Appendices — Lips v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-3359 and No. 92-3360

WILLIAM M. LPs,

A ppellee,/Cross-A ppellant,

Vv.

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES

DISCIPLINARY BARRACKS,

Appellant Cross-A ppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Kansas

(D.C. No. 88-3396-R )

[Filed July 1, 1993]

Jan Horbaly, Burke, Virginia, for Appellee Cross-Appel-

lant.

Thomas E. Booth and David Shelledy, United States De-

partment of Justice, Appellate Section, Criminal Division,

Washington, D.C. (Jackie A. Rapstine, Assistant U.S.

Attorney; Lee Thompson, U.S. Attorney, Topeka, Kansas;

and Conrad Von Wald, LTC., Office of the Judge Advo-

cate General, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., with him

on the brief), for Appellant Cross-Appellee.

2a

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

This case concerns the relationship between the federal

civil courts and the military courts.

William M. Lips, a Senior Master Sergeant serving on

active duty in the United States Air Force and assigned

to the 50th Civil Engineering Squadron at Hahn Air Force

Base in Germany, was convicted in 1984 by a military

jury of rape, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920; forcible sod-

omy, in violation of Article 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925;

and aggravated assault (three counts), in violation of

Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Lips was sen-

tenced, inter alia, to twenty years’ imprisonment.

On direct appeal, the United States Air Force Court

of Military Review affirmed Lips’ conviction and sentence.

United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679 (AFCMR 1986). The

United States Court of Military Appeals denied discre-

tionary review, United States v. Lips, 24 M.J. 45 (CMA

1987), and also denied Lips’ petition for reconsideration,

24 M.J. 203 (CMA 1987). Thereafter the Judge Ad-

vocate General of the Air Force denied Lips’ motion for

a new trial.

In 1988, while confined in the United States Discipli-

nary Barracks at Leavenworth, Kansas, Lips filed a peti-

tion for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

in the United States District Court for the District of

Kansas, naming as the defendant the Commandant of the

Disciplinary Barracks. In his petition, Lips set forth two

grounds for relief: (1) that the military judge improperly

admitted into evidence certain sexually explicit materials

taken from his apartment by the arresting officers; and

(2) that the prosecutor violated his right against self-

bi erenereermieeniimel

3a

incrimination by referring to his post-arrest silence in

cross-examination and in closing argument.

The district court rejected the first ground Lips ad-

vanced for habeas relief, but found Lips’ second ground

for relief based on improper reference to post-arrest si-

lence to be meritorious and ordered the government to

provide Lips with a new trial within 120 days or re-

lease him. The Commandant appeals the district court’s

grant of habeas relief (our No. 92-3359). Lips cross

appeals that part of the district court’s order denying re-

lief on his first ground, i.e., the admission of the sexually

explicit materials (our No. 92-3360). On motion, an-

other panel of this court entered an order staying the

judgment of the district court pending disposition of this

appeal. .

Limited background information regarding the court-

martial is in order. The testimony of Cynthia Carite at

trial established, prima facie, that Lips had committed the

various crimes with which he was charged. Cynthia

Carite testified, inter alia, that on the night in question

Lips had shown her certain sexually explicit materials,

including magazines and video tapes. After Lips’ arrest,

the officers searched his apartment and took certain maga-

zines and tapes, some of which were later received into

evidence at trial, over objection. The admission of these

materials constituted Lips’ first ground for habeas relief.

Although Lips had made no post-arrest statements to

authorities, he did testify at trial and admitted that he

had done the various acts to which Cynthia Carite had

testified, but further testified that she had consented

thereto. Lips’ post-arrest silence was first raised by de-

fense counsel in his direct examination of Lips. At the

outset of direct examination, defense counsel asked Lips

why he had made no post-arrest statements to the au-

thorities. Lips answered that he had remained silent on

the advice of counsel.

4a

In cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to show

that the real reason Lips made no post-arrest statements

was that he desired to hear Cynthia Cartie’s testimony in

court before giving anyone his version of events so that

he could “tailor” his testimony and make it believable.

Further, in closing argument to the military judge, the

prosecutor stated that while Lips’ post-arrest silence was

no evidence of guilt, Lips had nonetheless waited until

trial “to tell his story,” so that he could first hear Cynthia

Carite’s testimony. Defense counsel made no objection at

trial to the prosecutor’s argument, which is not altogether

surprising since the prosecutor conceded, in front of the

military jury, that Lips’ post-arrest silence was no evi-

dence of guilt. The prosecutor’s cross-examination of

Lips and his closing argument to the jury constitute Lips’

second basis for habeas relief.

Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that al-

though the federal district court had jurisdiction to en-

tertain Lips’ petition, its scope of review was initially

limited to determining whether the claims Lips raised in

his federal habeas corpus petition were given full and

fair consideration by the military courts. If they were

given full and fair consideration, the district court should

have denied the petition. The record indicates to us that

the military courts did give full and fair consideration to

the matters Lips sought to have the federal district court

review. Therefore, the judgment of the district court

granting habeas corpus relief is reversed and the case re-

manded to the district court with directions to deny the

petition.

