Reply Brief — New Jersey v. New York City

Supreme Court brief1935

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SraTement 1

f ARnouMENT:

ö 1. Replying to plaintiff's argument that thie

| . ¶ 2

(a) Because the suit is one to protect the

quasi-sovereign rights of the plaintiff... 2

(b) Because the defendant is before the

— 3

(c) The property affected is within the

— ~

2. Replying to plaintiff's argument that de-

fendant’s garbage dumped more than a marine

league from the New Jersey shore is driven by the

winds upon plaintiff’s beaches and into its adja-

cent waters, thus creating a public nuisance, to the

great injury of plaintiff’s rights and property........ 8

3. Replying to plaintiff's arguments that com-

pliance by the defendant with 29 Stats. 209, as

amended, and permits issued thereunder by the

Supervisor of the Harbor of New York, does not

relieve defendant from the effect of the public

4. Replying to plaintiff's arguments that such

garbage and refuse as reaches the plaintiff's shores

by dumpings from coastwise and otber vessels and

ii

other sources is negligible in comparison with that

dumped by defendant and reaching plaintiff's

—— nema

5. Replying to plaintiff's contentions in regard

to some particular exceptions to the Master's

Conciestos, We renew our prayer for action

by this Court set forth at the end of our main brief 27

Taste ov Canzs Crrep.

Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52

Ellen wood v. Marietta Chair Co,, 158 U. 8. 106, 108.

Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 563, 585

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 83.

Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wise. 263, 65 No. W. 1000

Lefrois v. County of Monroe, 162 N. V. 53

People v. „ 42 N. V. ona,

289, Writ Dis. 12 Wall. 455

Rhode Island (State of) v. Massachusetts

Ross, Ia re, 140 U. 8. 453, 471 -

Schollenberger, Ex-parte, 96 U. 8. 369, 777

United States v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co.,, 173 Fed.

United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322

Taste or Urte Starts Srarures Crrep.

25 Stats. 209 as amended (Title 33, Chap. 9, Sees. 441,

443, 449, 451 U. S. Code)

43 Stats. 604 (Oil Pollution Act) (Title 33, Chap. 9,

Sees. 431-437 U. S. Code)

(See. 433 of this Act is set forth in Appendix A,

pp. 100-101, Main Brief.)

4

26

‘4

30 Stats. 1152 (Title 33, Chap. 9, See. 407, U. S. Code) 21, 22

Coba Rune Crrep.

Equity Rule XXX U. S Sapreme Court

iv

Documents Crrzp.

Joint Resolution of — 1922 on Oil Pollution

of Waters a — 12, 13

Engineer's — on — Branch Sewer —

88

List of Defendant's Exceptions and — in Main

.. 28.29

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroszr Trau, 1930,

No. 17, Ontonwan.

Srare or New Jensey,

Plaintiff,

agamst

Tus Crry or New York,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN REPLY TO

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF.

Statement.

Defendant's reply to plaintiff's brief in support of the

report of the Special Master will follow the order of such

brief, which in turn follows the order of defendant’s excep-

tions to that report. Our points in this brief will, there-

fore, follow the group of headings or points of defendant’s

argument

(We are compelled, however, at the start to call atten-

tion and except to a statement in plaintiff’s brief as to the

claims of the defendant appearing in the first paragraph

of page 2 of said brief. It is there stated—presumably

referring to the amended answer—that it alleged that this

Court had no authority to enjoin such dumping because it

was done on the ‘high seas Defendant did not so

contend. The first defense in the amended answer alleged

2

*

that the garbage dumpings of the defendant were made in

the Atlantic Ocean under permits from the Supervisor of

New York Harbor, issued in accordance with the provisions

of 25 Stats. 209, now Title 33, Chap. 9, Secs. 441, 443, 449,

451, U. S. Code, at points 8, 12 and 20 miles southeast of

Scotland Lightship, and 10, 124% and 22 miles distant from

the shore of New Jersey, and that in view of such dumping

on the high seas in the manner and at the points afore-

said this Court has no authority to enjoin defendant from

dumping its garbage and refuse in the manner and at the

places mentioned. The term high seas as is well known

includes waters on the sea coast without the boundaries

of low water mark -In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 471. It

-was, therefore, not because defendant’s dumpings were

made on the high seas solely, but because they were made

in such seas more than a marine league from plaintiff’s

shores, that the jurisdiction of this Court was challenged

in this case.)

ARGUMENT.

1.

Replying to plaintiff’s argument that this Court

has jurisdiction:

(a) Because the suit is one to protect the quasi-sov-

ereign rights of the plaintiff:

Plaintiff introduced its contention by a quotation from

Kansas vs. Colorado, 206 U. 8. 46, at p. 85. Since plaintiff

refers to that case as an authority favorable to it, we

should like to quote from page 83 of the report the state-

ment that:

it (the judicial power) must be held to

embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature

arising within the territorial limits of the Nation,

no matter who may be parties thereto.’’ (Italics

those of the writer.)

