Motion — New Jersey v. New York City

Supreme Court brief1935

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

@rate or New Jenser,

Plaintiff,

aqaumst

Tue OCrry or New Youx,

Defendant.

Nottoe.

To:

Hon. WuszsaM A. Severs,

Attorney General of the State of New Jeruey,

Hon. Duaws E. Movazp,

Assistant Attorney General of the State of

New Jersey,

Roticitors for Plaintiff.

Rirs:

Piense be advised that on Monday, May 27, 1929,

the annexed motion will be presented to the Court

and application made for the relief therein prayed.

Dated, New York, May 25, 19298.

Aaruus J. W. Bmax,

Corporation Counsel,

Belicitor for Defemdant

In Equity.

Motion ror Laave TO ANSWER AKD FoR KiWLARoR-

MENT OF TIME TO ANSWER.

Comes now the defendant, The City of New

York, by its Corporation Counsel and Solicitor and

shows as follows, to wit:

1. That pursuant to leave of this Court granted

on the 20th day of May, 1920, the State of New

Jersey has filed in this Court a bill of

against the defendant The City of New York, pray-

ing that this Court grant to the plaintiff the United

States’ writ of injunction perpetually restraining

he defendant from dumping garbage and other

matter into the Ocean or other waters of the United

States off the coast of New Jersey and for other

relief.

2. That the suit in equity of the State of New

Jersey so permitted, by this Court, to be com-

menced was docketed as number 21, Original, :

October Term— 1928, on the 22nd day of May, 1929.

8S. That this Court’s subpoena to answer the

aforesaid bill of complaint was issned therefrom

HE cet a ik

ne rH TE jel tli

— a4

il

as}; it HE

of Counsel.

43

it

J. Josmpn Lay,

i

fi? sai]

oer SOSSSrARSANNSSAnRASRRSEssers!2

1

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Ocrosmn Tram, 1930.

No. 18, Origimal.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Pleintiff,

os

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

To the Supreme Court of the United States:

In the above entitled cause this Honorable Court ap-

pointed me as Special Master by its order dated October

14, 1929, as follows:

‘‘And it is farther ordered that the Honorable Edward

K. Campbell be and he is hereby appointed Special Master

in this cause with power to summon witnesses, issue sub-

poenas and to take such testimony as may be introduced

and such as he may desire to call. The master is directed

to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and to sub-

mit the same to this Court with all convenient speed, to-

gether with his recommendations for a decree. The find-

ings, conclusions and recommendations of the master shall

be subject to consideration, revision or approval by the

Court.’”’

The parties to the suit, by their respective counsel, ap-

peared before me in Washington, in compliance with my

request, in November, 1929, when a time was fixed for the

taking of proof. Public hearings began at Asbury Park,

New Jersey, on December 11, 1929, continuing for three

#48] $42 Savyqase pigy t23g:

a + a 1h a

3 dy Hf rs | Gr tay 3

Hal eeu Weds 7;

pif a$bis LH + ais i

Be iri! ee |

ud te Hate Bue

FUERTE LS

Hie PE: badlail iii Jitte

Special Master.

Baty

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

> 7 al o's te aaeeg Ja

ites

: iat HE : ut

+ ates

‘] At ) ie ny

parties Prt

+ fis ATC

gan Ff BSs stazae Hi

allies tela 7

mb—vtee-t

“.

i

i

F

i

E

:

:

:

z

F

TER

“1

EF

t

FF

H

;

447

i

aiiih

th

Li

+r

1 5

lin

said shore

ing and for pleasure boating, for fishing and other

purposes, and that many millions of dollars have been in-

vested within the beach section in hotels, bathing pavilions,

piers for landing and for pleasure, boardwalks, boulevards

and facilities for pleasure and profit, and that several thon-

sands of people are constantly employed to maintain and

operate the same.

F

(6) That the growth, prosperity and substantial prop

erty values of the seashore communities in question are

the result of enterprises dependent upon the population and

the suitability of said waters, beaches and shore front fa-

zens who have made investments in the fishing business of

large sums of money; that the production of these fish

pounds in one year amounts to approximately 20,000,000

pounds of fish, having a value of nearly a millicn dollars,

and that the industry gives employment to approximately

500 men.

(8) It is alleged that the defendant, with a population

exceeding 6,000,000 of people and increasing annually, dis-

poses of garbage and other refuse by transporting the same

in barges towed ont and dumped into the navigable waters

of the United States off the complainant's coast

and

tide upon the said beaches and cast thereon by

in heeps and windrows and under or about the piers,

wharves, adjacent boulevards and private property, where

it decays and pollutes the sea and land unless and until

(9) It is farther averred that the acts complained of

(a) Take the property of complainant and ite citizens

without due process of law im violation of Article XIV,

Section 1 of the Constitution;

to its sovereign rights as a member of the Union, and,

este of the plaintiff and its citizens.

The answer of the City of New York, except in its ad-

mission of the averments as to its own population, was

substantially a general denial of the allegations of the

Bill

The answer denies many of the averments of the bill,

and not admitting others sets forth ‘‘for a firet defense’’:

8

(2) And further answering and ‘‘for a second defense’’

;

4

:

J

REeeas

HAL E

TT ES

alu if

Thee

ip /

fipele i

wES EERE g

ctl

sie Feeeee

of each of those cities; and that all of the garbage, refuse

and sewage and offensive matter is the same kind and char-

acter as that dumped by the City of New York at points

eight to twenty miles southeast of Scotland Lightship and

from ten to twenty-tws miles from New Jersey shores.

That ‘‘such garbage, refuse, sewage and other offensive

matter discharged as aforesaid by private contractors, by

the United States Navy Yard authorities and by said

’ Jersey cities into the water of the Atlantic ocean

quantities would float under the influence of

wind into the water and on to the beaches of

New Jersey and its municipalities claimed to be polluted in

this action’’ and ‘‘it is impossible to determine whether

garbage or offensive materials in substantial quantity

dumped by the City of New York is deposited in the waters

of New Jersey and on ite beaches or in greater quantities

than that deposited in the sea by other agencies than the

City of New York; and that if any injuries or damages are

suffered by New Jersey or its citizens or to their health,

safety or property it is not chargeable to the acte of the

defendant ; and

(3) ‘*For a third defense the defendant alleges that

the bill of complaint does not state facts sufficient to con-

approved April 16, 1929, by direction of the Governor of

the State.

The defendant is the City of New York, a domestic mu-

nicipal corporation, created by and existing under the laws

of the State of New York.

The case presents a justiciable controversy over which

this Court has jurisdiction. (Art. III, Sec. 2, Const. of the

U. 8.) (Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U. 8.

230; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. 8. 208; 200 U. S. 496.

New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. 8. 296; Wisconsin v. Mli-

nots, 278 U. 8. 367, 418).

FINDINGS OF FACT.

The facts deemed to be established by the evidence and

which may be considered material to the contentions of the

bats i

ulti

slit

ieee

Hh i

Terie

ma

(1) Leeality.

The State of New Jersey on its easterly side borders on

the Atlantic Ocean for a distance of about one hundred

miles. A reduced copy of a map in evidence, showing the

geographical location, is made an exhibit to the bill.

(2) Area Affected.

(a) The part of the State affected more directly by the

matters complained of is that portion of the ocean front-

age extending from a point at or near Atlantic Highlands

southward to Beach Haven, a distance of approximately

fifty milee and inward from the shore at various distances.

Within this fifty miles of ocean frontage there are twenty-

nine separate municipalities of the State.

(b) The State of New Jersey, as the proprietary owner

of the seashore, has at different times conveyed to these

several municipalities, and in some instances by lease or

otherwise, to individuals designated, portions of the front-

age under water. No material changes have occurred since

1928 and in that year the ownership of the frontage under

water along the said fifty miles of coast line was as follows:

The State owns approximately 285,000 lineal feet be

i

if

HY

i

i}

;

sf

lt

Ht

Hitt

:

|

:

i

:

!

P

|

|

F

Lf

FE

i

if

(3) Sameer Resorts.

These municipalities are seashore resorts, inhabited and

maintained as such for the benefit of residents and visitors.

Many thousands of visitors frequent them during the sum-

A large number of photographs were introduced and

filed as exhibits, showing the crowded condition of beaches

by péople assembled there to take part in or witness the

bathing and enjoy the beaches and ocean.

There are many private homes in the several towns and

boroughs. In many of these the owners reside during the

summer and commute to their places of business in New

York, Philadelphia or some place in New Jersey.

(5) Fishing.

The statutes of New Jersey provide for a license

Board of Fish and Game Commissioners

500 persons.

The fish pound nets are extended fron a point about s

quarter of mile from shore outward for a distance of ap-

proximately 1500 feet, in water from twenty to thirty-five

feet deep, are supported by poles driven in the bottom, the

pounds or traps being at the outer end. When fish feed-

ing along the coast come in contact with the net, which

serves as @ wier, they turn toward deeper water, following

the net and the contraption is such that the fish are thus

led into the trap from which they cannot extricate them-

selves and from which they are taken.

More than one hundred of these fish pounds are located

at divers places off the coast of plaintiff and large quanti-

ties of fish are taken annually and sold from them. The

value of the fish pounds in 1928 was approximately $700,000.

The fish caught amounted to approximately 25,000,000

pounds and sold for epproximately $950,000. Less fish

were taken in 1928 than in 1924, 1925 or 1926, but more in

1928 than in 1927.

(b) Fishing as a sport is engaged in by many persons

using boats or the piers or the shore from which to cast

their lines and furnishes an attractive feature of these

resorts. .

ity HHH

vl tt

A

3

Intermixed with the foregoing is frequently found

Pieces of wood ; crates and parts of crates; bundles

Large numbers of electric light bulbs and pieces

of paper; broken furniture; rags, cans and rubbish.

thereof ; giase bottles, whole or broken.

Dead dogs, dead cats and dead fowls.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

it

|

he

:

i

£

if!

if]

442

Hip

lay

it if: a HEHE ay gia dey

Hit F sal Hat

LSE

HE

“1

|

3. sittin

HIRATA

Hit a ta

iF

the boardwalks and into the street beyond. Frequently

the depth of the mass exceeds one foot.

When the garbage and refuse are cast upon the beaches

they mus: be speedly removed, especially in summer. The

offensive odors and when subjected to the sun’s rays in-

conglomeration of things spoken of and referred to give off

16

crease in offensiveness and foul smelling that reach away

from the shore to the streets and into the homes of the

people. Swarms of flies appear on the mass and feed there.

The offensive odors from these deposits cause annoyance

and discomfort and nausea. They are unsightly on the

beaches. Large proportions of the animal and vegetable

matter forming a part of the conglomeration and being in

the putrid or decaying condition must be disposed of hur-

riedly and are buried. Other parts are hauled away. At

times it requires fifty or more truck loads to remove one

deposit from a single beach. The grease-like matter is re-

moved by rakes. The deposits of garbage and refuse

pollute the beaches and produce unhealthful conditions,

interfering with and frequently preventing the comfort-

able and enjoyable use of the beaches and the sea. It is

dangerous to leave children unattended on the beach while

the deposits are there because of things they may pick up;

some of the things found being unmentionable. Broken

giass and nails in pieces of wood have been the cause of

severe wounds to persons on the beach or in bathing. The

appearance and condition ef the conglomeration is aptly

described by witnesses as ‘‘nasty’’ and ‘‘filthy’’. It is a

menace to health and tends to injure business and property

values. It injures rental values. They have been made the

subject of many complaints as hereafter stated.

During June, July and August, 1929, there were in

Asbury Park a considerable increase over the preceding

year of cases of external otitis which is a swelling or infla-

mation of the ear canal and of cases of infection of the mid-

die ear, requiring the drum to be opened, and of sinus af-

fected cases, resulting from bathing in the ocean.

Pure sea water has a high chlorine content and is quite

antiseptic. Infection is contrary to the natural conditions

of sea water. One or.more of the Coast Guard incurred

a skin infection from the water which gave them consider-

able trouble.

17

(8) Removal and Expense.

Each deposit of garbage and refuse imposes upon

municipalities affected the expense incident to its rem

Men are regularly employed to perform that daty.

cost of cleaning the beaches following such deposits at

head amounted, in 1929, to $3,000; at Belmar,

Bradley Beach, for 1928 and 1929, it exceeded

Deal, from $1,000 to $1,500 per year; at Allenhurst,

per year; at Qoeean Grove an average of

$275 in four years; at Seaside Park, $600 per

side Heights, $500 per year; at Spring

various sume at the other places, some in excess of

stated.

(9) Water and Fish Nets.

its undertow can carry these things away. The objection-

able materials can be seen in the water and furnish the

basis for many complaints by visiters and others. Usu-

ally the sea clears along the shore in a few days and at

times, in a day after, the deposit on the beach.

When the garbage or refuse is cast upon the beaches it

frequently occurs that fish pound nets in the vicinity of

such beaches are torn by garbage or refuse in the water

thrown against them, and in addition to the damage so

resulting they become fouled and difficult to handle. The

repair of them from the effects of the garbage and refuse

costs many thousands of dollars, which must be borne by

the owners. The presence of garbage and refuse in

water in the vicinity of the nets injuriously affect the busi-

ness of fishing by such neta.

18

(10) Occur, When.

The deposits of garbage and refuse on the beaches occur

when the winds are from the east or northeast. A storm

or severe blow from either of these directions does and

will bring the garbage, and a wind of from twenty to thirty

miles an hour does also bring it to and upon the shore;

as also does an east or northeast wind of two or three days

duration. Sometimes the garbage and refuse are brought

in by southeast winds. The heavier deposits occur on some

of the beaches four or five times a season, and occur fre-

quently throughout the year, varying in number with the

different beaches.

There is no conflict in the testimony as to the foregoing

general statement. The sections thereof, numbered re-

spectively, (1) to (10), both inclusive, are made a part of

my findings of fact.

(11) Dumping.

Nor is there any dispute as to the fact of the disposal by

the City of New York of garbage, street sweeping and rub-

bish by dumping the same at sea. The defendant admits

it does now and has for years since the fall of 1918, dumped

these things in the ocean. It produced a statement from

its records showing that it has dumped into the ocean

during the last six years an average of more than a million

and a third cubic yards per year; that the last year, 1929,

was above that average and exceeded the amount dumped

im either of the three preceding years. Reduced to tons,

the disposal by dumping in the ocean during 1929 was ap-

proximately 493,000 tons. In the winter months there are

less materials dumped than in the summer months. In

February 1929 there were 52,000 cubic yards dumped, and

in June of that year 192,000 cubic yards. These dumpings

are made every day except when the weather conditions

prevent. The foregoing section numbered (11), title

**Dumping’’ is made a part of my findings of fact.

19

(To avoid repetition of statement I also make a part of

numbered, respectively, from 12 to 17 inclusive.)

(12) History of Dumping.

For about twenty years prior to 1918, the City of New

York disposed of its garbage and street sweepings by what

is known as the ‘‘reduction system’’ and except for a brief

period dnring 1906 did not dispose of these

Some necessary repairs or alterations in

been destroyed by fire, occurring

operating the one at Staten Island having failed, the ci

was confronted with the situation that it

for the disposal of its garbage and

applied to the Supervisor of the Harbor of New York

permission to dispose of these materials

Supervisor of the Harbor is an officer provided for by the

Act of Congress of June 29, 1888 (25 Stat. 209), entitled an

**Act to prevent obstructive and injurious deposits within

the Harbor and adjacent waters of New York by dumping

or otherwise and to punish and prevent such offenses’.

This Act and some amendments thereto are made Sec. 441

et seq. of the U. 8S. Code, 44 Stat. 1072.

