Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hansen v. United States

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Suprema Court, U.S.

wl FILE O

ee

041112 19% 2 4 2004

No. 01- a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHRISTIAN A. HANSEN and ALFRED R. TAYLOR,

Petitioners,

v,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COuRT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rosert L. BERNER, JR.

Counsel of Record

Davip P. HACKETT

ADRIANE W. BuURKLAND

Douc.as B. SANDERS

BaKER & MCKENZIE

Attorneys for Petitioners

130 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 861-8000

171787 g

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859 y \o-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether the responsible corporate officer doctrine can

be stretched to hold a person liable where that person no long °F

had the authority or the capacity to prevent the violations charged

and was not in a decision-making role for the corporation at the

time the violations occurred.

(2) Whether a criminal conviction based on the responsible

corporate officer doctrine for violations of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e), the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319%c), and the Comprehensive

Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,

42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) requires the defendant to have actual

knowledge of each element charged in the offense.

(3) Whether corporate officers and employees of a

corporation in bankruptcy may be liable for violations of

environmental statutes despite bankruptcy laws that deprive

them of the authority to act to correct or prevent the violations.

ll

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Randall W. Hansen, a defendant below, has been served

as a respondent herein.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented .....

Parties to the Proceeding ... 1

Table of Contents ............ | MI

Table of Cited Authorities ... \

Table of Appendices ......... , 1X

Opinions Below ............. i |

Statement of Jurisdiction ... nee : |

Statutory Provisions Involved ............... l

Statement of the Case ...... Se eee | Z

A. Factual Background .................... 2

B. Proceedings Below ................. 8

EE 9

Reasons for Granting the Writ ................- 10

I. The RCO Doctrine Requires That The

Corporate Officer Be In Actual Control

Of The Facility At The Time Of The

oe Ee Se i4

\1 ‘ 7 rt

\ ' t->,1 \ i > hy +} " +r sly

Was Violated When ihe Government! Failed

lo Prove That Hansen And Taylor Had Actual

Knowledge Of Each Element Of The

Olfenses 1s

II! Cernuorari Is Necessary lo Resolve The

Contlicting Objectives Of The Federal

Bankruptcy ct And Environmental

vA

statutes y.

(onclusion

TABLE OF CITEDAUTHORITIES

[J

FEDERAL CASES

In re Allegheny International, Inc.,

158 B.R. 343 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) 28, 2

Bovde v. California,

494 U.S. 370 (1990)

CFTC v. Weintraub,

471 U.S. 343 (1985)

In re Chateaugay Corp.,

944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991)

In re Chicago, Milwaukee, R.R.,

3 F.3d 200 (7thCir. 1993)

Hanousek v. United States,

528 U.S. 1102 (2000)

19, 21, 22,

Mid-Atlantic National Bank v. New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection,

474 U.S. 494 (1986)

In re National Gypsum,

139 B.R. 397 (Bankr.

Ohio v. Kovacs,

469 U.S. 274 (1985)

he Me. He. 24 ee

WO

Cited Authorities

Page

Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,

94 }.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996) .... 17

In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc.,

1600 B.R. 792 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1993) ..... 29

peees V. UNUCG SIAIES, 2. cave cceens Sa yao:

Tenn-Fla Partners v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla.,

229 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999) ....... 29

United States v. Ahmad,

101 F.3d 386 (Sth Cir. 1996) ...... 20, 22, 23, 24, 25

United States v. Bestfoods,

524 U.S. 51 (1998) .............. 11, 12, 14, 15, 16

United States v. Carr,

880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989) .......000.00... 16, 17

United States v. Dell ‘Aquilla,

150 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1998) .......... 15, 16,17, 18

United States v. Dotterweich,

BE ETT CNIS) cece eccceveseusses 10, 20, 23

United States v. Iverson,

162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) .......000000.. 25

iiieeiilersicisic.sico ty tied

Vil

Cited Authorities

Page

United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc.,

157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998) .........-----e- 20

United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,

933 F.2d 35 (ist Dist. 1991) ........-. 20, 22, 23, 24

United States v. Park,

Pos @ue @ . Fo. yp) er 9. 11, 12, 14, 20, 23

United States v. Township of Brighton,

153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998) ...........-- 15, 16, 17

United States v. USX Corp.,

6S F346 O11 635d Cig. F995) «. cc cece cen sces’s 16

United States v. White,

766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. i) reer rere 20

United States v. Whizco,

841 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1988) ..........------- 27

United States v. Wilson,

133 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) .......------ ne 20

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

SED ETE, GEESE ccckstevevcueswesesenss passim

————x

Vill

Cited Authorities

Page

STATUTES

Tt Ye |) eae ae 29

WU OI i ie kes

ik te | 9

Te ae oe: i, 1,9, 24

42 U.S.C. § 9603(D) oo e ccc e cece cece eee. i, 1,9

42 U.S.C. § 6928 ... 00. e eee cece cece cease i, 1, 9, 23

OTHERAUTHORITIES

Randall S. Abate & Dayna E. Mancuso, /t s All About

What You Know: The Specific Intent Standard

Should Govern “Knowing” Violations of

the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 304

SEPP Or cee Er Se ne ra eer eee 19, 20

TABLE OFAPPENDICES

Appendix A — Per Curiam Opinion Of The United

States Court Of Appeals Fer The Eleventh Circuit

Dated And Filed August 24, 2001 ........----

Appendix B — Order Of The United States District

Court For The Southern District Of Georgia,

Brunswick Division Dated And Filed April 26,

Ee CO POPP e Ee CT ere eke La

Appendix C — Per Curiam Order Of The United

States Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit

Denying Petition For Rehearing Dated And Filed

Cesober 26, 2001 occ ccc ccc cetecceneserces

Appendix D — Relevant Statutes ..........-----

|

Christian A. Hansen and Alfred R. Taylor respectfully

petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, United States \.

Hansen, (App. A, infra, 1a-76a), is reported at 262 F.3d 1217.

The opinion of the district court, United States v. Hansen,

(App. B, infra, 77a-117a), is unreported.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on August

24, 2001. Petitioners timely filed a petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc, which the Court of Appeals denied on

October 26, 2001 (App. C, infra, 118a-119a). The jurisdiction

of this Court is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves provisions of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e)

(App. D, infra, 126a-132a), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(c) (App. D, infra, 120a-126a) and the Comprehensive

Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act,

42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (App. D, injra, 133a-135a). Those

provisions are set forth in full in App. D to this Petition.

tl

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

LCP Chemicals-Georgia (“LCP”), a division of Hanlin

Group, Inc. (“Hanlin”), owned and operated an industrial

plant on Ross Road in Brunswick, Georgia (“Brunswick

plant”) of approximately 550 acres, which Hanlin purchased

in late 1979. At the Brunswick plant, LCP used a mercury

cell, chlor-alkali process to manufacture chlorine gas, sodium

hydroxide, and bleach, primarily for the pulp and paper

industries. In the chlor-alkali process operations, a

concentrated solution is electrochemically dissociated into

elemental sodium and chlorine gas, with contaminated

wastewater and waste sludges generated in the process.

Prior to the advent of environmental statutes in the 1970s,

multiple companies, including ARCO, Georgia-Power

Company and Allied Chemical (“Allied”), had operated for

approximately 50 years at the site unregulated by any

environmental requirements. Now a Superfund site, the

Brunswick site is being cleaned at the expense of owners

whose environmental contamination predated LCP’s presence

at the site.

LCP continued the mercury cell chlor-alkali process that

had been employed previously by Allied at the Brunswick

plant. Essentially, multiple individual mercury cells housed

in two large rooms (Cellrooms | and 2) processed material

to make products. Those cells contained mercury, which

regularly required replenishment. The operations also utilized

other chemicals and produced hazardous substances. Those

processes generated pollutants that were subject to various

environmental requirements, including for example,

3

wastewater discharge limitations on pH, mercury and chlorine

set forth in LCP’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (“NPDES”) permit No. GA (03247. LCP’s NPDES

permit authorized the Brunswick plant to store wastewaler

on the floor of Cellrooms | and 2 while awaiting treatment

in LCP’s wastewater treatment plant. LCP also generated

hazardous wastes subject to RCRA regulation.

The Brunswick plant operations also were subject to

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)

regulations designed to ensure for the protection and safety

of workers. To protect workers who might be exposed to

mercury vapors in the mercury cell process, LCP employed

an extensive plant inspection and mercury urinalysis program,

in which workers periodically were sampled. This program,

as well as employee education, training and quality assurance

measures, were developed by Dr. Leonard Goldwater and

Dr. Woodhall Stopford, occupational physicians, researchers

and internists at Duke University Medical Center. Those

workers exhibiting elevated mercury levels could not return

to work until they had been examined by a physician, and

were relocated immediately to other plant locations away

from the mercury cells.

Because LCP’s NPDES permit enabled LCP to retain

water on the floor of Cellrooms i and 2, prior to treatment

by LCP’s wastewater treatment plant, that water's proximity

to the electricity in the cells inherently posed some minor

electrical shock and chemical burn risks. OSHA specifically

addressed these risks by requiring LCP to install elevated

walkways that positioned workers away from freestanding

water. Further, LCP employed an electricity lockout program

to avoid potential shocks. LCP’s operations employed

chemicals including both acidic and caustic substances that

4

could irritate or burn skin. LCP minimized that risk by

providing protective equipment to minimize mercury vapor

exposure and preclude skin contact, proximately located

showers to relieve inadvertent contact, and first aid stations

and training. LCP also held regular safety meetings and plant

safety inspections. LCP policies also authorized all

employees, including those in the cellroom, to work

elsewhere in the facility if they were at any time concerned

abcut their safety.

LCP’s parent corporation, Hanlin, filed a voluntary

petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy

Code on July 10, 1991. Those bankruptcy proceedings

severely restricted the discretionary funds available to Hanlin,

including funds for maintenance and repair, as well as

for environmental compliance at the Brunswick plant.

The Bankruptcy Court ordered Hanlin to set aside $7,000 -

$10,000 per day for professional fees, including special

outside environmental counsel{ Dechert, Price and Rhoads).

Management continued day-to-day management of the

operations, but any capital and extraordinary expenditures

were subject to Hanlin Board of Directors, Creditors’

Committee and Bankruptcy Court approval. Sales of assets

were subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, as were the uses

of the resulting funds. Often the funds from sales were not

made available for use by Hanlin management. Ultimate

decision-making authority about major policies, such as

whether to close the Brunswick plant or to continue to operate

it, Was not reposed in Hanlin management, but resided instead

with the Board, the Creditors’ Committee and the Bankruptcy

Court.

Intense industry competition caused the declining

position of the company and its cash shortfall. As a result,

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with the support of the Creditors Committee and Bankruptcy

Court, Hanlin sought a buyer for the Brunswick plant (and other

facilities it owned). Throughout the spring and summer of 1993,

LCP negotiated with Allied (the previous owner), HoltraChem

and others to purchase the Brunswick plant. Allied was

particularly interested in making the purchase, which would have

allowed Allied to postpone and possibly avoid environmental

cleanup costs for which it was responsible.

For the five months beginning in February 1993, Alfred

Taylor was the Brunswick plant manager. Taylor resigned his

position on July 16, 1993. In the late summer and early fall of

1993, Allied agreed to advance funds to LCP to enhance

environmental compliance, including emergency expansion of

wastewater treatment capacity by using idle tanks, with those

funds to be applied to the purchase price when the companies

closed on the transaction.! The Georgia Environmental

Protection Department (“GA EPD”) participated in those LCP-

Allied negotiations to ensure environmental compliance.

Ultimately, GA EPD’s insistence that Allied agree to clean up

the adjacent river if it acquired the Brunswick plant caused Allied

to forego purchase of the facility. Shortly thereafter, in early

February 1994, the facility was closed.

Due to the cash shortfall occasioned by the bankruptcy, LCP

experienced operational and environmental compliance

difficulties in 1993 and until the plant closure in 1994. Most

notably, LCP struggled to meet its NPDES permit requirements,

which it duly reported to GA EPD in daily, weekly and monthly

Discharge Monitoring Reports.

1. AnAllied employee, Mark White, was assigned by Allied to

run the Brunswick plant as an LCP employee, formally commencing

on October 18, 1993.

6

The volume of wastewater increased and exceeded the

LCP wastewater treatment plant ‘capacity, compelling LCP

to utilize the floor of Cellrooms 1 and 2 and idle tanks to

hold the wastewater while awaiting treatment. Faced with

excessive wastewater, LCP also chose to pump the water to

empty Bunker C oil tanks for storage before treatment and

final discharge from the wastewater treatment plant. During

1993, LCP experienced other operational probiems, including

an accidental bleach spill, which the company promptly

reported to GA EPD.

As a result of the wastewater compliance problems,

GA EPD informed LCP that it would revoke LCP’s NPDES

permit on September 23, 1993. LCP appealed that proposed

permit revocation, which legally stayed the revocation.

On November 19, 1993, GA EPD sought a TRO ordering

the Brunswick plant closed. State court Judge Amanda

Williams was assigned the matter and personally visited the

Brunswick plant on December 6, 1993, with representatives

from LCP, GA EPD, Allied Signal and HoltraChem. After

the tour with Judge Williams, the GA EPD withdrew the

request fora TRO.

Following the eventual closure of the plant in 1994,

GA EPD turned the Brunswick plant over to the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”). U.S. EPA

listed the facility as a Superfund site and commenced a

cleanup, which remains ongoing. Predecessors to LCP at the

site, Allied, ARCO and Georgia-Power Company, are paying

for the cleanup.

The Government then chose to criminally prosecute

individuals who had been employed by Hanlin for the

environmental problems that LCP experienced in 1993 and

1994. Federal jurisdiction in the district court arose from

———_ —_

5

the criminal indictments against those individuals for

violations of United States environmental statutes RCRA,

CERCLA, and CWA.

The criminal indictments charged the Petitioners with

exceeding the NPDES permit limits during specified time

periods between June 1993 and January 1994 (Counts 2-21);

for storing wastewater on the cellroom floors and permitting

some to escape to the environment during specified time

periods between May 29, 1993 and February 1, 1994 (Counts

22-32); for storing wastewater in Bunker C oil tanks between

July 23, 1993 and February 1, 1994 (Count 33); for knowingly

endangering employees by exposing them to impermissibly

stored wastes and wastewater between May 29, 1993 and

February 1, 1994 (Count 34); for failing to notify the U.S.

Government of unpermitted releases of chlorine or

wastewater to the environment between July 21, 1993 and

October 23, 1993 (Counts 35-41); and for conspiring to

commit those violations between July 1, 1985 and February

1, 1994 (Count I).

Seventy-five year old Petitioner Christian Hansen ts one

of the charged and convicted employees. He formed Hanlin

in 1972, and served as President and Chief Executive Officer

(“CEO”) and Chairman of the Board of Directors until early

April 1993. At that time, he was ousted as CEO and Chairman

of the Board by the Bankruptcy Court, at the Board’s request.

Thereafter, he remained an employee and a Board member.

As an employee, he undertook specific projects at the request

of the Board. In late June 1993, the Board asked him to visit

the Brunswick plant and to investigate the operational and

environmental problems. When Taylor resigned as Brunswick

plant manager on July 16, 1993, Christian Hansen became

de facto plant manager for approximately two months, until

8

Allied/HoltraChem invested money in the facility and

installed Mark White as plant manager on October 18, 1993.

Prior to that date, Christian Hansen returned to New Jersey

on an emergency basis for medical treatment of his acute

rheumatoid arthritis. He remained there as a Hanlin employee

with no authority, responsibility or involvement with the

Brunswick plant.

Petitioner Alfred Taylor worked for LCP at the

Brunswick plant from 1979 until February 1994. As plant

manager, Taylor stressed safety and assured employees of

their right to refuse to perform any activity if they felt it was

unsafe. Taylor reported overflow to GA EPD and to the LCP

Board of Directors. A few months after becoming plant

manager, Taylor proposed that the Brunswick plant be shut

down piecemeal to permit rebuilding one cellroom at a time.

He prepared a statement of the costs associated with this

alternative, and gave his proposal to Randall Hansen. Randall

later told Taylor that the Board would not allow the

Brunswick plant to be closed. Approximately two months

later, on July 16, 1993, Taylor resigned as plant manager.