The military has its own independent criminal justice

system governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940. The Code is all-inclusive and pro-

vides, inter alia, for courts-martial, appellate review, and

limited certiorari review by the United States Supreme

Court. Lips’ petition for habeas corpus collaterally at-

tacked a general court-martial conviction that was af-

reel

Sa

firmed on appeal by the Air Force Court of Military

Review. Because of the independence of the military

court system, special considerations are involved when

federal civil courts collaterally review court-martial con-

victions.*

The starting point in our discussion is Burns v. Wilson,

346 U.S. 137 (1953). That case stands for the proposi-

tion that federal courts have jurisdiction over applicants

for habeas. corpus by persons incarcerated by the mili-

tary courts, though “in military habeas corpus the in-

quiry, the scope of matters open to review, has always

been more narrow than in civil cases.” /d. at 139. The

plurality in Burns further stated that “when a military

decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised

in [a petition for habeas corpus], it is not open to a fed-

eral civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate

the evidence.” Jd. at 142. In like vein, the Court stated

that “[i]t is the limited funtcion of the civil courts to de-

termine whether the military have given fair considera-

tion to each of these claims.” /d. at 144.

Under Burns, if the military gave full and fair con-

sideration to claims asserted in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the petition should be denied. Only when the

military has not given a petitioner’s claims full and fair

considerations does the scope of review by the federal

civil court expand.

In Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1990),

we held that review by a federal district court of a mili-

tary conviction is appropriate only if the following four

conditions are met: (1) the asserted error is of substan-

tial constitutional dimension; (2) the issue is one of law

rather than of disputed fact already determined by the

military tribunal; (3) there are no military considerations

that warrant different treatment of constitutional claims;

and (4) the military courts failed to give adequate con-

1 For an annotation on this general subject, see 95 A.L.R. Fed.

472.

6a

sideration to the issues involved or failed to apply proper

legal standards.

The district court held, in effect, that the military had

failed to give adequate consideration to Lips’ contention

that the prosecutor in cross-examining Lips concerning

post-arrest silence and in his closing argument violated

Lips’ Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. On that

basis, the district court proceeded to review that matter

de novo. The district court also reviewed Lips’ claim re-

garding the admission of the sexually explicit materials

without first determining whether the military had given

that matter full and fair consideration. We disagree and

believe that the military courts did give the matters raised

in this federal habeas proceeding full and fair considera-

tion and that the district court erred in reviewing these

matters de novo.

The brief on behalf of appellant in the appeal to the

United States Air Force Court of Military Review listed

twelve numbered issues. In “Issue V.” counsel asserted

that three separate errors occurred during the procecutor’s

closing argument. One of these errors was the prosecu-

tors comment on Lips’ “exercise of his right to remain

silent prior to trial.” Counsel did not set forth as a sep-

arate issue the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Lips and

made only passing reference to improper cross-examina-

tion in his argument under “Issue V.” In any event, the

United States Air Force Court of Military Review in its

opinion did not specifically refer to the improper cross-

examination issue, though it did specifically comment re-

garding the improper closing argument issue. In this re-

gard, that court spoke as follows:

The appellant also contends he is entitled to a

new trial because of improper findings and sentenc-

ing arguments by government counsel. Appellants’

counsel entered no objection at trial to the now

challenged statements made during argument. In

view of this, we consider this issue to be waived on

7a

appeal in the absence of plain error which doctrine

we find no basis here to invoke. R.C.M. 1001(g);

United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327 (1986); United

States v. Fisher, 17 M.J. 768 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).

22 M.J. at 683.

We think the United States Air Force Court of Mili-

tary Review gave the issue of improper closing argument

“full and fair consideration,” as required by Burns vy.

Wilson, supra, and also gave “adequate consideration” to

the issue and applied “proper legal standards,” as re-

quired by our Dodson v. Zelez, supra. Such being the

case, the district court erred in granting habeas corpus

relief based on improper prosecutorial closing argument.

As indicated, in addition to the improper closing argu-

ment issue, Lips also asserted as a basis for habeas corpus

relief the prosecutor’s cross-examination relating to his

post-arrest silence. At trial, defense counsel made only

one nonspecific objection to this line of questioning. Mil.

R. Evid. 103(a)(1), like Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), re-

quires a timely and specific objection to inadmissible tes-

timony. Moreover, counsel did not raise the issue of im-

proper cross-examination on appeal to the United States

Air Force Court of Military Review. Because defense

counsel did not make a timely and specific objection to

the prosecutor’s cross-examination at trial and also did

not assert the issue of improper cross-examination on ap-

peal, we deem the matter as one which was not raised

in the military courts.

To obtain federal habeas review of claims based on

trial errors to which no objection was made at trial, or of

claims that were not raised on appeal, a state prisoner

must show cause excusing the procedural default and ac-

tual prejudice resulting from the error. Murray v. Carrier.

477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986): Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72. 87 (1977). That same rule was applied by us

in Wolff v. United States, 737 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1984),

8a

wherein a federal habeas corpus procedure challenge was

made to a court-martial conviction. Nothing in the rec-

ord before us indicates that there was any “excuse” for

either of these procedural defaults, and hence the “cause

and actual prejudice” standard was not met. Accord-

ingly, the claim of improper cross-examination will not

be reviewed “on the merits” in the present federal habeas

corpus proceeding. Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143,

145 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986).?

