Appendices — Lips v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-3359 and No. 92-3360
WILLIAM M. LPs,
A ppellee,/Cross-A ppellant,
Vv.
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS,
Appellant Cross-A ppellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 88-3396-R )
[Filed July 1, 1993]
Jan Horbaly, Burke, Virginia, for Appellee Cross-Appel-
lant.
Thomas E. Booth and David Shelledy, United States De-
partment of Justice, Appellate Section, Criminal Division,
Washington, D.C. (Jackie A. Rapstine, Assistant U.S.
Attorney; Lee Thompson, U.S. Attorney, Topeka, Kansas;
and Conrad Von Wald, LTC., Office of the Judge Advo-
cate General, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., with him
on the brief), for Appellant Cross-Appellee.
2a
Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and
McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
This case concerns the relationship between the federal
civil courts and the military courts.
William M. Lips, a Senior Master Sergeant serving on
active duty in the United States Air Force and assigned
to the 50th Civil Engineering Squadron at Hahn Air Force
Base in Germany, was convicted in 1984 by a military
jury of rape, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920; forcible sod-
omy, in violation of Article 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925;
and aggravated assault (three counts), in violation of
Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Lips was sen-
tenced, inter alia, to twenty years’ imprisonment.
On direct appeal, the United States Air Force Court
of Military Review affirmed Lips’ conviction and sentence.
United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679 (AFCMR 1986). The
United States Court of Military Appeals denied discre-
tionary review, United States v. Lips, 24 M.J. 45 (CMA
1987), and also denied Lips’ petition for reconsideration,
24 M.J. 203 (CMA 1987). Thereafter the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the Air Force denied Lips’ motion for
a new trial.
In 1988, while confined in the United States Discipli-
nary Barracks at Leavenworth, Kansas, Lips filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, naming as the defendant the Commandant of the
Disciplinary Barracks. In his petition, Lips set forth two
grounds for relief: (1) that the military judge improperly
admitted into evidence certain sexually explicit materials
taken from his apartment by the arresting officers; and
(2) that the prosecutor violated his right against self-
bi erenereermieeniimel
3a
incrimination by referring to his post-arrest silence in
cross-examination and in closing argument.
The district court rejected the first ground Lips ad-
vanced for habeas relief, but found Lips’ second ground
for relief based on improper reference to post-arrest si-
lence to be meritorious and ordered the government to
provide Lips with a new trial within 120 days or re-
lease him. The Commandant appeals the district court’s
grant of habeas relief (our No. 92-3359). Lips cross
appeals that part of the district court’s order denying re-
lief on his first ground, i.e., the admission of the sexually
explicit materials (our No. 92-3360). On motion, an-
other panel of this court entered an order staying the
judgment of the district court pending disposition of this
appeal. .
Limited background information regarding the court-
martial is in order. The testimony of Cynthia Carite at
trial established, prima facie, that Lips had committed the
various crimes with which he was charged. Cynthia
Carite testified, inter alia, that on the night in question
Lips had shown her certain sexually explicit materials,
including magazines and video tapes. After Lips’ arrest,
the officers searched his apartment and took certain maga-
zines and tapes, some of which were later received into
evidence at trial, over objection. The admission of these
materials constituted Lips’ first ground for habeas relief.
Although Lips had made no post-arrest statements to
authorities, he did testify at trial and admitted that he
had done the various acts to which Cynthia Carite had
testified, but further testified that she had consented
thereto. Lips’ post-arrest silence was first raised by de-
fense counsel in his direct examination of Lips. At the
outset of direct examination, defense counsel asked Lips
why he had made no post-arrest statements to the au-
thorities. Lips answered that he had remained silent on
the advice of counsel.
4a
In cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to show
that the real reason Lips made no post-arrest statements
was that he desired to hear Cynthia Cartie’s testimony in
court before giving anyone his version of events so that
he could “tailor” his testimony and make it believable.
Further, in closing argument to the military judge, the
prosecutor stated that while Lips’ post-arrest silence was
no evidence of guilt, Lips had nonetheless waited until
trial “to tell his story,” so that he could first hear Cynthia
Carite’s testimony. Defense counsel made no objection at
trial to the prosecutor’s argument, which is not altogether
surprising since the prosecutor conceded, in front of the
military jury, that Lips’ post-arrest silence was no evi-
dence of guilt. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of
Lips and his closing argument to the jury constitute Lips’
second basis for habeas relief.
Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that al-
though the federal district court had jurisdiction to en-
tertain Lips’ petition, its scope of review was initially
limited to determining whether the claims Lips raised in
his federal habeas corpus petition were given full and
fair consideration by the military courts. If they were
given full and fair consideration, the district court should
have denied the petition. The record indicates to us that
the military courts did give full and fair consideration to
the matters Lips sought to have the federal district court
review. Therefore, the judgment of the district court
granting habeas corpus relief is reversed and the case re-
manded to the district court with directions to deny the
petition.
