Reply Brief — Miller v. Securities & Exchange Commission
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| Buprems Cour, US. |
PILs DO
No. 93-457 DEC - 8 198
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Cnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1993
GERARD A. MILLER,
Petitioner.
vV.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
DARYL J. Hupson III, Esa.
DaryYL J. Hupson III, PC
919 18th Street, NW Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-6953
Counsel for Petitioner
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203
BEST AVAILABLE COPY!
“——,,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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I. THE ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT OF RULE 60
(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE DOES NOT RESOLVE THE CON-
FUSION INHERENT IN THE SEC’S 1992
ORDER AND IN THE OPINION OF THE
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Il. THE SEC’S CALL FOR JUDICIAL DEFER-
ENCE IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN
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ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 182 (1971) .....
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..............00.
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 90 L.Ed.2d 445, 454
CRIED. iccrstctvessisenscneniatantaadaanedi quate
H.W. Wilson Co. v. U.S. Postal Service, 580 F.2d
| BS SR (BRR noe em
In The Matter of Munro Silver, Administrative Pro-
ceeding File No. 3-7496 (order of August 9,
BOWED - ntscscotctheranisieubtinencscuaemaa aaa
Institute for Scientific Information v. U.S. Postal
Service, 555 F.2d 128 (8rd. Cir. 1977) ...........
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.,
SES FAG BE ORG Cie.. FOGOP sccccecscaksiprontenrtsaasens
SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th
CAD, BBV ccsstankassisttsssteteis ae
SEC .. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d 457 (10th
I cdl sissistecrnstotssvecdavsiieiseitealreaeaa eee
SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115 (8d Cir. 1978) .......
4-6
5,6
8,9
2,3
6-9
U.S. v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932) . 3,8-10
SEC Rule
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1993
No. 93-457
GERARD A. MILLER,
Petitioner,
We
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
PETITIONER’S REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
I. THE ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT OF RULE 60 (b) OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT
RESOLVE THE CONFUSION INHERENT IN THE SEC’S
1992 ORDER AND IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS.
The issue before the SEC was why petitioner waited
“only six years” in bringing his petition; hence
petitioner was not given the opportunity to explain
“delay’’ in the SEC record.’
1 The issue of “‘delay’’ goes only to the issue of new evidence,
one of the grounds set forth in the petition before the SEC.
The other two grounds are petitioner’s experience since the cen-
The SEC’s Division of Enforcement opposed
petitioner’s request for relief before the SEC in part
because insufficient time had passed between the orig-
inal censure and the petition for relief. The key lan-
guage is quoted from the SEC’s Enforcement brief:
In In The Matter of Munro Silver, Admin-
istrative Proceeding File No. 3-7496 (order
of August 9, 1991), the Commission granted
relief from a sanction imposed in 1965 that
was, in effect, a permanent bar. In Silver,
nearly thirty years had elapsed since the
Commission had imposed sanctions on the
respondent. ... By contrast, only six years
have elapsed since sanctions were imposed
upon Miller.
Jt. App. A276. (Emphasis added).
The foregoing quotation from the SEC’s brief in
the proceedings below is significant because it reflects
with accuracy the principle of the Silver case, and
SEC policy as set forth in the SEC’s Rule 29, 17
CFR 201.29. That rule explicitly states that the SEC
looks to the passage of time in evaluating petitions
to set aside sanctions barring persons from the se-
curities industry. Moreover, applicable judicial au-
thority is in accord with this view of SEC case law
and policy. Thus the Tenth Circuit has noted:
[I]n instances where the defendant concerned
is an individual, and where the alleged vio-
sure showing compliance; and the impact of the censure on
petitioner. (Pet., p. 6). The SEC and the Court of Appeals were
silent regarding petitioner’s experience since the censure. Both
refused to consider the reputational impact of the censure on
petitioner.
lation leading to the injunction was an inci-
dent of limited scope or duration, the passage
of a substantial period of time with full com-
pliance and with no other violations may be
regarded as a significant factor showing a
‘change’ for these purposes. In reality this is
about all an individual can show under these
circumstances.