Under date of August 8, 1918, Dr. R. S. Copeland, then

Health Commissioner of New York, addressed a communi-

cation to the Supervisor of the Harbor stating the very

serious situation confronting the city because of garbage

and said:

**The only present method we have of getting rid of

garbage is to dump it atsea. . . . In order to pro-

twelve mile area in the early spring and late

and

of the scows in the service in the heavy seas usually pre-

vailing during such seasons of the year and the time con-

twelve and a half and twenty-two miles, respectively from

the shore of New Jersey.

The practice of dumping the materials at sea, begun as

an emergency, has continued, but ita character as an emer-

two or three scows to the area of disposal. Accompanying

each of the tug boats is « ‘‘dumping inspector’’ from the

office of the Supervisor of the Harbor whose duty it is to

see that the dumping is done within the prescribed areas.

to

7 HEE 2] ; :

rt ie

if 4 rElE th

j frHE- )

il Ha

32432 pea taas

tarieiiis:

ide HTB

3

ij

|

,&

fa ft

ij

4

ie

|

|

et

He ie HH ngste

+ HEH HIF a?

et HIE Hy dee

in their annual messages.

It has been the subject of joint resolutions by the legisla-

ture in 1927 and 1928 and 1929.

The City of New York, through its Mayor and other re-

sponsible agencies, has been informed of these beach con-

ditions and their injurious effect together with the desire

iy

re

1

ject

of the people of New Jersey that they cease, and this in-

formation has been repeatedly given said city.

(14) Supervisor's Reports.

She Route of Ge Roatan 0 he ee San

York, included in the annual report of the Chief of Engi-

neers for the years 1918 to 1929, inclusive, mention

that the defendant’s garbage is

The report for 1918 states that

In 1919 the report stated that ‘‘the practice of

of garbage at sea has continued.” In 1920 the report

states: ‘‘About two years ago at the request of the New

York City Commissioner of Street Cleaning and the

solicitation of the Commissioner of Health the Supervisor

authorized the disposal of city garbage at sea as a tem-

porary measure to continue for two or three months only.

The practice still continues and there is no prospect of an

immediate change.’’ The substance of this statement ap-

pears in the reports for the subsequent years.

In a letter dated September 10, 1925, from the Secretary

of War, in response to one from the Governor of New

Jersey complaining of garbage conditions on the shores of

the State, the Secretary disclaimed that any authority to

dump garbage emanated from his office but stated that per-

have been put in aie

float on the surface or are held in suspension by

The facts confirm the statement made by a Commission

pointed by the Mayor of New York in June, 1907, hersto-

:

rt

E

fi

f

i

i more than thirty

ifferent trips to the dumping places, and on at

E

:

teen of them were close by when the scows dumped their

contents, and they observed the same.

The defendant sent to the dumping areas on three occa

sions in February and March, 1930, persons to examine and

report upon conditions. The Supervisor of the Harbor sent

an agent to these areas tc investigate the floating garbage

in February, March and April of 1929, and this agent made

six trips. They all concur in the general conclusion, and [

find it to be a fact that the mass spreads out on the surface

of the water, gradually breaking up into smaller

moving for indefinite periods with the

materials being on the surface and some

The Supervisor's agent, instructed

Hl:

went about fourteen miles in twelve hours, the

toward the Narrows; on another occasion the -}

westward under a variable east wind from

five miles, went seventeen miles in 24 hours, and

six miles off the New Jersey shore when he left.

Es

EE

i

water, which were introduced in evidence. A number of

- the fishermen identified conditions which they had wit-

nessed as being similar to those shown by some of these

exhibits. The parties sent out as stated by plaintiff cast

into the mass on several occasions a large number of sealed

bottles containing self-addressed and stamped cards, with

the request that any finder return them by mail. About

twenty-five per cent of these cards came back to the parties

by mail from persons along the New Jersey shore and Long

Island shore, and some from farther north.

During fourteen times these persons went out in May,

June and July of 1929, they made a list of things seen in

the water after the scows were dumped. This list contains

27

the identical kinds of materials that are heretofore stated

to constitute the deposits on shore: fruite and fruit skins;

vegetables, electric light bulbs, papers and rags, wooden

boxes, crating, pasteboard boxes, dead animals and many

other things. The mass falling from the scows forma pilea

a foot clear of water. Gradually displacement takes place,

and the heavier stuffs, finding their way through the float-

ing mass, sink.

The odors arising from the mass are offensive and nauee-

ating. The Supervisor of the Harbor of New York, in his

report to the Chief of Engineers in 1918, said: ‘‘Garbage

deposited at sea, no matter what the distance from shore,

is apt to wash up on the beaches.’’ In each of his subse-

quent reports it is s*id in substance: ‘‘ Experience indi-

cates that garbage at sea at no matter what distance is

liable to wash up on the beaches.’’

I find that large parts of these floating and submerged

areas of garbage and refuse, dumped by the defendant, are

driven and carried by winds and water to a+ 4 upon the

shores o7 the plaintiff, and constitute the objectio...ble ma-

terials thereon and in the adjacent water, hereinbefore

described, and that the winds in such cases come from the

east or the northeast, and sometimes from the southeast,

as has been heretofore found.

(17) Incinerators.

As hereimbefore stated, the method of garbage disposal

in use by defendant prior to October, 1918, was what was

known as the ‘‘Reduction System’’, by which the by-prod-

ucts were conserved. It began the disposal of garbage and

refuse at sea in October, 1918 and has continued the same.

In the meantime, however, it has built a number of incin-

erators as will later appear.

In 1920, a Committee was appointed by the Mayor of

New York to report upon the subject of ‘‘Collection and

Disposal of City Waste.’’ This committee was composed

of the heads of departments and officials, including the

animals, aside from ‘‘large animals"’ amounted in 1920 to

217,600 small animals, such as sheep, calves, hogs, cats and

As to the method of disposal of garbage they reported:

**The greatest objection to the present system of disposing

of waste materials is in connection with the method now

Aside, however, from the question of cost it seems unde-

sirable to dump garbage at sea as it is being done at pres-

ent. It is known that the Federal authorities quietly re-

sent, if they do not openly object to it, and there is always

the possibility of objections from other communities which

have in the past claimed that they have been injured by

the practice. When these objections become sufficiently

strong it may be that New York will find itself so unpre-

pared as to be unable to quickly introduse a more satis-

factory form of disposal.’’

The Committee made no final recommendation for the

disposition of garbage, as to the method of incineration or

reduction, pending further investigation.

wet « ~~ + ew oF

i

Z

FEE

ut

fs

Hb

tte

through the action of current and wind.

beaches creates a nuisance that the public should

asked to tolerate.’’

Mr. Samuel A. Greeley, an hydraulic and sanitary engi

neer of recognized experience and ability, with practical

knowledge of the methods of the disposal of garbage, con-

demned the method of disposing of garbage and refuse at

sea for very much the same reasons given by the Commit-

tee above mentioned in their report of 1921. He gave as

his opinion that either incineration or the ‘‘ Reduction

System’’ is good.

Considerable portions of its garbage and refuse collected

by the defendant has been and is being disposed of by

incinerators constructed by the defendant. The first of

these was put in operation in 1924, some five years after

the dumping at sea began. In December, 1929, the de-

fandant had in operation three incinerators in the Borough

of Manhattan, none in the Bronx, nine in Queens, five in

Brooklyn and three in Richmond.

The Department of Sanitation in New York City is a

newly created one under the law and went into effect on

December 1, 1929. In took over the jurisdiction formerly

exercised by the Department of Street cleaning and some

other agencies of the City. On December 23, 1929, the new

Department ef Sanitation presented to the Mayor of the

City a program for increasing the number of incinerators

;

in the five boroughs as follews: Five 500-ton plants in

Manhattan ; four 500-ton plants in the Bronx; five 500-ton

plants in Queens and five 500-ton plants in Brooklyn, and

the reconstruction of two plants in Richmond.

The City now has the power of condemnation, which it

did not have prior to 1929. It does not appear what if any

action has been taken by the Mayor or city authorities

upon the program presented by the new Department of

Sanitation.

The evidence does not show the cause of the apparent

delay by the defendant in adopting and putting into opera-

tion the incinerating system. It was in 1924, some five

years after the defendant began dumping at sea that its

first incinerator was put into operation, and during the

next succeeding five years others were built. Those con-

structed and in use fall far short of taking care of the

garbage and refuse situation. A reason offered for the

delay is that the City did not have the power of condemna-

tion and could not override objections in localities to the

operation of incineraters therein. This power was ac

quired in 1929 and there is no evideuce explaining why it

was not acquired sooner.

I conclude that the method of disposing ¢¢ pei vag oad

refuse by dumping the same at sea is not an proved o or a

good system and that disposition of such material by incin-

eration or the ‘‘ Reduction system” is a proper way to dis-

pose of the same. I further conclude that the delay of de-

fendant in adopting a proper method of disposal has been

unreasonably long.

SOME ISSUES OF FACT. )

The defendant contends, however, that the garbage and

refuse on the beaches result from the disposals, first by

steamships, and second, by scows of private contractors

and by some others to be named.

OR eet are”

(1) Steamships: It ia to be observed that the lanes for

European ard foreign vessels to and from New York pase

-to the north and east of the designated dumping areas;

that is to say, these dumping areas are between the lanes

and the shores.

(a) There is evidence that some coastwise and other

vessels discharge garbage or refuse into the ocean. Ves-

sels out of New York go southward or come from southern

ports to New York, passing the New Jersey coast at a dis-

tance of from three to eight miles and their general routes

lie between the dumping places of the City and the shores.

The evidence as to the number of such vessels is that

produced by the defendant to the effect that in December,

1928 and January of 1929 there were 1227 vessels entering

the Port of New York from southern ports, and during

July and August of 1929 the number was 1892. That the

number clearing from New York for southern ports in

December, 1928 and January, 1929, was 1173; and in July

and August, 1929 was 1192. Whether freight or passenger

vessels, or the relative number of each does not appear, bat

if it be assumed that the vessels in and out of New York

for the four months mentioned represent a fair average

of the numl er for each month of the year and that the aver-

age per day is the same for the different years the result

would show that approximately thirty entered from south-

ern ports and twenty departed from New York for southern

ports each day, the difference in number in those coming

in and those going out being accounted for by the fact that

some entering New York from southern ports clear there-

from for other than southern ports.

A witness introduced by the defendant, being ene of

the three sent out by the defendant to examine the condi-

tions at the dumping places, and a pilot of experience,

made an estimate to the effect that there were twenty ves-

sels a day going and coming from southern ports to New

York.

The direction of the vessels, whether going to or clear-

ing from New York affects the amount and kind of material

ings from the cargo, the cleanings from the ships, includ-

ing dunnage and such crates and boxes as may have ac

eumulated and other materials are piled upon the deck to-

gether with garbage preparatory to casting the same over-

board after the vessels have gotten under way. There is

evidence that some of the vessels and a majority of the

lines operating out of New York southward do not aceumn-

late garbage or other refuse matter but make arrange-

ments for its disposal while in port. Crews of some ves-

sels are maintained on board and crews of others are not

maintained while in port. There is evidence that some

vessels southbound begin the disposition of their accuma-

lated garbage, refuse and rubbish soon after leaving the

point southwest of Scotland Light and continue to dis

charge as they proceed. There is an estimated amount by

two or three witnesses for the defendant, being the same

witnesses who went out to make the investigation at the

dumping areas for the defendant, that forty to fifty tons

are discharged from some of these vessels leaving New

York. The amount of the garbage that is intermixed with

‘the other materials is not stated or estimated.

(ec) In 1924 owing to complaints to his office of garbage

reaching the shore, the Supervisor of the Harbor sent re-

33

quests to all shipping companies that their vessels refrain

from discharging garbage within twenty-five miles of Am-

brose Lightship, and received from many of them assur-

ance of their cooperation.

(d) There is evidence by one of the witnesses already

mentioned for the defendant that vessels, sometimes as

many as fifty, coming to New York, are held by fog or heavy

seas at anchor off the ligh*ship for a day or two, and while

there throw overboard their accumulated garbage and

refuse material.

There is testimony by a special agent of the defendant's

department of sanitation, giving the location of various

docks of seows of private contractors im the borough of

Manhattan, and that on several occasions in March, 1930,

he visited some of these dumps and saw wagons and trucks

dumping into these scows a variety of materials; and two

other witnesses testified to similar conditions.

. There is no evidence that any garbage or refuse from

these places is dumped at sea. There is no evidence that

scows receiving the materials mentioned by the three wit-

nesses in March, 1930, dumped the same at sea, or where

they disposed of it.

On the other hand there is testimony from Officers of

ships operating along the coast that a few bushels of gar-

bage is cast overboard from vessels coming out of New

York and largely taken up by gulls; and some members of

the Coast Guard testified that they have seen ships cast off

garbage in small quantities, these expressing the opinion

that the quantities are too small to account for the areas

floating or in suspension in the water.

(e) There is evidence that a foreign steamship was seen

to discharge garbage on an occasion in or near the watets

of New York Harbor, and a photograph of the vessel on

that oceasion was made an exhibit.

(f) There is evidence that a witness had taken on his

vessel a cargo of condémned onions and discharged the

same at sea twenty-five miles southeast of Scotland Light-

ship.

(f) There is evidence that permits had been issued by

the Supervisor of the Harbor to five different concerns to

dump mud off shore at pointe designated as three mile

limit southeast of Scotland Lightship, and to three others

to dump ‘‘cellar dirt’’ at the four mile limit; and to sev-

eral to dump ‘‘cellar dirt intermixed with rock’’ at the six

mile limit. These concerns dumped the materials men-

tioned at the various places. Some other materials are

permitted to be dumped at the eight mile limit.

(h) From time to time and infrequently cargoes of food.

stuffs, vegetables and fruits, condemned by the Board of

Health authorities, are disposed of at sea by outbound

vessels under permits, the amounts being relatively small.

Such deposits are beyond the area used by the defendant.

A system of patrol boats and of inspection is maintained by

the Supervisor of the Harbor to prevent depositing mate-

rials at other than the stated areas.

(i) Seows from the Brooklyn Navy Yard dump mate.

rials at the dumping areas used by the defendant, their

contents being generally rubbish and refuse with a small

amount of garbage.

(g) Another souree alleged by the defendant in its

amended answer ‘‘for a Second defense’’ is that ineuffi-

ciently treated and unsanitary sewage from the City of

Long Branch and of Asbury Park has been for a number

of years discharged into the ocean at short distances from

each of these cities. :

As to the Long Branch sewer, the evidenee consists of a

plan of the sewage system and some evidente that com-

plaints were at one time made to the Department of Health

which investigated the same; and that the matters were

satisfactorily adjusted.

As to Asbury Park sewage, there is evidence that in

March, 1930, witnesses for the defendant made an exami-

nation of that system and at the outlet of the sewer about

LIL OR LE AD

sludge tank of its load’’, and ha

the period of this operation materials may go into the out-

let that cannot go there when the valve is closed; that this

kind of cleaning process was in operation on March 19,

1930, the date of said visits by said witnesses.

Defendant also introduced a bill of t exhibited

by the Department of Health of New J against As-

bury Park in Chancery in New Jersey, praying an injunc-

tion restraining that city from discharging into the ocean

inadequately treated sewage from the ‘‘municipal sewage

treatment works"’, which discharge, it is alleged, is due to

insufficient capacity and design of said works. These

works were constructed in 1909. This bill was filed in the ,

summer of 1990, under a proceeding authorized by the

statutes of New Jersey.

I have set forth in perLaps unnecessary detail some of

the evidence offered by the defendant and have done so

(1) to show the latitude extended in adducing proof when

much of it under the gener.! denials of the original answer

would in strictness be inadmissible. It was generally

heard without objection. And (2) to show something of

the indefiniteness of the testimony itself.

bage and refuse dumped into scows of private contractors

in March, 1930, has smal] probative force towards estab-

lishing what occurred in 1929 and prior years.