A statement is then made in the brief (p. 5):

„The principal issue raised by the pleadings is

whether the acts complained of create a public nuis-

ance on the lands and waters of the plaintiff.’’

Doubtless plaintiff would like to have the Court so con-

sider the problems presented herein. However, a reading

of our main brief should convince the Court that the above

is a wholly incorrect interpretation of the issues or their

importance. The principal issues are whether this Court

has power to restrain defendant’s acts in this case and

whether, if it has such power, the plaintiff has proved the

defendant guilty of causing the alleged nuisance.

Generally speaking, we do not argue that the plaintiff

has not proprietary rights to the shore and in its territorial

waters for a distance of three nautical miles from such

shore; or that it has vo right to sue in its character of

parens patriae, if the proof of defendant’s responsibility

warrants it.

(b) Because the defendant is before the Court:

Plaintiff contends (p. 11) that because the defendant

accepted the jurisdiction of the Court by not specifically

raising the question in its original answer, and having thus

accepted the same for more than a year it cannot now

raise the question’’. We will assume that anything said

in a written argument in a case of the importance of the

one at bar must be taken seriously even though its intrinsic

importance may be doubted.

By way of reply, we say that in the first place, the

Court allowed defendant to amend so as to specifically pre-

4

sent the question of jurisdiction over a strenuous similar

objection by the plaintiff. In the second place, it is ele-

mental that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent

where questions pertaining to the subject matter of the

controversy are involved.

State of Rhode Island vs. State of Massachu-

setts, 12 Peters, 657, 720;

People vs. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 42

N. Y., 283, 289 (Writ of Error dismissed 12

Wall. 455);

Ex parte, Schollenberger, 96 U. S., 369, 377;

Ellenwood vs. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U. 8.

105, 108.

Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts, supra, is such a land-

mark in the history of the power of this Court on the ques-

tion of original jurisdiction in suits between states that we

trust we will be pardoned if we quote from it at length.

This was an original suit in the Supreme Court brought

by Rhode Island against Massachusetts to determine the

boundary line between the two States at a certain point.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice

Baldwin. In the course thereof it is said in respect to

the powers and jurisdiction of this Court in reference to

suits of this character (page 720) :

„But as this court is one of limited and special

original jurisdiction, its action must be confined to

the particular cases, controversies, and parties over

which the constitution and laws have authorized it

to act; any proceeding without the limits prescribed,

is coram non judice, and its action a nullity; 10 Pet.

474; S. P. 4 Ress. 415. And whether the want or

excess power is objected by a party, or is apparent

to the court, it must surcease ita action, or proceed

extrajudicially. (Emphasis the writer’s.) ° °* °

Those States, in their highest sovereign capacity,

in the convention of the people thereof ; on whom, by

the Revolution, the prerogative of the crowp, and

the transcendent power of parliament devolved, in

a plenitude unimpaired by any act, and controllable

by no authority, 6 Wheat. 651, 8 Wheat. 584, 88,

adopted the constitution, by which they respectively

made to the United States a grant of judicial power

over controversies between two or more ‘os. By

the constitution, it was ordained that this judicial

power, in cases where a State was a party, should

be exercised by this court as one of original juris-

diction. The States waived their exemption from

judicial power, 6 Wheat. 378, 80, as sovereigns by

original and inherent right, by their own grant of its

exercise over themselves in such cases, but which

they would not grant to any inferior tribunal. By

this grant, this court has acquired jurisdiction over

the parties in this cause, by their own consent and

delegated authority; as their agent for executing

the judicial power of the United States in the case

specified.’’

On the question of the original power of this Court to

deal with suits such as the present, between a state and

a citizen of another state, we submit that what is said

above is applicable in the instant case. In other words,

this Court has the jurisdiction which the States in their

capacity as sovereign nations, in adopting the Constitution,

had to give to it. If the original States in interpreting the

powers of their courts under the common law had no power

to restrain a nuisance committed outside their boundaries,

they could not give any such power to this Court to adjudi-

cate the rights of the parties to litigations involving such

6

questions. That thoy did Yet have such powers is dis-

cussed in the cases set forth in our main brief from pages

28 to 33.

On page 11 of plaintiff’s brief, it is also said that the

contention of the defendant that this Court has no jurisdic-

tion because of the fact that garbage dumpings are made

more than three miles from New Jersey's shores is incon-

sistent with its contention that it dumps its garbage under

permits authorized by Act of Congress of June 29, 1888

(25 Stats. 209), and that they cannot be legally united by

the defendant.

It seems to us that it is a sufficient reply to this argu-

ment to quote Rule XXX of the United States Supreme

Court Equity Rules which states that:

„The answer may state as many defenses, in the

alternative, regardless of consistency, as the de-

fendant deems essential to his defense.

Argument in this regard is also set forth at pages 68

and 69 of our main brief.