S.E.C. v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F. 2d.
457 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927
(1973).
Despite this precedent, on which petitioner was en-
titled to rely in determining when to bring his petition,
the SEC reversed itself sua sponte in the 1992 Order
and stated that petitioner waited too long to bring
his petition. The SEC cited no authority for this prop-
osition; as it could not, because the authority goes
the other way.” Indeed, the apparently unseemly haste
of the Swift petitioners in seeking to set aside the
injunction was a development noted by Justice Car-
dozo. U.S. v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 112-131, 52 S.Ct.
460, 461-62 (1932). Nor was petitioner allowed any
opportunity to develop a record to explain his timing
in bringing the petition before the SEC. (Petitioner
did emphasize reputational harm in his Reply Brief
on appeal. See §II, infra). Where the record before
2 Nor does the new evidence, the Letter of Admonition, im-
plicate the concerns of the Second Circuit regarding faded mem-
ories and destroyed records. (Pet., p. 7a). The witness testimony
and documents are preserved. Nor did the passage of time cause
the SEC to feel constrained about reaching conclusions on the
merits after having reviewed the new evidence on the basis of
a most summary proceeding below. (Pet., pp. 120-136). There is
ample record for a re-evaluation.
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the SEC prior to the 1992 Order addressed not
petitioner’s “‘delay,’’ but instead the apparent pre-
maturity of his petition, it is patently unfair to pen-
alize petitioner for not having developed the record
before the SEC to include evidence explaining the
“‘delay.’’’
The SEC’s belated reliance on the policy of Rule
60(b) does cause confusion. Prior authority, including
the SEC’s own procedural rule and case law, and
judicial authority, contemplate a petition to set aside
a sanction after the passage of some time. In its
Opposition Brief, the SEC has selectively promulgated
a new rule, without notice, and without opportunity
to develop a record before the SEC supporting the
reason for the “‘delay.”’
Il. THE SEC’S CALL FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IS
WITHOUT FOUNDATION IN LAW.
The central issue presented is whether the SEC
applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing
petitioner’s case. This is a question of law, and thus
uniquely appropriate for this Court to review. Federal
8 At oral argument before the Second Circuit, counsel for
Petitioner alluded to matters not in the record to explain, in
part, Petitioner’s timing. If Petitioner is given the opportunity,
é.g., On remand, to explain further the timing of his Petition
before the SEC, he will supply evidence to show that he was
advised by newly obtained counsel in 1986, after the Censure
was entered and after the New York Stock Exchange Enforce-
ment Department Letter of Admonition was discovered, that he
should wait in bringing a petition to allow for the passage of
some substantial amount of time, as contemplated by the SEC’s
rules and case law, in which to demonstrate his ongoing com-
pliance with SEC Rule 15c3-3. Petitioner’s experience since the
censure tending to show compliance was ignored by the SEC
and the Second Circuit.
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 U.S. 447, 90 L.Ed.2d 445, 454 (1986) (‘The legal
issues presented—that is, the identification of gov-
erning legal standards and their application to the
facts found—are ... for the courts to resolve. . .’’);
Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 182 (1971) (“{T]he legal
standard to be applied is ultimately for the courts to
decide and enforce’’). The issue is purely one of law,
i.e., construing a series of judicial opinions addressing
the question of which standard of review is to be
applied in cases such as petitioner’s. As the Second
Circuit found in H.W. Wilson Co. v. U.S. Postal Ser-
vice, 580 F.2d 33, 37 (2nd Cir. 1978) ‘“{[W]hen the
question is one of law and does not implicate the
expertise of the agency, we must provide a stricter
standard of review. ... This particularly true when,
as in the present case, the administrator’s legal de-
cision 1s based on his interpretation of a judicial opin-
ton....’’ Id. at 37 (emphasis added). Citing Institute
for Scientific Information v. U.S. Postal Service, 555
F.2d 128, 132 (8rd. Cir. 1977). There the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the U.S. Postal Service, in an
administrative proceeding, had “applied an incorrect
legal standard....” Wilson, supra, at 37. This
petition presents the same issue: whether the SEC
applied an incorrect legal standard in reviewing
petitioner’s case. Under the standards of Indiana
Federation and Wilson, supra, the question is one for
the Court to decide freely. Petitioner does not call
upon this Court to review any of the SEC’s enabling
statutes.
