Reply Brief — Miller v. Securities & Exchange Commission

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| Buprems Cour, US. |

PILs DO

No. 93-457 DEC - 8 198

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Cnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

GERARD A. MILLER,

Petitioner.

vV.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

DARYL J. Hupson III, Esa.

DaryYL J. Hupson III, PC

919 18th Street, NW Suite 800

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 785-6953

Counsel for Petitioner

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

BEST AVAILABLE COPY!

“——,,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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I. THE ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT OF RULE 60

(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-

CEDURE DOES NOT RESOLVE THE CON-

FUSION INHERENT IN THE SEC’S 1992

ORDER AND IN THE OPINION OF THE

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Il. THE SEC’S CALL FOR JUDICIAL DEFER-

ENCE IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN

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ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 182 (1971) .....

Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..............00.

Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation

of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 90 L.Ed.2d 445, 454

CRIED. iccrstctvessisenscneniatantaadaanedi quate

H.W. Wilson Co. v. U.S. Postal Service, 580 F.2d

| BS SR (BRR noe em

In The Matter of Munro Silver, Administrative Pro-

ceeding File No. 3-7496 (order of August 9,

BOWED - ntscscotctheranisieubtinencscuaemaa aaa

Institute for Scientific Information v. U.S. Postal

Service, 555 F.2d 128 (8rd. Cir. 1977) ...........

King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.,

SES FAG BE ORG Cie.. FOGOP sccccecscaksiprontenrtsaasens

SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th

CAD, BBV ccsstankassisttsssteteis ae

SEC .. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d 457 (10th

I cdl sissistecrnstotssvecdavsiieiseitealreaeaa eee

SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115 (8d Cir. 1978) .......

4-6

5,6

8,9

2,3

6-9

U.S. v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932) . 3,8-10

SEC Rule

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

No. 93-457

GERARD A. MILLER,

Petitioner,

We

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

I. THE ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT OF RULE 60 (b) OF THE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT

RESOLVE THE CONFUSION INHERENT IN THE SEC’S

1992 ORDER AND IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS.

The issue before the SEC was why petitioner waited

“only six years” in bringing his petition; hence

petitioner was not given the opportunity to explain

“delay’’ in the SEC record.’

1 The issue of “‘delay’’ goes only to the issue of new evidence,

one of the grounds set forth in the petition before the SEC.

The other two grounds are petitioner’s experience since the cen-

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement opposed

petitioner’s request for relief before the SEC in part

because insufficient time had passed between the orig-

inal censure and the petition for relief. The key lan-

guage is quoted from the SEC’s Enforcement brief:

In In The Matter of Munro Silver, Admin-

istrative Proceeding File No. 3-7496 (order

of August 9, 1991), the Commission granted

relief from a sanction imposed in 1965 that

was, in effect, a permanent bar. In Silver,

nearly thirty years had elapsed since the

Commission had imposed sanctions on the

respondent. ... By contrast, only six years

have elapsed since sanctions were imposed

upon Miller.

Jt. App. A276. (Emphasis added).

The foregoing quotation from the SEC’s brief in

the proceedings below is significant because it reflects

with accuracy the principle of the Silver case, and

SEC policy as set forth in the SEC’s Rule 29, 17

CFR 201.29. That rule explicitly states that the SEC

looks to the passage of time in evaluating petitions

to set aside sanctions barring persons from the se-

curities industry. Moreover, applicable judicial au-

thority is in accord with this view of SEC case law

and policy. Thus the Tenth Circuit has noted:

[I]n instances where the defendant concerned

is an individual, and where the alleged vio-

sure showing compliance; and the impact of the censure on

petitioner. (Pet., p. 6). The SEC and the Court of Appeals were

silent regarding petitioner’s experience since the censure. Both

refused to consider the reputational impact of the censure on

petitioner.

lation leading to the injunction was an inci-

dent of limited scope or duration, the passage

of a substantial period of time with full com-

pliance and with no other violations may be

regarded as a significant factor showing a

‘change’ for these purposes. In reality this is

about all an individual can show under these

circumstances.