Whether permits are necessary to do such dumping as

defendant: does we do not know. Defendant has never

taken the position that they were not. How far beyond

the lines of New York Harbor, as laid down by the Secre-

tary of the Treasury (United States v. Newark Meadows

Imp. Co., 173 Fed. 426, 428), the Supervisor's jurisdiction

over dumping into the adjacent waters extends has never

been established although it seems to have been held in

one or more cases cited by the Special Master on pages

45-47 of his report that such jurisdiction extends beyond

the three mile limit.

However, it does appear in this case that the Master

did find that defendant had not violated the permits (unless

7

the finding on page 50 of his report that some garbage which

remains on the scows after dumping is cleaned off as they

„are being taken back from the dumping area can be so

interpreted. It is not so specified and we say it cannot be,

in view of the finding on page 43 ‘‘that the dumping was by

permission of the Supervisor of the Harbor’’.)

On page 12 of the brief plaintiff states that Congress

and the Supervisor of the Harbor have exercised’’, unchal-

lenged by defendants since 1918, a sustained juriedietion

over the dumping grounds used as navigable waters of

the United States’’, and defendant cannot now challenge

such jarisdiction, citing Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters,

539.

All this case holds on this subject is that an Act of

Congress, which has been upheld by the decisions of vari-

ous high State courts and by governmental officials, must

after a long period of judicial and practical construction

be considered valid (p. 621).

We ask, however, if plaintiff’s contention is sound, why

did not the Master make a specific finding to that effect as

a matter of fact or law? Once again, we refer to State of

Rhode Island vs. State of Massachusetts, supra, at page

729, where it is said, ‘‘that the boundaries of the United

States were the external boundaries of the several states’’.

Plaintiff’s argument really reinforces our own, namely,

that the matter of dumping is within the regulation of Con-

gress either under (possibly) 25 Stat. 209, as amended, or

some provision yet to be enacted if thought necessary. De-

fendant has not been found to be violating 25 Stat. 209,

as amended, and as yet there is no other appropriate

legislation.

Other arguments on pages 12 and 13 of plaintiff’s brief

are sufficiently answered on pages 36-3° of our main brief,

except that we might add that in Lefrois vs. County

Monroe, 162 N. Y. 563, where it was held that the defend:

could not be restrained at the suit of a neighboring farn

from permitting sewage to escape from its almshouse on

his farm, it was said that the alleged nuisance might

enjoined in an action against the Board of Supervisors

the County, and others in control of the building.

(c) The property affected is within the United Sta

This subject is treated also at page 28 of our origi

brief (and supra), and nothing further need be added he

Replying to plaintiff's argument that defendar

garbage dumped more than a marine league from |

New Jersey shore is driven by the winds upon pla

tiff’s beaches and into its adjacent waters, thus cre

ing a public nuisance, to the great injury of plainti:

rights and property.

On page 15 of its brief appear these statements:

„The practice (of dumping its garbage and 1

use at sea) was discontinued from that year (18!

until 1903 when it was resumed until 1906.’’

There are no references given as the source of this sta

ment ard no finding in accord therewith was made by

Master. Defendant’s witness, Greene (Pr. A. 566-567), t

tified that the Barren Island Disposal Plant broke down

1903 and for a short period of two or more months garba

had to be taken te sea. The abstract does make him st:

that from 1906 to 1918 no garbage was sent to sea

the City of New Tork“. However, if the stenographer’s

minutes at page 1707 » consulted, it will be found that

Greene’s testimony wz to the form of question asked

by City’s counsel, as fon. 4:

**Q. So then from 1906 to 1918 was any garbage

sent to sea by the City of New York? A. No, sir.“

The Master, however, finds that the defendant ‘‘except

for a brief period during 1906 did not dispose of these

things at sea’’ (R. Sp. M., p. 19). It is immaterial whether

the interruption was in 1903 cr 1916. But it is material

that it did not extend for a ee year period from 1903 to

1906, and nothing in the record justifies the statement in the

brief.

Taking up some of the statements in the brief in regard

to the evidence, we find:

On page 27, it is stated that ‘‘Exhibits 16 to 24, both

inclusive, show areas of garbage in mass and in process

of distribution as it drifted toward the New Jersey shore

(R. 15).’’ The words New Jersey’’ do not appear in

the printed abstract of testimony at the place referred to.

On page 28, it is said that:

„Soap will not work on bathers who have been in

that water (R. 16, 17).’’

The printed abstract shows that these words should be pre-

ceded by the words people remark . In other words, the

statement is hearsay.

On page 29, it is stated that:

„He (Smack) has followed the trail of garbage,

which he has seen dumped in a definite line continu-

ously to the beach, from approximately twenty miles

southeast by east of Scotland Light.’’

and that he:

10

‘*traced the course and direction for four and 3

half hours when the wind was blowing at the rate

of thirty miles an hour (R. 24).““

In other words, if Smack foilowed this garbage in that way,

it must have been moving about 4% miles to 5% miles per

hour (the Lightship being four miles from the shore—Pr.