The SEC’s reliance upon Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
staceeenneeeineenet
(1984) is misplaced. The issue in Chevron, USA was
whether the EPA regulation allowing states to treat
all pollution admitting devices within the same in-
dustrial grouping as though they were encompassed
within a single “bubble” was a permissible construc-
tion of the term “stationary source’’ set forth in the
Clean Air Act. The issue concerned not only the sub-
stantive statutory provisions relating to such curtail-
ment procedures, but also the underlying technological
issues. Chevron, USA, supra, 467 U.S. at 846-47. Such
issues are best left to agency expertise. Clearly not
in issue in Chevron, USA, however, was the question
of what standard of review should be applied to a
request or petition to modify a sanction,which Indiana
Federation, and Allied Chemical, supra control.‘ The
SEC’s efforts to portray the case as one of statutory
interpretation is misplaced twice over, first because
it disregards the pure case law issue on appeal, see,
Wilson, supra, and second, because to create a sta-
tutory issue, it points not to statutory language but
rather to Congressional silence. (Opp. Br. p. 6).
When the proper standard of review is applied, the
SEC’s distinction of SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115
(38d Cir. 1978) fails, and the conflict between the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits is explicit. Here, the SEC
contends for the first time, incorporating the error
of the Second Circuit, that petitioner seeks to set
aside the censure ab initio (Opp. Br., p. 7, footnote
3). The Second Circuit merely assumed this unwar-
‘Nor is the language in Indiana Federation regarding some
deference where agency expertise impacts in the standard of
review applicable to this appeal, which deals only with a series
of injunction cases raising issues traditionally within the scope
of the judicial function. See Wilson, supra, 580 F.2d at 37.
ranted conclusion without foundation in the record,
asserting that petitioner seeks to “‘erase’’ the censure
to “avoid having to disclose it’ (Pet. at 7a). This is
meritless and contrary to the arrangement assented
to with the SEC Division of Enforcement, Office of
Chief Counsel. This issue was neither briefed nor
argued before the Second Circuit, and the opinion
merely assumes petitioner sought such relief. It is
unfair and inaccurate for the SEC to contend that
petitioner seeks ab initio relief where the SEC has
access to its own Enforcement Division staff to verify
the disclosure arrangement petitioner and his counsel
reached with the SEC. Moreover, the Third Circuit
noted in Warren that an injunction has continuing
effects, even if dissolved, including disclosure impli-
cations:
‘The facts underlying the intended treatment of the relief
sought in this case are not in the record. The Second Circuit
erroneously assumed that Miller would not disclose the censure.
The SEC now places this assumption before the Court. If allowed
to establish a record on this new issue, Petitioner would show
that Petitioner and his counsel met with the SEC Enforcement
Division, Office of Chief Counsel, in April of 1992, prior to the
preparation of the Enforcement Division’s memorandum oppos-
ing Miller’s petition before the SEC. At that conference, in
response to a question from Colleen Mahoney, Esgq., of the SEC,
Miller assured the SEC that he would continue to disclose the
censure in all appropriate securities industry disclosure forms
as an historical fact with a distinct beginning and an end. Even
though the SEC Enforcement Division opposed Miller’s petition,
it never suggested that Miller had no intention of avoiding dis-
closure of the censure in the future. The Second Circuit’s as-{
sumption that Miller seeks to “avoid having to disclose it” Pet. \
7a) is unfounded and misplaced. This proffer is made to under-
score the unwarranted nature of the SEC’s recent contention
that Miller seeks ab initio removal of the censure.