In September 1993, Hansen requested Taylor to return to the

Brunswick plant. Taylor agreed to return only on the condition

that he would not have to assume managerial type duties.

Taylor remained at the Brunswick plant until it closed in

February 1994.

B. Proceedings Below

A jury convicted Christian Hansen of all counts,

including two counts in which the operative events predated

his tenure at the Brunswick plant and 19 counts that arose

from events that occurred after his departure. The district

court denied Christian Hansen’s post-trial request for a

9

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or a new trial on April

26, 1999. The Eleventh Circuit aftirmed the conviction and

denial of post-trial relief from the judgment.

A jury convicted Alfred Taylor of 20 counts, including

1] counts that arose from events that occurred after he was no

longer a manager at the Brunswick plant. The district court

denied Taylor’s post-trial request for a judgment notwithstanding

the verdict and/or a new trial on April 26, 1999. The Eleventh

Circuit affirmed the conviction and denial of post-trial relief

from the judgment.

On August 24, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

issued a 74-page per curium opinion, in which the Court

affirmed all of the Petitioners’ convictions on all counts.

In affirming Petitioners’ convictions, the Eleventh Circuit did

not acknowledge its improper reliance on the RCO doctrine as

a basis for finding liability under environmental criminal

statutes. The Eleventh Circuit also failed to acknowledge its

departure from the reasoning in Park and other Circuit Courts

of Appeals which clearly hold that a person cannot be criminally

liable for violations that occurred when that person was not ina

position of responsibility or control.

C. Jurisdiction Below

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, because the prosecution was brought by the United

States under federal environmental laws, including the

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A); the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d) & (e);

and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari is warranted in this case because the Hansen

decision is at odds with this Court’s interpretation of the

requirements of the responsible corporate officer (“RCO”)

doctrine and fundamental precepts of criminal law.

The Eleventh Circuit held Hansen liable for 22 violations

and Taylor liable for 11 violations that occurred when they

were not corporate officers, and when Hansen was not

working at, or affiliated with, the Brunswick plant, and Taylor

had no managerial duties at the Brunswick plant.’

The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Hansen was not an

officer of the corporation, was not even present at the

Brunswick plant and had “‘left his decision-making position”

at the time violations underlying 22 counts of his conviction

occurred. (See Op., App. A at 1 la-12a, 28a.) The Eleventh

Circuit also acknowledged that Taylor resigned in July 1993

and only returned to the Brunswick plant as an employee

without any remaining managerial or supervisory control.

(/d., App. A at 12a.) Then, without so much as a citation, the

court affirmed the convictions despite the undisputed facts

that neither Hansen nor Taylor were officers of the

corporation, neither were in a position of responsibility or

authority, and neither could prevent or correct the violations

charged.

The RCO doctrine arose from this Court’s decision in

United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), in which

2. Hansen Counts 2, 6-10, 14-15, 19-21, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, and

38-40 occurred when he had no authority at the Brunswick plant and

was not even working at the plant. Taylor Counts 23, 25, 29-32, and

38-41 all occurred after Taylor resigned from management and

returned to the Brunswick plant only as an engineer without any

management or supervisory responsibilities.

1]

this Court held that a corporate officer who has a “responsible

share in the furtherance of the transaction” could be held

liable, in addition to the corporation, for violations of law.

This Court determined that the corporate officers who

were subject to this liability could be determined by the

prosecutors, the trial judges and the juries. That determination

proved to be too little guidance, and in United States v. Park,

421 U.S. 658 (1975), this Court again considered a corporate

officer’s liability under the RCO doctrine. In Park, this Court

gave more specific guidelines, and held that RCO liability

could attach “if the defendant had, by reason of his position

in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to

prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the

violation complained of, and failed to do so.” Id. at 673-74.

Despite the clarification this Court provided in Park, courts

have interpreted the scope of RCO liability differently and

have applied it inconsistently in prosecutions of corporate

officers for environmental crimes.

In Hansen, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the necessary

ingredient of control as required by Park. Its decision is

symptomatic of the improper reduction of the Government's

burden of proof through the elimination of the mens rea

requirement that this Court has more recently determined

violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994); United

States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994); see

also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (requiring

actual involvement in or control of environmental operations

before a parent company may be liable under CERCLA).

The Hansen decision conflicts with this Court’s prior

application of the RCO doctrine because it imposes liability

12

on persons who had no responsibility or authority to prevent

or correct the charged violations. The Eleventh Circuit so

distorted the RCO doctrine that it affirmed Hansen’s

conviction for violations occurring when he was no longer

working at the Brunswick plant, after he had returned home

to New Jersey, and while he was hospitalized for treatment

of his rheumatoid arthritis. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit

twisted the doctrine to affirm Taylor’s convictions for

violations occurring after he had resigned from his short stint

as plant manager, and after he had been lured back to work

for the company only after negotiating with them that he

would not be in a position that entailed any management or

supervisory responsibilities. Despite admitting these facts and

without providing any rationale, the Eleventh Circuit

affirmed Petitioners’ convictions under its flawed

interpretation of the RCO doctrine for violations occurring

during the time Petitioners were removed from all

management and supervisory responsibilities. Under this

Court’s holding in Park, and more recently in Staples, X-

Citement Video, and Bestfoods, the Eleventh Circuit should

have reversed Hansen’s and Taylor’s convictions.

Three issues are presented here:

First, despite this Court’s clarification of the RCO

doctrine in Park and other Circuit Courts of Appeals clear

holdings that a person must be in actual control of a facility

before environmental liability will attach, in affirming the

district court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit eliminated the

“actual control” requirement. The Eleventh Circuit extended

liability to persons who were not corporate officers and had

no opportunity to prevent the violations, including Hansen

who was not even working at the facility when the violations

—— To ite

13

occurred. The Eleventh Circuit did not give its reasoning,

explain its decision or cite to any authority for this dramatic

departure from the RCO doctrine. (See Op., App. A at 28a.)

Second, Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on the issue

of whether a person convicted under the RCO doctrine must

have actual knowledge of each element of the charged

violation, even in the face of this Court’s clear direction in

Staples and X-Citement that statutes similar to RCRA and

the CWA require a demonstration of mens rea. The Eleventh

Circuit improperly eliminated the “actual knowledge”

standard by deeming the regulations at issue to be public

welfare statutes and allowing the jury to convict without the

Government proving that the Petitioners had the mens rea

necessary to commit the violation.

Third, Petitioners present an important issue of federal

law that should be settled by this Court: whether criminal

liability should be reduced or eliminated when the

corporation is in bankruptcy because the corporate officers

are no longer in a position to make decisions that could

correct or prevent the violations. In the district court, the

Government argued to the judge and jury that the Brunswick

plant needed to be closed, but Hanlin’s filing for bankruptcy

protection effectively limited those managers’ actual control

over the Brunswick plant. Hansen, Taylor and the other

corporate officers lacked the authority to take actions such

as closing or selling the Brunswick plant, or allocating funds

to prevent or correct the violations. In fact, the Board of

Directors and the Creditors’ Committee specifically refused

to close the Brunswick plant when co-defendant Randall

Hansen presented Taylor’s recommendation that the

Brunswick plant be shui down to prevent environmental

releases.

14

I. The RCO Doctrine Requires That The Corporate

Officer Be In Actual Control Of The Facility At The

Time Of The Occurrence

The Eleventh Circuit, without citation to authority or

justification for its decision, unilaterally extended the RCO

doctrine to make liable those employees who are not

corporate officers, are not in a position of authority or control,

and are not working at or associated with the facility at the

time the offending releases occurred. By doing so, the

Eleventh Circuit has completely ignored this Court’s holding

in Park requiring that a corporate officer have the ability to

prevent or correct a violation before that officer will be held

liable. Such a requirement is logical, given that the doctrine

is titled and based on the necessary fact that the corporate

officer be “responsible” for the violation.

Not only does the Eleventh Circuit decision conflict with

the holding in Park, but it also conflicts with this Court’s

holding in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)

(interpreting CERCLA). This Court’s reasoning in Bestfoods

is directly applicable to the RCO doctrine issue in this case.

In Bestfoods, a civil case, the Court considered whether a

parent corporation could be liable for the CERCLA violations

committed by its subsidiary. Under the CERCLA provision

at issue in Bestfoods, a person may only be liable if that

person “owns” or “operates” a facility. This Court held that

“operating” a facility for purposes of CERCLA required

managing, directing, or conducting operations specifically

related to the release or disposal of hazardous waste

or compliance with environmental regulations. /d. at 70-71.

This Court specifically limited liability to those persons with

a direct link to the release of hazardous waste that formed

the basis of the statutory violation. Even in the civil context,

15

this Court recognized that a nexus must exist between a

defendant’s conduct and the specific activity resulting in the

environmental violation. Clearly that same nexus must be

present in the criminal context, where defendants face severe

penalties and the Government must prove defendant's

connection to a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the nexus that this Court held

was necessary for liability in Bestfoods. The Eleventh Circuit

did not cite to Bestfoods in its opinion despite the fact that the

statutory provision at issue in Bestfoods, and the RCRA and

CERCLA statutes at issue in this case require a person to “own”

or “operate” a facility — essentially to be in a position to control

the facility or the activity that forms the basis for the liability.

In fact, the Court admitted that the acts occurred “after Hansen

left his decision making position,” but then casually, without

any citation to the record linking Hansen to those acts, stated:

“the acts occurred at [Hansen’s] direction.” (Op., App. A at 28a.)

Not only does the Court’s statement admit the legal impairment

to liability because Hansen was not in “actual control,” but it is

also factually deficient. The Government did not prove that

Brunswick employees followed any of Hansen’s directives.

Further, the Government did not link any of Hansen’s directives

with the specific violations that were charged. The Eleventh

Circuit simply refused to take a critical look at or address head-

on Petitioners’ arguments.

Certiorari also is warranted by the conflict in the Circuit

Courts of Appeals on the “actual control” issue. The Eleventh

Circuit’s decision is at odds with the holdings of several other

Circuit Courts of Appeals that have addressed the “actual

control” issue. See United States v. Dell ‘Aquilla, 150 F.3d 329

(3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting the Clean Air Act); United States v.

Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1998)

16

(interpreting CERCLA), United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550

(2d Cir. 1989) (interpreting CERCLA and the CWA). Each of

these cases has found that the corporate officer (or corporate

parent, as in Bestfoods) must exercise actual control before

liability attaches.

For example, the Eleventh Circuit decision conflicts with

the reasoning used by the Third Circuit in Dell ‘Aquilla, 150

F.3d at 334 (interpreting the Clean Air Act), a case that is directly

on point here. In Dell ‘Aquilla, the Third Circuit vacated the

grant of summary judgment and held that individual defendants

had to be directly involved with the operation of a facility at the

time that each violation occurred, and that prior involvement

with the facility would not result in liability for later violations.

Id. at 334. The Third Circuit relied on the Bestfoods

interpretation of “operator” under CERCLA which did not

specifically address corporate officer liability, but required the

Government to demonstrate that the person being charged

actually participated in or had some nexus to the liability-creating

conduct. The court reversed the district court because the district

court erred in assuming that once liability was demonstrated

for a Clean Air Act violation, it was proved for future violations

regardless of the capacity of the defendant to control the

polluting activity. Similarly, the Third Circuit has rejected the

argument that liability attaches based solely on the officer’s

active involvement in the corporations day-to-day affairs. United

States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding

that to find CERLA liability, the Government must show that

the person sought to be held liable actually participated in the

liability-creating conduct).

The Sixth Circuit employed the same reasoning in United

States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998),

which holding that a CERCLA operator had to exert “actual

+7

control” and “must perform affirmative acts” before liability

will attach for environmental violations. /d. at 314. The Sixth

Circuit held that the failure to act, even if coupled with the ability

or authority to do so, would not confer operator liability. The

Second Circuit considered a similar question in United States v.

Carr, when it stated that despite its expansive view of who was

“in charge” under CERCLA, it still required that “in charge”

include only those people who had supervisory control over the

facility. 880 F.2d 1550, 1554 (2d Cir. 1989).

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hansen even conflicts

with the Circuit’s own reasoning in another environmental case

addressing a similar situation. See Redwing Carriers, Inc.

vy. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)

? (interpreting CERCLA). In Redwing Carriers, the Eleventh

F Circuit held that partners of a limited partnership were not liable

; for environmental violations unless they had either participated

in the operations of the violating facility, participated in the

activities that resulted in the disposal of hazardous substances,

or that the partners actually exercised contro] over or were

otherwise intimately involved in the operation of the partnership.

Id. at 1505. The court required direct involvement by the person

in the activities charged as violations of the statutes or evidence

that the person was in a position of control.

The Eleventh Circuit ignored the Redwing Carriers

1 decision, and its decision in Hansen to extend liability to a person

: who is not a corporate officer and not in actual control stands in

stark contrast to the reasoning of the Third Circuit in

Dell ‘Aquilla, the other Circuit Courts of Appeals, and this Court.

This departure is more incredible because the court admitted

that the acts forming the basis of several of the Counts

“continued after Hansen left his decision-making position,”

while at the same time concluding, without citation to a single

18

case or the record, that those acts occurred at Hansen’s direction.

Similarly, the court failed to discuss the Counts where Alfred

Taylor was no longer in a position of actual control. Just as the

Third Circuit held in Dell ‘Aquilla, the Eleventh Circuit should

have reversed the district court because the Government failed

to show that Hansen or Taylor continued to function in a capacity

of responsibility or control for each violation of RCRA, the

CWA and CERCLA that occurred. See Dell ‘Aguilla, 150 F.3d

at 334.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hansen is elusive.

By holding the Petitioners liable when they were without any

power to effect change in Brunswick’s environmental operations,

the Eleventh Circuit potentially extended liability to a seemingly

endless class of employees who may have worked at a facility

prior to, during, or after the violation occurred but never had

any responsibility for the violation. The decision essentially

assumes liability without the necessary showing of a nexus

between the act or omission forming the basis of the liability

and a person’s responsibility for that act or omission as required

by the RCO doctrine. This Court has an opportunity to resolve

whether Petitioners were appropriately held criminally liable

under the RCO doctrine for violations where there was no nexus

because Petitioners were not able to exert actual control over

the facility at the time the violations occurred.

Il. The Fifth Amendment Right To Due Process Was

Violated When The Government Failed To Prove That

Hansen And Taylor Had Actual Knowledge Of Each

Element Of The Offenses

The “actual knowledge”’ issue has been addressed by this

court in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994), and

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994).

In those cases, this Court held that converting a federal statute

19

that provides criminal penalties into a public welfare statute,

rather than treating it as a standard criminal statute as intended

by Congress, is unconstitutional because it reduces the

Government’s burden of proof in violation of the Fifth

Amendment right to due process of law. The criminal provisions

of the CWA and RCRA do not impose strict liability on a

defendant and the lower courts’ converting them to public

welfare statutes by removing the mens rea element 1s

unconstitutional and violates due process.

While the Court has addressed the mens rea requirement

of other federal statutes, the Court has yet to address the mens

rea requirement of environmental criminal statutes such as the

CWA and RCRA. As Justices Thomas and O’Connor stated in

their recent dissent to the denial of a petition for a writ of

certiorari in Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103-

05 (2000), now is the time for the Court to resolve the split in

the Circuit Courts of Appeals and determine that the CWA and

RCRA cannot be public welfare statutes in light of their express

mens rea requirement and the serious penalties they impose.

This case presents the Court an opportunity to clarify the

confusing and contradictory standards expressed by the C ircuit

Courts of Appeals and reaffirm the holdings of Staples and

X-Citement in the environmental context.

_ The confusion in the scienter requirements of the RCO

doctrine results from the failure of prosecutors and courts to

distinguish the occasions when the RCO doctrine is applied to

true public welfare statutes from those where the RCO doctrine

is applied to regulations that call for explicit knowledge and

impose severe criminal penalties, such as the CWA and RCRA.

See Randall S. Abate & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All About What

You Know: The Specific Intent Standard Should Govern

“Knowing” Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl.

20

L. J. 304, 311-19 (2001). Several courts have properly held the

government to its burden to prove defendant’s knowledge of

each element of the crime and declined to apply the public

welfare doctrine to environmental statutes. See United States v.

Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (Sth Cir. 1996) (declining to hold that the

CWA 1s a public welfare statute); United States v. MacDonald

& Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 51-52 (1st Dist. 1991)

(distinguishing RCRA, which requires specific intent, from the

public welfare statutes at issue in Dotterweich and Park);

see also United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95

(E.D. Wash. 1991) (same). Other courts have applied the gloss

of the public welfare doctrine to knowing violations of RCRA

and the CWA and held persons criminally liable as responsible

corporate officers without the requisite showing of specific

intent. See United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157

F.3d 432, 438-39 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Wilson, 133

F.2d 251, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1997).

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit without explanation

declined to follow this Court and those Circuits that have

properly determined that the public welfare doctrine does not

apply to RCRA and the CWA. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision

directly conflicts with the reasoning of this Court 1n both

X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, and Staples, 511 U.S. at 618,

and with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad, 101 F.3d

at 39, and the First Circuit in MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 51-52.

In Hansen, the Eleventh Circuit has vastly broadened the scope

of liability in the environmental criminal arena — despite the -

grave penalties that may result from convictions under RCRA

and the CWA.

In Staples, this Court reaffirmed the common law rule that

the Government must prove mens rea for statutory crimes.

This Court rejected the Government’s argument that the National

21

Firearms Act (“NFA”) was a public welfare statute simply

because it regulated inherently dangerous activity. An important

element of this Court’s reasoning was that the severe penalties

of up to ten years imprisonment that may result from NFA

violations was a reason to maintain the Government's burden

of proof. This Court’s statement in Staples applies equally here:

“punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with

the theory of the public welfare offense.” Staples, 511 U.S. at

618.

In line with Staples, this Court next reversed a

Ninth Circuit decision that interpreted a statute as lacking a

mens rea requirement. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64.

In interpreting the Protection of Children Against Sexual

Exploitation Act of 1977, this Court held that the “knowingly”

requirement applied to each element of the crime. When making

its decision, this Court stated that “[oJur reluctance to simply

follow the most grammatical reading of the statute is heightened

by our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly

applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its

terms does not contain them.” /d. at 70. This Court again rejected

the argument that a statute imposing harsh penalties could be

considered a public welfare statute and determined that the

statute’s mens rea requirement must be applied to each element

of the crime. /d. at 71. The statute in X-Citement Video — like

the CWA and RCRA — carried penalties of up to ten years in

prison and substantial fines.

Members of this Court have expressly called into question

the application of the public welfare doctrine to the CWA in

terms that are applicable equally to RCRA. Hanousek, 528 U.S.

at 1103-05. Justices Thomas and O’Connor noted that the

seriousness of the penalties (felonies with three to six years In

prison) “counsels against concluding that the CWA can

22

accurately be classified as a public welfare statute.” /d. at 1104.

More troubling to the Justices was the broad sweep of such a

classification: classifying criminal statutes, such as the CWA,

as public welfare statutes simply because they regulate conduct

that is known to be subject to extensive regulation and that may

involve risk to the community would criminalize almost all

industrial activities. /d. In Hansen, Petitioners were sentenced

to harsh penalties — imprisonment for nine years for Hansen

and six and one-half years for Taylor. These sentences arose

from violations of the CWA, among other environmental

Statutes, and illustrate the Justice’s reasoning in Hanousek

against classifying the CWA as a public welfare statute.

The Fifth Circuit followed the reasoning of X-Citement

Video and Staples and held that the CWA was not a public welfare

Statute and that the Government had to prove mens rea before

liability could be found. Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 390-91. The Fifth

Circuit held that the CWA was not a public welfare statute

because CWA crimes were classified as serious felonies and

there was no clear statement from Congress that mens rea was

not required to find a violation. /d. at 391. The Fifth Circuit

also considered whether the jury instructions in Ahmad

adequately conveyed the mens rea requirement. The Court held

that the instructions were faulty and required reversal of the

conviction because “[a]t best, the jury charge made it uncertain

to which elements ‘knowingly’ applied.” Jd. Because this

presented the reasonable likelihood that the jury did not apply

the “knowingly” element to each element, the Fifth Circuit

reversed the defendant’s conviction.

While the First Circuit’s decision in MacDonald predates

this Court’s decisions in Staples and X-Citement Videos, it

applies the same principles to RCRA in reversing a conviction

based on the presumption that the defendant knew of the

23

violations simply because he was a corporate officer. 933 F.2d

at 55. The court stated: “[W]e know of no precedent for failing

to give effect to a knowledge requirement that Congress has

expressly included in a criminal statute. Especially is that

so where, as here the crime is a felony carrying possible

imprisonment of five years and, for a second offense, ten.”

Id. at 45 (citation omitted). The court held that a mere showing

of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park was not

an adequate substitute for the government proving knowledge.

Id. at 55.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in this case is directly

contrary to this Court’s reasoning in X-Citement Video and in

Staples, as well as the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Ahmad and

the First Circuit’s reasoning in MacDonald. Here, the Eleventh

Circuit ignored those precedents and did not instruct the jury

that the Government had to prove that the Petitioners acted

“knowingly” for each element of the offense. Because of the

blanket use of the RCO instruction, Hansen and Taylor were

convicted of violations under each statute without proof that

they had the requisite scienter.

This was especially true for Count 34 under RCRA for

Knowing Endangerment, a violation that carries a penalty of up

to ten years imprisonment. In Hansen, the jury was not instructed

of the appropriate mens rea element of the Knowing

Endangerment charge. A “Knowing Endangerment” violation

requires a finding that Petitioners knew that their actions created

an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, as required

by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). (See App. D at 129a.)

Specific, not inferred, knowledge of the imminent danger is the

standard for a violation. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f). (See id.) Because

the district court gave an RCO instruction at trial, the jury was

allowed to convict Hansen and Taylor based on their roles in

24

the corporation and the inference that they knew of a RCRA

violation instead of proof that they knowingly failed to prevent,

detect or correct a violation, as required by the statute.

Like MacDonald and Ahmad, this case should be reversed.

First, the Petitioners were convicted based on their corporate

status, not based on their actual knowledge. Second, the district

court failed to give effect to an express knowledge requirement

found in the statute. Third, the crime for which they were

convicted is a felony that carried severe penalties of up to ten

years imprisonment.

The jury instructions for the charges under the CWA also

were faulty and warrant reversal of the Petitioners’ convictions.

The CWA expressly requires proof that the person charged with

the violations possess the mens rea specified in the statute.

Courts have recognized that this mens rea requirement is not

superceded by the use of the RCO doctrine. The result is that an

officer’s corporate status is just one of several factors that lead

to an inference of actual knowledge, the mens rea standard in

the CWA. The CWA specifically confers liability on “any

responsible corporate officer,” 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6), making

the question of responsibility one of the elements necessary to

prove a CWA violation. (See App. D at 125a.)

The district court failed, however, to instruct the jury about

the circumstances that determine when a corporate officer may

be held responsible — including issues about the officer’s

knowledge, capacity to prevent, and knowing failure to prevent,

the offending discharge. Instead of requiring the Government

to prove this element, the district court instructed the jury that

“wherever I have used the term ‘corporate officers,’ | mean

responsible corporate officers.” By doing so, the district court

eliminated the CWA mens rea element, converted the CWA into

a strict liability statute and allowed Petitioners to be convicted

25

merely because of their status. The district court’s holding and

the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of that holding have been

specifically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad and by Justices

Thomas and O’Connor in their dissent to the denial of certiorari

in Hanousek, and resulted in Christian Hansen and Alfred Taylor

being sentenced to nine years and six and one-half years

imprisonment, respectively, without proper proof.

The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit's

Iverson case to justify its decision on the mens rea, issue also is

without merit. A closer look at /verson demonstrates that it does

not support the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit. See United

States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998). In fact, the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s

approval of the RCO jury instruction in /verson. /d. In Iverson,

the Ninth Circuit approved an instruction that required the jury

to find: that the defendant had knowledge of the facts that lead

to the offending discharge of pollutants; that the defendant had

the authority and capacity to prevent the discharge, and that the

defendant failed to prevent the ongoing discharge. /d. at 1022.

In Hansen, the jury was allowed to convict without specifying

that liability was arising under the RCO doctrine, and without

requiring a finding that the Petitioners had knowledge of the

facts that lead to the offending discharge of pollutants.”

This Court has held that where there is a reasonable

likelihood that the jury has applied the instructions in a manner

that does not give full effect to the statute at issue, the jury may

3. Although the defendant in /verson and this case faced similar

charges, the facts in /verson are distinct from those here. In /verson, the

defendant personally discharged the pollutants, ordered discharge at an

alternative location for easier release, conducted the business of the

company even after he was “retired,” and knew that his conduct was

illegal.

26

have been misled about the elements of the offense. When a

jury is instructed on an impermissible legal theory, reversal

is warranted. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).

In addition, when an instruction is ambiguous and capable of

an erroneous interpretation, reversal is warranted when there is

a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of

constitutionally relevant evidence. /d. In this case, any one of

these faulty instructions warrants reversal of the Petitioners’

convictions, and as a whole, the improper jury instructions

overwhelming weigh in favor of reversal.

The RCO doctrine should not eradicate the mens rea —

requirements of the underlying statute that attaches liability, and

under the CWA and RCRA the corporate officer must have

“actual knowledge” of the situation giving rise to the crime.

Nevertheless, Hansen’s and Taylor’s convictions under the CWA

and RCRA were reached without the Government proving that

the Petitioners had the mens rea necessary to find liability.

In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the misapplication

of the RCO doctrine by permitting the CWA and RCRA to be

converted into public welfare statutes and reducing the

government’s burden of proof in contravention of the decisions

of this Court and other Circuit Courts of Appeals.

Ill. Certiorari Is Necessary To Resolve The Conflicting

Objectives Of The Federal Bankruptcy Act And

Environmental Statutes

This Court should also grant certiorari to resolve

the friction between the bankruptcy and environmental

regulations. The contro] that Petitioners had in this case over

the Brunswick plant was further inhibited by Hanlin’s

bankruptcy, yet the Eleventh Circuit failed to address Petitioners’

27

arguments that their management authority and responsibilities

were fundamentally changed by Hanlin’s bankruptcy, limiting

its perfunctory discussion to Randall Hansen’s arguments.

(See Op., App. A at 29a-31a.)

Bankruptcy laws and environmental laws have competing

objectives. While the objective of bankruptcy laws Is to preserve

a corporation’s assets for reorganization or for the benefit of its

creditors, the objective of environmental laws is to protect the

health and environment, without consideration of the cost to

effectuate that goal. Courts have been forced to balance between

these competing goals, and the tension between those

two objectives has long been recognized. See In re Chicago,

Milwaukee, R.R., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993); In re

Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991)

(“We agree that the Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward

competing objectives.”’).

While the Eleventh Circuit’s statement that bankruptcy does

not insulate a debtor from environmental statutes (see Op., App.

A at 30a) is true to some degree, the reality is much more clouded

and courts have limited a debtor’s environmental liability in

bankruptcy although conflicts remain regarding the

circumstances that warrant such limitation. See Olio v. Kovacs,

469 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (state environmental clean-up order

that can be performed only by the payment of money is a claim

against the bankrupt estate and is dischargeable in bankruptcy);

In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 1002 (claim resulting from pre-

petition release may be dischargeable); United States v. Whizco,

841 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (to the extent an injunction

required debtor to expend resources to clean up site, it was a

dischargeable claim); but see Mid-Atlantic Nat'l Bank v.

New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 506 (1986)

(limiting ability of trustee to abandon contaminated property);

28

In re Nat'l Gypsum, 139 B.R. 397, 407 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)

(refusing to discharge debts associated with debtor’s

undiscovered sites).

The above-mentioned cases highlight the conflicting

objectives of bankruptcy and environmental laws and courts’

attempts to resolve those conflicts, but they do not address the

issue presented to the Eleventh Circuit and this Court by the

Petitioners. Nor did the Eleventh Circuit’s perfunctory analysis

(see Op., App. A at 29a-3 1a), because Petitioners did not contend

that LCP, as the debtor, should be absolved of environmental

liability. Petitioners argued that the bankruptcy shifted control

of the corporation from its management to the Bankruptcy Court,

the Board of Directors and the Creditor’s Committee, imposing

an overlay of bankruptcy rules that severely circumscribed

management’s ability to take action on behalf of the corporation.

Thus, the issue raised before this Court, which has not been

addressed below or by other courts, is whether a corporate officer

or employee can be held criminally liable for environmental

violations even when he had no authority to act to prevent,

control or mitigate those violations because the corporation was

in bankruptcy.

Once LCP entered bankruptcy as a debtor-in-possession,

the Board and the bankruptcy court, not Petitioners, possessed

the authority to commit the resources that the Government argues

were necessary to alleviate the environmental conditions at the

Brunswick plant.’ See CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352-

53 (1985); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 158 B.R. 343, 353-54

(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-

in-possession’s officers and directors are placed in the dual role

of running the corporation in the ordinary course of business

4. The Brunswick plant managers could not make a decision to

shut down the Plant, yet under the Government’s theory, that was

the way to cure its problems.

29

and carrying out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee,

including maximizing the value of the estate for the debtor’s

creditors. See Tenn-Fla Partners y. First Union Nat'l Bank of

Fla., 229 B.R. 720, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1999).

Consequently, management has conflicting responsibilities

placed on it when confronted with an environmental expense

that has both the possibility of depleting the estate and the

potential to incur liability for environmental violations.

Management’s control is further limited because the

corporation is under the control of the bankruptcy court.

See In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 799 (Bankr.

S.D. Texas 1993) (“Bankruptcy Code provides a supplemental

scheme of governance over the estate’). In order to “use, sell,

or lease” its property “other than in the ordinary course of

business,” a debtor-in-possession, must obtain approval from

the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b)(1). Environmental

expenses for compliance and cleanup are expenses that may be

outside of the ordinary course of business and require bankruptcy

court approval. See Jn re Allegheny Int'l, 158 B.R. at 353-54.

This shift in-eontrol, the new duties of a debtor-in-possession,

and the limits placed on an officer’s or director’s actions as a

result of bankruptcy must have a corresponding effect on the

criminal liability of individual officers or directors at a bankrupt

company.

In this case, after the bankruptcy petition was filed, funds

for maintenance, repair and environmental compliance were

restricted, and all decisions for continuing plant operation, major

projects, capital and extraordinary expenditures, and the sale of

assets, were subject to approval by the Board of Directors, the

Creditors Committee, and the Bankruptcy Court. Petitioners

tried, but were not allowed, to adequately allocate funds to

correct the offending releases, and alternatively, proposed that

the Brunswick plant be shut down until the problems there could

be solved. Because Petitioners could not authorize expenditures

30

for the Brunswick plant that, under the Government’s theory,

may have prevented the violations, Petitioners should not be

found criminally liable for failing to make those expenditures.

The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Hansen places Petitioners,

and other officers and directors in similar circumstances, 1n an

untenable position that will likely chill qualified persons from

taking or remaining in management positions in bankrupt

corporations for fear of personal criminal liability. Moreover,

because Hanlin’s bankruptcy limited Petitioner’s actual control

over the operations of the Brunswick plant and its operations,

not recognizing this reduction in control compounded the effects

of the blanket RCO jury instruction.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant this petition to correct the

misapplication of Supreme Court precedent and resolve the split

between the Eleventh Circuit and the other Circuit Courts of

Appeals that have applied the RCO doctrine to environmental

statutes. Further, this Court should grant this petition to address

the tension between the environmental laws and the laws of

bankruptcy. Accordingly, the Petitioners respectfully request that

this Court grant this petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RosBert L. BERNER, JR.

Counsel of Record

Davip P. HACKETT

ADRIANE W. BuRKLAND

Douc.tas B. SANDERS

BaKER & McKENZIE

Attorneys for Petitioners

130 East Randolph Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 861-8000

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A — PER CURIAM OPINION OF THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DATED AND

FILED AUGUST 24, 2001

-~

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-11638

D.C. Docket No. 98-00023-CR-2-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHRISTIAN A. HANSEN, ALFRED R. TAYLOR, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Georgia

(August 24, 2001)

Before BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and

HANCOCK’, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Alfred R. Taylor, Christian A. Hansen, and Randall W.