The military has its own independent criminal justice
system governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940. The Code is all-inclusive and pro-
vides, inter alia, for courts-martial, appellate review, and
limited certiorari review by the United States Supreme
Court. Lips’ petition for habeas corpus collaterally at-
tacked a general court-martial conviction that was af-
reel
Sa
firmed on appeal by the Air Force Court of Military
Review. Because of the independence of the military
court system, special considerations are involved when
federal civil courts collaterally review court-martial con-
victions.*
The starting point in our discussion is Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953). That case stands for the proposi-
tion that federal courts have jurisdiction over applicants
for habeas. corpus by persons incarcerated by the mili-
tary courts, though “in military habeas corpus the in-
quiry, the scope of matters open to review, has always
been more narrow than in civil cases.” /d. at 139. The
plurality in Burns further stated that “when a military
decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised
in [a petition for habeas corpus], it is not open to a fed-
eral civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate
the evidence.” Jd. at 142. In like vein, the Court stated
that “[i]t is the limited funtcion of the civil courts to de-
termine whether the military have given fair considera-
tion to each of these claims.” /d. at 144.
Under Burns, if the military gave full and fair con-
sideration to claims asserted in a federal habeas corpus
petition, the petition should be denied. Only when the
military has not given a petitioner’s claims full and fair
considerations does the scope of review by the federal
civil court expand.
In Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1990),
we held that review by a federal district court of a mili-
tary conviction is appropriate only if the following four
conditions are met: (1) the asserted error is of substan-
tial constitutional dimension; (2) the issue is one of law
rather than of disputed fact already determined by the
military tribunal; (3) there are no military considerations
that warrant different treatment of constitutional claims;
and (4) the military courts failed to give adequate con-
1 For an annotation on this general subject, see 95 A.L.R. Fed.
472.
6a
sideration to the issues involved or failed to apply proper
legal standards.
The district court held, in effect, that the military had
failed to give adequate consideration to Lips’ contention
that the prosecutor in cross-examining Lips concerning
post-arrest silence and in his closing argument violated
Lips’ Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. On that
basis, the district court proceeded to review that matter
de novo. The district court also reviewed Lips’ claim re-
garding the admission of the sexually explicit materials
without first determining whether the military had given
that matter full and fair consideration. We disagree and
believe that the military courts did give the matters raised
in this federal habeas proceeding full and fair considera-
tion and that the district court erred in reviewing these
matters de novo.
The brief on behalf of appellant in the appeal to the
United States Air Force Court of Military Review listed
twelve numbered issues. In “Issue V.” counsel asserted
that three separate errors occurred during the procecutor’s
closing argument. One of these errors was the prosecu-
tors comment on Lips’ “exercise of his right to remain
silent prior to trial.” Counsel did not set forth as a sep-
arate issue the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Lips and
made only passing reference to improper cross-examina-
tion in his argument under “Issue V.” In any event, the
United States Air Force Court of Military Review in its
opinion did not specifically refer to the improper cross-
examination issue, though it did specifically comment re-
garding the improper closing argument issue. In this re-
gard, that court spoke as follows:
The appellant also contends he is entitled to a
new trial because of improper findings and sentenc-
ing arguments by government counsel. Appellants’
counsel entered no objection at trial to the now
challenged statements made during argument. In
view of this, we consider this issue to be waived on
7a
appeal in the absence of plain error which doctrine
we find no basis here to invoke. R.C.M. 1001(g);
United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327 (1986); United
States v. Fisher, 17 M.J. 768 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).
22 M.J. at 683.
We think the United States Air Force Court of Mili-
tary Review gave the issue of improper closing argument
“full and fair consideration,” as required by Burns vy.
Wilson, supra, and also gave “adequate consideration” to
the issue and applied “proper legal standards,” as re-
quired by our Dodson v. Zelez, supra. Such being the
case, the district court erred in granting habeas corpus
relief based on improper prosecutorial closing argument.
As indicated, in addition to the improper closing argu-
ment issue, Lips also asserted as a basis for habeas corpus
relief the prosecutor’s cross-examination relating to his
post-arrest silence. At trial, defense counsel made only
one nonspecific objection to this line of questioning. Mil.
R. Evid. 103(a)(1), like Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), re-
quires a timely and specific objection to inadmissible tes-
timony. Moreover, counsel did not raise the issue of im-
proper cross-examination on appeal to the United States
Air Force Court of Military Review. Because defense
counsel did not make a timely and specific objection to
the prosecutor’s cross-examination at trial and also did
not assert the issue of improper cross-examination on ap-
peal, we deem the matter as one which was not raised
in the military courts.
To obtain federal habeas review of claims based on
trial errors to which no objection was made at trial, or of
claims that were not raised on appeal, a state prisoner
must show cause excusing the procedural default and ac-
tual prejudice resulting from the error. Murray v. Carrier.
477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986): Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72. 87 (1977). That same rule was applied by us
in Wolff v. United States, 737 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1984),
8a
wherein a federal habeas corpus procedure challenge was
made to a court-martial conviction. Nothing in the rec-
ord before us indicates that there was any “excuse” for
either of these procedural defaults, and hence the “cause
and actual prejudice” standard was not met. Accord-
ingly, the claim of improper cross-examination will not
be reviewed “on the merits” in the present federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143,
145 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986).?
