Motion — New Jersey v. New York City
Supreme Court brief1935
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
@rate or New Jenser,
Plaintiff,
aqaumst
Tue OCrry or New Youx,
Defendant.
Nottoe.
To:
Hon. WuszsaM A. Severs,
Attorney General of the State of New Jeruey,
Hon. Duaws E. Movazp,
Assistant Attorney General of the State of
New Jersey,
Roticitors for Plaintiff.
Rirs:
Piense be advised that on Monday, May 27, 1929,
the annexed motion will be presented to the Court
and application made for the relief therein prayed.
Dated, New York, May 25, 19298.
Aaruus J. W. Bmax,
Corporation Counsel,
Belicitor for Defemdant
In Equity.
Motion ror Laave TO ANSWER AKD FoR KiWLARoR-
MENT OF TIME TO ANSWER.
Comes now the defendant, The City of New
York, by its Corporation Counsel and Solicitor and
shows as follows, to wit:
1. That pursuant to leave of this Court granted
on the 20th day of May, 1920, the State of New
Jersey has filed in this Court a bill of
against the defendant The City of New York, pray-
ing that this Court grant to the plaintiff the United
States’ writ of injunction perpetually restraining
he defendant from dumping garbage and other
matter into the Ocean or other waters of the United
States off the coast of New Jersey and for other
relief.
2. That the suit in equity of the State of New
Jersey so permitted, by this Court, to be com-
menced was docketed as number 21, Original, :
October Term— 1928, on the 22nd day of May, 1929.
8S. That this Court’s subpoena to answer the
aforesaid bill of complaint was issned therefrom
HE cet a ik
ne rH TE jel tli
— a4
il
as}; it HE
of Counsel.
43
it
J. Josmpn Lay,
i
fi? sai]
oer SOSSSrARSANNSSAnRASRRSEssers!2
1
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Ocrosmn Tram, 1930.
No. 18, Origimal.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Pleintiff,
os
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
To the Supreme Court of the United States:
In the above entitled cause this Honorable Court ap-
pointed me as Special Master by its order dated October
14, 1929, as follows:
‘‘And it is farther ordered that the Honorable Edward
K. Campbell be and he is hereby appointed Special Master
in this cause with power to summon witnesses, issue sub-
poenas and to take such testimony as may be introduced
and such as he may desire to call. The master is directed
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and to sub-
mit the same to this Court with all convenient speed, to-
gether with his recommendations for a decree. The find-
ings, conclusions and recommendations of the master shall
be subject to consideration, revision or approval by the
Court.’”’
The parties to the suit, by their respective counsel, ap-
peared before me in Washington, in compliance with my
request, in November, 1929, when a time was fixed for the
taking of proof. Public hearings began at Asbury Park,
New Jersey, on December 11, 1929, continuing for three
#48] $42 Savyqase pigy t23g:
a + a 1h a
3 dy Hf rs | Gr tay 3
Hal eeu Weds 7;
pif a$bis LH + ais i
Be iri! ee |
ud te Hate Bue
FUERTE LS
Hie PE: badlail iii Jitte
Special Master.
Baty
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
> 7 al o's te aaeeg Ja
ites
: iat HE : ut
+ ates
‘] At ) ie ny
parties Prt
+ fis ATC
gan Ff BSs stazae Hi
allies tela 7
mb—vtee-t
“.
i
i
F
i
E
:
:
:
z
F
TER
“1
EF
t
FF
H
;
447
i
aiiih
th
Li
+r
1 5
lin
said shore
ing and for pleasure boating, for fishing and other
purposes, and that many millions of dollars have been in-
vested within the beach section in hotels, bathing pavilions,
piers for landing and for pleasure, boardwalks, boulevards
and facilities for pleasure and profit, and that several thon-
sands of people are constantly employed to maintain and
operate the same.
F
(6) That the growth, prosperity and substantial prop
erty values of the seashore communities in question are
the result of enterprises dependent upon the population and
the suitability of said waters, beaches and shore front fa-
zens who have made investments in the fishing business of
large sums of money; that the production of these fish
pounds in one year amounts to approximately 20,000,000
pounds of fish, having a value of nearly a millicn dollars,
and that the industry gives employment to approximately
500 men.
(8) It is alleged that the defendant, with a population
exceeding 6,000,000 of people and increasing annually, dis-
poses of garbage and other refuse by transporting the same
in barges towed ont and dumped into the navigable waters
of the United States off the complainant's coast
and
tide upon the said beaches and cast thereon by
in heeps and windrows and under or about the piers,
wharves, adjacent boulevards and private property, where
it decays and pollutes the sea and land unless and until
(9) It is farther averred that the acts complained of
(a) Take the property of complainant and ite citizens
without due process of law im violation of Article XIV,
Section 1 of the Constitution;
to its sovereign rights as a member of the Union, and,
este of the plaintiff and its citizens.
The answer of the City of New York, except in its ad-
mission of the averments as to its own population, was
substantially a general denial of the allegations of the
Bill
The answer denies many of the averments of the bill,
and not admitting others sets forth ‘‘for a firet defense’’:
8
(2) And further answering and ‘‘for a second defense’’
;
4
:
J
REeeas
HAL E
TT ES
alu if
Thee
ip /
fipele i
wES EERE g
ctl
sie Feeeee
of each of those cities; and that all of the garbage, refuse
and sewage and offensive matter is the same kind and char-
acter as that dumped by the City of New York at points
eight to twenty miles southeast of Scotland Lightship and
from ten to twenty-tws miles from New Jersey shores.
That ‘‘such garbage, refuse, sewage and other offensive
matter discharged as aforesaid by private contractors, by
the United States Navy Yard authorities and by said
’ Jersey cities into the water of the Atlantic ocean
quantities would float under the influence of
wind into the water and on to the beaches of
New Jersey and its municipalities claimed to be polluted in
this action’’ and ‘‘it is impossible to determine whether
garbage or offensive materials in substantial quantity
dumped by the City of New York is deposited in the waters
of New Jersey and on ite beaches or in greater quantities
than that deposited in the sea by other agencies than the
City of New York; and that if any injuries or damages are
suffered by New Jersey or its citizens or to their health,
safety or property it is not chargeable to the acte of the
defendant ; and
(3) ‘*For a third defense the defendant alleges that
the bill of complaint does not state facts sufficient to con-
approved April 16, 1929, by direction of the Governor of
the State.
The defendant is the City of New York, a domestic mu-
nicipal corporation, created by and existing under the laws
of the State of New York.
The case presents a justiciable controversy over which
this Court has jurisdiction. (Art. III, Sec. 2, Const. of the
U. 8.) (Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U. 8.
230; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. 8. 208; 200 U. S. 496.
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. 8. 296; Wisconsin v. Mli-
nots, 278 U. 8. 367, 418).
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The facts deemed to be established by the evidence and
which may be considered material to the contentions of the
bats i
ulti
slit
ieee
Hh i
Terie
ma
(1) Leeality.
The State of New Jersey on its easterly side borders on
the Atlantic Ocean for a distance of about one hundred
miles. A reduced copy of a map in evidence, showing the
geographical location, is made an exhibit to the bill.
(2) Area Affected.
(a) The part of the State affected more directly by the
matters complained of is that portion of the ocean front-
age extending from a point at or near Atlantic Highlands
southward to Beach Haven, a distance of approximately
fifty milee and inward from the shore at various distances.
Within this fifty miles of ocean frontage there are twenty-
nine separate municipalities of the State.
(b) The State of New Jersey, as the proprietary owner
of the seashore, has at different times conveyed to these
several municipalities, and in some instances by lease or
otherwise, to individuals designated, portions of the front-
age under water. No material changes have occurred since
1928 and in that year the ownership of the frontage under
water along the said fifty miles of coast line was as follows:
The State owns approximately 285,000 lineal feet be
i
if
HY
i
i}
;
sf
lt
Ht
Hitt
:
|
:
i
:
!
P
|
|
F
Lf
FE
i
if
(3) Sameer Resorts.
These municipalities are seashore resorts, inhabited and
maintained as such for the benefit of residents and visitors.
Many thousands of visitors frequent them during the sum-
A large number of photographs were introduced and
filed as exhibits, showing the crowded condition of beaches
by péople assembled there to take part in or witness the
bathing and enjoy the beaches and ocean.
There are many private homes in the several towns and
boroughs. In many of these the owners reside during the
summer and commute to their places of business in New
York, Philadelphia or some place in New Jersey.
(5) Fishing.
The statutes of New Jersey provide for a license
Board of Fish and Game Commissioners
500 persons.
The fish pound nets are extended fron a point about s
quarter of mile from shore outward for a distance of ap-
proximately 1500 feet, in water from twenty to thirty-five
feet deep, are supported by poles driven in the bottom, the
pounds or traps being at the outer end. When fish feed-
ing along the coast come in contact with the net, which
serves as @ wier, they turn toward deeper water, following
the net and the contraption is such that the fish are thus
led into the trap from which they cannot extricate them-
selves and from which they are taken.
More than one hundred of these fish pounds are located
at divers places off the coast of plaintiff and large quanti-
ties of fish are taken annually and sold from them. The
value of the fish pounds in 1928 was approximately $700,000.
The fish caught amounted to approximately 25,000,000
pounds and sold for epproximately $950,000. Less fish
were taken in 1928 than in 1924, 1925 or 1926, but more in
1928 than in 1927.
(b) Fishing as a sport is engaged in by many persons
using boats or the piers or the shore from which to cast
their lines and furnishes an attractive feature of these
resorts. .
ity HHH
vl tt
A
3
Intermixed with the foregoing is frequently found
Pieces of wood ; crates and parts of crates; bundles
Large numbers of electric light bulbs and pieces
of paper; broken furniture; rags, cans and rubbish.
thereof ; giase bottles, whole or broken.
Dead dogs, dead cats and dead fowls.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
it
|
he
:
i
£
if!
if]
442
Hip
lay
it if: a HEHE ay gia dey
Hit F sal Hat
LSE
HE
“1
|
3. sittin
HIRATA
Hit a ta
iF
the boardwalks and into the street beyond. Frequently
the depth of the mass exceeds one foot.
When the garbage and refuse are cast upon the beaches
they mus: be speedly removed, especially in summer. The
offensive odors and when subjected to the sun’s rays in-
conglomeration of things spoken of and referred to give off
16
crease in offensiveness and foul smelling that reach away
from the shore to the streets and into the homes of the
people. Swarms of flies appear on the mass and feed there.
The offensive odors from these deposits cause annoyance
and discomfort and nausea. They are unsightly on the
beaches. Large proportions of the animal and vegetable
matter forming a part of the conglomeration and being in
the putrid or decaying condition must be disposed of hur-
riedly and are buried. Other parts are hauled away. At
times it requires fifty or more truck loads to remove one
deposit from a single beach. The grease-like matter is re-
moved by rakes. The deposits of garbage and refuse
pollute the beaches and produce unhealthful conditions,
interfering with and frequently preventing the comfort-
able and enjoyable use of the beaches and the sea. It is
dangerous to leave children unattended on the beach while
the deposits are there because of things they may pick up;
some of the things found being unmentionable. Broken
giass and nails in pieces of wood have been the cause of
severe wounds to persons on the beach or in bathing. The
appearance and condition ef the conglomeration is aptly
described by witnesses as ‘‘nasty’’ and ‘‘filthy’’. It is a
menace to health and tends to injure business and property
values. It injures rental values. They have been made the
subject of many complaints as hereafter stated.
During June, July and August, 1929, there were in
Asbury Park a considerable increase over the preceding
year of cases of external otitis which is a swelling or infla-
mation of the ear canal and of cases of infection of the mid-
die ear, requiring the drum to be opened, and of sinus af-
fected cases, resulting from bathing in the ocean.
Pure sea water has a high chlorine content and is quite
antiseptic. Infection is contrary to the natural conditions
of sea water. One or.more of the Coast Guard incurred
a skin infection from the water which gave them consider-
able trouble.
17
(8) Removal and Expense.
Each deposit of garbage and refuse imposes upon
municipalities affected the expense incident to its rem
Men are regularly employed to perform that daty.
cost of cleaning the beaches following such deposits at
head amounted, in 1929, to $3,000; at Belmar,
Bradley Beach, for 1928 and 1929, it exceeded
Deal, from $1,000 to $1,500 per year; at Allenhurst,
per year; at Qoeean Grove an average of
$275 in four years; at Seaside Park, $600 per
side Heights, $500 per year; at Spring
various sume at the other places, some in excess of
stated.
(9) Water and Fish Nets.
its undertow can carry these things away. The objection-
able materials can be seen in the water and furnish the
basis for many complaints by visiters and others. Usu-
ally the sea clears along the shore in a few days and at
times, in a day after, the deposit on the beach.
When the garbage or refuse is cast upon the beaches it
frequently occurs that fish pound nets in the vicinity of
such beaches are torn by garbage or refuse in the water
thrown against them, and in addition to the damage so
resulting they become fouled and difficult to handle. The
repair of them from the effects of the garbage and refuse
costs many thousands of dollars, which must be borne by
the owners. The presence of garbage and refuse in
water in the vicinity of the nets injuriously affect the busi-
ness of fishing by such neta.
18
(10) Occur, When.
The deposits of garbage and refuse on the beaches occur
when the winds are from the east or northeast. A storm
or severe blow from either of these directions does and
will bring the garbage, and a wind of from twenty to thirty
miles an hour does also bring it to and upon the shore;
as also does an east or northeast wind of two or three days
duration. Sometimes the garbage and refuse are brought
in by southeast winds. The heavier deposits occur on some
of the beaches four or five times a season, and occur fre-
quently throughout the year, varying in number with the
different beaches.
There is no conflict in the testimony as to the foregoing
general statement. The sections thereof, numbered re-
spectively, (1) to (10), both inclusive, are made a part of
my findings of fact.
(11) Dumping.
Nor is there any dispute as to the fact of the disposal by
the City of New York of garbage, street sweeping and rub-
bish by dumping the same at sea. The defendant admits
it does now and has for years since the fall of 1918, dumped
these things in the ocean. It produced a statement from
its records showing that it has dumped into the ocean
during the last six years an average of more than a million
and a third cubic yards per year; that the last year, 1929,
was above that average and exceeded the amount dumped
im either of the three preceding years. Reduced to tons,
the disposal by dumping in the ocean during 1929 was ap-
proximately 493,000 tons. In the winter months there are
less materials dumped than in the summer months. In
February 1929 there were 52,000 cubic yards dumped, and
in June of that year 192,000 cubic yards. These dumpings
are made every day except when the weather conditions
prevent. The foregoing section numbered (11), title
**Dumping’’ is made a part of my findings of fact.
19
(To avoid repetition of statement I also make a part of
numbered, respectively, from 12 to 17 inclusive.)
(12) History of Dumping.
For about twenty years prior to 1918, the City of New
York disposed of its garbage and street sweepings by what
is known as the ‘‘reduction system’’ and except for a brief
period dnring 1906 did not dispose of these
Some necessary repairs or alterations in
been destroyed by fire, occurring
operating the one at Staten Island having failed, the ci
was confronted with the situation that it
for the disposal of its garbage and
applied to the Supervisor of the Harbor of New York
permission to dispose of these materials
Supervisor of the Harbor is an officer provided for by the
Act of Congress of June 29, 1888 (25 Stat. 209), entitled an
**Act to prevent obstructive and injurious deposits within
the Harbor and adjacent waters of New York by dumping
or otherwise and to punish and prevent such offenses’.
