Opposition Brief — Sullivan v. Raytheon Co.

Supreme Court brief2002

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 01-745

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

DONALD E. SULLIVAN,

Petitioner,

RAYTHEON COMPANY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAMES F. KAVANAUGH, UR.

Counsel of Record

STEPHEN S. CHURCHILL

CONN KAVANAUGH ROSENTHAL

PEISCH & FORD, LLP

Ten Post Office Square

Boston, Massachusetts 02109

(617) 482-8200

Counsel for Respondent

Date: December 28, 2001

BATEMAN & SLADE, INC. BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Ss Whether the court of appeals cor-

rectly ruled that it was not an abuse of discretion

for the district court to deny petitioner’s claim for

penalties under ERISA.

IT. Whether the court of appeals cor-

rectly ruled that petitioner’s claim for retaliation

under the Massachusetts worker’s compensation

law was preempted by the Labor Management

Relations Act.

II]. Whether the court of appeals cor-

rectly ruled under ERISA that respondent

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s termina-

tion of petitioner’s benefits was not arbitrary and

capricious.

IV. Whether the court of appeals cor-

rectly ruled that petitioner’s state law claims of

handicap and age discrimination failed because

the evidence was insufficient for him to prove a

prima facie case of discrimination based on his

repeated and unequivocal claims of total disabil-

ity.

‘i

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties named in the caption, Donald

Sullivan, Raytheon Company, Raytheon Employ-

ees Disability Trust, and Metropolitan Life Insur-

ance Company were the only parties to the pro-

ceedings before the court of appeals and the

district court. Raytheon Company has no parent

companies, and no publicly held company owns

ten percent or more of its stock. Metropolitan Life

Insurance Company is wholly owned by MetLife,

Inc., which is a publicly held company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............cccccsecccecececeeees i

EN EE ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...........cscccccccsscossecceees v

TEENIE" seccdd cosccoswedsusevedenecsesteaseussavecs 1

i 1

ERE CU BUM OEE) occcccccvcccccsccccccvccevescencesees 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..............cccccsecceeeeee 2

Factital Background .......c.ccccccccsscsessccscees 2

ae 5

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ......... 6

I, THE COURT OF APPEALS DE-

CISION AFFIRMING THE DIS-

TRICT COURT’S DISCRETION-

ARY REFUSAL TO AWARD

PENALTIES UNDER ERISA

WAS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH

DECISIONS OF OTHER CIR-

CUITS AND WAS CORRECT. .......... 6

Il. IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT

lii

COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PETI-

TIONER’S CLAIM FOR RE-

TALIATION UNDER THE MAS-

SACHUSETTS WORKER'S

COMPENSATION ACT, THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOL-

LOWED THIS COURT’S LAW

REGARDING PREEMPTION

~ UNDER THE LABOR MAN-

AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. ......... 8

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS

CORRECTLY DETERMINED

THAT RESPONDENT METLIFE

DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-

TION WHEN TERMINATING

PETITIONER’S LONG TERM

DISABILITY BENEFITS. ............... 10

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS AP-

PLIED MASSACHUSETTS LAW,

AND APPLIED IT CORRECTLY,

IN RULING THAT PETITIONER

WAS NOT QUALIFIED FOR

THE POSITION HE SOUGHT

AT RAYTHEON AND THERE-

FORE THAT HIS AGE AND

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

CLAIMS WERE \ PROPERLY

DISMISSED. ......... sdoghdnidibervedstonsete 11

CTCL AFIIIN | cccncestecicvcncecssescsncansisetsnnvzcavecevess 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Beal v. Board of Selectmen of Hingham,

419 Mass. 535, 646 N\E.2d 131

SSUNEE ctiivwakecensacsieetind iponeaiaceaikieuedion 12,13

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

DOS UD. GE (1GGSS) crcccrccvccccccccsscrsoces 11,13

Godwin v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,

980 F.2d 323 (Sth Cir. 1992) ................... 7

Harsch v. Eisenberg,

956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied

Bihler v. Eisenberg, 506 U.S. 818

EDU scbcntitndccsinmansnicbedinnieaedadamboadedess 7

Leavitt v. Jane L.,

EU Ore BT CRIN cncccnscstececsccnccciacnssanics 2)

Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,

Dope SFittv EY CPD Saiinséeisistasecevenaccasenkei 9

Moothart v. Bell,

21 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) ............. 6, 7

Powers v. H.B. Smith Co.,

42 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 679 N.E.2d

252 (1997), appeal denied, 424 Mass.