A., p. 24). Since the highest rate of drift of garbage as

tested by Haas, plaintiff’s witness, from the Harbor Su-

pervisor’s Office, was only slightly over a mile an hour

with a 35 mile wind bebind it, we submit that Smack’s testi-

mony, as well as that of the lobster men, on this subject

was incredible and not to be interpreted as plaintiff and

the Special Master have interpreted it. The correct con-

“struction is simply that they have gone through garbage

all the way to the beach from the dumping grounds, but

not that they have goue along with garbage that they saw

dumped all the way to the beach (see also main brief, pp.

62 and 63).

From the bottom of page 32 to the middle of page 35 is

a section of the brief relating to the testimony of fishermen,

almost all of whom fished for lobsters. A majority of these

men testified to having seen the scows dumped frequently,

the reason therefor being because they often had their

lobster pots set out near the dumping areas 18 to 20 miles

off shore (Voorhees, Pr. A., 36-37; Schweitzer, 42; De

Camp, 47; Peterson, 50; C. Holgarson, 55; Oleson, 75; Popp,

347-348 ; Jacobson, 373). Now, although the Special Master

made use of the testimony of these men as to following

garbage from the dumping grounds to the shore (R. Sp.

M., p. 26) he made no finding in respect to injury or dam-

age to their lobster pots or to their business. Perhaps this

was because one of them—Oleson—testified (Pr. A., 77):

11

J fished right around the dumping ground last

year. That was the only place we could pick up a

few lobsters * * *.’’

As it is a matter of common knowledge that lobsters are

seavengers (Standard Dictionary ‘‘Lobsters’’), the reason

why the lobster-men fished on the dumping grounds is ap-

parent. As to the damage they suffered, it often came from

the dumping by scows of heavy stuff (cellar dirt, ete.,

Schweitzer, Pr. A., 46; Hines, 354; EK. Phillips, 402). The

testimony of this last witness should be examined with

special care, as it is stated on page 33 of plaintiff's brief:

Th garbage comes from New York City scows

and is mortor less a regular thing every day. This

garbage affects lobster pots five or six miles in-

shore from the dumping ground (R. 402).”’

Phillips actually testified in this regard (p. 402):

The way I put that distance is the inshore light-

ship there, [1239] the inshore lightship, which is

supposed to be six miles from the beach. And I

was directly south of him when he dumped on me.

That is the subway dumping that I am talking

about.

Surely it will not be contended that the dumping of

subway material is the dumping of garbage, in view of the

testimony of Anderson (Pr. A., 537) and Duggan (Pr. A.,

546-547). We submit, therefore, that the summary is plain-

tiff’s brief is misleading to say the least.

In view of the absence of a finding by the Master as to

damage to lobster pots, we also submit that the statements

on the bottom of page 33 and top of page 34, and middle of

page 34, are out of place therein. The Master could not

very well make a finding in regard to such damage in view

of his finding (Report, p. 58) that, The property affected

is within the United States.

12

On page 34 it is stated:

‘*Whenever the wind is from the east or north-

east, it (garbage) drifts to the New Jersey shore.

Their (lobster fishermen’s) testimony positively

identifies garbage on the beach and in the waters

as having come from New York City scows dumped

at sea.’’

There is no evidence in the record which justifies this

conclusion of fact. If the word ‘‘toward’’ had been used

instead of ‘‘to’’ in the sentence ‘‘it drifts to the New Jersey

shore it would not have been so objectionable. Several

of the lobster fishermen witnesses so testified and two or

three do testify that it drifted ‘‘to’’ the shore. In view

of the testimony of Haas, however, heretofore referred to,

we say that even such testimony cannot be relied upon

(Main Brief, pp. 62-63).

As to the statements (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 34) in regard

to diminishing returns to fishermen, we refer again to the

testimony of Olsen above, and also to the fact that the

pollution of coastal waters near important harbors by oil

burning or oil carrying vessels and by refineries, has been

a very serious menace to the fishing industry.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 258 is a transcript of the minutes of

a meeting of the National Coast Anti-Pollution League,

hetd in September, 1923. Set forth therein is a copy of a

joint resolution adopted by Congress in the year 1922,

authorizing the President to call a conference of marine

nations with a view to the adoption of effective means for

the prevention of the pollution of navigable waters by oil,

etce., discharged from oil carrying or operated steamers.

The preamble of such resolution, so set forth, contained

the following provisions: 7

13

‘*Wueneas, the careless casting of oil refuse into

the sea from oil carrying steamers has become a seri-

ous menace to the maritime and fishing industries

of the United States, and other countries, and

Wuenreas, serious loss to ocean fisheries has re-

sulted from such discharge into the territorial waters

of waste products of oil used for fuel in many steam

ers in place of coal, which threatens to exterminate

the food fish, oysters, clams, lobsters and other food

supply, and

Wuereas, the dumping of this oil refuse is not

only ruining the bathing beaches situated in the ter-

ritorial waters of the various countries which, dur-

ing the summer, attract thousands and thousands of

people to the seashore resorts, and the injury to sea-

shore property is most alarming * * °.’’

