Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp.
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1934.
No. 255. 256
= =
——
ALTOONA PUBLIX THEATRES, INC.,
; Petitioner,
and
WILMER & VINCENT CORPORATION and LOCUST
STREET REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
Petitioners,
vs.
AMERICAN TRI-ERGON CORPORATION and
TRI-ERGON HOLDING, A. G.,
Respondents.
Ow Peririon ror a Writ or CEertTiIornaRI TO THE CIRCUIT
Court or APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRcuIT.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION.
‘ THOMAS D. THACHER,
HUGH M. MORRIS,
! §. MORTIMER WARD, Jr,
Counsel for Respondents.
GALLO & ACKERMAN, Inc., 142 Liberty Street, Telephones—Rector 2--5356-7
——— SD ee TRIP rote geet bach BPI AI 9 a ETS, , ba hi
— *?
LAGE 8 RIE TYSON OS NT NA LOI IOE SNE: OSE INE OSSETIA SE MICE 8 ot
Opinions Below
Jurisdiction ae ia
Question Presented
Statement ....
rArgument
The Decision Below is not in Conflict with Decisions
of this Court on the Question of Invention
The Decision Below is not in Conflict with the Deci-
sions of this Court in Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97
U. S. 554, and Pattee Plow Co. v. Kingman, 129
U. S. 294, Claims 9, 13, 17, 18 and 19, Finding
Ample Support in the Disclosure of the Original
Application
The Decision Below is not in Conflict with the Decisions
of this Court with Respect to what is a Patentable
Process
The Decision Below is not in Conflict with the Decision
of the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Highway Trailer Co., 67
F. (2d) 558
There is no Uncertainty in the Rule of Law to be Ap-
plied under R. S. 4887 in Determining whether there
has been a Forfeiture of a Patent, and the Rule
of Identity of Claims was Correctly applied in the
Courts Below
Conclusion
Appendix ...
Claims relied on, as Granted, with Disclaimer
Applied
FEL LOU PMS ERS oF “PRISE
14
16
18
il
CASES OITED.
PAGES
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin, 245 U. S. 198,
206-207 16
American Road Machine Co. v. Pennock & Sharp Co.,
164 U. S. 26, 41 10, 11, 12
Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U. S.
403 17, 19, 20
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 21
Concrete Appliances Co., et al., v. Gomery, et al., 269
U. S. 177, 180 7, 10,13
DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U. S.
664, 678, 682 10, 13, 14
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated, 220 U. S. 428 .. 13
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
261 U. S. 45, 64 12
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366 17
Fireball Gas Tank & Ill. Co. v. Commercial Acetylene
Co., 239 U. S. 156 22
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Highway Trailer Co., 54 F.
(2d) 691, 67 F. (2d) 558 18, 20, 21
General Electric Co. v. Cooper Hewitt Elec. Co., 249
}’. 61; Certiorari denied, 246 U. S. 668 16
Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 247
U. S. 426, 432 10, 12, 13
Hailes v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582, 587 18, 20, 21
Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U. S. 353 10, 12
Heller Bros. v. Crucible Co., 297 F. 39 16
Hobbs v. Beach, 180 U. S. 383, 391, 392, 395-397 13, 15
Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U. S.
245, 253 16, 18
Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 434 21
Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U. S. 456, 463 20
-~ ——
iil
PAGES
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213
U. 8. 301, 322, 323 17, 22
Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342, 345 10
Pattee Plow Co. v. Kingman, 129 U. S. 294 wnnucssmeumnl4, 16
Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp., et al., v. Concrete
Mixing & Conveying Co., 282-U. S. 175 vrennenenrmnlQ, 13
Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. 8S. 554 14, 15
Risdon Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68 ........16, 18
Robertson v. Blake, 94 U. S. 728 12
Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 8 F. (2d)
682; Certiorari denied, 269 U. S. 571 12
Siemens v. Sellers, 123 U. S. 276 22
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 400 21
Straus v. Crane, 235 F. 126 19
Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 17
Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood Ry., etc., 281
U. S. 548 7
Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.
S. 445 7
Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 432 mss 21
Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U. S. 402, 414 21
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S.
537 16, 17, 18
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United St-tes
OCTOBER TERM, 1934.
No. 255.
lili
—_—o>
Auroona Pusirx THeatres, Inc.,
Petitioner,
and
Witmer & Vincent Corporation and Locust STREET
Rea Estate Company,
Petitioners,
vs.
American Tri-Ercon Corporation and Tri-Ercon
Houprne, A. G.,
Respondents.
= ==
ow
On Petition ror a Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE CrrcuitT
- Court or APPEALS FoR THE THIRD CrRculr.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION.
OPINIONS BELOW.
The District Court’s opinion appearing in Vol. II of
the Record at page 1027, is reported in 5 Fed. Supp. 32.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals appearing in
2
Vol. II of the Record, page 1157, is not officially reported.