Hansen appeal their convictions for conspiracy to commit

* Honorable James H. Hancock, U.S. District Judge for the

Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

2a

Appendix A

environmental crimes, violating the Clean Water Act,

- violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and

violating the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act. On appeal, they each assert

several alleged trial and sentencing errors. Finding no merit

to their claims, we AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

Christian Hansen (“Hansen’’) founded the Hanlin Group

(“Hanlin”) in 1972, and served as its President, Chief

Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board until early

April 1993. R19-160. Hanlin operated an industrial plant in

Brunswick, Georgia, as LCP Chemicals-Georgia (“LCP”),

R21-41, and Hansen served as the plant manager for

approximately two months in 1993. R19-166-67. Randall

Hansen (“Randall”), Hansen’s son, was hired as an executive

vice president in 1992. R21-193. He became Chief Executive

Officer in April 1993 and served in that capacity until

November 1993. R21-195. Alfred Taylor (“Taylor”) began

working for LCP in 1979, and became the Brunswick

operations manager in 199]. R21-243-44. He served as plant

manager from February until July 1993. R21-244-45.

Hanlin purchased the Brunswick plant in 1979.' R21-

41. The plant, which is on a site adjacent to tidal marshes

1. The site has been used by various companies for 50 years,

and was unregulated by any environmental regulations until the

1970s. The site was operated as an oil refinery from 1919 to 1937 by

Atlantic Richfield [ARCO], as a manufacturing site from 1937 to

1955 by Dixie Paint Company, and as a chlor-alkali facility from

(Cont'd)

3a

Appendix A

and Purvis Creek, operated continuously year-round,

manufacturing caustic soda, hydrogen gas, hydrochloric acid,

and chlor-alkali bleach. About 150 people worked at the plant

in two “cell buildings” or “cellrooms.” Each cellroom was

about the size of a football field and contained fifty mercury

“cells,” the units used to produce the bleach, soda, gas, and

acid ultimately sold by LCP. R8-200-2. “The production

process generated hazardous wastes, including elemental

mercury, mercury-contaminated sludge (or “muds”’),°

(Cont'd)

1955 to 1979 by Allied Chemical. R16-85-86. Allied Chemical used

graphite anodes impregnated with PCBs during the chlor-alkah

process, and buried the contaminated anodes on the site. R21-54,

229. It is now a Superfund site, and is being cleaned at the expense

of the government and these earlier owners.

2. In a memorandum regarding mercury consumption, dated

4 October 1993, Taylor noted that mercury “[c]onsumption was

particularly high in 1988” and for 1990-1993. Govt. Ex. 19-5. An

attachment showed “excess” mercury from consumption of 243, 102

pounds from 1986 to 1993. /d.

The “mud” was spread onto the cellroom floors to dry, the

mercury was recovered from underneath and on top of the mud, and

the mud was put into drums for disposal. R19-190-93. When the

wastewater covered the floors, the mud could not be stored until the

water receded and it was dried. /d. at 191. The drums were stored

underneath the cellrooms. R20-62. The drums were labeled and dated

when the mud was first put into the drum “because [the plant] only

had a ninety-day storage period under [the] permit.” /d. at 62-63.

There were “times” when the mud was “redrumed” and again labeled

for another ninety-days. /d. Hanson testified that Taylor was aware

of the muds in the drums. /d. at 62.

(Cont'd)

4a

Appendix A

wastewater, chlorine contaminated wastewater, and extremely

caustic wastes with high pH values.” /d. at 2-3; R16-112-14.

The wastes were subject to various environmental

regulations, including wastewater limitations on pH, mercury,

and chlorine set forth in LCP’s National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (“NPDES”), and to regulations of the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42

U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).

LCP constructed a wastewater treatment system in 1989

and 1990, and was allowed, by NPDES permit, to discharge

- the treated wastewater into Purvis Creek. Although LCP

represented that the system would have a continuous

treatment capacity of 70 gallons per minute in the project

description submitted to we prone EPD, Govt. Ex. 10-3b

at SWS 00001807, the filtration and storage systems installed

had a capacity of only 35 gallons per minute, R20-20-21;

Govt. Ex. 1-12. LCP did not notify the Georgia EPD of the

lower wastewater treatment capacity. R20-290. The plant was

authorized to store wastewater which was awaiting treatment

in the wastewater treatment plant on the floor of the

cellrooms. R16-118; R21-145, 161. The cellrooms were

constructed of concrete, with a downward slope which

diverted the wastewaters to a sump’ and then to the

wastewater treatment holding tanks. R19-33-34. If the

cellroom became incapable of holding the wastewater, it

(Cont'd)

At Taylor’s direction, mud that accumulated in the wastewater

stored in tank railcars was “drained off to the wastewater treatment

area.” R20-356-57.

3. A sump is a hole with a grate over it. R19-34

Sa

Appendix A

leaked out onto the ground and accumulated in a lake. R16-

131-32. LCP also used “Bunker C” oil tanks for additional

wastewater storage. R19-291; R20-42-45. Due to accidental

spills, bleach sometimes accumulated on the Cellroom |

floor. R19-258. During the early 1990s, the maintenance at

the plant began deteriorating. R20-177, 179. Replacement

parts were not made available, and wastewater began

accumulating around the plant. /d. -

The operations were subject to Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations for the

protection and safety of the employees. The workers exposed

to mercury vapors in the mercury cell process were provided

with liquids to drink in order to stay hydrated and deplete

the mercury, and their exposure was periodically monitored

through an extensive mercury urinalysis procedure. R20-145-

46; R21-251-52. Employees who showed exposure‘to excess

mercury were not allowed to return to work until they were

seen by a medical physician, and were then relocated to other

plant locations away from the mercury cells.* R20-146, 164-

65, 168-69, 174; R21-255, 258; R22-12, 24.

In August 1992, OSHA inspected the plant “due to an

employee complaint about safety hazards associated with

water on cell room floors.” Govt. Ex.-10-7i. OSHA found

this to be a “willful violation and demanded that no

employees be allowed to work in contact with the water while

the equipment was energized,” and “forced” LCP “to erect a

4. LCP retested and counseled any employee who tested above

150 micrograms per liter, and employees with a confirmed result

above 250 micrograms were removed from further exposure until

their level went below 150. R21-253-55.

6a

Appendix A

boardwalk system above the water level around all the

equipment until the water c[ould] be eliminated

permanently.” /d. LCP added wooden elevated walkways in

the cellrooms to prevent the workers from having contact

with the water on the floor and to reduce the workers’ risk of

electrical shock or chemical burns.* R16-118; R21-145-46,

161. The chemicals used in LCP’s operations were very

alkaline and caustic and could irritate and burn skin.° R16-

93; R19-43, 197; R20-188; R21-263-64. To minimize the

workers’ risk of skin irritations and burns, LCP held routine

safety meetings, encouraged and received safety inspections,

and provided the employees with training, protective

equipment to preclude skin contact, and first aid stations and

5. The water occasionally rose high enough to splash onto or

soak the walkways, and they became slick. R20-181, 322. OSHA

also required that LCP utilize a lockout procedure for employees to

work on a cell or pump because of the potential electrical hazards.

R19-45; R20-190. In the lockout procedure, an operator ensured that

the electrical power was shut off before a mechanic was permitted to

begin work. R19-46-47; R20-190, 323.

6. One former employee, Duane Lorenzo Carver, testified that

he received second and third degree burns on his thighs from caustic

that had soaked through his clothes. R19-182, 197. In reference toa

question regarding the conditions of the cellrooms in 1993, he said

that, while digging out the sump, he misstepped and fell into the

sump hole, which was filled with wastewater, “about chest deep.”

R19-201-03, 227-228. Carver said that he showered immediately and

suffered minor burns on his stomach and legs. R19-203, 229. Carver

was unable to recall the exact date, and admitted the accident could

have occurred any time between 1987 and 1993. R19-226. Carver

testified that, although the employees were told to report all 2. ~idents

to management, he did not report the accident, and thus did not receive

any medical attention. R19-230.

7a

Appendix A

showers to relieve inadvertent contact. R19-47, 194, 233-

34, 246, 300-01; R20-170, 181-82, 185, 188, 190-91; R21-

249. All employees, including those assigned to the

cellrooms, were authorized to work elsewhere in the plant if

they were concerned about their safety. R19-302; R20-186-

87, 320-2; R21-156.

In 1991, LCP’s parent corporation, Hanlin, filed a

voluntary bankruptcy petition with pre-petition obligations

exceeding $100 million. R19-119,; R21-194. Shortly

thereafter, Randall was hired as an executive vice president

of LCP and charged with “developing thé business and

financial plans necessary to turn around the financial

condition of the chemical business.”” R21-193, R16-97.

Randall worked closely with Hanlin’s bankruptcy attorneys,

the law firm of McCarter and English, and the environmental

law firm of Decher, Price and Rhoads. R19-140-43; R21-

194, 215.* Randall also worked closely with LCP’s corporate

environmental manager and site environmental managers.

R20-64-65; R21-210, 215. During the bankruptcy

proceedings, available funds for maintenance, repair, and

environmental compliance were restricted. R1 9-50-52.

Randall attempted to find additional funds by selling excess

equipment and reducing the payroll but the funds remained

limited. /d. The ultimate decision-making for all major

7. Randall Hansen had worked for Hanlin in a financial capacity

from 1986 until 1989.

8. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Hanlin set aside seven

to ten thousand dollars per day for professional fees. R19-147.

Sa

Appendix A

bankruptcy creditor's committee and court. R19-121, 143-

47, 174-75; R21-196. Although funds were requested to

address the cellrooms’ wastewater problem, the funds were

usually not released. R21-259-60.

In February 1992, the Brunswick plant manager, James

L. Johns, advised Randall in writing that, without “extensive

work,” to keep the wastewater treatment system operable,

they would be unable to “operate the plan for more than a

few days without ‘willfully’ violating EPD regulations which

we will not do.” Govt. Ex. 1-8a at HA 00024857.’ In April

1992, Randall visited the Brunswick plant and met with plant

manager James L. Johns for “an update on regulatory

compliance requirements.” Govt. Ex. 10-7b. He indicated

that he would provide guidance on the approval of funds for

a study for the NPDES permit, LCP’s commitment regarding

the 1 June 1992 Georgia EPD deadline for cellroom floor

repairs, and the possibility of a study or remediation plan for

the “brine impoundments.” /d. In June 1992, Randall was

advised in writing that a conference with OSHA on 8 May

1992 noted 26 serious violations and 11 non-serious

violations. Govt. Ex. 10-7d.

During the summer of 1992, the Brunswick plant

management changed.'® R16-104-05. In August 1992, Taylor

9. The memo was addressed “Production Reliability” and noted

that “[l]ack of money has limited the plant production capability and

imposed substantial risk on maintaining acceptable production

levels.” Govt. Ex. 1-8a at HA 00024856. The wastewater treatment

issues were one of nine noted problems. /d., HA 00024856 and 57.

10. J.L. Johns, the plant manager at the beginning of 1992,

retired due to heart problems. R16-104. During the six month search

(Cont'd)

9a

Appendix A

advised Randall that Brunswick was “unable to meet current

permit limitations,” that he anticipated “more restrictive”

limitations, and that the “[p]erformance of the waste water

treatment system [was] a serious threat to the continued

operation of the plant.” Govt. Ex. 1-12. Taylor said that while

the “generation of waste water ha[d] greatly increased due

to leaking brine tanks, [poor condition of the] brine pumps

[and]... brine filters, heavy rainfall, the necessity to destroy

bleach, and numerous operating problems,” at the same time

the capacity of the wastewater system was limited by the

reduced capacity of the filtration and storage systems, was

“further reduced” by the “[{l]ack of maintenance,” and the

system was “frequently shut down due to mechanical

problems and operator errors.” /d. In November 1992,

Randall visited the Brunswick plant to interview a candidate

for plant manager, and spoke with the acting manager, Hugh

Croom. R19-30. At that time, Croom advised Randall of

problems with the caustic filters and the intentional dumping

of caustic on the cellroom floors by some unknown employee.

R19-30-31, 56-58. Croom testified that Randall “was just as

concerned as we were about the problems” and authorized

Croom to hire a task force.'' R19-50, 58.

(Cont'd)

to replace Johns, Hugh Croom, the plant manager for the LCP chlor-

alkali plant in North Carolina, transferred to Brunswick and acted as

plant manager. /d. at 103-05. Croom returned to the North Carolina

plant in January 1993, and admitted that problems with the wastewater

treatment plant and his concerns for maintaining a production rate

and for the safety of the employees and the community contributed

to his desire to leave Brunswick. R16-134-36.

11. The dumping abated once the task force was hired and the

valve area was monitored. R19-58.

10a

Appendix A

In February 1993, LCP offered the plant manager job to

Taylor. R21-244. During his tenure as manager, Taylor

stressed safety and strict adherence with LCP’s training and

safety programs, and assured employees the right to refuse

to perform any activity if the employee felt 1t to be unsafe.

R19-302-03. When the wastewater overran the cellroom

berms and streamed outside the building, the overflow was

reported to the EPD and to the LCP Board by letters signed

by Taylor. R20-25-27. The amounts reported in the letters

were consistent with the data that the plant had at that time.

R20-27.

During the spring of 1993, Taylor attended a company

meeting with Randall and Croom in which they discussed

the condition of the Brunswick plant and possible solutions.

R19-18-19. Taylor and Croom recommended “eithers’ ung

the plant down or shutting it down long enough’ salvage

one cellroom and rebuild the second cellroom, and then

starting back up with just one cellroom.” R19-20, 22. Taylor

worked up “the figures and costs” and submitted it to Randall,

but Randall later advised them that “[t]hey won’t let me do

it.” R19-22-23, 64. By letters to EPD, Taylor reported that

the plant had exceeded the maximum daily allowable

discharges seventeen times, and explained that the discharges

were due to “heavy rainfall,” “miscommunication between

operations supervision,” “a slight miscalculation,” and

“storm, rainfall and process leaks.” Govt. Ex. 10-1d, e.g.

Taylor noted that the “waste water treatment operating

efficiency and outfall discharge” was “positive[ly] affect

[ed]” by LCP’s decision not to replace a leaking brine-tank.

Govt. Ex. 10-1g.

t

7

'

'

“

|

lla

Appendix A

In April 1993, the Board of Directors, with the approval

of the bankruptcy court, removed Hansen as Chairman,

President, and CEO of Hanlin after he attempted to expel

the outside directors from the board. R19-122-23, 160, 167-

68. The Board and the bankruptcy creditors’ committee asked

Randall to serve as LCP’s interim CEO and Chief Operating

Officer [COO]. R19-160; R21-195, 200. His primary focus

was financial and, with the support of the bankruptcy

creditors committee and court, he sought to sell the company

to a responsible party who could operate the business and

have the financial resources to deal with the various

environmental conditions. R19-147-48, 164, 174-75; R21-

200-01, 219. In this capacity, Randall received daily reports

concerning the Brunswick plant’s operations and problems.

R16-97-98. After Hansen’s removal as CEO, he was no longer

a corporate officer and became a director and employee. R19-

136, 160, 168. Sometime later, the Board sent Hansen to

Brunswick to help run the plant. R19-166-67.

Taylor reported five discharge violations in April, and

indicated that two violations were due to a problem in the

wastewater treatment system that had been corrected, one

violation was attributable to rainfall, and one violation was

due to leaks which had been repaired. Govt. Ex. 10-1h. Taylor

indicated that “[a]n upset in the wastewater treatment system

caused a release of ineffectively treated wastewater” but that

“the discharge was rerouted until the system resumed normal

operation.” /d. Taylor reported 16 discharge deviations in

May 1993, which he indicated were caused by an equipment

failure which had been repaired, “overloading the wastewater

treatment system,” and rainfall. Govt. Ex. 10-1i. In June,

Taylor reported 21 excessive discharges which were

2a

Appendix A

attributable to “upsets” and “operational problems” in the

wastewater treatment system and equipment failures. Govt.

Ex. 10-1) and 10-1k. Hansen visited the plant in late June

and began working with Taylor. R19-167.