By cross-appeal, Lips seeks review of the district court’s
holding that the use at trial of sexually explicit material
taken from his apartment shortly after his arrest did not
render his court-martial “fundamentally unfair.” A _ read-
ing of the opinion of the United States Air Force Court
of Military Review indicates clearly that that court fully
and fairly considered, and then rejected Lips’ claim that
the sexually explicit material taken from his apartment
was improperly admitted into evidence. 22 M.J. at 681-
83. Such being the case, the federal district court should
not have made further inquiry.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with direction
to the district court to deny the petition.
2 Even assuming that counsel’s objection at trial to the prosecu-
tor’s cross-examination was adequate and further assuming that
the matter of improper cross-examination was presented to the
United States Air Force Court of Military Review, the fact that
the court did not specifically address the question of improper cross-
examination in its opinion is not controlling. That court did spe-
cifically state that it had “examined the remaining assignments of
error and resolved them against the appellant.” In Watson, we
stated that “{w]hen an issue is briefed and argued before a mili-
tary board of review, we have held that the military tribunal has
given the claim fair consideration, even though its opinion sum-
marily disposed of the issue with the mere statement that it did not
find the issue meritorious or requiring discussion.” 782 F.2d at 145.
9a
APPENDIX B
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF KANSAS
Case No. 88-3396-R
WILLIAM M. L Ips,
Petitioner,
Vv.
COMMANDANT, USDB,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
[Filed July 31, 1992]
This matter comes before the court on petition for writ
of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner, an inmate at the United States Disciplinary
Barracks, Leavenworth, Kansas, was convicted of rape,
nonconsensual sodomy, assault, assault with a dangerous
weapon, and battery, and was sentenced to twenty-five
(25) years imprisonment on September |, 1984.
In this action, petitioner challenges his conviction and
asserts: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted into
evidence a sexually explicit video tape and four sexually
explicit magazines; and (2) his constitutionally guar-
anteed right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment
was violated when trial counsel (prosecutor) impermis-
sibly, and repeatedly, questioned him on cross-examina-
tion about his post-arrest silence. Counsel also com-
mented during closing argument on petitioner’s silence.
Having reviewed the record in this matter. the court
makes the following findings and order.
10a
Factual Background
In June, 1984, petitioner was serving on active duty
in the United States Air Force at Hahn Air Force Base,
Federal Republic of Germany. On June 4, 1984, while
petitioner's wife was in Texas, Cynthia Carite came to
petitioner's home for dinner. During the course of the
evening, sexual intercourse and sodomy occurred. Peti-
tioner claimed the events, which included bondage, oral
sex, and physically harsh behavior, such as spanking,
were consensual. Carite contended petitioner forced her
at gunpoint and knifepoint to perform the acts described.
On September 1, 1984, petitioner was convicted of
rape, nonconsensual sodomy, assault, assault with a dan-
gerous weapon, and battery. He was sentenced to: re-
duction to the lowest enlisted grade (E-1), forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, a dishonorable discharge, and
confinement for a period of twenty-five (25) years. On
June 19, 1985, the sentence was approved except for a
reduction in the term of confinement to twenty (20)
years.
Petitioner properly appealed his case to the Air Force
Court of Military Review (AFCMR) citing five (5)
errors, including the two (2) currently before this court
on his habeas petition. The AFCMR affirmed petitioner's
conviction and sentence. United States v. Lips, 22 M.J.
679 (AFCMR 1986). The court found that the sexually
explicit material was properly admitted. The court also
found that petitioner’s claim of impermissible prosecu-
torial comment on his post-arrest silence had been waived
for failure to object at trial. Petitioner’s motion for grant
of review was denied by the United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals (CMA). United States v. Lips, 24 M.J.
45 (USCMA 1987). A petition for reconsideration was
also denied. United States v. Lips, 24 M.J. 203
(USCMA 1987). Petitioner’s motion for a new trial
was denied by the Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force on August 13, 1987.
Petitioner commenced this action on October 27, 1988.
enter teeeeel
lla o
Discussion
Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court erred when
it admitted into evidence the sexually explicit videotape
and magazines. Any errors in the admissibility of evi-
dence are not grounds for habeas relief absent a showing
that the trial was so fundamentally unfair that it consti-
tutes a denial of due process. Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d
931, 934 (10th Cir. 1990). With respect to claims
which assert a denial of due process, this court will not
question the evidentiary or procedural rulings of the trial
court unless petitioner can show that, because of the
court’s actions, his trial, as a whole, was fundamentally
unfair. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th
Cir.) cert. denied, US. » FS Ban. 1
(1991).
Petitioner claimed the introduction of the sexually ex-
plicit evidence was highly prejudicial. This, however, is
usually true of any relevant evidence. The trial judge
admitted the evidence to show motive, intent, plan, and
design.
Petitioner has failed to show that the trial judge’s rul-
ing resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. This court
finds petitioner’s first claim is without merit.
Petitioner's second claim is more problematic and one
which this court believes requires it to grant the writ.
The court acknowledges that its review of a claim
made in a military habeas corpus petition is limited. In
Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir.