Both opinions have been separately printed by the Peti-
tioners for the conve-.ience of the court. The Circuit Court
of Appeals also rendered a supplemental opinion on Au-
gust 6, 1934 not officially reported but filed in this court
after the filing of the record.
JURISDICTION.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Sec. 240a,
Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925,
43 Stat. 938 (Title 28, U. S. C. A., § 347).
QUESTION PRESENTED.
This is an ordinary patent suit for infringement and the
sole question presented is whether the patent is valid.
Infringement is not contested. The petitioners contend
that the patent is invalid for want of invention, because
of expansion of the claims beyond the original disclosure,
because the process claims are for the mere function of
a machine, because of a disclaimer filed before trial and
because of forfeiture under R. S., 4887 by reason of an
earlier German patent issued to the same inventors.
Respondents dispute all of these contentions, all of which
were resolved in their favor in both courts below.
STATEMENT.
The patent in these suits, #1,713,726, was granted on
May 21, 1929 (Vol. III, pp. 1-10, and printed in pamphlet
form herewith). It relates to photographic sound on film
recording and reproducing. It is owned by the American
Tri-Ergon Corporation, one of the Respondents. On Octo-
ber 10, 1932, the bills of complaint (Vol. I, pp. 9, 28) were
filed against Petitioners, who operate motion picture thea-
tres, charging infringement of said patent. A disclaimer
to the patent was filed before trial (Vol. ITI, p. 227, and
Appendix, infra, p. 23). Both suits were tried on the
3
same record and defended by R. C. A. Photophone, Inc.
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Radio Corporation of Amer-
ica), the licensor of the infringing machines. Validity was
contested but not infringement (Vol. II, p. 1049). The
type PS-16 machine, involved in the Altoona Public suit,
was held to infringe claims 9, 13, 17, 18 and 19, as
charged. The type PS-1 machine, involved in the Wilmer
& Vincent suit, was held to infringe claims 5, 7, 9, 13, 18
and 19, as charged (pp. 1049, 1090). No petition for a
rehearing was filed.
The Radio Corporation and Western Electric Company
are cross-licensors in the sound picture field (Vol. II, pp.
1024-25), and apparently have enjoyed a substantial mo-
nopoly in supplying sound picture machines to the industry
in this country (Vol. II, pp. 847-51). Western Electric
commenced in August, 1926 to pvt out sound picture ma-
chines. These embodied only sound on disk. One of the
patentees then brought one of their Tri-Ergon sound on
film machines here in December, 1926, and demonstrated
and discussed it with Western Electric engineers, after
which Western Electric carried on experiments with sound
on film (Finding 31, Vol. I, p. 1047). The first R. C. A.
sound picture machine of any kind was put out in October,
1928 (Finding 29, Vol. II, p. 1046). Machines put out and
licensed by each of these two companies have been
equipped for sound on film and Found on disk (Vol. V,
pp. 1411-17), but in the last few years sound on film sound
pictures have driven sound on disk sound pictures from .
the market (Finding 24, Vol. IT, p. 1045).
The record here contains over 2,900 pages. The trial
court heard many witnesses, fact and expert; witnessed
extensive demonstrations of Petitioners’ and Respondents’
machines and of many alleged prior art models, and after
an exhaustive review of the record, as shown from the
many findings of fact and conclusions of law considered and
passed upon (Vol. II, pp. 1037-1129)—it rendered its opin-
ion accompanied by said findings which should be read as
a part of the trial court’s opinion. They cover all of the
a ee
aa
4
points here presented by Petitioners, and are against them
in every particular.
The trial court found, among other things, that the pat-
ent in suit discloses apparatus and methods which made
possible the successful establishment of a new and impor-
tant art—sound on film sound pictures (Vol. II, pp. 1030
and 1045); that the invention made possible the first suc-
cessful photographic sound reproduction (p. 1079); that the
patentees were the first in the world to demonstrate pub-
licly sound on film either with or without pictures, which
they did in 1922 with a machine made according to the
patent (p. 1045); that the prior efforts of various other
scientists to produce sound on film were unsuccessful (p.