By cross-appeal, Lips seeks review of the district court’s

holding that the use at trial of sexually explicit material

taken from his apartment shortly after his arrest did not

render his court-martial “fundamentally unfair.” A _ read-

ing of the opinion of the United States Air Force Court

of Military Review indicates clearly that that court fully

and fairly considered, and then rejected Lips’ claim that

the sexually explicit material taken from his apartment

was improperly admitted into evidence. 22 M.J. at 681-

83. Such being the case, the federal district court should

not have made further inquiry.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with direction

to the district court to deny the petition.

2 Even assuming that counsel’s objection at trial to the prosecu-

tor’s cross-examination was adequate and further assuming that

the matter of improper cross-examination was presented to the

United States Air Force Court of Military Review, the fact that

the court did not specifically address the question of improper cross-

examination in its opinion is not controlling. That court did spe-

cifically state that it had “examined the remaining assignments of

error and resolved them against the appellant.” In Watson, we

stated that “{w]hen an issue is briefed and argued before a mili-

tary board of review, we have held that the military tribunal has

given the claim fair consideration, even though its opinion sum-

marily disposed of the issue with the mere statement that it did not

find the issue meritorious or requiring discussion.” 782 F.2d at 145.

9a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF KANSAS

Case No. 88-3396-R

WILLIAM M. L Ips,

Petitioner,

Vv.

COMMANDANT, USDB,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

[Filed July 31, 1992]

This matter comes before the court on petition for writ

of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Petitioner, an inmate at the United States Disciplinary

Barracks, Leavenworth, Kansas, was convicted of rape,

nonconsensual sodomy, assault, assault with a dangerous

weapon, and battery, and was sentenced to twenty-five

(25) years imprisonment on September |, 1984.

In this action, petitioner challenges his conviction and

asserts: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted into

evidence a sexually explicit video tape and four sexually

explicit magazines; and (2) his constitutionally guar-

anteed right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment

was violated when trial counsel (prosecutor) impermis-

sibly, and repeatedly, questioned him on cross-examina-

tion about his post-arrest silence. Counsel also com-

mented during closing argument on petitioner’s silence.

Having reviewed the record in this matter. the court

makes the following findings and order.

10a

Factual Background

In June, 1984, petitioner was serving on active duty

in the United States Air Force at Hahn Air Force Base,

Federal Republic of Germany. On June 4, 1984, while

petitioner's wife was in Texas, Cynthia Carite came to

petitioner's home for dinner. During the course of the

evening, sexual intercourse and sodomy occurred. Peti-

tioner claimed the events, which included bondage, oral

sex, and physically harsh behavior, such as spanking,

were consensual. Carite contended petitioner forced her

at gunpoint and knifepoint to perform the acts described.

On September 1, 1984, petitioner was convicted of

rape, nonconsensual sodomy, assault, assault with a dan-

gerous weapon, and battery. He was sentenced to: re-

duction to the lowest enlisted grade (E-1), forfeiture of

all pay and allowances, a dishonorable discharge, and

confinement for a period of twenty-five (25) years. On

June 19, 1985, the sentence was approved except for a

reduction in the term of confinement to twenty (20)

years.

Petitioner properly appealed his case to the Air Force

Court of Military Review (AFCMR) citing five (5)

errors, including the two (2) currently before this court

on his habeas petition. The AFCMR affirmed petitioner's

conviction and sentence. United States v. Lips, 22 M.J.

679 (AFCMR 1986). The court found that the sexually

explicit material was properly admitted. The court also

found that petitioner’s claim of impermissible prosecu-

torial comment on his post-arrest silence had been waived

for failure to object at trial. Petitioner’s motion for grant

of review was denied by the United States Court of Mili-

tary Appeals (CMA). United States v. Lips, 24 M.J.

45 (USCMA 1987). A petition for reconsideration was

also denied. United States v. Lips, 24 M.J. 203

(USCMA 1987). Petitioner’s motion for a new trial

was denied by the Judge Advocate General of the Air

Force on August 13, 1987.

Petitioner commenced this action on October 27, 1988.

enter teeeeel

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Discussion

Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court erred when

it admitted into evidence the sexually explicit videotape

and magazines. Any errors in the admissibility of evi-

dence are not grounds for habeas relief absent a showing

that the trial was so fundamentally unfair that it consti-

tutes a denial of due process. Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d

931, 934 (10th Cir. 1990). With respect to claims

which assert a denial of due process, this court will not

question the evidentiary or procedural rulings of the trial

court unless petitioner can show that, because of the

court’s actions, his trial, as a whole, was fundamentally

unfair. Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th

Cir.) cert. denied, US. » FS Ban. 1

(1991).

Petitioner claimed the introduction of the sexually ex-

plicit evidence was highly prejudicial. This, however, is

usually true of any relevant evidence. The trial judge

admitted the evidence to show motive, intent, plan, and

design.

Petitioner has failed to show that the trial judge’s rul-

ing resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. This court

finds petitioner’s first claim is without merit.

Petitioner's second claim is more problematic and one

which this court believes requires it to grant the writ.