1990), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified
the four factors necessary for a determination of whether
review of a military conviction on habeas corpus is ap-
propriate. The factors to be considered are: (1) the
asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimen-
sion; (2) the issue must be one of law rather than of
disputed fact already determined by the military tribunal;
(3) military considerations may warrant different treat-
12a
ment of constitutional claims; and (4) the military court
must give adequate consideration to the issues involved
and apply proper legal standards. /d.
First, there can be little question that the asserted
error, impermissible comment on petitioner’s post-arrest
silence, is of substantial constitutional dimension. Once
a suspect has been apprised of his rights in accordance
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he is
assured that his silence will not be used against him.’
The use of his silence to impeach his testimony at trial is
fundamentally unfair and violates the protection provided
by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Barton, 731
F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1984).
Second, the issue before the court is clearly one of law
rather than a fact question previously determined by the
military tribunal.
Third, this court finds no unique military consideration
which apply to this issue.
Finally, this issue was raised before the military courts
of review, but those courts found the issue had been
waived for lack of a contemporaneous objection. A\l-
though this summary dismissal might not in itself justify
this court’s review, when considered with the other three
factors. the court holds this claim meets the requirements
for review. Dodson at 1253.
The test, in this circuit, for determining whether there
has been an impermissible comment on a defendant's
right to remain silent at the time of, and subsequent to,
his arrest is “whether the language is manifestly intended
or was of such character that the jury would naturally
and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defend-
ant’s right to remain silent.” U.S. v. Mora, 844 F.2d 233.
235 (10th Cir.) cert. denied Mora v. United States, 488
1 The equivalent of the Miranda warnings in the military is found
in Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
13a
U.S. 995 (1988). Furthermore, “the court must look to
the context in which the statement was made in order
to determine the manifest intention which prompted it
and its natural and necessary impact on the jury.” /d.
If some other equally plausible explanation exists for the
prosecutor’s comments, manifest intent will not be found.
Id.
A review of the transcript in this case reveals numer-
ous occasions during cross-examination where the prose-
cutor repeatedly referred to petitioner’s failure to “tell
anyone his story until now.” During cross-examination
of petitioner, the following questions and answers took
place:
Q. And you waited to talk about it until today
for the reason you told us, because it seemed to
you to be a good idea, and your lawyers told you it
was a good idea, correct?
A. I waited to tell you about it today, Sir?
Q. Talk to anybody about it.
A. There was no way I could have told any-
body—anybody about this from the get-go. There’s
no way I could tell anvone anything.
Q. You don’t think that the OSI would have
talked to you? You don’t think I would have talked
to you? You don’t think Captain Basten would have
talked to you? You don’t think that the jailer would
have talked to you?...
Q. In fact, unlike you, the victim in this case
has talked about this over and over and over and
over again, to OSI agents, to people involved in the
government’s side of this case, to your lawyers, at an
Article 32 Investigation, over and over and over
again. She talked—
(Transcript, Vol. IX, p. 965-66).
At pages 1090-91 the following exchange occurs:
Q. Sergeant Lips (sic), you sat on this witness
stand on Saturday and just as you told these people
l4a
for the first time to any government authorities of
any kind—certainly, for the first time to me—you
told this story, correct?
A. I did not tell you that was the first time I
told any government authorities.
Q. What government authorities have you told
it to before?
A. Captain Marlow.
Q. Who is your defense counsel.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who you understand operated only in your
interest, correct?
A. COO... .
Q. And that’s why you told it to him as opposed
to any of these people that you wouldn’t talk to,
correct?
(Transcript, Vol. X, p. 1090-91).
The court notes there are numerous other exchanges
throughout the transcript where direct comment was made
concerning petitioner’s post-arrest silence. Perhaps the
most compelling example is found at page 1238 of the
transcript:
Q. You know what’s going on here is that you
have chosen not to talk about this for the reasons
that you told us because it was the advice of counsel
and because you though it was in your best interests.
But you also know that if you wanted to talk about
it, you could have each and every day. You could
have talked to me. You could have talked to Cap-
tain Basten. You could have talked to the OSI. You
could have talked to your commander. You could
have talked to any number of people. Now isn’t that
true in spite of what you sat here a minute ago
and said? Isn’t that very simply the situation that
you've been in?
(Transcript Vol. XI, p. 1238).
—————L—<<$<$ - i.
15a
Using the test stated in Mora, this court concludes
that the manifest intent of the prosecutor was to com-
ment on the petitioner’s post-arrest silence and, thus.
attack his credibiliy. Furthermore, the natural and neces-
sary impact is that the jury would draw the conclusion
that the comments and questions concerned petitioner's
right to remain silent.
The court can find no other plausible explanation for
the prosecutor’s comments. The government, in its brief,
argues that petitioner’s counsel invited these comments
by asking on direct examination whether this was the
first time petitioner had told his story to the government
Officials. (Transcript, Vol. IX, p. 838). The government
cites no case authority to support its argument.