1084); and no sound on film machine was ever previously
put out (pp. 1045-6) ; that the features of the claims all co-
operate to produce the new and useful result of distortion-
less sound reproduction from sound on film (pp. 1078 and
-1030) ; and that none of the seventy odd patents cited, an-
ticipated or invalidated the claims (pp. 1077-78); that the
prior art sound on film patents were for inoperative, use-
less structures (p. 1080); that the old Edison cylinder and
disk gramophones with flywheel control, involved entirely
different problems and were superseded by centrifugal ball
governors useful there, but not satisfactory for and not
used in sound on film machines (pp. 1069; 1070-71; 1050);
that the claims are not merely for the use of a fly wheel in
a sound head (p. 1048)*; that the patent is entitled to a
“Not only are the claims for combinations of features, but
as to the flywheel itself there are many places in a sound on
film machine where a flywheel may be placed without opera-
tively controlling the film. By reason of the teachings of
the patent it is now known that the flywheel should be
associated with the cylinder—sprocket or roller—either at
or adjacent the optical slit (translation point) over a por-
tion of which cylinder the film passes so as to properly
contrel the film, and that it should not be associated with
some other part of the machine where it will not properly
function.
sews ~ ren 8. PTO CEERI DOR ORIN eR ot ——
5
pioneer status (p. 1078), and that all of the claims at issue
were valid and infringed (p. 1090).
The Circuit Court of Appeals (who also had the various
machines and models before it) in a comprehensive opin-
ion affirmed the trial court in its findings and conclusions,
in which it stressed the points that the prior art sound on
film patents were inoperative paper patents (p. 1162); that
these paper patents embodied many disturbing factors pre-
venting proper photographic sound on film, and that these
disturbing factors had never been segregated, diagnosed
and then collectively remedied, until the patentees did it
(p. 1160) ; that the suggestions and prophesies found in the
prior art were confusing and not helpful (p. 1162); that
each of the elements of the patent in suit coacts directly
with the others to produce a new and useful result, the
prevention of sound distortion (pp. 1162-3). Thus the in-
vention made possible the successful recording and repro-
duction of sound on film, which had not been attained be-
cause of many difficulties in eliminating the different dis-
turbing elements which reacted one upon another. The
apparatus designed was the first embodiment of successful
invention.
It is not possible to fix a film in a machine as Hdison
fixed his cylinders. The flimsy light film enters the sound
head from the motion picture machine at 90 ft. per minute
charged with complex vibrations. Each successive short
length of film at the optical slit must be instantaneously
and momentarily endowed with the property of a heavy
mass and brought into accurate focus with the fine line of
light and yet permitted immediately to pass on out of the
sound head. Applying the irertia control directly to a
film adjacent the translation point had not even occurred
to anyone. No one yet knew that irregularities in the film
perforations and the meshing of the sprocket teeth there-
with would cause distortion of the sound. No one had dis-
6
covered the sources of the difficulties, although scientists
had tried unsuccessfully for years to use light to translate
sound to or from film. Prophesies and speculations for
remedying one or another of the disturbing factors while
retaining others, got nowhere from a practical standpoint
because the ‘remaining disturbing effects left the result so
poor that the actual effect of the proposed remedy could
not be determined.
No one had successfully used film sound records of any
kind, nor sound modulated light in any practical art.
The uniformity of speed of the film, the arcuate bending
of the film and the focused line of light all coact at the
same point to determine the desired spacing, definition and
transparency of the light lines photographed for distor-
tionless swand recording—pitch and volume; and in repro-
ducing they all coact at the same point in determining
the character of each instantaneous, modulated fine line of
light directed upon the P.E. cell to produce distortionless
sound reproduction.
Petitioners’ assertions as to the facts in this case are
contrary to the findings below. Thus for example they seek
to build up a case of inconsistency with this Court’s opin-
ions by attempting to create the impression that. the gist of
the invention here was the use of a flywheel in an old well
known film phonograph, and by representing that the prob-
lem here was the same as in Edison’s old cylinder phono-
graph. The lower courts on the evidence presented have
found against them on each of these points and their only
references for sound on film are to paper patents which do
not anticipate.
There is no reason for granting this petition. This is
merely an ordinary patent suit in which Petitioners seek
to have this Court review all but one of their defenses
below. The questions presented are largely questions of
fact upon which both courts below have concurred in find-
ing for the Respondents. The issues relate to the validity
ROI ESS TE SO eT eI NT et tk he
7
of a patent. There is no conflict among*the Circuits on
that issue nor any conflict between the decision of the court
below and any cther court upon any question of law in-
volved, and no novel or unusual questions of law are
involved.
Petitioners assert that a brief which it has been sought
to file as amicus curiae, was tendered ‘‘on behalf of sub-
stantially the entire motion picture industry’’. This state-
ment is not supported by the record or by the brief sought
to be filed, and many important producers and exhibitors
of sound motion pictures did not join in the petition for
leave to file the brief (Vol. II, pp. 848-51).
So far as concerns the effect of this patent on the in-
dustry, the record further shows that up to a few years
ago, disk-sound pictures were in commercial use until
driven from the market by the superiority of the invention
here involved. The industry is free to go back to that ap-
paratus which this record further shows the infringing
machines are equipped to use (Vol. V, pp. 1411-i7).
ARGUMENT.
THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
“DECISIONS OF THIS COURT ON THE QUESTION OF
INVENTION.