The minutes of such meeting, as set forth in Exhibit 258,

also show that several speakers at such conference em-

phasized the great injury which oil pollution was inflicting

on bathing beaches and to bathers using them, and to the

coastal fishing industry.

Evidently, as a result of the facts and representations

made to Congress, that body, in 1924, passed an act, known

as the ‘‘Oil Pollution Act“ (43 Stat. 604), and set forth in

Title 33, Chapter 9, Sections 431 to 437, inclusive, U. 8.

Code. The act prohibited the discharge, except under regu-

lations prescribed by the Secretary of War, of oil, fuel oil,

oil sludge, and oil refuse into or upon the coastal navigable

waters of the United States, from vessels.

That the prohibitions provided by the statute were not

wholly effective, however, is evidenced from the testimony

of certain of the witnesses for the plaintiff in this case.

Frank Durand, Mayor of Sea Girt (Pr. A. 164) testified

14

that there had deen complaints from people there (Pr. A.

171) of oi] and tar in the water which got on the feet of

bathers but in the last two or three years it had not been

serious. Edmund R. Willets, a summer resident of Sea

Girt testified (Pr. A. 203) 1 have seen oil come in on the

beach at Sea Girt * * * more like tar than oil’’ (Pr. A. 204).

Joseph C. Hoagland, a real estate man from New York

who spends his summers at Rumson, New Jersey (Pr. A.

520) testified (Pr. A. 523) we have had an oily deposit

that we described, perhaps not technically correctly, as ‘tar’

on the beach. It is a crude oi! deposit.

Perhaps, too, the dumping of Newark, N. J. sewer sludge

at the 8 mile point southeast of Scotland Light has some-

“thing to do with the alleged injury to fishing (Pr. A. 537,

545).

As to whether the garbage is getting worse every year

(Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 34-36) although many of plaintiff's

witnesses have so testified, others state thaf this is not so.

M. E. Snyder (Pr. A. 57) General Superintendent of the

Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association since April 1, 1925

testified for plaintiff :

Pr. A. 60) This strewing of our beach with

garbage occurred quite frequently in 1926. Each year

since then it has been diminishing in quantity.

Gustave Holgarson (Pr. A. 82) fisherman for 48 years,

living at Seabright, also testifying for plaintiff, said:

(Pr. A. 84) I have seen this stuff on the beach

in Seabright. I cleaned a good many tons of it off

(326). That is a good many years ago. I saw some

garbage this summer on the beach, but the last three

years there ain't been so much garbage on the beach

in Seabright.

15

On page 42 of the Brief, about the middle of the page,

we find this statement,

It (garbage) depreciates the value of property

and interferes with the raising of municipal rev-

enue (R. 505).""

One witness only, Walter J. Sweeney (Pr. A. 504), the

borough tax aseeseor of Seabright, gave the testimony upon

which this sweeping statement is based. His evidence is

so lacking in substance as a support for such a conclusion

that we take the liberty of quoting it (F A. 505):

On two or three occasions, I went into the home

of Mr. Reiker and Mr. Sisson, (1515) and they

— to tham (and this was done).

On pages 44 and 45 of the Brief are to be found state-

ments in support of the contention that garbage and refuse

on the beaches is a ‘‘menace to life and body

With very few exceptions, all of the citations to pages

of the record given as supporting these statements refer to

hearsay testimony or conclusions of the witnesses from

what had been told to them, and except for such testimony

in reference to cut feet from broken bottles, the substance

thereof is in respect to unimportant matters.

Toward the bottom of page 44, 12 citations to pages

of the record are enumerated and in only one of these

was the testimony given by an individual who actually cut

16

his foot. Four citations near the top of page 45 are giv.

and all relate to the conclusions of witnesses or hearsa

In respect to the reference to the bather who had sued t

City of Asbury Park for cutting his knee (R. 39), the

is no proof whatever that he recovered a judgment.

The statement on page 45 that ‘‘some of the bottles

the garbage are labeled poison which shall have materi

in them’’, referring to R. 106-107, the testimony sho

that only one bottle was referred to.

Shortly below this are six references to testimony

the record about bathers who avoid garbage and refuse

the waters because of the menace to health. These al

refer to the conclusions of the witaesses.

On page 46, of the plaintiff’s brief, there is a reference

typhoid fever having occurred in Red Bank (R. 331). T

witness actually testified ‘‘that there has been typhoid

Red Bank, plenty. At different times surely—the avera,

amount that would happen in any community.“

We have commented in our main brief (Appendix ‘‘E

thereto, pages 110-111) upon the finding of the Mast

(R. Sp. M., p. 16) based on the testimony of Dr. Fisch

(plaintiff’s brief, page 47). In all of the 50 or more mil

of beach front communities affected with their hundre

of thousands of summer residents and visitors and 160,0

of all the year around population, only one doctor cou

be found who could testify in relation to the increases

the various affections mentioned and he only compar

the records of 1928 with 1929. The number of cases me

tioned even in the year 1929 as compared with the perm

nent population is almost grotesque as a basia for a findin

Besides the failure to elicit any such evidence from t

Health Physician of Spring Lake (Pr. A. 24f), Heal

17

Inspector Bostwick of Bradley Beach gave no testimony to

support such finding (Pr. A. 198).