This circuit has held that under certain circumstances
defense counsel may invite prosecutorial comment on de-
fendant’s post-arrest silence and that such an invitation
leads to harmless error. In U.S. v. Pino, 827 F.2d 1429
(10th Cir. 1987). defense counsel asked on direct ex-
amination why petitioner had not told the arresting offi-
cer the truth when he was picked up. Defense counsel
further asked defendant why he had not told the FBI
the truth. A third time, defense counsel asked defendant
about who questioned him and how he answered. /d.
at 1432. "When the prosecutor narrowly cross-examined
on these questions, the court found no error. The court
cautioned. however, that pursuit of any further ques-
tioning by the prosecutor would have resulted in imper-
missible comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence. /d.
at 1432.° Two important distinctions between Pino and
2In Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 (1987), the Court held
that impermissible comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence did
not result in a violation of defendant’s due process rights where
the prosecutor asked only a single question, defense counsel lodged
an immediate objection and the court gave an immediate curative
instruction followed by a second curative instruction when the jury
retired for deliberation.
l6a
the case before this court are that there was very strong,
if not overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt in Pino
and the court gave a prompt curative instruction after
which the government refrained from any additional com-
ments on defendant’s silence.
The court finds that Pino is clearly distinguishable on
its facts and does not apply in this case. Defense coun-
sel did not invite the impermissible and repeated com-
ments by the prosecutor on petitioner’s post-arrest silence.
In Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1067 (10th
Cir.) cert. denied 414 U.S. 878 (1973), the defendant,
like petitioner, was accused of rape and acknowledged
that sexual activity had taken place. He also testified
the activity was consensual. During cross-examination, in
much less egregious terms than in the case before this
court, the prosecutor commented on defendant’s failure
to tell the police his story following his arrest. /d. Dur-
ing closing argument the prosecutor again commented
on defendant’s silence. The court held defendant’s con-
stitutional right to remain silent had been violated and
affirmed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. The
court said: “It would indeed be irregular and anomalous
to warn an accused that he had the right to remain
silent, that if he says anything it may be used against
him, however, if he does remain silent that too may be
used against him.” /d. at 1068.
The court believes that this case, like Johnson, was
mainly a test of the credibility of the victim and the peti-
tioner. In such a case, the prosecutor’s impermissible
comment on petitioner’s post-arrest silence is even more
damaging. In similar situations when juries have been
presented with two versions of the same incidents. it
has been held “where the case comes down to a one-on-
one situation, i.e. the word of the defendant against the
word of a key prosecution witness, and there is no cor-
roboration on either side, the importance of the defend-
ant’s credibility becomes so significant that prosecutorial
I i a iii ica
17a
error attacking that credibility cannot be considered
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Velarde y. Shulsen,
757 F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1985).
The government argues that counsel’s failure to object
at trial waived the issue and the military review court
so found. The record, however. shows one objection
made by counsel. In addition. the military review court’s
order only spoke to the failure to challenge the state-
ments made during argument. The court assumes that
this refers to the prosecutor’s statements during closing
argument rather than questions during cross-examination
Therefore, the objection made during cross-examination
preserved the issue for review. In Barton the court held
that even absent an objection at trial. the magnitude of
the right to post-arrest silence constitutes plain error and
the lack of an objection may be disregarded. 731 F.2d
at 675. See United States v. Howell, 18 MJ. 573. 575
(military judge has duty to instruct on prosecutor’s im-
“permissible comment. on defendant’s post-arrest silence
despite defense counsel’s failure to object).
In this case. even if the court did not find the issue
preserved, it finds that under plain error analysis, the
continuous and repeated comment on petitioner’s post-
arrest silence was “obvious and substantial error that
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” U.S. y. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242,
1254 (10th Cir.) cert. denied —— U.S, ——. iiZ SA.
238 (1991) citing United States v. Guzman. 781 F.2d
428, 431-32 (Sth Cir.) cert. denied 475 US. 1143
(1986).* The prosecutor’s repeated comments on peti-
8’ The court notes that this circuit, in United States v. Massey,
687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982), has articulated five factors
relevant to the determination of whether prosecutorial comment
on post-arrest silence is harmless. These include: (1) the use to
which the prosecutor puts the post-arrest silence; (2) who elected
to pursue the line of questioning; (3) the quantum of other evidence
of guilt; (4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and
ee
18a
tioner’s post-arrest silence resulted in a violation of the
constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Consequently, petitioner did not receive a fair trial
- and should be afforded a new trial.
It IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED
that the government must provide petitioner with a new
trial within 120 days or grant his release. The writ of
habeas corpus is granted.
DATED: This 3lst day of July, 1992, at Topeka,
Kansas.
s Richard D. Rogers
RICHARD D. ROGERS
United States District Judge
(5) the availaiblity of the trial judge of an opportunity to grant
a motion for a mistrial or to give curative instructions.
In this case, the prosecutor obviously used petitioner’s post-arrest
silence to attack his credibility. The evidence of guilt clearly de-
pended upon whose story was believed. The prosecutor vehemently
and continuously commented and questioned on the silence. The trial
judge failed to interpose curative instructions.