1105, 682 N.E.2d 1362 (1997) .............. 12

Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank,

986 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1993) ............. eee 7

CODES AND STATUTES:

United States Code

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et Seq. v.eccecccsceseseescesees 6

50 UGG. © STD vssicrescedladedditieniacess 6

Massachusetts General Laws

i SE cccitttaliciinncdeitt bist Rath Sista 11

elle, SRST GIRO viinsesinieiserninieaccbanes 12

Se ee -

Ss) 2 eee 1,9

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents Raytheon Company (“Ray-

theon”), Raytheon Employees Disability Trust

(“Trust”), and Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-

pany (“MetLife”) respectfully oppose the petition

for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-

cuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

As stated by petitioner.

JURISDICTION

As stated by petitioner.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Respondents provide the following supple-

mentation to petitioner’s description of statutes

involved. ;

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(3):

In the event that any right set forth in this

section is inconsistent with an applicable

collective bargaining agreement, such

agreement shall prevail... .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Factual Background

Petitioner began his employment as a secu-

rity guard with Raytheon in 1965. (Pet. App. 2).

Between 1971 and 1990, he suffered seven indus-

trial accidents that caused injuries to his neck,

lower back, and legs. (Jd.). Petitioner sought

medical treatment for some of these injuries and

occasionally missed work. (/d.). Shortly after peti-

tioner’s seventh accident in 1990, his absentee-

ism from work increased. (/d.). After giving him a

written warning in June 1990 and imposing a

suspension for abuse of Raytheon’s sick leave pol-

icy in September 1991, Raytheon terminated peti-

tioner’s employment on March 31, 1992. (Id. at 2-

3).

Petitioner filed a grievance pursuant to the

collective bargaining agreement between Ray-

theon and his union, the Raytheon Guards Asso-

ciation, challenging his termination. (ld. at 3).

_After a hearing on August 10, 1995, the arbitrator

found that petitioner had been terminated with-

out just cause. (Id.). However, noting that “on a

current and prospective basis, [petitioner] is not

able to work,” the arbitrator ordered petitioner re-

instated retroactive to March 31, 1992 on “inac-

tive employment status” so that petitioner could

apply for disability benefits under Raytheon’s long

term disability plan (“LTD plan”). (Jd.). Shortly af-

ter the arbitrator’s decision, petitioner wrote to

Raytheon and requested information about the

LTD plan so that he could apply for benefits. (Id.).

Under the LTD plan, benefits are payable

for twenty-four months for an employee who is

“fully disabled”; they are payable after that to an

employee who is “totally disabled.” (Id. at 23). In

statements provided to plan participants, employ-

ees are informed that they are fully disabled if

-“because of a sickness or an injury you cannot do

your job.” (Id. at 3). An employee is totally dis-

abled if “because of sickness or injury: (a) you

can not do your job; and (b) you can not do any

other job for which you are fit by your educatien,

your training, or your experience.” (Id.).

Petitioner submitted an application for long

term disability benefits in November 1995. (Id.).

MetLife, the claims administrator responsible for

determining a participant’s eligibility under the

plan, denied his claim in March 1996. (Id.). Met-

Life stated that there was “inadequate evidence of

a disabling condition that would prevent h::n from

performing his occupation as a Guard from April

1, 1992 through the present.” (Id. at 3-4). Peti-

tioner appealed the denial of benefits to MetLife.

(Id. at 4).

Petitioner also applied for worker’s compen-

sation benefits. (Id.). On August 4, 1994, an ad-

ministrative law judge for the Massachusetts De-

partment of Industrial Accidents found that

petitioner was partially disabled as of March 22,

1992, and totally disabled as of October 12, 1994.

(Id.). Petitioner received worker’s compensation

benefits until 1998, when he exhausted his enti-

tlement to them. (Id.).

Petitioner requested reinstatement to Ray-

theon by letter dated June 18, 1996. (Id.). In that

letter, he stated that either he was totally dis-

abled, in which case he should receive long term

disability benefits, or he was not disabled, in

which case he sought reinstatement to a position

with or without reasonable accommodation. (/d.).

By letter dated July 10, 1996, Raytheon advised

petitioner that it would not consider reinstating

him until after MetLife considered petitioner’s ap-

peal from its denial of his claim for benefits. (Id.).

Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the

MCAD on October 9, 1996. (Id.)

On October 17, 1997, MetLife determined

that petitioner was fully disabled for the first

twenty-four months of his disability through April

30, 1994 because he was not capable of perform-

ing his job as a security guard, and thus entitled

to benefits during that time. (/d. at 4-5). In this

respect, MetLife’s decision of October 1997 dif-

fered from its denial of benefits in March 1996.

(Id. at 5). However, MetLife affirmed its previous

determination that petitioner was not totally dis-

abled because he was not disabled from all occu-

pations for which he was fit by his training or ex-

perience. (Id.). Accordingly, MetLife terminated

his benefits. (Id.). Petitioner’s appeal of that de-

termination to MetLife was denied. (Id.).

rs)

In addition to his allegations of total dis-

ability in connection with his application for long

term disability benefits and his claim for worker’s

compensation benefits, petitioner alleged during

depositions in 1994 and 2000 that he was totally

disabled. (Id. at 35).