Apparently, the injunction once issued does
have significant residual effects under the
federal securities laws even if dissolved. The
Commission asserts that even if the court
were to raise or lift the injunction, disclosure
of its previous existence may be necessary,
and the facts surrounding its dissolution if
material to investors should Warren, Jr. be-
come an officer or director of a public cor-
poration.
Warren, supra, 583 F.2d at 122, note 10.
Thus, even if petitioner sought relief ab initio as char-
acterized by the SEC, which petitioner does not, War-
ren would remain applicable.
The Second Circuit’s assertion_that the outcome is
the same ‘‘no matter which standard”’ (Pet. at p. 5a)
applies, does not resolve the conflict issue. First, that
statement refers only to Swift, supra, and King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 418 F.2d 31
(2d Cir. 1969). No reference is made to Warren. Sec-
ond, the reason given for denying petitioner’s appeal,
‘no matter which standard”’ applies, is ‘‘delay.”” This
emphasis on delay is an application of the Swift stand-
ard through its progeny. The stated reason for the
“delay,’’ was to show evidence of reputational harm.
This factor—reputational harm—is appropriate for
consideration under Warren. In refusing to consider
reputational harm, the Second Circuit and the SEC
followed the Tenth Circuit’s application of Swift in
SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th
Cir. 1970) (holding that reputational harm is not suf-
ficient to meet the standard of Swift). (Pet., p. 6a).
This circular reasoning—application of Jan-Dal and
Swift to support a refusal to consider reputational
harm as a rationale for purportedly refusing to con-
sider a standard other than Swift—is erroneous. This
error, and the refusal to apply the Warren standard,
which would allow consideration of reputational harm,
is the central legal error of the SEC’s order and the
Second Circuit’s opinion. Without acknowledgement,
the Second Circuit has applied Swift through Jan-Dal.
In so doing, it has disregarded Warren. Thus the
assertion that the Second Circuit ‘‘neither approved
nor rejected the Commission’s use of the Swift stand-
ard’ (Opp. Br., p. 6) is erroneous. Clearly a conflict
in the Circuits exists.
Moreover, the question of delay goes only to the
issue of the new evidence. It has no impact on the
other grounds raised by petitioner: petitioner’s “‘ex-
perience since the censure’ having demonstrated
petitioner’s compliance with the SEC’s Rule 15c3-3,
and the ‘“‘continuing negative impact’’ of the censure
on petitioner. (Pet., p. 6). Warren took into account
the non-reoccurrence, or isolation, of violations. (Pet.,
p. 11). The Order of the SEC and the Opinion of the
Court of Appeals are silent on the question of
petitioner’s experience since 1986. And, as noted, nei-
ther the SEC nor the Second Circuit considered rep-
utational harm, following Jan-Dal, which in turn,
implements the Swift standard. As noted, such harm
is a basis for relief under Warren.
Nor is the Third Circuit’s post-Warren application
of Swift standard relevant, where the two cases in
question (Opp. Br., p. 6, note 3) concerned petitioners
who sought relief to act in derogation of the original
order. C.A. Reply Br. at 7. The SEC admittedly draws
no distinction between petitions seeking relief to per-
mit action in derogation of the original order, and
ae,
10
those, such as the current petitioner’s, which do not.
Petitioner’s reliance on the cases limiting Swift is
proper, as each of the cases stands for the proposition
that Swift should be limited to its facts. Pet. pp. 20-
21; Opp. Br., p. 7, footnote 4.
Conclusion
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DARYL J. HUDSON III, Esa.
DARYL J. HUDSON III, P.C.
919 18th Street, NW
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-6953
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