The only factor which is questionable in this case is who elected
to pursue the line of questioning. However, defense counsel’s one
rather ambiguous question on direct examination about whether
this was the first time petitioner had told his story to government
authorities did not warrant the barrage of comment and questions
from the prosecutor.
On this record, the error cannot be deemed harmless.
19a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
No. 55284,/AF
CMR 24883
U.S.
Vv.
WILLIAM M. Lips
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED
April 17, 1987
On consideration of appellant’s petition for reconsider-
ation and motions to file documents and to file corrected
page, it is ordered that the motion to file corrected page
is hereby granted; that the motion to file documents is
hereby denied; and that the petition is hereby denied.
20a
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
No. 55284 AF
CMR 24883
US.
v.
WILLIAM M. L Ips
ORDERS DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW
March 2, 1987
2la
APPENDIX E
U.S. AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW
ACM 24883
UNITED STATES
Vv.
SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT WILLIAM M. Lips,
FR 041-38-5639, United States Air Force
2 May 1986
Appellate Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Vaughan E.
Taylor and Mr. George Martin Kripner, Jacksonville,
North Carolina 28540. Colonel Leo L. Sergi, Major Con-
rad C. Baldwin, Jr., Captain Timothy J. Malloy and
Captain Charles L. Wille.
Counsel for the United States: Colonel Kenneth R.
Rengert, Colonel Andrew J. Adams, Jr., and Major David
F. Barton.
Before HODGSON, FORAY and MICHALSKI Ap-
pellate Military Judges.
DECISION
HODGSON, Chief Judge:
This is an appeal from a conviction of rape, forcible
sodomy and three allegations of assault culminating in an
approved sentence of a dishonorable discharge, 20 years
confinement, total forfeitures and reduction to airman
basic. The appellant is a senior non-commissioned officer
with years of outstanding service. The complaining wit-
ness is the dependent wife of a serviceman from whom
she was in the process of divorcing although at the time
of her encounter with the appellant she was living with
22a
another airman. In affirming the conviction we deem it
appropriate to discuss some of the assigned errors.
I
The victim’s husband and the appellant were assigned
to the same organization and it was at squadron parties
that the appellant and the victim first met. She and her
husband had been to the appellant’s apartment for dinner
several times, and on those occasions the appellant’s wife
was present. After the complainant and her husband
separated, she would see the appellant and talk to him—
sometimes at the on-base convenience store where she
worked. On 3 June, the appellant asked her over for
dinner the next evening. She accepted and told her boy
friend where she was going, which was about two blocks
away. When she arrived at the appellant’s house at about
1730 hours and saw his wife was not there, she assumed
Mrs. Lips was working and would be home later. While
they were sitting in the living room, the appellant tossed
her a magazine ‘ and said, “Here read this while I go get
. some appetizers.” The article he wished read was
entitled “Professor of Pleasure.” When she started read-
ing, the appellant put his arm around her shoulder and
a knife to her neck, saying, “Drop your pants, shirt and
bra.” He bent her over the coffee table and tied her
hands and legs to it. He then laid underneath her and
performed an act of cunnilingus. Later, the appellant
pointed a gun at her, said, “Are you ready for the ap-
petizer” and indicated she was to perform fellatio on him.
When she exhibited some reluctance, he told her, “[you
have] until the count of five to get it in [your] mouth.”
While this episode was continuing the appellant put
devices on her breasts described as “nipple clamps.”
There was conflicting testimony as to how painful this
apparatus was. He then hit her four or five times on the
buttocks with a belt saying, “You can [perform fellatio]
1 Penthouse Variations, May 1984, pages 12-18.
inital
23a
better than that.” This activity Stopped when the phone
rang and the appellant answered. When he finished the
conversation he brought her a drink and followed her into
the bathroom. In response to her query, “Why me?”, the
appellant replied, “Because you’re the most perfect one—
you're separated from your husband and living with an-
other man.” He indicated that “7 out 10 rapes go unre-
ported.” Subsequently, the appellant cooked a meal for
himself and the victim.
Later, they went into the bedroom and engaged in sex-
ual intercourse and mutual oral copulation. During this
episode the appellant attempted anal sodomy using a lub-
ricant from a blue and white tube; he was unsuccessful.
The victim left the appellant's apartment at about 2130
hours and went home. She said nothing about the inci-
dent to her boy friend until noon the next day when she
told him about the incident and he convinced her to re-
port the matter. Medical examination disclosed bruises
on her buttocks “three fingers wide” and abrasions on her
wrists consistent with being tied with a rope.
A search of the appellant’s apartment disclosed a
knife, a gun, “nipple clamps” and ropes. Over defense
objection the trial judge admitted a video tape and five
magazines containing explicit sexual behavior between
men and women. The dominant theme of these publica-
tions is the physical and sexual abuse of women.