There is proof that some vessels discharge garbege and

refuse and that scows with permits to dump cellar dirt

frequently have with it pieces of wood in more or less quan-

tities, besides other proof referred to.

Giving to the evidence due consideration, I think it should

be concluded that whatever garbage and refuse reaches the

plaintiff’s shores from coastwise and other vessels und

other causes, and other dumpings than those of the -de-

fendant, are negligible in comparison with that constantly

being dumped by the defendant, and frequently carried by

wands and wares Crom Ge Camping pines to ane apes

plaintiff’s shores, a1 hereinbefore stated. .

SOME QUESTIONS OF LAW.

Some questions of law arising between the parties are

as follows:

1. The plaintiff's contention that defendant dutpe its

garbage in water over soi] belonging to plaintiff, that is

to say, in the waters of its marginal sea.

2. Effect of permits issued by the Supervisor of the

Harbor of New York to defendant.

The question of nuisance.

Prescription.

Degree of proof.

Jurisdiction.

a w

1. Trespass.

The plaintiff contends that the dumping of garbage by

defendant is upon its property and therefore constitates

trespass.

As the farthest place of the dumping is more than twenty

miles from the New Jersey shore, the claim that the ‘‘mar-

ginal sea”’ of the State extends to and beyond that point

is at least interesting. It is, of course, true that within

its territorial limits property rights are to be measured

by the rules and decisions of the courts of the State, and

that these will be followed by this Court (St. Anthony Falls

Co. v. Board, 168 U. 8. 349, 362; Baum v. Keohm, 94 U. 8.

324, 338; Rundell v. D. d R. Canal, 20 Howard 80 and 93).

But the plaintiff insists that the limit of its marginal sea

is not to be measured from the low water line on ite shore

but from a line drawn between two headlands projecting

the one at Montauk Point, New York, and the other at

Cape May, New Jersey, and seeks to apply the rule of the

common law for determining whether the head or arm of

the sea was within the jurisdiction of a given county or

outside of it and therefore under the jurisdiction of the

sovereign alone.

This method for determining the county’s jurisdiction

was that the distance between the terrae fauces should be

no greater than to render it possible for a person to dis-

cern with the naked eye what was being done on the op-

posite shore. Plaintiff argues that im this country ‘‘we

thus determine the jurisdiction of states rather than of

counties’’.

This Court said in Manchester v. Massachusetts (139

U. S. 240, 263), that ‘‘there is no indication that the eus-

tomary law of England in regard to the boundaries of

counties was adopted by the Constitution of the United

States as a means of determining jurisdiction of states.’’

The Court was there considering a contention that the

jurisdiction of the State as between it and the United

States should be confined to the border of the courties and

that the counties should be defined according to the custo-

mary English usage, by the application of the rule as to

headlands. This Court said (page 264): ‘‘The extent of

the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts over the sea

wee,

adjacent to its coasts is that of an independent nation and

except in so far as any right of control over this

has been granted to the United States this control remains

with the state."’

In Martin v. Waddell (16 Pet. 307, 410), language from

which is applicable to New Jersey, this Court said: ‘“‘For

when the Revolution took place the people of each state

became themselves sovereign and in that character hold

the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the

shores to them for their own common use, subject only to

the right since surrendered by the Constitution to the gen-

eral Government."’ To the same effect see [limois Central

Railroad Company +. Illinois (146 U. 8. 387).

At the time the plaintiff became a state, succeeding to

the rights of English sovereign, the common law rule was

that the territorial limit extended ‘‘only to such distance

as is capable of command from the shore of the range of

a cannon, which for the purposes of certainty is regarded

as one marine league, although for the purposes of self-

protection in times of war and for the prevention of fraud

upon its revenues each nation is accustomed to exercise

authority beyond this limit. (Gould on Waters, 3; Angell

on Tidewaters, 2.)

In Manchester v. Massachusetts, supra, this Court said

(p. 258): “*We think it must be regarded as established

that as between nations the minimam limit of territorial

jurisdiction of a nation over tide water is a marine league

from its coast; that bays wholly within its territory, not

exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth are

without this limit, and that included in this territorial juris-

diction is the right of control over fisheries. . . . The

open sea within this limit is, of course, subject to common

law rights of navigation ana the government for the pur-

pose of self-protection in times of war or for the protec-

tion from fraad on its revenues, exercises authority beyond

this limit.’’

ject to its jurisdiction includes the land area

dominion and control, the porta, harbors, bays and other

He

Hie

i

if

eral Government of power conferred by the States does

not operate to increase the territorial limits of a State. The

treaty making power and that of providing for the common

defense, as well as the power applicable to commerce and

navigation admit of the assertion of claims by the United

States no longer open to the several States. (United

States v. Rauscher, 119 U. 8. 407, 418; Gibbons v. Ogden,

9 Wheat. 1; Maicrano v. Baltimore Road, 213 U. 8. 268,

272.)

As a practical expression by the Federal Government!

on this question there may be mentioned the comparatively

recent treaty with Great Britain relative to infractions of

the Prohibition Laws and fixing a limit, sometimes called

the ‘Twelve Mile Limit"’, Article I of which provides:

“The High Contracting Parties declare that it is

;

|

and measured from law water mark constitutes the

proper limit of territorial waters’. (See Ford v

United States, 273 U. 8. 593, 607.)

The State of New Jersey succeeded to rights of the

English crown. (See Martin v. Waddell, aupra, cating

Arnold v. Munday, 6 N. J. L. 1).

In its first constitution, adopted July 2, 1776, Art. ¥ XII,

it is provided: ‘‘That the common law of England as well

as so much of the statute laws as have been heretofore

practiced in this colony shall still remain in force until

they shall be altered by future law of the legislature’’.

(1 Comp. Stat. XXXII).

And in its present constitution, it is provided that the

common law and statute law “‘now in force’’ and not repug-

nant to the constitution shall remain in force until altered

or repealed. (I Comp. Stat. XLVII).

The Statute of New Jersey defining the boundary of

counties provides (109 Sec. I), the ‘‘territorial limits of

each county of this State fronting upon the sea coast be

and the seme are hereby extended to a line parallel with

the ocean shore line of said counties and extend easterly

three nautical miles therefrom and the division lines be-

tween said counties as they now exist be and the same

hereby are extended from the several points where they

now reach the sea in course due east nntil they severally

reach said outer line of said counties as hereby estab

lished.”’ (2 Comp. Stat., p. 1703, Public Laws of 1906, p.

542).

Reference has already been made to the Act requiring

licenses for pound net fishing. Another Act (2 Comp.

Stat, See. 123, p. 252) makes it unlawful for any person

to take with ‘‘purse or shirred nets’’ certain fish in any

county within the jurisdiction of this State, including a

county or. the Atlantic ocean within three nautical miles of

the coast line.’’

In Gough v. Bell (22 N. J. L. 411, 455), it is said: ‘This

title, which by the common law of Encland is vested in the

King, upon the Revolutidn became vested in the people of

41

the State. . . In this State the rule of the common law

as to the limit of its rights remains unaltered.’’

I think the established rule of the common law should be

accepted in determining the territorial limits of New Jersey

in the soil under water and that its claim that the dumping

of garbage is upon its property is not sustained.

As before stated, large areas of garbage and refuse

floating upon or held in suspension by the water, which

have been dumped by defendant's scows, are driven and

carried by wind and water to and upon the shores of plain-

tiff and other portions or areas thereof are held for indefi-

nite periods in the waters above soil owned by plaintiff

and do great injury to fishing and bathing in such waters.

2. Permits.

In its amended answer the defendant alleges ‘‘for a first

defense’’ that it has, for many years last past dumped

the garbage and some refuse collected by it in the Atlantic

ocean, under the supervision of the Supervisor of the Har-

bor of New York and in accordance with and only after the

issuance of permits by said Supervisor under the authority

conferred on him by the Act of June 29, 1888’’ (29 Stat.

* 209, as amended; Sees. 441, 443, 449 and 451 U. 8. Code)

‘‘at points eight, twelve and twenty miles southeast of Scot-

land Light and about ten, twelve and a half and twenty-two

miles distant, respectively, from the New Jersey shore

(being clearly in excess of one marine league from said

shore) and not within the navigable waters of said State of

New Jersey or of the United States’’ and adds that ‘‘ such

dumping occurring at these points this Court has no au-

thority to enjoin said City . . . from said dumping

of garbage and refuse’’.

The plaintiff insists that there is no evidence of any

permits.

It is a fact that no written perm't was introduced in evid-

ence but this ‘s not to say that there is no evidence of

permits.

PR owes ee 0.42% for Rn el NE SO ORS

42

A witness introduced by defendant and afterwards by

the plaintiff in rebuttal was Captain Anderson, detailed

under the provisions of the Act of June 29, 1888, to per-

form the duties of Supervisor of the Harbor of New York.

Captain Anderson, having made a general statement rela-

tive to the duties of his office under the Act was asked:

“‘Q. Permits have been issued by your office to the

city of New York to dispose of garbage and refuse ma-

terial at sea?

‘A. They have.

**Q. Will you explain for our information as well

as for the record just how these permits are issued,

the procedure so that we may understand for the first

time how that is done?

‘‘A. In issuing these permits we have dealt directly

with the old department of street cleaning, which is

now a division of the Department of Sanitation. They

have to apply on a printed form for permission to

move and dispose of whatever class of material they

may have. We have certain dumping grounds that

are customarily used and if their request meets the

approval of the office the permission is granted and

the permit is issued. This permit is good for sd a

limited number of days.

**Q. And as the barges and tows proceed to sea

under permit is there some representative of your

office stationed in the upper and lower Bay to inspect

or collect this permit?

‘*A. On these two boats, towing loads of that de-

scription we have an inspector, called a dumping in-

spector, whose job it is to see that the dumping does

not take place short of the designated dumping ground.

Also we have on duty patrol boats from my office which

are customarily stationed in the vicinity of the Nar-

rows and around Sandy Hook and a little outside and

these boats inspect outward and inbound tows and

make appropriate notation upon their permit, which

they collect.’’ The statute contemplates that they will

be collected.

43

This witness further éxplained that the officers on the

patrol boats noted the time of passing and returning by

the tows and these notations ‘‘are subsequently checked

up in my office to see whether the lapsed time would per-

mit them to go to designated dumping ground.’’

This officer had testified, as stated, without objection,

that permits were issued to the defendant. In addition,

the plaintiff has shown by repeated statements in the re-

ports of the Supervisor made a part of the annual reports

of the Chief of Engineers for the years 1918 to 1929, in-

clusive, introduced in evidence, that the Supervisor had

given permission to the defendant to dispose of garbage

and refuse at designated places, and had also shown by

the letter of the Secretary of War to the Governor of the

State that the ‘‘permission’’ was given by the Supervisor

of the Harbor and not by the office of the Secretary of

War to dump the garbage in an ‘‘emergency’’; and further

by the Supervisor’s statement to the Mayor of the City

when the latter requested a change in the designated area.

In addition to these it affirmatively appears in evidence

not only that this officer designated the place where the

dumping could be done but there went from his office with

each tug towing the scows a ‘‘deputy inspector’’ to see to

it thes the dumping actually took place at the designated

places. The established fact is that the defendant had the

Supervisor’s authority to dump the materials, whatever

that authority may amount to, and would seem to make un-

necessary the production of one or all of the ‘‘permits’’,

‘which in the ordinary practice of the Supervisor’s office,

would amount, in ten or twelve years, to probably a thous-

and or more. I find as a fact that the dumping was by

permission of the Supervisor of the Harbor.

The Act of 1888, (U. S. Code, Sees. 441 et seg. 44 Stat.

1072) was entitled ‘‘An Act to prevent obstructive and in-

jurious deposits within the Harbor and adjacent waters of

New York City by dumping or otherwise and to punish and

prevent such offenses.’’

44

This Act, amended in 1898 (U. 8S. Code, Sec. 443), pro-

vided that a line officer of the Navy shall be designated by

the President as Supervisor of the Harbor ‘‘to Act under

the direction of the Secretary of War in enforcing”’ its pro-

visions. Depositing of certain kinds of materials in the

tidal waters of New York or its adjacent tributaries or in

those of Long Island Sound ‘‘within the limit which shall

be prescribed by the Supervisor of the Harbor’’ are strictly

forbidden. One section provided for a permit defining the

precise limits within which the discharge of the scows may

be made.

Material parts of the Act of 1888, and the amendment

of 1898, are as follows: Section 441 and 443 U. 8. Code—

Title 33. Sees. 441. Deposit of refuse in New York

Harbor and adjacent waters prohibited; penalty.—The

placing, discharging, or depositing, by any process or

in any manner, of refuse, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud,

sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, or any other matter of

any kind, other than that flowing from streets, sewers,

and passing therefrom in a liquid state, in the tidal

waters of the harbor of New York, or its adjacent or

tributary waters, or in those of Long Island Sound,

within the limits which shall be prescribed by the

supervisor of the harbor, is hereby strictly forbid.

den, and every such act is made a misdemeanor, and

every person engaged in or who shall aid, abet, author-

ize, or instigate a violation of this section, shall, upon

conviction, be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or

both, such fine to be not less than -250 nor more than

$2,500, and the imprisonment to be not less than

thirty days nor more than one year, either or both

united, as the judge before whom conviction is obtained

shall decide, one-half of said fine to be paid to the per-

son or persons giving information which shall lead to

conviction of this misdemeanor. (June 29, 1888, c. 496,

1, 25 Stat. 209.)

Sec. 443. Permit for dumping; penalty for taking

or towing boat or scow without permit.—In all cases

45

of receiving on board of any scows or boats such for-

bidden matter or substance as described in section 441

of this chapter, the owner or master, or person acting

in such capacity on board of such scows or boats, be-

fore proceeding to take or tow the same to the place of

deposit, shall apply for and obtain from the super-

visor of the harbor appointed, as provided in section

451 of this chapter, a permit defining the precise limits

within which the discharge of such scows or boats may

be made; and it shall not be lawful for the owner or

master, or person acting in such capacity, of any tug

or towboat to tow or move any scow or boat so loaded

with such forbidden mati.. util such permit shall have

been obtained; and every person violating the fore-

going provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty

of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be

punished ‘by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less

than $500, and in addition thereto the master of any

tug or towboat so offending shall have his license re-

voked or suspended for a term to be fixed by the judge

before whom tried and convicted. (May 28, 1908, c.

212, 8, 35 Stat. 426.)

In United States v. Sadie (41 Fed. 396) Judge Lacombe

speaking of this Act of 1888 says (p. 398): ‘‘The bodies of

water referred to are (a) the Harbor of New York; (b)

waters adjacent to the Harbor of New York; (c) waters

tributary to the Harbor of New York; (d) Long Island

Sound, and as to each of these bodies of water there is a.

restriction of application of the Act to such waters only as

are tidal.’’

In the present inquiry only the first two of these de-

scriptions can apply: the Harbor and waters adjacent to

the Harbor of New York.

The Act contemplated that the Supervisor prescribe cer-

tain limits but there is no evidence in this case as to what

limits were prescribed. In City v. Leland (45 Fed. 380,

381), there is reference to certain prescribed limits.

A construction of the Act of 1888, as amended, becomes

important. The defendant relies upon the ‘‘permit’’ or

46

the permission granted by the Supervisor of the Harb

who has no authority other than that which the Act conf:

It may be noted in this conection that this Act is not

fected by the Rivers and Harbors Act of March 3, 1

(U. 8. Code, Title 33, Section 407). The latter is a g

eral Act and as was observed by Judge Thatcher in ‘‘’

Albania’’ (30 Fed. (2) 727) See. 441, et seq. of the C

(the Act of 1888) is a special Act applied to New Y.