The question of patentable invention is a question of
fact. Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265
U. S. 445; Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U. S.
177, 180. Both courts below decided this question against
the petitioners. Under the well-established rule this Court
accepts the findings in which two courts concur unless clear
error is shown, Tezas ¢ N. O. R. Co.v. Brotherhood Ry. éc.,
281 U. S. 548, or, in patent cases, unless the question of
fact I is been differently decided in two circuits. Thom-
son Spot Welder v. Ford Motor Co., supra; Concrete Appli-
ances Co. v. Gomery, supra.
~The claims in suit were sustained in the District
Court upon extensive findings of fact predicated upon evi-
See RY Pee tee ne .
8
dence much of which was conflicting and contradictory.
The Circuit Court of Appeals found no error justifying
reversal of the trial court’s findings or conclusions, and
upon a careful review of the record stated its own conclu-
sions upon the facts and the law, which are in accord with
those of the trial court. Upon the facts thus found the
decision of the court below is in accord with the decisions
of this Court upon the question of invention.
After describing the invention in its relation to the art,
the Court of Appeals reached the following conclusions:
‘‘The prior art does not disclose this combination
nor the result which it produced. The evidence shows
that the moving, talking picture art was looking for
something like this. The defendants point to some
seventy patents, some having one element of the patent
in issue, and some another, but none have this com-
bination and none produce the result of this combina-
tion. The patentees were the first to accomplish suc-
cessfully and commercially photographic sound on film
reproduction. The suggestions and prophecies found
in paper patents were confusing and not helpful.
‘‘This new combination of the patent was not ob-
vious to one skilled in the art for no one else had dis-
covered it, although many were working on it and it
required years of patient study and research before
the patentees were able to work out this combination
and method, although some of the individual elements
were old, one being found here and another there in
inoperative paper patents. The defendants were un-
able to produce a single anticipation among the sev-
enty or more paper patents upon which they relied.
‘‘The trial judge said that the combination and
methods of the claims of the patent in issue are not
found in any prior art citations and are new and useful.
A close study of the citations confirms this finding.
No one before the patentees was able to bring together
9
all the elements of the patent into a successfully op-
erative combination. Each of these elements coact di-
rectly with the others to produce a new and useful
result, the prevention of sound distortion. It is well
settled that a new combination, every element of which
is old, is patentable if it produces a new and useful
result, or an old result in a ‘new and materially better
way’, or an ‘old result in a more advantageous way’ ”’
(Vol. II, pp. 1162, 1163).
Referring to the many difficulties which confronted the
art, and which were overcome by the inventors, the Court
said:
‘‘These had never been segregated and diagnosed
and then collectively remedied, until the patentees did
it’’ (Vol. II, p. 1160).
The trial court expressly found that the claims are not
merely for the use of a fly wheel in a sound head, and that
the combination and methods of the claims in suit are not
found in any of the prior art citations and are new and
useful (Vol. II, pp. 1048; 1078).
‘For the facts in detail see findings of the trial court
(Vol. II, pp. 1037-1090). The Pedersen patent is covered
by Finding 71 (Vol. II, p. 1077), Finding 54 (Vol. I, p.
1056) and Conclusion of Law 9 (Vol. II, p. 1080). The
Ries Patent is covered by Finding 59 (Vol. II, p. 1068)
and Conclusion of Law 9 (Vol. II, p. 1080). The Edison
cylinder phonograph equipped with a fly wheel is covered
in Findings 60 and 62 (Vol. II, pp. 1069-71), and the
Dragoumis Patent by Finding 56 (Vol. II, p. 1062). As
to petitioners’ assertion that only the use of a fly wheel
performing its well known function is embodied in the
claims, see Findings describing the combination of the pat-
ent numbered 1 to 17; 23-a to 26, and 73 (Vol. II, pp.
1037-42, 1045-46, 1078) and particularly Findings 32, 37, 38
and 39 (Vol. II, pp. 1048-51) ; and also Conclusions of Law
2 and 4 (Vol. II, pp. 1078-9).
MIE rer) ~
RE OF pe —— cremnene Ae i ed oe
10
Upon the facts found by both courts below the patented
combination clearly involved invention under rules repeat-
edly enunciated by this Court. Hailes v. Van Wormer,
87 U. S. 353; Palmer v. Corning, 156 U. S. 342, 345; Grin-
nell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 247 U. S. 426,
432.
The lower court cited these very cases (now relied upon
by petitioners) for the rule it followed. It recognized the
rule but also that the invention before it was distinctly dif-
ferent from the stove in the Hates case, each of the sepa-
rate elements of which had been well known and in public
use in stoves; from the sewer grate of the Palmer case
as to which the Court said: ‘‘A grate over a sewer is
one of the simplest of mechanical devices’’; and from the
washing machine which was merely the gearing together
of a common washing machine and a common wringer with
a control handle.