This Act and some amendments thereto are made Sec. 441
et seq. of the U. 8S. Code, 44 Stat. 1072.
Under date of August 8, 1918, Dr. R. S. Copeland, then
Health Commissioner of New York, addressed a communi-
cation to the Supervisor of the Harbor stating the very
serious situation confronting the city because of garbage
and said:
**The only present method we have of getting rid of
garbage is to dump it atsea. . . . In order to pro-
twelve mile area in the early spring and late
and
of the scows in the service in the heavy seas usually pre-
vailing during such seasons of the year and the time con-
twelve and a half and twenty-two miles, respectively from
the shore of New Jersey.
The practice of dumping the materials at sea, begun as
an emergency, has continued, but ita character as an emer-
two or three scows to the area of disposal. Accompanying
each of the tug boats is « ‘‘dumping inspector’’ from the
office of the Supervisor of the Harbor whose duty it is to
see that the dumping is done within the prescribed areas.
to
7 HEE 2] ; :
rt ie
if 4 rElE th
j frHE- )
il Ha
32432 pea taas
tarieiiis:
ide HTB
3
ij
|
,&
fa ft
ij
4
ie
|
|
et
He ie HH ngste
+ HEH HIF a?
et HIE Hy dee
in their annual messages.
It has been the subject of joint resolutions by the legisla-
ture in 1927 and 1928 and 1929.
The City of New York, through its Mayor and other re-
sponsible agencies, has been informed of these beach con-
ditions and their injurious effect together with the desire
iy
re
1
ject
of the people of New Jersey that they cease, and this in-
formation has been repeatedly given said city.
(14) Supervisor's Reports.
She Route of Ge Roatan 0 he ee San
York, included in the annual report of the Chief of Engi-
neers for the years 1918 to 1929, inclusive, mention
that the defendant’s garbage is
The report for 1918 states that
In 1919 the report stated that ‘‘the practice of
of garbage at sea has continued.” In 1920 the report
states: ‘‘About two years ago at the request of the New
York City Commissioner of Street Cleaning and the
solicitation of the Commissioner of Health the Supervisor
authorized the disposal of city garbage at sea as a tem-
porary measure to continue for two or three months only.
The practice still continues and there is no prospect of an
immediate change.’’ The substance of this statement ap-
pears in the reports for the subsequent years.
In a letter dated September 10, 1925, from the Secretary
of War, in response to one from the Governor of New
Jersey complaining of garbage conditions on the shores of
the State, the Secretary disclaimed that any authority to
dump garbage emanated from his office but stated that per-
have been put in aie
float on the surface or are held in suspension by
The facts confirm the statement made by a Commission
pointed by the Mayor of New York in June, 1907, hersto-
:
rt
E
fi
f
i
i more than thirty
ifferent trips to the dumping places, and on at
E
:
teen of them were close by when the scows dumped their
contents, and they observed the same.
The defendant sent to the dumping areas on three occa
sions in February and March, 1930, persons to examine and
report upon conditions. The Supervisor of the Harbor sent
an agent to these areas tc investigate the floating garbage
in February, March and April of 1929, and this agent made
six trips. They all concur in the general conclusion, and [
find it to be a fact that the mass spreads out on the surface
of the water, gradually breaking up into smaller
moving for indefinite periods with the
materials being on the surface and some
The Supervisor's agent, instructed
Hl:
went about fourteen miles in twelve hours, the
toward the Narrows; on another occasion the -}
westward under a variable east wind from
five miles, went seventeen miles in 24 hours, and
six miles off the New Jersey shore when he left.
Es
EE
i
water, which were introduced in evidence. A number of
- the fishermen identified conditions which they had wit-
nessed as being similar to those shown by some of these
exhibits. The parties sent out as stated by plaintiff cast
into the mass on several occasions a large number of sealed
bottles containing self-addressed and stamped cards, with
the request that any finder return them by mail. About
twenty-five per cent of these cards came back to the parties
by mail from persons along the New Jersey shore and Long
Island shore, and some from farther north.
During fourteen times these persons went out in May,
June and July of 1929, they made a list of things seen in
the water after the scows were dumped. This list contains
27
the identical kinds of materials that are heretofore stated
to constitute the deposits on shore: fruite and fruit skins;
vegetables, electric light bulbs, papers and rags, wooden
boxes, crating, pasteboard boxes, dead animals and many
other things. The mass falling from the scows forma pilea
a foot clear of water. Gradually displacement takes place,
and the heavier stuffs, finding their way through the float-
ing mass, sink.
The odors arising from the mass are offensive and nauee-
ating. The Supervisor of the Harbor of New York, in his
report to the Chief of Engineers in 1918, said: ‘‘Garbage
deposited at sea, no matter what the distance from shore,
is apt to wash up on the beaches.’’ In each of his subse-
quent reports it is s*id in substance: ‘‘ Experience indi-
cates that garbage at sea at no matter what distance is
liable to wash up on the beaches.’’
I find that large parts of these floating and submerged
areas of garbage and refuse, dumped by the defendant, are
driven and carried by winds and water to a+ 4 upon the
shores o7 the plaintiff, and constitute the objectio...ble ma-
terials thereon and in the adjacent water, hereinbefore
described, and that the winds in such cases come from the
east or the northeast, and sometimes from the southeast,
as has been heretofore found.
(17) Incinerators.
As hereimbefore stated, the method of garbage disposal
in use by defendant prior to October, 1918, was what was
known as the ‘‘Reduction System’’, by which the by-prod-
ucts were conserved. It began the disposal of garbage and
refuse at sea in October, 1918 and has continued the same.
In the meantime, however, it has built a number of incin-
erators as will later appear.
In 1920, a Committee was appointed by the Mayor of
New York to report upon the subject of ‘‘Collection and
Disposal of City Waste.’’ This committee was composed
of the heads of departments and officials, including the
animals, aside from ‘‘large animals"’ amounted in 1920 to
217,600 small animals, such as sheep, calves, hogs, cats and
As to the method of disposal of garbage they reported:
**The greatest objection to the present system of disposing
of waste materials is in connection with the method now
Aside, however, from the question of cost it seems unde-
sirable to dump garbage at sea as it is being done at pres-
ent. It is known that the Federal authorities quietly re-
sent, if they do not openly object to it, and there is always
the possibility of objections from other communities which
have in the past claimed that they have been injured by
the practice. When these objections become sufficiently
strong it may be that New York will find itself so unpre-
pared as to be unable to quickly introduse a more satis-
factory form of disposal.’’
The Committee made no final recommendation for the
disposition of garbage, as to the method of incineration or
reduction, pending further investigation.
wet « ~~ + ew oF
i
Z
FEE
ut
fs
Hb
tte
through the action of current and wind.
beaches creates a nuisance that the public should
asked to tolerate.’’
Mr. Samuel A. Greeley, an hydraulic and sanitary engi
neer of recognized experience and ability, with practical
knowledge of the methods of the disposal of garbage, con-
demned the method of disposing of garbage and refuse at
sea for very much the same reasons given by the Commit-
tee above mentioned in their report of 1921. He gave as
his opinion that either incineration or the ‘‘ Reduction
System’’ is good.
Considerable portions of its garbage and refuse collected
by the defendant has been and is being disposed of by
incinerators constructed by the defendant. The first of
these was put in operation in 1924, some five years after
the dumping at sea began. In December, 1929, the de-
fandant had in operation three incinerators in the Borough
of Manhattan, none in the Bronx, nine in Queens, five in
Brooklyn and three in Richmond.
The Department of Sanitation in New York City is a
newly created one under the law and went into effect on
December 1, 1929. In took over the jurisdiction formerly
exercised by the Department of Street cleaning and some
other agencies of the City. On December 23, 1929, the new
Department ef Sanitation presented to the Mayor of the
City a program for increasing the number of incinerators
;
in the five boroughs as follews: Five 500-ton plants in
Manhattan ; four 500-ton plants in the Bronx; five 500-ton
plants in Queens and five 500-ton plants in Brooklyn, and
the reconstruction of two plants in Richmond.
The City now has the power of condemnation, which it
did not have prior to 1929. It does not appear what if any
action has been taken by the Mayor or city authorities
upon the program presented by the new Department of
Sanitation.
The evidence does not show the cause of the apparent
delay by the defendant in adopting and putting into opera-
tion the incinerating system. It was in 1924, some five
years after the defendant began dumping at sea that its
first incinerator was put into operation, and during the
next succeeding five years others were built. Those con-
structed and in use fall far short of taking care of the
garbage and refuse situation. A reason offered for the
delay is that the City did not have the power of condemna-
tion and could not override objections in localities to the
operation of incineraters therein. This power was ac
quired in 1929 and there is no evideuce explaining why it
was not acquired sooner.
I conclude that the method of disposing ¢¢ pei vag oad
refuse by dumping the same at sea is not an proved o or a
good system and that disposition of such material by incin-
eration or the ‘‘ Reduction system” is a proper way to dis-
pose of the same. I further conclude that the delay of de-
fendant in adopting a proper method of disposal has been
unreasonably long.
SOME ISSUES OF FACT. )
The defendant contends, however, that the garbage and
refuse on the beaches result from the disposals, first by
steamships, and second, by scows of private contractors
and by some others to be named.
OR eet are”
(1) Steamships: It ia to be observed that the lanes for
European ard foreign vessels to and from New York pase
-to the north and east of the designated dumping areas;
that is to say, these dumping areas are between the lanes
and the shores.
(a) There is evidence that some coastwise and other
vessels discharge garbage or refuse into the ocean. Ves-
sels out of New York go southward or come from southern
ports to New York, passing the New Jersey coast at a dis-
tance of from three to eight miles and their general routes
lie between the dumping places of the City and the shores.
The evidence as to the number of such vessels is that
produced by the defendant to the effect that in December,
1928 and January of 1929 there were 1227 vessels entering
the Port of New York from southern ports, and during
July and August of 1929 the number was 1892. That the
number clearing from New York for southern ports in
December, 1928 and January, 1929, was 1173; and in July
and August, 1929 was 1192. Whether freight or passenger
vessels, or the relative number of each does not appear, bat
if it be assumed that the vessels in and out of New York
for the four months mentioned represent a fair average
of the numl er for each month of the year and that the aver-
age per day is the same for the different years the result
would show that approximately thirty entered from south-
ern ports and twenty departed from New York for southern
ports each day, the difference in number in those coming
in and those going out being accounted for by the fact that
some entering New York from southern ports clear there-
from for other than southern ports.
A witness introduced by the defendant, being ene of
the three sent out by the defendant to examine the condi-
tions at the dumping places, and a pilot of experience,
made an estimate to the effect that there were twenty ves-
sels a day going and coming from southern ports to New
York.
The direction of the vessels, whether going to or clear-
ing from New York affects the amount and kind of material
ings from the cargo, the cleanings from the ships, includ-
ing dunnage and such crates and boxes as may have ac
eumulated and other materials are piled upon the deck to-
gether with garbage preparatory to casting the same over-
board after the vessels have gotten under way. There is
evidence that some of the vessels and a majority of the
lines operating out of New York southward do not aceumn-
late garbage or other refuse matter but make arrange-
ments for its disposal while in port. Crews of some ves-
sels are maintained on board and crews of others are not
maintained while in port. There is evidence that some
vessels southbound begin the disposition of their accuma-
lated garbage, refuse and rubbish soon after leaving the
point southwest of Scotland Light and continue to dis
charge as they proceed. There is an estimated amount by
two or three witnesses for the defendant, being the same
witnesses who went out to make the investigation at the
dumping areas for the defendant, that forty to fifty tons
are discharged from some of these vessels leaving New
York. The amount of the garbage that is intermixed with
‘the other materials is not stated or estimated.
(ec) In 1924 owing to complaints to his office of garbage
reaching the shore, the Supervisor of the Harbor sent re-
33
quests to all shipping companies that their vessels refrain
from discharging garbage within twenty-five miles of Am-
brose Lightship, and received from many of them assur-
ance of their cooperation.
(d) There is evidence by one of the witnesses already
mentioned for the defendant that vessels, sometimes as
many as fifty, coming to New York, are held by fog or heavy
seas at anchor off the ligh*ship for a day or two, and while
there throw overboard their accumulated garbage and
refuse material.
There is testimony by a special agent of the defendant's
department of sanitation, giving the location of various
docks of seows of private contractors im the borough of
Manhattan, and that on several occasions in March, 1930,
he visited some of these dumps and saw wagons and trucks
dumping into these scows a variety of materials; and two
other witnesses testified to similar conditions.
. There is no evidence that any garbage or refuse from
these places is dumped at sea. There is no evidence that
scows receiving the materials mentioned by the three wit-
nesses in March, 1930, dumped the same at sea, or where
they disposed of it.
On the other hand there is testimony from Officers of
ships operating along the coast that a few bushels of gar-
bage is cast overboard from vessels coming out of New
York and largely taken up by gulls; and some members of
the Coast Guard testified that they have seen ships cast off
garbage in small quantities, these expressing the opinion
that the quantities are too small to account for the areas
floating or in suspension in the water.
(e) There is evidence that a foreign steamship was seen
to discharge garbage on an occasion in or near the watets
of New York Harbor, and a photograph of the vessel on
that oceasion was made an exhibit.
(f) There is evidence that a witness had taken on his
vessel a cargo of condémned onions and discharged the
same at sea twenty-five miles southeast of Scotland Light-
ship.
(f) There is evidence that permits had been issued by
the Supervisor of the Harbor to five different concerns to
dump mud off shore at pointe designated as three mile
limit southeast of Scotland Lightship, and to three others
to dump ‘‘cellar dirt’’ at the four mile limit; and to sev-
eral to dump ‘‘cellar dirt intermixed with rock’’ at the six
mile limit. These concerns dumped the materials men-
tioned at the various places. Some other materials are
permitted to be dumped at the eight mile limit.
(h) From time to time and infrequently cargoes of food.
stuffs, vegetables and fruits, condemned by the Board of
Health authorities, are disposed of at sea by outbound
vessels under permits, the amounts being relatively small.
Such deposits are beyond the area used by the defendant.
A system of patrol boats and of inspection is maintained by
the Supervisor of the Harbor to prevent depositing mate-
rials at other than the stated areas.
(i) Seows from the Brooklyn Navy Yard dump mate.
rials at the dumping areas used by the defendant, their
contents being generally rubbish and refuse with a small
amount of garbage.
(g) Another souree alleged by the defendant in its
amended answer ‘‘for a Second defense’’ is that ineuffi-
ciently treated and unsanitary sewage from the City of
Long Branch and of Asbury Park has been for a number
of years discharged into the ocean at short distances from
each of these cities. :
As to the Long Branch sewer, the evidenee consists of a
plan of the sewage system and some evidente that com-
plaints were at one time made to the Department of Health
which investigated the same; and that the matters were
satisfactorily adjusted.
As to Asbury Park sewage, there is evidence that in
March, 1930, witnesses for the defendant made an exami-
nation of that system and at the outlet of the sewer about
LIL OR LE AD
sludge tank of its load’’, and ha
the period of this operation materials may go into the out-
let that cannot go there when the valve is closed; that this
kind of cleaning process was in operation on March 19,
1930, the date of said visits by said witnesses.
Defendant also introduced a bill of t exhibited
by the Department of Health of New J against As-
bury Park in Chancery in New Jersey, praying an injunc-
tion restraining that city from discharging into the ocean
inadequately treated sewage from the ‘‘municipal sewage
treatment works"’, which discharge, it is alleged, is due to
insufficient capacity and design of said works. These
works were constructed in 1909. This bill was filed in the ,
summer of 1990, under a proceeding authorized by the
statutes of New Jersey.