Proceedings Below

Respondent provides the following supple-

mentation to petitioner’s description of the pro-

ceedings below.

The proceedings in the district court were

as stated by petitioner. In describing the pro-

ceedings in the court of appeals, however, peti-

tioner incorrectly states that the district court

had jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction.

(Pet. 12). The district court had jurisdiction

based on a federal question. (Pet. 5). Petitioner

also incorrectly states that the court of appeals

was required to apply Massachusetts law with re-

spect to the standard for summary judgment.

(Pet. 13). Finally, petitioner incorrectly states

that the court of appeals found facts, drew infer-

ences in favor of the parties moving for summary

judgment, and misapplied Massachusetts law.

(Pet. 13).

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AF-

FIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S DIS-

CRETIONARY REFUSAL TO AWARD.

PENALTIES UNDER ERISA WAS NOT IN

CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER

CIRCUITS AND WAS CORRECT.

The second question set forth in the peti-

tion incorrectly states that the decision of the

court of appeals conflicts with the decisions of

other circuits on the issue of when a court may

impose discretionary penalties under the disclo-

sure requirements of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001 et seq. Specifically, petitioner here main-

tains that the court of appeals required that he,

in order to recover penalties under 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(c)(1), prove that he suffered prejudice or

that the administrator acted in bad faith, while

other circuits do not impose such a requirement.

On the contrary, however, the court of appeals’

decision here did not impose such a requirement

on the petitioner and is entirely consistent with

the law of other circuits.

The courts of appeals of other circuits con-

sistently have held that plaintiffs seeking penal-

ties under section 1132(c)(1) need not prove, as a

necessary element of their claim, that they suf-

fered prejudice as a result of an administrator’s

failure to provide plan documents. See, e.g.,

Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir.

1994) (noting general accord in circuits); Godwin

v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 980 F.2d

323, 327 and n.8 (5th Cir. 1992) (showing of

prejudice not required by statute); Harsch uv.

Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 662 (7th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, Bihler v. Eisenberg, 506 U.S. 818 (1992)

(same). It is equally well established, however,

that a court may, in the exercise of its discretion,

consider the issue of prejudice when determining

whether to impose penalties. Moothart, 21 F.3d

at 1506; Godwin, 980 F.2d at 327; Harsch, 956

F.2d at 662. Petitioner agrees with these state-

ments of the law. (Pet. 16-17). The law in the

First Circuit is the same, Rodriguez-Abreu uv.

Chase Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580, 588 (lst

Cir. 1993), as petitioner explicitly acknowledges.

(Pet. 17).

The law that the court of appeals applied in

this case is fully consistent with these decisions

from other circuits and with prior case law in the

First Circuit. In refusing to award penalties for

respondents’ alleged failure to provide plan

documents, the district court considered peti-

tioner’s lack of proof that respondents acted in

bad faith or that he was prejudiced by any non-

disclosure. (Pet. App. 31-33). The district court

did not, however, construe these two factors to be

required elements of petitioner’s claim. (Id.).

When affirming the district court’s judg-

ment, the court of appeals expressly agreed with

petitioner’s legal position, and then ruled that the

district court’s decision was consistent with that

position:

We agree with Sullivan that showings of

bad faith and prejudice are not necessary

for a court to award penalties under

§ 1132(c)(1). . . . However, the district court

did not require Sullivan to prove that Ray-

theon acted in bad faith or that he was

prejudiced. Instead, the court appropri-

ately cited the absence of those factors

among the reasons for its decision not to

award penalties.

(Pet. App. 19) (emphasis added). As a result, be-

cause the court of appeals’ decision was consis-

tent with the law of other circuits, there is no is-

sue warranting this Court’s review.

II.

IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S

DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM

FOR RETALIATION UNDER THE MASSA-

CHUSETTS WORKER’S COMPENSATION

ACT, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOL-

LOWED THIS COURT’S LAW REGARDING

PREEMPTION UNDER THE LABOR MAN-

AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that

Raytheon retaliated against him based on his

claim for worker’s compensation benefits, in viola-

tion of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(2). More

specifically, he alleged that Raytheon retaliated

against him by refusing to reinstate him to his

former position, which was a union position sub-

ject to a collective bargaining agreement. The

statute under which petitioner brought his claim

provides, in relevant part, “In the event that any

right set forth in this section is inconsistent with

an applicable collective bargaining agreement,

such agreement shall prevail.” Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 152, § 75B(3). In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic

Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), this Court held

that “an application of state law is pre-empted by

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of

1947 only if such application requires the inter-

pretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”

Id. at 413. In this case, the court of appeals ruled

that, because petitioner was a unionized em-

ployee subject to a collective-bargaining agree-

ment, his claim required the interpretation of the

agreement and therefore was preempted by sec-

tion 301 of the LMRA. (Pet. App. 11-14). The

court of appeals, therefore, followed this Court’s

holding in Lingle.