Thns the court below recognized and applied to the par-
ticular facts peculiar to this case the ‘‘settled’’ rule enunci-
ated by this Court governing the patentability of new and
useful combinations of old elements producing either a new
result or an old result in a better way. There was no mis-
statement of the established rule, and therefore no conflict
of decisions. Furthermore, the established principles were
correctly applied.
The decision of the court below is not in conflict with
any of the following decisions of this court which are relied
upon by the petitioners as conflicting:
American Road Machine Co. v. Pennock & Sharp
Co., 164 U. S. 26.
Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 247
U. 8. 426.
Concrete Appliances Co., et al., v. Gomery, et al.,
269 U. S. 177.
Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp., et al., v. Con-
crete Miaing & Conveying Co., 282 U. S. 175.
DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283
U. 8. 664.
_ Aare a itiaainial os)
SE DCN CT ean OREN PEER MATT OR EEE! FT “pow —
11
In American Road Machine Co. v. Pennock, et al., supra,
a patent for a machine for making, repairing and cleaning
roads was held void for want of invention. The claim of
invention was predicated upon increasing the weight of the
old well known hand-wheel fo: lifting the road scraper
employed in this class of machinery. The opinion, as we
understand it, goes no further than to hold that road
machine mechanisms had been operated by hand-wheels;
that such mechanism was a ‘‘common device’’ and had been
used in various machines, and a heavy wheel in ‘‘this class
of machinery’’ to secure ‘‘the well known result’’, was not
patentable. After an exhaustive review of the prior art this
Court concluded (164 U.S., p. 41).
‘*But the decision of the Circuit Court rested on the
want of invention, and in that conclusion we concur.
‘**The whole essence of the Taft invention’, says
appellant’s counsel, is the application of momentum to
carry the wheel along ‘sufficiently to enable the opera-
tor to take a new grasp (as explained by Mr. Breevort),
without clamping the wheel to prevent its running
backward’.
‘*Did increasing the weight of the hand-wheels in this
class of road machmes, in order to correct the tend-
ency of smaller wheels to reverse, involve patentable
novelty?
‘*We do not think so. The use of hand-wheels as
a substitute for straight levers in this class of ma-
chinery was old, and whether the wheels were light or
heavy (and heavy wheels were old), they alike per-
formed the service of rotary levers.’’ (Italics ours.)
Obviously there is no conflict between that decision and
the decision of the court below, unless, as petitioners seem
to contend, no use of a flywheel in any combination for
any purpose can be patentable, no matter what the char-
acter of the machine embodying it, or the arrangement,
12
purpose or result may be. Of course this is not the law,
and the Road Machine case did not so hold.
In Robertson v. Blake, 94 U. S. 728, the patentable
machine was certainly not the first commercially success-
ful stone crusher. It could not be compared in its rela-
tion to the art with the apparatus disclosed by the pat-
ent in suit. And yet in that case this Court found the
use of a flywheel in combination with a revolving shaft
and a movable jaw to be patentable invention. Even a
novel application of the force of gravity may involve inven-
tion. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
261 U. S. 45, 64; Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher
Co., 8 F. (2) 682 (C. C. A. 2); (Certiorari denied, 269
U. S. 571).
Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 274 U.
S. 426, was cited and relied upon in the court below in
holding upon the facts found that a combination of the
claims was a patentable invention. In that case this court
restated the rules, which it declared were authoritatively
settled by its own decisions for determining the patenta-
bility of combinations of old elements known to the art.
The opinion of the Court states (p. 432):
‘*Generally speaking, a combination of old elements
in order to be patentable must produce by their joint
action a novel and useful result, or an old result in
a more advantageous way.’’
It then quotes from Hailes v. Van Wormer, supra:
‘* «Tt must be conceded that a new combination, if
it produces new and useful results, is patentable,
though all the constituents of the combination were
well known and in common use before the combination
was made. But the results must be a product of the
combination, and not a mere aggregate of several re-
sults, each the complete product of one of the com-
bined elements’. * * *
13
‘Merely bringing old devices into juxtaposition, and
there allowing each to work out its own effect without
the production of something novel, is not invention’ ”’
(p. 432).
The applicable and controlling principles in the Washing
Machine case were properly applied to the facts found in
the court below and the case was cited as authority for
the application of the rule. (Opinion below, Vol. II, p.
1163.)
Other decisions of this Court sustaining the patentability
of combinations of old elements are Hobbs v. Beach, 180
U. S. 383, 391-392, cited by the trial court and Diamond
Rubber Co. v. Consolidated, 220 U. S. 428.
In Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U. 8. 177, the
question of invention was stated to be one of fact depend-
ent upon consideration of the state of the art as applied
to the disclosure of the patent in that suit (p. 180). Norule
different from that of the Washing Machine case was
stated. The old rule was simply applied to the particular
device before the Court.
Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp., et al., v. Concrete
Mixing € Conveying Co., 282 U. S. 175, was simply the
application of the same rule to another state of facts.
In DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.
S. 664, Langmuir’s patent for a high vacuum discharge
tube used as a detector and as an amplifier in radio com-
munication and telephony, and for the process of making
it, was held invalid both for want of invention and because
of prior use. No new rule was stated. The Court simply
affirmed the findings of the trial court—that on the evi-
dence presented the Langmuir improvement was an ob-
vious thing and in prior use (pp. 682, 685).
This Court was careful to point out in its opinion (p.
678) that even though the improvement was accomplished
by a change so simple as to be brought about by reducing
the pressure in the well-known low vacuum tube by a few
14
microns, still it might be invention. But the trial court
having found that both the method and the result of such
a change were well known to the art (p. 682), this Court
concluded that the patent was void for want of invention.
Here the invention and its relation to the prior art are
entirely different from those in Petitioners’ cases; and the
courts below simply applied the settled rule of this Court
to a different state of facts.
THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT IN RAILWAY CO. v. SAYLES,
97 U. S. $54, AND PATTEE PLOW CO. v. KINGMAN, 129 U. S&S.
294, CLAIMS 9, 13, 17, 18 AND 19, FINDING AMPLE SUP-
PORT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF THE ORIGINAL APPLI-
CATION.
This, of course, is a question of fact. And fere, again,
the findings below in both courts were against the peti-
tioners.
Petitioners contend in substance that in the original ap-
plication it was not indicated that the following features
were part of the invention, i. e., (1) arcuate bending of
the film; (2) the use of a film feeding sprocket in addition
to the cylinder over which the film is passed; (3) the photo
electric cell; and (4) the optical slit. But the trial court
found as a fact that each of these four features was dis-
closed in the original application as filed.? As to all of these
features the trial court found that ‘‘The combinations and
methods of the claims in suit were adequately disclosed
under the provisions of R. S., 4888, in the application for
the patent in suit as originally filed’’ (Vol. I, p. 1080).
*As to features (1), (3) and (4), see Finding 6 (Vol. II,
pp. 1038, 1039), and as to feature (2) see Finding 14 as to
Figure 2 originally in the application disclosing this fea-
ture (Vol II, p. 1041), also described in the original
specification, see Appendix to Petitioners’ Brief, p. 43, and
in Finding 72 (Vol. H, p. 1077).
15
It is significant that petitioners have omitted as a part
of the original specifications printed in the appendix to
their brief all of the original drawings which form an im-
portant part of the disclosure. They are found with the
patent (Vol. III, pp. 1-10, and printed in pamphlet form
herewith).
The petitioners also claim that it was not until after the
Radio Corporation of America had put out their machines
that these four features were included in some of the claims,
and that such inclusion was an expansion of the invention
to cover the machines which have been held to infringe
in the courts below. The record, however, fails to show
that any machine was put out by Radio Corporation prior
to the grant of the patent (May, 1929) excepting only a
single isolated PS-1 machine, in October, 1928, at Johns-
town, Pennsylvania, and that no PS-16 machine was
put out until several months after the grant of the patent
(Vol. II, p. 848, and Finding 29, p. 1046). The PS-1
machine was held to infringe Claims 5, 7, 9, 13, 18 and
the PS-16 machine was held to infringe Claims 9, 13,
17, 18 and 19 (Vol. II, p. 1090). Claims 5, 7 and 9
were made long prior to the date of the earlier machine
(the first two in March, 1925, and the last in May, 1928;
Vol. III, pp. 52-3, 79). Thus each of these machines
infringed at least»one of the patent claims already in the
application before the machine was buili.
The claims being fully supported by the disclosure of
the original application, and no intervening rights having
accrued, the decision below was controlled by Hobbs v.
Beach, 180 U. S. 383, 395-397, where these considerations
were emphasized and made the basis of decision in dis-
tinguishing from Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554. In
that case (pp. 557-59) the original application, rejected as
defective and insufficient, lay dormant and unaltered for
five years during which time defendants’ machines were
put out, whereupon a new application was filed with new
drawings and specifications disclosing a new apparatus,
16
different from the original in construction and operation.
Even when implication from the drawings and specifica-
tions of the original application is necessary to suppogt
the new claims, this Court will sustain such claims pro-
vided they have not been expanded beyond what may rea-
sonably be implied from the original disclosure. <Aber-
crombie & Fitch Co. v. Baldwin. 245 U. S. 198, 206-207.
