is the purchasing agent for its
Principals. TLA Agents make all purchasing decisions,
and they bid competitively for purchases at auctions by
offering to accept a lower interest rate than the statutory
rate to which purchasers would otherwise be entitled.
Pursuant to the contract, the Agency bids on tax liens
which TLA believes have a reasonable prospect of not
being redeemed. The Principal agrees to pay Agent a
“non-refundable agency fee” (between 12-25% of the
principal’s initial tax lien purchase amount) and grants
TLA an inchoate interest of 50% ownership in any
unredeemed TLCs.
For each TLC purchased on a principal’s behalf, the
principal gives the Agent a cashiers check (or a Trust
directive if using a trust) made payable to the “County
Treasurer for Tax Liens.” The TLCs purchased are
listed in the principal’s name. If a TLC is redeemed
before its maturity date (usually 1-3 years), the Prin-
3a
cipal keeps all redemption monies, including interest
and penalties; however, if the TLC is not redeemed, the
Principal agrees to immediately sign papers to assign,
convey and register the property, and to confirm the
Agent has a 50% ownership interest in the net profit
of the TLC and any resultant deed issued. The Prin-
cipal is required (unless agreed upon with the Agent)
to commence good faith efforts to quiet the title and
sell the property. Although Principals have the right
to select closing attorneys and quiet title, etc., they
very seldom do so as the majority are absentee owners
living a considerable distance from the properties; the
majority use TLA’s services to facilitate both the sale
and quieting title. Although TLA represents only one
principal for each TLC purchased, an agent represents
15-20 principals (also referred to as “employers’’) at
each tax sale or as many as 200 “employers” over a two
week period.
if a Principal wishes to sell TLCs, the Agent has first
right of refusal, and if the TLC is sold to any other
party, the third party must agree to the same contract
terms as the Principal. If either party elects, the under-
lying property which was not redeemed may be pur-
chased by paying 50% of the average of three apprisals.
The agency contract also stated that “while there are no
risks in owning government sold and issued TLCs that
are redeemed (paid off), there are potential down side
financial risks if a TLC matures into a property deed
as the underlying property market value could sub-
stantially drop during the tax lien maturity period.”
4a
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2003, the Attorney General, acting as
the South Carolina Securities Exchange Commissioner
(Commissioner), entered an order for Majors and TLA
to “Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities and
Engaging in Securities Fraud’”’ and gave them notice of
a right to a hearing. The Commissioner appointed G.
Marcus Knight as the Administrative Hearing Officer for
the matter, and a public hearing was held on Oct 30-31,
2003. Thereafter, Knight issued a detailed report and
recommendation concluding that 1) the South Carolina
Uniform Securities Act (the Act) applied because TLA
was engaged in the sale of “securities” as defined in that
Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-20 (15) because its contract
constituted an “investment contract.” The Hearing
Officer also rejected TLA and Majors’ contention that
the manner of issuance of the cease and desist order
deprived them of due process, or that their due process
rights were violated by his appointment as Hearing
Officer. The Hearing Officer concluded that the Com-
missioner should order a final Cease and Desist Order,
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60, due to a violation
of the registration requirements § 35-1-810 of the Act.
However, the Commissioner opined the Final Order
should exclude any reference to TLA making “material
misrepresentations and/or omissions” in connection with
its sale of TLCs, and should not pursue any criminal or
civil penalties.
In February 2004, the Commissioner issued a ‘Final
Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securi-
ties.’” The Commissioner found TLA’s investment oppor-
tunity constituted a “security” under the Act and also
found a violation of the registration requirements § 35-1-
810. TLA and Majors were ordered to cease and desist
5a
from offering or selling the TLC investment opportunity
in or from the State of South Carolina. The final order
did not find TLA was engaged in securities fraud.
Majors and TLA appealed to the circuit court which
ruled 1) the investment opportunity offered was a secur-
ity, 2) the SEC Commission had authority to issue the
original cease and desist order, and 3) Majors and TLA
were afforded due process in the underlying adminis-
trative proceeding.
ISSUES
1. What is the proper standard of review?
2. Did the SEC have authority to issue the initial
cease and desist order?
3. Were Appellants afforded due process in the un-
derlying administrative proceeding?
4. Were Appellants properly ordered to cease and
desist from the sale of unregistered securities in vio-
lation of the S.C. Uniform Securities Act?
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue in this case involves a decision of whether
TLA’s sale of TLCs constitutes the sale of securities. We
find this is a novel question of law, such that we are free
to decide the issue with no particular deference to the
lower court. Baggerly v. CSX Transp. Inc., 370 S.C. 362,
635 S.E.2d 97 (2006); citing J’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 411, 526 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2000).
2. INITIAL CEASE AND DESIST ORDER
TLA asserts the Commissioner had no statutory auth-
ority to enter the initial Cease and Desist order, such that
6a
the whole proceeding should be voided for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
This issue is not one of subject matter jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the pro-
ceedings in question belong. Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314
S.C. 235, 236, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994); State v.
Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005).
In any event, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (2004 Supp),
as it read at the time this matter arose, stated in pertinent
part, “The Securities Commissioner may make, amend,
and rescind those rules, forms, and orders, including cease
and desist orders, as are necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of this chapter...” (emphasis supplied).
As originally written, S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-60 did
not allow the Commissioner to issue cease and desist
orders. It was amended in 1992 to permit the Commis-
sioner to make, amend, and rescind those rules, forms,
and orders, including cease and desist orders. ..”” 1992
Act No. 451 § 1, eff. June 15, 1992. We find it was
within the Commissioner’s authority to issue the initial
cease and desist order.!
1We note also that, effective Jan. 1, 2006, Chapter 1 of the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act was repealed and replaced
with a new Chapter 1, to comport with the Uniform Securities
Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Section 35-160 has been repealed. In its
place, §§ 35-1-603 and 35-1-604 now govern civil and adminis-
trative enforcement of the Act. Section 35-1-603 permits the
Commissioner to maintain a civil action in the court of common
please. Section 35-1-604 (Supp 2005) states, in pertinent part, as
follows:
a) If the Securities Commissioner determines that a person
has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act,
[footnote continued]
~ alae .
7a
3. DUE PROCESS
TLA and Majors next assert issuance of the cease and
desist order in violated their rights to due process. We
disagree.
The initial cease and desist order, prior to a hearing,
was permissible. See Ross v. MUSC, 328 S.C. 51, 72,
492 S.E.2d 62, 69 (1997) (Article I, § 22, requires an
administrative agency provide notice and an opportunity
to be heard, but does not require notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard at each level of the administrative pro-
cess. It mandates notice and opportunity to be heard at
some point before the agency makes its final decision).
Moreover, contrary to TLA’s contention, we find no
due process violation in the SEC Commissioner’s role in
this matter.
In Ross v. MUSC, 328 S.C. 51, 492 S.E.2d 62 (1997),
we held the purpose of S.C. Const., Art. I, § 22 is to
ensure adjudications are conducted by impartial adminis-
trative bodies. Partiality exists where an adjudicator
either has ex parte information as a result of prior inves-
tigation or has developed, by prior involvement with the
case, a “will to win.” Ross, 328 S.C. at 69, 492 S.E.2d
practice, or course of business constituting a violation of
this chapter or a rule adopted or order issued under this
chapter or that a person has materially aided, is materially
aiding, or is about to materially aid an act, practice, or
course of business constituting a violation of this chapter
or a rule adopted or order issued under this chapter, the
Securities Commissioner may: (1) issue an order directing
the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act,
practice, or course of business or to take other action neces-
sary or appropriate to comply with this chapter. . .
Clearly, the Commissioner has authority to issue cease and desist
orders prior to commencement of a civil proceeding. ‘
8a
at 72. In Ross, we found no violation of Section 22
where MUSC’s president investigated a tenured profes-
sor’s conduct, terminated the professor, and then testi-
fied against him at a committee hearing. We found no
due process violation because the president did not later
participate as an adjudicator, and he did not improperly
Cunenne ex parte information. /d. at 70, 492 S.E.2d at
72.
In Garris v. Governing Board of S.C. Reinsurance Facil-
ity, 333 S.C. 432, 511 S.E.2d 48 (1998), this Court
recognized, “‘the fact that investigative, prosecutorial,
and adjudicative functions are performed within the same
agency, or even performed by the same persons within an
agency, does not, without more, constitute a violation of
due process.” 333 S.C. 443, 511 S.E.2d at 54. In that
case, Garris was a designated insurance agent for the
South Carolina Reinsurance Facility. The Facility began
investigating Garris, alleging irregularities in his under-
writing practices. After a hearing, the Governing Board
of the Facility voted to revoke Garris’ status as a desig-
nated agent. Garris appealed, contesting the composi-
tion of the Board which revoked his designation. In
Garris, the five Governing board members and one non-
member of the South Carolina Reinsurance Facility
attended one or more committee meetings at which
Garris’ case was discussed extensively in open and execu-
tive sessions, and all six voted to revoke Garris’ status as
a designated agent. Of those six, four were members of
the committees which considered the Garris matter.
2 However, we did find a violation of Section 22 where the
university vice-president investigated the professor’s case, testified
as an adverse witness at a committee hearing, and sat as the inter-
mediate judge in a three-stop disciplinary procedure. /d.
9a
Further, two other Governing Board members attended
committee meetings and the hearing, but did not vote.
We concluded the procedure violated due process, stat-
ing:
we conclude that Governing Board members who
participate in the investigation or prosecution of a
designated agent as a membr or observer at a com-
mittee meeting may not participate as adjudicators
of that agent’s case at a subsequent hearing. Mem-
bers who participate in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of a case must distance themselves from the
adjudicatory process, and should refrain from even
discussing that case with future adjudicators.
333 S.C. at 446, 511 S.E.2d at 55.
Garris and Ross are distinguishable from the present
case. Unlike those cases, the Commissioner did, in this
instance, appoint a Hearing Officer to take evidence and
make a report and recommendation. Further, the Com-
missioner did not personally participate in the gathering
of the evidence before the Hearing Officer, and there is
no evidence he discussed the underlying case with the
Hearing Officer.
Moreover, we find the power of the SEC Commis-
sioner is akin to this Court’s power to issue an order of
interim suspension of an attorney, and then, after an
investigation by the Commission on Lawyer Conduct and
a Report and Recommendation, issue the ultimate sanc-
tion. See Kirven v. Board of Grievances and Discipline,
271 S.C. 194, 246 S.E.2d 857 (1978) (members of Board
of Grievance are officers of this Court commissioned and
charged by this Court with the duty of investigating
alleged acts of professional misconduct on the part of
their fellow members of the bar, and of reporting to this
Court the proceedings of their inquiry, their findings and
10a
recommendation); Matter of Iseman, 356 S.C. 280,
588 S.E.2d 606 (2003).(Supreme Court holds ultimate
authority to sanction attorneys).
We find TLA and Majors have been afforded due pro-
cess in this matter. The initial cease and desist order
provided them with the right to a hearing, which they
requested and were afforded by an independent Hearing
Officer. Thereafter, they were permitted to appeal the
SEC Commissioner’s Final Cease and Desist Order, and
were allowed to post a bond to stay enforcement of that
order pending appeal. The order has further been stayed
by this appeal.
4. SECURITY
Finally, TLA asserts that its sale of TLCs does not
involve the sale of a security, and it is therefore not in
violation of the Act, because it was not required to regis-
ter under S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-810 (1987) (making it
unlawful to sell any security in this state unless it is
either registered or exempt). We disagree. The Commis-
sioner and the circuit court properly held the sale of
TLCs in this case constituted the sale of ‘“‘securities”’
within the meaning of the Act.
S.C. Code Ann. § 35-1-20 (12), as it read at time of
the cease and desist order, defined a “‘security”’ as, inter
alia, “any certificate of interest or participation in
any ... investment contract . . . or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a security .. .””
As noted by the Court of Appeals in Garrett v. Sned-
igar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App.
1987), overruled on other grounds, Olson v. Faculty
House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 161, 580 S.E.2d 440
(2003), ‘in construing the state Act, [the Court] may
lla
look for guidance to cases construing its federal counter-
part.” In Garrett, the Court of Appeals recognized that
both our Act and the Federal Act define the word
“security” to include any “‘certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, [or] invest-
ment contract.” The Court of Appeals cited the semin-
al United States Supreme Court case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. W.J. Hlowey Co., 328 U.S.
293, reh’g dented, 329 U.S. 819 (1946) in which the
Court defined an investment contract as a “transaction
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” Jd. at
298-299.
Under the Howey test, an investment contract exists
where there has been (i) an investment of money, (ii) in
a common enterprise, (iii) with an expectation of profits
garnered solely from the efforts of others. See Teague v.
Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994). The test isa
flexible one, ‘capable of adaptation to meet the count-
less and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”
Howey, 328 USS. at 299.
We find the Commissioner and the circuit court prop-
erly found TLA’s sale of TLCs constitutes the sale of an
“investment contract,” such that under § 35-1-20 (12),
it constitutes a security and therefore TLA and Majors
were properly ordered to cease and desist from the sale
absent proper registration with the SEC Commission.
a. Investment of Money
An “investment of money” under Howey means the
investor must have committed his assets to the enterprise
12a
in such a manner as to subject himself to financial loss.
SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 80 (E.D. NC 1996).
It is indisputable that Principals meet this test. They
paid an up-front, non-refundable agency fee of 12-25%
of their TLC purchase price, they paid all fees and ex-
penses associated with the purchase of the TLCs, as well
as the expenses associated with establishing clear title
to those properties which were not redeemed, and
agreed to pay TLA 50% of the profits from the sale of
any properties which were not redeemed. It cannot
seriously be argued that Principals here did not make
an investment of money.
TLA also asserts Principals were not subject to finan-
cial loss. However, its contract specifically states that,
“while there are no risks in owning government sold and
issued TLCs that are redeemed (paid off), there are
potential down side financial risks if a TLC matures
into a property deed as the underlying property market
value could substantially drop during the tax lien matur-
ity period.” Accordingly, we find the first prong of
Howey is met inasmuch as there is an “investment of
money.”
b. Common Enterprise Test
TLA next contends the Commissioner, and the circuit
court, erred in applying a “strict vertical commonality”
test to determine whether it is engaged in a common
enterprise. We disagree.
In order to meet the “common enterprise’”’ prong of
the Howey test, courts around the country have strug-
gled with discerning whether vertical or horizontal com-
monality, or both, must exist. See Top of lowa Coop-
erate v. Schewe, 6 F.Supp.2d 843, 852 (N.D. lowa
l3a
1998) (noting that the Eighth Circuit had not ruled on
whether either vertical or horizontal commonality or
both are required under the “common enterprise” prong
of Howey, such that the court examined the contracts
for either kind of commonality); see also S.E.C. v. SG
Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing and discus-
sing the different standards in courts across the country);
S.E.C, v. Pinckney, 923 F.Supp. 76, 81 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
(same). As a general guide, vertical commonality requires
only a pooling of the interests of the developer or pro-
moter and each individual investor, while “horizontal
commonality” requires as well a pooling of interests
among the investors. Schewe, 6 F.Supp.2d at 852 (cit-
ing Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp., 24 F.3d 1016,
1017-18 (7th Cir. 1994)). See also SEC v. Alpha Tel-
com, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
the second element of the Howey test can be satisfied by
the existence of either vertical commonality or horizontal
commonality. Vertical commonality is the dependence
of the investors’ fortunes on the success or expertise of
the promoter. Horizontal commonality is the pooling of
investor funds and interests. Citing Brodt v. Bache & Co.,
Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978).)
The courts have further identified two kinds of vertical
commonality: broad vertical commonality and strict
vertical commonality. To establish “broad vertical com-
monality,” the fortunes of the investors need be linked
only to the efforts of the promoter. See Long v. Shultz
Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1989).
“Strict vertical commonality” requires the fortunes of
investors be tied to the fortunes of the promoter. Brodt
v. Bache & Co.
l4a
TLA asserts the only proper test is horizontal com-
monality which, by its nature, requires a pooling of
interest among investors. We disagree.