I have set forth in perLaps unnecessary detail some of
the evidence offered by the defendant and have done so
(1) to show the latitude extended in adducing proof when
much of it under the gener.! denials of the original answer
would in strictness be inadmissible. It was generally
heard without objection. And (2) to show something of
the indefiniteness of the testimony itself.
bage and refuse dumped into scows of private contractors
in March, 1930, has smal] probative force towards estab-
lishing what occurred in 1929 and prior years.
There is proof that some vessels discharge garbege and
refuse and that scows with permits to dump cellar dirt
frequently have with it pieces of wood in more or less quan-
tities, besides other proof referred to.
Giving to the evidence due consideration, I think it should
be concluded that whatever garbage and refuse reaches the
plaintiff’s shores from coastwise and other vessels und
other causes, and other dumpings than those of the -de-
fendant, are negligible in comparison with that constantly
being dumped by the defendant, and frequently carried by
wands and wares Crom Ge Camping pines to ane apes
plaintiff’s shores, a1 hereinbefore stated. .
SOME QUESTIONS OF LAW.
Some questions of law arising between the parties are
as follows:
1. The plaintiff's contention that defendant dutpe its
garbage in water over soi] belonging to plaintiff, that is
to say, in the waters of its marginal sea.
2. Effect of permits issued by the Supervisor of the
Harbor of New York to defendant.
The question of nuisance.
Prescription.
Degree of proof.
Jurisdiction.
a w
1. Trespass.
The plaintiff contends that the dumping of garbage by
defendant is upon its property and therefore constitates
trespass.
As the farthest place of the dumping is more than twenty
miles from the New Jersey shore, the claim that the ‘‘mar-
ginal sea”’ of the State extends to and beyond that point
is at least interesting. It is, of course, true that within
its territorial limits property rights are to be measured
by the rules and decisions of the courts of the State, and
that these will be followed by this Court (St. Anthony Falls
Co. v. Board, 168 U. 8. 349, 362; Baum v. Keohm, 94 U. 8.
324, 338; Rundell v. D. d R. Canal, 20 Howard 80 and 93).
But the plaintiff insists that the limit of its marginal sea
is not to be measured from the low water line on ite shore
but from a line drawn between two headlands projecting
the one at Montauk Point, New York, and the other at
Cape May, New Jersey, and seeks to apply the rule of the
common law for determining whether the head or arm of
the sea was within the jurisdiction of a given county or
outside of it and therefore under the jurisdiction of the
sovereign alone.
This method for determining the county’s jurisdiction
was that the distance between the terrae fauces should be
no greater than to render it possible for a person to dis-
cern with the naked eye what was being done on the op-
posite shore. Plaintiff argues that im this country ‘‘we
thus determine the jurisdiction of states rather than of
counties’’.
This Court said in Manchester v. Massachusetts (139
U. S. 240, 263), that ‘‘there is no indication that the eus-
tomary law of England in regard to the boundaries of
counties was adopted by the Constitution of the United
States as a means of determining jurisdiction of states.’’
The Court was there considering a contention that the
jurisdiction of the State as between it and the United
States should be confined to the border of the courties and
that the counties should be defined according to the custo-
mary English usage, by the application of the rule as to
headlands. This Court said (page 264): ‘‘The extent of
the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea
wee,
adjacent to its coasts is that of an independent nation and
except in so far as any right of control over this
has been granted to the United States this control remains
with the state."’
In Martin v. Waddell (16 Pet. 307, 410), language from
which is applicable to New Jersey, this Court said: ‘“‘For
when the Revolution took place the people of each state
became themselves sovereign and in that character hold
the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the
shores to them for their own common use, subject only to
the right since surrendered by the Constitution to the gen-
eral Government."’ To the same effect see [limois Central
Railroad Company +. Illinois (146 U. 8. 387).
At the time the plaintiff became a state, succeeding to
the rights of English sovereign, the common law rule was
that the territorial limit extended ‘‘only to such distance
as is capable of command from the shore of the range of
a cannon, which for the purposes of certainty is regarded
as one marine league, although for the purposes of self-
protection in times of war and for the prevention of fraud
upon its revenues each nation is accustomed to exercise
authority beyond this limit. (Gould on Waters, 3; Angell
on Tidewaters, 2.)
In Manchester v. Massachusetts, supra, this Court said
(p. 258): “*We think it must be regarded as established
that as between nations the minimam limit of territorial
jurisdiction of a nation over tide water is a marine league
from its coast; that bays wholly within its territory, not
exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth are
without this limit, and that included in this territorial juris-
diction is the right of control over fisheries. . . . The
open sea within this limit is, of course, subject to common
law rights of navigation ana the government for the pur-
pose of self-protection in times of war or for the protec-
tion from fraad on its revenues, exercises authority beyond
this limit.’’
ject to its jurisdiction includes the land area
dominion and control, the porta, harbors, bays and other
He
Hie
i
if
eral Government of power conferred by the States does
not operate to increase the territorial limits of a State. The
treaty making power and that of providing for the common
defense, as well as the power applicable to commerce and
navigation admit of the assertion of claims by the United
States no longer open to the several States. (United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U. 8. 407, 418; Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1; Maicrano v. Baltimore Road, 213 U. 8. 268,
272.)
As a practical expression by the Federal Government!
on this question there may be mentioned the comparatively
recent treaty with Great Britain relative to infractions of
the Prohibition Laws and fixing a limit, sometimes called
the ‘Twelve Mile Limit"’, Article I of which provides:
“The High Contracting Parties declare that it is
;
|
and measured from law water mark constitutes the
proper limit of territorial waters’. (See Ford v
United States, 273 U. 8. 593, 607.)
The State of New Jersey succeeded to rights of the
English crown. (See Martin v. Waddell, aupra, cating
Arnold v. Munday, 6 N. J. L. 1).
In its first constitution, adopted July 2, 1776, Art. ¥ XII,
it is provided: ‘‘That the common law of England as well
as so much of the statute laws as have been heretofore
practiced in this colony shall still remain in force until
they shall be altered by future law of the legislature’’.
(1 Comp. Stat. XXXII).
And in its present constitution, it is provided that the
common law and statute law “‘now in force’’ and not repug-
nant to the constitution shall remain in force until altered
or repealed. (I Comp. Stat. XLVII).
The Statute of New Jersey defining the boundary of
counties provides (109 Sec. I), the ‘‘territorial limits of
each county of this State fronting upon the sea coast be
and the seme are hereby extended to a line parallel with
the ocean shore line of said counties and extend easterly
three nautical miles therefrom and the division lines be-
tween said counties as they now exist be and the same
hereby are extended from the several points where they
now reach the sea in course due east nntil they severally
reach said outer line of said counties as hereby estab
lished.”’ (2 Comp. Stat., p. 1703, Public Laws of 1906, p.
542).
Reference has already been made to the Act requiring
licenses for pound net fishing. Another Act (2 Comp.
Stat, See. 123, p. 252) makes it unlawful for any person
to take with ‘‘purse or shirred nets’’ certain fish in any
county within the jurisdiction of this State, including a
county or. the Atlantic ocean within three nautical miles of
the coast line.’’
In Gough v. Bell (22 N. J. L. 411, 455), it is said: ‘This
title, which by the common law of Encland is vested in the
King, upon the Revolutidn became vested in the people of
41
the State. . . In this State the rule of the common law
as to the limit of its rights remains unaltered.’’
I think the established rule of the common law should be
accepted in determining the territorial limits of New Jersey
in the soil under water and that its claim that the dumping
of garbage is upon its property is not sustained.
As before stated, large areas of garbage and refuse
floating upon or held in suspension by the water, which
have been dumped by defendant's scows, are driven and
carried by wind and water to and upon the shores of plain-
tiff and other portions or areas thereof are held for indefi-
nite periods in the waters above soil owned by plaintiff
and do great injury to fishing and bathing in such waters.
2. Permits.
In its amended answer the defendant alleges ‘‘for a first
defense’’ that it has, for many years last past dumped
the garbage and some refuse collected by it in the Atlantic
ocean, under the supervision of the Supervisor of the Har-
bor of New York and in accordance with and only after the
issuance of permits by said Supervisor under the authority
conferred on him by the Act of June 29, 1888’’ (29 Stat.
* 209, as amended; Sees. 441, 443, 449 and 451 U. 8. Code)
‘‘at points eight, twelve and twenty miles southeast of Scot-
land Light and about ten, twelve and a half and twenty-two
miles distant, respectively, from the New Jersey shore
(being clearly in excess of one marine league from said
shore) and not within the navigable waters of said State of
New Jersey or of the United States’’ and adds that ‘‘ such
dumping occurring at these points this Court has no au-
thority to enjoin said City . . . from said dumping
of garbage and refuse’’.
The plaintiff insists that there is no evidence of any
permits.
It is a fact that no written perm't was introduced in evid-
ence but this ‘s not to say that there is no evidence of
permits.
PR owes ee 0.42% for Rn el NE SO ORS
42
A witness introduced by defendant and afterwards by
the plaintiff in rebuttal was Captain Anderson, detailed
under the provisions of the Act of June 29, 1888, to per-
form the duties of Supervisor of the Harbor of New York.
Captain Anderson, having made a general statement rela-
tive to the duties of his office under the Act was asked:
“‘Q. Permits have been issued by your office to the
city of New York to dispose of garbage and refuse ma-
terial at sea?
‘A. They have.
**Q. Will you explain for our information as well
as for the record just how these permits are issued,
the procedure so that we may understand for the first
time how that is done?
‘‘A. In issuing these permits we have dealt directly
with the old department of street cleaning, which is
now a division of the Department of Sanitation. They
have to apply on a printed form for permission to
move and dispose of whatever class of material they
may have. We have certain dumping grounds that
are customarily used and if their request meets the
approval of the office the permission is granted and
the permit is issued. This permit is good for sd a
limited number of days.
**Q. And as the barges and tows proceed to sea
under permit is there some representative of your
office stationed in the upper and lower Bay to inspect
or collect this permit?
‘*A. On these two boats, towing loads of that de-
scription we have an inspector, called a dumping in-
spector, whose job it is to see that the dumping does
not take place short of the designated dumping ground.
Also we have on duty patrol boats from my office which
are customarily stationed in the vicinity of the Nar-
rows and around Sandy Hook and a little outside and
these boats inspect outward and inbound tows and
make appropriate notation upon their permit, which
they collect.’’ The statute contemplates that they will
be collected.
43
This witness further éxplained that the officers on the
patrol boats noted the time of passing and returning by
the tows and these notations ‘‘are subsequently checked
up in my office to see whether the lapsed time would per-
mit them to go to designated dumping ground.’’
This officer had testified, as stated, without objection,
that permits were issued to the defendant. In addition,
the plaintiff has shown by repeated statements in the re-
ports of the Supervisor made a part of the annual reports
of the Chief of Engineers for the years 1918 to 1929, in-
clusive, introduced in evidence, that the Supervisor had
given permission to the defendant to dispose of garbage
and refuse at designated places, and had also shown by
the letter of the Secretary of War to the Governor of the
State that the ‘‘permission’’ was given by the Supervisor
of the Harbor and not by the office of the Secretary of
War to dump the garbage in an ‘‘emergency’’; and further
by the Supervisor’s statement to the Mayor of the City
when the latter requested a change in the designated area.
In addition to these it affirmatively appears in evidence
not only that this officer designated the place where the
dumping could be done but there went from his office with
each tug towing the scows a ‘‘deputy inspector’’ to see to
it thes the dumping actually took place at the designated
places. The established fact is that the defendant had the
Supervisor’s authority to dump the materials, whatever
that authority may amount to, and would seem to make un-
necessary the production of one or all of the ‘‘permits’’,
‘which in the ordinary practice of the Supervisor’s office,
would amount, in ten or twelve years, to probably a thous-
and or more. I find as a fact that the dumping was by
permission of the Supervisor of the Harbor.
The Act of 1888, (U. S. Code, Sees. 441 et seg. 44 Stat.
1072) was entitled ‘‘An Act to prevent obstructive and in-
jurious deposits within the Harbor and adjacent waters of
New York City by dumping or otherwise and to punish and
prevent such offenses.’’
44
This Act, amended in 1898 (U. 8S. Code, Sec. 443), pro-
vided that a line officer of the Navy shall be designated by
the President as Supervisor of the Harbor ‘‘to Act under
the direction of the Secretary of War in enforcing”’ its pro-
visions. Depositing of certain kinds of materials in the
tidal waters of New York or its adjacent tributaries or in
those of Long Island Sound ‘‘within the limit which shall
be prescribed by the Supervisor of the Harbor’’ are strictly
forbidden. One section provided for a permit defining the
precise limits within which the discharge of the scows may
be made.
Material parts of the Act of 1888, and the amendment
of 1898, are as follows: Section 441 and 443 U. 8. Code—
Title 33. Sees. 441. Deposit of refuse in New York
Harbor and adjacent waters prohibited; penalty.—The
placing, discharging, or depositing, by any process or
in any manner, of refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud,
sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other matter of
any kind, other than that flowing from streets, sewers,
and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the tidal
waters of the harbor of New York, or its adjacent or
tributary waters, or in those of Long Island Sound,
within the limits which shall be prescribed by the
supervisor of the harbor, is hereby strictly forbid.
den, and every such act is made a misdemeanor, and
every person engaged in or who shall aid, abet, author-
ize, or instigate a violation of this section, shall, upon
conviction, be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or
both, such fine to be not less than -250 nor more than
$2,500, and the imprisonment to be not less than
thirty days nor more than one year, either or both
united, as the judge before whom conviction is obtained
shall decide, one-half of said fine to be paid to the per-
son or persons giving information which shall lead to
conviction of this misdemeanor. (June 29, 1888, c. 496,
1, 25 Stat. 209.)
Sec. 443. Permit for dumping; penalty for taking
or towing boat or scow without permit.—In all cases
45
of receiving on board of any scows or boats such for-
bidden matter or substance as described in section 441
of this chapter, the owner or master, or person acting
in such capacity on board of such scows or boats, be-
fore proceeding to take or tow the same to the place of
deposit, shall apply for and obtain from the super-
visor of the harbor appointed, as provided in section
451 of this chapter, a permit defining the precise limits
within which the discharge of such scows or boats may
be made; and it shall not be lawful for the owner or
master, or person acting in such capacity, of any tug
or towboat to tow or move any scow or boat so loaded
with such forbidden mati.. util such permit shall have
been obtained; and every person violating the fore-
going provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished ‘by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $500, and in addition thereto the master of any
tug or towboat so offending shall have his license re-
voked or suspended for a term to be fixed by the judge
before whom tried and convicted. (May 28, 1908, c.
212, 8, 35 Stat. 426.)
In United States v. Sadie (41 Fed. 396) Judge Lacombe
speaking of this Act of 1888 says (p. 398): ‘‘The bodies of
water referred to are (a) the Harbor of New York; (b)
waters adjacent to the Harbor of New York; (c) waters
tributary to the Harbor of New York; (d) Long Island
Sound, and as to each of these bodies of water there is a.
restriction of application of the Act to such waters only as
are tidal.’’
In the present inquiry only the first two of these de-
scriptions can apply: the Harbor and waters adjacent to
the Harbor of New York.
The Act contemplated that the Supervisor prescribe cer-
tain limits but there is no evidence in this case as to what
limits were prescribed. In City v. Leland (45 Fed. 380,
381), there is reference to certain prescribed limits.