The court acknowledges that its review of a claim

made in a military habeas corpus petition is limited. In

Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir.

1990), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals identified

the four factors necessary for a determination of whether

review of a military conviction on habeas corpus is ap-

propriate. The factors to be considered are: (1) the

asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimen-

sion; (2) the issue must be one of law rather than of

disputed fact already determined by the military tribunal;

(3) military considerations may warrant different treat-

12a

ment of constitutional claims; and (4) the military court

must give adequate consideration to the issues involved

and apply proper legal standards. /d.

First, there can be little question that the asserted

error, impermissible comment on petitioner’s post-arrest

silence, is of substantial constitutional dimension. Once

a suspect has been apprised of his rights in accordance

with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he is

assured that his silence will not be used against him.’

The use of his silence to impeach his testimony at trial is

fundamentally unfair and violates the protection provided

by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Barton, 731

F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1984).

Second, the issue before the court is clearly one of law

rather than a fact question previously determined by the

military tribunal.

Third, this court finds no unique military consideration

which apply to this issue.

Finally, this issue was raised before the military courts

of review, but those courts found the issue had been

waived for lack of a contemporaneous objection. A\l-

though this summary dismissal might not in itself justify

this court’s review, when considered with the other three

factors. the court holds this claim meets the requirements

for review. Dodson at 1253.

The test, in this circuit, for determining whether there

has been an impermissible comment on a defendant's

right to remain silent at the time of, and subsequent to,

his arrest is “whether the language is manifestly intended

or was of such character that the jury would naturally

and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defend-

ant’s right to remain silent.” U.S. v. Mora, 844 F.2d 233.

235 (10th Cir.) cert. denied Mora v. United States, 488

1 The equivalent of the Miranda warnings in the military is found

in Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

13a

U.S. 995 (1988). Furthermore, “the court must look to

the context in which the statement was made in order

to determine the manifest intention which prompted it

and its natural and necessary impact on the jury.” /d.

If some other equally plausible explanation exists for the

prosecutor’s comments, manifest intent will not be found.

Id.

A review of the transcript in this case reveals numer-

ous occasions during cross-examination where the prose-

cutor repeatedly referred to petitioner’s failure to “tell

anyone his story until now.” During cross-examination

of petitioner, the following questions and answers took

place:

Q. And you waited to talk about it until today

for the reason you told us, because it seemed to

you to be a good idea, and your lawyers told you it

was a good idea, correct?

A. I waited to tell you about it today, Sir?

Q. Talk to anybody about it.

A. There was no way I could have told any-

body—anybody about this from the get-go. There’s

no way I could tell anvone anything.

Q. You don’t think that the OSI would have

talked to you? You don’t think I would have talked

to you? You don’t think Captain Basten would have

talked to you? You don’t think that the jailer would

have talked to you?...

Q. In fact, unlike you, the victim in this case

has talked about this over and over and over and

over again, to OSI agents, to people involved in the

government’s side of this case, to your lawyers, at an

Article 32 Investigation, over and over and over

again. She talked—

(Transcript, Vol. IX, p. 965-66).

At pages 1090-91 the following exchange occurs:

Q. Sergeant Lips (sic), you sat on this witness

stand on Saturday and just as you told these people

l4a

for the first time to any government authorities of

any kind—certainly, for the first time to me—you

told this story, correct?

A. I did not tell you that was the first time I

told any government authorities.

Q. What government authorities have you told

it to before?

A. Captain Marlow.

Q. Who is your defense counsel.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who you understand operated only in your

interest, correct?

A. COO... .

Q. And that’s why you told it to him as opposed

to any of these people that you wouldn’t talk to,

correct?

(Transcript, Vol. X, p. 1090-91).

The court notes there are numerous other exchanges

throughout the transcript where direct comment was made

concerning petitioner’s post-arrest silence. Perhaps the

most compelling example is found at page 1238 of the

transcript:

Q. You know what’s going on here is that you

have chosen not to talk about this for the reasons

that you told us because it was the advice of counsel

and because you though it was in your best interests.

But you also know that if you wanted to talk about

it, you could have each and every day. You could

have talked to me. You could have talked to Cap-

tain Basten. You could have talked to the OSI. You

could have talked to your commander. You could

have talked to any number of people. Now isn’t that

true in spite of what you sat here a minute ago

and said? Isn’t that very simply the situation that

you've been in?

(Transcript Vol. XI, p. 1238).

—————L—<<$<$ - i.

15a

Using the test stated in Mora, this court concludes

that the manifest intent of the prosecutor was to com-

ment on the petitioner’s post-arrest silence and, thus.

attack his credibiliy. Furthermore, the natural and neces-

sary impact is that the jury would draw the conclusion

that the comments and questions concerned petitioner's

right to remain silent.

The court can find no other plausible explanation for

the prosecutor’s comments. The government, in its brief,

argues that petitioner’s counsel invited these comments

by asking on direct examination whether this was the

first time petitioner had told his story to the government

Officials. (Transcript, Vol. IX, p. 838). The government

cites no case authority to support its argument.