Harbor and vicinity and it may be repeated in this conn

tion that the Secretary of War in a communication to

Governor of New Jersey stated that the dumping by N

York City was through permission of the Supervisor

the Harbor and not by the Secretary. But the purport

the Act of 1888, as was that of the general Rivers »

Harbors Act of 1899, is referable to the power of Congr

to legislate for the protection of navigation.

‘There can be no doubt that the dumping was not wit

the limits of Harbor of New York, as these limits ;

spoken of in United States v. Newark Meadows Impro

ment Company (173 Fed. 426, 428), as being ‘‘ within a |

from Navesink Lighthouse to Scotland Light thence

Whistling Buoy in Gedneny’s Channel and thence to Ro

away Point prescribed by the Secretary of the Treast

as the limits of the waters of the Harbor of New Yori

pursuant to the Act of February 2, 1895, (28 Stat. 67

It was done at eight, twelve and twenty miles, accord

to the season of the year, southeast by east from Scotla

Light, one of the points in the foregoing description.

In United States v. Various Tugs and Scows (225 F

505), where it appeared that permits had been issued,

was said by Judge Hand (p. 507): ‘‘It seems to me t!

a permit to dump no less than four miles east by southe

of Scotland Light Ship excludes by implication dumpi

within New York Harbor and its adjacent and tributs

waters inside of that point and thus deffnes the prec

limit.’”” He added that even though ‘the himits prescril

by the Supervisor are beyond a marine league from ‘|

shore any other interpretation of the national power wo!

47

render the Government impotent to protect the harbor and

adjacent channel and waters. In order to sustain a con-

viction under the Act it was held in Warner Quinlan v.

United States (273 Fed. 503), to be necessary for the evid-

ence to show that the Supervisor had prescribed such limits

and that the defendant had placed such materials within

such limits.

If the limits of the adjacent waters be taken as pre-

scribed by the designation of the places by which dumping

was allowable (U. 8. v. Various Tugs and Scows, supra),

:t is manifest from the distance given that the limits are in

excess of ‘‘one marine league from said shor. ’’ to use the

words of the amended answer; but it is diffienh ‘> under-

stand how this fact affords any defense in this case. li the

defendant did not Gump the materials nearer than the

designated areas the Supervisor’s permission would afford

protection against penalties of the Act. But can it be said

that these permits serve as a defense against the claim of

others whose rights have been invaded?

The purpose of the Act is to protect navigation with ref-

erence to New York harbor. The authority of the Federal

Government does not extend beyond the requirements of

navigation. (Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. 8S. 367-415.)

In Cummings v. Chicago (188 U. 8. 410, 431), it was said

with reference to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors

Act of 1899, that its effect ‘‘reasonably interpreted is to

make the erection of a structure in a navigable river

within the limits of a state depend upon the concurrent and

joint assent of both national government and the state gov-

ernment. . . . Without such assent the structure can

not be erected by them. ‘(United States v. Bellingham

Bay Boom Company, 176 U. 8. 211).

In Port of Seattle v. Oregon and Washington Road Com-

pany (255 U. S. 55, 63), it is said: ‘‘The right of the use

of the navigable waters within the several states is limited

to the control thereof for purpose vf navigation.’’

And in United States v. River Range Improvement Com-

pany (269 U. S. 411, 419), this Court says: ‘‘While Con-

4

48

gress in the exercise of this power may adopt, in its j

ment, any means having some positive relation to the

trol of navigation and not otherwise inconsistent with

Constitution of the United States (United States v. Ch

ler-Dunbar Company, 229 U. 8. 62), it may not arbitr,

destroy or impair the rights of riparian owners by |

lation which has no relation or substantial relation t<

control of navigation or appropriate to that end.’’

Wisconsin v. IWimois, 278 U. 8. 367, 415.)

The authority conferred by the Act of 1888 upon

Supervisor was not as general as that found in the Ri

and Harbors Act, nor was it an arbitrary power. Sc

as the defendant’s acts are concerned his authority

only permissive. The title of the original Act (tha

1888) shows its purpose was to protect the Harbor of

“York. When the powers of the Supervisor are limite

partir apnea sayy saath.” pont i teky.-

authorization to regulate the dumping of garbage ou!

of the waters specified in the Act.

The powers which the Suprevisor has under the Sts

and the effect to be given the permits authorized t

issued are to be strictly construed, because of the effe

the dumping upon the rights of others. ‘‘The doctri

firmly established that only that which is grarted in «

and explicit terms passes by a grant of property {

chises or privileges in which the government or the p

has an interest. . . . Whatever is not unequivoc

granted is withheld; nothing passes by mere implicati

Coosa Mining Co. v. So. Carolina, 144 U. 8. 550, 562;

tilized Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. 8. 659, 666.

In order to accord to the act full scope as a shield

protection, it is not necessary to make of it also a si

of offense.

Nor does the fact that the defendant is a municipal

poration afford immunity from the results of its

action. It was said by the Massachusetts Court im Ha

v. New Bedford (108 Mass. 208, 214): ‘‘The owner of

lands bordering upon the sea may lawfully throw re

49

matters into it provided he does not create a nuisance to

othe-s. But it by no means follows that either the city or

oe vate person has the right to deposit filth upon the

see * : in such quantities as to create a nuisance to health

or navigation. (See Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218,

230). This case quotes and approves Franklyn Wharf v.

Portland (57 Me. 446, 457), to the effect that ‘‘The right of

defendant to construct an outfall for their sewer in the

sea does not include the right to create a nuisance, public

or private.’’

In Noonan v. City of Albany (79 N. Y. 476, cited in

Huffmire v. Brooklyn, 162 N. Y. 584, 590), it is said: ‘‘A

municipal corporation has no greater right than an indi-

vidual to collect the surface water from the land or streets

into ar(‘ficial channels and discharge it upon the lands of

another, nor has it any immunity from legal responsibility

for creating or maintaining a nuisance.’’

In Block v. Maryland (149 Md. 39), the city was enjoined

from the commission of a nuisance notwithstanding it

claimed that it was authorized by statute to make a contract

and that in the performance of that contract a nuisance

was created.

My conclusion is that the Act of 1888, as amended, fur-

nishes no defense to the defendant, and that compliance

with permits from the Supervisor of the Harbor acting

under the provisions of that Act does not furnish a defense

nor relieve it from the effect of a public nuisance resulting

from or created by its action.

3. Nuisance

There is no doubt (the amended answer admits) that the

defendant for years past, at least since October, 1918, has

been dumping large quantities of garbage and refuse at

sea, and principally in places designated by the Supervisor

of the Harbor of New York. I use the word “‘principally’’

because there is evidence that sometimes through accident

or the occurring of something unusual, a few scows have

dumped their loads nearer to the shore than the appointed

places. There is also evidence uncontradicted, and I fir

the fact to be that some scows have left upon them consi:

erable quantities of garbage or refuse after their gat

have been thrown open to release the contents and the:

remnants are cast off by the men in charge as the scovw

are being taken back from the dumping area. The gener:

practice continues, more materials were dumped in 19%

than in the preceding year.

As already stated, the conditions on the plaintiff’s shore

and adjacent waters produced by garbage and other ol

jectionable materials alleged in the bill are proved by w

contradicted evidence. A summary of the facts foun

may be stated as follows: Along the shores are man

summer resorts which serve to furnish recreation, pleasur

and rest to people. Their beaches when unaffected by th

bad conditions mentioned are pleasure grounds for thot

sands of visitors. A large number of people living in an

doing business in these municipalities are dependent fe

their livelihood upon the resorts and the preservation «

their recreational advantages. The summer resorts alon

these shores constitute one of the plaintiff’s most valuab!

industries and they suffer frequently in annoyance and e:

pense from deposits of the materials meniioned. The e:

pense of the removal of garbage and other materials fal

upon these municipalities and individuals, and this expens

amounts annually to large sums. Their disposition as soo

as can be after being cast upon the shore is imperativ:

Foul smelling and repellent as they generally are whe

first stranded, they become more so as soon as they a1

subjected to the rays of the sun. They attract swarms «

flies. The odors create nausea, and sometimes reach int

homes. The deposits interfere with, and until remove

frequently prevent, the use and enjoyment of the beach«

for the purposes to which the latter are adapted and fe

the comfortable and enjoyable use of which people vis

them. They cause many complaints from and disappoin

ments to visitors to the severa! resorts for recreation an

health, as well as from those whose business depends upo

51

the attendance of visitors. Many visitors leave the resorts

because they cannot use the beaches when littered or secure

the surf bathing when the waters adjacent hold garbage

and refuse in suspension. The shores below high water

mark and the soil under the adjacent waters for at least

three nautical miles belong to plaintiff, and their chief

value is in the fisheries and the fact that they can and do

afford the attractions pertaining to summer resorts which

fisheries and attractions are seriously interfered with by

the deposits in question.

Along with and at times of the deposite there frequently

come broken bottles and pieces of glass and wood pieces

with nails therein, and the broken glass and nails are a

menace to the bathers in the surf and to persons on the

beaches. Severe bodily injuries have resulted from them.

The rental value of property has been impaired because of

the deposits. The decayed and decaying vegetables and

animal matters cast upon the shore is offensive to a high

degree to sight and to smell. The deposits are frequent

and recurrent.

In Cleveland v. Citizens Gas Light Company (20 N. J.

Eq. 201, 204), it is said: ‘‘Any business, however lawful,

which causes annoyances that materially interfere with the

ordinary comforts of human existence is a nuisance which

should be restrained, and small n ises and bad odors, even

when not injurious to health, may render a dwelling so un-

comfortable as to drive from it anyone not compelled by

poverty to remain. Unpleasant odors from the very con-

stitution of our nature render us uncomfortable, and when

continued or repeated make life uncomfortable. To live

comfortably is the chief and most reasonable object of men

in acquiring property as the means of attaining it, aad any

interference with our neighbor in the comfortable enjoy-

ment of life is a wrong which the law will redress.”’

In Northwestern Fertilizer v. Hyde Park, et al. (97 U. 8.

659), this Court considered a case coming from the Su-

preme Court of Diiaois which involved the question of

nuisance. The Company sought to defend because of its

52

charter rights; but this Court held that the State oo

give an effectual remedy, saying (p. 667): ‘‘It rests uy

the fundamental principle that every one shall so use |

own as not to wrong or injure another. . . . Pure |

and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as m

the rights belonging tc it as the right of possession and

cupancy.”’

In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company (206 U.

230), the State filed its Bill in this Court to enjoin the ¢

charge of noxious gases from the works of defendant

the State of Tennessee. The allegations of the Bill shov

that as a result of these gases there was destruction

forest trees, orchards, crops and other injuries. In |

course of the opinion it is said: ‘‘It hardly is denied «

cannot be denied with success that this often is carried

the wind great distances and over great tracts of Geor,

land. From the evidence the pollution of the air and '

magnitude of that pollution are not open to dispute.’’

In Mugler v. Kansas (123 U. 8. 623, 673), this Co

said: ‘‘The ground of equity jurisdiction in cases of p

presture as well as of public nuisance is the ability of cou

of equity to give more speedy, effectual and perman

remedy than can be had at law. They can not only p

vent nuisances that are threatened and before irrepara

mischief results but arrest or abate those in progress 2

by perpetual injunction protect the public against them

the future. . . . This is a salutary jurisdiction especia

where the nuisance affects the health, morals or safety

the community.’’

It is well established that noxious smells may constit

a nuisance. (Baltimore, etc. Railroad Co. v. Fifth Bapi

Chw ch, 108 U. 8. 317.) In Block v. Baltimore, 149 Md.

51, where the Maryland court considered a case arising |

of the transportation of offensive materials by scows fr

the city to reduction plants, and says (p. 56): ‘‘That

conditions complained of constitute an unwholesome d

ger and offense is obvious.’’

Replying to the contention that the bill did not contain

allegations sufficient to maintain it, that court, after stat-

ing the facts, said (p. 51): ‘‘It would be a reproach to the

law if it afforded the plaintiff no adequate relief from the

burdensome and intolerable conditions shown by those

facts.’’ "

In Northwestern Fertilizer Company v. Hyde Park,

supra, this Court, adopting the findings of the Lllinois

Court, said: ‘‘That a nuisance of so flagrant character

exists, as found by the Court below, is not controverted.’’

And in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, supra,

this Court granted relief against a nuisance caused by the

discharge of gases from the defendant’s work in Tennessee,

and said (p. 238): ‘‘It is a fair and reasonable demand

on the part of a sovereign that the air of its territory

should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphuric acid

gas; that the forests on its mountains, be they better or

worse and whatever domestic destruction they have suf-

fered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by

the acts of persons beyond its control.’’ (See Missouri v.

Illinois, 180 U. 8. 208; Board of Health v. Schmidt, 83

N. J. Eq. 35, 36; Butterfoss v. State Board, 40 N. J. Eq.

325.)

I conclude that the conditions described in this case

amount to a public nuisunce, and that the State and com-

munities affected should not be required to tolerate the

same.

4. Prescription.

The authorities declare that if the facts develop a public

nuisance there can be no prescription. Thus in Block v.

Baltimore, supra, the Maryland court said (p. 59): ‘‘But

the wrong complained of and disclosed by the evidence

amounts to a public nuisance and there can be no prescrip-

tion’; (citing Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 10).

This Court said in Northwestern Fertilicer Company v.

Hyde Park, supra: ‘‘In such cases prescription, whatever ~

4

the length of time, has no application. Every day’s con-

tinuance is a new offense.’’ And in Missouri v. Illinois

(200 U. 8. 496, 520), it is said: **The reasons upon which

5. Municipality: Degree of Proof.

But the defendant claims that it is performing govern-

mental functions and entitled to invoke the rule of proof

ee ee ee

The rule relied upon is stated in North Dakota v. Minne.

sota (263 U. S. 364), as follows:

~ ‘In euch action by one state against another the

burden on the complaining state of sustaining the al-

legations of its complaint is much greater than that

imposed upon a complainant in ordinary suits between ©

private parties. Before this Court can be moved to

exercise its extraordinary power under the Constita-

tion to control the conduct of another state at the suit

of another the threatened invasion of rights must be

of serious magnitade and it must be established by

clear and convincing evidence.’’

There is a qualification of the rule stated in a case by

the State against a corporation or person. ‘‘Some peculi-

arity necessarily marks a suit of this kin®. If the State

has a case at all it is somewhat more certainly entitled to

special relief than a private party might be’’ (Georgia v.

Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U. 8. 230, 237). And

farther in that case this Court said, at page 238: ‘This

Court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm

that will be done by an injunction against that of which

the plaintiff complains that it would have in deciding be-

tween two subjects of a single political power.’’

55 :

That the defendant is a political subdivision of the State,

created as a convenient agent for exercising certain govern-

mental powers entrusted to it by the State (Hunter v.

Pittsburgh, 207 U. 8. 161, 178), or is a deparizoent of the

state government (City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. 8.

182, 187) would seem to be settled by these cases.

The fact is that the parent State has left to the defendant

the determination of the method to be adopted in carrying

out certain duties certainly those with reference to sani-

tation, and the further fact is that the conditions com-

plained of here are the results of the adoption by the de-

fendant of its own methods. It was not necessary that the

defendant dump its ga oage at sea except in an emergency.