Initially, we note that many courts have applied an
“either/or” test of vertical and horizontal commonality
such that there is a common enterprise if either test is
met. See e.g. Integrated Research Svcs. v. Illinois Sec.
of State, 765 F.E.2d 130 (Ill. 2002); SEC v. Parkersburg
Wireless LLC, 991 F.Supp. 6 (D. Col. 1997); Securities
and Exchange Commission v. R.G. Reynolds Enter-
prises, Inc., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991).
We find the newly revised Uniform Securities Act
lend guidance to resolutionof this issue. The comments
to S.C, Code Ann. § 35-1-102 (29)(D) state, in pertinent
part:
The courts have divided over the interpretation of
the “common enterprise”’ element of an investment
contract. The courts generally recognize that “hori-
zontal” commonality (for example, the pooling of
an investment by two or more investors) is a com-
mon enterprise. A small minority of the federal cir-
cuits will also find a common enterprise in a “vert-
ical” relationship when a single investor is depend-
ent upon the expertise of a single commodities
broker. Since two or more persons do not share in
the profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to
argue that there is a common enterprise. Section
102(29)(D) follows a significantly larger number of
federal circuits and adopts a more restrictive form of
vertical commonality that occurs only when there is
profit sharing between two persons even if, for
example, one is a conventional investor and one is
a promoter. See generally 2 Louis Loss & Joel
Seligman, Securities Regulation 989-997 (3d ed.
Rev. 1999). In interpreting all elements of the
l5a
investment contract, the courts have emphasized
substance, not form.
Clearly, it sppears the Legislature intends a strict vertical
commonality test to apply. Accordingly, we find the
trial court and Commissioner applied the proper test.
TLA and Majors also assert that, even under a strict
vertical commonality test, the Commissioner erred in
finding a common enterprise because the relationship
here is precisely the opposite of that found in cases of
strict vertical commonality. It contends for such a rela-
tionship to exist, there must be a showing that the inves-
tors’ profits are dependent upon the promoter’s profits
whereas, here, TLA’s profits are dependent upon the
profits of the principals. We disagree.
The court in SEC v. TLC Investments, 179 F.Supp. 2d
1149, 1156 (D. CA. 2001), specifically rejected such a
claim, holding that ‘““TLC’s fortunes were inextricably
linked to the fortunes of the individual investors. So long
as the promoter’s gain is contingent on the investor’s
gain, there is a common enterprise.”’
c. Efforts of others
Lastly, TLA asserts that because its Principals have
input into purchasing and sales decisions, they do not
have “an expectation of profits garnered solely from the
efforts of others.’’ We disagree.
As noted by the Court of Appeals in Garrett, the third
prong of Howey has been relaxed. In Garrett, the Court
of Appeals held:
Later cases have eliminated the requirement that
one must expect profits solely from the efforts of
others in order for an interest to be a security. See
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
l6a
U.S. 837, 852, reh’g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975)
(the touchstone is the presence of an investment in
a common venture premised on a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others); O’Quinn
v. Beach Associates, 272 S.C. 95, 105, 249 S.E.2d
734, 739 (1978) (iiivestment contracts may be
found where the investor has duties that are nom-
inal and insignificant or where the investor lacks
any real control over the operation of the enter-
prise).
The key determination is whether the promoters’ ef-
forts, not that of the investors, form the “essential mana-
gerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise. Unique Financial Concepts, 196 F.3d at
1201 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). See also SEC v.
Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (test is whether
the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise).
We find the test is met here. As noted in the Com-
mission’s order, although TLA’s Principals retained some
contractual rights of control, in practice their control
was very limited. TLA made all of the purchasing deci-
sions, and exercised the majority of control in issues
relative to clearing title, picking closing attorneys, etc.,
because the majority of its investors lived a considerable
distance away. As further noted in the Commissioner’s
order, TLA’s marmeting material indicated “we do all
the work.”
l7a
CONCLUSION
In summary, we hold the SEC Commissioner has auth-
ority to issue initial cease and desist orders prior to a
hearing, so long as a hearing is thereafter afforded. Fur-
ther, we find the procedure utilized here did not violate
TLA’s due process rights, and that the final cease and
desist order was properly issued because TLA’s sale of
tax lien certificates was properly found to be the sale of
“securities” within the meaning of the S.C. Uniform
Securities Act. Accordingly, the order on appeal is
AFFIRMED.
TOAL, C.J., MOORE, BURNETT and PLEICONES,
| JJ., concur.
18a
APPENDIX B
[Filed January 13, 2004]
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SECURITIES SECTION
IN THE MATTER OF
Ned B. Majors and Tax Liens Agents, Inc.
Respondents
Case No. 03010
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
HEARING OFFICER TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA
SECURITIES COMMISSIONER
This matter arises from the issuance by the South
Carolina Securities Commission (the “Commission’’) of
its Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Secur-
ities and Engaging in Securities Fraud, and Notice of
Right to a Hearing (the “C&D Order’’) to Ned B. Majors
(‘‘Majors’”’) and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. (““TLA”), on Sep-
tember 9, 2003. The parties then apparently engaged in
litigation before the Circuit Court for the State of South
Carolina, the subject of which is not presently germane
to the issues brought before the administrative hearing
officer in this matter. Respondents apparently made
timely request for a hearing in this matter to review the
issuance of the C&D Order and to determine whether a
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final order should be issued. On October 23, 2003, the
South Carolina Attorney General, acting in his statutory
capacity as the State’s Securities Commissioner, appoint-
ed G. Marcus Knight as the administrative hearing officer
for this matter pursuant to Section 35-1-1450 of the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act (the “Act’’) and
delegated to the hearing officer such authority as is
necessary to conduct the hearing and render this Report
and Recommendation. A public hearing on this matter
was conducted on October 30-31, 2003 pursuant to Sec-
tion 35-1-90 of the Act. Subsequent to the conclusion
of the hearing, the parties submitted briefs and reply
briefs, which were received by the hearing officer not
later than December 5, 2003. A transcript of the hearing,
together with all exhibits submitted during the hearing
and briefs submitted after the hearing, will be delivered
to the Securities Commissioner by the hearing officer
simultaneoulsy with delivery of this Report and Recom-
mendation.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
TLA is a South Carolina corporation organized by fil-
ing of its Articles of Incorporation with the South Caro-
line Secretary of State on November 19, 1998. TLA
commenced its business during 1999 and has, from the
inception, operated its business principally from Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina. Majors is a resident of South
Carolina and is the sole shareholder and officer of TLA.
The primary business activity of TLA centers around
the bidding and purchasing of tax lien certificates
(“TLCs”’) at tax lien auctions or sales conducted by the
taxing authorities of city and county governments
throughout approximately 26 states in the United States.
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Purchasers of TLCs bid competitively for their purchase
at auctions conducted by the governmental entity by
offering to accept a lower interest rate than the statu-
torily prescribed rate to which the issuing governmental
entity is entitled. TLSs generally mature under the
applicable states’ laws in periods of one to three years.
Each of the unmatured TLCs may be redeemed by the
owner of the underlying property by paying the past due
taxes, plus penalties and interest at statutorily prescribed
rates, to the issuing governmental entity, which in turn
pays the amount of the TLCs’ purchase price plus the bid
interest rate to the holder of the TLCs. Each of the
matured TLCs which are not redeemed create for the
holder of the TLCs the right to obtain a tax deed or simi-
lar instrument of conveyance for the underlying prop-
erty. The TLCs holder must often undertake legal action
to quiet or clear his title to underlying property of any
other liens or encumbrances on the title which are junior
to the tax lien by which the holder of the TLCs obtains
title. According to Majors’ testimony, all or virtually
all other liens on the underlying property, including bank
mortgages and federal tax liens, are junior to the interest
of the holder of the TLCs, and accordingly can be exting-
uished in the process of quieting title. The stated objec-
tives of the investment in TLCs is to either (x) receive a
return of the original purchase price for the TLCs plus
payment of interest and penalties from the redemption
of unmatured TLCs by the underlying property owner,
or (y) obtain marketable title to and sell at a significant
profit the property underlying matured TLCs.
In conducting this enterprise, TLA serves as a contract
agent for investors (the “Principals’”) who furnish the
funds required to purchase the TLCs. Most of the Prin-
cipals appear to be individual investors or trusts con-
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trolled by individual investors. Many of these Principals
appear to be South Carolina residents or to have been
present in South Carolina when solicited by TLA. TLA
solicotrs Principals pursuant to newspaper advertise-
ments, booths at conventions and expositions, a website,
seminars, and tapes, among other methods. TLA has
published advertisements in newspapers in South Carolina
and conducted seminars and sponsored booths at conven-
tions and expositions in South Carolina in recent years.
Majors’ testimony and the other evidence presented at
the hearing requires the deduction that TLA made offers
and sales of TLCs to considerably more than 25 persons
during the twelve-month period preceding September 9,
2003 in or from the State of South Carolina. The rela-
tionship between the Principals and TLA is governed by
a standard form Agency Contract, substantially in the
form attached to this Report and Recommendation as
Exhibit A.
In its advertising, video tapes, and other promotional
materials, TLA claimed, among other things, that: “We
eliminate all the risk. We do all the work. We never
touch your money.” Transcript of Hearing, p. 149,
lines 5-6. TLA also claimed in its promotional materials
that “‘every investment check . .. [ the Principal] make[s]
will be made directly to the government selling the tax
lien. . . . All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by
the government in your name and address only . . . Ned
Majors, our founder, is the recognized authority on real
estate tax liens. He wrote the book. . . . We can only
make a profit when you receive a property deed and
sell it for more than your total cost. ... We do all the
work... . And .. . we never touch your money.” Tr.
p. 146, l. 21 — p. 147, 1. 9. TLA advertises that Prin-
cipals can expect a “government guaranteed eight to
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_ twenty-five percent . . . annual interest” return on re-
deemed TLCs and an “expectation of a potential yield
of 10,000 percent’’ on the sale of the property un-
derlying matured TLCs. Tr., p. 57, Il. 8-11. In its
promotional materials, TLA claims that “our growth
expectation is not speculative. We don’t have any
speculation in our business.” Tr. p. 96, ll. 23-25. In
TLA’s promotional materials, Majors also emphasiz-
es the importance of TLA’s experience, connections,
and volume leverage in connection with selecting, ne-
gotiating, and engaging attorneys to quiet title to, and
real estate brokers to market and sell, the properties
underlying matured TLCs. See e.g., Tr. at p. 109, 1.
22 — p. 113, 1. 5. Majors testified that these promo-
tional materials were sent to prospective Principals
from TLA’s offices at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina,
and were given to prospective Principals at seminars and
expositions conducted in Myrtle Beach and Charleston,
South Carolina, and other locations in various states.
In the Agency Contract, each of the Principals ap-
points TLA as its agent to bid on and purchase TLCs
in the Principal’s name or in the name of a trust desig-
nated by the Principal. The funding mechanism for
purchase of TLCs under the Agency Contract requires
the Principal to provide TLA with cashier’s checks from
an FDIC insured bank payable to “County Treasurer for
Tax Liens”. The Agency Contract also states that the
TLCs will be “listed” in Principal’s name. . . by the issu-
ing governmental entity . . . with Principal’s address . . .
as the official notification address. The Agency Contract,
further states that if the amounts of the cashiers checks
provided by the Principal for purposes of purchasing
TLCs exceeds the actual cost of the TLCs purchased by
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TLA on behalf of the Principal, then the excess will be
refunded by the governmental entity to the Principal.
Under the Agency Contract, the Principal will be enti-
tled to all interest and penalties paid in connection with
any redemption of TLCs by an underlying property
owner prior to maturity of the TLC. In the event of a
redemption of one of the TLCs, the Agency Contract
provides that TLA will continue to reinvest the redemp-
tion proceeds, at no additional charge for an agency fee,
until the Principal either receives a matured TLC (or tax
deed) or a period of 36 months expires. In return for
TLA’s services under the Agency Contract, the Principal
agrees to pay TLA a “non-refundable agency fee’’ (usu-
ally in the range of several hundred dollars) and grants
an “inchoate interest of 50% ownership” in any TLCs
purchased by agent for the Principal which are not re-
deemed by the underlying property owners within the
statutorily prescribed time, and as a result of which
“go to deed’’. Under the Agency Contract, the Principal
is obligated to convey the 50% interest “in the net profit
of the TLC and in any resultant tax deed’’ to TLA and
the Principal must “promptly thereafter commence
good faith efforts to quiet the title and sell’’ the prop-
erty underlying the matured TLCs. At the Principal’s
request, TLA is obligated to engage legal counsel and
real estate brokers and “‘such other professionals as . . .
[TLA] deems advisable” to complete the process of
selling the property underlying matured TLCs. Upon
the sale of the underlying property, the closing agent is
directed by the terms of the Agency Contract to first
reimburse the Principal for its TLC purchase price and
the direct out-of-pocket costs, second reimburse TLA
for its direct out-of-pocket costs paid on the Principal’s
behalf in connection with the marketing and sale of the
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underlying property, and third divide equally between
the Principal and TLA any remaining net proceeds of the
sale. The Agency Contract also grants to TLA a right
of first refusal should the Principal decide to sell the
TLCs or the underlying property, and requires the
Principal to purchase TLA’s 50% interest at 50% of
the appraised value of the property underlying the
matured TLCs if the Principal desires to keep the prop-
erty. See Tr. at p. 298, ll. 15-25. The Agency Contract
contains an acknowledgement by the Principal that
“while there are no risks in owning government sold
and issued TLC(s) that are redeemed (paid off), there
are potential downside financial risks if a TLC matures
into a property deed as the underlying property market
value could substantially drop during the tax lien matur-
ity period”. See Exhibit A attached hereto.
Accordingly to the testimony at the hearing, TLA
usually conducts it’s business relationship with the Prin-
cipals in substantial conformity to the Agency Con-
tract, with a few notable exceptions. In a number of
cases, the governmental entity conducting the tax lien
sale would not accept checks that were not in the exact
amount of the bid for the TLCs. In these situations,
TLA deposited the checks in the IOLTA attorney trust
account maintained by Majors. Majors testified that in
each instance the Principals were notified of the need
for this deviation from the standard procedure and the
Principals granted permission for the deposit of the
checks into Majors’ attorney trust account. Majors then
wrote checks to the governmental entity in the exact
amount of the bid price for the TLCs and sent refunds
of the balance of each deposit to the Principals from his
attorney trust account. Majors testified, and provided
his bookkeeping evidence to support, that he maintained
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individual accounting records for each Principal whose
funds were deposited into his attorney trust account, and
that while there might have been approximately 400
checks from Principals handled this way, these checks
constitute a very small percentage of TLA’s overall TLC
business. Majors also testified that in some instances, by
mistake, the governmental entity has issued TLCs or sent
redemption payments to TLA, and that in some instances
in the past TLA’s address has been used as the notice
address for the TLCs purchased on behalf of Principals
who were traveling or had other reasons for not using
their own addresses.
Majors testified that while the Agency Contract
grants the Principals the legal right to specify certain
criteria governing the purchase of TLCs and to select
the attorneys, real estate agents, and other professionals
necessary to clear title and sell the property underlying
matured TLCs, that he discourages the exercise of such
rights (Tr. p. 296, ll. 18-22), and that such rights are
rarely exercised by the Principals. In addition, in his pro-
motional video Majors stated that “I can’ tell you right
now where your money — which auction you’re going to
go to or which county, but we know a county treasurer
in every county of all 2,642 counties who sell tax liens.”
Tr. p. 102, ll. 17-22. Majors confirmed that most of his
Principals live a considerable distance from the properties
to which their TLCs apply and that they rarely exercise
their rights to select professionals needed to clear title
and sell the underlying properties. Tr. p. 299, 1. 23 —
p. 300, 1. 12.