In July 1993, Taylor resigned as plant manager. R21-

245. Upon Taylor’s resignation, Hansen assumed the running

of the plant and served as plant manager from July through

September 1993. R19-24, 167; R20-354. Taylor subsequently

returned to the plant as a full time employee as a process or

project enginéer on the condition that he not have to “assume

managerial type duties.” R21-246. He remained involved in

environmental issues, however, and in October 1993,

questioned the assistant production manager regarding the

loss of mercury. R20-325, 337-38.

The Georgia Environmental Protection Division notified

LCP in writing in June 1993 that it proposed revoking the

NPDES permit to discharge treated wastewater in Purvis

Creek based on “continuous violations ... since May 1992

of pH, total residual chlorine, and mercury.” Govt. Ex. 13-

ld at 1. It explained that, although it had provided LCP

“Notice of Violation” letters twice in 1992 and had requested

that LCP “take all necessary measures to come into

compliance,” “these violations have continued” and

“significant noncompliance” was documented in 10 out of

13 months from May 1992 through May 1993. /d. The

notification summarized that there had been “no progress

. In upgrading the plant or its operation” since the

noncompliance had begun to be a serious problem. /d. at 2;

R20-274-276. Randall submitted formal written comments

on the revocation stating that “LCP has already taken steps

13a

Appendix A

to improve the situation by installing additional filter

capacity, repairing or replacing equipment and reducing the

load on the system” and referring to a 23 July plan addressing

future corrective measures. Govt. Ex. 10-6 at 4.

In July and August 1993, Hansen directed the plant

employees to begin pumping the wastes into the large

“bunker” tanks that had once been used to store oil although

he knew that the wastewater mixed with oil could not be run

through the wastewater treatment system, R20-48, 183, 328-

29, 350. The plant environmental/safety manager reported

the use of the tanks to Randall in July. Govt. Ex. 10-7x. After

the EPD moved to revoke the plant’s permit, Hansen advised

the employees to “increase the flow on the wastewater

treatment system to a level that was to keep the water from

running out the [cellroom] door” and into the lake. R20-358-

59. During their respective terms as plant manager, Hansen

and Taylor were advised of and observed “water [ ] flow[ing]

out the back door of the cellroom” as a result of a break in

the cellroom berms, and “overflow[ing] on the ground.” R20-

327-28, 335-36, 341. The employees complained to Hansen,

Taylor, and Randall about “the water condition, the

deterioration of the plant with the pipes, the leaks, and the

safety equipment,” and, despite assurances that conditions

would improve “[a]s soon as [the plant] g[o]t some money,”

the plant did not get “any money” and conditions did not

change. R21-146-50.

The NPDES permit was revoked on 23 September 1993.

R20-275. LCP filed an appeal which stayed the revocation.

4a

Appendix A

R20-275. Although EPD sought a temporary restraining

order, 1t was denied by the state court judge.'’ R20-302-03.

During this same period of time, Allied Signal and

HoltraChem indicated interest as buyers, and a financial

agreement was worked out in which Allied Signal would

provide needed money, personnel, and raw materials or

maintenance parts for the plant, including an extra wastewater

treatment facility. R9-228, Exs. A & B; R19-149-51; R20-

18, 80. As a part of the financial agreement, Allied Signal

loaned employee Mark White to LCP to serve as plant

manager in October 1993.'? R19-152-53; R20-18. With the

influx of Allied Signal’s resources, conditions at the plant

improved. R20-80. The purchase agreement eventually fell

through and shortly thereafter the facility closed. After the

plant closed, Randall, through the bankruptcy counsel,

requested $1,500,000 in additional funds from the bankruptcy

court to deal with the environmental impact of closing but

the request was denied. R9-228, Ex. C at 2, 7, Feb. 8, 1994,

letter from M. Patrick M. Nuciarone.

12. By letter, the bankruptcy creditors’ committee advised the

State judge of the bankruptcy proceedings and “the likely

consequences that would result from any closing of the Brunswick

plant.” R9-228, Ex. B at 1. The committee represented that “even if

actual production at [the plant] was to cease, Hanlin would have an

obligation to continue to spend considerable amounts of money at

[the] plant in order to avoid the possibility of an environmental

catastrophe.” /d. at 2. A possible environmental impact of shutting

the plant down included “additional mercury leakage.” R20-147; R19-

83-84. |

13. White continued at the plant as manager until the plant

closed. R20-18.

lSa

Appendix A

The Georgia EPD turned the closed plant over to the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for cleanup

and EPA estimated that the cleanup will cost more than $50

million. R20-380; R21-57. Taylor, as one of the ten LCP

employees approved by the EPA to participate in the site

cleanup, assisted in the decommissioning of the cellrooms

and ran the water treatment plant built by the EPA. R21-55-

56. The cleanup was paid for by the government and Hanlin’s

predecessors at the site: Allied Signal (successor to Allied

Chemical), ARCO, and Georgia-Power Company. R21-39-

40.

The government indicted Christian Hansen, Randall

Hansen, Douglas Brent Hanson, and Alfred R. Taylor for

conspiracy to commit environmental crimes at the site

between | July 1985, and 1 February 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 371,

(Count |), and various substantive crimes.'* R1-1-1. The

charges included: violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, by exceeding

the NPDES permit between June 1993 and January 1994

(Counts 2-21); violating the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(2)(A) and

(e), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, by storing wastewater on the cellroom

floor and permitting some to escape into the environment

between 29 May 1993 and | February 1994 (Counts 22-32),

storing wastewater in the Bunker “C” tanks between 23 July

1993 and | February 1994 (Count 33), and knowingly

endangering employees by exposing them to impermissibly

stored wastes and wastewaters between 29 May 1993 and

14. Two other plant employees, Duane Outhwaite and

Christopher Dunn, were charged separately and entered into plea

agreements. R8-200-7 n. 5.

loa

Appendix A

1 February 1994 (Count 34); violating the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3), by failing to notify

the U.S. government of unpermitted releases of chlorine or

wastewater into the environment between 21 July and 23

October 1993 (Counts 35-41); and violating the Endangered

Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), 1538(g), and

1540(b)(1), by taking an endangered species, a Wood Stork,

as a result of discharging mercury into the marsh, Purvis

Creek, and the Turtle River (Count 42). R1-1. Hansen was

charged with Counts 1-42, Randall was charged with Counts

1-34 and 42, Hansen was charged with Counts 1-6, 10-22,

24, 26-32, and 34-42, and Taylor was charged with Counts

1-32, and 34-42. /d. Hanson, the former environmental and

health and safety LCP manager, pled guilty to a CERCLA

offense (Count 41) and the offense under the Endangered

Species Act (Count 42) and testified against Hansen, Randall,

and Taylor.'*> R3-83; R20-6. At the conclusion of the

defendants’ case, the district judge granted their motion for

acquittal as to Count 42 but denied the motion as to all other

charges. R6-123. Hansen was convicted of all counts, Randall

was convicted of all charged counts, and Taylor was convicted

of Counts 1-3, 10-11, 22-26, 29-32, 34-35, and 38-41. R22-

214-15. Their renewed motions for acquittal and motions

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and/or for a new

trial were denied. R7-145, 146, 153-54, 163; R8-200.

Hansen was sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment,

a fine of $20,000, a special assessment of $2,050, and two

15. Hanson was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment,

and one year of supervised release on each count, concurrent. R8-

123.

ee

17a

Appendix A

years of supervised release. R8-214. Randall was sentenced

to 46 months of imprisonment, a fine of $20,000, a special

assessment of $1,700, and two years of supervised release.

R9-236. Taylor was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment,

a special assessment of $1,000, and two years of supervised

release. R8-215. Each defendant appealed, and was allowed

to remain on bond pending appeal. R8-219, 221; R19-226,

238-40.

On appeal, Hansen raises four issues: (1) the district court

erred in admitting the government’s expert witness testimony;

(2) the district court’s instructions misstated the reasonable

doubt standard, improperly applied the concept of reasonable

corporate officer, improperly defined the elements of

knowing endangerment, and effectively eliminated the mens

rea requirement from each statutory violation; (3) the

_ evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and

(4) the district court erred in concluding that it lacked the

authority to depart from the applicable sentencing guidelines.

Randall argues that: (1) district court erred by not granting

his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction for knowing

endangerment under the RCRA and the government never

proved causation on counts 2-33; (2) the district court’s

instructions were erroneous on the elements of the charged

substantive offenses and on the responsible corporate officer

instruction as an alternative basis for criminal liability;

(3) the district court erroneously admitted high prejudicially

and irrelevant evidence; and (4) the district court erred by

declining to depart downward. Taylor maintains that the

district court erred: (1) by not granting his motion for

judgment of acquittal and for a new trial based on

18a

Appendix A

insufficiency of the evidence; (2) in its instruction concerning

the wastewater treatment system; and (3) in sentencing him.

H. DISCUSSION

A. Admission of Expert Witness Testimony

Hansen argues that the district court erred in admitting

testimony from government expert witness Daniel Teitelbaum

because the government failed to disclose Teitelbaum’s

checkered history of credibility and the court failed to conduct

a hearing regarding the testimony. Hansen also maintains that

the district court erred in admitting the testimony of

Teitelbaum and government expert witness Christopher Reh

because the testimony was unreliable, irrelevant, and highly

prejudicial. The government responds that Hansen waived

the arguments regarding Teitelbaum’s testimony by failing

to object to the testimony at trial.

The week before trial, Hansen moved for a Daubert'®

hearing and to exclude the testimony of expert witnesses

regarding certain allegedly scientific conclusions and

exhibits. R4-94-95; R6-110-1. Noting that the motion was

directed to the expert testimony regarding the effect of high

mercury levels on endangered species as charged in Count

42, the district court denied it, finding that the motion did

S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert, the Court held that, when “[flaced

with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, ... the trial judge

must determine . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)

scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand

or determine a fact in issue.” /d. at 592, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.

PR ere

ORY Lay Art Seo aU

19a

Appendix A

“not identif]y] the source, the substance, or most importantly

the underlying methodology of this testimony” and that,

therefore, there was “no underlying methodology or reasoning

for the court to assess.” R6-110-1-2, 4.

During the trial, Teitelbaum confirmed that he had

previously testified as an expert witness, and explained that

“it has been a regular portion of [his] practice over the

years.”’'’ R20-230-31. Hansen neither objected nor examined

Teitelbaum after the government moved to tender Teitelbaum

as an expert, and the court directed that the jury consider

him an expert in his field. /d. at 232.

Teitelbaum testified regarding the plant employees’

potential exposure to hazardous substances. Based on his

review of “the large number of biological samples,” “many

interviews,” the “documents concerning the health and

hygiene program,” and other documents, he found “a

Substantial amount of spillage of sodium hydroxide,”

“numerous chlorine leaks,” and spills and leaks of

hydrochloric acid at the plant. R20-233-35; see also 248-49.

He noted that, because the sodium hydroxide spillage had a

very high pH and was quite caustic, contact with the spillage

could cause a first-to third-degree burn, or even be lethal.

17. On cross-examination, Teitelbaum stated that this was the

first time that he had testified as “a consultant for the U.S. Attorney,”

but explained that he had testified “for OSHA many times,” “for the

Department of Justice a number of times,” and for “the EPA.” R20-

255-56. He was asked whether he considered the government to be a

“pretty good customer” for his services, and responded that he did

not “take any money from the government” for consulting services.

Id. at 256.

20a

Appendix A

Id. at 233-34. Teitelbaum explained that exposure to the

chlorine leaks could cause “severe injurivs to eyes, upper

airways, and lungs, and, under some circumstances, death.”

Id. at 234. He commented that hydrochloric acid was a

“classic poison” which would also cause burns and potential

death. Jd. at 234-35. Based on the biological samples, he

concluded that the employees were “in danger of death or

serious bodily injury.” /d. at 244-45, 248. Finally, Teitelbaum

noted that the data showed the mercury levels in the workers’

urine were “between two and five times the acceptable level

of excretion, based on the World Health Organization or the

NIOSH recommendations.” /d. at 244-45. No objections were

raised to his testimony. /d. at 232-63.

At sentencing, the probation officer noted that he had

“discredit{ed]” one of Hansen’s witnesses “because he was

not even at the LCP Plant” and “did not have firsthand

knowledge to see this.” R13-26. Hansen’s attorney responded

that, based on the probation officer’s theory, Teitelbaum’s

testimony should also be discounted “because he never went

to the plant before it was shut down.” /d. at 28. The district

judge commented that Teitelbaum “made a very credible

witness. I think the best witness that the Government had.”

Id. at 29.

We review for abuse of discretion both the district court’s

decisions regarding the admission of expert testimony and

reliability of an expert, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,

526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999), and the

denial of a Daubert hearing, United States v. Nichols, 169

F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 1999). “Absent an objection, we

can review the challenged evidence only for plain error.”

21a

Appendix A

Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th

Cir. 1995).

Scientific expert testimony is admissible if ‘*(1) the expert

is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he

intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert

reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined

by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the

testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of

scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” City of

Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th

Cir. 1998). In Daubert, the Supreme Court suggested a

flexible inquiry regarding the methodology considering such

factors as “whether it can be (and has been) tested,” whether

it “has been subjected to peer review and publication,” the

“known or potential rate of error,” “the existence and

maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s

operation, and the degree it is accepted as reliable within the

relevant scientific community.” 509 U.S. at 591, 593-94, 113

S. Ct. at 2795-96. Daubert hearings are not required, but

may be helpful in “complicated cases involving multiple

expert witnesses.” City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 564-65

n. 21. Adistrict court should conduct a Daubert inquiry when

the opposing party’s motion for a hearing is supported by

“conflicting medical literature and expert testimony.” Zanner

v. Westbrook, 174 F.3d 542, 546 (Sth Cir. 1999). Consistent

with Daubert, the evidence must be scientifically related to

the disputed facts at issue in the case. Allison v. McGhan

Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).

22a

Appendix A

Hansen's motion ior a Daubert hearing was neither

addressed to the charges to which Teitelbaum testified, or

his testimony in general, nor supported by the source,

substance, or methodology of the challenged testimony.

Hansen failed to object to either Teitelbaum’s qualification

as an expert or his testimony during trial. Teitelbaum’s

testimony was based on his review of biological samples,

interviews, and docur.sents, and assisted the trier of fact in

understanding the potential injuries that could result from

the conditions at the plant. The district judge did not abuse

his discretion by denying the motion or by admitting the

testimony.

To the extent that Hansen raises a Brady"* claim that the

government suppressed exculpatory or impeachment

evidence by failing to disclose Teitelbaum’s “checkered” past,

we find that it is without basis. In order to state such a claim,

a defendant must show (1) “that the government possessed

evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment

evidence) ... ; (2) that the defendant does not possess the

evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable

diligence ... ; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the

favorable evidence ... ; and (4) that had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”

United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1989)

(per curiam). In this case, the evidence which Hansen alleges

18. Brady v. Marvland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-

97 (1963) (“The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

is material to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or

bad faith of the prosecution.”).

ee Te et as 9 ae

Ate WEEE Bec hnganggy ee +)

23a

Appendix A

the government failed to disclose consists of court opinions

either disregarding or discrediting Teitelbaum’s testimony.

Although Hansen argues that the government knew of this

discredited testimony based on Teitelbaum’s previous

testimony for the government, Hansen fails to show that the

government was in actual possession of the information or

actually suppressed it. Further, the information was available

to Hansen through reasonable diligence both before and

during the trial.'* The cases were all available through legal

research and information on them could have been, but was

not, addressed during Teitelbaum’s testimony. Finally, the

cases relied on by Hansen all relate to Teitelbaum’s testimony

in tort actions as to causation of a specific injury. They do

19. Hansen argues that Teitelbaum’s testimony was

“discredited” in four cases: General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.

136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997), Sweger v. Texaco, Inc., Nos. 88-1781,

88-1834 and 88-2745, 1991 WL 35345 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991);

Land v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 345 (1996), and National Bank of

Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942

(E.D. Ark. 1998). In General Elec. Co., the Court found that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony

of Teitelbaum (and other expert witnesses) because the studies on

which he relied were not sufficient to support his conclusion. 522

U.S. at 146-47, 118 S. Ct. at 519. In Sweger, the court found that

Teitelbaum’s testimony did not provide the necessary certainty to

establish causation. Sweger, slip op. at 1, 5-6. In Land, Teitelbaum

appeared as the plaintiffs’ medical expert. 35 Fed. Cl. at 352 n. 7.