A construction of the Act of 1888, as amended, becomes
important. The defendant relies upon the ‘‘permit’’ or
46
the permission granted by the Supervisor of the Harb
who has no authority other than that which the Act conf:
It may be noted in this conection that this Act is not
fected by the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1
(U. 8. Code, Title 33, Section 407). The latter is a g
eral Act and as was observed by Judge Thatcher in ‘‘’
Albania’’ (30 Fed. (2) 727) See. 441, et seq. of the C
(the Act of 1888) is a special Act applied to New Y.
Harbor and vicinity and it may be repeated in this conn
tion that the Secretary of War in a communication to
Governor of New Jersey stated that the dumping by N
York City was through permission of the Supervisor
the Harbor and not by the Secretary. But the purport
the Act of 1888, as was that of the general Rivers »
Harbors Act of 1899, is referable to the power of Congr
to legislate for the protection of navigation.
‘There can be no doubt that the dumping was not wit
the limits of Harbor of New York, as these limits ;
spoken of in United States v. Newark Meadows Impro
ment Company (173 Fed. 426, 428), as being ‘‘ within a |
from Navesink Lighthouse to Scotland Light thence
Whistling Buoy in Gedneny’s Channel and thence to Ro
away Point prescribed by the Secretary of the Treast
as the limits of the waters of the Harbor of New Yori
pursuant to the Act of February 2, 1895, (28 Stat. 67
It was done at eight, twelve and twenty miles, accord
to the season of the year, southeast by east from Scotla
Light, one of the points in the foregoing description.
In United States v. Various Tugs and Scows (225 F
505), where it appeared that permits had been issued,
was said by Judge Hand (p. 507): ‘‘It seems to me t!
a permit to dump no less than four miles east by southe
of Scotland Light Ship excludes by implication dumpi
within New York Harbor and its adjacent and tributs
waters inside of that point and thus deffnes the prec
limit.’”” He added that even though ‘the himits prescril
by the Supervisor are beyond a marine league from ‘|
shore any other interpretation of the national power wo!
47
render the Government impotent to protect the harbor and
adjacent channel and waters. In order to sustain a con-
viction under the Act it was held in Warner Quinlan v.
United States (273 Fed. 503), to be necessary for the evid-
ence to show that the Supervisor had prescribed such limits
and that the defendant had placed such materials within
such limits.
If the limits of the adjacent waters be taken as pre-
scribed by the designation of the places by which dumping
was allowable (U. 8. v. Various Tugs and Scows, supra),
:t is manifest from the distance given that the limits are in
excess of ‘‘one marine league from said shor. ’’ to use the
words of the amended answer; but it is diffienh ‘> under-
stand how this fact affords any defense in this case. li the
defendant did not Gump the materials nearer than the
designated areas the Supervisor’s permission would afford
protection against penalties of the Act. But can it be said
that these permits serve as a defense against the claim of
others whose rights have been invaded?
The purpose of the Act is to protect navigation with ref-
erence to New York harbor. The authority of the Federal
Government does not extend beyond the requirements of
navigation. (Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. 8S. 367-415.)
In Cummings v. Chicago (188 U. 8. 410, 431), it was said
with reference to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, that its effect ‘‘reasonably interpreted is to
make the erection of a structure in a navigable river
within the limits of a state depend upon the concurrent and
joint assent of both national government and the state gov-
ernment. . . . Without such assent the structure can
not be erected by them. ‘(United States v. Bellingham
Bay Boom Company, 176 U. 8. 211).
In Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington Road Com-
pany (255 U. S. 55, 63), it is said: ‘‘The right of the use
of the navigable waters within the several states is limited
to the control thereof for purpose vf navigation.’’
And in United States v. River Range Improvement Com-
pany (269 U. S. 411, 419), this Court says: ‘‘While Con-
4
48
gress in the exercise of this power may adopt, in its j
ment, any means having some positive relation to the
trol of navigation and not otherwise inconsistent with
Constitution of the United States (United States v. Ch
ler-Dunbar Company, 229 U. 8. 62), it may not arbitr,
destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners by |
lation which has no relation or substantial relation t<
control of navigation or appropriate to that end.’’
Wisconsin v. IWimois, 278 U. 8. 367, 415.)
The authority conferred by the Act of 1888 upon
Supervisor was not as general as that found in the Ri
and Harbors Act, nor was it an arbitrary power. Sc
as the defendant’s acts are concerned his authority
only permissive. The title of the original Act (tha
1888) shows its purpose was to protect the Harbor of
“York. When the powers of the Supervisor are limite
partir apnea sayy saath.” pont i teky.-
authorization to regulate the dumping of garbage ou!
of the waters specified in the Act.
The powers which the Suprevisor has under the Sts
and the effect to be given the permits authorized t
issued are to be strictly construed, because of the effe
the dumping upon the rights of others. ‘‘The doctri
firmly established that only that which is grarted in «
and explicit terms passes by a grant of property {
chises or privileges in which the government or the p
has an interest. . . . Whatever is not unequivoc
granted is withheld; nothing passes by mere implicati
Coosa Mining Co. v. So. Carolina, 144 U. 8. 550, 562;
tilized Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. 8. 659, 666.
In order to accord to the act full scope as a shield
protection, it is not necessary to make of it also a si
of offense.
Nor does the fact that the defendant is a municipal
poration afford immunity from the results of its
action. It was said by the Massachusetts Court im Ha
v. New Bedford (108 Mass. 208, 214): ‘‘The owner of
lands bordering upon the sea may lawfully throw re
49
matters into it provided he does not create a nuisance to
othe-s. But it by no means follows that either the city or
oe vate person has the right to deposit filth upon the
see * : in such quantities as to create a nuisance to health
or navigation. (See Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218,
230). This case quotes and approves Franklyn Wharf v.
Portland (57 Me. 446, 457), to the effect that ‘‘The right of
defendant to construct an outfall for their sewer in the
sea does not include the right to create a nuisance, public
or private.’’
In Noonan v. City of Albany (79 N. Y. 476, cited in
Huffmire v. Brooklyn, 162 N. Y. 584, 590), it is said: ‘‘A
municipal corporation has no greater right than an indi-
vidual to collect the surface water from the land or streets
into ar(‘ficial channels and discharge it upon the lands of
another, nor has it any immunity from legal responsibility
for creating or maintaining a nuisance.’’
In Block v. Maryland (149 Md. 39), the city was enjoined
from the commission of a nuisance notwithstanding it
claimed that it was authorized by statute to make a contract
and that in the performance of that contract a nuisance
was created.
My conclusion is that the Act of 1888, as amended, fur-
nishes no defense to the defendant, and that compliance
with permits from the Supervisor of the Harbor acting
under the provisions of that Act does not furnish a defense
nor relieve it from the effect of a public nuisance resulting
from or created by its action.
3. Nuisance
There is no doubt (the amended answer admits) that the
defendant for years past, at least since October, 1918, has
been dumping large quantities of garbage and refuse at
sea, and principally in places designated by the Supervisor
of the Harbor of New York. I use the word “‘principally’’
because there is evidence that sometimes through accident
or the occurring of something unusual, a few scows have
dumped their loads nearer to the shore than the appointed
places. There is also evidence uncontradicted, and I fir
the fact to be that some scows have left upon them consi:
erable quantities of garbage or refuse after their gat
have been thrown open to release the contents and the:
remnants are cast off by the men in charge as the scovw
are being taken back from the dumping area. The gener:
practice continues, more materials were dumped in 19%
than in the preceding year.
As already stated, the conditions on the plaintiff’s shore
and adjacent waters produced by garbage and other ol
jectionable materials alleged in the bill are proved by w
contradicted evidence. A summary of the facts foun
may be stated as follows: Along the shores are man
summer resorts which serve to furnish recreation, pleasur
and rest to people. Their beaches when unaffected by th
bad conditions mentioned are pleasure grounds for thot
sands of visitors. A large number of people living in an
doing business in these municipalities are dependent fe
their livelihood upon the resorts and the preservation «
their recreational advantages. The summer resorts alon
these shores constitute one of the plaintiff’s most valuab!
industries and they suffer frequently in annoyance and e:
pense from deposits of the materials meniioned. The e:
pense of the removal of garbage and other materials fal
upon these municipalities and individuals, and this expens
amounts annually to large sums. Their disposition as soo
as can be after being cast upon the shore is imperativ:
Foul smelling and repellent as they generally are whe
first stranded, they become more so as soon as they a1
subjected to the rays of the sun. They attract swarms «
flies. The odors create nausea, and sometimes reach int
homes. The deposits interfere with, and until remove
frequently prevent, the use and enjoyment of the beach«
for the purposes to which the latter are adapted and fe
the comfortable and enjoyable use of which people vis
them. They cause many complaints from and disappoin
ments to visitors to the severa! resorts for recreation an
health, as well as from those whose business depends upo
51
the attendance of visitors. Many visitors leave the resorts
because they cannot use the beaches when littered or secure
the surf bathing when the waters adjacent hold garbage
and refuse in suspension. The shores below high water
mark and the soil under the adjacent waters for at least
three nautical miles belong to plaintiff, and their chief
value is in the fisheries and the fact that they can and do
afford the attractions pertaining to summer resorts which
fisheries and attractions are seriously interfered with by
the deposits in question.
Along with and at times of the deposite there frequently
come broken bottles and pieces of glass and wood pieces
with nails therein, and the broken glass and nails are a
menace to the bathers in the surf and to persons on the
beaches. Severe bodily injuries have resulted from them.
The rental value of property has been impaired because of
the deposits. The decayed and decaying vegetables and
animal matters cast upon the shore is offensive to a high
degree to sight and to smell. The deposits are frequent
and recurrent.
In Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Company (20 N. J.
Eq. 201, 204), it is said: ‘‘Any business, however lawful,
which causes annoyances that materially interfere with the
ordinary comforts of human existence is a nuisance which
should be restrained, and small n ises and bad odors, even
when not injurious to health, may render a dwelling so un-
comfortable as to drive from it anyone not compelled by
poverty to remain. Unpleasant odors from the very con-
stitution of our nature render us uncomfortable, and when
continued or repeated make life uncomfortable. To live
comfortably is the chief and most reasonable object of men
in acquiring property as the means of attaining it, aad any
interference with our neighbor in the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life is a wrong which the law will redress.”’
In Northwestern Fertilizer v. Hyde Park, et al. (97 U. 8.
659), this Court considered a case coming from the Su-
preme Court of Diiaois which involved the question of
nuisance. The Company sought to defend because of its
52
charter rights; but this Court held that the State oo
give an effectual remedy, saying (p. 667): ‘‘It rests uy
the fundamental principle that every one shall so use |
own as not to wrong or injure another. . . . Pure |
and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as m
the rights belonging tc it as the right of possession and
cupancy.”’
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company (206 U.
230), the State filed its Bill in this Court to enjoin the ¢
charge of noxious gases from the works of defendant
the State of Tennessee. The allegations of the Bill shov
that as a result of these gases there was destruction
forest trees, orchards, crops and other injuries. In |
course of the opinion it is said: ‘‘It hardly is denied «
cannot be denied with success that this often is carried
the wind great distances and over great tracts of Geor,
land. From the evidence the pollution of the air and '
magnitude of that pollution are not open to dispute.’’
In Mugler v. Kansas (123 U. 8. 623, 673), this Co
said: ‘‘The ground of equity jurisdiction in cases of p
presture as well as of public nuisance is the ability of cou
of equity to give more speedy, effectual and perman
remedy than can be had at law. They can not only p
vent nuisances that are threatened and before irrepara
mischief results but arrest or abate those in progress 2
by perpetual injunction protect the public against them
the future. . . . This is a salutary jurisdiction especia
where the nuisance affects the health, morals or safety
the community.’’
It is well established that noxious smells may constit
a nuisance. (Baltimore, etc. Railroad Co. v. Fifth Bapi
Chw ch, 108 U. 8. 317.) In Block v. Baltimore, 149 Md.
51, where the Maryland court considered a case arising |
of the transportation of offensive materials by scows fr
the city to reduction plants, and says (p. 56): ‘‘That
conditions complained of constitute an unwholesome d
ger and offense is obvious.’’
Replying to the contention that the bill did not contain
allegations sufficient to maintain it, that court, after stat-
ing the facts, said (p. 51): ‘‘It would be a reproach to the
law if it afforded the plaintiff no adequate relief from the
burdensome and intolerable conditions shown by those
facts.’’ "
In Northwestern Fertilizer Company v. Hyde Park,
supra, this Court, adopting the findings of the Lllinois
Court, said: ‘‘That a nuisance of so flagrant character
exists, as found by the Court below, is not controverted.’’
And in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, supra,
this Court granted relief against a nuisance caused by the
discharge of gases from the defendant’s work in Tennessee,
and said (p. 238): ‘‘It is a fair and reasonable demand
on the part of a sovereign that the air of its territory
should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphuric acid
gas; that the forests on its mountains, be they better or
worse and whatever domestic destruction they have suf-
fered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by
the acts of persons beyond its control.’’ (See Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U. 8. 208; Board of Health v. Schmidt, 83
N. J. Eq. 35, 36; Butterfoss v. State Board, 40 N. J. Eq.
325.)
I conclude that the conditions described in this case
amount to a public nuisunce, and that the State and com-
munities affected should not be required to tolerate the
same.
4. Prescription.
The authorities declare that if the facts develop a public
nuisance there can be no prescription. Thus in Block v.
Baltimore, supra, the Maryland court said (p. 59): ‘‘But
the wrong complained of and disclosed by the evidence
amounts to a public nuisance and there can be no prescrip-
tion’; (citing Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 10).
This Court said in Northwestern Fertilicer Company v.
Hyde Park, supra: ‘‘In such cases prescription, whatever ~
4
the length of time, has no application. Every day’s con-
tinuance is a new offense.’’ And in Missouri v. Illinois
(200 U. 8. 496, 520), it is said: **The reasons upon which
5. Municipality: Degree of Proof.
But the defendant claims that it is performing govern-
mental functions and entitled to invoke the rule of proof
ee ee ee
The rule relied upon is stated in North Dakota v. Minne.
sota (263 U. S. 364), as follows:
~ ‘In euch action by one state against another the
burden on the complaining state of sustaining the al-
legations of its complaint is much greater than that
imposed upon a complainant in ordinary suits between ©
private parties. Before this Court can be moved to
exercise its extraordinary power under the Constita-
tion to control the conduct of another state at the suit
of another the threatened invasion of rights must be
of serious magnitade and it must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.’’
There is a qualification of the rule stated in a case by
the State against a corporation or person. ‘‘Some peculi-
arity necessarily marks a suit of this kin®. If the State
has a case at all it is somewhat more certainly entitled to
special relief than a private party might be’’ (Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U. 8. 230, 237). And
farther in that case this Court said, at page 238: ‘This
Court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm
that will be done by an injunction against that of which
the plaintiff complains that it would have in deciding be-
tween two subjects of a single political power.’’
55 :
That the defendant is a political subdivision of the State,
created as a convenient agent for exercising certain govern-
mental powers entrusted to it by the State (Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U. 8. 161, 178), or is a deparizoent of the
state government (City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. 8.
182, 187) would seem to be settled by these cases.
The fact is that the parent State has left to the defendant
the determination of the method to be adopted in carrying
out certain duties certainly those with reference to sani-
tation, and the further fact is that the conditions com-
plained of here are the results of the adoption by the de-
fendant of its own methods. It was not necessary that the
defendant dump its ga oage at sea except in an emergency.