TLA’s promotional video, which appears from the
testimony to have been widely distributed to prospec-
tive Principals, also establishes an offer of liquidity in
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the TLCs purchased by TLA for its Principals. In the
video, Majors tells his prospective Principals that ‘“‘if
you go off and buy tax liens [on] your own, there is no
liquidity. Because the tax collector’s not going to give
you your money back. . . . However, with our program, if
you hire us as our agent, and you want to sell your tax
liens, we'll buy them from you. Or we'll have clients
that buy them from you. And usually within a week,
you know, we can handle up to about four or $500,000
a week easily. I get that much back on redemptions al-
most every week. ... After you buy them, we’ll not
only buy them back from you, but we’ll pay you the
eight percent interest a yeai on your money.” Tr. p.
97, Il. 5-23. Majors testified that the main source of
funding for TLA’s compliance with this offer to purchase
the TLCs from Principals was its profits off of its agency
fees and its share of the profits when property under-
lying the matured TLCs are sold. Tr. p. 306, ll. 17-22.
In TLA’s promotional video, Majors stated that TLA’s
50% interest in the underlying properties is “the only
place where I make my money.” Tr. p. 97, Il. 5-23.
The parties stipulated that the video was sent to pros-
pective Principals in South Carolina.
Neither the offers nor the sales of opportunities to
invest in TLCs pursuant to TLA’s Agency Contract and
related services (the “TLC Investment Opportunity’’)
have been registered with the Commission pursuant to
Section 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. No claim that the
TLC Investment Opportunity satisfied the elements of
an exemption from the registration requirements of the
Act was made under Sections 35-1-310 or -320 of the
Act, nor would the testimony and evidence presented at
the hearing tend to support such a claim of an exemp-
tion. No claim that the TLC Investment Opportunity
ty
i
27a
constituted a ‘“‘federal covered security”’ was made under
Sectiond 35-1-810(c) and -1100 of the Act, nor would
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend
to support such a claim. TLA and Majors were not
registered as broker-dealers or agents under Section
35-1-410 et seg. of the Act. No claim was asserted by
TLA or Majors that an exemption from the broker-dealer
and agent licensing requirements of the Act would apply
to them under Section 35-1-15 of the Act, nor would
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend
to support such a claim.
In their opening statements and post-hearing briefs, the
parties agreed that the principal issue in this matter is
whether or not the TLC Investment Opportunity con-
stituted a “security” as defined in Section 35-1-20 of
the Act!. If the TLC Investment Opportunity did not
constitute a “‘security”’ as defined by the Act, then the
Act did not apply, the Commission would not have
jurisdiction over this matter, and the C&D Order would
be inappropriate. If the TLC Investment Opportunity
did constitute a “security” as defined for purposes of
the Act, then the Act did apply and this hearing officer
must analyze the potential violations of the Act by the
Respondents.
APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT
The staff of the Securities Section of the Attorney
General’s Office (the “Staff”), as the proponent of the
C&D Order, asserts that the TLC Investment Opportun-
The Respondents also have raised a due process question as
tq the statutory scheme and procedures for issuance and review of
the C&D Order by the Commission, which will be addressed below.
28a
ity constituted a “security” for purposes of the Act
because it constituted either a (1) “investment con-
tract” or (2) a “certificate of interest or participation
in... [a] profit-sharing agreement”. Section 35-1-
20(15) of the Act. Respondents deny that the TLC
Investment Opportunity constituted a “‘security”’ under
either definition. 3
1. Investment Contract. The term “investment con-
tract”, as used in the definition of the term “security”
for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act, has
apparently not been defined in any fashion meaningful
to this matter by the courts of this State. However, it
is well established that the South Carolina courts seek
guidance from the federal courts in interpreting provi-
sions of the Act which parallel federal statutes, such
as the definition of the term “security”. See Carver v.
Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 310, 342 S.E.2d 406, 407
(1986); McGaha v. Moseley, 283 S.C. 268, 273, 322
S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984); Bradley v. Hullander, 272
S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978). The seminal case for
the definition of the term “investment contract”’ is
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 66 S. Ct.
1100, 1102-03 (1946). In Howey it is well estab-
lished that the United States Supreme Court defined an
“fnvestment contract” as any arrangement whereby an
investor makes {a} an investment of money (b) in a
common ente*prise (c) with an expectation of profits
solely from the efiorts of the promoter or a third party.
Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1153, 115 S.Ct. 1107 (1995)
(citing Howey, 328 U.S. 299-300, 66 S. Ct. 1103). The
South Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted the Howey
analysis. Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 180, 359
S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds
29a
Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 1161,
580 S.E.2d 440 (2003).
(a) Investment of Money. An “investment of mon-
ey”’ means, for purposes of the definition of an “‘invest-
ment contract’’, that the investor must have committed
his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject
himself to financial loss. SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.
76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996). In the instant case, the Prin-
cipals wrote checks to TLA for the non-refundable
agency fee and invested money in TLCs purchased by
TLA on their behalf. Majors testified, that while he
promoted and believed that the TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity was a safe investment, the Principals could lose
some or all of their investment if the underlying prop-
erty had at the time of sale a value less than the amount
of the investment. The terms of the Agency Contract
included a specific acknowledgement by the Principal
that this “‘potential down side financial risk” existed. In
addition, the Principals were required to grant TLA a
“650% inchoate interest” in each TLC that TLA pur-
chases on behalf of the Principal, which is a further
commitment of the Principal’s assets to the enterprise.
Thus, the first element of the Howey test, requiring
an “investment of money” is satisfied in the instant
case. Cf. Pinckney, 923 F.Supp. at 81 (Although the
promoter represented that the investor’s funds would
be under the investor’s control, profits would be gen-
erated by trading of the financial instruments in which
the investment was made. The investor would have
been subject to financial loss by virtue of the trades
to be made.).
(b) Common Enterprise. The Howey definition of
investment contract requires as a second element that
the particular transaction constitute a “common enter-
30a
prise”. In this regard, the Howey analysis contemplates
that the transaction will involve a relationship between
investors. The Howey case, however, does not define pre-
cisely the required nature of the relationship or the re-
quired number of investors that must be involved. As a
result, the courts have subsequently developed three dif-
ferent tests to determine whether the requisite “common
enterprise” element is satisfied: (i) horizontal common-
ality, (ii) strict vertical commonality and (iii) broad
vertical commonality. Morrow K. Monaghan, Note,
An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enter-
prise of Element of Investment Contract Analysts, 63
Fordham L. Rev. 2135, 2152 (1995). While the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled definitely ox
the applicable.test for this element of the Howey anal-
ysys, district courts in the Fourth Circuit have recognized
both horizontal commonality and strict vertical common-
ality as applicable. See e.g., Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at
81-82; see also SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enter., Inc., 952
F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991). This hearing officer
agrees with the cases in the Fourth Circuit recognizing
horizontal commonality and strict vertical commonality
as appropriate tests, and rejects broad vertical common-
ality (which would be relatively easy to demonstrate in
the instant case) for two reasons: (x) the broad vertical
commonality test considers whether the investor’s
realization of profits is inextricably tied to the pro-
moter’s expertise and skill, which overlaps, and renders
superfluous, the third element of the Howey test, which
requires an expectation of profits based on the efforts
of the promoter or other third persons (see Pinckney,
923 F. Supp. at 81-82; Monaghan at 2161); and (y) the
broad vertical commonality test is simply too broad,
potentially bringing within the special regulation of the
3la
securities laws a wide variety of contracts and other
arrangements between parties that neither require nor
comport with the policies and principles underlying the
securities laws, which could unduly hinder commerce
in the marketplace (see Monaghan at 2162). Accord-
ingly, this hearing officer will review the “common ent-
erprise element” of the Howey analysis in the instant
matter under only the horizontal commonality and
strict vertical commonality tests.
(i) Horizontal Commonality. The horizontal com-
monality test, which is derived principally from the facts
of the Howey case itself, is present when the investments
of multiple investors are pooled and the fortunes of one
investor are linked to the fortunes of other investors.
Specifically, the court will find that horizontal common-
ality exists where investors’ contributions are pooled and
the distributions of profits and losses are experienced
ratably among the investors as a group. See Monaghan
at 2152-57; see also Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. Thus,
the outcome of the investment for each individual
investor is tied both to the success of the enterprise and
to the outcome for the other investors in the enterprise.
In the instant matter, the testimony and evidence suggest
some facts supportive of a finding that horizontal com-
monality existed:
First, in a number of situation, where the gov-
ernmental entity required TLA to deposit the pre-
cise amount of the bid for TLCs, the Principals’
checks were deposited in a single account, namely
Majors’ attorney trust account. While these depos-
its into a single account have certain aspects of a
pooling of the funds of multiple investors, Majors
did, according to his testimony and evidence, main-
tain individual accounting of the funds for each
Principal.
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Second, TLA agents purchased TLCs at each auc-
tion on behalf of multiple Principals by using a rota-
tional process, whereby the TLA agent bids for
TLCs identified as suitable by TLA first for one
Principal and then for each other Principal in order,
on a virtually random basis. This random rota-
tional purchasing suggests that the quality of the
TLCs purchased on behalf of one Principal is linked
to the randomly selected quality of the TLCs pur-
chased on behalf of other Principals at the same
auction. However, the testimony and evidence at
the hearing suggests that TLCs are always bought
for a single Principal at a time, in that Principal’s
name, and that multiple Principals do not share in
the benefits of TLCs purchased for other Principals.
Third, TLA is obligated by the Agency Contract
te purchase replacement TLCs for any Principal
whose TLCs are redeemed by the underlying prop-
erty owner prior to maturity of the TLC. For this
replacement service, TLA does not charge an addi-
tional agency fee, meaning that the benefit of this
replacement obligation to the Principal whose
TLCs are redeemed prior to maturity is at risk for
the continued operational success of TLA, who
will have to fund the costs of pursuing replacement
TLCs out of its own operational resources, which
is necessarily subject to the profitability of the
entire enterprise, and thereby linked to the for-
tunes of the other Principals. However, because of
the volume of business and the number of auctions
routinely attended by TLA agents, and the rela-
tively nominal amount of the non-refundable
agency fee, this risk seems to be minimal.
Fourth, TLA and Majors promote the liquidity of
the TLC Investment Opportunity by marketing
a standing “offer” to the Principals to purchase
TLCs from Principals who wish to dispose of them,
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and if TLA or Majors do not purchase such TLCs,
TLA and Majors offer to help arrange for another
Principal to purchase TLCs. According to the testi-
mony at the hearing, the major source of funding
for this liquidity option are the profits derived by
TLA from its 50% interest in matured TLCs of other
Principals, thereby linking the liquidity alternative
for the Principal wishing to dispose of TLCs to the
profits of other Principals who have sold, or will
sell, matured TLCs. However, this liquidity alter-
native does not appear to be a contractual obliga-
tion in the Agency Contract, and there was no tes-
timony or other evidence presented at the hearing
about whether this liquidity alternative was relied
upon or material to the Principals in making an
investment decision.
Fifth, in TLA’s promotional video, Majors admits
that he buys the second and third liens which attach
to the property underlying the Principal’s TLCs
for the years intervening between the tax lien sale
at which TLA purchases the TLCs for the Principal
at the time at which the Principal’s TLCs mature.
Majors tells his prospective Principals in the video
that he buys such subjsequent tax liens for his
“financial institutions’? because, as Majors says, “‘l
know when you foreclose in three years or sell the
property, you’re going to pay off my financial
institution [on] that lien. ...” Tr. p. 109, ll. 11-
14. These transactions suggest that multiple in-
vestors have mutual, linked lien interests in the same
underlying properties, and that the proceeds of the
sale of such properties are shared or pooled on
some basis between multiple investors (i.e., when
the underlying property is sold, multiple investors
receive shares of the proceeds). However, the evi-
dence is ambiguous as to whom Major’s “financial
institutions” were, how they were solicited, what
34a
contractual terms applied to them, and precisely
how they were related to the Respondents. Nor is
it clear in the records whether the “financial insti-
tutions” and the first lien Principals shared the
potential for profit or loss on a ratable basis. Pre-
sumably, the second and third liens are each pur-
chased for distinct “financial institutions’ and the
Principal acquires no direct interest in such liens.
There was also no evidence presented at the hearing
as to how many such transactions occurred with
Major’s “financial institutions” or when they
occurred, or whether they involved any South
Carolina residents.
Sixth, Majors promotes TLA’s services to facil-
itate IRS Section 1031 tax-free exchanges of prop-
erties underlying the matured TLCs among various
Principals. These services suggest a horizontal
financial linkage among participating Principals who
exchange properties with one another through
TLA’s facilitation. However, these services do
not appear to be constrctual obligations of the
Agency Contract, and there was no testimony or
other evidence presented at the hearing that any
Principals actually took advantage of these ser-
vices, whether these services were relied upon or
material to Principals in making an investment
decision, or whether such exchanges involved any
South Carolina residents.
While the foregoing six aspects of TLA’s relationship
with its Principals are indicative of horizontal common-
ality, none of them seem to fall squarely within the com-
monly recognized view of this test — a pooling of the
investment proceeds and a pro rata distribution of profits
and losses. These aspects suggest degrees of horizontal
(i.e., Principal-to-Principal) economic relationship or
dependency, but either the supporting facts are ambig-
35a
uous or incomplete as presented in the hearing or the law
is not well-developed as applicable to these aspects.
Moreover, since these six aspects of the overall TLA
enterprise are more or less on the periphery of the enter-
prise, and in some instances are exceptions from the
normal course of business, a finding in this matter that
horizontal commonality existed based on these facets
alone would result in a modified C&D Order that simply
prohibits a very limited scope of the conduct at ques-
tion. Thus, reaching conclusions on fine distinctions in
these facts would seem to be unproductive and unnec-
essary, and this hearing officer declines to do so.
(ii) Strict Vertical Commonality. In their post-
hearing briefs and reply briefs, counsel for both the Staff
and the Respondents agreed that the SEC v. Pinckney,
923 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.C, 1996), enunciated the proper
analysis of the strict vertical commonality test. This
hearing officer concurs. In Pinckney, the Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina held that ‘ta common
enterprise may be established by showing that the inves-
tor’s profits are directly related to the promoter’s pro-
fits”. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court concluded that the often more
restrictive horizontal commonality test is not the ex-
clusive test for the “‘common enterprise” element of the
Howey analysis. To rely exclusively on horizontal com-
monality would be “overly restrictive and not in keeping
with the Act’s remedial goal of preventing . . . [viola-
tions of the securities laws] in connection with an offer
of what would otherwise be a security but for the ab-
sence of multiple investors.” Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.
at 82. Exclusive reliance on horizontal commonality
would “also make the test easy to evade by a disingen-
uous promoter who simply maintains separate bank
36a sic;
accounts or who dissipates the investors’ contributions
immediately”. Monaghan at 2157.
In the instant matter, TLA’s Agency Contract with
its Principals provides expressly for an equal 50/50 shar-
ing between TLA and the Principal of the profits derived
from the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs,
after the Principal and TLA are each reimbursed their
respective out-of-pocket costs. In his testimony, Majors
acknowledged that this was the primary motivation for
TLA undertaking this enterprise and the only source of
profit for TLA, as the relatively nominal non-refundable
agency fee did not cover the costs of operations. Thus,
the Principals’ profits are inceed directly related to TLA’s
profits and vice versa.
In the expert testimony of Attorney Robert A. Singer
offered by the Respondents at the hearing, and in Res-
pondents’ post-hearing briefs, Respondents contend that
because in the instant situation TLA’s revenues are der-
ived from the Principals’ profits, that this is the “exact
opposite of the relationship required . . . to show strict
vertical commonality”. Respondents’ Brief dated Nov-
ember 26, 2003, p. 17. However, in Pinckney, which
was a summary judgment case cited in Respondent’s
_ Briefs, the court concluded that “evidence... that...