S.E.C. v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F. 2d.

457 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927

(1973).

Despite this precedent, on which petitioner was en-

titled to rely in determining when to bring his petition,

the SEC reversed itself sua sponte in the 1992 Order

and stated that petitioner waited too long to bring

his petition. The SEC cited no authority for this prop-

osition; as it could not, because the authority goes

the other way.” Indeed, the apparently unseemly haste

of the Swift petitioners in seeking to set aside the

injunction was a development noted by Justice Car-

dozo. U.S. v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 112-131, 52 S.Ct.

460, 461-62 (1932). Nor was petitioner allowed any

opportunity to develop a record to explain his timing

in bringing the petition before the SEC. (Petitioner

did emphasize reputational harm in his Reply Brief

on appeal. See §II, infra). Where the record before

2 Nor does the new evidence, the Letter of Admonition, im-

plicate the concerns of the Second Circuit regarding faded mem-

ories and destroyed records. (Pet., p. 7a). The witness testimony

and documents are preserved. Nor did the passage of time cause

the SEC to feel constrained about reaching conclusions on the

merits after having reviewed the new evidence on the basis of

a most summary proceeding below. (Pet., pp. 120-136). There is

ample record for a re-evaluation.

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the SEC prior to the 1992 Order addressed not

petitioner’s “‘delay,’’ but instead the apparent pre-

maturity of his petition, it is patently unfair to pen-

alize petitioner for not having developed the record

before the SEC to include evidence explaining the

“‘delay.’’’

The SEC’s belated reliance on the policy of Rule

60(b) does cause confusion. Prior authority, including

the SEC’s own procedural rule and case law, and

judicial authority, contemplate a petition to set aside

a sanction after the passage of some time. In its

Opposition Brief, the SEC has selectively promulgated

a new rule, without notice, and without opportunity

to develop a record before the SEC supporting the

reason for the “‘delay.”’

Il. THE SEC’S CALL FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IS

WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN LAW.

The central issue presented is whether the SEC

applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing

petitioner’s case. This is a question of law, and thus

uniquely appropriate for this Court to review. Federal

8 At oral argument before the Second Circuit, counsel for

Petitioner alluded to matters not in the record to explain, in

part, Petitioner’s timing. If Petitioner is given the opportunity,

é.g., On remand, to explain further the timing of his Petition

before the SEC, he will supply evidence to show that he was

advised by newly obtained counsel in 1986, after the Censure

was entered and after the New York Stock Exchange Enforce-

ment Department Letter of Admonition was discovered, that he

should wait in bringing a petition to allow for the passage of

some substantial amount of time, as contemplated by the SEC’s

rules and case law, in which to demonstrate his ongoing com-

pliance with SEC Rule 15c3-3. Petitioner’s experience since the

censure tending to show compliance was ignored by the SEC

and the Second Circuit.

Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,

476 U.S. 447, 90 L.Ed.2d 445, 454 (1986) (‘The legal

issues presented—that is, the identification of gov-

erning legal standards and their application to the

facts found—are ... for the courts to resolve. . .’’);

Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 182 (1971) (“{T]he legal

standard to be applied is ultimately for the courts to

decide and enforce’’). The issue is purely one of law,

i.e., construing a series of judicial opinions addressing

the question of which standard of review is to be

applied in cases such as petitioner’s. As the Second

Circuit found in H.W. Wilson Co. v. U.S. Postal Ser-

vice, 580 F.2d 33, 37 (2nd Cir. 1978) ‘“{[W]hen the

question is one of law and does not implicate the

expertise of the agency, we must provide a stricter

standard of review. ... This particularly true when,

as in the present case, the administrator’s legal de-

cision 1s based on his interpretation of a judicial opin-

ton....’’ Id. at 37 (emphasis added). Citing Institute

for Scientific Information v. U.S. Postal Service, 555

F.2d 128, 132 (8rd. Cir. 1977). There the Second Cir-

cuit concluded that the U.S. Postal Service, in an

administrative proceeding, had “applied an incorrect

legal standard....” Wilson, supra, at 37. This

petition presents the same issue: whether the SEC

applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing

petitioner’s case. Under the standards of Indiana

Federation and Wilson, supra, the question is one for

the Court to decide freely. Petitioner does not call

upon this Court to review any of the SEC’s enabling

statutes.

The SEC’s reliance upon Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat-

ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

staceeenneeeineenet

(1984) is misplaced. The issue in Chevron, USA was

whether the EPA regulation allowing states to treat

all pollution admitting devices within the same in-

dustrial grouping as though they were encompassed

within a single “bubble” was a permissible construc-

tion of the term “stationary source’’ set forth in the

Clean Air Act. The issue concerned not only the sub-

stantive statutory provisions relating to such curtail-

ment procedures, but also the underlying technological

issues. Chevron, USA, supra, 467 U.S. at 846-47. Such

issues are best left to agency expertise. Clearly not

in issue in Chevron, USA, however, was the question

of what standard of review should be applied to a

request or petition to modify a sanction,which Indiana

Federation, and Allied Chemical, supra control.‘ The

SEC’s efforts to portray the case as one of statutory

interpretation is misplaced twice over, first because

it disregards the pure case law issue on appeal, see,

Wilson, supra, and second, because to create a sta-

tutory issue, it points not to statutory language but

rather to Congressional silence. (Opp. Br. p. 6).

When the proper standard of review is applied, the

SEC’s distinction of SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115

(38d Cir. 1978) fails, and the conflict between the Sec-

ond and Third Circuits is explicit. Here, the SEC

contends for the first time, incorporating the error

of the Second Circuit, that petitioner seeks to set

aside the censure ab initio (Opp. Br., p. 7, footnote

3). The Second Circuit merely assumed this unwar-

‘Nor is the language in Indiana Federation regarding some

deference where agency expertise impacts in the standard of

review applicable to this appeal, which deals only with a series

of injunction cases raising issues traditionally within the scope

of the judicial function. See Wilson, supra, 580 F.2d at 37.

ranted conclusion without foundation in the record,

asserting that petitioner seeks to “‘erase’’ the censure

to “avoid having to disclose it’ (Pet. at 7a). This is

meritless and contrary to the arrangement assented

to with the SEC Division of Enforcement, Office of

Chief Counsel. This issue was neither briefed nor

argued before the Second Circuit, and the opinion

merely assumes petitioner sought such relief. It is

unfair and inaccurate for the SEC to contend that

petitioner seeks ab initio relief where the SEC has

access to its own Enforcement Division staff to verify

the disclosure arrangement petitioner and his counsel

reached with the SEC. Moreover, the Third Circuit

noted in Warren that an injunction has continuing

effects, even if dissolved, including disclosure impli-

cations:

‘The facts underlying the intended treatment of the relief

sought in this case are not in the record. The Second Circuit

erroneously assumed that Miller would not disclose the censure.

The SEC now places this assumption before the Court. If allowed

to establish a record on this new issue, Petitioner would show

that Petitioner and his counsel met with the SEC Enforcement

Division, Office of Chief Counsel, in April of 1992, prior to the

preparation of the Enforcement Division’s memorandum oppos-

ing Miller’s petition before the SEC. At that conference, in

response to a question from Colleen Mahoney, Esgq., of the SEC,

Miller assured the SEC that he would continue to disclose the

censure in all appropriate securities industry disclosure forms

as an historical fact with a distinct beginning and an end. Even

though the SEC Enforcement Division opposed Miller’s petition,

it never suggested that Miller had no intention of avoiding dis-

closure of the censure in the future. The Second Circuit’s as-{

sumption that Miller seeks to “avoid having to disclose it” Pet. \

7a) is unfounded and misplaced. This proffer is made to under-

score the unwarranted nature of the SEC’s recent contention

that Miller seeks ab initio removal of the censure.