It was put on notice as early as 1907 by a report of dis-

tinguished engineers to the Mayor of the City, already re-

ferred to, that the method of garbage disposal by dumping

it at sea is not the best method. In discussing that method

of disposition they said as follows:

ing of the beach creates a nuisance that the public

should not be asked to tolerate. The cost of sendiag

the scows so far at sea that there would be no danger

of f the beaches and the and interruptions

caused by storms forbid the use of this plan. The

dumping of refuse at sea should not be resorted to ex-

cept in of emergency when the burdens of such

Heit!

; &

Heer

an

Hai

il ie

Ha ee

fy anything but at & mater of fot returned eal

von A profit. Aside however from the question of

cost it seems undesirabl- to dump garbage at sea as it

is being done at present. It is known that the Fed.

Prior to this last report the City had been informed by

ths Supervisor of the Harbor of bad conditions on the

shores arising from the duniping at sea. The Mayor re-

quested the right to dump the scows nearer than the area

at that time prescribed by the Supervisor. The latter de-

clined the request because of the complaints about the gar-

The defendant had been satisfactorily using the ‘‘re-

duction’’ system of garbage disposal when in an ‘‘emer-

gency’’ it was authorized to dispose of it at sea. In the

meantime it has erected a number of incinerating plants

and plans to erect more. One reason given for the delay

in building the needed incinerators is that the defendant

was not given the power of condemnation of sites. It has

such power now, conferred in 1929, and it is « question

whether the defendant, given the right and duty of per-

forming a function that may be called a governmental

function but not given the power necessary for its full per-

formance may indefinitely follow a course as heretofore

stated to the injury of others and still claim that in such

matters it is in the position of the state itself. But if the

stricter rule be applied I think the only reasonable con-

clusion to be reached under all the evidence is that the

objectionable conditions

cent waters complained

due to the action of the defendant in dumping its garbage

There has not only been an invasion of serious magnitude .

of the plaintiff's rights extending through some years but

it is continuing and is threatened for an indefinite period.

&g

°

E

Ay

5

[

}

E

6. Jurisdiction.

The defendant insists further ‘‘that the dumping is done

at designated places which are not in the navigable

of the United States but on the high seas, more than a

marine league from the beaches and territorial waters of

the state of New Jersey, over which this Court has, in this

case, no authority, control or. jurisdiction.’’

There seems to be some inconsistency between the con-

tention of the defendant that the permits of the Supervisor

afford protection and yet that the appointed places are

not within the navigable waters of the United States.

The authorities cited to this proposition relate to the

cases in the District Courts where the question was whether

the act complained of was done in the one District or

another, the holding being that an action to

ance must be brought in the District where

situated. (Umited States v. Newark Meadows

ment Company, 173 Fed. 426; McGowan v. Columbia

Power Association, 245 U. 8. 352.) In Mississippi

sourt Railroad Company v. Ward (2 Black 485

peared that Ward sued the defendant, a citizen

in the District for Iowa, to restrain the

alleged nuisance arising from the manner of the construc

tion of a bridge over the Mississippi River, the boundary

between the two states being the center of the river. The

allegation was that the obstruction was on the Illinois side.

This Court held that the District Court of Iowa was with-

out jurisdiction, and said (p. 494) : ‘He seeks nothing from

F

Bale

— ie ah

Me eee cnet ;

322328 int 7 4° |

apa ‘iia jie HE tg

fi Ll Hie sit

the ;

sewage

oags alt

“ali jin Beit

+ s is? sfireetsl és : fin

ie iideiitiur tail

tig arialicdda liauseegedsitgd dl

the

indi

not

pow he ab J

another sta

te

be the

C.

suit

earth

the sta

outside

agree to

on the

interests and

In New York v. New Jersey (256 U. 8. 296)

songht an injunction against the discharge

See on Ore”

paren gh sength ptar yan oy The

were regarded as justiciable by this Court even though

finally the bills were dismissed. (See Wisconsin v. Ili

nois, 278 U. 8. 367; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. 8.

365; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. 8. 592).

I conclude the Court has jurisdiction.

There is expert testimony that the actual construction

that duration of time from the period work starts on them

severally. The evidence does not disclose what is a rea-

sonable time for determining the availability of sites and

for their acquisition.

My conclusions upon the whole case are that the de-

fendant has created and continues to produce a

nuisance on the beaches and property of the State of New

Jersey, as has been hereinbefore found, and that the plain-

tiff is entitled to relief in accordance with the prayer of the

bill; but the defendant should be given a reasonable time

within which to put into operation sufficient incinerators

to care for its garbage and rubbish. (See Georgia v. Ten-

nessee Copper Company, supra.)

E

RECOMMENDATIONS.

My recommendations are:

1. That the Court’s decree should declare that the plain-

tiff is entitled to relief and to an injunction as prayed for,

but that before an injunction shall issue a reasonable time

will be accorded defendant within which to carry into ef-

fect its prorcscd plan for the erection and operation of

incineratcrs to destroy the materials such as are now being

dumred by defendant at sea.

2. That in as mach as the evidence adduced does not

disclose what such reasonable time is the case be referred

to a Master for findings of fact upon that subject.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,

Special Master.

In Manhattan the resident population is shrinking some-

what; in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens it is increasing

rapidly, and in Richmond moderately.

The garbage and refuse being dumped at sea goes from —

the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx. There are

now three incinerators in Manhattan and none in the

Bronx. The three in Manhattan have a rated capacity of

940 tons per day. There are five garbage incinerators

in the Borough of Brooklyn with a rated capacity of 1700

tons per day; nine incinerators in the Borough of Queens,

with a rated capacity of 1230 tons per day, and five incin-

erators in Richmond with a rated capacity of 540 tons per

day, making a total of 22 incinerators in the City of New

York.

S28 GFE QlesgSeeoOgarse s

eS,

—

SFSFSER FESS esses

re al iy Hane

ibs

ite

i

HIE His it

: ied i in it pele fat

ete ti Hil

ine it eld eel

bau) a4 HEHEHE relia

sion of the Sanitary Commission to erect new incinerators

of larger rated capacity than were formerly contemplated.

The evidence shows that the defendant’s plan for garbage

disposal involves the erection of 14 new incinerators, which

~ will take care of the matter of garbage disposal at least

until the year 1945, and that such a plan, if consummated,

is a proper and effective means for such disposal.

(c) Amounts of Garbage:

The quantities of garbage and refuse now being de-

posited at sea off the New Jersey coast by the City of New

York during the greatest dumping at its peak in summer,

from June to September, inclusive, of each year and for

some years to come if present methods continue, amounts

to an approximate average of 3,000 tons per day. To burn

this quantity during the summer months mentioned and to

provide for future needs, there should be additional incin-

erating capacity of 3,000 tons per day to be provided by

new incinerators, unless by an increase of consumption by

existing incinerators, or some temporary expedients for

disposal, the need for new incinerator capacity be corre-

spondingly reduced.

The evidence showe that during one week in June, 1931,

the three incinerators in Manhattan and the nine in Queens

and the three in Richmond (15 in all) taken collectively

actually consumed at least 10 per cent more garbage and

rubbish than their rated capacity. Eight of these incinera-

expected to consume at least 10 per cent in

rated capacity of 2250 tons per day, which would increase

their total consumption to 2475 tons per day, and on the

basis of actual performance by the large

24 hours per day and six days per week, the consumption

of garbage and rubbish by the new incinerators may be still

further increased. It is not, however, considered pradent

to conclude that, with the construction and operation of

three 750-ton incinerators, the amount of garbage and rab-

bish just stated would be consumed. The quantity being

disposed of at sea should be provided for anu provision for

its disposal at times of peak production and its possible

increase in the future must be made. The proposed fourth

new incinerator should be constructed. The four are

planned to take care of garbage and rubbish in the locali-

ties mentioned until 1945.

(d) Sites:

sort to certain methods or expedients such as (a) a better

separation of garbage and rubbish and ashes by house

holders; (b) the improvement of the relative proportions

of garbage and rubbish’ in the incinerators, and where

necessary, the use of some coal as additional fuel; (c) the

transfer of excess garbage from one Borough to another

where incineration may be had; (d) seven-day operation

of all incinerators ‘‘when necessary during the peak

months of summer’’; (e) the dumping of garbage mixed

7

with ashes or sand in land fills. The defendant takes issue

with these contentions.

(a) Separation—The defendant has ordinances and

regulations requiring the separation of garbage and other

substances into four separate classes—garbage, refuse,

ashes, and liquid waste, and the use of separate receptacles

for them. The evidence shows that in tenement house sec-

tions in the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx compli-

ance with these regulations and ordinances is difficult to

secure. Many thousands of notices of the requirements of

these regulations (printed in four languages) are annually

distributed to the householders and others concerned. A

force of from 60 to 70 men is kept employed in looking after

this matter; and in 1929, when a special ‘‘drive’’ was made

to enforce the ordinances and regulations by a considerable

addition to the regularly-employed force, the result was a

large increase in convictions and fines for violations. The

evidence does not show that reasonable efforts to enforce

these ordinances are not being made by the defendant.

(b) Proportions—The burning of a mixed refuse con-

taining 80 per cent of garbage and 20 per cent of rubbish

is the upper limit for operation with satisfactory tempera-

tures and without the use of some coal. The use of this

ratio is difficult to maintain. The weather affects the rub-

bish, and other conditions may reduce its heat-producing

qualities. The defendant has two types of plants, the Del-

carie and the Sterling, and they are not designed for using

coal, though in emergencies some coal may be and has been

used. In the Sterling type, being a fire-brick lined furnace,

there is a tendency when using coal to get ‘‘ballaning’’, that

is, an amalgamation of the fire-brick with the ash, which at

various temperatures tends to fuse and to rum into any

interstices in the brick or between the brick, and when it

becomes slightly cold to form a mass the removal of which

tends to break up the face of the brick and reduce the life

of the furnace. The Delearie type is a higher-temperature

furnace, and because of its peculiar constructivn is liable,

were designed to serve, and their full rated capacities are

not used in doing so. Difficulties to be met in the making

of such transfers may be summarized as the distances in-

volved; the method of transfer; inadequate storage space

and disproportionate expense. In times of stress of

weather, some garbage otherwise going to sea has been

taken to Brooklyn plants. The Sanitary Commission ap-

plied to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment ‘for and

obtained its leave to modify the contract of the Brooklyn

Ash Removal Company to permit excess garbage from

other Boroughs to be disposed of in the Brooklyn incinera-

tors. Under this resolution, it is possible to transfer some

of the garbage now being dumped at sea to Brooklyn in-

cinerators to the extent of their capacity. The collection

of garbage and rubbish for transfer from Manhattan and

the Bronx to other places will involve some night coilec-

tions of garbage in residential districts, and the noises and

annoyances incident thereto, besides the transportation of

the materials for long distances. There would be an addi-

to thd

practicability, and that such a plan would be a reasonable

step to take. hg

(d) As to the practicability of seven-day per week

operation, the evidence is uncertain; in some instances

left

there has been a burning of the residuum over from

operation on Saturday.

(e) Fille—Assuming the existence of appropriate

places, it may not be said that garbage and rubbish mixed

with ashes and used as a fill is an impracticable expedient

for their disposal during short peak periods, if thereby

the dumping at sea can be avoided. The materials here

referred to do not include some things thet the original

report herein shows were being dumped at sea, but refers

to what is generally known as ‘‘hog-feeding garbage’’ and

rubbish and ashes. The evidence shows that ashes mixed

with a small percentage of garbage taken from Manhattan

are being disposed of in part at Rikers Island, part being

near-by communities; but to make it available for garbage

and rubbish it is shown by the evidence to be necessary to

provide much equipment. One of the witnesses stated that

the construction of the necessary docks, sea-wall, unload-

ing machinery and other equipment that would be required

to make such an island available for the disposal of ashes

.

i

?

i

HE

ra

tH

qe

at

[enki Sos

!

H

incinerators sufficient to accomplish the desired end.

TIME FOR CONSTRUCTION.

The plaintiff introduced witnesses who qualified as ex-

perts and testified upon the question of the time in which

the proposed incinerators could be built, and the defendant

introduced expert testimony on the same question. The

conclusions stated by Mr. Samuel Greeley, a witness called

by the plaintiff, and by Mr. George W. Faller, a witness

called by the defendant, fairly represent the contentions of

the respective parties on the question of a reasonable

time. Both of these witnesses are eminent engineers with

wide experience and well qualified as experts to speak

upon the questions submitted to them.

As to the reasonable length of time within which addi-

tional incinerators may be installed in New York City,

ee [ag

: ait th

S Ey 2%

mae

ia

me Ua

333? i £035131 a $ iit

eis! i

e a ni Hil

ure

et

a st ml : 4]

mb de ffi £8 -~e78e- agin : 2a, § te

citi atid Ag i

a anal tHe iF

é iuiliels i TPR iif

ell Bet al

TABUIH HTS BLY (HE

Z3=s 5 § 8 gg25 BSE. =:

belagiteend asa tadlag i deetid

15

The evidence shows that under‘ez'sting conditions labor

ean be secured readily and that this is a favorable time for

the Bronx, with a rated capacity of 750 tons each per day,

should be ready for operation on or before June 1, 1933,

and that until June 1, 1933, is a reasonable time to be al-

lowed the def: within which to put into effect and

operation the necessary incinerators to enable it to

in the letters of the defendant’s representatives or agents

to the Supervisor of the Port of New York in 1918, when

asking leave to dump at sea, and referred to in the former

report in this cause.

A reduction in the amount of garbage and rubbish, being

dumped at sea, can be.made by the use of some of the

methods already mentioned, pending the completion of the

needed incinerators.

To make suitable provision for the contingencies men-

tioned, it would be just to the parties for the Court to re-

tain jurisdiction of the case for the purpose of such modi-

fication as, upon due application and notice, the Court may

determine to be proper.

16 ©

Recommendations.

Pursuant to the decree of re-referenee, it is

(1) That the decree make the injunction mentioned in —

the opinion and decree of the Court in this case effective —

from and after June 1, 1933, and require the defendant and —

its agents or employees to cease the dumping of any :

bage or refuse into the ocean or waters off the coast of

plaintiff the State of New Jersey, on and after June 1, 19%3.

(2) That the defendant be required to file with the

Clerk of this Coart on the first days of April and October

of each year, beginning April, 1932, a report to this Court

setting forth the progress made in the construction of the

incinerators in the Boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx,

and the amount of garbage and refuse dumped at sea

during the period of the report.

(3) That either party to this cause, on due notice to the

other, may apply at the foot of the decree for any modifi-

cation thereof, and this Court retain jurisdiction for the

purpose of any order or decree it may deem proper in the

premises.

No recommendation is made as to costs.

Inasmuch as the parties to this cause, by their respective

solicitors, have entered into a consent decree which has

been filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court, I deem

it unnecessary to a full compliance with the Court's decree

of re-reference to do more than refer to the consent de

cree, which amply embodies the foregoing recommenda-

tions and includes some other matters.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,

Specal Master.

gay pasties 17}

i,

OP io hej

-

a

i Parc ae

fe 7.

Pursuant to the order in this cause of May 29,

pa. ties plaintiff and defendant, by their respective

having appeared before me at public

City of New York, July 10th and 11th and 17

tember 12th, 1933; at Asbury Park, New Jersey,

tember 25th and 26th, and again in New York City on Oc

tober 2nd, 1933, I have reported the teatimony

with exhibits, by filing the same in the office of

of this Court with my certificate.

request for findings and conclusions.

with the decree.

respec.ively sustained by them as the re-

and the damages

*> gult of defendant's failure to comply

hi int He

| He

ee U

baeluaal

irae

*~

a eater

kt uh

i

m Hi: it Hi ee

i fi ull | iui ie ii

Windle ADEA al iff ii

tionment held on January 22, 1932, the matter of the ap-

proval of the contracts was again postponed for two weeks,

to February 5th, and on that date it was again put over for

two weeks, to February 19, 1932, and postponements were

later made until February 26th and then until Mareh 4,

1932, when the matter of the approval of the terms and

os Bt

+H

343

Hil

ales

iit

HE

were all carried

HE

yitsaas

Hin

ne

working days, 250 worki

with the right to award on

iff a i He

He

aE

HUET

ala

IH

HI HSE

fai tHE

hall th; H

g%%

Beit

to

Boulevard

Borough

"Dates buts of Octenhes 1932, copies of the examina-

tion of the second sei of four bidders were transmitted to

the secretary of the Boar J of Estimate and Apportionment

and to the acting Mayor direct.