[the promoters’] fortunes would be linked to... [the
investor’s] return on the investment and those fortunes
would be derived from a percentage of the [investor’s]
return” was legally sufficient to establish a factual dis-
pute as to the existence of a common enterprise. Pinck-
ney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this conclusion, the
Pinckney court analyze whether an investment in “prime
bank instruments” by a individual investor would satis-
fy the strict vertical commonality test for purposes of
37a
the ‘“‘common enterprise” element oi the Howey anal-
ysis. In Pinckney, the defendants were promoters who
would profit only as a result of commissions or a simi-
lar payments of a percentage of the return received by
the investor. Thus, the Pinckney court reached a con-
clusion that the promoter’s profit being linked to the
investor’s profit has the same impact, for purposes of
strict vertical commonality, as the investor’s profit being
linked to the promoter’s profit. In other words, Pinck-
ney held that it is legally sufficient that the profit of
the investor and the promoter are linked; and it is not
determinative for purposes of the strict vertical com-
monality test whose profits are derivative upon the
profits of whom. This is particularly so in the instant
matter since TLA has from the beginning of the ar-
rangement a 50% inchoate interest in the profits of the
sale of property underlying matured TLCs. Both the
Principals and TLA profit from the sale of the property
in the same fashion and at the same time, and pursuant
to parallel and equal interests. See Reynolds, 952 F.2d
at 1130-31 (“One indicator of vertical commonality,
though by no means the only indicator, is an arrange-
ment to share profits on a percentage basis between the
investor and the... promoter.... In the instant case,
[the promoter] ... told investors he would take a man-
agement fee based on a percentage of profits, thus mak-
ing his own profit contingency on the profit of his
investors”’).
Moreover, that a clever and creative promoter can
develop investment vehicles whereby the promoter’s
profits are derived from the investor’s profits, and not
vice versa, should not eliminate the application of the
securities laws and the availability of the protections of
investors mended to be afforded thereby, especially in
38a
light of Howey’s conclusion that the purposes of the
inclusion of the term “investment contract’’ in the def-
inition of “security” was to provide a flexible term that
will achieve the purposes of the securities laws in a var-
iety of changing situations in a dynamic marketplace.
Monaghan at 2145 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 64S. Ct. 120 (1943)).
This hearing officer concludes, therefore, that “strict
vertical commonality” is an appropriate test for the
“common enterprise” element of the Howey analysis,
that the Pinckney case analysis is apposite, and that
under the Pinckney analysis, the facts of the instant
matter satisfy the “strict vertical commonality” test for
the “common enterprise”’ element of the Howey anal-
ysis.
(c) Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of
Others. The third element of the Howey analysis is
whether the investor had an expectation of profits
“solely” from the efforts of the promoter or third
party. Monaghan at 2137. This element of the Howey
analysis addresses the degree of control by the investor
over the profit-making aspects of the transaction. Mona-
ghan at 2149. Over the years since the enunciation of
the Howey analysis, the courts have not strictly con-
strued the word “solely” from the efforts of others.
Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920
(4th Cir. 1990); Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. The
later cases after Howey have softened this requirement
by interpreting “‘solely” to mean “‘largely’’ or “‘prin-
cipally”. Monaghan at 2149. This test can still be
met if the most essential functions or duties must be
performed by others and not the investor. Batley, 904
“F.2d at 920; see also Garrett, 359 S.E.2d at 285-86.
Moreover, the court is not required to look exclusively
39a
at the language of the contract. “Rather, it must con-
sider the economic realities of the situation to deter-
mine whether the investor has any real control over the
management of his investment.” Waterman v. Alta
Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 804 (E.D.N.C.
1986); see also Robinson v, Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170
(4th Cir. 2003) (“What matters more than the form of
an investment scheme is the ‘economic reality’ that it
represents”). See generally South Carolina Securities
Statement of Policy 95-2 (membership interests in a
member-managed limited liability company will con-
stitute securities where the “facts and circumstances ren-
der substantially meaningless the managerial powers”
of the members despite the rights of control granted to
members by statute or the operating agreement).
In the Waterman case, the court focused on the pro-
moter’s managerial efforts that could cause the invest-
ment to increase in value, the manager’s special expertise
in selecting items within a particular class of items which
will appreciate at a faster rate than a particular class in
general, and the managerial efforts dcaling with the
property where an investor is unable or not equipped to
do so. In Waterman, the investor had a contractual right
to manage the feeding and care of the cattle in which the
investor invested; however, the court found that the
investor could not have invested in a cattle operation
except through an operation managed in a fashion such
as offered by the promoter. The investor seldom was
able to visit the operation and lacked the expertise or
time to manage the cattle operation. The court con-
cluded that, in looking at the reality of the situation,
the investor did not in fact have any real control over
the maintenance of the investment. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court focused on the promoter’s representa-
40a
tions that it would provide a “turn-key package” and
its advertisements that it “handles everything’ for its
investors. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 805-806. As a
result, the Waterman court found that this third element
of the Howey analysis was satisfied despite the contract-
ual right of the investor to determine when to sell the
cattle. This conclusion was based on the impracticality
of the investor having any real control over the deci-
sions. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 806; see also SEC
v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.
1994).
In the instant situation, this hearing officer reaches
a similar conclusion that the essential functions from
which the profit? is derived were to be performed by
TLA and Majors. The Principals typically have no
input into what TLCs are purchased for them. They
merely sign the Agency Contract and provide the funds
to TLA, relying on TLA to screen the properties, select
the TLCs, attend the auction, conduct the bid, and pro-
cess the paperwork. The selection of TLCs is the essent-
ial step in making a profit — TLA touts its expertise in
selecting TLCs that will mature to permit a sale of the
underlying property for a value greater than the amount
of the investment, and the Agency Contract reserves to
TLA the essential decision-making authority for the
2 It is indisputable that the Principals expect a “profit” from
this investment in TLC. All of TLA’s promotional materials hype
the return on investment that prospective Principals can expect
(see e.g., Tr. p. 57, I. 8-11), and in his testimony, Majors fre-
quently referred to “profits” for investors and TLA from the sale
of the properties underlying the TLCs. The only legitimate ques-
tion, therefore, is whether the Principals were led to expect the
profit from the efforts of others or themselves.
4la
selection of TLCs to purchase. TLA discourages (quite
successfully, it appears) the Principals from setting cri-
teria for the purchase of TLCs by TLA.
Majors and TLA also promote the TLC Investment
Opportunity as one in which the Principals have to do
little or nothing, and tout repetitively that “we do all
the work’, While the Agency Contract technically leaves
to the Principal the right to select legal counsel, real
. estate brokers, and other professionals necessary to quiet
the title and sell the property underlying matured TLCs,
this right is no more than rarely exercised, according
to Majors’ testimony. Moreover, the Principals have no
realistic ability to control the sale of the property under-
lying the matured TLCs. Under the Agency Contract, the
Principals have an obligation to use their best efforts to
sell the property, and if TLA requests, immediately con-
vey to TLA the 50% inchoate interest in the property, or
in the alternative they must buy TLA’s 50% interest in
the property at 50% of its appraised value if the Prin-
cipals wish to retain the property. The Principals must
bear the costs and other burdens of compliance with
these obligations, which TLA offers in its marketing
materials to expertly supervise and minimize using its
experience, connections, and volume leverage. Thus, the
obligations imposed on the Principals by the Agency
Contract create pressure on the Principals to let TLA
“do all the work” to quiet the title and sell the property.
The Principals are most often located far from the prop-
erties. TLA’s marketing program almost ensures that it
will most frequently purchase TLCs for Principals who
are located nowhere near the location of the Principals.
Majors even markets that he does not know, at the time
of a seminar when Principals are solicited and contracted,
where their money will be invested. The Principals have
42a
virtually no input into the selection, identity, character-
istics, or location of the underlying properties at the time
the TLCs are purchased for them, and generally have rela-
tively small units of investment in separate properties
located in various states, which would not justify travel
to, or other long-distance control over, the properties
or the sale process.
Given the volume of properties in the overall enter-
prise, as managed by TLA, and TLA’s heavy promotion
of its expertise, experience, services, and connections
with regard to selecting TLCs and selling the underlying
properties in an efficient, fast, and profitable manner,
the Principals’ technical legal rights to control the sale
process appears to be a little more than window-dressing.
See Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1133-34 (“While the sales
contract gave investors the right to make other arrange-
ments for the refining of their ore, there is no evidence
that a single investor exercised that right. Promotional
materials for the program did not emphasize investors’
legal right to refine the ore themselves but rather . .
[the Promoter’s] commitment to build a new refinery
at which investor’s ore would be processed. Further-
more, since the refining contract was included in the
price paid for the ore, investors would have incurred
unnecessary costs if they had the ore transported and
refined elsewhere.”). The mere existence of contract-
ual rights of control granted in the Agency Contract to
the Principals is not determinative. See Robinson, 349
F.3d at 170 (“Agreements do not annul the securities
laws by retaining nominal powers for investors un-
able to exercise them.”). It is unrealistic to anticipate
that the Principals would incur the cost and hassle
inherent in exercising this right and it is completely
consistent with the realities of the overall situation
43a
to conclude that the efforts of TLA and Majors (e.g.,
the handling of the complicated paperwork for, and
expert attendance at, remote auction sales of TLCs in
a wide variety of locations throughout 26 states, the
selection and purchase of TLCs that are more likely
to mature for sale at values greater than the amount
of investment, the replacement of redeemed TLCs
with new TLCs at no additional charge, the offer and
arrangement of liquidity in the Principals’ investment
in TLCs, the arrangement of Section 1031 exchange
opportunities, and the expert selection and negotiation
with professionals to efficiently, quickly, and profit-
ably sell the underlying properties) are the “undeni-
ably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure ot success of the enterprise.”
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,
482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973). These services are also the empha-
sized core of TLA’s marketing program. By virtue of
the realities of the situation, TLA and Majors have and
will perform all of the essential functions of managing
the TLC Investment Opportunity, and not the Prin-
cipals. 3 See Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82; see also Gar-
rett, 359 S.E.2d at 286.
3s an analogy, Respondent’s expert Attorney Singer testi-
fied that the contractual and statutory rights of general partners
of general partnerships and members of member-managed limited
liability companies to control the management of the business
entity resulted in these investments not satisfying the Howey anal-
ysis, meaning these investments were held not to be “securities’’.
However, the case law and statements of policy to which Attor-
ney Singer referred take exception from the indicated results, and
subject such investments to the securities laws, where it is imprac-
tical or unrealistic that the general partners or members can or will
[footnote continued]
,
;
os
a
iG
:
44a
Thus, the TLC Investment Opportunity satisfies all
three elements of the Howey analysis, meaning that the
TLC Investment Opportunity is an “investment con-
tract’’ for purposes of the definition of “‘security” under
Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act.
2. Certificate of Interest or Participation in a Profit
Sharing Agreement. Counsel for the Staff also asserts
that the TLC Investment Opportunity constitutes a
“certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing
agreement” under Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act. The
South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled on the definition
of this type of “security” in McGaha v. Moseley, 283
S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984). In the Mc-
Gaha case, the investor was granted by written assign-
ment an interest in the profits that arose under a fran-
chise agreement that the promoter had with a third party.
The court concluded that on its face, the written assign-
ment of an interest in the profits arising under the fran-
chise agreement constituted a “certificate of interest
or participation in a profit-sharing agreement”. McGaha,
322 S.E.2d at 464.
In the instant case, counsel for the Respondents have
asserted through expert testimony of Attorney Singer
and the post-hearing briefs that the TLC Investment
Opportunity does not constitute a “certificate of interest
or participation in a profit sharing agreement” because
the Principals do not depend on the profits of TLA for
their return. In other words, Respondents assert that the
dependency of TLA on the profits to be derived from
the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs owned
by the Principals is the opposite of what would be re-
quired for a “certificate of interest or participation in a
profit sharing agreement” for purposes of the definition
of “security’’ under Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act.
45a
While this hearing officer does not find persuasive this
analysis as asserted in connection with the “common ent-
erprise” element of the Howey analysis by which the
term “investment contract” is defined for purposes
of the Act, this analysis is useful for purposes of the
definition of a “certificate of interest or participa-
tion in a profit-sharing agreement”. The analysis was
inconsistent with the Pinckney case for purposes of
the definition of “investment contract’, but is con-
sistent with the McGaha case for purposes of the defini-
tion of “certificate of interests or participation in a
profit-sharing agreement”’.
In McGaha, the promoter made an assignment to the
investor of the promoter’s profit rights in the franchise
agreement between the promoter and a third party. The
court found this assignment to be sufficient to meet the
definition of a “security”. Moreover, if a mere co-de-
pendency for profits, such as that arising from the equal
50/50 sharing by TLA and the Principals of profits
derived from the sale of property underlying the matured
TLCs, were to be sufficient for purposes of the defin-
ition of “certificate of interests or participation in a
profit-sharing agreement’’, then there would be very lit-
tle distinction between an “investment contract” and a
“certificate of interest or participation in a profit-shar-
ing agreement” for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of
the Act. We must assume that the legislature intended
different things by inclusion of different terms in the
definition; hence, a distinction would seem to be approp-
riate in the definitions of the terms included by the
legislature. Moreover, unlike an “investment contract”,
the term “certificate of interest or participation in a
profit-sharing agreement’’ on its face suggests that the
certificate or interest obtained by the investor must be
46a
granted in the profits of someone other than the inves-
tor in order for this term to have a sensible meaning.
See McGaha, 322 S.E.2d at 464. In the instant case,
TLA derives its profits from the sale by the Principals
of the property underlying the Principal’s matured TLC,
which is a relationship opposite from the McGaha
which is a relationship opposite from the McGaha rela-
tionship. In addition, since there is ample support for
the conclusion that the TLC Investment Opportunity
constituted a “security” for purposes of the Act under
the definition of “investment contract” as described
above, there is no need to determine whether an ex-
pansion on the apparent definition of “certificate of
interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement”
enunciated in McGaha is appropriate, and this hearing
officer declines to do so.
APPLICATION OF THE ACT
The TLC Investment Opportunity offered and sold
by TLA, who was controlled by Majors, is an “invest-
ment contract” under the definition of “security” in
Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act by virtue of application
by the Howey analysis, satisfying all three of the Howey
elements: (i) an investment of money under the Pinck-
ney case, (ii) in a common enterprise under the strict
vertical commonality test set forth in Pinckney, (iii) for
which the Principals expect profit to be derived from
be able to exercise effectively such rights of control. See ¢.g.,
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented,
454 U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); South Carolina Securities
Statement of Policy 95-2 (“The analytical pattern usually turns,
in essence, upon a qualitative analysis about the meaningful partici-
pation of investors in management of the entity”.).
47a
the efforts of TLA and Majors under the Waterman,
Reynolds, and Garrett cases. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the methods and content of the promotional
materials and activity of TLA and Majors, which tout the
TLC Investment Opportunity as a lucrative, passive,
remote investment, in which TLA and Majors “do all
the work”, The realities of the overall situation and the
nature of TLA’s promotional materials override the
technical rights of control granted to the Principals in
the Agency Contract.
Since the TLCs Investment Opportunity is a “‘secur-
ity” under the Act, then the offer and sale of the TLCs
Investment Opportunity are subject to regulation of the
Act and jurisdiction of the Commission. Respondents
have not sustained the burden of proof under Section
35-1-340 of the Act that an exemption from the regis-
tration requirements is applicable to the transaction.
Moreover, it would appear that no such exemption could
be sustained under the facts as presented at the hearing.
See e.g., Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 807 (“[P]ublic
advertising is incompatibie with the claim of a private
offering”) (quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Intl
Franchise, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)).
It is undisputed that neither the TLCs Investment Oppor-
tunity offered and sold by TLA, nor the promoters of
the TLCs Investment Opportunity, have been registered
with the Commission under Sections 35-1-810 et seq.
and -410 et seg. of the Act. Thus, TLA, and Majors as
its controlling person under Section 35-1-1500, have
violated the registration requirements of Sections 35-1-
810 et seg. of the Act* and are subject to enforcement
*The “security” in this matter was the TLC Investment
Opportunity embodied in TLA’s Agency Contract and related ser-
[footnote continued]
48a
action by the Commission for such violations under Sec-
tion 35-1-60 of the Act.