Apparently, the injunction once issued does

have significant residual effects under the

federal securities laws even if dissolved. The

Commission asserts that even if the court

were to raise or lift the injunction, disclosure

of its previous existence may be necessary,

and the facts surrounding its dissolution if

material to investors should Warren, Jr. be-

come an officer or director of a public cor-

poration.

Warren, supra, 583 F.2d at 122, note 10.

Thus, even if petitioner sought relief ab initio as char-

acterized by the SEC, which petitioner does not, War-

ren would remain applicable.

The Second Circuit’s assertion_that the outcome is

the same ‘‘no matter which standard”’ (Pet. at p. 5a)

applies, does not resolve the conflict issue. First, that

statement refers only to Swift, supra, and King-Seeley

Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 418 F.2d 31

(2d Cir. 1969). No reference is made to Warren. Sec-

ond, the reason given for denying petitioner’s appeal,

‘no matter which standard”’ applies, is ‘‘delay.”” This

emphasis on delay is an application of the Swift stand-

ard through its progeny. The stated reason for the

“delay,’’ was to show evidence of reputational harm.

This factor—reputational harm—is appropriate for

consideration under Warren. In refusing to consider

reputational harm, the Second Circuit and the SEC

followed the Tenth Circuit’s application of Swift in

SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th

Cir. 1970) (holding that reputational harm is not suf-

ficient to meet the standard of Swift). (Pet., p. 6a).

This circular reasoning—application of Jan-Dal and

Swift to support a refusal to consider reputational

harm as a rationale for purportedly refusing to con-

sider a standard other than Swift—is erroneous. This

error, and the refusal to apply the Warren standard,

which would allow consideration of reputational harm,

is the central legal error of the SEC’s order and the

Second Circuit’s opinion. Without acknowledgement,

the Second Circuit has applied Swift through Jan-Dal.

In so doing, it has disregarded Warren. Thus the

assertion that the Second Circuit ‘‘neither approved

nor rejected the Commission’s use of the Swift stand-

ard’ (Opp. Br., p. 6) is erroneous. Clearly a conflict

in the Circuits exists.

Moreover, the question of delay goes only to the

issue of the new evidence. It has no impact on the

other grounds raised by petitioner: petitioner’s “‘ex-

perience since the censure’ having demonstrated

petitioner’s compliance with the SEC’s Rule 15c3-3,

and the ‘“‘continuing negative impact’’ of the censure

on petitioner. (Pet., p. 6). Warren took into account

the non-reoccurrence, or isolation, of violations. (Pet.,

p. 11). The Order of the SEC and the Opinion of the

Court of Appeals are silent on the question of

petitioner’s experience since 1986. And, as noted, nei-

ther the SEC nor the Second Circuit considered rep-

utational harm, following Jan-Dal, which in turn,

implements the Swift standard. As noted, such harm

is a basis for relief under Warren.

Nor is the Third Circuit’s post-Warren application

of Swift standard relevant, where the two cases in

question (Opp. Br., p. 6, note 3) concerned petitioners

who sought relief to act in derogation of the original

order. C.A. Reply Br. at 7. The SEC admittedly draws

no distinction between petitions seeking relief to per-

mit action in derogation of the original order, and

ae,

10

those, such as the current petitioner’s, which do not.

Petitioner’s reliance on the cases limiting Swift is

proper, as each of the cases stands for the proposition

that Swift should be limited to its facts. Pet. pp. 20-

21; Opp. Br., p. 7, footnote 4.

Conclusion

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DARYL J. HUDSON III, Esa.

DARYL J. HUDSON III, P.C.

919 18th Street, NW

Suite 800

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 785-6953

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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