This circuit has held that under certain circumstances

defense counsel may invite prosecutorial comment on de-

fendant’s post-arrest silence and that such an invitation

leads to harmless error. In U.S. v. Pino, 827 F.2d 1429

(10th Cir. 1987). defense counsel asked on direct ex-

amination why petitioner had not told the arresting offi-

cer the truth when he was picked up. Defense counsel

further asked defendant why he had not told the FBI

the truth. A third time, defense counsel asked defendant

about who questioned him and how he answered. /d.

at 1432. "When the prosecutor narrowly cross-examined

on these questions, the court found no error. The court

cautioned. however, that pursuit of any further ques-

tioning by the prosecutor would have resulted in imper-

missible comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence. /d.

at 1432.° Two important distinctions between Pino and

2In Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 (1987), the Court held

that impermissible comment on defendant’s post-arrest silence did

not result in a violation of defendant’s due process rights where

the prosecutor asked only a single question, defense counsel lodged

an immediate objection and the court gave an immediate curative

instruction followed by a second curative instruction when the jury

retired for deliberation.

l6a

the case before this court are that there was very strong,

if not overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt in Pino

and the court gave a prompt curative instruction after

which the government refrained from any additional com-

ments on defendant’s silence.

The court finds that Pino is clearly distinguishable on

its facts and does not apply in this case. Defense coun-

sel did not invite the impermissible and repeated com-

ments by the prosecutor on petitioner’s post-arrest silence.

In Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1067 (10th

Cir.) cert. denied 414 U.S. 878 (1973), the defendant,

like petitioner, was accused of rape and acknowledged

that sexual activity had taken place. He also testified

the activity was consensual. During cross-examination, in

much less egregious terms than in the case before this

court, the prosecutor commented on defendant’s failure

to tell the police his story following his arrest. /d. Dur-

ing closing argument the prosecutor again commented

on defendant’s silence. The court held defendant’s con-

stitutional right to remain silent had been violated and

affirmed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. The

court said: “It would indeed be irregular and anomalous

to warn an accused that he had the right to remain

silent, that if he says anything it may be used against

him, however, if he does remain silent that too may be

used against him.” /d. at 1068.

The court believes that this case, like Johnson, was

mainly a test of the credibility of the victim and the peti-

tioner. In such a case, the prosecutor’s impermissible

comment on petitioner’s post-arrest silence is even more

damaging. In similar situations when juries have been

presented with two versions of the same incidents. it

has been held “where the case comes down to a one-on-

one situation, i.e. the word of the defendant against the

word of a key prosecution witness, and there is no cor-

roboration on either side, the importance of the defend-

ant’s credibility becomes so significant that prosecutorial

I i a iii ica

17a

error attacking that credibility cannot be considered

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Velarde y. Shulsen,

757 F.2d 1093, 1095 (10th Cir. 1985).

The government argues that counsel’s failure to object

at trial waived the issue and the military review court

so found. The record, however. shows one objection

made by counsel. In addition. the military review court’s

order only spoke to the failure to challenge the state-

ments made during argument. The court assumes that

this refers to the prosecutor’s statements during closing

argument rather than questions during cross-examination

Therefore, the objection made during cross-examination

preserved the issue for review. In Barton the court held

that even absent an objection at trial. the magnitude of

the right to post-arrest silence constitutes plain error and

the lack of an objection may be disregarded. 731 F.2d

at 675. See United States v. Howell, 18 MJ. 573. 575

(military judge has duty to instruct on prosecutor’s im-

“permissible comment. on defendant’s post-arrest silence

despite defense counsel’s failure to object).

In this case. even if the court did not find the issue

preserved, it finds that under plain error analysis, the

continuous and repeated comment on petitioner’s post-

arrest silence was “obvious and substantial error that

affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.” U.S. y. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242,

1254 (10th Cir.) cert. denied —— U.S, ——. iiZ SA.

238 (1991) citing United States v. Guzman. 781 F.2d

428, 431-32 (Sth Cir.) cert. denied 475 US. 1143

(1986).* The prosecutor’s repeated comments on peti-

8’ The court notes that this circuit, in United States v. Massey,

687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982), has articulated five factors

relevant to the determination of whether prosecutorial comment

on post-arrest silence is harmless. These include: (1) the use to

which the prosecutor puts the post-arrest silence; (2) who elected

to pursue the line of questioning; (3) the quantum of other evidence

of guilt; (4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and

ee

18a

tioner’s post-arrest silence resulted in a violation of the

constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amend-

ment. Consequently, petitioner did not receive a fair trial

- and should be afforded a new trial.

It IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED

that the government must provide petitioner with a new

trial within 120 days or grant his release. The writ of

habeas corpus is granted.

DATED: This 3lst day of July, 1992, at Topeka,

Kansas.

s Richard D. Rogers

RICHARD D. ROGERS

United States District Judge

(5) the availaiblity of the trial judge of an opportunity to grant

a motion for a mistrial or to give curative instructions.

In this case, the prosecutor obviously used petitioner’s post-arrest

silence to attack his credibility. The evidence of guilt clearly de-

pended upon whose story was believed. The prosecutor vehemently

and continuously commented and questioned on the silence. The trial

judge failed to interpose curative instructions.