Counsel for the Staff introduced testimony and
other evidence at the hearing of misrepresentations and
omissions by TLA and Majors in connection with the
promotion and sale of TLCs Investment Opportunities.
Majors stipulated to “puffery”. Tr. at p. 248, ll. 23-25.
And the testimony and promotional materials intro-
duced into evidence at the hearing included “puffery”
that would be inappropriate, and omitted disclosures
that would be expected, in a registered securities offer-
ing. It is clear that TLA’s promotional materials would
vices. Thus, TLA is the “issuer” of the security under Section
$5-1-20(10) of the Act. Majors is the sole shareholder and officer
of TLA. The testimony and other evidence presented at the hear-
ing was ambiguous and incomplete (e.g., there was no evidence pre-
sented about how Majors was compensated, if at all, for his services
in soliciting prospective Principals), and the parties’ post-hearing
briefs provided no definitive legal authorities, as to whether either
TLA or Majors were “engaged in the business of effecting transac-
tions in securities for the account of others or for... [their] own
account[s]” within the meaning of Section 35-1-20(3) for pur-
poses of the broker-dealer registration requirements of Section
35-1410 of the Act. Aconclusicn that Respondents violated Sec-
tion 35-1410 of the Act is somewhat derivative upon a violation
of Section 35-1-810 of the Act. Majors would be an “agent” of
the issuer under Section 35-1-20(2) for purposes of Section 35-1-
415 of the Act and would have been entitled to an issuer sales
permit under SC Securities Rule 113-2 (Order 97003, Proposed
Rule 113-201(C)), if the TLC Investment Opportunity were a
registered offering and if he performed substantial other duties
for TLA and was not improperly compensated, etc. The remedial
goals of the Act can be adequately achieved by a conclusion merely
that Respondents violated Sections 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. A
conclusion that Respondents also violated Section 35-1-410 of
the Act is problematic, and to a large degree duplicative. Thus,
this hearing officer declines to rule on whether the Respondents
also violated the broker-dealer or agent registration requirements of
Sections 35-1410 et seq. of the Act.
49a
not satisfy the requirements for a prospectus pursuant
to a registration of the offer or sale of the TLC Invest-
ment Opportunity under Section 35-1-880 of the Act,
and that most of the materials would not be permitted
for use as “advertisement or other sales literature”
under Section 35-1-50 of the Act and South Carolina
Securities Statement of Policy with Respect to Adver-
tising of New Issues (Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) 951,553).
It is not enough for purposes of liability under the anti-
fraud requirements of the Act, however, that there are
simply misrepresentations, omissions, or other “puf-
fery” — the misrepresentations or omissions must be
material. Section 35-1-1210 of the Act.
A finder of fact could infer materiality from the
circumstances. For example, since it appears a likely
opportunity for loss of investor’s funds would be a mis-
handling of the funds by TLA, a finder of fact could
conclude that Respondents’ repetition of the phrase
“we never touch your money” without describing the
exceptions when the Principals’ funds are deposited
into Majors’ attorney trust account, or Respondents’
failure to fully and accurately describe Majors’ disbar-
ment by the Georgia Bar or the receivership of Majors’
prior Tax Lien Acquisitions company in Georgia were
material. Or for sample, since TLA’s promotional mat-
erials tout TLA’s expertise and the Principals are depend-
ent on TLA’s expertise to produce a profit from the
TLC Investment Opportunity, a finder of fact could
conclude that Majors’ representation that he author-
ized and published two definitive books on TLCs that
sold thousands of copies and were “best sellers”, if
not true (and the truth of these representations stretches
credibility when Majors cannot furnish a single copy of
either “best seller” book at the present), were material.
>! ; 7%
me :
ie leper “4 =
50a
There has been, however, no persuasive showing of a
loss or even of unresolved complaints by investors. In
fact, the only evidence about the level of satisfaction of
the Principals with regard to the TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity is admittedly self-serving (but essentially uncon-
troverted) testimony from Majors, a witness with an
acknowledged tendency toward “puffery”, that none
of his investors have complained about the TLC Invest-
ment Opportunity. A finder of fact could certainly
conclude from the absence of testimony by, or other
persuasive evidence of, complaining or disgruntled Prin-
cipals, and Majors’ testimony about his generally favor-
able relationships with his Principals, that TLA’s Prin-
cipals are uniformly satisfied, repeat customers.? To
impose criminal or even civil procedures against a pro-
moter whose investors appear to be satisfied with their
investments would seem to be an odd, and unduly puni-
tive, result.
Moreover, this case turns on a novel legal issue in
South Carolina (i.e., whether the “strict vertical com-
51f this matter results in the disconuation of TLA’s business,
it is not inconceivable to anticipate that TLA’s existing investors
will be disappointed, if in fact, as the testimony and other evidence
suggests, they are indeed satisfied with the TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity. Registration of the TLC Investment Opportunity, if prac-
ticable, will increase the costs of the enterprise, a cost increase
which might be passed on to the investors. However, the policy
underlying the securities laws is that the investing public benefits
from the disclosure and other regulation imposed by the securities
laws, which contribute to more efficient and reliable markets, in
ways exceeding the costs and practical limitations which result
from compliance. See generally Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; Mona-
ghan at 2139-44. This is true even if the particular investors might
prefer to eschew the delays, complications, and costs inherent in
compliance with the securities laws for a specific investment
scheme in which they are presently satisfied.
5la
monality” test is sufficient for purposes of the ‘“tcom-
mon enterprise’ element of the Howey analysis) about
which, in advance of this ruling, reasonable minds could
have drawn differing legal conclusions. If the TLC
Investment Opportunity did not constitute a “‘secur-
ity” under the Act, about which there was uncertainty
prior to this ruling, then in the absence of a loss by
investors, Majors’ puffery and omissions would probably
not be regulated, or at least not actionable.© The deter-
mination that the TLC Investment Opportunity is a
“security” is a close question. In light of all of these
considerations, it would appear inappropriate to penalize
the Respondents for violation of the anti-fraud require-
ments of the Act for misstatements, omissions, or other
“puffery” occurring prior to this ruling. No abuse of
the investing public’s trust in TLA or Majors has been
proven by a demonstration of loss or unresolved com-
plaints. And to accomplish the legitimate objectives of
The anti-fraud provisions of fedcral and state securities
laws create a remedy that is almost unique in the law since proof
of damages is not an element required for a remedy. Outside of
the securities laws, misrepresentations, omissions, or other ‘“‘puf-
fery” by Respondents, in the absence of proof of damages suf-
fered by the Principals, would not ordinarily give rise to a recov-
ery or other remedy, other than perhaps an equitable rescission of
the contract. The securities laws were not intended as a codifi-
cation of common law fraud. They are intended to create a special
type of regulatory scheme that is different from common law
fraud, with broader goals, providing prevention, enforcement, res-
cission, and other remedies even where an investor suffers no loss.
See Monaghan at 2142-45; see also Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 79
(the prospective investor chose not to invest, and therefore suf-
fered no loss; yet the SEC pursued an enforcement action against
the promoters that was upheld on summary judgment). Further
prevention would appear to be the only legitimate goa] in the
instant case, in the absence of a showing of loss or other abuses.
53a
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and legal
conclusions, this hearing officer makes the following
recommendations: |
1. The Securities Commissioner should, pursuant to
Section 35-1-60 of the Act, issue a final Cease and Desist
Order modified from the September 9, 2003 C&D Order
to be consistent with the findings of fact and analysis
and conclusions of law set forth in (or to incorporate by
reference and attached) this Report and Recommenda-
tion, and in particular should: (a) find that the TLC
Investment Opportunity, as offered and sold prior to
September 9, 2003 by TLA, which is controlled by Maj-
ors, is an “investment contract”’ under the definition of
“security” in Section 35-1-20(15) of the Act by virtue of
the Howey case analysis (which has been adopted in
South Carolina in the Garrett case), satisfying all three
of the Howey elements: (i) an investment of money
under the Pinckney case, (ii) in a common enterprise
under the “strict vertical commonality” test set forth
in the Pinckney case, (iii) for which the Principals expect
profit to be derived from the efforts of Respondents
under the Waterman, Reynolds, and Garrett cases; (b)
prohibit the offer and sale of the TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity by Respondents and every successor, affiliate,
control person, agent, servent, or employee of either of
them, and every entity owned, operated, or directly
or indirectly controlled or organized by or on behalf
of either of them, in or from the State of South Carolina
in violation of the registration requirements of Sections
35-1-810 et seg. of the Act; (c) deny and revoke any
exemption from such registration requirements of the
Act which Respondents and such other persons or entities
described above might otherwise have had with respect
54a
to the offer and sale of TLC Investment Opportunity;
and (d) grant Respondents the right to review of the
Order in the proper court for Richland County, South
Carolina, or the county in which the Respondents reside,
by filing within thirty days after entry of the Order a
proper written petition, as required by Section 35-1-
1310 of the Act. As this hearing officer did not con-
clude’ that (i) the TLC Investment Opportunity satis-
fied the “horizontal commonality” test for the defin-
ition of an “investment contract” under Section 35-1-
20(15) of the Act or constituted a “certificate of inter-
est or participation in a profit-sharing agreement,” (ii)
the Respondents violated the broker-dealer or agent
registration requirements of Section 35-1-410 of the Act,
or (ili) the Respondents made material misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in connection with the offer and sale
of the TLC Investment Opportunity, the modified Cease
and Desist Order should exclude any reference to, or
enforcement action based on, such issues.
2. Other than the modified Cease and Desist Order
described in Recommendation 1 above, the Commission
should not pursue criminal or civil penalties against
Respondents {unless subsequent complaints or other evi-
dence are received indicating loss or other violations of
the anti-fraud requirements of the Act) for violation of
the registration requirements of the Act by Respondents
in connection with offering and selling the TLC Invest-
ment Opportunities prior to September 9, 2003 because
7This hearing officer determind that, in this proceeding,
conclusions on these issues were problematic in light of ambiguous
or conflicting evidence or uncertainty in the law, and/or were
unnecessary to achieve the remedial objectives of the Act in this
matter.
55a
this matter turns upon a novel legal issue in South Caro-
lina about which, prior to this ruling, reasonable minds
could reach differing conclusions.
3. The Commission should not pursue criminal or civil
penalties against Respondents (unless subsequently com-
plaints or other evidence are received indicating loss or
other violations of the anti-fraud requirements of the
Act) for the specific instances of potential violations of
the anti-fraud requirements of the Act by Respondents
prior to September 9, 2003, as to which testimony and
other evidence was presented at the hearing, because this
matter turns upon a novel legal issue in South Carolina
about which, prior to this ruling, reasonable minds could
reach differing conclusions.
4. The finding in this Report and Recommendation of
violation of the registration requirements of the Act by
Respondents, and the testimony and other evidence
presented at the hearing of specific instances of potential
violations of the anti-fraud requirements of the Act,
should not alone serve as grounds for denial of an appli-
cation by ILA and Majors to register the TLC Invest-
ment Opportunities (or a future iteration thereof) under
Sections 35-1-810 et seq. of the Act, or qualify for an
exemption from such registration requirements, or to
register themselves as securities broker-dealers or agents
under Sections 35-1410 et seg. of the Act.’ Registra-
8 This hearing officer notes that under specified conditions,
Respondents might not be required to register as broker-dealers
or agents under Sections 35-1-410 et seq. of the Act in connection
with future registered, or certain future exempt, offerings of the
TLC Investment Opportunity. See e.g., Sections 35-1-415(1) and
(3) of the Act; and SC Securities Rule 113-2 (Order 97003, Pro-
posed Rule 113-201(C)).
56a
tion of the offer and sale of the TLC Opportunity, and
the regulation of all of the related promotional activities
and disclosures by Respondents, would seem to accom-
plish the purposes of the Act so long as this proceeding
and the results hereof are adequately disclosed in the sub- ©
ject prospectus or other disclosure document. However,
this recommendation should not be construed as a man-
date that such registrations or exemptiens be granted
if the applications do not comply with all applicable
requirements of the Act and the rules, regulations, and
statements of policies promulgated pursuant to the Act,
or if evidence of violations of the Act or other wrong-
doing by TLA, Majors or their agents other than as des-
cribed in this Report and Recommendation is found to
warrant denial of such registrations or exemptions.
5.No legal conclusion reached or declined in this
Report and Recommendation or the modified Cease and
Desist Order described in Recommendation 1 above shall
prohibit the pursuit by any Principal or other investor of
a private right oi action against Respondents under Sec-
tions 35-1-1490 or -1500 of the Act, if any.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ G. Marcus Knight
G. Marcus Knight
Hearing Officer
Date: January 13, 2004
57a
Exhibit A
AGENCY CONTRACT
This contract is formed to acquire real property Tax
Liens or Tax Lien Certificates, hereafter referred to as
TLCs. The undersigned, TAX LIEN AGENTS, Inc.,
(TLA) an Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent, 1s
hereafter referred to as ‘Agent’ and the other under-
signed, hereafter referred to as ‘Principal’, are the sole
two parties to this two-party employment contract.
Both parties agree to the following terms and conditions:
1. Agent will make all purchasing decisions, subject to
such criteria as may be specified by Principal. Principal
will make all selling decisions. Agent shall pay all ex-
penses of going to TLCs auction sites, searching tax
records, evaluating the properties, bidding (it is under-
stood by Principal that, unless Principal instructs Agent
otherwise, Agent will bid primarily on tax liens that,
in Agent’s exclusive opinion, have a reasonable prospect
of not being redeemed) and purchasing TLC(s) only in
Principal’s name or, in event of a Trust, Principal Trust’s
name. Principal agrees to pay Agent a NON-REFUND-
ABLE AGENCY FEE and grants an inchoate interest of
50% ownership in any unredeemed TLC(s) to Agent for
its valuable service.
2. Principal will give Agent FDIC Insured Bank Cash-
ier’s Checks made payable to “COUNTY TREASURER
FOR TAX LIENS” or, if Principal is using a fiduciary
Trust, will give Principal’s Trust a Trust Investmeit Dir-
ection Authorization for the maximum amount that
Principal wishes Agent to buy in TLC(s). Each TLC
bought will be listed in Principal’s name or Trust’s name
by the issuing governmental entity, hereinafter referred
58a
to as “County”, with Principal’s address or Trust address
as the official notification address. Principal and/or
Trust agree that Agent will be notified when anything
happens concerning the TLC. After each auction, Prin-
cipal and/or Trust should get a receipt or a certificate
from the County which shows the exact cost of the
TLC(s). All monies paid to County in excess of the exact
cost of the TLC(s) should be refunded directly back to
the Principal or Trust by the County according to that
government’s policies.
3. If any original TLC is redeemed before its matur-
ity date, Agent agrees that Principal shall keep all re-
demption monies, including interest and penalties, and
Agent shall not be entitled to any of such amounts. If
Principal provides the necessary funds to reinvest such
proceeds, using the procedures set forth in paragraph
2 above, Agent (without charging any additional agency
fee) shall use its best efforts to purchase replacement
TLC(s) at the next tax lien auction that Agent attends.
Agent further agrees, if Principal so elects, to continue
to reinvest redemption monies, at no additional charge,
until (a) Principal receives a matured tax lien/certificate
or tax deed or (b) thirty six (36) months have passed
from the original date of first TLC purchase.
4,.Agent SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT OF FIRST
REFUSAL should Principal and/or Trust decides to
sell or transfer ownership of the TLC(s) or resultant
property purchased under this contract. If Principal/
Trust sells or otherwise transfers its ownership of a TLC
to any other party, the transferee or purchasing party
is required to become the new Principal party and must
agree in writing to the same terms and conditions as
this contract. If Principal/Trust violates the aforesaid
conditions, Principal/Trust must immediately buy out
59a
Agent’s interest by paying to Agent 50% of the then >
appraised value of the real property that secures each
pertinent TLC. If Principal uses a Trust to acquire and
hold the TLC, it is also agreed that once Agent is noti-
fied of any sale proceeds, if Agent does not file a writ-
ten demand with the Trustee of such Trust for the
amounts due to Agent in accordance with this contract
(with the exception of a transfer condition, for which
no claim against Trustee can be made at any time) with-
in 90 days after payment is received by Trustee, no
future demands or claims for such amounts may be
made against Trustee, and any such demand or claim
must be made by Agent directly to the Principal and
Grantor of the Trust.