It was put on notice as early as 1907 by a report of dis-
tinguished engineers to the Mayor of the City, already re-
ferred to, that the method of garbage disposal by dumping
it at sea is not the best method. In discussing that method
of disposition they said as follows:
ing of the beach creates a nuisance that the public
should not be asked to tolerate. The cost of sendiag
the scows so far at sea that there would be no danger
of f the beaches and the and interruptions
caused by storms forbid the use of this plan. The
dumping of refuse at sea should not be resorted to ex-
cept in of emergency when the burdens of such
Heit!
; &
Heer
an
Hai
il ie
Ha ee
fy anything but at & mater of fot returned eal
von A profit. Aside however from the question of
cost it seems undesirabl- to dump garbage at sea as it
is being done at present. It is known that the Fed.
Prior to this last report the City had been informed by
ths Supervisor of the Harbor of bad conditions on the
shores arising from the duniping at sea. The Mayor re-
quested the right to dump the scows nearer than the area
at that time prescribed by the Supervisor. The latter de-
clined the request because of the complaints about the gar-
The defendant had been satisfactorily using the ‘‘re-
duction’’ system of garbage disposal when in an ‘‘emer-
gency’’ it was authorized to dispose of it at sea. In the
meantime it has erected a number of incinerating plants
and plans to erect more. One reason given for the delay
in building the needed incinerators is that the defendant
was not given the power of condemnation of sites. It has
such power now, conferred in 1929, and it is « question
whether the defendant, given the right and duty of per-
forming a function that may be called a governmental
function but not given the power necessary for its full per-
formance may indefinitely follow a course as heretofore
stated to the injury of others and still claim that in such
matters it is in the position of the state itself. But if the
stricter rule be applied I think the only reasonable con-
clusion to be reached under all the evidence is that the
objectionable conditions
cent waters complained
due to the action of the defendant in dumping its garbage
There has not only been an invasion of serious magnitude .
of the plaintiff's rights extending through some years but
it is continuing and is threatened for an indefinite period.
&g
°
E
Ay
5
[
}
E
6. Jurisdiction.
The defendant insists further ‘‘that the dumping is done
at designated places which are not in the navigable
of the United States but on the high seas, more than a
marine league from the beaches and territorial waters of
the state of New Jersey, over which this Court has, in this
case, no authority, control or. jurisdiction.’’
There seems to be some inconsistency between the con-
tention of the defendant that the permits of the Supervisor
afford protection and yet that the appointed places are
not within the navigable waters of the United States.
The authorities cited to this proposition relate to the
cases in the District Courts where the question was whether
the act complained of was done in the one District or
another, the holding being that an action to
ance must be brought in the District where
situated. (Umited States v. Newark Meadows
ment Company, 173 Fed. 426; McGowan v. Columbia
Power Association, 245 U. 8. 352.) In Mississippi
sourt Railroad Company v. Ward (2 Black 485
peared that Ward sued the defendant, a citizen
in the District for Iowa, to restrain the
alleged nuisance arising from the manner of the construc
tion of a bridge over the Mississippi River, the boundary
between the two states being the center of the river. The
allegation was that the obstruction was on the Illinois side.
This Court held that the District Court of Iowa was with-
out jurisdiction, and said (p. 494) : ‘He seeks nothing from
F
Bale
— ie ah
Me eee cnet ;
322328 int 7 4° |
apa ‘iia jie HE tg
fi Ll Hie sit
the ;
sewage
oags alt
“ali jin Beit
+ s is? sfireetsl és : fin
ie iideiitiur tail
tig arialicdda liauseegedsitgd dl
the
indi
not
pow he ab J
another sta
te
be the
C.
suit
earth
the sta
outside
agree to
on the
interests and
In New York v. New Jersey (256 U. 8. 296)
songht an injunction against the discharge
See on Ore”
paren gh sength ptar yan oy The
were regarded as justiciable by this Court even though
finally the bills were dismissed. (See Wisconsin v. Ili
nois, 278 U. 8. 367; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. 8.
365; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. 8. 592).
I conclude the Court has jurisdiction.
There is expert testimony that the actual construction
that duration of time from the period work starts on them
severally. The evidence does not disclose what is a rea-
sonable time for determining the availability of sites and
for their acquisition.
My conclusions upon the whole case are that the de-
fendant has created and continues to produce a
nuisance on the beaches and property of the State of New
Jersey, as has been hereinbefore found, and that the plain-
tiff is entitled to relief in accordance with the prayer of the
bill; but the defendant should be given a reasonable time
within which to put into operation sufficient incinerators
to care for its garbage and rubbish. (See Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Company, supra.)
E
RECOMMENDATIONS.
My recommendations are:
1. That the Court’s decree should declare that the plain-
tiff is entitled to relief and to an injunction as prayed for,
but that before an injunction shall issue a reasonable time
will be accorded defendant within which to carry into ef-
fect its prorcscd plan for the erection and operation of
incineratcrs to destroy the materials such as are now being
dumred by defendant at sea.
2. That in as mach as the evidence adduced does not
disclose what such reasonable time is the case be referred
to a Master for findings of fact upon that subject.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,
Special Master.
In Manhattan the resident population is shrinking some-
what; in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens it is increasing
rapidly, and in Richmond moderately.
The garbage and refuse being dumped at sea goes from —
the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. There are
now three incinerators in Manhattan and none in the
Bronx. The three in Manhattan have a rated capacity of
940 tons per day. There are five garbage incinerators
in the Borough of Brooklyn with a rated capacity of 1700
tons per day; nine incinerators in the Borough of Queens,
with a rated capacity of 1230 tons per day, and five incin-
erators in Richmond with a rated capacity of 540 tons per
day, making a total of 22 incinerators in the City of New
York.
S28 GFE QlesgSeeoOgarse s
eS,
—
SFSFSER FESS esses
re al iy Hane
ibs
ite
i
HIE His it
: ied i in it pele fat
ete ti Hil
ine it eld eel
bau) a4 HEHEHE relia
sion of the Sanitary Commission to erect new incinerators
of larger rated capacity than were formerly contemplated.
The evidence shows that the defendant’s plan for garbage
disposal involves the erection of 14 new incinerators, which
~ will take care of the matter of garbage disposal at least
until the year 1945, and that such a plan, if consummated,
is a proper and effective means for such disposal.
(c) Amounts of Garbage:
The quantities of garbage and refuse now being de-
posited at sea off the New Jersey coast by the City of New
York during the greatest dumping at its peak in summer,
from June to September, inclusive, of each year and for
some years to come if present methods continue, amounts
to an approximate average of 3,000 tons per day. To burn
this quantity during the summer months mentioned and to
provide for future needs, there should be additional incin-
erating capacity of 3,000 tons per day to be provided by
new incinerators, unless by an increase of consumption by
existing incinerators, or some temporary expedients for
disposal, the need for new incinerator capacity be corre-
spondingly reduced.
The evidence showe that during one week in June, 1931,
the three incinerators in Manhattan and the nine in Queens
and the three in Richmond (15 in all) taken collectively
actually consumed at least 10 per cent more garbage and
rubbish than their rated capacity. Eight of these incinera-
expected to consume at least 10 per cent in
rated capacity of 2250 tons per day, which would increase
their total consumption to 2475 tons per day, and on the
basis of actual performance by the large
24 hours per day and six days per week, the consumption
of garbage and rubbish by the new incinerators may be still
further increased. It is not, however, considered pradent
to conclude that, with the construction and operation of
three 750-ton incinerators, the amount of garbage and rab-
bish just stated would be consumed. The quantity being
disposed of at sea should be provided for anu provision for
its disposal at times of peak production and its possible
increase in the future must be made. The proposed fourth
new incinerator should be constructed. The four are
planned to take care of garbage and rubbish in the locali-
ties mentioned until 1945.
(d) Sites:
sort to certain methods or expedients such as (a) a better
separation of garbage and rubbish and ashes by house
holders; (b) the improvement of the relative proportions
of garbage and rubbish’ in the incinerators, and where
necessary, the use of some coal as additional fuel; (c) the
transfer of excess garbage from one Borough to another
where incineration may be had; (d) seven-day operation
of all incinerators ‘‘when necessary during the peak
months of summer’’; (e) the dumping of garbage mixed
7
with ashes or sand in land fills. The defendant takes issue
with these contentions.
(a) Separation—The defendant has ordinances and
regulations requiring the separation of garbage and other
substances into four separate classes—garbage, refuse,
ashes, and liquid waste, and the use of separate receptacles
for them. The evidence shows that in tenement house sec-
tions in the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx compli-
ance with these regulations and ordinances is difficult to
secure. Many thousands of notices of the requirements of
these regulations (printed in four languages) are annually
distributed to the householders and others concerned. A
force of from 60 to 70 men is kept employed in looking after
this matter; and in 1929, when a special ‘‘drive’’ was made
to enforce the ordinances and regulations by a considerable
addition to the regularly-employed force, the result was a
large increase in convictions and fines for violations. The
evidence does not show that reasonable efforts to enforce
these ordinances are not being made by the defendant.
(b) Proportions—The burning of a mixed refuse con-
taining 80 per cent of garbage and 20 per cent of rubbish
is the upper limit for operation with satisfactory tempera-
tures and without the use of some coal. The use of this
ratio is difficult to maintain. The weather affects the rub-
bish, and other conditions may reduce its heat-producing
qualities. The defendant has two types of plants, the Del-
carie and the Sterling, and they are not designed for using
coal, though in emergencies some coal may be and has been
used. In the Sterling type, being a fire-brick lined furnace,
there is a tendency when using coal to get ‘‘ballaning’’, that
is, an amalgamation of the fire-brick with the ash, which at
various temperatures tends to fuse and to rum into any
interstices in the brick or between the brick, and when it
becomes slightly cold to form a mass the removal of which
tends to break up the face of the brick and reduce the life
of the furnace. The Delearie type is a higher-temperature
furnace, and because of its peculiar constructivn is liable,
were designed to serve, and their full rated capacities are
not used in doing so. Difficulties to be met in the making
of such transfers may be summarized as the distances in-
volved; the method of transfer; inadequate storage space
and disproportionate expense. In times of stress of
weather, some garbage otherwise going to sea has been
taken to Brooklyn plants. The Sanitary Commission ap-
plied to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment ‘for and
obtained its leave to modify the contract of the Brooklyn
Ash Removal Company to permit excess garbage from
other Boroughs to be disposed of in the Brooklyn incinera-
tors. Under this resolution, it is possible to transfer some
of the garbage now being dumped at sea to Brooklyn in-
cinerators to the extent of their capacity. The collection
of garbage and rubbish for transfer from Manhattan and
the Bronx to other places will involve some night coilec-
tions of garbage in residential districts, and the noises and
annoyances incident thereto, besides the transportation of
the materials for long distances. There would be an addi-
to thd
practicability, and that such a plan would be a reasonable
step to take. hg
(d) As to the practicability of seven-day per week
operation, the evidence is uncertain; in some instances
left
there has been a burning of the residuum over from
operation on Saturday.
(e) Fille—Assuming the existence of appropriate
places, it may not be said that garbage and rubbish mixed
with ashes and used as a fill is an impracticable expedient
for their disposal during short peak periods, if thereby
the dumping at sea can be avoided. The materials here
referred to do not include some things thet the original
report herein shows were being dumped at sea, but refers
to what is generally known as ‘‘hog-feeding garbage’’ and
rubbish and ashes. The evidence shows that ashes mixed
with a small percentage of garbage taken from Manhattan
are being disposed of in part at Rikers Island, part being
near-by communities; but to make it available for garbage
and rubbish it is shown by the evidence to be necessary to
provide much equipment. One of the witnesses stated that
the construction of the necessary docks, sea-wall, unload-
ing machinery and other equipment that would be required
to make such an island available for the disposal of ashes
.
i
?
i
HE
ra
tH
qe
at
[enki Sos
!
H
incinerators sufficient to accomplish the desired end.
TIME FOR CONSTRUCTION.
The plaintiff introduced witnesses who qualified as ex-
perts and testified upon the question of the time in which
the proposed incinerators could be built, and the defendant
introduced expert testimony on the same question. The
conclusions stated by Mr. Samuel Greeley, a witness called
by the plaintiff, and by Mr. George W. Faller, a witness
called by the defendant, fairly represent the contentions of
the respective parties on the question of a reasonable
time. Both of these witnesses are eminent engineers with
wide experience and well qualified as experts to speak
upon the questions submitted to them.
As to the reasonable length of time within which addi-
tional incinerators may be installed in New York City,
ee [ag
: ait th
S Ey 2%
mae
ia
me Ua
333? i £035131 a $ iit
eis! i
e a ni Hil
ure
et
a st ml : 4]
mb de ffi £8 -~e78e- agin : 2a, § te
citi atid Ag i
a anal tHe iF
é iuiliels i TPR iif
ell Bet al
TABUIH HTS BLY (HE
Z3=s 5 § 8 gg25 BSE. =:
belagiteend asa tadlag i deetid
15
The evidence shows that under‘ez'sting conditions labor
ean be secured readily and that this is a favorable time for
the Bronx, with a rated capacity of 750 tons each per day,
should be ready for operation on or before June 1, 1933,
and that until June 1, 1933, is a reasonable time to be al-
lowed the def: within which to put into effect and
operation the necessary incinerators to enable it to
in the letters of the defendant’s representatives or agents
to the Supervisor of the Port of New York in 1918, when
asking leave to dump at sea, and referred to in the former
report in this cause.
A reduction in the amount of garbage and rubbish, being
dumped at sea, can be.made by the use of some of the
methods already mentioned, pending the completion of the
needed incinerators.
To make suitable provision for the contingencies men-
tioned, it would be just to the parties for the Court to re-
tain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of such modi-
fication as, upon due application and notice, the Court may
determine to be proper.
16 ©
Recommendations.
Pursuant to the decree of re-referenee, it is
(1) That the decree make the injunction mentioned in —
the opinion and decree of the Court in this case effective —
from and after June 1, 1933, and require the defendant and —
its agents or employees to cease the dumping of any :
bage or refuse into the ocean or waters off the coast of
plaintiff the State of New Jersey, on and after June 1, 19%3.
(2) That the defendant be required to file with the
Clerk of this Coart on the first days of April and October
of each year, beginning April, 1932, a report to this Court
setting forth the progress made in the construction of the
incinerators in the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx,
and the amount of garbage and refuse dumped at sea
during the period of the report.
(3) That either party to this cause, on due notice to the
other, may apply at the foot of the decree for any modifi-
cation thereof, and this Court retain jurisdiction for the
purpose of any order or decree it may deem proper in the
premises.
No recommendation is made as to costs.
Inasmuch as the parties to this cause, by their respective
solicitors, have entered into a consent decree which has
been filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court, I deem
it unnecessary to a full compliance with the Court's decree
of re-reference to do more than refer to the consent de
cree, which amply embodies the foregoing recommenda-
tions and includes some other matters.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,
Specal Master.
gay pasties 17}
i,
OP io hej
-
a
i Parc ae
fe 7.