The hearing officer found Teitelbuam’s “ ‘preliminary’ medical

opinion” regarding the cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries to be “of little

value because Dr. Teitelbaum did not conduct physical examinations

of the plaintiffs.” /d. In National Bank of Commerce, the court found

that Teitelbaum’s view of the causation of the plaintiff’s cancer was

“undercut by the inadequacy of ... reliable scientific proof of

causation.” 22 F. Supp. at 967.

24a

Appendix A

not, therefore, have probative value as to his testimony

regarding potential health effects of the chemicals or the

employees’ risk of death or serious injury after exposure to

these chemicals. Hansen is unable to show a reasonable

probability that the information would have changed the

outcome of the proceedings.

Christopher Reh, an employee of the National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), also testified

for the government. R20-192. The district judge qualified

him as an expert in the field of industrial hygiene.”° /d. at

194. Reh explained that he was assigned to the Brunswick

plant as the project officer after NIOSH received “a valid

request for a health hazard evaluation” from one of the plant’s

unions in 1987.?' /d. at 196. He said that, during the initial

site visit, he and his team met with Taylor, a plant engineer,

and a few union representatives to discuss the request.”* /d.

at 196-98. They visited the plant, and observed “mercury in

many places on the cellroom floor in cracks or crevices,”

and passively monitored mercury exposure in the workers’

“breathing zone.” Jd. at 198-99. They found that the plant

was not using the creatnine monitoring scale, but was

20. Neither Hansen nor his codefendants questioned Reh

regarding his background or his area of expertise and raised no

objections to Reh’s qualification. R20-194.

21. Reh indicated that they were requested to evaluate the health

hazards associated with mercury, chlorine, and hydrochloric acid.

R20-199, 203; Govt. Ex. 40-1b.

22. The NIOSH team consisted of Reh, a medical doctor, and

another industrial hygienist. R20-198.

Pe eh er ea

25a

Appendix A

reporting mercury levels by “micrograms per liter.” /d. at

204. The monitors found that mercury exposure exceeded

the NIOSH and OSHA recommended levels.”’ Tayler’s

objection to further testimony from Reh on the grounds of

relevance was overruled. /d. at 201. Reh and his team advised

Taylor of their findings by letter and recommended use of

creatnine correction urine mercury monitoring which would

indicate the amount of mercury per gram of creatnine. /d. at

201-03; Govt. Ex. 40-1b. From the results of the first visit,

the team made a second visit to conduct a more in-depth

study in 1988. R20-202. During the second visit, the team

used an active sampling method to determine 28 workers’

breathing zone exposure levels, collected urine samples from

58 workers, and administered questionnaires to and

conducted physical examinations of 65 workers. /d. at 205-

07. Taylor was provided with a written interim report in 1988

and a final report in 1991, both of which showed that workers

had mercury levels above recommended standards.”* /d. at

207-08, 210, 214; Govt. Exs. 40-1c and 1d.

23. Reh explained that the NIOSH recommended exposure

levels (“REL”) were 50 micrograms of mercury per cubic meter of

air and that the OSHA permissible exposure levels (“PEL”) are 100

micrograms of mercury per cubic meter of air. R20-200. He said that

all of the sixteen monitored workers showed RELs above 50, and

eleven © the monitored workers had levels above the PEL. /d. at

200-01.

24. Reh reported that they found that 29 of the tested 58 workers

had urine mercury levels which exceeded the World Health

Organization recommended standard of 50. R20-208, 210. The

average level was 136 micrograms per gram of creatinine, with a

range from 2 to 689. /d. at 210.

26a

Appendix A

The government offered Reh’s testimony to show that

the workers were placed “in imminent danger of death or

serious bodily injury” and that Hansen, Randall, and Taylor

were aware of the workers’ exposure to hazardous substances.

This testimony supports both of those propositions. The

district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the

testimony of Reh.

B. Insufficiency of the Evidence

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse

of discretion, and the denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal de novo. United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957,

958 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). To uphold the denial of a

motion for judgment of acquittal, we “need only determine

that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the evidence

established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we

“view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom

in the ight nvest favorable to the government.” United States

v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 594 (11th Cir. 1983).

_

1. Pesiion of authority

“To prove aiding and abetting, the government must

demonstrate that a substantive offense was committed, that

the defendant associated himself with the criminal venture,

and that he committed some act which furthered the crime.”

United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1990).

“(T]he government must show that the defendant shared the

same unlawful intent as the actual perpetrator” but does not

need to prove that “the defendant was present at the scene

27a

Appendix A

when the crime occurred, or that he was an active participant.”

Id. at 557-58; United States y. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 665 (11th

Cir. 1984) (“aider and abettor . . . need not even be present’).

“Encouraging” a violation and “discouraging” the reporting

of the violation, United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 718

(8th Cir. 1997), and “personally attempting to avoid [a

violation’s] detection by the [RCRA] inspectors,” United

States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993), have been

held sufficient to show that a defendant aided and abetted

the commission of a crime.

The indictment alleged that the defendants, “after

learning that the Brunswick facility was disposing of

hazardous wastes . . . without a RCRA permit, continued to

operate the Brunswick facility in such a manner as to continue

the disposal of these hazardous wastes without expending

adequate funds. . . to prevent the disposal of such hazardous

wastes into the environment.” RI-1-11. The jury was

instructed that the defendants were responsible for the acts _

of others that they “wilfully directed,” “authorized,” or aided

and abetted by “willfully joining together with [another]

person in the commission of a crime.” R22-181. The district

court denied Taylor’s motion to acquit or for a new trial on

these charges finding that “the Defendants worked for LCP

in positions of responsibility and authority while ... the

violations took place.” R8-200-23.

a. Hansen

Hansen maintains that the evidence failed to show that

he was in a position of authority after he was deposed as

CEO in April 1993 until he began serving as plant manager

KL

ee EE

28a

Appendix A

on 16 July 1993, and after he was officially replaced as plant

manager by Allied employee Mark White on 18 October

1993. Therefore, he contends that the district court erred in

not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the

18 counts that occurred after 18 October 1993 (Counts 6-9,

14-15, 19-21, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, 38-40), the two counts that

occurred between April and July 1993 (Counts 2 and 10),

and the count that arose on 22 October 1993 (Count 33).

The testimony at trial indicated that Hansen was aware

that wastewater was permitted to flow out the cellroom back

door in June 1993,*° and directed the use of the old Bunker

C storage tanks for storage of wastewater, including the

inadequately treated wastewater from the treatment system,

from: July through September 1993.*° Although the acts

continued after Hansen left his decision-making position, the

acts occurred at his direction. This evidence was sufficient

for the jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that his acts were in furtherance of the violations. The district

court did not err in denying Hansen’s motion for judgment

of acquittal or motion for new trial.

25. Testimony of LCP former assistant production manager

James Dunn, R20-327-28, 341.

26. Testimony of former LCP health and safety manager

Douglas Brent Hanson, R20-48-49, LCP maintenance handler and

expeditor George Mower, R20-183, and LCP former production

manager Duane Outhwaite, R20-350. Outhwaite testified that the

storage tanks were used for wastewater overflow to keep the

inadequately treated wastewater from “running out the door” and to

help prevent the deep pools of wastewater from forming on the

cellroom floors. R20-350, 358.

PARSE EE OM Decorah tem pee.

s

1 NE OSE Beate ty ak eG

29a

Appendix A

b. Randall

Randall claims that the government presented no

evidence that he personally treated, stored, or disposed of a

hazardous waste, personally effected a CWA violation, or

instructed an agent to do so. He maintains that, under the

laws of bankruptcy and corporate governance, he lacked the

authority to close the plant or to allocate the funds for the

needed capital improvements. He contends that LCP needed

the bankruptcy court’s approval to use the bankruptcy estate’s

assets, or to obtain a new debt, to perform the needed repairs

at the Brunswick plant.

In February 1994, LCP applied to the bankruptcy court

for the funds “to shutdown” the plant and for new equipment,

but the motion was denied. Def. Randall Ex. 1, Amended

Notice of Motion at 5; R9-228, Ex. C and 8 Feb letter. Hanlin

Board of Directors member James Mathis testified that

Randall was responsible for “run[ning] the day-to-day

operations of the company” once he became the interim CEO

and COO. R19-160. He said that the Board was “very

interested in whether the environmental problems-whether

we were in a position of compliance with the environmental

- regulations. But the information that we had indicated that,

really, compliance was not a problem.” /d. at 164. He

explained that, as a result of the weekly reports on the plant’s

operations, the Board believed that “there were really no

excursions of any significance going on”. /d. at 165.”’ Mathis

27. Mathis testified that there were places on the report forms

for the “number of excursions” or environmental noncompliances

which “were filled in with ‘zeros’ each time.” R19-165. He said that

they later learned that the zeros were clerical errors. /d.

30a

Appendix A

said that Randall “had the primary responsibility” for

providing information regarding the environmental

compliance issues to the Board and that Hansen fed

“information to Randall in that regard.” /d. at 166. He agreed

that the decision to sell the plant would have been a board

decision requiring the approval of the bankruptcy court. /d.

at 174-75.

LCP, as a debtor in possession, could “use the property

of the estate in the ordinary course of business,” but needed

court approval to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary

course of business, property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.

§ 363(c)(1) and (b)(1). It could “obtain unsecured credit. . .

in the ordinary course of business,” but needed court approval

“to obtain unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other

than” “in the ordinary course of business.” /d. at 364(a) and

(b). Bankruptcy does not insulate a debtor from

environmental regulatory statutes. In reviewing an injunction

to clean up a hazardous waste site, the Supreme Court

commented:

[W]e do not suggest that [the debtor’s] discharge

{in bankruptcy] will shield him from prosecution

for having violated the environmental laws .. .

or for criminal contempt for not performing his

obligations under the intunction prior to

bankruptcy.... [W]e do not hold that the

injunction ... against any conduct that will

contribute to the pollution of the site or the State’s

wasters is dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . Finally,

we do not question that anyone in possession of

the site .. . must comply with the environmental

3la

Appendix A

laws .... Plainly, that person or firm may not

maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the

State, or refuse to remove the source of such

conditions.

Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284-85, 105 S. Ct. 705, 710-

11 (1985). See also Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept.

of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 507, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762

(1986) (A bankrupt debtor in possession “may not abandon

property in contravention of a... regulation that is

reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety

from identified hazards.”’).

Although Randall claims that his role as Executive Vice-

President and acting CEO was limited to financial matters,

he also received daily reports about the plant’s operations

and environmental problems, R16-97-98, R21, 359, wrote

and received memos regarding specific plant operational

problems, Govt. Ex. 104, 1-6f, 1-8a, 1-12, received monthly

written environmental reports, Govt. Ex. 10-1o-10-1nn, 10-

7c-7d, 10-7f, and oral environmental reports, R21-64, 359.

He admitted that Hanlin’s bankruptcy was not an excuse for

violating environmental laws. R21-219-21. There is no

indication that he asked the Hanlin Board or the bankruptcy

court to close the plant. The evidence indicates that he

apparently misled them into believing that environmental

compliance was not a problem. After the Georgia EPD

attempted to revoke the plant’s NPDES permit in June 1993,

Randall contested the revocation, explaining that the plant’s

CWA violations were due to a lightning strike and equipment

failures, and asserted that “LCP has already taken steps to

improve the situation.” Govt. Ex. 10-6. This evidence was

32a

Appendix A

sufficient for the jury to conclude that Randall actions were

in furtherance of the violations.

c. Taylor

Taylor argues that he should not be held responsible for

the environmental violations that occurred after he resigned

as plant manager, specifically counts 2-3, 25, 29-32, 38-41.

Taylor resigned as plant manager on 16 July 1993, R21-245,

but returned shortly thereafter as a project engineer and

continued in that position until the plant closed, R21-246-

47, 317-18. As project engineer, Taylor was directly involved

in responding to the plant’s environmental and safety

problems and, at Hansen’s request, developed a list of short-

term solutions to the problems with estimated costs. R20-

338; R21-247-48. Taylor’s proposed solutions were

subsequently funded. R21-247-48.

Although Taylor left his managerial position, he

continued to work in a position in which he directed or

authorized acts of the employees on environmental and safety

problems.”* Testimony at trial indicated that, in October 1993,

28. Despite Taylor's resignation as plant manager and his re-

employment as project engineer, he was considered to be in a

management position. See R20-152 (D. Brent Hanson testified that

Taylor was his immediate supervisor both before and after his

resignation and re-employment); id at 335 (Dunn testified that Taylor

“probably would have been plant manager” in late 1993), 337 (Dunn

said that in “October of °93 I would assume [Taylor] was plant

manager.”); id. at 312, Govt. Ex. 13-4 (19 January 1994 letter from

Georgia EPD acting unit coordinator Susan Eason to “Plant Manager”

(Cont'd)

33a

Appendix A

Taylor was aware of the wastewater overflow from the

cellrooms, the excess loss of mercury, and the use of the tank

cars for wastewater storage, and that he supervised the release

of the overflow.” This evidence was sufficient for the jury

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were

in furtherance of the violations. The district court did not err

in denying his motion for a new trial.

2. Hazardous substances or materials

Taylor and Hansen argue that the government failed to

prove that the untreated wastewater contained enough

(Cont'd)

Taylor in which she referenced Taylor's explanation for “NPDES

excursions” at a 6 December 1993 meeting). But see Govt. Exs. 13-

2ff, gg, hh, ii, and jj (letters from Mark S. White, as “Plant Manager,”

to EPD dated October-February 1994).

29. Testimony of James Dunn. R20-335-39. Taylor directed a

memorandum addressing the mercury losses and suggesting a solution

to LCP employee Chris Dunn on 4 October 1993. Govt. Ex. 19-5.

Dunn responded “yes” when asked whether Taylor was aware of the

overflow release from the backdoor of the cellroom. R20-327-28.

Dunn testified that Taylor observed the overflow “on the ground.”

Id. at 336. Dunn said that he told Taylor he was having trouble

pumping the waste into the tank cars and that mercury loss was due

to “leaks coming out of the products or it was tied up in hazardous

waste muds.” R20-337, 339. By memorandum, Taylor proposed a

flow plan for the projected waste streams of “19 to 125 gallons per

minute” when the wastewater treatment system was only working at

a 40 gallon per minute capacity. /d. at 340; Govt Ex. 19-4a. Wilbur

Outhwaite testified that Taylor advised that the employees needed to

empty the wastewater from the tank cars. R20-356.

34a

Appendix A

mercury and caustic to meet the environmentaL laws’

definition of hazardous substances or materials, or that the

untreated wastewater was improperly stored.

a. Hazardous substances as defined

OSHA chemist Clinton Leroy Merrell testified that

samples which were submitted from LCP on 9 September

_ 1992 tested as containing 8 to 30 parts per million of mercury,

and six to ten-percent caustic, with a pH of 14. R21-163,

165-67; Govt Exs. 45-6, 45-9. Former LCP plant manager

Hugh Leroy Croom testified that, in January 1993, the

untreated wastewater may have had “a high pH, and. . . some

mercury,” but would not have contained mercury sludge. R16-

91, 131-32. He said that the pH could be high enough to be a

danger “at times” but that it did not stay high and varied

according to the spills. /d. at 132; R19-35-36. However, he

testified that muds containing mercury and caustic were

washed onto the cellroom floors every three or four days

when the treatment system’s filters were back washed. R16-

127-28; R19-103. When asked whether the wastewater on

the cellroom floors would be considered a hazardous waste,

Croom responded “[m Jost of the time, probably it was.” R16-

112-13; see also id. at 128 (Croom admitted that wastes on

the cellroom floor were listed as hazardous wastes).

Dr. Teitelbaum testified that a fall and submersion into

caustic soda with a pH of 14 would cause a third-degree burn

over the entire body with a likelihood of death. R20-241-42.