5. If not in a fiduciary Trust, once a TLC’s period of
redemption has expired, Principal agrees, upon Agent’s
request, to immediately sign such papers as are legally
required to assign, convey, register and confirm that
Agent has an earned 50% interest in the net profit of
the TLC and in any resultant Tax Deed, Warranty Deed,
Property Deed, Treasurer’s Deed or such other docu-
ments and instruments regarding title to the related real
property that may be issued by the County. Unless
Principal and Agent otherwise agree, once the Govern-
ment issues a tax deed or title to Principal, Principal
shall promptly thereafter commence good faith efforts
to quiet the title and sell such property. Agent, upon
Principal’s request, will contact and negotiate terms with
a third party attorney who Principal can then retain to
prepare documents necessary to arrange for good and
marketable (quiet) title to the property represented by
the TLC(s). If and to the extent that Principal so re-
quests, Agent shall conduct or supervise the listing, nego-
tiation and sale of the property, and shall retain real
60a
estate brokers, agents, and such other professionals as
Agent deems advisable. At closing, the proceeds of the
sale will be applied (1) to repay Principal its purchase
price, including direct out-of-pocket costs, paid for the
TLC, and (2) to reimburse Agent for any actual direct
out-of-pocket costs paid by Agent on Principal’s behalf
in connection with the marketing and sale of the prop-
erty. Thereafter, any remaining net proceeds will be
divided equally between Principal and Agent by the
escrow fiduciary per standard closing procedures. If
a TLC is held by a fiduciary Trust and such Trust cannot
legally hold a deed in that state, then the TLC itself
will be marketed and sold by Principal (or at Principal’s
request, by Agent) as if the TLC is the marketable deed,
and the gross proceeds of the sale, as determined by the
closing fiduciary as final authority, will be transferred
back to Trust to replace the TLC, upon receipt of the
gross proceeds, the Trust will pay Agent its invoice for
actual out-of-pocket costs paid by Agent on Principal’s
behalf and then Agent’s invoice for 50% of the net gain
on sale of the TLC.
6. Once a TLC’s period of redemption has expired, if
either party elects to buy the other party’s 50% interest,
each party will select one certified real estate appraiser,
who in turn will jointly select a third certified appraiser.
The resulting sale price to be paid, either by Principal or
by Agent for the other party’s 50% interest, will be 50%
of the average of all three appraisals.
7.Except for the purchase by Agent of the TLC
itself and the incidental costs of sale per paragraph 5,
no party may obligate the other party to any liabilities
without the written consent of the other party.
6la
8.Princiy understands, while there are no risks
in owning gc‘ ernment sold and issued TLC(s) that are
redeemed (paid off), there are potential down side
financial risks if a TLC matures into a property deed
as the underlying property market value could sub-
stantially drop during the tax lien maturity period.
9. This contract is the full and complete agreement
between the parties. This contract shall be governed by
and construed in accordance with the laws of the State
of South Carolina. Time is of the essence.
NOTICE: COUNTY TAX LIENS ARE SOLD AND REGULAT-
ED BY LAWS OF THE STATE THEY ARE LOCATED IN AND
THIS AGREEMENT IS VOID ONLY WHERE IT CONFLICTS
WITH THOSE LAWS.
(If Principal is a legal resident of California,
use California agency contract)
AGREED this —_ day of - 206...
AGENT
TAX LIEN AGENTS, INC.
by
Print Name
Title
4502 Hwy. 17 Bypass So., Myrtle Beach, SC 29588
Phone 843-293-6307
Fax 843-293-6340
AGREED this ___ day of jain
PRINCIPAL
Print Name
Signature
62a
Address
City IG aicecsiceinnabieinis: MAMI iectatnac
Day Phone
Night Phone
Fax Number
SS# or Fed. ID#
Principal’s Witness Signature Date
Principal’s Witness’ Address and Phone
Agent’s Witness’ Signature Date
FOR AGENT’S USE ONLY |
W9 or W8 ____
Amount of TLC(s) to purchase: $
Fee Paid: $ Referred by:
63a
APPENDIX C
| [Filed May 23, 2007]
[SEAL]
THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Daniel E. Shearouse Brenda F. Shealy
Clerk Of Court Chief Deputy Clerk
Post Office Box 11330
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
(803) 734-1080
FAX (803) 734-1499
May 23, 2007
Mr. Ned Majors
133A lvy Stone Drive
Myrtle Beach,SC 29588
Re: Majors, Ned v. SC Securities Commission
Dear Mr. Majors: '
The Court has issued the following order on your Peti-
tion for Rehearing:
“Petition for rehearing is denied.
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J.
s/ James E. Moore J.
s/ E.C. Burnett III J.
s/ Costa P. Pleicones J.
64a
Justice John H. Waller, Jr., not participating.
May 23, 2007.”
The remittutur is today being forwarded to the lower
court.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Daniel E, Shearouse
CLERK
DES/jjp
cc: John F. Beach, Esquire
John J. Pringle, Jr., Esquite
Scott E. Hultstrand, Esquire
Tracy A. Meyers, Esquire
65a
APPENDIX D
[Filed Feb. 11, 2004]
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SECURITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF:
Ned B. Majors and
Tax Lien Agents, Inc.
Respondents.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
FINAL ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST
SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
Case No. 03010
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arose from the issuance by the South Caro-
lina Securities Commission (the “Commission”) of an
Order to Cease and Desist Selling Unregistered Securities
and Engaging in Securities Fraud (the “C&D Order’’) to
Ned B. Majors (‘‘Majors”) and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.
(“TLA’’), on September 9, 2003. Respondents made a
timely requrest for a hearing to review the issuance of the
C&D Order and to determine whether a final order
should be issued.
On October 23, 2003, the South Carolina Attorney
General, acting in his statutory capacity as the State’s
Securities Commissioner, appointed attorney G. Marcus
Knight as the administrative hearing officer for this mat-
66a
ter pursuant to Section 35-1-1450 of the South Carolina
Uniform Securities Act, S.C. Code Ann. §35-1-10, et.
seq. (the “‘Act”), and delegated to the hearing officer
such authority as is necessary to conduct the hearing
and render a Report and Recommendation. A public
hearing was conducted on October 30 and 31, 2003 pur-
suant to Section 35-1-90 of the South Carolina Uniform
Securities Act, §.C. Code Ann. §35-1-10, et seq. (the
“Act”’), and the following findings of fact and conclusion
of law result.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
TLA is a South Carolina corporation organized by
filing of its Articles of Incorporation with the South
Carolina Secretary of State on November 19, 1998. TLA
commenced its business during 1999 and has, from the
inception, operated its business principally from Myrtle
Beach, South Carolina. Majors is a resident of South
Carolina and the sole shareholder and officer of TLA.
The primary business activity of TLA centers around
the bidding and purchasing of tax lien certificates
(““TLCs”’) at tax lien auctions or sales conducted by the
taxing authorities of city and county governments
throughout approximately twenty-six states in the
United States. Purchasers of TLCs bid competitively
for their purchase at auctions conducted by the gov-
emmental entity by offering to accept a lower inter-
est rate than the statutorily prescribed rate to which
the issuing governmental entity is entitled. TLCs gener-
ally mature under the applicable states’ laws in priods of
one to three years. Each of the unmatured TLCs may
be redeemed by the owner of the underlying property
by paying the past due taxes, plus penalties and interest
at statutorily prescribed rates, to the issuing govern-
67a
mental entity, which in tum pays the amount of the
TLCs’ purchase price plus the bid interest rate to the
holder of the TLCs.
Each of the matured TLCs which are not redeemed
create for the holder of the TLCs the right to obtain a
tax deed or similar instrument of conveyance for the
underlying property. The TLCs holder must often
undertake legal action to quiet o” clear his title to under-
lying property of any other liens or encumberances on
the title which are junior to the tax lien by which the
holder of the TLCs obtains title. According to Majors’
testimony, all or virtually all other liens on the under-
lying property, including bank mortgages and federal
tax liens, are junior to the interest of the holder of the
TLCs, and accordingly can be extinguished in the pro-
cess of quieting title. The stated objective of an invest-
ment in TLCs is to either (1) receive a return of the
original purchase price for the TLCs plus payment of
interest and penalties from the redemption of unma-
tured TLCs by the underlying property owner, or (2)
obtain imarketabl title to and sell at a significant profit
the property underlying matured TLCs.
In conducting this enterprise, TLA serves as a contract
agent for investors (the “Principals”; individually, a
Principal”) who furnish the funds required to purchase
the TLCs. Most of the Principals appear to be individual
investors or trusts controlled by individual investors.
Many of these Principals appear to be South Carolina
residents or to have been present in South Carolina when
solicited by TLA. TLA solicits Principals pursuant to
newspaper advertisements, booths at conventions and
expositions, a website, seminars, and tapes, among other
methods. TLA has published advertisements in news-
papers in South Carolina and conducted seminars and
68a
sponsored booths at conventions and expositions in
South Carolina in recent years. Majors’ testimony and
the other evidence presented at the hearing requires the
deduction that TLA made offers and sales of TLCs to
considerably more than twenty-five persons during the
twelve-month period preceding September 9, 2003, in
or from the State of South Carolina. The relationship
between the Principals and TLA purports to be governed
by document denominated “Agency Contract.”
In its advertising, video tapes, and other promotional
materials, TLA claimed, among other things, that: “We
eliminate all the risk. We do all the work. We never
touch your money.”’ Transcript of Hearing of October
30-31, 2003 (“Tr.’’), p. 149, lines 5-6. TLA also claimed
in its promotional materials that “every investment
check .. . [the Principal] make[s] will be made directly
to the government selling the tax lien ... All tax liens
will be purchased and recorded by the government in
your name and address only . . . Ned Majors, our founder,
is the recognized authority on real estate tax liens. He
wrote the book. . . . We can only make a profit when
you receive a property deed and sell it for more than
your total cost.... We do'all the work... And... we
never touch your money.” Tr. p. 146, 1. 21 — p. 147,
1. 9. TLA advertises that Principals can expect a “‘gov-
ernment guaranteed eight to twenty-five percent .. .
annual interest” return on redeemed TLCs and an “ex-
pectation of a potential yield .of 10,000 percent” on
the sale of the property underlying matured TLCs. Tr.,
p. 57, ll. 8-11. In its promotional materials, TLA claims
that “our growth expectation is not speculative. We
don’t have any speculation in our business.” Tr. p. 96,
Il. 23-25.
69a
In TLA’s promotional materials, Majors also emph-
asizes the importance of TLA’s experience, connections,
and volume leverage in connection with selecting, nego-
tiating, and engaging attomeys to quiet title to, and real
estate brokers to market and sell, the properties underly-
ing matured TLCs. See e.g., Tr. at p. 109,1. 22 — p. 113,
l. 5. Majors testified that these promotional materials
were sent to prospective Principals from TLA’s offices in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, and were given to pros-
pective Principals at seminar and expositions conducted
in Myrtle Beach and Charleston, South Carolina, and
other locations in various states.
In the Agency Contract, each of the Principals ap-
points TLA as its agent to bid on and purchase TLCs in
the Principal’s name or in the name of a trust designated
by the Principal. The funding mechanism for purchase
of TLCs under the Agency Contract requires the Principal
to provide TLA with cashiers checks from a FDIC insured
bank payable to “County Treasurer for Tax Liens’. The
Agency Contract also states that “each TLC bought will
be listed in Principal’s name . . . by the issuing govern-
mental entity . . . with Principal’s address . . . as the offi-
cial notification address.”” The Agency Contract further
states that if the amounts of the cashiers checks provided
by the Principal for purposes of purchasing TLCs ex-
ceeds the actual cost of the TLCs purchased by TLA on
behalf of the Principal, then the excess will be refunded
by the governmental entity to the Principal.
Under the Agency Contract, the Principal will be
entitled to all interest and penalties paid in connection
with any redemption of TLCs by an underlying property
owner prior to maturity of the TLC. In the event of a
redemption of one of the TLCs, the Agency Contract
provides that TLA will continue to reinvest the redemp-
70a
tion proceeds, at no additional charge for an agency fee,
until the Principal either receives a matured TLC (or tax
deed) or a period of thirty-six months expires. In return
for TLA’s services under the Agency Contract, the Prin-
cipal agrees to pay TLA a “non-refundable agency fee”
(usually in the range of several hundred dollars) and
grants to TLA an “inchoate interest of 50% owner-
ship” in any TLCs purchased by the Agent for the
Principal which are not redeemed by the underlying
property owners within the statutorily prescribed time,
and as a result of which “go to deed”. Under the Agency
Contract, the Principal is obligated to convey the 50%
interest “in the net profit of the TLC and in any result-
ant tax deed” to TLA, and the Principal must “‘prompt-
ly thereafter commence good faith efforts to quiet
the title and sell’ the property underlying the matured
TLC. At the Principal’s request, TLA is obligated to
engage legal counsel and real estate brokers and “‘such
other professionals as . . . [TLA] deems advisable” to
complete the process of selling the property underlying
matured TLCs.
Upon the sale of the underlying property, the clos-
ing agent is directed by the terms of the Agency Con-
tract to first reimburse the Principal for its TLC pur-
chase price and the direct out-of-pocket costs, second
reimburst TLA for its direct out-of-pocket costs paid on
the Principal’s behalf in connection with the marketing
and sale of the underlying property, and third divide
equally between the Principal and TLA any remaining net
proceeds of the sale. The Agency Contract also grants
to TLA a right of first refusal should the Principal decide
to sell the TLCs or the underlying property, and requires
the Principal to purchase TLA’s 50% interest at 50% of
the appraised value of the property underlying the
7la
matured TLCs if the Principal desires to keep the prop-
erty. See Tr. at p. 298, ll. 15-25. The Agency Contract
contains an acknowledgement by the Principal that
“while there are no risks in owning government sold
and issued TLC(c) that are redeemed (paid off), there are
potential downside financial risks if a TLC matures into |
a property deed as the underlying property market value
could substantially drop during the tax lien maturity
period”.
Majors testified that while the Agency Contract grants
the Principals the legal night to specify certain criteria
governing the purchase of TLCs and to select the attor-
neys, real estate agents, and other professionals necessary
to clear title and sell the property underlying matured
TLCs, he discourages the exercise of such rights (Tr. p.
296, ll. 18-22), and that such rights are rarely exercised
by the Principals. In addition, in his promotional video
Majors stated that “I can’t tell you mght now where your
money — which auction you’re going to go to or which
county, but we know a county treasurer in every county
of all 2,642 counties who scll tax liens.” Tr. p. 102, Il.
17-22. Majors confirmed that most of his Principals
live a considerable distance from the properties to which
their TLCs apply and that they rarely exercise their rights
to select professionals needed to clear title and sell the
underlying properties. Tr. p. 299, 1. 23 — p. 300, 1. 12.
TLA’s promotional video, which appears from the
testimony to have been widely distributed to prospective
Principals, also establishes an offer of liquidity in the
TLCs purchased by TLA for its Principals. In the video,
Majors tells his prospective Principals that “if you go off
and buy tax liens [on] your own, there is no liquidity.
Because the tax collector’s not going to give you your
money back . . . However, with our program, if you hire
72a
us as our agent, and you want to sell your tax liens, we’ll
buy them from you. Or we'll have clients that buy them
from you. And usually within a week, you know, we can
handle up to about four or $500,000 a week easily. I
get that much back on redemptions almost every week.