Pursuant to the order in this cause of May 29,
pa. ties plaintiff and defendant, by their respective
having appeared before me at public
City of New York, July 10th and 11th and 17
tember 12th, 1933; at Asbury Park, New Jersey,
tember 25th and 26th, and again in New York City on Oc
tober 2nd, 1933, I have reported the teatimony
with exhibits, by filing the same in the office of
of this Court with my certificate.
request for findings and conclusions.
with the decree.
respec.ively sustained by them as the re-
and the damages
*> gult of defendant's failure to comply
hi int He
| He
ee U
baeluaal
irae
*~
a eater
kt uh
i
m Hi: it Hi ee
i fi ull | iui ie ii
Windle ADEA al iff ii
tionment held on January 22, 1932, the matter of the ap-
proval of the contracts was again postponed for two weeks,
to February 5th, and on that date it was again put over for
two weeks, to February 19, 1932, and postponements were
later made until February 26th and then until Mareh 4,
1932, when the matter of the approval of the terms and
os Bt
+H
343
Hil
ales
iit
HE
were all carried
HE
yitsaas
Hin
ne
working days, 250 worki
with the right to award on
iff a i He
He
aE
HUET
ala
IH
HI HSE
fai tHE
hall th; H
g%%
Beit
to
Boulevard
Borough
"Dates buts of Octenhes 1932, copies of the examina-
tion of the second sei of four bidders were transmitted to
the secretary of the Boar J of Estimate and Apportionment
and to the acting Mayor direct.
On October 11, 1932, the commanication dated September
12th from the Sanitary Commission was on the calendar of
the committee of the whole, but the report of the engineers
of the office of the secretary of the Board not being ready,
it was laid over for two weeks, to October 25, 1932. At the
meeting of the committee of the whole held on October 25,
ill eh
Hie
fH
leh
esis
li
His
} lille:
4
nthe eatin he Boa of atime a Apt
mission to award contracts for the erection of a destructor
Price of $696,
Manhattan at a bid
of a destructor plan
plant at 215th Street in
erettion
395, and a contract for the
é
4 i i it noe p1itié i
ie ate iit i
i
i
On May 25, 1933, the Department of Sanitation called
to the Comptroller’s attention the proposed contracts for
heating and plumbing, and asked for the schedule of wages
to be paid, in accordance with said Act. There followed
considerable correspondence between these branches on the
subject. No contract for the heating anc plumbing had
been made up to October 2, 1933.
Constraction of the two incinerators was commenced
March 21, 1933. On October 2, 1933, the incinerator for
Manhatten was 34 per cent complete, and the incinerator
for the Bronx was 20 per cent complete.
The chief engineer of the Department of Sanitation was
produced as a witness by defendant on July 17, 1933, and
again on October 2, 1933. Between those dates he had been
made Commissioner of Sanitation in succession to Mr.
>
fendant if it uses some other means of disposal. He
outlined a schedule he had prepared for
a
plants was being delayed by the absence of work on plumb-
ing and heating, the contracts for which had not yet been
let.
The plaintiff introduced as a witness the chief account-
ant of the department of finance. He explained the method
of financing improvements such as the building of inciner-
ators to be by funds obtained from the sale of corporate
stock notes which are redeemable by the issuance of long-
term bonds known as corporate stock or serial bonds, and
that these can be sold under sealed bids after advertise-
ment. He said that the corporate stock note is simply a
“*forerunner”’ to enabie the city to borrow as it need:
borrow, without borrowing millions of money in adva
of actual needs, and that when the Board of Estimate |
Apportionment had authorized an improvement and p
ments thereon, it did not mean that the money was avails
unless the Comptroller were able to sell corporate notes
te have a long-term bond saie. He testified that from es
in March, 1931, the defendant had not been able to hav
long-term bond sale and that on that date, March 4, 1:
it had a bond sale of $100,000, which was to take up «
porate stock notes already issued, but leaves $9,000,00C
corporate stock .vies outstanding, while there were ¢
tract liabilities besides of $189,000,000, which contract
bilities had been registered on authorizations duly m
by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. There '
a large amount of corporate stock notes outstanding
the independent subway, and on the 4th of May, 1931
sale was held of $52,000,000 of four-year bonds, and beca
of that fact the ‘‘bankers’’ agreed to bid for them un
competitive bidding and sealed bids. This sale in M
1931, and the one in March, 1931, were, according to ¢
witness, the last sales of 4-year bonds or long-term bor
In January, 1932, the legislature restricted the issue
corporate stock notes by the city to $200,000,000, but
new notes could be issued for a period not exceeding |
years. Prior to that time the corporate notes were iss
for one year with the right of renewal The ‘‘banke:
took $100,000,000 of these notes to take up $76,700,000
outstanding notes, and paid $23,300,000 in cash.
There were approximately $94,000,000 of corporate no
outstanding in June, 1933.
In 1931 the defendant spent on subway construct
about $70,000,000, in 1932 about $80,000,000, and in 1
the witness estimated the expenditures for the subway w
$6,000,000.
The aggregate budgets for several years, less the amount
of debt service within such badgets, for all departmestel
The witness stated that he had never known of pay-
ments for such work as that of building incinerators being
paid out of the budgets, that such payment would be con-
trary to the provisions of the city charter, and that since
the sale of the corporate stock notes issued as above stated
under the last Act of the Legislatare, the defendant had
been uaable to sell any more bonds or stock notes.
With reference to the incinerator contracts the witness
stated that every voucher that had come from the con-
tractors for these two incinerators had been paid, and that
the city had ‘‘a little money left of our corporate stock
borrowings to pay whatever else comes along for the next
couple of months.’’ These contracts provide for progress
payments.
in April, 1933, the ‘‘bankers’’ refused any further loans.
The city cannot sell any kind of securities at less than par,
and its 6 per cent corporate stock were in July, as stated
by this witness, on the market at a discount. The city has
not offered to sell corporate stock notes for incinerator
purposes alone,
On October 2, 1933, the Special Master called as a wit-
ness Mr. George McAneny, who at that time was Comp-
troller of the city of New York. He had been Commis-
sioner of Sanitation under the re-organization made in
April, 1933, already mentioned, whersby the Sanitary Com-
corporate stock for a long time. He fu
program had been developed under his instruction looking
to a 100 per cent incineration, but that how long it would
take to execute that program depended upon the dates on
which funds were provided, and that the city was unable
in October, and had been for a considerable length of time,
to borrow money for these purposes; that he could not say
at what time dumping at sea could be stopped under pres-
ent conditions. He said that in view of the uncertainty as
to the city funds his plan included a request for moneys
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R. F. C.),
that weuld enable the city to make a start on the plan for
incineration, which is ‘‘coupled with the broad subject of
our needs for sewage disposal as well.’’ He expressed
the opinion that the application to the R. F. C. would go
forward within the next two or three weeks.
1
3
r
At a hearing held in Asbury Park, New Jersey, Septem-
ber 25 and 26, 1933, a number of witnesses were introduced
by plaintiff, who testified relative to the expense of re-
moving deposits on the beaches between June lst and Sep-
tember 15th. There was also introduced a book of 64 pho-
tographs identified as having been taken on and along the
beaches, and showing deposits thereon between the dates
of June 9th and September Ist. The witness was employed
by the State to examine beaches and make observations of
were on the beach dead animals, cans, bottles, wooden floor
as oranges, grape fruit, melon rinds and vegetables.
On August 5th at Bradley Beach there were orange peel-
ings, rotted melons and vegetables.
side Park were clear, and on August 1ith the beaches from
Highland Beach to Manasquan were clean, and a small
amount of garbage consisting of orange and lemon skins,
grape fruit and dead chickens were in the undertow about
to be washed up at Point Pleasant, Lavallette and Seaside
Park.
On August 12th at Mantoloking Beach as far as the eye
could see there was garbage strewn.
From August 14th to 18th, inclusive, the beaches from
Seaside Park to Highland Park were clean.
On August 23rd, on the beaches at Ocean Grove, Bradley
Beach, Avon, Delmar, there were bottles, cans, driftwood,
decayed fruit and vegetables, and the beaches at Manas-
quan, Point Pleasant, Bayhead, Mantoloking, Lavallette
and Seaside Park had a large amount of garbage, fruits
and vegetables, besides driftwood, broken furniture, cases,
bottles and electric light bulbs in windrows along the be
At Mantoloking, along with the refuse on the beach th
was a dead fow! and a dead dog-~
On August 24th at Highland Beach there were some ¢
tric light bulbs and a smal) amount of orange skins
parts of grape fruit. At Seabright some driftwood, ¢
and bottles. At Asbury Park the tide had taken out «
of refuse and garbage brought in the preceding day.
At Bradley Beach the picture showed garbage and ref
the way of garbage and driftwood and bottles.
At Spring Lake the beaches were clean to within 25 |
of the boardwalk, but from that point to the boardy
and beyond in the street were bottles, cana, electric li
bulbs and some fruit, orange skins, grape fruit and m
rinds.
Pictures 1 to 9, taken at Poiat Pleasant, show conditi
on August 24th, the date of a heavy storm.
On August 25th pictures taken at Bradley Beach |
Avon showed the refuse and garbage along with driftw
brought up by the storm.
On August 29th pictures No. 30 and 31 were taker
Spring Lake, showing a great number of bottles, elec
light bulbs, radio tubes, jugs and driftwood. Picture
shows a pile of refuse, including cans and bottles, deca
fruit and vegetables with driftwood, parts of furnit
garbage and rotted fruit mixed with it.
Another witness testified that at Bayhead Beach tl
were, between June 15th and September 15th acoum
tions on the beach of various kinds, fruits and vegeta!
and dead animals, and that accumulations of garbage |
it
i
ii
1
1
i
i
i
f
|
et
|
|
i
it
Fe
7
F
*
iy
i
:
i
it
é
:
+t
rt
ri
if
dump.
The defendant adduced testimony to show that no ma-
terial was dumped at sea on designated days in June, July
and August, but the same accumulated material was
dumped on other days.
Commencing July 17, 1933, the defendant was granted
permission to dump and did dump garbage and refuse at
!
;
|
ficer of the defendant made observations at the
location. This testimony was to the effect that the drift
was not toward the New Jersey shore.
The defendant showed that during the months of June,
July and August, and until September 15th, the number
vessels passing the Jersey coast was 4459, taken froin
records of the Monmouth Beach Coast Guard station.
this number there was included boata of all character
description.
Este
&
The expenditures for removing garbage and refuse from
New Jersey beaches from June Ist to September 15th, —
a
~ 4,
*
«2
Cost
$134.25
~ It was stated by counsel for the plaintiff that a number
of other witnesses appearing could not show the expendi-
tures because of the method in which the accounts had
been kept.
Mr. Goodrich, who was chief engineer of the Depart-
ment of Sanitation of the City of New York, under ap
pointment by Mr. McAneny when the latter was Commis-
sioner of Sanitation, and who when he testified on October
2nd, 1933, had become Commissioner of Sanitation, was
asked by defendant’s counsel whether, upon the construc-
tion of the two incinerators now being built the city of
New York would be able to suspend the dumping of gar-
bage and refuse and other materials at sea, and he replied:
‘*Not from the results of the construction of those. two in-
cinerators, no.’’ He was further asked:
“‘Q. Upon the completion of the incinerators is it
your intention positively to discontinue the dumping
of material at sea, other than ashes?
**A. I don’t see how it can be done.
could be done inside of a year.
“Q. Inside of a year?
“A. Yes.
“Q. But if the Government don’t loan the money
you have no answer to make have you?
“A. Exactly.’’
During one of the hearings before the Special Master it
was given as an excuse for the absence of an expected wit-
ness that he, with other city officials, was discussing with
the Governor of the State the question of a special session
of the legislature to give authority to the city to levy
special taxes for stated purposes. It does not appear that
funds were sought for incinerators at the proposed extra
session nor at the last session of the legislature. The
charter of the city of New York as amended provides that
corporate stock may be issued for various epecified pur-
poses, among them, ‘‘for the erection and equipment when
first erected of buildings for garbage and rubbish disposal
plants and dumps.”’
cp Uggedinettayrtay fplagasi lt
1 HTH pe
A aia: elt
| ile i Ht lll
at it AHR,
Hl il die
He
i: ply 244 pegiiye @ g4e2g2es
BREET
HME Cite
rit RTH iF ia: rT +H HEE:
inti aii : rittteh
a tMItiMithtr 34 : ee:
at thal Ht ft udu
ae
statement is in error and the sale of authorized corporate
stock notes or bonds is necessary.
If the defendant were required to show, within a stated
time before the date fixed for the completion of the two in
cinerators, what the result of its application to the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, or the result of any appli-
cation to the legislature had been upon the question of
funds, the time reasonably necessary to enable defendant
to complete the work or comply with the decree could be
more satisfactorily determined.
3. The municipal subdivisions of plaintiff have ex.
pended, between June 1, 1933, and September 15, 1933, te
prevent or lessen the pollution of the waters, shores or
beaches of New Jersey, resulting from defendant’s failure
to comply with the decree, the sum of $2,160.79.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,
Special Master.
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1930.
No. 17, Original.
Prats or New Junaer,
Plaintiff,
agasnat
Tue Crryvy or New Yor,
Defendant.
Now comes The City of New York, the defendant above
named in the above entitled suit and objects and excepta to
the report of Hon. Edward A. Campbell, the Special Master,
herein filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on the
20th day of March, 1931, in the following particulars, to wit:
he Ge Soc ene Ca See see
rights of the , because the defendant is before
on property affected is within the United
ow
1. To so much of the conc con-
clusion, of law, set forth under the heading “Parties and
Jurisdiction” (Report of Special Master, p. 9), as concludes — 3
2. To so much of the finding of fact or
law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some
as finds that the property affected is within
States.
3. To so much of the conclusions of law set forth under
the heading “Some Questions of Law—6 Jurisdiction” (Re
port of Special Master, p. 59) asx concludes that this Court
has jurisdiction.
4. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 49) that The City of New York has not dumped gar-
bage and refuse in the ocean for many years in any appre
ciable quantities within a marine league (three nantical
miles) of the shores of the State of New Jersey, except on
rare occasions either when necessary to preserve life where
a scow was in danger of foundering or when there is some
unauthorized action upon the part of the individuals em-
pleved by the contractors in charge of the scows or tow-
boata.
5. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 50) that the territorial waters of the plaintiff do not
extend more than one marine league or three nautical miles
from the Atlantic Coast shore line of said State of New
Jersey at low water mark.
Fact 53) that the Atlantic Ocean dumping
the defendant in dumping its garbage an
within the navigable waters of the United
in the Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage
for many years last past at points 8, 12 and 20
east of Scotland Lightship and about 10, 12
in the navigable waters of the United
9%. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master
conclude as a matter of law as requested by
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 5) that the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of
many years last past at the points and
land Lightship and from the New Jersey shore
in Exception No. 8, was not and is not a dumping thereof
in the territorial waters of the State of New Jersey.
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 6) thatthe dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage and refuse for
many years last past at the points and distances from Scot-
land Lightship and from the New Jersey shore as stated
‘4
in Exception No. 8, was a dumping thereof on and into the
high seas.
ll, To the failure and refasal of the Special Master to
conclude as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclasion of Law 15) that by reason of the dump
ing in the Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage and
refuse at the places, in the manner and under the conditions
aforesaid, no justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and
the defendant is presented over which the Supreme Court of
the United States has authority, jurisdiction or control ander
Article II], Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States
12. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) ( Report of Spe
cial Master, p. 25) as finds that such parte of the garbage or
refuse as float either on the surface or in suapension in the
water, move with the direction of the wind and current, the
wind exercising the greater influence on the direction of its
movement, and the mass moves at times westward and north.
ward or towards the shores of New Jersey or Long Island
according to the direction and velocity of the wind.
13. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) ( Report of Spe
cial Master, p. 25) as finds that the mass spreads out on the
surface of the water gradually breaking up into amaller areas
and moving for indefinite periods with the wind, some of the
materials being on the surface and some in suspension.
14. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) (Report of Spe-
cial Master, p. 26) as finds that some of the lobster fishermen
have followed the floating garbage from the place where it is
dumped by the defendant in the ovean to where it went ashore
on New Jerney's beaches. :
15. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) (Report of Spe
cial Master, p. 26) as finds that about 25% of the self-
addressed, stamped postal cards deposited in sealed bottles
dropped in garbage in the ocean immediately after the dump
ing by New York City scows came back to the parties deposit
ing same by mail from persons along the New Jersey and
Long Island shores and from further north.
16. To so much of the Finding of Fact (7) (Report of
Special Master, p. 16) as finds that the deposits of garbage
and refuse produce unhealthfal conditions interfering with
and frequently preventing the comfort and enjoyable ase of
the beaches and sea, it being dangerows to leave children
unattended on the beach while the deposits are there because
of things they may pick up, some of the same being unmen-
tionable; that broken glass and nails in pieces of wood have
been the cause of severe wounds to persons on the beach or
in bathing, and that it ie a menace to health and tends to
injure busipess and property values and rental values.
17. To so much of the Finding of Fact (7) (Report of
Special Master, p. 16) as finds that during June, July and
Auguet, 1929, there were in Asbury Park, a considerable
increase over the preceding year of cases of external otitis
which is a swelling or inflammation of the ear canal, and of
cases of infection of the middle ear requiring the drum to be
opened, and of sinus affected cases resulting from bathing
in the ocean, and that one or more of the coast guard incurred
a skin infection from the water which gave them considerable
troabh:. 2
18. To so much of the Finding of Fact (16)—Appear-
ance and Movement—(Report of Special Master, p. 27) as
finds that large parts of these floating and submerged areas
of garbage and refuse, dumped by the defendant are driven
and carried by winds and water to and upon the shores of
the plaintiff, and constitute the objectionable materials
thereon and in the adjacent water, hereinbefore described.
19. To so much of the Finding of Fact, or Conclusion of
Law, or both, set forth uncer the heading—Some Questions
of Law—1. Trespass (Report of Special Master, p. 41) a
finds that large areas of garbage and refuse floating upon or
held in suapension by the water, which have been dumped by
defendant's scows, are driven and carried by wind and water
to and upon the shores of plaintiff and other portions or areas
thereof are held for indefinite periods in the waters above soi!
owned by plaintiff and do creat injury to fishing and bathing
in such waters.
2). To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of
law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions of
Law—3. iuisance” (Report of Special Master, pp. 50-51)
as finds that the conditions on plaintiff's shores and adjacent
waters produced by garbage and other objectionable mate
rials alleged in the bill are proved by uncontradicted evi-
dence. A summary of the facts found may be stated as fol-
lows: Along the shores are many summer resorts and their
beaches, and when unaffected by the bad conditions men-
tioned are pleasure grounds for thousands of visitors. * * *
The deposits interfere with, and until removed frequently
prevent, the use and enjoyment of the beaches for the pur-
poses to which the latter are adapted and for the comfortable
and enjoyable use of which people visit them. * * * Many
visitors leave the resorts because they cannot use the beaches
when littered or secure the surf bathing when the waters
adjacent hold garbage and refuse in suspension and the chief
value of the shores below high water mark and the soil under
7
the adjacent waters for at least three nautical miles is ir the
fisheries and the fact that they can and do afford the attrac-
tions pertaining to summer resorts, which fisheries and at-
tractions are seriously interfered with by the deposits in
question. .
21. Te so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of
law, or both, set forth ander the heading “Some Questions of
Law—3. Nuisance” (Report of Special Master, p. 53) as
finds that conditions described in this case amount to a pub-
lic nuisance, and that the State and communities affected
should not be required to tolerate the same.
22. To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of
law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions
of Law—5. Municipality—Decree of Proof” ( Report of Spe-
cial Master, pp. 56-57) as finds that even if the stricter rule
of evidence ve applied, I think the only reasonable conclusion
to be reached ander all the evidence is that the objectionable
conditions on the beaches and in the adjacent waters com
plained of in this suit are caused by and due to the action
of the defendant in dumping its garbage and refuse into the
waters of the ocean as already stated and that there has not
only been an invasion of serious magnitude of the plaintiff's
rights extending through some years but it is continuing and
is threatened for an indefinite period.
23. To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of
law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions of
Law—6. Jurisdiction” (Report of Special Master, p. 59)
as finds that the defendant has created and continues to pro-
duce a public nuisance on the beaches and property of the
State of New Jersey and that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
in accordance with the prayer of the bill.
24. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Pact 46) that six different inspections made by an official
:
|
F
:
I
:
y
fil
i
aay
the
Pact 54) that the dumping of garbage and refose at eva as
aforesaid by defendant, has not caused substantial injury to
the navigation of the ocean by the plaintiff or its citizens or
visitors
2%. To the failure and refosal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 55) that the dumping of garbage and refuse at ora as
aforemaid by the defendant, has not caused any substantial
injary to bathing or bathing rights or property connected
therewith on the part of the plaintiff or any of ite citizens or
visitors.
29. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Fiading of
31. To the failure and refusa) of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
32. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
33. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 60) that (be damping of garbage and refuse at sea by
defendant as aforesaid has not caused and does not cause
|
1
!
i
any substantial depreciation to the value of the plaintiff's
property or that of its citizens, has not retarded and does not
not impose in any substantial manner upon plaintiff's manici-
palities and inhabitants a constant or considerable expense in
removing defendant's garbage and refuse from public and
retard the economic development of plaintiffs territory, and
that of ite municipalities in any substantial manner and dors
'
i
:
34. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Pact 65) that the plaintiff failed to produce on the trial
of this action, any scientific or expert evidence as to the
effect of ocean currents or tides apon the movement of objects
dumped into the ocean at from 10 to 22 miles from the New
Jersey shore, and floating partially or wholly submerged in
the orean
356. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclade as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 7) that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage
and refuse, has not obstructed and does not obstruct or
_ impede the navigation of the waters of the United States
or of the Btate of New Jersey.
36. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 8) that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage
and refuse, has not injured or destroyed and does not injure
or destroy the bathing or fishing rights or property therein
of the plaintiff or its citizens or visitors thereto.
37. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 9) that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant ae aforesaid, of garbage
and refuse, has not regulated or destroyed and does not
regulate or destroy the commerce of the State of New Jersey
and /or its citizens in violation of Article I, Section 8, para
graph 3 of the Constitution of the United States or of any
statute of the United States.
38. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
le XIV, Section 1 of the
Constitation of the United States.
39. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 13) that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage
and refuse, has not deprived and does not deprive the plain-
tif? and/or any of its citizens of the natural advantages
of its or their position along the seashore contrary to the
sovereign rights of said State as a member of the Union
or of any of such righta.
40. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 16) that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant at the places and in the
manner aforesaid, of garbage and refuse, has not been and
is not an unreasonable disposition of the same as a matter
of law.
41. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 18) that the plaintiff herein
must prove its claims and case against the defendant herein
by clear and convincing evidence.
42. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 19) that the plaintiff herein
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any
substantial portion of the garbage and refuse which found
its way into the waters of the State of New Jersey or onto
12
ite shores or beaches was that which was dumped into the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant.
43. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 17) that the damping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendant at the places and in the
manner aforesaid, of garbage and refuse has not created
and does not create a public nuisance as a matter of law
in respect to the plaintiff and/or its citizens or visitors or
front facilities of the plaintiff or its citizens or damages the
property of said plaintiff, its municipalities and citizens or
44. To so mach of the Finding of Fact set forth ander
the heading “Rome Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report
of the Special Master, p. 45) as finds that the Act (29 Stat.
209, ax amended) contemplated that the Supervisor prescribe
certain limita, but there is no evidence in this case as to
what limits were prescribed.
45. To so much of the Findirg of Fact on Conclusion of
Law or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions
of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 47) as
finds, or purports to find, that although the defendant dumps
its garbage under permits issued by the Supervisor of the
Harbor of New York at points in excess of one marine league
from the shore of New Jersey, it is difficult to understand
how that fact affords any defense in this case.
46. Toso much of the Conclusion of Law set forth under
the heading “Some Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report
of the Special Master, p. 47) as concludes that the authority
of the Federal Government does not extend beyond the re-
quirements of navigation.
47. Toso much of the Conclusion of Law set forth ander
the heading “Some (Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report
of the Special Master, p. 48) as concludes that the powers
which the Supervisor has under the statute and the effect to
be given the permits authorized to be issued are to be strictly
construed because of the effect of the dumping upon the
rights of others.
48. To so much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion
of Law, or both, set forth uader the heading “Some Questions
of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 48) as
concludes that the fact that the defendant is a municipal
corporation does not afford immunity from the results of its
own action.
49. Toso much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion of
Law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions
of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 49) as
concludes that the Act of 1888, as amended, furnishes no
defense to the defendant and that compliance with permits
from the Supervisor of the Harb’ ~ acting under the provi-
sions of that Act does not furnish a defense nor relieve it
from the effect of a public nuisance resulting from or created
by its action.
). To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a matter of law as requested by defendant ( Pro-
posed Conclusion of Law 14) that the dumping in the Atlan-
4
tie Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid of garbage and refuse
under permit from, and supervision of, the Government of
the United States through its Supervisor of the Harbor of
New York and in accordance with the provisions of Title 33,
Chapter 9, Sections 441-451 inclusive, U. 8. Code (approved
June 30, 1926) and preceding statutes on which founded, is
a compliance with each and every regulation and statute of
the United States relating to navigation, commerce and/or
any other subject over which Congress has exercised the juris-
diction of the United States.
51. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth under
the heading “Some Issues of Fact” (Report of Special Mas-
ter, p. 31) as finds, or purports to find, that there is evidence
that only some coast wise and other vessels discharge garbage
refuse into the ocean.
52. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth under
the heading “Some Issues of Fact” (Report of Special Mas-
ter, p. 31) as finds, or purports to find, that a witness intro-
duced by the defendant made an estimate to the effect that
there were only twenty vessels a day going and coming from
southern ports to New York.
53. To so much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion of
Law, or both, set forth under the heading “Pome Issues of
Fact” (Report of Special Master, p. 35) as finds or concludes
that testimony that some vessels discharge garbage and refuse
after clearing from New York, falls short of establishing a
custom by other vessels.
M4. To so much of the Finding of Fact
the heading “Bome leeues of Fact” (
that constantly being dumped by the defendant and fre-
quently carried by winds and waves from the dumping places
to and upon plaintiff's shores as hereinbefore stated.
SS. «Te the failere and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
27) that the scows of private contractors, having no connec-
tion with the City of New York, containing “cellar dirt,” i. ¢.,
debris from buildings that have been torn down consisting
of joists, timbers, lathe, plaster, etc, of a
have for years been dumped and are being
Atlantic Ocean under permit from the
Harbor of New York at a point about 4
Scotland Lightship.
M6. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
33) that cargoes of condemned foodstuffs, vegetables, fruita,
etc.) are also dumped at sea wader permit from the Buper-
visor of the Harbor of New York ai a point 25 miles from
the New Jersey shore.
57. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
34) that Brooklyn Navy Yard scows containing refuse and
garbage also dumped at sea at the regular dumping points at
which New York City garbage is dumped.
58. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
35) that the Supervisor of the Harbor of New York in his
report for 1929, stated that it is probable that a great deal
16
of garbage is dumped both outside and inside the harbor
entrance by the enormous tonnage passing in and out of New
York Harbor and aleo that the local floating equipment
throws more or less garbage overboard.
59. To the failure and refweal of the Special) Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 36) that the records of the Collector of the Port of New
York show that in 1928-1929 the following was the number
of vessels clearing from or entering such port from points
south thereof for periods of two months at a time; months
of December 1928 and January 1929, foreign and coastwise
vessels entering, 1,227; clearing, 1,173. Months of July and
August, 1929, foreign and coastwise vessels entering, 1,105;
clearing, 1,192.
60. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 37) that the sea lane or route for coastwise ships going
to and coming from points south of New York is about 2%
to 3 miles over the New Jersey coast at Seabright, Mon-
mouth Beach and Asbury Park; 5 miles at Sea Girt and
8 miley at Barnegat Lighthouse.
6]: To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find ax requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
28) that practically all freight and passenger shiva leaving
and entering New York Harbor (expecially those leaving)
dump more or less garbage and refuse in such sea lave.
62. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find ax requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
39) that many freight and passenger lines and ships feed
their crews in port and none of their garbage or refuse is
removed by the City or dispesxed of by the ship while in port,
but such accumulations consisting of bettles, tin cans, elec-
tric light bulbs, pieces of meat, fruit, other food waste, wood,
17
’ mattresses, pillows, shoes, old clothes, boxes, barrels, crates,
ete, ar. ‘emped after passing Scotland Lightship.
» 63. To the feilure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
40) that passenger and freight ships often anchor in great
numbers during a fog for 24 hours or more outside of the
harbor and dump garbage accumulated during that period
into the sea where they are anchored.
64. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 41) that the holds of cargo boats are usually swept in
port after the removai of the cargo and before reloading;
that such sweepings and also sweepings from the forecastle
are placed on deck for dumping in addition to garbage and
refuse and all are dumped in said sea lane for coastwise
ships shortly after passing Scotland Lightship on the way
south.
65. To the failure and refusal of che Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 42) that fruit, vegetables, poultry and other suppiies
delivered to the ships in port to feed passengers and crews,
are usually packed in crates, barrels and boxes which have
the names on them of New York dealers from whom they
are bought, and such crates, boxes and barrels, partly
broken up, are on most ships piled on deck and dumped with
other refuse in said sea lane shortly after passing Scotland
Lightship on the way south.
66. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 45) that insufficiently treated and unsanitary sewage
from the cities of Long Branch and Asbury Park on the
Atlantic Coast of ew Jersey has been and is being dis-
charged into the Atlantic Ocean within a skort distance
from the beaches of each of those cities.
beaches.
68. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
66) that the deposit in substantial quantities in the Atlantic
Ocean at points varying from 24% to 8 miles from the Atlantic
shore front of the plaintiff State commencing with the
minimum distance at Sandy Hook and extending to Bar
negat Lighthouse where the maximum distance existed, of
garbage, refuse and cellar dirt (material taken from de
molished buildings in New York City) by steamships and
other floating equipment and by scows of private contractors,
of the same kind and character ts that deposited in said
ocean as aforesaid by defendant much further away from
said shore front of the plaintiff, and the deposit of garbage
and refuse in sald ocean by the United States ( Browklyn)
Navy Yard authorities at the points where defendant dumped
and the deposit in said ocean less than \ mile from plain-
tiff’s said shore front of insufficiently treated and unsanitary
sewage from the cities of Long Hranch and Asbury Park,
makes it impossible to determine as a fact, whether garbage
and refuse and other offensive matter in substantial quan-
tities is deposited by defendant in the waters of the State
of New Jersey or on its beaches.
69. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude as a matter ef law as requested by defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 20) that by reason of the
deposit in substantial quantities of garbage, refuse, cellar
dirt and unsanitary sewage in the Atlantic Ocean by agencies
p. 29) as finds that the first incinerating plant was put in
operation by the City of New York in February, 1924.
Tl. Tose mach of Finding of Fact (17)—Incineratore—
(Report of the Special Master, p. 20) as finds that the
evidence does not show the cause of the apparent delay by
the defendant in adopting and putting into operation the
incinerating system, and that it was in 1924, some five years
after the defendant began dumping at sea, that its first
incinerator was put into operation, and during the next
succeeding five years other were built. That those con-
structed and in use fall far short of taking care of the
garbage and refuse situation.