LCP former employee Duane Carver testified that, some time

between 1987 and 1993, he stepped into the cellroom sump

hole and went in up to his waist. R19-226-28. He knew that

35a

Appendix A

the pH was “pretty high” because he quickly felt it. /d. at

228. He showered and was able to get most of it off so that

he “didn’t get burned all the way” and-did not seek medical

attention. /d. at 229-30, 251.

Environmental Protection Agency regulatory expert Paul

Peronaud explained the hazardous waste classifications to

the jury, R21-11-13, and the jury was instructed as to various

types of hazardous wastes, R22-199-200.*

30. Specifically, the jury was instructed:

[T]he following wastes are listed as hazaidous wastes

under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, that

is, RCRA: ‘

K-106 is wastewater treatment sludge from

the mercury cell process in chlorine

production.

K-071 is brine purification muds from the

mercury cell process in chlorine production,

where separately prepurified brine is not used.

And U-151 is simply mercury.

Now you are instructed that a solid waste exhibits the

characteristic of toxicity for mercury if, using the test

methods set forth in the regulations, a representative

sample of the waste contains mercury at a concentration

of equal to or greater than 0.2 milligrams per liter.

Under the law, liquid wastes which are “corrosive” are

identified as hazardous wastes. A liquid waste is

(Cont'd)

36a

Appendix A

The Waste Water Treatment Operators Logs for the

periods of the indictment showed that the wastewater often

contained more than 200 parts per billion of mercury.*' Govt.

Exs. 4, 5, 6-1. Former LCP employee Dunn testified that

Taylor directed the employees to “put a sign up” labeling the

wastewater in the rail cars as “[h]azardous waste materials.”

R20-345. Taylor testified that the pH of the plant’s wastewater

was normally between seven and ten, and in concentration

of eight to ten percent. R21-262, 264.

(Cont'd)

considered to be corrosive if a representative sample of

the waste is aqueous and has a pH less than or equal to 2

or greater than or equal to 12.5. ‘

| instruct you that when a hazardous waste listed under

the regulations is mixed with a solid waste, the resulting

mixture is a hazardous waste if the reason for the listing

of the hazardous waste is that it 1s a toxic waste.

R22-199-200.

31. LCP former employee Carver explained that the line for

“Discharge HC (ppb)” showed “the mercury level in the discharge

water coming from the wastewater system.” R19-209. The logs

provided for thirteen readings per day, but readings were typically

taken only twelve times per day. Mercury levels were recorded as

above 200 for nine readings on 17 April, six readings on 28 June,

eight readings on 28 August, four readings on 29 August, three

readings on 12 September, four readings on 6 October, two readings

on 9 October, three readings on 13 October, nine readings on 18

October, six readings on October 22, and nine readings on 5

November, 1993. Govt. Exs. 4, 5, 6-1. The logs show that the system

was not working during readings on 17 April. 21 June, 27-28 June,

29 August, 12 September, 6-9 October, 12-13 October, and 18-21

October 1993. /d.

37a

Appendix A

A “hazardous waste” is defined as

a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes,

which because of its quantity, concentration, or

physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics

may —

(A) cause, or significantly contribute

to an increaseth mortality or an increase

in serious irreversible, or incapacitating

reversible, illness; or

(B) pose a substantial present or

potential hazard to human health or the

environment when improperly treated,

stored, transported, or disposed of, or

otherwise managed.

42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). Hazardous wastes are categorized as

either “listed” hazardous substances or “characteristic”

hazardous substances. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a); R21-11-15. The

“characteristic” hazardous substances are not per se

hazardous but may be classified as hazardous if, because of

a mixture with a hazardous substance, testing proves that

the substance exhibits characteristics of hazardous waste. 40

C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a)(2)(i) and 261.20(a). Characteristics of

hazardous waste include ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity,

and toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21, 261.22, 261.23, and

261.24. Wastewater containing mercury is classified as a

characteristic hazardous substance when the water contains

200 parts per billion or more of mercury. /d. at § 261.24(a),

Table. “Wastewater treatment sludge from the mercury cell

38a

Appendix A

process in chlorine production” is listed as hazardous waste

K106. /d. at § 261.32. Wastewater containing caustic is

classified as a characteristic hazardous substance when the

water “has a pH less than or equal to 2 or greater than or

equal to 12.5.” /d. at § 261.22(a)(1). Once solid wastes are

mixed with sludge or caustic, they are defined as hazardous.

Id. at § 261.3(a)(2)(iv).

Where there is no sampling of the actual wastes, the

government may prove the hazardous nature of the material

by inventories, hazardous waste logs, internal memoranda,

and trial testimony. United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.,

934 F.2d 599, 614 (Sth Cir. 1991). The government is not

required to prove that material is hazardous by EPA testing.

United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1086 (10th Cir. 1993). We

find that the testimony of the former LCP employees and the

wastewater logs were sufficient for the jury to find that the

untreated wastewater contained enough mercury and caustic

to meet the environmental laws’ definition of hazardous

substances or materials.

b. Storage of hazardous materials.

Taylor and Hansen maintain that the accumulation of

wastewater on the cellroom floors did not violate federal law

because the wastewaters were not stored there for the

statutory requisite of 90 days. Croom testified that hazardous

wastewater was on the cellroom floors “[a]t times,” R16-

114, and that hazardous materials were shipped, turned over,

or treated within 90 days, R19-41. In response to a question

as to whether wastewater on the cellroom floors was a regular

occurrence in 1992, he responded that it was in both

39a

Appendix A

cellrooms in 1992, but when he left “it was just mostly in

#2.” R16-114. Former LCP employee Roger Cooper testified

that on 28 June 1993, although wastewater was pumped to

the railcars for storage from cellroom two, the cellroom one

floor was dry. R19-275-76, 281-82; Govt. Ex. 6-1. He

explained that they “tried to keep [the wastewater in cellroom

one} pumped over to #2 cellroom” because of the possibility

that water would escape from cellro6om one as a result of

cracks in its floor. R19-284-85. Dirt dikes were constructed

in the cellrooms to prevent the wastewater from leaking, but

the dikes were frequently breached. R19-256; R25-26. The

cellrooms were often “full of water” so that the employees

had to wade into standing wastewater to repair the pumps.

R20-318; R19-205.

Hazardous waste generators are permitted to “accumulate

hazardous waste on-site for 90 days or less without a permit”

if “the waste is placed” in tanks visibly marked with “(t]he

date upon which each period of accumulation begins”

and clearly labeled as “Hazardous Waste.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 262.34(a)(1)(ii), (2), and (3). A “tank” is “a stationary

device, designed to contain an accumulation of hazardous

waste which is constructed primarily of non-earthen materials

... which provide structural support.” 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.

There was no evidence that suggested that the cellrooms,

in which earthen berms were constructed to contain the

wastewater, were marked with the date of accumulation or

labeled as containing hazardous wastes and thus qualified as

“tanks.” The testimony and logs indicate that the wastewater,

which may have abated in cellroom one during various

periods of time, remained in cellroom two and was present

40a

Appendix A

for more than 90 days. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient

for the jury to find that the wastewater was improperly stored.

3. Knowing Endangerment Under RCRA

Hansen, Randall, and Taylor argue that the evidence was

insufficient to convict them for knowing endangerment. They

acknowledge that the government may have shown that they

“could have been aware” of the inherent dangers of working

in a chlor-alkali plant, but argue that it failed to show that

they knew and had an actual belief that the conduct which

allegedly violated the environmental iaws was substantially

certain to cause death or serious bodily injury to others.

Specifically, they maintain that, while the evidence showed

that the employees were exposed to mercury, the evidence

did not show that they were endangered due to any RCRA

violation. They contend that the evidence of the employees’

exposure to caustic was not sufficient to support the

conviction for knowing endangerment. They claim that the

government did not show that they had actual knowledge

that their conduct in causing the RCRA violation was at that

time substantially certain to place the employees in imminent

danger of death or serious bodily injury. They also posit that

there was no evidence that they were participants in any

alleged conspiracy.

For a conviction of knowing endangerment under the

RCRA, the government must prove that the defendants

knowingly caused the illegal treatment, storage, or disposal

of hazardous wastes while knowing that such conduct placed

others in imminent danger of death or serious injury. 42

U.S.C. § 6928(e). A defendant acts “knowingly” “if he is

4la

Appendix A

aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to

cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.” /d. at

6928(f)(1)(C). The defendant must have possessed “actual

awareness or actual belief.” /d. at 6928(f)(2)(A).

Circumstantial evidence, “including evidence that the

defendant took affirmative steps to shield himself from

relevant information,” may be used to prove the defendant’s

awareness or belief. Id. The knowing endangerment statute

was drafted to “assure to the extent possible that persons are

not prosecuted or convicted unjustly for making difficult

business judgments where such judgments are made without

the necessary scienter” “however dire may be the danger in

fact created.” S. Rep. 96-172, at 37-38 (1979), reprinted in

1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5036-38. The penalties imposed

by the knowing endangerment section were “designed for

the occasional case where the defendant’s knowing conduct

shows that his respect for human life is utterly lacking and it

is merely fortuitous that his conduct may not have caused a

disaster.” /d. at 38, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038. We have

held that “[t]he government need only prove that a defendant

had knowledge of the general hazardous character of the

cnemical” and knew “that the chemicals have the potential

to be harmful to others or to the environment.” United States

v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645-646 (11th Cir. 1992) (per

curiam) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[W]hile

knowledge of prior illegal activity is not conclusive as to

whether a defendant possessed the requisite knowledge of

later illegal activity, it most certainly provides circumstantial

evidence of the defendant’s later knowledge from which the

jury may draw the necessary inference.” Self, 2 F.3d at 1088.

42a

Appendix A

The statute defines “serious bodily injury” as “(A) bodily

injury which involves a substantial risk of death; (B)

unconsciousness; (C) extreme physical pain; (D) protracted

and obvious disfigurement; or (E) protracted loss or

impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or

mental faculty.” 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(6). A condition which

may cause one of the statutorily defined-conditions is

sufficient to show “serious bodily injury.” See United States

v. Protex Industries, Inc., 874 F.2d 740, 743 (10th Cir. 1989)

(finding that a serious bodily injury was suffered by

employees who contracted psychoorganic syndrome which

may cause a mental faculties impairment).

a. The Evidence of Endangerment

Former LCP employees testified that they suffered

serious skin and respiratory conditions from the wastewater

on the cellroom floors.*? A November 1992 memorandum

32. Hugh Croom explained that “when the pH was high [in the

wastewater on the cellroom floors] and somebody stepped over in it,

it could easily burn their skin on their legs.” R16-121. He volunteered

that caustic could “peel the skin off” a person if he or she fell into it.

R19-107. He said that airborne mercury could cause problems because

of the potential for accumulation in the body. /d. at 108. Duane Carver

testified that he received second-and third-degree burns on his thighs,

R19-182, 197, and that he and other employees shoveled mercury

off the cellroom floors, R19-192. He explained that there was “plenty”

of mercury to see “under the mud and also beaded up on top in the

mud.” Jd. He said that “[t]here would be so much [mercury] that it

would be running off of the mud” and that “[y]ou could get a shovelful

and lean your shovel over, and the mercury would just run off the

shovel onto the floor.” Jd. at 192-93. John Baker testified that the

wastewater “would cause severe burns.” /d. at 245.

43a

Appendix A

from Taylor to Randall showed Taylor’s concern for needed

repairs “to avert severe safety and environmental problems.”

Govt. Ex. 1-5. The urinalysis testing on employees showed

“an increase” in the number with mercury levels which

exceeded the 150 action level from 1986 to 1993. R21-294-

96. Taylor admitted that most of the employees in the

cellroom were removed to other plant locations “before any

medical condition occurred” but said that he did not see any

“reason to draw any correlation between” the rise in the

number of employees exposed to excess mercury and the

dumping of hazardous wastes and mercury. /d. at 294, 296.*°

Expert testimony and reports linked exposure to mercury

and caustic to a variety of serious health problems. The

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

(NIOSH) report on sodium hydroxide caustic indicated that

local contact with caustic could result in “extensive damage

to tissues, with resultant blindness, cutaneous burns, and

perforations of the alimentary tract,” with potential for

development of “squamous cell carcinomas.” Govt. Ex. 17-

7b. The NIOSH report on inorganic mercury warned of the

effects of mercury and mercury vapors to the central nervous

system. Govt. Ex. 17-7c. Dr. Teitelbaum testified that

exposure to caustic could cause burns ranging from first-to

third-degree and could be lethal, and that exposure to mercury

33. Taylor commented that “[j]ust because the trend happened

to be the same on two completely unrelated events, does not

necessarily tie them together.” R21-296. He said that he “noticed a

similar trend on two completely unrelated events.” /d. at 297. He

admitted “that the mercury vapor levels in the workplace did increase”

and that “drums of dried waste can be a source of mercury.” /d. at

297-98.

44a

Appendix A

could cause mild tremors, personality changes, some

detectable neurological abnormalities, changes in kidney

function to severe kidney damage with potential death, and

immune system problems. R20-229, 239-42. Dr. Teitelbaum

opined that the employees were “in danger of death or serious

bodily injury.” R20-248. The evidence was sufficient for the

jury to find that the defendants placed others in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.

b. The Evidence of Mens Rea

The evidence showed that Hansen, Randall, and Taylor

knew that the conditions of the plant were dangerous and

that the conditions posed a serious danger to the employees.

LCP former employee Wilbur Duane Outhwaite testified that

he voiced his opposition to the use of the Bunker “C”’ storage

with Hansen, and that Hansen responded that it was “his

decision to make, and he decided to use them.” R20-350.

LCP acting plant manager Hugh Croom discussed his

concerns regarding the dangerous conditions in the cellroom

and the danger to the employees with Randall. R16-129-30.

Croom and LCP former employee Outhwaite testified that

Randall received daily reports from the plant managers

concerning plant operations and “safety problems.” R16-97-

98; R20-359, 374. Randall was aware of the water on the

cellroom floor and “wouldn’t say that [he] wasn’t unaware

of the hazard,” but thought that the walkway was “an

acceptable resolution” to “eliminating the hazard to the

employees while we worked to dry the cellroom floor.” R21-

224-25. He conceded that he was aware that the company

was cited for willful violation of OSHA safety regulations

as a result of water on cellroom floors. /d. at 225; Govt. Ex.

45a

Appendix A

10-71. Jesse Jones, a former LCP employee and a union

representative, met with Randall to discuss the employees’

safety issues, and Randall promised the needed repairs. R21-

148. He said that he discussed the safety concerns,

specifically “the water condition, the deterioration of the plant

with the pipes, the leaks, and the safety equipment[ }” with

Hansen and Taylor. /d. at 146. Between 3 August 1993, and

4 February 1994, Randall was sent 22 reports listing 110

different violations of the NPDES standards. Govt. Exs. 10-

lo-10-1nn. As LCP’s environmental manager, Brent Hanson

regularly advised Randall of the plant’s environmental

problems “[w]henever he was interested in things” and by

monthly reports. R20-64-65.

As early as 1988, NIOSH informed Taylor that the plant

employees had “extremely high” levels of mercury in their

bodies which created “an unacceptably high potential for

health effects,” and that the mercury-contaminated wastes

should be kept in vapor-proof containers. Govt Ex. 40-Ic at

2. Despite this, the employees’ exposure to high levels of

mercury continued. In 1992, Taylor addressed his concerns

about “severe safety” problems in a memorandum to Randall.

Govt. Ex. 1-5. Taylor was aware that, during the spring of

1993, 23 cellroom employees were removed from their duty

in the cellrooms due to their high levels of mercury and that

the mercury level in the workplace increased. R21-294-95,

297. Taylor was aware of and concerned by the mercury-

contaminated waste which was stored in drums in the

cellrooms’ basement and which was emitting elevated levels

of mercury fumes. /d. at 298-303. He admitted that the

mercury-contaminated mud on the cellroom floors posed a

health risk and needed to be monitored. /d. at 301-02. He

46a

Appendix A

testified that, on occasion, he would get into the water

wearing protective equipment to maxe repairs and

improvements to the pumps, and admitted that, if the

wastewater got onto bare skin and was caustic, “you would

start to feel a little burning or a little heat sensation” but that

it could be neutralized by washing with the safety solution.