Pattee Plow Co. v. Kingman, 129 U. S. 294, involved a
reissue patent filed over two years after the application
for the original patent, and this Court found that the
reissue claim sued on was broader than the original
claim and held the patent invalid on that ground, under
the well established rule that a patent cannot be broadened
by a reissue after two years in the absence of special cir-
cumstances excusing the delay. The decision is not appli-
cable in the case at bar.
That the court below clearly understood the rules estab-
lished by this Court on this point is shown not only by
the opinion in this case but by its earlier opinion in Heller
Bros. v. Crucible Co., 297 Fed. 39, where the law was re-
viewed at length. Certiorari was denied on this point in
the case of General Electric Co. v. Cooper-Hewitt Electric
Co., 249 Fed. 61 (Certiorari denied, 246 U. S. 668).
THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT WITH RESPECT TO WHAT
IS A PATENTABLE PROCESS.
Both courts below having found the method claims to
be valid, petitioners assert that the decision below is in
conflict with the decisions of this Court in Holland Furni-
ture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U. S. 245; Westinghouse
v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U. S. 537, and Risdon
Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68. These cases
are not applicable.
When Risdon Locomotive Works v. Medart, supra, was
decided it was assumed that a patentable process must
— ET” Pe se EP Oe Te
17
involve a chemical or other similar elemental action. This
assumption was questioned by this Court in Westinghouse
v. Boyden, 170 U. S. 537, and until its decision in Expanded
Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, the question as to
whether any process involving a purely mechanical opera-
tion was patentable was not entirely free from doubt. But
in the latter case the Court, after reviewing all of the deci-
sions of this Court upon the subject, including the Tele-
phone Cases, 126 U. S. 1; Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria
Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403, and Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor
Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301,* concluded:
‘‘That an invention or discovery of a process or method
involving mechanical operations, and producing a new
and useful result, may be within the protection of the
Federal statute, and entitle an inventor to a patent for
his discovery’’ (214 U. S., at 386).
This Court also pointed out in the Expanded Metal Case
(p. 386) that in the Telephone Cases it had sustained a
patent for a method of transmitting electrical undulations
similar in form to the vibrations of the air accompanying
vocal sounds, and at the same time the patent for the
apparatus by which the method was operated was sus-
tained; and that in the Leeds ¢ Catlin Case it had held
that a process and apparatus by which it is performed
are distinct things, and may be patented in one patent or
in different patents.
®*The process claim involved in the Victor Talking Ma-
chine case read as follows:
‘*Claim 45: The method of reproducing sounds from
a record of the same, which consists in vibrating a
stylus, and propelling the same along the record by
and in accordance with the said record, substantially
as described’’ (213 U. S., at 314).
Compare with process claims 9, 18 and 19 (appendix,
infra).
18
Upon the findings of the courts below the method claims
here in suit are clearly within the decision of this Court in
the last four cases, and the decisions of this Court relied
upon by the petitioners are not applicable,—Risdon Locomo-
tive Works v. Medart, supra, because the ruling of that case
has been limited and qualified by the later decisions of
this Court; Westinghouse v. Boyden, supra, because the
only question there presented was whether the apparatus
claims were drawn on the function of the apparatus rather
than upon its structure, the opinion stating that the case
did not call for any expression of opinion on what may
be a patentable process; Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins
Glue Co., supra, because that decision dealt solely with a
product claim for vegetable glue, and the opinion expressly
states that the ‘‘process claims are not before us’’ (p. 253).
THE DECISION BELOW IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT IN FRUEHAUF TRAILER CO. v. HIGHWAY
TRAILER CO., 67 F. (2d) 558.
The petitioners assert a conflict between the decision of
the court below sustaining the validity of a disclaimer and
the decision in Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Highway Trailer
Co., 67 F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 6th), declaring a disclaimer
invalid. In that case the disclaimer was obviously invalid
under the ruling of this Court in Hailes v. Albany Stove
Co., 123 U. S. 582, but there is no conflict here with the
latter decision and none is asserted by the petitioners.
The trial court in its Opinion held:
‘‘The disclaimer limits the patent and does not en-
large it. The subject matter of the disclaimer is con-
sistent and in accordance with the teachings of the
patent. No part of the disclaimer broadens or pur-
ports to broaden the scope of the claim of the patent.
The presumption of validity of the patent in suit is
19
unaffected by the disclaimer and the claims in suit here,
as modified by the disclaimer, are valid. Carnegie
Steel case, 185 U. S., at 435’’ (Vol. II, p. 1034).*
The court below considered this defense, regarded it as
unsubstantial, and affirmed the decision of the trial court
(Vol. II, p. 1172).