Moreover, the court of appeals’ decision on

this question was based on its interpretation of

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 75B(3), specifically

whether claims under this statute require the in-

terpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.

Such a determination does not warrant this

Court’s attention, because this Court normally

will not review a federal court’s interpretation of

state law. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 144

(1996). Departures from this practice have oc-

curred only rarely, and only in exceptional cir-

cumstances, such as “blatant federal-court nulli-

fication of state law.” Id.

Ill. THE COURT OF A”?PEALS CORRECTLY

DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENT MET-

LIFE DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION

WHEN TERMINATING PETITIONER’S

LONG TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS.

The court of appeals determined that re-

spondent MetLife did not abuse its discretion

when terminating petitioner’s long term disability

benefits. Petitioner does not contend that the

court of appeals applied an improper standard;

rather, he argues that the court misapplied the

arbitrary and capricious standard of review. This

ruling raises no compelling issues warranting the

Court’s attention. In effect, petitioner simply asks

this Court to sit as the final arbiter of his claim

for benefits by reviewing and analyzing his evi-

dence of disability, even though two courts al-

ready have done so using the proper standard of

review.

The court of appeals ruling that MetLife did

not abuse its discretion was, in any event, cor-

rect. In terminating petitioner’s long term disabil-

ity benefits, MetLife reasonably relied on the opin-

ion of an independent doctor that petitioner was

not totally disabled. (Pet. App. 15-16). Peti-

tioner’s own treating doctor indicated that peti-

tioner had some work capacity, and an independ-

ent medical examination was both inconclusive

and unreliable. (Pet. App. 16-17). Because Met-

Life’s final determination was not arbitrary and

capricious, the court of appeals properly upheld

the district court’s dismissal of petitioner’s claim

for benefits.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED MAS-

SACHUSETTS LAW, AND APPLIED IT

CORRECTLY, IN RULING THAT PETI-

TIONER WAS NOT QUALIFIED FOR THE

POSITION HE SOUGHT AT RAYTHEON

AND THEREFORE THAT HIS AGE AND

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED.

Contrary to the petitioner’s statement that

the court of appeals failed to apply Massachusetts

law, the court faithfully complied with Ere R. Co.

v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which requires

federal courts to apply a state’s substantive law

when adjudicating claims arising under that law.

In considering petitioner’s claims for age and dis-

ability discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

151B, the court of appeals plainly recognized that

Massachusetts law applied, as demonstrated by

the court’s explicit citation to that law. (Pet. App.

6, 9-10).

The court of appeals went on to apply that

law correctly. With respect to his claim of handi-

cap discrimination, Sullivan was required to

prove as part of his prima facie case that he was

qualified for the position to which he sought rein-

statement. Beal v. Board of Selectmen of Hingham,

419 Mass. 535, 541, 646 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1995);

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16) (extending

protection only to “qualified handicap person”).

Similarly, Sullivan was required to prove as part

of his prima facie case of age discrimination that

he was qualified for the position in question.

Powers v. H.B. Smith Co., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 657,

661, 679 N.E.2d 252, 255 (1997), appeal denied,

425 Mass. 1105, 682 N.E.2d 1362 (1997). The

court of appeals ruled that there was insufficient

evidence to prove these elements. Petitioner had

made repeated and unequivocal statements, un-

der oath, that he was totally disabled, and he

pointed to no evidence to show how these state-

ments were consistent with his ability to perform

the job to which he sought reinstatement. (Pet.

App. 6-10).

This ruling is consistent with decisions by

Massachusetts courts. In Beal, the Massachu-

setts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dis-

missal of the disability discrimination claim of a

plaintiff who had previously alleged, in the con-

text of claims for disability retirement and social

security benefits, that she was physically unable

to perform her job. 419 Mass. at 543, 646 N.E.2d

at 137-38. The plaintiffs sex discrimination

claim was dismissed for the same reason. 419

Mass. at 544-45, 646 N.E.2d at 138. With re-

spect to both claims, the plaintiffs allegations of

total disability precluded her from proving a

prima facie case of discrimination, because she

could not prove that she was qualified for the job

in question. Because petitioner’s case does not

differ in any significant respect from Beal, »

claims properly were dismissed. Based on iis

faithful adherence to Massachusetts law, the

court of appeals complied with the mandate of the

Erie doctrine. Therefore, the court of appeals rul-

ing does not present any federal question and

does not warrant this Court’s review.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES F. KAVANAUGH, JR.