The appellant admitted that his sexual encounter with
the complaining witness occurred on the day alleged, but
testified that the entire episode was initated by her when
she came to his apartment uninvited. It was she who
agreed to do something “kinky” like asking him to
“spank” her with a belt. It was her idea to use the
“nipple clamps” and it was she who Suggested anal sod-
omy which he declined. The appellant acknowledged he
has a “bondage fantasy.” and that he had lubricant in a
blue and white tube at his apartment. He also stated the
complaining witness suggested that “others” might enjoy
24a
this type of activity for money. She then demanded
$200.00, and when he refused, threatened to tell his wife
and otherwise harm his career. After he gave her only
$60.00, she said, “You will pay.” He also offered testi-
mony of the victim’s next door neighbor who stated she
heard the victim say, “Don’t hit so hard,” “Quit, it hurts”
and “Stop.” The witness attributed this conversation to
some type of sexual activity.
Finally, the appellant offered extensive evidence as to
his good character and reputation for truthfulness.
In rebuttal, the government established that it is not
unusual for a rape victim to delay reporting the incident
because of feelings of shame and belief that no one will
accept what happened. Additionally, there was evidence
by the victim’s exspouse and current partner that her
sexual preferences did not include being beaten or physi-
cally abused.
II
The appellant contends the trial judge erred in admit-
ting a sexually explicit video tape and similar literature
found in his apartment. He argues that Mil.R.Evid.
404(b)* does not apply as his possession of the seized
material was lawful and not probative of any contested
issue. He also urges that prejudicial effect of the chal-
lenged evidence is enormous. See Mil.R.Evid. 403.
The appellant is correct in that possession of sexually
explicit materials is lawful. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). He is also
correct that the admission of such materials is prejudicial.
2 Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;
Exceptions; Other Crimes.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
25a
But this is true of any relevant evidence, and in order
to be admissible under Rule 404(b) the evidence of
“OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS” must: 1)
Establish a matter in issue other than the accused’s pro-
pensity to commit the crime charged; 2) The other acts
are similar enough to be relevant: 3) The evidence of the
other acts is clear and convincing; and 4) The probative
value of the other acts is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. United States y. Tuchow,
768 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.1985): United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898 (Sth Cir.1978). To resolve this assigned
error we must examine the record in light of the criteria
just stated.
Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) states that evidence of other acts
are admissible to establish “. . . proof of motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.” The rule provides ex-
amples of bases for admission of other acts rather than an
exclusive list. By decision we have included modus op-
erandi, United States v. Barus, 16 M.J. 624 (A.F.C.M.R.
1983), and the accused’s consciousness of guilt, United
States v. Borland, 12 M.J. 855 (A.F.C.M.R.1981), as
other reasons for which other acts are admissible.
What matter in issue does the appellant’s possession of
materials depicting the sexual and physical abuse of
women establish? The trial judge admitted the evidence
as tending to establish motive, intent. plan and design.
Commendably, he explained on the record why he con-
cluded the probative value of the proffered evidence was
not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
appellant. See United States y. Holt, 21 M.J. 946
(A.F.C.M.R.1986). Our task now is to determine whether
the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in this regard.
United States v. Barus, supra; United States v. Byrd, 77)
F.2d 215 (7th Cir.1985),
Motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to
do an act. People v. Weiss, 252 A.D. 463, 300 N.Y.S.
26a
249 (1937). As such it is a state of mind tending to
show the basis for that individual’s behavior. See United
Siates v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 224 (C.M.A.1986). The
possession of graphically posed photographs showing
women being sexually and physically abused is a clear
indication of the appellant's emotional penchant for sex-
ual aberration. See State v. Bailey, 125 Ariz. 263, 609
P.2d 78 App. 1980). Thus, the admission of this ma-
terial would tend to supply a motive for the appellant to
commit the acts alleged.
His trial theory, that the victim had consented to the
sexual acts, was tantamount to a denial that he had
intended to achieve oral copulation and sexual inter-
course by force. The challenged evidence is admissible to
establish his intent in this trial by corroborating the vic-
tim’s testimony that she did not consent to the sexual acts.
People v. Jackson, 110 Cal.App.3d 560, 167 Cal. Rptr.
915 (1980). Such evidence is relevant because most sex
offenses occur in private and the determination of witness
credibility is a crucial role. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal.
3d 457, 143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433 (1978).
The seized sexually-oriented material also tends to
establish preparation for the charged offenses in the sense
that he had photographic depictions available suggesting
the activity in which he wished to participate. The photo-
graphs and the video tape depicted scenarios for non-
consensual sex. These materials together with the knife.
gun, ropes. “nipple clamps,” lubricant and magazine he
initially provided the victim when she arrived, are all
indicative of preparation and planning to achieve what
the victim said occurred.
Of the remaining Tuchow factors, those left are also
clearly established. There is no question that the sexual
activity protrayed in the magazines and video tape and
the offenses being tried are sufficiently alike to be rele-
vant. The photographs shows women being sexually
abused in a manner the victim claims happened to her.
27a
Also, it is clear that the challenged evidence belonged to
him—he admitted the material was his. We further con-
clude the evidence offered on the question of motive,
intent, plan and design was relevant as it had “a tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable than it
would be without the evidence.” Mil.R.Evid. 401.
Based upon the facts before us we hold the trial judge
was within the broad discretion given him to admit the
challenged evidence. We find no basis to overturn the
lower court's ruling on this issue. United States v. Rich-
ardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1985).