On the bottom of page 48 of plaintiff's brief it is stated

that

‘*Instances appear where guests stop coming to

these resorts entirely because of their disgust with

the garbage condition (R. 250)."’ .

The testimony is I think I have had people stop com-

ing there on that account’’.

On page 49 of the brief we find it stated that the loca-

tions of the ‘‘dumping grounds are shown on plaintiff's

Exhibit 205 (R. 294-5).’’ The distances marked on the

exhibit are somewhat less than those testified to by Super-

visor Anderson and his Assistant Haas (Pr. A. 537, 637)

and the Special Magter has made a finding (K. Sp. M., p.

20), to which plaintiff has not excepted, that the distances

of the dumping points from the shore are in accordance

with their testimony and not with that of Smack and his

chart. Why then should the plaintiff have referred to the

matter of the chart and Smack s testimony? Can it be that

the brief was written before the Master made his report?

Near the bottom of page 49 of the brief we find it stated:

The fact that defendant’s garbage reached

plaintiff’s shore was constantly called to its attention

without denial, during the negotiations of Governors

Silzer, Moore and Larson.

This is also somewhat inaccurate. In a letter dated

May 23, 1923 from Commissioner Taylor of the New York

Street Cleaning Department to Mr. John Gruetzner, Su-

perintendent of the beach at Asbury Park, read into the

record at pages 507-508, we find the following:

18

A study of the tides show that they travel at the

rate of 2 miles an hour for the period of 6 hours, so

that the distance that any material could approach

the shore at Asbury Park would be 6 miles, and then

it would be caught by the outgoing tide and carried

out again * [t seems to me that unless an

accident occurs to one of our scows from collision

or otherwise, there is no chance of the garbage of the

City of New York reaching the beaches.

A similar statement in substance is to be found in a

later letter fram Commissioner Taylor to Governor Silzer

dated May 29, 1924, read into the record at pages 457-458.

On page 50 of the brief this statement appears:

„On the second occasion they put bottles over-

board in the garbage to test the floating but did not

gather them up because they were floating to the

Jersey shore’ (R. 557).’’

We ask the Court if it is not apparent from this state

ment that the impression is sought to be created that the

defendant's witnesses Gainard, Lawrence and Bergasten

when making their test threw bottles overboard and then

abandoned them because they were floating to the New Jer-

sey shore? The actual testimony (to which we may refer

under the stipulation set forth at page XXIII of the Printed

Abstract) is as follows (S. M. 1674):

„. And you went and gathered them up again,

didn’t you? A. We certainly did not.

Q. Didn’t you go and gather any of those bot-

tles and cans up because they were floating to the

Jersey shore? A. We certainly did not.

Q. Now, you did not on any of those trips go and

gather up the cans or bottles because they were float-

ing towards New Jersey shore? A. We did not.“

19

(This reminds one of the ancient illustration of unfair

‘ eross-examination ‘‘Have you stopped \eating your wife?

Answer, yes, or no.)

On page 52 of the brief we find this statement as to the

defendant's rarbage “umped at sea:

It retard the development and growth of the

seashore cetimunities; depreciates the value of real

property: reduces and impairs the development of

comuervial enterprises; and retards the general

prosperity ; „ „ „ „*

As set forth under subdivision A“, Point VI (pp. 81-

86), of our main brief, there is no clear and convincing

proof to substantiate these important contentions of the

plaintiff.

At the bottom of page 52 of the brief the last subdi-

vision is Public Nuisance Proven’’. We attacked the weak-

ness of the plaintiff’s proof in Point II of our main brief

on pages 55-57. We cited the testimony of seven of plain-

tiff’s witnesses who stated in substance that for many

years prior to the time when defendant started to dump

garbage at sea in 1918, conditions on the beaches had been

bad. Here is the testimony of three more of such wit-

nesses on the subject.

M. Hall, a fisherman and companion of Smack’s on his

investigating trips, testified (Pr. A. 117):

„For the last 20 years, I guess 1 have seen moge

or less garbage.

Albert B. Carver, another lobster fisherman, testified

(Pr. A. 213):

have been in that business for 17 years.

(Pr. A. 214). That condition (garbage) has existed

ever since I can remember.

20

E. Donald Sterner, State Senator, who has lived at Bel-

mar all his life testified (Pr. A. 216): ;

J have encountered this garbage on the beach

or elsewhere ever since my boyhood days.

In support of the last mentioned conclusion of the plain-

tiff are cited a number of authorities, among others the

case of Kuehn vs. Milwaukee, 92 Wise. 263, 18 L. R. A. 553,

554-6. The L. R. A. citation is not correct. That corre.

sponds to a citation of the same case when it reached the

highest court of Wisconsin four years earlier reported in

83 Wisc. 583 (53 No. W. 912). When the case came before

the Court later in 92 Wisc. 263, it was also reported in 65

No. W. 1030.