On October 11, 1932, the commanication dated September

12th from the Sanitary Commission was on the calendar of

the committee of the whole, but the report of the engineers

of the office of the secretary of the Board not being ready,

it was laid over for two weeks, to October 25, 1932. At the

meeting of the committee of the whole held on October 25,

ill eh

Hie

fH

leh

esis

li

His

} lille:

4

nthe eatin he Boa of atime a Apt

mission to award contracts for the erection of a destructor

Price of $696,

Manhattan at a bid

of a destructor plan

plant at 215th Street in

erettion

395, and a contract for the

é

4 i i it noe p1itié i

ie ate iit i

i

i

On May 25, 1933, the Department of Sanitation called

to the Comptroller’s attention the proposed contracts for

heating and plumbing, and asked for the schedule of wages

to be paid, in accordance with said Act. There followed

considerable correspondence between these branches on the

subject. No contract for the heating anc plumbing had

been made up to October 2, 1933.

Constraction of the two incinerators was commenced

March 21, 1933. On October 2, 1933, the incinerator for

Manhatten was 34 per cent complete, and the incinerator

for the Bronx was 20 per cent complete.

The chief engineer of the Department of Sanitation was

produced as a witness by defendant on July 17, 1933, and

again on October 2, 1933. Between those dates he had been

made Commissioner of Sanitation in succession to Mr.

>

fendant if it uses some other means of disposal. He

outlined a schedule he had prepared for

a

plants was being delayed by the absence of work on plumb-

ing and heating, the contracts for which had not yet been

let.

The plaintiff introduced as a witness the chief account-

ant of the department of finance. He explained the method

of financing improvements such as the building of inciner-

ators to be by funds obtained from the sale of corporate

stock notes which are redeemable by the issuance of long-

term bonds known as corporate stock or serial bonds, and

that these can be sold under sealed bids after advertise-

ment. He said that the corporate stock note is simply a

“*forerunner”’ to enabie the city to borrow as it need:

borrow, without borrowing millions of money in adva

of actual needs, and that when the Board of Estimate |

Apportionment had authorized an improvement and p

ments thereon, it did not mean that the money was avails

unless the Comptroller were able to sell corporate notes

te have a long-term bond saie. He testified that from es

in March, 1931, the defendant had not been able to hav

long-term bond sale and that on that date, March 4, 1:

it had a bond sale of $100,000, which was to take up «

porate stock notes already issued, but leaves $9,000,00C

corporate stock .vies outstanding, while there were ¢

tract liabilities besides of $189,000,000, which contract

bilities had been registered on authorizations duly m

by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. There '

a large amount of corporate stock notes outstanding

the independent subway, and on the 4th of May, 1931

sale was held of $52,000,000 of four-year bonds, and beca

of that fact the ‘‘bankers’’ agreed to bid for them un

competitive bidding and sealed bids. This sale in M

1931, and the one in March, 1931, were, according to ¢

witness, the last sales of 4-year bonds or long-term bor

In January, 1932, the legislature restricted the issue

corporate stock notes by the city to $200,000,000, but

new notes could be issued for a period not exceeding |

years. Prior to that time the corporate notes were iss

for one year with the right of renewal The ‘‘banke:

took $100,000,000 of these notes to take up $76,700,000

outstanding notes, and paid $23,300,000 in cash.

There were approximately $94,000,000 of corporate no

outstanding in June, 1933.

In 1931 the defendant spent on subway construct

about $70,000,000, in 1932 about $80,000,000, and in 1

the witness estimated the expenditures for the subway w

$6,000,000.

The aggregate budgets for several years, less the amount

of debt service within such badgets, for all departmestel

The witness stated that he had never known of pay-

ments for such work as that of building incinerators being

paid out of the budgets, that such payment would be con-

trary to the provisions of the city charter, and that since

the sale of the corporate stock notes issued as above stated

under the last Act of the Legislatare, the defendant had

been uaable to sell any more bonds or stock notes.

With reference to the incinerator contracts the witness

stated that every voucher that had come from the con-

tractors for these two incinerators had been paid, and that

the city had ‘‘a little money left of our corporate stock

borrowings to pay whatever else comes along for the next

couple of months.’’ These contracts provide for progress

payments.

in April, 1933, the ‘‘bankers’’ refused any further loans.

The city cannot sell any kind of securities at less than par,

and its 6 per cent corporate stock were in July, as stated

by this witness, on the market at a discount. The city has

not offered to sell corporate stock notes for incinerator

purposes alone,

On October 2, 1933, the Special Master called as a wit-

ness Mr. George McAneny, who at that time was Comp-

troller of the city of New York. He had been Commis-

sioner of Sanitation under the re-organization made in

April, 1933, already mentioned, whersby the Sanitary Com-

corporate stock for a long time. He fu

program had been developed under his instruction looking

to a 100 per cent incineration, but that how long it would

take to execute that program depended upon the dates on

which funds were provided, and that the city was unable

in October, and had been for a considerable length of time,

to borrow money for these purposes; that he could not say

at what time dumping at sea could be stopped under pres-

ent conditions. He said that in view of the uncertainty as

to the city funds his plan included a request for moneys

from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R. F. C.),

that weuld enable the city to make a start on the plan for

incineration, which is ‘‘coupled with the broad subject of

our needs for sewage disposal as well.’’ He expressed

the opinion that the application to the R. F. C. would go

forward within the next two or three weeks.

1

3

r

At a hearing held in Asbury Park, New Jersey, Septem-

ber 25 and 26, 1933, a number of witnesses were introduced

by plaintiff, who testified relative to the expense of re-

moving deposits on the beaches between June lst and Sep-

tember 15th. There was also introduced a book of 64 pho-

tographs identified as having been taken on and along the

beaches, and showing deposits thereon between the dates

of June 9th and September Ist. The witness was employed

by the State to examine beaches and make observations of

were on the beach dead animals, cans, bottles, wooden floor

as oranges, grape fruit, melon rinds and vegetables.

On August 5th at Bradley Beach there were orange peel-

ings, rotted melons and vegetables.

side Park were clear, and on August 1ith the beaches from

Highland Beach to Manasquan were clean, and a small

amount of garbage consisting of orange and lemon skins,

grape fruit and dead chickens were in the undertow about

to be washed up at Point Pleasant, Lavallette and Seaside

Park.

On August 12th at Mantoloking Beach as far as the eye

could see there was garbage strewn.

From August 14th to 18th, inclusive, the beaches from

Seaside Park to Highland Park were clean.

On August 23rd, on the beaches at Ocean Grove, Bradley

Beach, Avon, Delmar, there were bottles, cans, driftwood,

decayed fruit and vegetables, and the beaches at Manas-

quan, Point Pleasant, Bayhead, Mantoloking, Lavallette

and Seaside Park had a large amount of garbage, fruits

and vegetables, besides driftwood, broken furniture, cases,

bottles and electric light bulbs in windrows along the be

At Mantoloking, along with the refuse on the beach th

was a dead fow! and a dead dog-~

On August 24th at Highland Beach there were some ¢

tric light bulbs and a smal) amount of orange skins

parts of grape fruit. At Seabright some driftwood, ¢

and bottles. At Asbury Park the tide had taken out «

of refuse and garbage brought in the preceding day.

At Bradley Beach the picture showed garbage and ref

the way of garbage and driftwood and bottles.

At Spring Lake the beaches were clean to within 25 |

of the boardwalk, but from that point to the boardy

and beyond in the street were bottles, cana, electric li

bulbs and some fruit, orange skins, grape fruit and m

rinds.

Pictures 1 to 9, taken at Poiat Pleasant, show conditi

on August 24th, the date of a heavy storm.

On August 25th pictures taken at Bradley Beach |

Avon showed the refuse and garbage along with driftw

brought up by the storm.

On August 29th pictures No. 30 and 31 were taker

Spring Lake, showing a great number of bottles, elec

light bulbs, radio tubes, jugs and driftwood. Picture

shows a pile of refuse, including cans and bottles, deca

fruit and vegetables with driftwood, parts of furnit

garbage and rotted fruit mixed with it.

Another witness testified that at Bayhead Beach tl

were, between June 15th and September 15th acoum

tions on the beach of various kinds, fruits and vegeta!

and dead animals, and that accumulations of garbage |

it

i

ii

1

1

i

i

i

f

|

et

|

|

i

it

Fe

7

F

*

iy

i

:

i

it

é

:

+t

rt

ri

if

dump.

The defendant adduced testimony to show that no ma-

terial was dumped at sea on designated days in June, July

and August, but the same accumulated material was

dumped on other days.

Commencing July 17, 1933, the defendant was granted

permission to dump and did dump garbage and refuse at

!

;

|

ficer of the defendant made observations at the

location. This testimony was to the effect that the drift

was not toward the New Jersey shore.

The defendant showed that during the months of June,

July and August, and until September 15th, the number

vessels passing the Jersey coast was 4459, taken froin

records of the Monmouth Beach Coast Guard station.

this number there was included boata of all character

description.

Este

&

The expenditures for removing garbage and refuse from

New Jersey beaches from June Ist to September 15th, —

a

~ 4,

*

«2

Cost

$134.25

~ It was stated by counsel for the plaintiff that a number

of other witnesses appearing could not show the expendi-

tures because of the method in which the accounts had

been kept.

Mr. Goodrich, who was chief engineer of the Depart-

ment of Sanitation of the City of New York, under ap

pointment by Mr. McAneny when the latter was Commis-

sioner of Sanitation, and who when he testified on October

2nd, 1933, had become Commissioner of Sanitation, was

asked by defendant’s counsel whether, upon the construc-

tion of the two incinerators now being built the city of

New York would be able to suspend the dumping of gar-

bage and refuse and other materials at sea, and he replied:

‘*Not from the results of the construction of those. two in-

cinerators, no.’’ He was further asked:

“‘Q. Upon the completion of the incinerators is it

your intention positively to discontinue the dumping

of material at sea, other than ashes?

**A. I don’t see how it can be done.

could be done inside of a year.

“Q. Inside of a year?

“A. Yes.

“Q. But if the Government don’t loan the money

you have no answer to make have you?

“A. Exactly.’’

During one of the hearings before the Special Master it

was given as an excuse for the absence of an expected wit-

ness that he, with other city officials, was discussing with

the Governor of the State the question of a special session

of the legislature to give authority to the city to levy

special taxes for stated purposes. It does not appear that

funds were sought for incinerators at the proposed extra

session nor at the last session of the legislature. The

charter of the city of New York as amended provides that

corporate stock may be issued for various epecified pur-

poses, among them, ‘‘for the erection and equipment when

first erected of buildings for garbage and rubbish disposal

plants and dumps.”’

cp Uggedinettayrtay fplagasi lt

1 HTH pe

A aia: elt

| ile i Ht lll

at it AHR,

Hl il die

He

i: ply 244 pegiiye @ g4e2g2es

BREET

HME Cite

rit RTH iF ia: rT +H HEE:

inti aii : rittteh

a tMItiMithtr 34 : ee:

at thal Ht ft udu

ae

statement is in error and the sale of authorized corporate

stock notes or bonds is necessary.

If the defendant were required to show, within a stated

time before the date fixed for the completion of the two in

cinerators, what the result of its application to the Recon-

struction Finance Corporation, or the result of any appli-

cation to the legislature had been upon the question of

funds, the time reasonably necessary to enable defendant

to complete the work or comply with the decree could be

more satisfactorily determined.

3. The municipal subdivisions of plaintiff have ex.

pended, between June 1, 1933, and September 15, 1933, te

prevent or lessen the pollution of the waters, shores or

beaches of New Jersey, resulting from defendant’s failure

to comply with the decree, the sum of $2,160.79.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD K. CAMPBELL,

Special Master.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1930.

No. 17, Original.

Prats or New Junaer,

Plaintiff,

agasnat

Tue Crryvy or New Yor,

Defendant.

Now comes The City of New York, the defendant above

named in the above entitled suit and objects and excepta to

the report of Hon. Edward A. Campbell, the Special Master,

herein filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court on the

20th day of March, 1931, in the following particulars, to wit:

he Ge Soc ene Ca See see

rights of the , because the defendant is before

on property affected is within the United

ow

1. To so much of the conc con-

clusion, of law, set forth under the heading “Parties and

Jurisdiction” (Report of Special Master, p. 9), as concludes — 3

2. To so much of the finding of fact or

law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some

as finds that the property affected is within

States.

3. To so much of the conclusions of law set forth under

the heading “Some Questions of Law—6 Jurisdiction” (Re

port of Special Master, p. 59) asx concludes that this Court

has jurisdiction.

4. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 49) that The City of New York has not dumped gar-

bage and refuse in the ocean for many years in any appre

ciable quantities within a marine league (three nantical

miles) of the shores of the State of New Jersey, except on

rare occasions either when necessary to preserve life where

a scow was in danger of foundering or when there is some

unauthorized action upon the part of the individuals em-

pleved by the contractors in charge of the scows or tow-

boata.

5. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 50) that the territorial waters of the plaintiff do not

extend more than one marine league or three nautical miles

from the Atlantic Coast shore line of said State of New

Jersey at low water mark.

Fact 53) that the Atlantic Ocean dumping

the defendant in dumping its garbage an

within the navigable waters of the United

in the Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage

for many years last past at points 8, 12 and 20

east of Scotland Lightship and about 10, 12

in the navigable waters of the United

9%. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master

conclude as a matter of law as requested by

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 5) that the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of

many years last past at the points and

land Lightship and from the New Jersey shore

in Exception No. 8, was not and is not a dumping thereof

in the territorial waters of the State of New Jersey.

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 6) thatthe dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage and refuse for

many years last past at the points and distances from Scot-

land Lightship and from the New Jersey shore as stated

‘4

in Exception No. 8, was a dumping thereof on and into the

high seas.

ll, To the failure and refasal of the Special Master to

conclude as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclasion of Law 15) that by reason of the dump

ing in the Atlantic Ocean by the defendant of garbage and

refuse at the places, in the manner and under the conditions

aforesaid, no justiciable controversy between the plaintiff and

the defendant is presented over which the Supreme Court of

the United States has authority, jurisdiction or control ander

Article II], Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States

12. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) ( Report of Spe

cial Master, p. 25) as finds that such parte of the garbage or

refuse as float either on the surface or in suapension in the

water, move with the direction of the wind and current, the

wind exercising the greater influence on the direction of its

movement, and the mass moves at times westward and north.

ward or towards the shores of New Jersey or Long Island

according to the direction and velocity of the wind.

13. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) ( Report of Spe

cial Master, p. 25) as finds that the mass spreads out on the

surface of the water gradually breaking up into amaller areas

and moving for indefinite periods with the wind, some of the

materials being on the surface and some in suspension.

14. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) (Report of Spe-

cial Master, p. 26) as finds that some of the lobster fishermen

have followed the floating garbage from the place where it is

dumped by the defendant in the ovean to where it went ashore

on New Jerney's beaches. :

15. Toso much of Finding of Fact (16) (Report of Spe

cial Master, p. 26) as finds that about 25% of the self-

addressed, stamped postal cards deposited in sealed bottles

dropped in garbage in the ocean immediately after the dump

ing by New York City scows came back to the parties deposit

ing same by mail from persons along the New Jersey and

Long Island shores and from further north.