Ill
The appellant next argues that the trial judge erred
when he allowed Doctor Freddy E. Drummond, a clinical
psychologist with experience in counseling rape victims,
to testify in rebuttal that a high number of rapes i.e.,
between approximately 70-90% go unreported or are de-
layed in being reported because the victim is ashamed
or fearful that no one will believe her. It was the de-
fense’s position that Doctor Drummond had no special
expertise in this area and relied on hearsay, i.e., books
and articles to gain the necessary knowledge. In a col-
lateral assertion of error the appellant also contends that
the government should not have been permitted to offer, in
rebuttal, testimony that the victim's sexual preferences did
not include “rough sex.”
The purpose of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel,
counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by the op-
posing party. United States v. Shaw, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 267.
26 C.M.R. 47 (1958). Certainly testimony by the vic-
tim’s past and present sexual partners that she did not
enjoy “rough sex” tends to negate evidence by the de-
fense that she did. Further, Doctor Drummond is per-
mitted under Mil.R.Evid. 703 to rely on facts and data
known to him that are neither admitted nor admissible in
28a
evidence, so long as they are of a type “reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming an opin-
ion or inference upon the subject. United States v.
Neeley, 21 M.J. 606 (A.F.C.M.R.1985); see also United
States v. Eastman, 20 M.J. 948 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985). The
admission or exclusion of evidence on rebuttal rests
largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge
which we find he properly exercised. United States v.
Posey, 647 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1981).
IV
The appellant also contends he is entitled to a new trial
because of improper findings and sentencing arguments by
government counsel. Appellant’s counsel entered no ob-
jection at trial to the now challenged statements made
during argument. In view of this, we consider this issue
to be waived on appeal in the absence of plain error which
doctrine we find no basis here to invoke. R.C.M. 1001
(g); United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327 (1986); United
States v. Fisher, 17 M.J. 768 (A.F.C.M.R. 1938).
V
The appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the
offenses charged. He puts forth numerous reasons to
Support this argument. They are: the victim’s testimony
is so riddled with inconsistencies that it is not credible;
his version_of the incident, although it pictures him as
less than an ideal husband, is very credible; he has an
outstanding military record and a good reputation for
truthfulness which lends weight to his version of the facts;
and the victim is antagonistic toward him and claimed
rape only after he refused to pay her the amount she
demanded for the sexual services to which she willingly
consented.
That a sexual encounter took place between the appel-
lant and the victim is not disputed—the question is
eel
29a
Whether she consented to his actions. When a crucial
issue must be resolved in terms of essentially “a one-on-
one confrontation,” corroborative evidence of guilt is a
factor to be weighed. United States y. Pastor, 8 M.J.
280 (C.M.A. 1980): United States vy. King, 17 M.J.
L099 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984). The available corroborative
evidence includes: the victim reporting the incident, albeit
the next day, the gun, knife, ropes, and lubricant, sexually
explicit video tape, and the sexually-oriented magazine
the victim testified the appellant used in the assault were
found in his apartment. The appellant’s explanation of
why he possessed these items was before the court.
Much of the crucial testimony offered by the appel-
lant and the complaining witness is in toal conflict. She
said he invited her to dinner that evening; he stated she
came to his house uannounced. He testified she was the
one who broached the subject of “kinky sex” i.c., being
bound, beaten, anal sodomy and use of the “nipple
clamps.”; her version focused on the appellant using a
knife and gun to force her to submit. It is readily ap-
parent that the outcome of the trial rested on the weight
the members chose to give to the testimony of each
witness. United States vy. Lecappelain, 9 M.J. 562
(A.F.C.M.R.1980).
We have a statutory mandate to review the evidence
and in so doing we must judge the credibility of witnesses
and determine controverted questions of facts, recognizing
that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. Article
66(c), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to an accused’s guilt does not mean
that the evidence must be free of conflict. United States
v. Steward, 18 M.J. 506 (A.F.C.M.R.1984). This was a
vigorously contested trial with both the appellant and the
government offering a full measure of evidence to sup-
port their theory of the case. We have examined the rec-
ord of trial and, like the trial court, we are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of
the offenses alleged.
30a
VI
We have examined the remaining assigned errors and
resolve them against the appellant. United States v. Whit-
ing, 12 M.J. 253 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Hen-
derson, ACM 24341, 31 August 1984, pet. denied, 21
M.J. 38 (C.M.A.1985); see United States v. Heriot, 21
M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1985).
Vil
Finally, appellant defense counsel suggest that the ap-
proved sentence is inappropriately severe given the appel-
lant’s past outstanding military record. It is, of course,
true that an outstanding military record is a mitigating
factor in reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence.
United States v. Benedict, 20 M.J. 939 (A.F.C.M.R.
1985). But the scales of punishment must also weigh the
seriousness of the crime. Here the appellant has been
convicted of a series of aggravated sex offenses with the
same victim. Under the facts of this case we consider
the approved sentence to be entirely appropriate. For the
reasons stated the findings of guilty and the sentence are
AFFIRMED.
FORAY, Senior Judge and MICHALSKI, Judge, con-
cur.
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