. . » After you buy them, we'll not only buy them back
from you, but we’ll pay you the eight percent interest a
year on your money.” Tr. p. 97, Il. 5-23. Majors testi-
fied that the main source of funding for TLA’s com-
pliance with this offer to purchase the TLCs from Prin-
cipals was its profits off of its agency fees and its share
of the profits when property underlying the matured
TLCs are sold. Tr. p. 306, ll. 17-22. In TLA’s promo-
tional video, Majors stated that TLA’s 50% interest in
the underlying properties is “‘the only place where I make
my money.” Tr. p. 97, ll. 5-23. The parties stipulated
that the video was sent to prospective Principals in
South Carolina.
Neither the offers nor the sales of opportunities to
invest in TLCs pursuant to TLA’s Agency Contract and
related services (singularly the “TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity” and plurally the “TLC Investment Opportuni-
ties’’) have been registered with the Commission pursuant
to Section 35-1-810 et seg. of the Act. No claim that the
TLC Investment Opportunity satisfied the elements of an
exemption from the registration requirements of the Act
was made under Sections 35-1-310 or 35-1-320 of the
Act, nor would the testimony and evidence presented at
the hearing tend to support such a claim of an exemp-
tion. No claim that the TLC Investment Opportunity
constituted a “federal covered security” was made under
Sections 35-1-810(c) and 35-1-1100 of the Act, nor
would the testimony and evidence presented at the hear-
ing tend to support such a claim. TLA and Majors were
73a
not registered as broker-dealers or agents under Section
35-1410 et seq. of the Act. No claim was asserted by
TLA or Majors that an exemption from the broker-dealer
and agent licensing requirements of the Act would apply
to them under Section 35-1415 of the Act, nor would
the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing tend
to support such a claim.
In their opening statements and post-hearing briefs,
the parties agreed that the principal issues in this matter
are (1) whether the TLC Investment Opportunity con-
stituted a “security”’ as defined in Section 35-1-20 of
the Act and (2) whether the Commission’s Cease and
Desist Order should be upheld.
Counsel for the Commission also introduced testimony
and other evidence at the hearing of misrepresentations
and omissions by TLA and Majors in connection with the
promotion and sale of the TLC Investment Opportunities.
Majors stipulated to “‘puffery”. Tr. at p. 248, Il. 23-25.
Ill. CONCLUSION OF LAW
A. THE TLC INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY IS A
SECURITY UNDER THE HOWEY TEST FOR
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
The TLC Investment Opportunity constitutes a “‘secur-
ity’’ for purposes of the Act because, under the Howey
test, it is an “investment contract.” The term “invest-
ment contract’’, as used in the definition of the term
“security” for purposes of Section 35-1-20(15) of the
Act, has apparently not been defined in any fashion
meaningful to this matter by the courts of this State.
However, it is well established that the South Carolina
courts seek guidance from the federal courts in inter-
preting provisions of the Act which parallel federal stat-
74a
utes, such as the definition of the term “security”.
Carver. v. Blanford, 288 S.C. 309, 310, 342 S.E.2d
406, 407 (1986); McGaha v. Moseley, 283 S.C. 268,
273, 322 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1984); Bradley v. Hullander,
272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978). The seminal case
for the definition of the term “investment contract” is
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298, 66 S. Ct.
1100, 1102-03 (1946). In Howey the United States
Supreme Court defined an “investment contract” as
any arrangement whereby an investor makes (a) an
investment of money (b) in a common enterprise (c)
with an expectation of profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party. Teague v. Bakker,
35 F.3d 978, 986 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1153, 115 S. Ct. 1107 (1995) (citing Howey, 328
U.S. 399-300, 66 S. Ct. 1103). The South Carolina
Court of Appeals has adopted the Howey analysis.
Garrett v. Snedigar, 293 S.C. 176, 359 S.E.2d 283, 285
(Ct. App. 1987), rev’d on other grounds Olson v. Faculty
House of Carolina, Inc., 354 S.C. 1161, 580 S.E.2d 440
(2003).
(1) Investment of Money. An “investment of
money” means, for purposes of the definition of an
“investment contract’, that the investor must have
committed his assets to the enterprise in such a manner
as to subject himself to financial loss. SEC v. Pinckney,
923 F. Supp. 76, 80 (E.D.N.C. 1996). In the instant
case, the Principals wrote checks to TLA for the non-
refundable agency fee and invested money in TLCs
purchased. by TLA on their behalf. Majors testified,
that while he promoted and believed that the TLC
Investment Opportunity was a safe investment, the
Principals could lose some or all of their investment
if the underlying property had at the time of sale a
75a
value less than the amount of the investment. The
terms of the Agency Contract included a specific ac-
knowledgement by the Principal that this “poteatial
down side financial risk’ existed. In addition, the
Principals were required to grant TLA a “50% inchoate
interest” in each TLC that TLA purchases on behalf
of the Principal, which is a further commitment of the
Prinvipal’s assets to the enterprise. Thus, the first ele-
ment of the Howey test, requiring an “investment of
money”’, is satisfied in the instant case. Cf. Pinckney,
923 F. Supp. at 81 (Although the promoter represented
that the investor’s funds would be under the investor’s
control, profits would be generated by trading of the
financial instruments in which the investment was made.
The investor would have been subject to financial loss
by virtue of the trades to be made.).
(2) Common Enterprise. The Howey decision of
investment contract requires as a second element that
the particular transaction constitute a “common enter-
prise”. In this regard, the Howey analysis contemplates
that the transaction will involve a relationship between
investors. The Howey case, however, does not define
precisely the required nature of the relationship or the
required number of investors that must be involved.
As a result, the courts have subsequently developed
three different tests to determine whether the requisite
“common enterprise” element is satisfied: (i) horizontal
commonality, (ii) strict vertical commonality, and
(iii) broad vertical commonality. Maura K. Monaghan,
Note, An Uncommon State of Confuston: The Common
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis,
63 Fordham L. Rev. 2135, 2152 (1995). While the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled defin-
itely on the applicable test for this element of the Howey
76a
analysis, courts in the Fourth Circuit have recognized
both horizontal commonality and strict vertical com-
monality as applicable and appropriate tests. Pinck-
ney, 923 F. Supp. at 81-82; Bailey v. J.W.J. Properties,
Inc., 703 F. Supp. 478, 492 (W.D.Va. 1989); S.E.C. v.
Dowdell, 202 WL 424595, No. CIV.A. 3:01CV0016,
at *8 (W.D.Va. March 14, 2002); Waterman v. Alta
Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D.N.C.
1986). Because strict vertical commonality exists in
this present case, neither a ruling on whether horizontal
commonality applies to this case nor a holding as to
the legal validity of the broad vertical commonality test
is necessary.
SEC v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.C. 1996),
enunciates the proper analysis of the strict vertical com-
monality test. In Pinckney, the Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina held that “a common enter-
prise may be established by showing that the investor’s
profits are directly related to the promoter’s profits”’.
Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82. In reaching this hold-
ing, the Court concluded that the often more restrictive
horizontal commonality test is not the exclusive test
for the “common enterprise’”’ element of the Howey
analysis. To rely exclusively on horizontal common-
ality would be “overly restrictive and not in keeping
with the Act’s remedial goal of preventing . . . [viola-
tions of the securities laws] in connection with an offer
of what would otherwise be a security but for the ab-
sence of multiple investors.” Pinckney, 923 F. Supp.
at 82. Exclusive reliance on horizontal commonality
would “also make the test easy to evade by a disin-
genuous promoter who simply maintains separate bank
accounts or who disspates the investors’ contributions
immediately”. Monaghan at 2157.
77a
In the instant matter, TLA’s Agency Contract with
its Principals provides expressly for an equal 50/50
sharing between TLA and the Principal of the profits
derived from the sale of the property underlying ma-
tured TLCs, after the Principal and TLA are each reim-
bursed their respective out-of-pocket costs. In his tesi-
mony, Majors acknowledged that this was the primary
motivation for TLA’s undertaking this enterprise and
the only source of profit for TLA, as the relatively nom-
inal non-refundable agency fee did not cover the costs
of operations. Thus, the Principals’ profits are indeed
directly related to TLA’s profits and vice versa.
In the expert testimony of Attorney Robert A. Singer
offered by the Respondents at the hearing, and in Res-
pondents’ post-hearing bricfs, Respondents contend that
because in the instant situation TLA’s revenues are der-
ived from the Principals’ profits, that this is the “exact
opposite of the relationship required . . . to show strict
vertical commonality”. Respondents’ Brief dated Nov-
ember 26, 2003, p. 17. However, in Pinckney, which
was a summary judgment case cited in Respondents’
Briefs, the court concluded that “evidence... that...
[the promoters’| fortunes would be linked to... [the
investor’s] return on the investment and those fortunes
would be derived from a percentage of the [investor’s]
return” was legally sufficient to establish the existence
of a common enterprise. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82.
In reaching this conclusion, the Pinckney court analyzed
whether an investment in “prime bank instruments” by
an individual investor would satisfy the strict vertical
commonality test for purposes of the “common enter-
prise” element of the Howey analysis. In Pinckney, the
defendants were promoters who would profit only as a
result of commissions or similar payments of a percentage
of the return received by the investor.
78a
Thus, the Pinckney court reached a conclusion that
the promoter’s profit being linked to the investor’s profit
has the same impact, for purposes of strict vertical com-
monality, as the investor’s profit being linked to the
promoter’s profit. In other words, Pinckney held that
(1) it is legally sufficient that the profit of the investor
and the promoter are linked and (2) it is not determin-
ative for purposes of the strict vertical commonality test
whose profits are derivative upon the profits of whom.
This is particularly so in the instant matter since TLA
has from the beginning of the arrangement a 50% in-
choate interest in the profits of the sale of property
underlying matured TLCs. Both the Principals and TLA
profit from the sale of the property in the same fash-
ion and at the same time, and pursuant to parallel and
equal interests. SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enter., Inc.,
952 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991) (“One indicator
of vertical commonality, though by no means the only
indicator, is an arrangement to share profits on‘a per-
centage basis between the investor and the . . . pro-
moter. .. In the instant case, [the promoter] .. . told
investors he would take a management fee based on a
percentage of profits, thus making his own profit con-
tingent on the profit of his investors.’’)
Moreover, that a promoter can develop investment
vehicles whereby the promoter’s profits are derived
from the investor’s profits, and not vice versa, should
not eliminate the application of the securities laws and
the availability of the protections of investors intended
to be afforded thereby, especially in light of Howey’s
conclusion that the purpose of the inclusion of the term
“investment contract” in the definition of “security”
was to provide a flexible term that will achieve the
purposes of the securities laws in a variety of changing
79a
situations in a dynamic marketplace. Monaghan at 2145
(citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
64 S.Ct. 120 (1943)).
Therefore, “strict vertical commonality”’ is an approp-
riate test for the “common enterprise” element of the
Howey analysis, and the Pinckney case analysis is appo-
site. Moreover, under the Pinckney analysis, the facts of
the instant matter satisfy the “strict vertical common-
ality” test for the “common enterprise” element of the
Howey analysis.
(3) Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of
Others. The third element of the Howey analysis is
whether the investor had an expectation of profits
“solely” from the efforts of the promoter or third party.
Monaghan at 2137. This element of the Howey analysis
addresses the degree: of control by the investor over the
profit-making aspects of the transaction. Monaghan at
2149. Over the years since the enunciation of the Howey
analysis, the courts have not strictly construed the word
“solely”. Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d
918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990); Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82.
Rather, post-Howey cases have interpreted “solely” to
mean “largely” or ‘‘principally”. Monaghan at 2149.
This test can be met if the most essential functions or
duties must be performed by others and not by the
investor. Bailey, 904 F.2d at 920; see also Garrett,
359 S.E.2d at 285-86. Moreover, the court is not re-
quired to look exclusively at the language of the con-
tract. “Rather it must consider the economic realities
of the situation to determine whether the investor has
any real control over the management of his invest-
ment.” Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 804; see also Robin-
son v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003) (“What
matters more than the form of an investment scheme is
80a
the ‘economic reality’ that it represents.”) See generally
South Carolina Securities Statement of Policy 95-2
(membership interests in a member-managed limited
liability company will constitute securities where the
“facts and circumstances render substantially meaning-
less the managerial powers” of the members despite
the rights of control granted to members by statute or
the operating agreement).
In the Waterman case, the court focused on the pro-
moter’s managerial efforts that could cause the invest-
ment to increase in value, the manager’s special expertise
in selecting items within a particular class of items
which should appreciate at a faster rate than a particular
class in general, and the manager’s efforts in dealing
with the property the investor was not equipped and
unable to manage. In Waterman, the investor had a con-
tractual right to manage the feeding and care of the
cattle in which the investor invested; however, the court
found that the investor could not have invested in a cat-
tle operation except through an operation managed in
a fashion such as offered by the promoter. The investor
seldom was able to visit the operation and lacked the
expertise or time to manage the cattle operation. The
court concluded that, in looking at the reality of the sit-
uation, the investor did not in fact have any real control
over the maintenance of the investment. In reaching this
conclusion, the court focused on the promoter’s represen-
tations that it would provide a “turn-key package”’ and
its advertisements that it “‘handles everything” for its
investors. Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 805-806. As a
result, the Waterman court found that this third element
of the Howey analysis was satisfied despite the contract-
ual right of the investor to determine when to sell the cat-
tle. This conclusion was based on the impracticality of
8la
the investor’s having any real control over the decisions.
Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 806; see also SEC v. Euro-
bond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1994).
Similarly, the essential functions from which the
profit! is derived in this present matter were to be per-
formed by TLA and Majors. The Principals typically
have no input into what TLCs are purchased for them.
They merely sign the Agency Control and provide the
funds to TLA, relying on TLA to screen the properties,
select the TLCs, attend the auction, conduct the bid, and
process the paperwork. The selection of TLCs is the
essential step in making a profit — TLA touts its exper-
tise in selecting TLCs that will mature to permit a sale of
the underlying property for a value greater than the
amount of the investment, and the Agency Contract
reserves to TLA the essential decision-making authority
for the selection of TLCs to purchase.
Majors and TLA also promote the TLC Investment
Opportunity as one in which the Principals have to do
little or nothing, and tout repetitively that ‘‘we do all
the work”. While the Agency Contract technically
leaves to the Principal the right to select legal counsel,
real estate brokers, and other professionals necessary
to quiet the title and sell the property underlying
matured TLCs, this right is no more than rarely exer-
cised, according to Majors’ testimony. Moreover, the
Principals have no realistic ability to control the sale of
the property underlying the matured TLCs. Under the
lit is indisputable that the Principals expect a “profit” from
their investment with TLA and Majors. All of TLA’s promotional
materials hype the return on investment that prospective Principals
can expect (see e.g., Tr. p. 57, ll. 8-11), and in his testimony,
Majors frequently referred to “profits” for investors and TLA
from the sale of the properties underlying the TLCs.
82a
Agency Contract, the Principals technically have an
obligation to use their best efforts to sell the property,
and if TLA requests, immediately convey to TLA the
50% inchoate interest in the property, or in the alter-
native they must buy TLA’s 50% interest in the prop-
erty at 50% of its appraised value if the Principals wish
to retain the property. Although the Principals tech-
nically must bear the costs and other burdens of com-
pliance with these obligations, TLA offers in its mar-
keting materials to use its experience, connections,
and volume leverage to contro] and minimize the Prin-
cipals’ technical obligations.
Thus, the obligations imposed on the Principals by the
Agency Contract create pressure on the Principals to let
TLA “do all the work’ to quiet the title and sell the
property. The Principals are most often located far from
the properties. TLA’s marketing program almost ensures
that it will most frequently purchase TLCs for Principals
who are located nowhere near the location of the Prin-
cipals. Majors even markets that he does not know, at
the time of a seminar when Principals are solicited and
contracted, where their money will be invested. The
Principals have virtually no input into the selection,
identity, characteristics, or location of the underlying
properties at the time the TLCs are purchased for them,
and generally have relatively small units of investment in
separate properties located in various states, which would
not justify travel to, or other long-distance control over,
the properties or the sale process.