72. To so much of Finding of Fact, or Conclusion of
Law, or both, (17)-—Incinerators—(Report of Special
Master, p. 30) as finds that the delay of the defendant in
adopting a proper method of disposal has been unreasonably
long.
20
73. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding
Fact 17) that three incineration plants were built in
Borough of Manhattan as a resuit of an appropriation
$5,000,000 made in July, 1921, the first being completed in
February, 1924, the second in November, 1925, and the
third on October 1, 1928, the cost of each incinerator being
about $1,000,000, exclusive of the cost of the land on which
built.
2Fe
74. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
19) that the commencement of building operations on a
fourth site was halted by injunction duly obtained in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York.
75. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
20) that in the Borough of Brooklyn there are two incine
rators, each with the capacity of 100 tons a day and three
with a capacity of 500 tons a day each, all now in operation,
built by a contractor under a contract to dispose of all
material that may be delivered, and since December 1, 1929,
no garbage from that borough has been dumped at sea.
76. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Propesed Finding of Fact
21) that in the Borough of Queens there are now nine
incinerators operating with an average daily garbage and
refuse consumption of from 100 to 270 tons and that borough
has never dumped any of its garbage at sea.
77. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master io
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
22) that in the Borough of Richmond there are now three
incinerators in operation and none of the garbage from that
borough has been or is now being damped at sea.
21
78. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
24) that approximately only 27 per cent. of the garbage
collected in the City of New York is dumped at sea, the
greatest proportion of which comes from the Borough of
The Bronx, and such amount will be continually reduced.
79. To the failure or refusal of the Special Mastc~ to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
63) that the dumping in the ocean by the defendant more
than a marine league from the New Jersey coast at points
8, 12 and 20 miles southeast of Scotland Lightship designated
by the United States Supervisor of the Harbor of New York
and under conditions imposed by him of about 27 per cent.
of the garbage collected by said City is not in fact an un-
reasonable disposition of its total garbage collections, pend-
ing the carrying out of its plans for the installation of
additional incinerators.
80. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
61) Chat the size, summer population, property investments
and assessed value of property of practically all of the New
Jersey communities and municipalities located along the
Atlantic Ocean shore front from Highlands to Seaside Park
has increased greatly during the period from 1919 to 1929,
during which the City of New York has been dumping a
portion of its garbage and refuse into the Atlantic Ocean
as aforesaid.
81. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to
find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact
62) that, although much more garbage and refuse has been
dumped at sea by the City of New York during the summer
months than during those of winter, the summer population
of, and visitors to, all of the New Jersey Atlantic shore front
communities and municipalities claimed by plaintiff to have
been injured, is and are many times grester than in winter.
82. To so much of the Finding of Pact set forth in the
report of the Special Master under the heading “Some lmocs
of Pact,” page 34, av finds that as to the Long Branch sewer
the evidence only of a plan of the sewage system and
some evidence com plainta were at one time made to the
Department of Health, which investigated the samc, anc that
the matters were mtisfactorily adjusted.
83. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth in the
report of the Special Master under the heading “Home (on.
clusions of Law,” page 50, as finds that some scows have left
upon them considerable quantities of garbage or refuse after
their gates have been thrown open to release the contents, and
these remnants are cast off by the men in charge as the scows
are being taken back from the dumping area, and that the
general practice continues, more materials being dumped in
1929 than in the preceding year.
S44. To the failure and refueal of the Special Master to
find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Pact 3), that by Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897 of the State
of New York, known as The (ireater New York Charter, vari-
ous municipalities of the State of New York were united and
consolidated into the City of New York, which was thereby
divided into five boroughs, known, respectively, as the bor-
coughs of Manhattan, The Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and
Richmond.
&5. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Findings of
Fact 5 and 6), that by said Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897
of the Btate of New York, a Department of Street Cleaning
was created in the municipal government of said city, with
juriadiction over the removal and disposition, as often as
the public health required, of ashes, refuse, street sweepings
and garbage collected in said city, bat that by Chapter 466
of the Laws of 1901, jurisdiction over the removal and ie
87. To the failure and refusal of the Bpecial Master to
find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of
Fact 15) that, on collection, this garbage is taken to docks
or dumping boards on the waterfront of said city and is then
dumped into city-owned barges, which are designated by the
initials of the departmental name apd letters of the alphabet,
and these are towed to sea by tugboats chartered from, and
in charge of, contractors, and the contents are there dumped.
88. Te the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 1), that the defendant, The
City of New York, is a municipal corporation and a politica!
sul<livision of the State of New York, administering govern-
me tal funciions in the localities described in Sections 1 and
2 of Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New
York, as amended by Chapter 466 of the Laws of 1901 of said
State, and subdivided into five boroughs therein described.
89. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
\ a
‘
(Progosed Conclusion of Law 2), that the Department of
®treet Cleaning and the Presidents of the Boronghs of Queens
and Richmond of the City of New York, for many years prior
ee tele ae a
of thereof, had jurisdiction in said city over the
removal and Wgposition, as often as the public health
required, ce ane street eweepings and garbage in
said city.
90. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude, as 4 matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law J2), that the dumping in the
Atlantic Ocean by the defendam, as aforesaid, of garbage
and re*use has not violated, and does not violate, Public
Laws of New Jersey, 1882, page 155 (3. Compiled Statutes
‘of New Jersey “Pilots”, Bec. 47, p. 3958), nor any other
statute of the State of New Jersey.
91. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 21), that the plaintiff has
failed to prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
in equity for the relief demanded in the complaint or for
any relief whatever in equity.
#2. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to
conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant
(Proposed Conclusion of Law 22), that the defendant is
entitled to a dismissal of the complaint herein, with costs
to the defendant.
F. Recommendations for Decree.
The defendant also objects and excepts to the recom-
mendations for a decree made by the Special Master in the
following particulars:
93. To subdivision No. 1 (Report of Special Master,
pp. 59-60) in its entirety.
04. To subdivision No. 2 (Report of Special Masten,
p. 60) in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
Agtuve J. W. Huy,
Corporation Counsel of The City of New York,
Solicitor for the Defendant.
E.wtsor 8. Benepicr,
J. Joseru Litty,
Tuomas W. A. Crows,
Of Counsel.
PP Oa Fi Tey aid — ——
> pape die Nee
ae ts cou Lerieer tall
>i Righetti aidh
Lone Me aalinlliameaadey et aire
& : ha Bhp Ch oval
ack Te P vr,
twits’ 3 wba rit
De. CRE Gon
ppd Blaby
Bote oct ihe ek
Ri Nest tp aa oe whe
Tere ar seg
% .
Ate peor Wea ene Caer ee.
; 7
- tego. my ye ee yan pies
Ta AE nied nts as a
. ON CNS tp a
Pe oh. .
re ayy
ante? Bygy 3 Se FRR 6,
ny oe wnag, + $8.
py i na Ss
a ie woe adant oe we
¥ *
31, 1982, to wit, a site located in the Borough of Manhat- oS
tan, one of the sites located in the Borough of The Bronx
and the site iocated in the Borough of Queens.
This resolution of said Board directed that the costs
of such contracts be charged against Corporate Stock of
The City of New York in the manner in such cases pro-
vided by its Charter. } .
Advertisement for sealed bids on said three contracts
commenced in the City Reeord, published by The City of
New York, July 18, 1982, and bids therefor were received ©
and publicly opened on August 10, 1932.
In all, a total of one hundred and eighty-eight (188) .
bids were received and nineteen (19) separate sets of
any Conmusianten ap pond of the Glte’a peapentl 0 tities
the plans submitted by the bidders in relation to the
commenced August 11, 1932. ‘The oral examination of the
resolution the bide fecetved, the exantine-
viom of the bidders, and a report of ite Engineer Member
Ax
. ~
ine SOR SYS See
KE bl agate: 2 Beere es
»
eo eee
se
ey
ne Bd.
ae
ie fe
wh ee ae
. »
— -
> >
ee
Pinks
25 ey
mo
gate
it a
es
Fs i!
< we
ee
*.
Re fit bi, =
om ee : ae SO, 4s oY
W ede FAAS PS : bn x ce tien: a fle : a OS ae
ti af fed il fe lit Mi ar 3
i
. i His fi Sago
ay Hu EE Pe
Sue
he i
= Sbgeae
PER ees IRENE SOTEN
POA arhe ae ee oe a Pap eR Bas, SS
All of which i respectfully submitted.
Dated, New York, September 80, 1982.
--4-
S..eme Court of the United States
RE. /OD
No. @ Original—October Term, 1931
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
agasnat
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.
Plaintiff,
REPORT OF THE DEFENDANT, THE CITY OF
NEW YORK
ARTHUR J. W. HILLY,
Corporation Counsel,
Solicitor for the Defendant,
The City of New York,
Municipal Building,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No, 13, Original—October Term, 1931.
STaTEe oF New JERsey,
Plaintiff,
against
Tue Crry or New York,
Defendant.
To the Supreme Court of the United States:
Purvuant to the Decree of this Court in the above en-
titled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The
City of New York, respectfully presents the following re-
port to this Honorable Court :
1. The Sanitary Commission, the head of the Depart-
ment of Sanitation of the City of New York, is the Munid-
pal Agency vested with and exercising exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the matter of the removal and final disposition
of ashes, garbage, and rubbish of the City of New York.
2. The following is a statement of the progress made
in the matter of the construction of incinerator plants for
the final disposition of garbage and rubbish in the City of
New York for the period, October 1, 1931, to March 31,
1932.
On October 23, 1931, the defendant, The City of New
York, duly selected an additional site for the erection and
construction of a new incinerator, being a piece of land
located on the northerly side of Northern Boulevard and —
226th Street, Doug!aston, Borough of Queens, and having
an area of 249,775 square feet ; that following such selec-
tion, proceedings were begun in the Bupreme Court of the
State of New York to condemn the said lands so selected
as a site for the construction of an ineinerator plant, and
that title to the said lands so selected was vested in the
City of New York on December 31, 1931.
Contracts, specifications and plans for the construction
of four incinerator plants, each having a capacity for the
incineration of 750 tons of garbage and rubbish in twenty-
four hours, were prepared and transmitted to the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York
for approval thereof and the authorization of the expendi-
ture of Municipal funds required for the carrying out of
said contracts. One of the incinerator plants, construc-
tion of which is called for by the four contracts herein-
above referred to, will be erected on the site located at
Douglaston hereinabove referred to, and the other three
incinerator plants will be erected and constructed on sites
duly acquired for such purpose by the City of New York
prior to October 1, 1931; two of which latter sites are
located in the Borough of The Bronx of the City of New
York, and the third site located in the Borough of Man-
hattan of the City of New York.
3. During the period commencing December 7, 1931,
being the date of the Decree herein, and ending March 7,
1.32, the amount of the garbage and ashes dumped at sea
was the following:
Cubie Yards
Month Dumpers Ashes Garbage Total
December 7 to 31,1931 113 145,645 49,073 194,718
January, 1932 ...... 138 167,519 652,182 219,701
February, 1932 ..... 138 167,722 59,316 227,038
March 1 to 7, 1932... 31 37,045 11,521 48,566
Det sdcces 420 617,931 172,092 690,023
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Dated New York, March 31, 1932.
WILiiAM ScHrogper, Jr.,
Chairman, Sanitary Commission
of the City of New York.
ArTuur J. W. HILty,
Corporation Counsel,
Solicitor for the Defendant,
The City of New York,
_ Municipal Building,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
hem
Supreme Court of the United States
Octonma Texm, 1931.
No. 13, Original.
Stats or New Juaaer,
against
Tue Crry or New Your,
To THe SuPpaems Cover or Tae Unrrep Sratzs:
Pursuant to the Decree of this Court in the-above ex
titled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The City
of New York, respectfully presents the following report to
this Honorable Coart:
1. The following is a statement of the progress made in
the matter of construction of incinerator plants for the final
disposition of garbage and rubbish in The City of New York
during the period from October 1, 1982 to March 31, 1933.
The statement under this heading in the last report, dated
September 30, 1982, carried the recital of facts down to a
point where the bids received for the construction of in-
cinerator planta were pending before the Board of Estimate
and Apportionment of The City of New York for their
approval or disapproval as to the proposed awards thereon.
At a meeting of the sald Boal of Estimate and Appor-
tionment held on November 18, 1982, a resolution was daly
edopted euthortsing the Renitary Commianlon of the Depart :
ment of Sanitation of The City of New York to award two
contracts for the erection and equipping complete (
plumbing and heating) of two Destructor Plants for the |
incineration of garbage and rubbish, each capable of destroy.
ing 750 tons of refuse in 24 hours, one each to be located ag
follows:
(A) At 215th to 216th Streets, 9th to 10th Avenues
in the Borough of Manhattan.
(B) At Zerega and Lafayette Avenues and Westches
ter Creek, in the Borough of The Bronx.
Pursuant to such approval so obtained from the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment, the Sanitary Commission at
a special meeting duly held at its office in the Borough of
Manhattan on November 23, 1932, adopted resolutions award-
ing the said two contracts to the Superior Incinerator
Company of Texas and The L. E. Myers Co., joint bidders,
the contract for the plant in the Borough of Manhattan ata
contract price of $696,395.00 and the contract for the plant
in the Borough of The Bronx at a contract price of
$713,140.00.
The contracts were executed by the Chairman of the Sani-
tary Commission, acting for The City, and by the Contractors
on November 23, 1932, and registered by the Comptroller of
The City of New York, in accordance with Charter require
menta, on December 23, 1932.
On March 22, 1933, the work of actual construction of
each of these planta was commenced at each of the sites.
2. During the period of six months commencing Septem-
ber 8, 1932, and ending March 7, 1933, the amount of garbage
and ashes dumped at sea was the following:
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Dated, New York, March 31, 1933.
of the City of New York.
Solicitor for the Defendant,
The City of New York,
Municipal Building,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
meats nore
Pandich Presa, tec. 22 Thames St. Hew Yorh UO & A
Supreme Court of the Anited states
No. 12, Onsernat-—Octonsr Tuam, 1933.
Sats or New Junseyr,
Plaintiff,
Tas Crry or New York,
Defendant.
To the Supreme Court of the United 8.\es:
Pursuant to the Decree of this Court in the above ~/
entitled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The. ;
City of New York, respectfully presents the following re-
port to this Honorable Court:
1. The following is a statement of the progress made
in the matter of construction of incinerator for the
final disposition of garbage and rubbish in the City of New
York during the period from March 22, 1933 to March
31, 1934. .
pet agi Pee a * f
> ¢ 7 ’
domed Sy renigd. GSR er
(A) Manhattan Incinerator.
On March 31, 1934, the work of constructing thid incin-
erator plant was 80 per cent. complete.
(B) Bronx Incinerator.
On March 31, 1934, the work of constructing this; incin-
erator plant was 70 per cent. complete.
2. Since the filing of the previous report by the above-
aad Sanneaet, Go Sees 2S eee eee
tities of garbage and ashes dumped at sea:
!
’
Ashes Garbage
(In Cubic Yards)
All of which is respectfully submitted.
Dated, New York, March 31, 1934.
Tuomas W. Hammon,
Deputy and Acting Commissioner
of Sanitation of The
City of New York.
Pauw. Wruepera,
Corporation Counsel,
Solicitor for the Defeggant,
The City of New York,
Municipal Building,
Borough of Manhattan,
City of New York.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.