16. To so much of the Finding of Fact (7) (Report of

Special Master, p. 16) as finds that the deposits of garbage

and refuse produce unhealthfal conditions interfering with

and frequently preventing the comfort and enjoyable ase of

the beaches and sea, it being dangerows to leave children

unattended on the beach while the deposits are there because

of things they may pick up, some of the same being unmen-

tionable; that broken glass and nails in pieces of wood have

been the cause of severe wounds to persons on the beach or

in bathing, and that it ie a menace to health and tends to

injure busipess and property values and rental values.

17. To so much of the Finding of Fact (7) (Report of

Special Master, p. 16) as finds that during June, July and

Auguet, 1929, there were in Asbury Park, a considerable

increase over the preceding year of cases of external otitis

which is a swelling or inflammation of the ear canal, and of

cases of infection of the middle ear requiring the drum to be

opened, and of sinus affected cases resulting from bathing

in the ocean, and that one or more of the coast guard incurred

a skin infection from the water which gave them considerable

troabh:. 2

18. To so much of the Finding of Fact (16)—Appear-

ance and Movement—(Report of Special Master, p. 27) as

finds that large parts of these floating and submerged areas

of garbage and refuse, dumped by the defendant are driven

and carried by winds and water to and upon the shores of

the plaintiff, and constitute the objectionable materials

thereon and in the adjacent water, hereinbefore described.

19. To so much of the Finding of Fact, or Conclusion of

Law, or both, set forth uncer the heading—Some Questions

of Law—1. Trespass (Report of Special Master, p. 41) a

finds that large areas of garbage and refuse floating upon or

held in suapension by the water, which have been dumped by

defendant's scows, are driven and carried by wind and water

to and upon the shores of plaintiff and other portions or areas

thereof are held for indefinite periods in the waters above soi!

owned by plaintiff and do creat injury to fishing and bathing

in such waters.

2). To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of

law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions of

Law—3. iuisance” (Report of Special Master, pp. 50-51)

as finds that the conditions on plaintiff's shores and adjacent

waters produced by garbage and other objectionable mate

rials alleged in the bill are proved by uncontradicted evi-

dence. A summary of the facts found may be stated as fol-

lows: Along the shores are many summer resorts and their

beaches, and when unaffected by the bad conditions men-

tioned are pleasure grounds for thousands of visitors. * * *

The deposits interfere with, and until removed frequently

prevent, the use and enjoyment of the beaches for the pur-

poses to which the latter are adapted and for the comfortable

and enjoyable use of which people visit them. * * * Many

visitors leave the resorts because they cannot use the beaches

when littered or secure the surf bathing when the waters

adjacent hold garbage and refuse in suspension and the chief

value of the shores below high water mark and the soil under

7

the adjacent waters for at least three nautical miles is ir the

fisheries and the fact that they can and do afford the attrac-

tions pertaining to summer resorts, which fisheries and at-

tractions are seriously interfered with by the deposits in

question. .

21. Te so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of

law, or both, set forth ander the heading “Some Questions of

Law—3. Nuisance” (Report of Special Master, p. 53) as

finds that conditions described in this case amount to a pub-

lic nuisance, and that the State and communities affected

should not be required to tolerate the same.

22. To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of

law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions

of Law—5. Municipality—Decree of Proof” ( Report of Spe-

cial Master, pp. 56-57) as finds that even if the stricter rule

of evidence ve applied, I think the only reasonable conclusion

to be reached ander all the evidence is that the objectionable

conditions on the beaches and in the adjacent waters com

plained of in this suit are caused by and due to the action

of the defendant in dumping its garbage and refuse into the

waters of the ocean as already stated and that there has not

only been an invasion of serious magnitude of the plaintiff's

rights extending through some years but it is continuing and

is threatened for an indefinite period.

23. To so much of the finding of fact, or conclusion of

law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions of

Law—6. Jurisdiction” (Report of Special Master, p. 59)

as finds that the defendant has created and continues to pro-

duce a public nuisance on the beaches and property of the

State of New Jersey and that the plaintiff is entitled to relief

in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

24. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Pact 46) that six different inspections made by an official

:

|

F

:

I

:

y

fil

i

aay

the

Pact 54) that the dumping of garbage and refose at eva as

aforesaid by defendant, has not caused substantial injury to

the navigation of the ocean by the plaintiff or its citizens or

visitors

2%. To the failure and refosal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 55) that the dumping of garbage and refuse at ora as

aforemaid by the defendant, has not caused any substantial

injary to bathing or bathing rights or property connected

therewith on the part of the plaintiff or any of ite citizens or

visitors.

29. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Fiading of

31. To the failure and refusa) of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

32. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

33. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 60) that (be damping of garbage and refuse at sea by

defendant as aforesaid has not caused and does not cause

|

1

!

i

any substantial depreciation to the value of the plaintiff's

property or that of its citizens, has not retarded and does not

not impose in any substantial manner upon plaintiff's manici-

palities and inhabitants a constant or considerable expense in

removing defendant's garbage and refuse from public and

retard the economic development of plaintiffs territory, and

that of ite municipalities in any substantial manner and dors

'

i

:

34. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Pact 65) that the plaintiff failed to produce on the trial

of this action, any scientific or expert evidence as to the

effect of ocean currents or tides apon the movement of objects

dumped into the ocean at from 10 to 22 miles from the New

Jersey shore, and floating partially or wholly submerged in

the orean

356. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclade as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 7) that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage

and refuse, has not obstructed and does not obstruct or

_ impede the navigation of the waters of the United States

or of the Btate of New Jersey.

36. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 8) that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage

and refuse, has not injured or destroyed and does not injure

or destroy the bathing or fishing rights or property therein

of the plaintiff or its citizens or visitors thereto.

37. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 9) that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant ae aforesaid, of garbage

and refuse, has not regulated or destroyed and does not

regulate or destroy the commerce of the State of New Jersey

and /or its citizens in violation of Article I, Section 8, para

graph 3 of the Constitution of the United States or of any

statute of the United States.

38. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

le XIV, Section 1 of the

Constitation of the United States.

39. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 13) that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid, of garbage

and refuse, has not deprived and does not deprive the plain-

tif? and/or any of its citizens of the natural advantages

of its or their position along the seashore contrary to the

sovereign rights of said State as a member of the Union

or of any of such righta.

40. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 16) that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant at the places and in the

manner aforesaid, of garbage and refuse, has not been and

is not an unreasonable disposition of the same as a matter

of law.

41. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 18) that the plaintiff herein

must prove its claims and case against the defendant herein

by clear and convincing evidence.

42. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a Matter of Law as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 19) that the plaintiff herein

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any

substantial portion of the garbage and refuse which found

its way into the waters of the State of New Jersey or onto

12

ite shores or beaches was that which was dumped into the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant.

43. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 17) that the damping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendant at the places and in the

manner aforesaid, of garbage and refuse has not created

and does not create a public nuisance as a matter of law

in respect to the plaintiff and/or its citizens or visitors or

front facilities of the plaintiff or its citizens or damages the

property of said plaintiff, its municipalities and citizens or

44. To so mach of the Finding of Fact set forth ander

the heading “Rome Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report

of the Special Master, p. 45) as finds that the Act (29 Stat.

209, ax amended) contemplated that the Supervisor prescribe

certain limita, but there is no evidence in this case as to

what limits were prescribed.

45. To so much of the Findirg of Fact on Conclusion of

Law or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions

of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 47) as

finds, or purports to find, that although the defendant dumps

its garbage under permits issued by the Supervisor of the

Harbor of New York at points in excess of one marine league

from the shore of New Jersey, it is difficult to understand

how that fact affords any defense in this case.

46. Toso much of the Conclusion of Law set forth under

the heading “Some Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report

of the Special Master, p. 47) as concludes that the authority

of the Federal Government does not extend beyond the re-

quirements of navigation.

47. Toso much of the Conclusion of Law set forth ander

the heading “Some (Questions of Law—2. Permits” ( Report

of the Special Master, p. 48) as concludes that the powers

which the Supervisor has under the statute and the effect to

be given the permits authorized to be issued are to be strictly

construed because of the effect of the dumping upon the

rights of others.

48. To so much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion

of Law, or both, set forth uader the heading “Some Questions

of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 48) as

concludes that the fact that the defendant is a municipal

corporation does not afford immunity from the results of its

own action.

49. Toso much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion of

Law, or both, set forth under the heading “Some Questions

of Law—2. Permits” (Report of Special Master, p. 49) as

concludes that the Act of 1888, as amended, furnishes no

defense to the defendant and that compliance with permits

from the Supervisor of the Harb’ ~ acting under the provi-

sions of that Act does not furnish a defense nor relieve it

from the effect of a public nuisance resulting from or created

by its action.

). To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a matter of law as requested by defendant ( Pro-

posed Conclusion of Law 14) that the dumping in the Atlan-

4

tie Ocean by the defendant as aforesaid of garbage and refuse

under permit from, and supervision of, the Government of

the United States through its Supervisor of the Harbor of

New York and in accordance with the provisions of Title 33,

Chapter 9, Sections 441-451 inclusive, U. 8. Code (approved

June 30, 1926) and preceding statutes on which founded, is

a compliance with each and every regulation and statute of

the United States relating to navigation, commerce and/or

any other subject over which Congress has exercised the juris-

diction of the United States.

51. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth under

the heading “Some Issues of Fact” (Report of Special Mas-

ter, p. 31) as finds, or purports to find, that there is evidence

that only some coast wise and other vessels discharge garbage

refuse into the ocean.

52. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth under

the heading “Some Issues of Fact” (Report of Special Mas-

ter, p. 31) as finds, or purports to find, that a witness intro-

duced by the defendant made an estimate to the effect that

there were only twenty vessels a day going and coming from

southern ports to New York.

53. To so much of the Finding of Fact or Conclusion of

Law, or both, set forth under the heading “Pome Issues of

Fact” (Report of Special Master, p. 35) as finds or concludes

that testimony that some vessels discharge garbage and refuse

after clearing from New York, falls short of establishing a

custom by other vessels.

M4. To so much of the Finding of Fact

the heading “Bome leeues of Fact” (

that constantly being dumped by the defendant and fre-

quently carried by winds and waves from the dumping places

to and upon plaintiff's shores as hereinbefore stated.

SS. «Te the failere and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

27) that the scows of private contractors, having no connec-

tion with the City of New York, containing “cellar dirt,” i. ¢.,

debris from buildings that have been torn down consisting

of joists, timbers, lathe, plaster, etc, of a

have for years been dumped and are being

Atlantic Ocean under permit from the

Harbor of New York at a point about 4

Scotland Lightship.

M6. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

33) that cargoes of condemned foodstuffs, vegetables, fruita,

etc.) are also dumped at sea wader permit from the Buper-

visor of the Harbor of New York ai a point 25 miles from

the New Jersey shore.

57. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

34) that Brooklyn Navy Yard scows containing refuse and

garbage also dumped at sea at the regular dumping points at

which New York City garbage is dumped.

58. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

35) that the Supervisor of the Harbor of New York in his

report for 1929, stated that it is probable that a great deal

16

of garbage is dumped both outside and inside the harbor

entrance by the enormous tonnage passing in and out of New

York Harbor and aleo that the local floating equipment

throws more or less garbage overboard.

59. To the failure and refweal of the Special) Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 36) that the records of the Collector of the Port of New

York show that in 1928-1929 the following was the number

of vessels clearing from or entering such port from points

south thereof for periods of two months at a time; months

of December 1928 and January 1929, foreign and coastwise

vessels entering, 1,227; clearing, 1,173. Months of July and

August, 1929, foreign and coastwise vessels entering, 1,105;

clearing, 1,192.

60. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 37) that the sea lane or route for coastwise ships going

to and coming from points south of New York is about 2%

to 3 miles over the New Jersey coast at Seabright, Mon-

mouth Beach and Asbury Park; 5 miles at Sea Girt and

8 miley at Barnegat Lighthouse.

6]: To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find ax requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

28) that practically all freight and passenger shiva leaving

and entering New York Harbor (expecially those leaving)

dump more or less garbage and refuse in such sea lave.

62. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find ax requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

39) that many freight and passenger lines and ships feed

their crews in port and none of their garbage or refuse is

removed by the City or dispesxed of by the ship while in port,

but such accumulations consisting of bettles, tin cans, elec-

tric light bulbs, pieces of meat, fruit, other food waste, wood,

17

’ mattresses, pillows, shoes, old clothes, boxes, barrels, crates,

ete, ar. ‘emped after passing Scotland Lightship.

» 63. To the feilure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

40) that passenger and freight ships often anchor in great

numbers during a fog for 24 hours or more outside of the

harbor and dump garbage accumulated during that period

into the sea where they are anchored.

64. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 41) that the holds of cargo boats are usually swept in

port after the removai of the cargo and before reloading;

that such sweepings and also sweepings from the forecastle

are placed on deck for dumping in addition to garbage and

refuse and all are dumped in said sea lane for coastwise

ships shortly after passing Scotland Lightship on the way

south.

65. To the failure and refusal of che Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 42) that fruit, vegetables, poultry and other suppiies

delivered to the ships in port to feed passengers and crews,

are usually packed in crates, barrels and boxes which have

the names on them of New York dealers from whom they

are bought, and such crates, boxes and barrels, partly

broken up, are on most ships piled on deck and dumped with

other refuse in said sea lane shortly after passing Scotland

Lightship on the way south.

66. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 45) that insufficiently treated and unsanitary sewage

from the cities of Long Branch and Asbury Park on the

Atlantic Coast of ew Jersey has been and is being dis-

charged into the Atlantic Ocean within a skort distance

from the beaches of each of those cities.

beaches.

68. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

66) that the deposit in substantial quantities in the Atlantic

Ocean at points varying from 24% to 8 miles from the Atlantic

shore front of the plaintiff State commencing with the

minimum distance at Sandy Hook and extending to Bar

negat Lighthouse where the maximum distance existed, of

garbage, refuse and cellar dirt (material taken from de

molished buildings in New York City) by steamships and

other floating equipment and by scows of private contractors,

of the same kind and character ts that deposited in said

ocean as aforesaid by defendant much further away from

said shore front of the plaintiff, and the deposit of garbage

and refuse in sald ocean by the United States ( Browklyn)

Navy Yard authorities at the points where defendant dumped

and the deposit in said ocean less than \ mile from plain-

tiff’s said shore front of insufficiently treated and unsanitary

sewage from the cities of Long Hranch and Asbury Park,

makes it impossible to determine as a fact, whether garbage

and refuse and other offensive matter in substantial quan-

tities is deposited by defendant in the waters of the State

of New Jersey or on its beaches.

69. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude as a matter ef law as requested by defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 20) that by reason of the

deposit in substantial quantities of garbage, refuse, cellar

dirt and unsanitary sewage in the Atlantic Ocean by agencies

p. 29) as finds that the first incinerating plant was put in

operation by the City of New York in February, 1924.

Tl. Tose mach of Finding of Fact (17)—Incineratore—

(Report of the Special Master, p. 20) as finds that the

evidence does not show the cause of the apparent delay by

the defendant in adopting and putting into operation the

incinerating system, and that it was in 1924, some five years

after the defendant began dumping at sea, that its first

incinerator was put into operation, and during the next

succeeding five years other were built. That those con-

structed and in use fall far short of taking care of the

garbage and refuse situation.

72. To so much of Finding of Fact, or Conclusion of

Law, or both, (17)-—Incinerators—(Report of Special

Master, p. 30) as finds that the delay of the defendant in

adopting a proper method of disposal has been unreasonably

long.