The only factor which is questionable in this case is who elected

to pursue the line of questioning. However, defense counsel’s one

rather ambiguous question on direct examination about whether

this was the first time petitioner had told his story to government

authorities did not warrant the barrage of comment and questions

from the prosecutor.

On this record, the error cannot be deemed harmless.

19a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 55284,/AF

CMR 24883

U.S.

Vv.

WILLIAM M. Lips

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

April 17, 1987

On consideration of appellant’s petition for reconsider-

ation and motions to file documents and to file corrected

page, it is ordered that the motion to file corrected page

is hereby granted; that the motion to file documents is

hereby denied; and that the petition is hereby denied.

20a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 55284 AF

CMR 24883

US.

v.

WILLIAM M. L Ips

ORDERS DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW

March 2, 1987

2la

APPENDIX E

U.S. AIR FORCE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW

ACM 24883

UNITED STATES

Vv.

SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT WILLIAM M. Lips,

FR 041-38-5639, United States Air Force

2 May 1986

Appellate Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Vaughan E.

Taylor and Mr. George Martin Kripner, Jacksonville,

North Carolina 28540. Colonel Leo L. Sergi, Major Con-

rad C. Baldwin, Jr., Captain Timothy J. Malloy and

Captain Charles L. Wille.

Counsel for the United States: Colonel Kenneth R.

Rengert, Colonel Andrew J. Adams, Jr., and Major David

F. Barton.

Before HODGSON, FORAY and MICHALSKI Ap-

pellate Military Judges.

DECISION

HODGSON, Chief Judge:

This is an appeal from a conviction of rape, forcible

sodomy and three allegations of assault culminating in an

approved sentence of a dishonorable discharge, 20 years

confinement, total forfeitures and reduction to airman

basic. The appellant is a senior non-commissioned officer

with years of outstanding service. The complaining wit-

ness is the dependent wife of a serviceman from whom

she was in the process of divorcing although at the time

of her encounter with the appellant she was living with

22a

another airman. In affirming the conviction we deem it

appropriate to discuss some of the assigned errors.

I

The victim’s husband and the appellant were assigned

to the same organization and it was at squadron parties

that the appellant and the victim first met. She and her

husband had been to the appellant’s apartment for dinner

several times, and on those occasions the appellant’s wife

was present. After the complainant and her husband

separated, she would see the appellant and talk to him—

sometimes at the on-base convenience store where she

worked. On 3 June, the appellant asked her over for

dinner the next evening. She accepted and told her boy

friend where she was going, which was about two blocks

away. When she arrived at the appellant’s house at about

1730 hours and saw his wife was not there, she assumed

Mrs. Lips was working and would be home later. While

they were sitting in the living room, the appellant tossed

her a magazine ‘ and said, “Here read this while I go get

. some appetizers.” The article he wished read was

entitled “Professor of Pleasure.” When she started read-

ing, the appellant put his arm around her shoulder and

a knife to her neck, saying, “Drop your pants, shirt and

bra.” He bent her over the coffee table and tied her

hands and legs to it. He then laid underneath her and

performed an act of cunnilingus. Later, the appellant

pointed a gun at her, said, “Are you ready for the ap-

petizer” and indicated she was to perform fellatio on him.

When she exhibited some reluctance, he told her, “[you

have] until the count of five to get it in [your] mouth.”

While this episode was continuing the appellant put

devices on her breasts described as “nipple clamps.”

There was conflicting testimony as to how painful this

apparatus was. He then hit her four or five times on the

buttocks with a belt saying, “You can [perform fellatio]

1 Penthouse Variations, May 1984, pages 12-18.

inital

23a

better than that.” This activity Stopped when the phone

rang and the appellant answered. When he finished the

conversation he brought her a drink and followed her into

the bathroom. In response to her query, “Why me?”, the

appellant replied, “Because you’re the most perfect one—

you're separated from your husband and living with an-

other man.” He indicated that “7 out 10 rapes go unre-

ported.” Subsequently, the appellant cooked a meal for

himself and the victim.

Later, they went into the bedroom and engaged in sex-

ual intercourse and mutual oral copulation. During this

episode the appellant attempted anal sodomy using a lub-

ricant from a blue and white tube; he was unsuccessful.

The victim left the appellant's apartment at about 2130

hours and went home. She said nothing about the inci-

dent to her boy friend until noon the next day when she

told him about the incident and he convinced her to re-

port the matter. Medical examination disclosed bruises

on her buttocks “three fingers wide” and abrasions on her

wrists consistent with being tied with a rope.

A search of the appellant’s apartment disclosed a

knife, a gun, “nipple clamps” and ropes. Over defense

objection the trial judge admitted a video tape and five

magazines containing explicit sexual behavior between

men and women. The dominant theme of these publica-

tions is the physical and sexual abuse of women.

The appellant admitted that his sexual encounter with

the complaining witness occurred on the day alleged, but

testified that the entire episode was initated by her when

she came to his apartment uninvited. It was she who

agreed to do something “kinky” like asking him to

“spank” her with a belt. It was her idea to use the

“nipple clamps” and it was she who Suggested anal sod-

omy which he declined. The appellant acknowledged he

has a “bondage fantasy.” and that he had lubricant in a

blue and white tube at his apartment. He also stated the

complaining witness suggested that “others” might enjoy

24a

this type of activity for money. She then demanded

$200.00, and when he refused, threatened to tell his wife

and otherwise harm his career. After he gave her only

$60.00, she said, “You will pay.” He also offered testi-

mony of the victim’s next door neighbor who stated she

heard the victim say, “Don’t hit so hard,” “Quit, it hurts”

and “Stop.” The witness attributed this conversation to

some type of sexual activity.