We take the liberty of quoting therefrom as an addition

to the list of cases set forth at page 49 of our main brief.

It holds that the City of Milwaukee, in disposing of its

garbage through a contractor (who dumped it in Lake

Michigan, 15 miles from shore thereby injuring the plain-

tiff’s fishnets) was acting in a governmental capacity, the

opinion also stating:

„And it is not necessarily nor prima facie, an act

of nuisance to cast the garbage of a city upon Lake

Michigan, 15 miles from the shore. It has long been

the almost universal custom everywhere to empty

the sewage of cities into adjacent lakes and streams

almost from necessity.’’

Harbor of New York, does not relieve defendant from

the effect of the public nuisance created by its dump-

ing.

We have little to add to what was said in Point III

in our main brief and what has already been said on the

subject herein.

The cases cited by the plaintiff on page 55 relate to

nuisances erected or committed within State boundaries

and much that is said in them is colored by that fact.

At page 56 it is stated that the validity of the permits

issued by the Supervisor of the Harbor to the defendant

cannot be determined from the record herein. In reply it

is sufficient to state that they were regarded as valid by

the Master (R. Sp. p. 43) [even although valueless as a

defense] and plaintiff has not excepted to the finding.

Plaintiff contends (p. 56) that 30 Stats. 1152 (Section

13, Title 33, Section 407 of United States Code) applies

outside the Harbor of New York and adjacent waters. No

authority for this claim is cited and in reason it has no

validity. If 25 Stats. 209, as amended, does not apply to

defendant's acts certainly 30 Stats. 1152 does not. If one is

not violated neither is the other. If a permit from the

Harbor Supervisor is not good, one from the Secretary

of War would not be valid either.

As a matter of fact, however, 30 Stats. 1152 was orig-

inally part of a general River and Harbor Act making

‘appropriations for works in rivers and harbors. 25 State. Te

900 wes a special act covering for Now York Hacker aul

adjacent waters the same subject as that covered for other ie

harbors by 30 Stats. 1152. The Master so held (R. Sp. ,

p. 46).

4.

Replying to plaintiff's arguments that such garbage

and refuse as reaches the plaintiff's shores from

dumpings by coastwise and other vessels and other

sources is negligible in comparison with that dumped

by defendant and reaching plaintiff's shores, and com-

stitutes no defense to the plaintiff's complaint.

On page 58 of plaintiff’s brief it is said that defendant's

three witnesses Gainard, Lawrence and Bergsten testified

to the alleged accumulation of garbage on the decks of

vessels amounting ‘‘to 50 tons accumulated in ten to fifteen

days in port occupying a space of 50 cu. ft. to the ton.

It is claimed that the testimony is incredible. The char-

acterization that testimony related to accumulations ‘‘of

garbage is inaccurate and unfair. Gainard used the gen-

eral word materials (Pr. A. 554) and then described

them in detail (Pr. A. 555). He did not state that the accu-

mulation was for a period of ten or fifteen days, but for a

week or ten days (Pr. A. 555, 560), and that When I said

they accumulate garbage, now I am talking of accumala-

tion in port, hold cleanings”’ (Pr. A. 560) * * What was

left of the cargo, the dirt, the dunnage the 50 tons consists

of garbage and rubbish’’ (Pr. A. 561). The others testi-

to much the same thing (Pr. A., 564-585, 624-625),

although the amount was made smaller.

It really seems rather difficult for the plaintiff’s brief-

writer to characterize the testimony accurately. The testi-

mony of defendant’s witnesses in regard to the kind of

material dumped from cargo boats was in a measure cor-

roborated by plaintiff’s rebuttal witness, Snow (Pr. X. 647.

648), except that he had not seen garbage in dunmage accu-

Under the head of ‘‘Sewer Pollution plaintiff discusses

evidence relating to the Long Branch and Asbury Park

Sewers. We have treated this subject on pages 72-74 of

our main brief. We will only add that the criticiam of the

system of the Long Branch Sewer Company in the Ep<i-

neers’ Report (Defendant’s Exhibit 10) is about as 8 :-

ing as could be made.

The criticiams of the engineers appear on pages 16, 31

and 33 of their report. On page 16, it is stated

CC

satisfactory.’*

On page 31, it is said:

The treatment in the disposal plant is by screen-

ing only of a most primitive kind.

On page 32, we find the foilowing:

Fly soreen wire haz been found elsewhere to be

unsuitable for the screening of sewage. As might

be expected, large solids are found in the effiuent.’’

On page.33, it is stated:

The plant has been condemned by the State

authorities and a new plant ordered, consisting of

septic tank, chlorine disinfection, and pumps to raise

the sewage to an elevation where it will be free from

tidal interference.

On page 64 of the brief, plaintiff states that ‘‘defendant

produced no evidence of any such dumping, i. e., by Brook-

lyn Navy Yard scows. Well, Harbor Supervisor Anderson

testified (Pr. A. 540):

‘*Seows of the Navy Yard in New York deposit

materials on the high seas. They are required to

go out to the garbage limit, although the proportion

of the garbage in their loads is a mall proportion

Theirs is generally a rubbish and refuse proposi-

tion.