20

73. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding

Fact 17) that three incineration plants were built in

Borough of Manhattan as a resuit of an appropriation

$5,000,000 made in July, 1921, the first being completed in

February, 1924, the second in November, 1925, and the

third on October 1, 1928, the cost of each incinerator being

about $1,000,000, exclusive of the cost of the land on which

built.

2Fe

74. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

19) that the commencement of building operations on a

fourth site was halted by injunction duly obtained in the

Supreme Court of the State of New York.

75. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

20) that in the Borough of Brooklyn there are two incine

rators, each with the capacity of 100 tons a day and three

with a capacity of 500 tons a day each, all now in operation,

built by a contractor under a contract to dispose of all

material that may be delivered, and since December 1, 1929,

no garbage from that borough has been dumped at sea.

76. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Propesed Finding of Fact

21) that in the Borough of Queens there are now nine

incinerators operating with an average daily garbage and

refuse consumption of from 100 to 270 tons and that borough

has never dumped any of its garbage at sea.

77. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master io

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

22) that in the Borough of Richmond there are now three

incinerators in operation and none of the garbage from that

borough has been or is now being damped at sea.

21

78. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

24) that approximately only 27 per cent. of the garbage

collected in the City of New York is dumped at sea, the

greatest proportion of which comes from the Borough of

The Bronx, and such amount will be continually reduced.

79. To the failure or refusal of the Special Mastc~ to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

63) that the dumping in the ocean by the defendant more

than a marine league from the New Jersey coast at points

8, 12 and 20 miles southeast of Scotland Lightship designated

by the United States Supervisor of the Harbor of New York

and under conditions imposed by him of about 27 per cent.

of the garbage collected by said City is not in fact an un-

reasonable disposition of its total garbage collections, pend-

ing the carrying out of its plans for the installation of

additional incinerators.

80. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

61) Chat the size, summer population, property investments

and assessed value of property of practically all of the New

Jersey communities and municipalities located along the

Atlantic Ocean shore front from Highlands to Seaside Park

has increased greatly during the period from 1919 to 1929,

during which the City of New York has been dumping a

portion of its garbage and refuse into the Atlantic Ocean

as aforesaid.

81. To the failure or refusal of the Special Master to

find as requested by defendant (Proposed Finding of Fact

62) that, although much more garbage and refuse has been

dumped at sea by the City of New York during the summer

months than during those of winter, the summer population

of, and visitors to, all of the New Jersey Atlantic shore front

communities and municipalities claimed by plaintiff to have

been injured, is and are many times grester than in winter.

82. To so much of the Finding of Pact set forth in the

report of the Special Master under the heading “Some lmocs

of Pact,” page 34, av finds that as to the Long Branch sewer

the evidence only of a plan of the sewage system and

some evidence com plainta were at one time made to the

Department of Health, which investigated the samc, anc that

the matters were mtisfactorily adjusted.

83. To so much of the Finding of Fact set forth in the

report of the Special Master under the heading “Home (on.

clusions of Law,” page 50, as finds that some scows have left

upon them considerable quantities of garbage or refuse after

their gates have been thrown open to release the contents, and

these remnants are cast off by the men in charge as the scows

are being taken back from the dumping area, and that the

general practice continues, more materials being dumped in

1929 than in the preceding year.

S44. To the failure and refueal of the Special Master to

find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Pact 3), that by Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897 of the State

of New York, known as The (ireater New York Charter, vari-

ous municipalities of the State of New York were united and

consolidated into the City of New York, which was thereby

divided into five boroughs, known, respectively, as the bor-

coughs of Manhattan, The Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and

Richmond.

&5. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Findings of

Fact 5 and 6), that by said Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897

of the Btate of New York, a Department of Street Cleaning

was created in the municipal government of said city, with

juriadiction over the removal and disposition, as often as

the public health required, of ashes, refuse, street sweepings

and garbage collected in said city, bat that by Chapter 466

of the Laws of 1901, jurisdiction over the removal and ie

87. To the failure and refusal of the Bpecial Master to

find, as requested by the defendant (Proposed Finding of

Fact 15) that, on collection, this garbage is taken to docks

or dumping boards on the waterfront of said city and is then

dumped into city-owned barges, which are designated by the

initials of the departmental name apd letters of the alphabet,

and these are towed to sea by tugboats chartered from, and

in charge of, contractors, and the contents are there dumped.

88. Te the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 1), that the defendant, The

City of New York, is a municipal corporation and a politica!

sul<livision of the State of New York, administering govern-

me tal funciions in the localities described in Sections 1 and

2 of Chapter 378 of the Laws of 1897 of the State of New

York, as amended by Chapter 466 of the Laws of 1901 of said

State, and subdivided into five boroughs therein described.

89. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

\ a

‘

(Progosed Conclusion of Law 2), that the Department of

®treet Cleaning and the Presidents of the Boronghs of Queens

and Richmond of the City of New York, for many years prior

ee tele ae a

of thereof, had jurisdiction in said city over the

removal and Wgposition, as often as the public health

required, ce ane street eweepings and garbage in

said city.

90. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude, as 4 matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law J2), that the dumping in the

Atlantic Ocean by the defendam, as aforesaid, of garbage

and re*use has not violated, and does not violate, Public

Laws of New Jersey, 1882, page 155 (3. Compiled Statutes

‘of New Jersey “Pilots”, Bec. 47, p. 3958), nor any other

statute of the State of New Jersey.

91. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 21), that the plaintiff has

failed to prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

in equity for the relief demanded in the complaint or for

any relief whatever in equity.

#2. To the failure and refusal of the Special Master to

conclude, as a matter of law, as requested by the defendant

(Proposed Conclusion of Law 22), that the defendant is

entitled to a dismissal of the complaint herein, with costs

to the defendant.

F. Recommendations for Decree.

The defendant also objects and excepts to the recom-

mendations for a decree made by the Special Master in the

following particulars:

93. To subdivision No. 1 (Report of Special Master,

pp. 59-60) in its entirety.

04. To subdivision No. 2 (Report of Special Masten,

p. 60) in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Agtuve J. W. Huy,

Corporation Counsel of The City of New York,

Solicitor for the Defendant.

E.wtsor 8. Benepicr,

J. Joseru Litty,

Tuomas W. A. Crows,

Of Counsel.

PP Oa Fi Tey aid — ——

> pape die Nee

ae ts cou Lerieer tall

>i Righetti aidh

Lone Me aalinlliameaadey et aire

& : ha Bhp Ch oval

ack Te P vr,

twits’ 3 wba rit

De. CRE Gon

ppd Blaby

Bote oct ihe ek

Ri Nest tp aa oe whe

Tere ar seg

% .

Ate peor Wea ene Caer ee.

; 7

- tego. my ye ee yan pies

Ta AE nied nts as a

. ON CNS tp a

Pe oh. .

re ayy

ante? Bygy 3 Se FRR 6,

ny oe wnag, + $8.

py i na Ss

a ie woe adant oe we

¥ *

31, 1982, to wit, a site located in the Borough of Manhat- oS

tan, one of the sites located in the Borough of The Bronx

and the site iocated in the Borough of Queens.

This resolution of said Board directed that the costs

of such contracts be charged against Corporate Stock of

The City of New York in the manner in such cases pro-

vided by its Charter. } .

Advertisement for sealed bids on said three contracts

commenced in the City Reeord, published by The City of

New York, July 18, 1982, and bids therefor were received ©

and publicly opened on August 10, 1932.

In all, a total of one hundred and eighty-eight (188) .

bids were received and nineteen (19) separate sets of

any Conmusianten ap pond of the Glte’a peapentl 0 tities

the plans submitted by the bidders in relation to the

commenced August 11, 1932. ‘The oral examination of the

resolution the bide fecetved, the exantine-

viom of the bidders, and a report of ite Engineer Member

Ax

. ~

ine SOR SYS See

KE bl agate: 2 Beere es

»

eo eee

se

ey

ne Bd.

ae

ie fe

wh ee ae

. »

— -

> >

ee

Pinks

25 ey

mo

gate

it a

es

Fs i!

< we

ee

*.

Re fit bi, =

om ee : ae SO, 4s oY

W ede FAAS PS : bn x ce tien: a fle : a OS ae

ti af fed il fe lit Mi ar 3

i

. i His fi Sago

ay Hu EE Pe

Sue

he i

= Sbgeae

PER ees IRENE SOTEN

POA arhe ae ee oe a Pap eR Bas, SS

All of which i respectfully submitted.

Dated, New York, September 80, 1982.

--4-

S..eme Court of the United States

RE. /OD

No. @ Original—October Term, 1931

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

agasnat

THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendant.

Plaintiff,

REPORT OF THE DEFENDANT, THE CITY OF

NEW YORK

ARTHUR J. W. HILLY,

Corporation Counsel,

Solicitor for the Defendant,

The City of New York,

Municipal Building,

Borough of Manhattan,

City of New York.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No, 13, Original—October Term, 1931.

STaTEe oF New JERsey,

Plaintiff,

against

Tue Crry or New York,

Defendant.

To the Supreme Court of the United States:

Purvuant to the Decree of this Court in the above en-

titled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The

City of New York, respectfully presents the following re-

port to this Honorable Court :

1. The Sanitary Commission, the head of the Depart-

ment of Sanitation of the City of New York, is the Munid-

pal Agency vested with and exercising exclusive jurisdic-

tion over the matter of the removal and final disposition

of ashes, garbage, and rubbish of the City of New York.

2. The following is a statement of the progress made

in the matter of the construction of incinerator plants for

the final disposition of garbage and rubbish in the City of

New York for the period, October 1, 1931, to March 31,

1932.

On October 23, 1931, the defendant, The City of New

York, duly selected an additional site for the erection and

construction of a new incinerator, being a piece of land

located on the northerly side of Northern Boulevard and —

226th Street, Doug!aston, Borough of Queens, and having

an area of 249,775 square feet ; that following such selec-

tion, proceedings were begun in the Bupreme Court of the

State of New York to condemn the said lands so selected

as a site for the construction of an ineinerator plant, and

that title to the said lands so selected was vested in the

City of New York on December 31, 1931.

Contracts, specifications and plans for the construction

of four incinerator plants, each having a capacity for the

incineration of 750 tons of garbage and rubbish in twenty-

four hours, were prepared and transmitted to the Board

of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York

for approval thereof and the authorization of the expendi-

ture of Municipal funds required for the carrying out of

said contracts. One of the incinerator plants, construc-

tion of which is called for by the four contracts herein-

above referred to, will be erected on the site located at

Douglaston hereinabove referred to, and the other three

incinerator plants will be erected and constructed on sites

duly acquired for such purpose by the City of New York

prior to October 1, 1931; two of which latter sites are

located in the Borough of The Bronx of the City of New

York, and the third site located in the Borough of Man-

hattan of the City of New York.

3. During the period commencing December 7, 1931,

being the date of the Decree herein, and ending March 7,

1.32, the amount of the garbage and ashes dumped at sea

was the following:

Cubie Yards

Month Dumpers Ashes Garbage Total

December 7 to 31,1931 113 145,645 49,073 194,718

January, 1932 ...... 138 167,519 652,182 219,701

February, 1932 ..... 138 167,722 59,316 227,038

March 1 to 7, 1932... 31 37,045 11,521 48,566

Det sdcces 420 617,931 172,092 690,023

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Dated New York, March 31, 1932.

WILiiAM ScHrogper, Jr.,

Chairman, Sanitary Commission

of the City of New York.

ArTuur J. W. HILty,

Corporation Counsel,

Solicitor for the Defendant,

The City of New York,

_ Municipal Building,

Borough of Manhattan,

City of New York.

hem

Supreme Court of the United States

Octonma Texm, 1931.

No. 13, Original.

Stats or New Juaaer,

against

Tue Crry or New Your,

To THe SuPpaems Cover or Tae Unrrep Sratzs:

Pursuant to the Decree of this Court in the-above ex

titled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The City

of New York, respectfully presents the following report to

this Honorable Coart:

1. The following is a statement of the progress made in

the matter of construction of incinerator plants for the final

disposition of garbage and rubbish in The City of New York

during the period from October 1, 1982 to March 31, 1933.

The statement under this heading in the last report, dated

September 30, 1982, carried the recital of facts down to a

point where the bids received for the construction of in-

cinerator planta were pending before the Board of Estimate

and Apportionment of The City of New York for their

approval or disapproval as to the proposed awards thereon.

At a meeting of the sald Boal of Estimate and Appor-

tionment held on November 18, 1982, a resolution was daly

edopted euthortsing the Renitary Commianlon of the Depart :

ment of Sanitation of The City of New York to award two

contracts for the erection and equipping complete (

plumbing and heating) of two Destructor Plants for the |

incineration of garbage and rubbish, each capable of destroy.

ing 750 tons of refuse in 24 hours, one each to be located ag

follows:

(A) At 215th to 216th Streets, 9th to 10th Avenues

in the Borough of Manhattan.

(B) At Zerega and Lafayette Avenues and Westches

ter Creek, in the Borough of The Bronx.

Pursuant to such approval so obtained from the Board of

Estimate and Apportionment, the Sanitary Commission at

a special meeting duly held at its office in the Borough of

Manhattan on November 23, 1932, adopted resolutions award-

ing the said two contracts to the Superior Incinerator

Company of Texas and The L. E. Myers Co., joint bidders,

the contract for the plant in the Borough of Manhattan ata

contract price of $696,395.00 and the contract for the plant

in the Borough of The Bronx at a contract price of

$713,140.00.

The contracts were executed by the Chairman of the Sani-

tary Commission, acting for The City, and by the Contractors

on November 23, 1932, and registered by the Comptroller of

The City of New York, in accordance with Charter require

menta, on December 23, 1932.

On March 22, 1933, the work of actual construction of

each of these planta was commenced at each of the sites.

2. During the period of six months commencing Septem-

ber 8, 1932, and ending March 7, 1933, the amount of garbage

and ashes dumped at sea was the following:

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Dated, New York, March 31, 1933.

of the City of New York.

Solicitor for the Defendant,

The City of New York,

Municipal Building,

Borough of Manhattan,

City of New York.

meats nore

Pandich Presa, tec. 22 Thames St. Hew Yorh UO & A

Supreme Court of the Anited states

No. 12, Onsernat-—Octonsr Tuam, 1933.

Sats or New Junseyr,

Plaintiff,

Tas Crry or New York,

Defendant.

To the Supreme Court of the United 8.\es:

Pursuant to the Decree of this Court in the above ~/

entitled cause, dated December 7, 1931, the defendant, The. ;

City of New York, respectfully presents the following re-

port to this Honorable Court:

1. The following is a statement of the progress made

in the matter of construction of incinerator for the

final disposition of garbage and rubbish in the City of New

York during the period from March 22, 1933 to March

31, 1934. .

pet agi Pee a * f

> ¢ 7 ’

domed Sy renigd. GSR er

(A) Manhattan Incinerator.

On March 31, 1934, the work of constructing thid incin-

erator plant was 80 per cent. complete.

(B) Bronx Incinerator.

On March 31, 1934, the work of constructing this; incin-

erator plant was 70 per cent. complete.

2. Since the filing of the previous report by the above-

aad Sanneaet, Go Sees 2S eee eee

tities of garbage and ashes dumped at sea:

!

’

Ashes Garbage

(In Cubic Yards)

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Dated, New York, March 31, 1934.

Tuomas W. Hammon,

Deputy and Acting Commissioner

of Sanitation of The

City of New York.

Pauw. Wruepera,

Corporation Counsel,

Solicitor for the Defeggant,

The City of New York,

Municipal Building,

Borough of Manhattan,

City of New York.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.