Finally, the appellant offered extensive evidence as to

his good character and reputation for truthfulness.

In rebuttal, the government established that it is not

unusual for a rape victim to delay reporting the incident

because of feelings of shame and belief that no one will

accept what happened. Additionally, there was evidence

by the victim’s exspouse and current partner that her

sexual preferences did not include being beaten or physi-

cally abused.

II

The appellant contends the trial judge erred in admit-

ting a sexually explicit video tape and similar literature

found in his apartment. He argues that Mil.R.Evid.

404(b)* does not apply as his possession of the seized

material was lawful and not probative of any contested

issue. He also urges that prejudicial effect of the chal-

lenged evidence is enormous. See Mil.R.Evid. 403.

The appellant is correct in that possession of sexually

explicit materials is lawful. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.

557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). He is also

correct that the admission of such materials is prejudicial.

2 Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;

Exceptions; Other Crimes.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,

wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a

person in order to show that the person acted in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

25a

But this is true of any relevant evidence, and in order

to be admissible under Rule 404(b) the evidence of

“OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS” must: 1)

Establish a matter in issue other than the accused’s pro-

pensity to commit the crime charged; 2) The other acts

are similar enough to be relevant: 3) The evidence of the

other acts is clear and convincing; and 4) The probative

value of the other acts is not substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice. United States y. Tuchow,

768 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.1985): United States v. Beechum,

582 F.2d 898 (Sth Cir.1978). To resolve this assigned

error we must examine the record in light of the criteria

just stated.

Mil.R.Evid. 404(b) states that evidence of other acts

are admissible to establish “. . . proof of motive, oppor-

tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident.” The rule provides ex-

amples of bases for admission of other acts rather than an

exclusive list. By decision we have included modus op-

erandi, United States v. Barus, 16 M.J. 624 (A.F.C.M.R.

1983), and the accused’s consciousness of guilt, United

States v. Borland, 12 M.J. 855 (A.F.C.M.R.1981), as

other reasons for which other acts are admissible.

What matter in issue does the appellant’s possession of

materials depicting the sexual and physical abuse of

women establish? The trial judge admitted the evidence

as tending to establish motive, intent. plan and design.

Commendably, he explained on the record why he con-

cluded the probative value of the proffered evidence was

not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the

appellant. See United States y. Holt, 21 M.J. 946

(A.F.C.M.R.1986). Our task now is to determine whether

the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in this regard.

United States v. Barus, supra; United States v. Byrd, 77)

F.2d 215 (7th Cir.1985),

Motive is that which incites or stimulates a person to

do an act. People v. Weiss, 252 A.D. 463, 300 N.Y.S.

26a

249 (1937). As such it is a state of mind tending to

show the basis for that individual’s behavior. See United

Siates v. Watkins, 21 M.J. 224 (C.M.A.1986). The

possession of graphically posed photographs showing

women being sexually and physically abused is a clear

indication of the appellant's emotional penchant for sex-

ual aberration. See State v. Bailey, 125 Ariz. 263, 609

P.2d 78 App. 1980). Thus, the admission of this ma-

terial would tend to supply a motive for the appellant to

commit the acts alleged.

His trial theory, that the victim had consented to the

sexual acts, was tantamount to a denial that he had

intended to achieve oral copulation and sexual inter-

course by force. The challenged evidence is admissible to

establish his intent in this trial by corroborating the vic-

tim’s testimony that she did not consent to the sexual acts.

People v. Jackson, 110 Cal.App.3d 560, 167 Cal. Rptr.

915 (1980). Such evidence is relevant because most sex

offenses occur in private and the determination of witness

credibility is a crucial role. People v. Thomas, 20 Cal.

3d 457, 143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433 (1978).

The seized sexually-oriented material also tends to

establish preparation for the charged offenses in the sense

that he had photographic depictions available suggesting

the activity in which he wished to participate. The photo-

graphs and the video tape depicted scenarios for non-

consensual sex. These materials together with the knife.

gun, ropes. “nipple clamps,” lubricant and magazine he

initially provided the victim when she arrived, are all

indicative of preparation and planning to achieve what

the victim said occurred.

Of the remaining Tuchow factors, those left are also

clearly established. There is no question that the sexual

activity protrayed in the magazines and video tape and

the offenses being tried are sufficiently alike to be rele-

vant. The photographs shows women being sexually

abused in a manner the victim claims happened to her.

27a

Also, it is clear that the challenged evidence belonged to

him—he admitted the material was his. We further con-

clude the evidence offered on the question of motive,

intent, plan and design was relevant as it had “a tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the action more probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Mil.R.Evid. 401.

Based upon the facts before us we hold the trial judge

was within the broad discretion given him to admit the

challenged evidence. We find no basis to overturn the

lower court's ruling on this issue. United States v. Rich-

ardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1985).