Plaintiff's investigator, Smack (Pr. A. 9) said:

In trailing Woodson we passed a Navy vessel

N towing one empty garbage scow * * *°.”’

It is true, defendant had no eye-witness or photog-

rapher to record the dumping by Navy Yard vessels

Doubtless, it is possible to infer that the empty garbage

scow being towed by a Navy vessel was simply out for an

airing, and that the testimony of Captain Anderson was,

unlike the conclusions of dozens of plaintiff's witnesses,

which were based on complaints, of no value whatever.

The sea lane, or course, of coastwise vessels south-

bound from New York ranges from three miles offshore

at Seabright, Long Branch and Asbury Park to five miles

at Sea Girt and to eight miles off Barnegat Lighthouse (Pr.

A. 553, 584). The Master seems to have so found, and

that their routes lie between the dumping places of the

City and the shore (R. Sp. M. p. 31). The dumping points

for ‘‘cellar dirt’’ barges being at 4 miles southeast of the

lightship must also have been nearer the shore than the

City’s dumping place. Hence the retarding inflaence of

the tides would be less upon materials dumped from these

sources than they would be on materials dumped farther

offshore, since only one tide would operate against those

dumped nearer inshore. They also have a shorter distance

to go when drifting under the influence of an east wind.

In other words, the likelihood of such garbage and refus:

reaching New Jersey shores and waters would be much

greater. 0

Our contention is, not as stated by plaintiff at page 64,

that a similar nuisance created by passing ships or private

contractors from Brooklyn Navy Yard excuses defendant

and is a valid defense. We are aware of the doctrine that

if A is proved to have committed a nuisance upon X's

property, the fact that B, C and D contribute thereto does

not relieve A. Our contention relates to the difficulty of

proving that A (the defendant herein) actually committed

a nuisance which affected plaintiff's property, in view of

all the other sources from which the offending substances

are more likely to have come, and which affected it for

years when defendant was not dumping its garbage into

the ocean.

Replying to plaintiff's contentions in regard to

some particular exceptions to the Master's report.

The only thing on which we wish to comment is the

statement on page 66 of the brief relating to defendant's

contention that the plaintiff must be held to strict proof,

plaintiff remarking that the defendant has not the status

or sovereignty of a State. We do not contend that the de-

fendant has all of the sovereign powers or prerogatives of

a State, but we have argued in support of our contention

6 di amd tn j ;

and cases cited therein). ;

To the cases cited in our Main Brief, we would add:

2 United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wallace, $235

Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass, 52; :

Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Masa,

583.

In the headnote to United States v. Railroad Co.

(supra), it is said:

„A municipal corporation (City of Baltimore)

is a portion of the sovereign power of the State, and

is not subject to taxation by Congress upon its mu-

nicipal revenue.

In Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston (supra), it is said,

at page 585:

They (Cities and towns as territorial subdi-

visions of the State) have a two-fold character, ore

governmental, the other private. In the one they

execute the functions and possess the attributes of

sovereignty which have been delegated by the legis-

lative department of the government

Other contentions of the plaintiff need not be specifically

replied to here except that costs should not be awarded to

the plaintiff, but to the defendant, on dismissal of the com-

plaint as prayed for by defendant. Our views in regard

to the remaining subjects argued by the plaintiff are suffi-

ciently set forth in our main brief.

As an appendix to this brief, we have set forth a list

of the exceptions to the Master’s findings and page num-

bers where the reasons for taking the exceptions are die-

cussed in our main brief.

27

Conclusion.

We renew our prayer for action by this Court set forth

at the end of our main brief.

Respectfully submitted,

Asruvs J. W. Huy,

Corporation Counsel of the City of New York,

Solicitor for the Defendant.

Euusor S. BAND,

J. Joanru Lua x,

Tuomas W. A. Crows,

of Counsel.

New York, April 27th, 1931.

Appendix.

List of Defendant's Exceptions and places in Main Brief

where discussed.

Exceptions Drec ussed in brief Exceptions Discussed in brief

Now at pages Now at pages

1 24 27 105

la 25 28 105

2 28 29 105-6

3 25 30 105-6

4 102 31 105-6

5 102 32 No specific argument

6 (Error; found by 33 46, 47, 86

Master)

7 25 34 67

— 25 35 105-6

9 103 36 1065, 107

10 103 37 105, 107

11 25 38 105, 108

12 103-4 39 105, 108

13 103-4 40 79-80

14 61 41 46, 47

15 52 42 46, 47

16 110-11 43 46, 47

17 110-11 44 108

18 46 45 108-09

19 46 46 27, 36, 69

20 46 47 No specific argument

21 46-47 48 109

22 46-47 49 68

23 46-47 50 68

24 63 51 70-71

25 104 52 74

26 104-5 53 109

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

8⁴

85

86

87

E8 88888

Lib

8888888

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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