Id. at 263-64. He said that such burns were “not unusual” in

a caustic soda manufacturing plant through employee

carelessness and equipment failures. /d. at 264.

c. Consent to the Risks

The RCRA knowing endangerment provision can be

affirmatively defended if “the conduct charged was consented

to by the person endangered and that the danger and conduct

charged were reasonably foreseeable hazards of — (A) an

occupation, a business, or a profession.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(f)(3). The evidence showed that the plant’s

environmental violations seriously endangered the employees

and were not typical to chlor-alkali plants. Hugh Croom, the

plant manager for the LCP chlor-alkali plant in North

Carolina, testified that the dangerous conditions in the

Brunswick plant were not present in the North Carolina plant

because the North Carolina plant had adequate waste

treatment equipment and facility maintenance. R16-108-09,

127-29; R19-32-34, 52, 107-09.110-11. He said that he

discussed his concerns regarding the environmental issues,

the wastewater treatment system issues, and the dangers to

the employees with Xandall and with Taylor. R16-129-30.

LCP environmental manager Brent Hanson noted that,

although covering mercury with water to limit mercury

vapors was an accepted practice within the chlor-alkali

47a

Appendix A

industry, it was usually practiced “in a little more confined

manner” than the condition of the cellrooms, it was not an

industry practice to allow such quantities of mercury to

accumulate on the cellroom floors, and he knew of no other

chlor-alkali plants that permitted such a condition to exist.

R20-145, 153. Dr. Teitelbaum testified that, although he did

not think that “you can get a zero risk” in a chlor-alkali plant,

he thought “you can make chlor-alkali plants safe so that

workers under everyday conditions are éxtremely unlikely

to be hurt.” R20-245.*

Spee

The employees also did not freely consent to conditions

at the plant. They complained to management, including

Hansen, Randall, and Taylor, about the dangerous working

conditions, and refused to work in the cellrooms. Union

representative and former plant employee Jesse Jones

testified that LCP suspended nine employees who refused to

“go underneath the cellroom to repair the pump” because of

the wastewater on the cellroom floor. R2i-138-42. Jones said

that he discussed his concerns about the working conditions

with Hansen, Randall, and Taylor. R21-138-39, 146-48.

Former employee Larry Barwick said that he complained “to

whoever would listen,” including the LCP management,

34. He noted that “the Swedish chlor-alkali industry ... had

air levels of 20 or below and urine levels which almost never exceeded

30” in 1990, demonstrating that such an environment was possible.

R20-245. He explained that a safe environment could be promoted

by the use of industrial hygiene, including “engineering controls,

protective equipment, substitution of materials in places where you

can substitute, and administrative controls as to how long and what

kind of environments people work in.” /d. at 246.

48a

Appendix A

about the fumes* and visible mercury in the cell buildings.”

R20-319-20. He refused to go into the cellrooms, and was

once sent home for the day based on his refusal. R20-321.

The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to show that the

defendants knew that the plant’s violations of the CWA and

RCRA violations were inevitable, that the plant was incapable

of complying with environmental standards, and that the

employees were endangered while working within this

environment without consenting to the risk.

4. Conspiracy

Hansen, Randall, and Taylor argue that the district court

erred by not granting their motions for acquittal because the

government never proved a conspiracy. They maintain there

35. Barwick said that:

[T]he fumes from the acid burners were coming down

and you couldn’t breathe without wearing a respirator.

It would burn your skin. It would take the hair off of

your arms. It would get in your eyes, under your goggles.

And everything-it had caustic. It had bleach. It had acid

fumes. . . . After probably the last year or year and a half,

that was probably a regular everyday thing almost, that

you would get gas somewhere in [the cell building]. R20-

319-20.

36. Barwick testified that the mercury “was everywhere. . . the

floors, the ledges, the beams, any place you had to get up in to to

change headers. . . You would have mercury on the beams. You would

have mercury on the floors. When you would take the headers apart,

mercury would run out of them.” R20-320.

49a

Appendix A

was no showing of an agreement between them, the operation

of the plant was a legal act, and they did not pursue the

objectives of the conspiracy. Randall suggests that the

evidence showed that he took affirmative steps to improve

compliance. Taylor contends that he was not involved in the

operations at the Brunswick plant for a significant period of

the “conspiracy” and authored several memos to management

expressing his concerns regarding the plant’s operation once

he began working there. He maintains that, after assuming

the plant manager position, he recommended shutting down

the plant or at least one of the cellrooms and, when those

recommendations were rejected, he spent several months

seeking money for maintenance. He also argues that the

evidence showed that he directed that the reports be truthful

and accurate.

To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371, “the

government must show: ‘(1) the existence of an agreement

to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowing

and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the

commission of an overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy.’ ” United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1267

(11th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d

625, 628-30 (11th Cir. 1986)). “An agreement may be proved

by either direct or circumstantial evidence and a common

scheme or plan may be inferred from the conduct of the

participants or from other circumstances.” United States v.

Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999). However, it is

“essential” “that the object of the agreement must be illegal.”

United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).

“Each party to a continuing conspiracy may be vicariously

liable for substantive criminal offenses committed by a co-

50a

Appendix A

conspirator during the course and in the furtherance of the

conspiracy, notwithstanding the party’s non-participation in

the offenses or lack of knowledge thereof.” United States v.

Mothersill, 87 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing

Pinkerton vy. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47, 66 S. Ct.

1180, 1184 (1946)). In the usual Pinkerton case, it is not

necessary fur the court to inquire into a particular

conspirator’s individual culpability, “so long as the

substantive crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence

of the conspiracy.” United States vy. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830,

849-50 (11th Cir. 1985). It is unnecessary for the government

to prove that each conspirator participated in all aspects of a

conspiracy, knew each phase or every detail of the conspiracy,

or knew all of the participants. United States v. Pedrick, 181

F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999). A conspirator may be

convicted if he “participates in some affirmative conduct

designed to aid the success of the venture with knowledge

that h[{is] actions would further the venture.” /d. A defendant

may be convicted of conspiracy if he joined the conspiracy

after its inception and played only a minor role within it,

- United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th Cir. 1995),

and he is presumed to be a part of the conspiracy until all

conspiracy activity ceases or he proves that he withdrew.

United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1563-64 (11th Cir.

1991). To show withdrawal, a conspirator must show that he

“has taken affirmative steps to defeat the objectives of the

conspiracy,” and “made a reasonable effort to communicate

these acts to his co-conspirators or disclosed the scheme to

law enforcement officers.” Jd. at 1564.

The indictment charged that, from July 1985 to

1 February 1994, Hansen, Randall, and Taylor “did knowingly

LAL ave ae

Sla

Appendix A

and willfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree

together and with others” to knowingly act in violation of

the environmental laws by “continu[ing] to operate the

Brunswick facility” after learning that they were in violation,

storing and disposing of hazardous wastes without a permit,

and submitting “incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading

information” in their reports to the various state and federal

regulatory agencies. R1-1-10-14. The evidence showed that

the defendants admitted to sharing the common goal to

operate the plant until a buyer could be found. The jury could

infer from this goal and the defendants’ knowledge of the

plant’s continuing problems with worker safety and

environmental compliance that they reached a tacit agreement

to operate the plant in violation of environmerital laws. The

defendants knew of the violations from either personal

observation or from information that they received from the

plant employees, and frequently communicated with each

other regarding operation of the plant despite the continuous

environmental concerns. The defendants failed to provide

the corporate board with information about the violations,

and failed to accurately present the plant’s inability to comply

with the regulations to the Georgia EPD. Each of the

substantive offenses were foreseeable consequences of the

agreement to continue operating the plant in violation of the

environmental statutes.

5. Knowledge of the Substantive Offenses

Randall argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion for acquittal because the government failed to

show that he had the requisite “knowledge” of the CWA and

RCRA violations on the specific dates when they occurred.

§2a

_-

Appendix A

He contends that his knowledge after the violations had

occurred was not sufficient. The statutes for the violations

under which Randall was indicted contain explicit knowledge

requirements. For a conviction under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(2)(A),

the defendant must be shown to have “knowingly” violated

various sections of the CWA or permit conditions or

limitations. For a conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A),

the defendant must be shown to have “knowingly” treated,

stored, or disposed of an identified hazardous waste without

a permit. We have held that the knowledge element 1s satisfied

where a defendant, who may not have “directly” caused a

hazardous waste violation but had “approved of previous

dumpings as a way to meet storage squeezes,” “effectively

ordered” a subsequent violation when he instructed a

subordinate to “handle” hazardous waste. United States y.

Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (11th Cir. 1988).

Here, although Randall did not directly cause the

violations, he knew that the plant was violating its permit on

an almost daily basis, accumulating wastes that it could not

treat, and was frequently releasing the wastes from the

cellrooms as needed to keep the plan‘ operational. He

received 22 written reports between 3 August 1993 and 4

February 1994 advising him of a total of 110 different

violations of the NPDES permit. He received frequent and

sometimes daily oral and written reports from the various

plant managers of the plant’s operations and safety concerns.

He knew that the plant was incapable of complying with the

environmental standards and knew that the violations were

inevitable. We conclude that the evidence that Randall

permitted the plant employees to process the hazardous

wastes as they had in the past despite his knowledge that the

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Appendix A

procedures were in violation of environmental regulations

was sufficient to show that Randall acted “knowingly.”

C. Jury Instructions

Hansen, Randall, and Taylor argue that the district court's

jury instructions misstated the reasonable doubt standard,

improperly applied the concept of responsible corporate

officer, improperly defined the elements of knowing

endangerment, and effectively eliminated the mens rea

requirement from each of these statutory violations. Hansen

contends that the instructions essentially instructed the jury

that they could convict him because of his job title.

“ “We review jury instructions de novo to determine

whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the

prejudice of the objecting party.’ ” United States v. Grigsby,

111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th C ». 1997), quoting United States \.

Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1085 (11th Cir. 1993). We review

the district court’s denial of a requested instruction for abuse

of discretion, because a defendant is entitled to an instruction

on a defense theory if it has some basis in the evidence and

is supported by law. Grigsby, 111 F.3d at 814. A defendant

cannot challenge a jury instruction on a ground not raised at

trial unless he establishes “plain error” under Fed.R.Crim.P.

52(b). United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 879-80 (11th

Cir. 1985). If the requirements of Rule 52(b) are satisfied

and the instruction was made in error, is plain, and affected

substantial rights, we “may then exercise [our] discretion to

notice a forfeited error, ... only if ... the error seriously

affect{ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

S4a

Appendix A

466-68, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1548-49 (1997) (internal citations

omitted). Under the invited error doctrine, we will generally

not review an error induced or invited by a party through the

submission of an incorrect jury instruction to the judge which

passed on to the jury. United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822,

838 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

1. Reasonable Doubt Standard

Hansen and Randall maintain that the district judge

misstated the essential basis of the convictions by instructing

that the government did not have to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. In his introduction to the jury instructions,

the district judge advised the jury that he would read them

the jury charge and would provide them each a copy of the

charge for them to “refer to it at any time you think is

appropriate” when they were sent out to deliberate. R22-172.

The district judge then orally instructed the jury on reasonable

doubt as follows:

So the Government always has the burden of

proving a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. If it fails to do so, under your oath, you

would have to find that Defendant not guilty.

But while the Government Ss burden is a heavy

burden, it is not necessary that the Defendants

guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,

because that is generally impossible. The law does

not require a mathematical certainty, only the

exclusion of any reasonable doubt concerning that

Defendant's guilt.

Appendix A

In that regard, a “reasonable doubt” 1s defined

as a real doubt, based upon reason and common

sense after a careful and impartial consideration

of the entire evidence in this case, or the lack of

evidence.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in other

words, is proof of such a convincing character that

you would be willing to rely or act upon it without

hesitation in a decision involving the most

important of your affairs. But you take a common

sense view. ...

You may not find a Defendant guilty unless

: - you find that the inferences you draw from the

evidence are consistent with the theory of his guilt

and inconsistent with reasonable theories of

innocence. If you are convinced that a Defendant

has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,

say so with a verdict of guilty. On the contrary, if

you have reasonable doubt, then under your oath,

you would have to find that Defendant not guilty.

R22-174-75 (emphasis added). No objection was made as to

this instruction. R22-206-09.°’

37. The government argues that there may be an error in the

transcript. Government brief at 23. There 1s no indication that this

: matter was submitted to and settled by the district court consistent

with the procedure outlined in Fed.R.App.P. 10(e).

4

2 4

oo

The district judge provided the parties with an opportunity to

(Cont'd)

56a

Appendix A

The passage, as provided to the jury in the written charge,

read:

Thus, while the Government’s burden of

proof is a strict or heavy burden, it 1s not necessary

that a Defendant’s guilt be proved beyond all

possible doubt. It is only required that the

Government’s proof exclude any “reasonable

doubt” concerning a Defendant’s guilt.

R6-133-2.

“W]e consider [a reasonable doubt] instruction as a

whole to determine if the instruction misleads the jury as to

the government’s burden of proof.” Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d

1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1995). The jury must be instructed

that defendant’s guilt must be proved by the government

“beyond a reasonable doubt” on each element of the charged

offense, but the trial court is not required to define reasonable

doubt. /d. If the trial court defines reasonable doubt, the

standard must be explained correctly. /d. A district court’s

failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury,

including an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt, is a

(Cont'd)

“{s]tate [their] exceptions” after the jury instructions were read. R22-

206-09. Taylor’s counsel said he had been “listening carefully to the

charge” and had heard the word “water” used in the place of “wastes.”

Id. at 208. He then noted that the jury “will have it to read.” /d.

Taylor’s counsel also observed that the word “person” had been

defined as an “individual corporate officer” instead of a “responsible

corporate officer,” the judge made a curative instruction. /d. at 208-

09.

S7a

Appendix A

structural error which defies the harmless-error analysis.

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S. Ct. 1544 at 1549-50.

Although we have held that “an inadequate reasonable doub!

instruction cannot be cured by other circumstances at trial,”

Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1994)

(reversing a conviction in which the instruction defined

reasonable doubt using the phrase “substantial doubt’),

“{jJury instructions are not considered in isolation; rather

we view them tn the context of the entire ... proceeding.”

Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).

Here, the improper passage 1s immediately prefaced and

followed by a correct instruction, and the correct instruction

was included in the written copy provided to each juror. The

judge stated the correct instruction numerous times, including

each element of each offense to be proven. See R22-172,

173, 182, 185, 187,189, 193-94, 199-201. The instruction,

as written and as provided to the jury, was not inadequate

and presented the correct reasonable doubt standard. Viewing

this instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire

proceeding, we find that it did not mislead the jury as to the

reasonable doubt standard. See United States v. Torres, 90)

F.2d 205, 243 (2nd Cir. 1990) (rejecting a challenge to the

language used in one sentence of a reasonable doubt standard

where a correct instruction was provided “immediately after”

the challenged language and provided at least five times in

the instructions in general and as to the specific offenses);

but see Bloomer vy. United States, 162 F.3d 187, 189, 194

(2nd Cir. 1998) (finding an improper reasonable doubt

instruction constitutionally deficient despite at least 17 proper

instructions where there was no curative instruction to alert

the jury to disregard the incorrect instruction.)

58a

Appendix A

2. Reasonable Corporate Officer

Hansen and Randall contend that the district judge

undermined the jury’s fact-finding function by directing that

they treat the defendants as “responsible corporate officers”

(“RCO”). They maintain that the instruction as given

permitted the jury to convict them on the basis of their

corporate positions instead of their individual liability. They

suggest that the district court’s separate RCO instruction

allowed the jury to believe that it applied equally to the

conspiracy, CWA and RCRA charges.

The district judge instructed the jury:

Under the federal Clean Water Act, the

definition of a “person” specifically includes

corporations and individual corporate officers.

You are instructed that the Defendants, Christian

Hansen, Randall Hansen, and Alfred Taylor are

persons for purposes of the Clean Water Act.

R22-191. Taylor’s attorney objected that “‘[t]he statute says,

. and responsible corporate officers.’ ”’ R22-209. The

district judge then explained “[w]herever I have used the term

‘corporate officers,’ ] mean responsible corporate officers.”

Id.

In a CWA case, “the term ‘person’ means ... an

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