Ill

The appellant next argues that the trial judge erred

when he allowed Doctor Freddy E. Drummond, a clinical

psychologist with experience in counseling rape victims,

to testify in rebuttal that a high number of rapes i.e.,

between approximately 70-90% go unreported or are de-

layed in being reported because the victim is ashamed

or fearful that no one will believe her. It was the de-

fense’s position that Doctor Drummond had no special

expertise in this area and relied on hearsay, i.e., books

and articles to gain the necessary knowledge. In a col-

lateral assertion of error the appellant also contends that

the government should not have been permitted to offer, in

rebuttal, testimony that the victim's sexual preferences did

not include “rough sex.”

The purpose of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel,

counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by the op-

posing party. United States v. Shaw, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 267.

26 C.M.R. 47 (1958). Certainly testimony by the vic-

tim’s past and present sexual partners that she did not

enjoy “rough sex” tends to negate evidence by the de-

fense that she did. Further, Doctor Drummond is per-

mitted under Mil.R.Evid. 703 to rely on facts and data

known to him that are neither admitted nor admissible in

28a

evidence, so long as they are of a type “reasonably relied

upon by experts in the particular field in forming an opin-

ion or inference upon the subject. United States v.

Neeley, 21 M.J. 606 (A.F.C.M.R.1985); see also United

States v. Eastman, 20 M.J. 948 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985). The

admission or exclusion of evidence on rebuttal rests

largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge

which we find he properly exercised. United States v.

Posey, 647 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1981).

IV

The appellant also contends he is entitled to a new trial

because of improper findings and sentencing arguments by

government counsel. Appellant’s counsel entered no ob-

jection at trial to the now challenged statements made

during argument. In view of this, we consider this issue

to be waived on appeal in the absence of plain error which

doctrine we find no basis here to invoke. R.C.M. 1001

(g); United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327 (1986); United

States v. Fisher, 17 M.J. 768 (A.F.C.M.R. 1938).

V

The appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the

offenses charged. He puts forth numerous reasons to

Support this argument. They are: the victim’s testimony

is so riddled with inconsistencies that it is not credible;

his version_of the incident, although it pictures him as

less than an ideal husband, is very credible; he has an

outstanding military record and a good reputation for

truthfulness which lends weight to his version of the facts;

and the victim is antagonistic toward him and claimed

rape only after he refused to pay her the amount she

demanded for the sexual services to which she willingly

consented.

That a sexual encounter took place between the appel-

lant and the victim is not disputed—the question is

eel

29a

Whether she consented to his actions. When a crucial

issue must be resolved in terms of essentially “a one-on-

one confrontation,” corroborative evidence of guilt is a

factor to be weighed. United States y. Pastor, 8 M.J.

280 (C.M.A. 1980): United States vy. King, 17 M.J.

L099 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984). The available corroborative

evidence includes: the victim reporting the incident, albeit

the next day, the gun, knife, ropes, and lubricant, sexually

explicit video tape, and the sexually-oriented magazine

the victim testified the appellant used in the assault were

found in his apartment. The appellant’s explanation of

why he possessed these items was before the court.

Much of the crucial testimony offered by the appel-

lant and the complaining witness is in toal conflict. She

said he invited her to dinner that evening; he stated she

came to his house uannounced. He testified she was the

one who broached the subject of “kinky sex” i.c., being

bound, beaten, anal sodomy and use of the “nipple

clamps.”; her version focused on the appellant using a

knife and gun to force her to submit. It is readily ap-

parent that the outcome of the trial rested on the weight

the members chose to give to the testimony of each

witness. United States vy. Lecappelain, 9 M.J. 562

(A.F.C.M.R.1980).

We have a statutory mandate to review the evidence

and in so doing we must judge the credibility of witnesses

and determine controverted questions of facts, recognizing

that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses. Article

66(c), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt as to an accused’s guilt does not mean

that the evidence must be free of conflict. United States

v. Steward, 18 M.J. 506 (A.F.C.M.R.1984). This was a

vigorously contested trial with both the appellant and the

government offering a full measure of evidence to sup-

port their theory of the case. We have examined the rec-

ord of trial and, like the trial court, we are convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty of

the offenses alleged.

30a

VI

We have examined the remaining assigned errors and

resolve them against the appellant. United States v. Whit-

ing, 12 M.J. 253 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. Hen-

derson, ACM 24341, 31 August 1984, pet. denied, 21

M.J. 38 (C.M.A.1985); see United States v. Heriot, 21

M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1985).

Vil

Finally, appellant defense counsel suggest that the ap-

proved sentence is inappropriately severe given the appel-

lant’s past outstanding military record. It is, of course,

true that an outstanding military record is a mitigating

factor in reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence.

United States v. Benedict, 20 M.J. 939 (A.F.C.M.R.

1985). But the scales of punishment must also weigh the

seriousness of the crime. Here the appellant has been

convicted of a series of aggravated sex offenses with the

same victim. Under the facts of this case we consider

the approved sentence to be entirely appropriate. For the

reasons stated the findings of guilty and the sentence are

AFFIRMED.

FORAY, Senior Judge and MICHALSKI, Judge, con-

cur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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