Given the volume of properties in the overall enter-
prise, as managed by TLA, and TLA’s heavy promotion
of its expertise, experience, services, and connections
with regard to selecting TLCs and selling the underlying
properties in an efficient, fast, and profitable manner,
83a
the Principals’ technical legal right to control the sale
process is specious. See Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1133-
34 (‘‘While the sales contract gave investors the right to
make other arrangements for the refining of their ore,
there is no evidence that a single investor exercised
that right. Promotional materials for the program did not
emphasize investors’ legal night to refine the ore them-
selves but rather .. . [the Promoter’s] commitment to
build a new refinery at which investor’s ore would be
processed. Furthermore, since the refining contract was
included in the price paid for the ore, investors, would
-have incurred unnecessary costs if they had the ore
transported and refined elsewhere.’’). The mere exist-
ence of contractual rights of control granted in the
Agency Contract to the Principals is not determinative.
Robinson, 349 F.3d at 170 (“Agreements do not annul
the securities laws by retaining nominal powers for
investors unable to exercise them.”’).
It is unrealistic to anticipate that the Principals would
incur the cost and hassle inherent in exercising this con-
trol, and it is completely consistent with the realities of
the overall situation to conclude that the efforts of TLA
and Majors (e.g., the handling of the complicated paper-
work for, and expert attendance at, remote auction sales
of TLCs in a wide variety of locations throughout
twenty-six states, the selection and purchae of TLCs
that are more likely to mature for sale at values greater
than the amount of investment, the replacement of
redeemed TLCs with new TLCs at no additional charge,
the offer and arrangement of liquidity in the Principals’
investment in TLCs, the arrangement of Section 1031
exchange opportunities, and the expert selection and
negotiation with professionals to sell the underlying
properties efficiently, quickly, and profitably) are the
84a
“undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise.” SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94
S. Ct. 117 (1973). These services are also the emphasized
core of TLA’s marketing program. By virtue of the real-
ities of the situation, TLA and Majors have and will per-
form all of the essential functions of managing the TLC
Investment Opportunity, and not the Principals.? See
Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. at 82; see also Garrett, 359
S.E.2d at 286. Thus, the third element of the Howey
test, requiring an “expectation of profits ‘solely’ from
the efforts of the promoter or third party” is satisfied
in the instant case.
2As an analogy, Respondent’s expert Attorney Singer tes-
tified that the contractual and statutory rights of general partners
of general partnerships and members of member-managed limited
liability companies to control the management of the business
entity resulted in these investments not satisfying the Howey anal-
ysis, meaning these investments were held not to be “securities”.
However, the case law and statements of policy to which Attorney
Singer referred take exception from the indicated result, and sub-
ject such investments to the securities laws, where it is impractical
or unrealistic that the general partners or members can or will be
able to exercise effectively such rights of control. See e.g., William-
son v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 454
U.S. 897, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); South Carolina Securities State-
ment of Policy 95-2 (“The analytical pattern usually turns, in
essence, upon a qualitative analysis about the meaningful partici-
pation of investors in management of the entity”’.).
85a
B. THE ISSUANCE OF A FINAL CEASE AND
DESIST ORDER IS IN THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST FOR THE PROTECTION OF SOUTH
CAROLINA INVESTORS AND CONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSES FAIRLY INTENDED BY
THE POLICY AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT.
Testimony and promotional materials introduced into
evidence at the hearing included “‘puffery” that would be
inappropriate, and omitted disclosures that would be
expected, in a registered securities offering. It is clear
that TLA’s promotional materials would not satisfy
the requirements for a prospectus pursuant to a regis-
tration of the offer or sale of the TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity under Section 35-1-880 of the Act, and that most
of the materials would not be permitted for use as “‘ad-
vertisement or other sale literature’? under Section 35-1-
50 of the Act and South Carolina Securities Statement
of Policy with Respect to Advertising of New Issues
(Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) 451,553).
Since it appears that a likely opportunity for loss of
investor’s funds would be a mishandling of the funds by
TLA, Respondents’ repetition of the phrase “‘we never
touch your money” without describing the exceptions
when the Principals’ funds are deposited into Majors’
attorney trust account, Respondents’ failure to fully and
accurately describe Majors’ disbarment by the Georgia
Bar, and the fact of the receivership of Majors’ prior Tax
Lien Acquisitions company in Georgia were all material
matters. Additionally, for example, since TLA’s promo-
tional materials tout TLA’s expertise and the Principals
are dependent on TLA’s expertise to produce a profit
from the TLC Investment Opportunity, Majors’ represen-
tation that he authored and published two definitive
books on TLCs which sold thousands of copies and
were “best sellers”, certainly were material. And given
that Majors cannot furnish a single copy of either “best
seller” book at the present, the truth of these represen-
tations is suspect. 7
C. BECAUSE THE TLC INVESTMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY IS A SECURITY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST REQUIREMENT IS MET, A FINAL
CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS APPRO-
PRIATE.
The TLC Investment Opportunity offered and sold by
TLA, which was controlled by Majors, is a “security”
because it is an “investment contract” under Section
35-1-20(15) of the Act. The TLC Investment Oppor-
tunity satisfies all three elements of the Howey analysis
for investment contracts because it is: (i) an investment
of money under the Pickney case, (ii) in a common
enterprise under the strict vertical commonality test
set forth in Pickney, (iii) for which the Principals expect
profit to be derived from the efforts of TLA and Majors
under the Waterman, Reynolds, and Garrett cases. This
conclusion is supported by the methods and content of
the promotional materials and the activity of TLA and
Majors, which tout the TLC Investment Opportunity
as a lucrative, passive, remote investment, in which TLA
and Majors ‘‘do all the work’. The realities of the over-
all situation and the nature of TLA’s promotional mater-
ials override the technical rights of control granted to the
Principals in the Agency Contract.
Since the TLC Investment Opportunity is a “security”
under the Act, then the offer and sale of the TLC Invest-
ment Opportunity are subject to regulation of the Act
87a
and jurisdiction of the Commission. Respondents have
not sustained the burden of proof under Section 35-1-
340 of the Act that an exemption from the registration
requirements is applicable to the transaction. Moreover,
it would appear that no such exemption could be sus-
tained under the facts as presented at the hearing. See
e.g., Waterman, 643 F. Supp. at 807 (“[P] ublic advertis-
ing is incompatible with the claim of a private offering”’)
(quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchise,
Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)). It is undis-
puted that neither the TLC Investment Opportunity
offered and sold by TLA, nor the promoters of the TLC
Investment Opportunity, have been registered with the
Commission under Sections 35-1-810 et seg. and -410
et seq. of the Act. Thus, TLA, and Majors as its control-
ling person under Section 35-1-1500, have violated the
registration requirements of Sections 35-1-810 e¢ seq.
of the Act and are subject to enforcement action by the
Commission for such violations under Section 35-1-60
of the Act.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respond-
ents Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. and every
successor, affiliate, control person, director, agent, ser-
vant, or employee either of them, and every entity
owned, operated, or indirectly or directly controlled or
hereinafter organized by or on behalf of either of them
immediately CEASE AND DESIST from offering or
selling the TLC Investment Opportunity in or from the
State of South Carolina.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents Ned
B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc. and any successor,
affiliate, control person, director, agent, servant, or
employee of either of them, and every entity owned,
operated, or indirectly or directly controlled or herein-
88a
after organized by or on behalf of either of them CEASE
AND DESIST from offering or selling any other invest-
ment opportunity involving an unregistered security in
or from the State of South Carolina; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any exemption that
Respondents Ned B. Majors and Tax Lien Agents, Inc.
and any successor, affiliate, control person, director,
agent, servant, or employee of either of them, and every
entity owned, operated, or indirectly or directly con-
trolled or hereinafter organized by or on behalf of either
of them might be otherwise entitled to utilize, be and
hereby is REVOKED, subject only to the limitations
provided in Section 35-1-330 of the Act.
So ORDERED this 11th day of February, 2004.
By: /s/ Henry. McMaster
Henry McMaster
South Carolina Securities Commissioner
89a
APPENDIX E
[Filed Sept. 9, 2003]
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SECURITIES SECTION
IN THE MATTER OF:
Ned B. Majors and
Tax Lien Agents, Inc.
Respondents.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING (FIRST)
ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST
SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AND ENGAGING IN SECURITIES FRAUD,
AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO A HEARING
Case No. 03010
The South Carolina Securities Section (“‘Section’’),
under the authority of the South Carolina Uniform
Securities Act (the “Act’’), §35-1-10, et seg., Code of
Laws of South Carolina, issues the following Order
against Respondents for alleged violations of the Act,
as set forth below, and notifies Respondent of their right
to a hearing.
1. Ned B. Majors (‘‘Majors’’) was at all times material
herein both a person resident and doing business in
South Carolina.
90a
Majors’ primary business and the business which
forms the basis for this Order is accomplished
through an entity known as “Tax Lien Agents”’
(“TLA’’).
TLA is a South Carolina corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Myrtle Beach, South Caro-
lina.
For service of process, the last known address for
both Majors and TLA is 4052 Highway 17 Bypass
South, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29588.
On or around January 27, 2003, the Section re-
ceived a letter of compliant against Majors and TLA.
The letter indicated:
A. Respondent Majors, on behalf of himself and
TLA, was conducting seminars at which Majors
described the benefits of investigating in his and
TLA’s tax lien program;
B. In connection with the seminars, a video tape
explaining the process and benefits of investing
in tax liens is played;
C. At a seminar attended by a widowed cousin of
complainant, the widow was promised an an-
nual 8 to 24% annual return on money provided
to Majors to purchase tax liens on her behalf;
D. “Finders fees” were being paid in connection
with the investment opportunity; and
E. In connection with the investment opportunity,
Majors makes reference to a book he indicates
he has written on tax liens that is a bestseller,
and yet complainant, a trader and seller of
books, can find no such book.
9la
An investigative file was opened and further inform-
ation sought.
The Section’s investigation revealed that solicita-
tions were made through seminars, newspaper ads,
and one or more web sites.
At the seminars, on tape and through the ads and
written literature, Majors and TLA portray tax lien
investments through them to be both safe and prof-
itable.
Specific representations made by Majors to induce
investment include:
A.
B.
This is an investment plan that always works;
This investment has a government guaranteed
8% to 25% A.P.R. with real expectations for
a 10,000% yield;
This is safer than any CD or any other invest-
ment;
. The investment is purchased in your name by
your Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent,
who never touches your money;
All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by
the government in your name and address only;
Majors is the recognized authority on real estate
tax liens, having written two books on tax lien
investing, one in 1990 and another in 1999;
Majors sold several hundred thousand books on
tax liens, and one of his books on tax liens was
a financial bestseller;
Investment in tax liens offers safety, income,
growth, liquidity, tax shelter, and convenience;
92a
Tax Lien Certificates are a safe way to potent-
ially acquire enormous wealth government
guaranteed; and
“You’re going to make more than a CD and this
is safer than a CD.”
10. Material facts Majors did not tell investors, prior
to or at the time of investment include:
A.
O
Upon Complaint, the Georgia Bar commenced
an investigation of Majors, which resulted in
an August 29, 2002 recommendation that he
be disbarred, and on July 10, 2003, the Sup-
reme Court of Georgia upheld the recommenda-
tion and disbarred Majors;
Majors previously owned and managed a busi-
ness [Tax Lien Acquisitions (“TLAQ”)] which
was operated in the same manner as TLA, and
TLAQ investor money was deposited in Majors’
trust account, in violation of what he told
investors when he induced them to invest;
TLAQ is now in bankruptcy;
Majors previously owned a computer company
which declared bankruptcy;
Majors and TLA’s investment produce has been
the source of inquiries from state and federal
securities regulators;
. In February 2003, the Utah Division of Secur-
ities issued to Majors and TLA an Order To
Show Cause why Majors and TLA should not
be ordered to cease violating the Utah Securities
Act and why they should not have to pay a fine
for earlier violations;
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
i
93a
G. Majors paid “commissions” to unregistered
agents who recruited new investors; and
H. Majors did, in fact, deposit a significant num-
ber of investor checks into his attorney trust
account, though such checks were marked pay-
able to “The County Treasurer for Tax Liens.”
Following solicitation by Majors, interested invest-
ors complete an “agency contract” and send checks
to Majors and TLA.
The checks are titled as follows: one is for a non-
refundable agency fee and is made out to Tax Lien
Agents, Inc. and the second and any others are
for investment and are made out to “County Treas-
urer for Tax Liens.”
According to the terms of the agency contract, Maj-
ors and TLA are to search tax records, evaluate
delinquent properties, and bid on and purchase such
delinquent properties. In return for Majors’ and
TLA’s efforts, the investor agrees to grant TLA a
(post expense) 50% ownership interest in any pur-
chased properties.
In the State of South Carolina, profit sharing
agreements and investment contracts both con-
stitute securities pursuant to South Carolina Code
Section 35-1-20(15).
The investments offered by Majors and TLA are
securities, in the form of participation in a profit
sharing agreement and as investment contracts.
Registration records of the Section were searched
for registrations of Ned Majors or Tax Lien Agents.
No agent or other type securities registration was
located for Majors or TLA, and no issuer registra-
18.
19,
20.
94a
tion was located for either Majors, TLA or the
investment opportunity offered by them.
During the period September 28, 1999 to at least
June 23, 2003, Majors actively promoted, offered
and sold the securities in and from the State of
South Carolina.
The securities were not registered or exempt prior
to sale.
Respondent Majors, acting on behalf of himself and
TLA, in connection with the offer and sale of the
securities above, made the following misrepresen-
tation of fact:
A. This is an investment plan that always works;
B. This investment has a- government guaranteed
8% to 25% A.P.R. with real expectations for a
10,000% yield;
C. This is safer than any CD or any other invest-
ment;
D. The investment is purchased in your name by
your Individually Contracted Purchasing Agent,
who never touches your money;
E. All tax liens will be purchased and recorded by
the government in your name and address only;
F, Majors sold several hundred thousand books on
tax liens, and one of his books on tax liens was
a financial bestseller;
G. Investment in tax liens offers safety, income,
growth, liquidity, tax shelter, and convenience;
H. Tax Lien Certificates are a safe way to poten-
tially acquire enormous wealth government guar-
anteed; and
4 O
ie
95a
“You’re going to make more than a CD and this
is safer than a CD.”
Respondent Majors, acting on behalf of himself and
TLA, in connection with the offer and sale of the
securities above, failed to inform investors of various
material facts concerning their investments, includ-
ing the facts that:
A.
B.
The investments were not registered for sale in
or from this State;
An investment with Majors in tax liens carried
with it a degree of risk of loss of some or all of
the investor’s funds;
Majors was not licensed to effect securities trans-
actions in this State;
. Majors and TLA did not hold and use investor’s
funds in the manner which they stated when
they induced investment;
Majors often deposited investor checks addres-
sed to the “County Treasurer for Tax Liens”
into his attorney trust account;
Titles routinely were issued in the name of
“Attorney Ned Majors Trust Account”’ instead
of investor’s names;
Investor money was not in an investment “safer
than any CD or any other investment.”
Upon complaint, the Georgia Bar commenced
an investigation of Majors, which resulted in
an August 29, 2002 recommendation that he
be disbarred, and on July 10, 2003, the Sup-
reme Court of Georgia upheld the recommenda-
tion and disbarred Majors;
96a
I. Majors previously owned and managed a prior
business [Tax Lien Acquisitions (‘““TLAQ”’)]
which was operated in the same manner as
TLA and that TLAQ investor money was
deposited in Majors’ trust account, in violation
of what he told investors when he induced them
to invest;
a)
TLAQ is now in bankruptcy;
K. Majors previously owned a computer company
which declared bankruptcy ;
L. Majors and TLA’s investment product has been
the source of inquiries from state and federal
securities regulators; and
M. In February 2003, the Utah Division of Secur-
ities issued to Majors and TLA an Order To
Show Cause why Majors and TLA sho
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