The facts relating to the disclaimer are: (1) No claim
is broadened by the disclaimer (pp. 1086-7) ; (2) each of the
features by-which the claims in suit are qualified by dis-
claimer was shown and described in the application for
the patent as filed and in the patent as granted (pp. 1077
and 1041); (3) each of the limitations by disclaimer was
actually included in one or more of the claims of the patent
as issued (p. 1086); (4) each limitation is entirely con-
sistent and in accordance with the teachings of the patent
(p. 1086); (5) the disclaimer qualifies the already claimed
apparatus or method by limiting it to one wherefn the
sound is translated by light to or from the film (p. 1086);
(6) the disclaimer qualifies claims 9, 13, 18 and 19, by limit-
ing them to the feature of flywheel control, a feature dis-
closed in the specification and covered in several of the
claims as issued (p. 1086); (7) the disclaimer qualifies
claim 17 by limiting it to a sprocket forming a part of the
‘‘carrier-progressing means’’ (already in the claim) located
with respect to a portion of the periphery of the ‘‘cylinder’’
already in the claim. This construction is in accordance
with the teachings of the patent, which disclose the arrange-
ment, for example, in connection with Figure 2 (pp. 1086
and 1041).
Upon this state of facts the disclaimer was valid under
the decision of this Court in Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria
Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403. In Straus v. Crane, 235 Fed. 126
(C. C. A. 2nd), Judge Learned Hand stated (p. 129): ‘‘We
“See also Finding No. 72, Vol. II, page 1077, and Conclu-
sion No. 24, Vol. II, page 1086.
20
do not mean to suggest that a disclaimer may not add a new
element to the combination, thereby limiting it to a part
only of what was covered by the specifications. That was
the effect of the disclaimer in Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cam-
bria Iron Works, 185 U.S. 403.’’ The disclaimer sustained
by this Court in Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U. S. 456, had
the same effect of limiting the claim to a part only of what
was covered by the specifications. In that case the limita-
tion was accomplished by adding a new element to the
combination, i. e., the tar paper or other material between
the blocks of concrete (see p. 463).
There was no attempt in the case at bar by merely filing
a paper to make a new patent, or one for a different inven-
tion from that shown and described in the specification and
drawings of the patent. That is what was attempted in
Hades v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582, as the Court
etated at page 587. In that case it was also held:
‘‘The first claim, as modified by the disclaimer, has
nothing in the specification to stand upon, nothing to
explain it, nothing to furnish a reason for it.’’
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Highway Trailer Co., 67
F. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 6th), involved a set of facts
similar to those in the Hailes case, and the Court held
that the disclaimer did not limit the combination al-
ready claimed but expanded it to cover structures upon
which it could not before have been read; and in
ef‘ect claimed a new and a different combination by the
addition of a structural feature which was not disclosed
or expressly referred to in the patent. This is quite obvi-
ous from a mere reading of the claims and disclaimers.
The Court in its Opinion stated that it agreed with the
views expressed by the learned trial Judge upon the sub-
ject of the disclaimers. We therefore refer to the Opinion
of the trial court, 54 F. (2d) 691, for the facts, which are
21
there set forth at length. With respect to one of the dis-
claimers it appears that the apparatus claimed in the pat-
ent was concededly inoperative, and that the effect of the
disclaimer was to add to the invention operative features
which were not disclosed at all in the patent, which were
not only not thought of by the patentee but were contrary
to the instruction of his patent. With respect to the other
disclaimer the same situation appeared, because the origi-
nal claim was directed entirely to a trailer—not a tractor—
and contained no reference to a tractor but the disclaimer
introduced the tractor—a different machine—making a new
claim out of the original—a claim for the combination of
a trailer and tractor.
There is a general statement in the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Trailer case which if read without
regard to the facts in that case, may perhaps give the
appearance of conflict with the decision in the case at bar.
But every opinion must be read with regard to the facts
of the case and the question actually decided. Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399; Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270
U. S. 402, 414; Tyson @ Bros. v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418,
432; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 400; Home Bldg.
¢ L. Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434.
When the opinion in the Trailer case is thus read no con-
flict appears. Upon the facts of that case invalidity of the
disclaimer was perfectly apparent under the rule in Hailes
v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582. General statements
in an opinion going beyond the facts in the case do not
raise conflicts of decisions because decision in each case
is necessarily confined by the facts presented and cannot
be broadened by generalities thrown out in the opinion.
22
THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY IN THE RULE OF LAW TO BE
APPLIED UNDER R. S. 4887 IN DETERMINING WHETHER
THERE HAS BEEN A FORFEITURE OF A PATENT,
AND THE RULE OF IDENTITY OF CLAIMS WAS COR-
RECTLY APPLIED IN THE COURTS BELOW.
The decisions of this Court in Leeds ¢ Catlin Co. v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, and Fireball
Gas Tank @ Ill. Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239 U. S.
156, establish the rule that forfeiture under R. S., 4887,
depends upon the identity of invention claimed in the two
patents; that claims are independent inventions; that a
process claim is a distinct invention from an apparatus
claim, and that although certain elements may be common
to the claims of both patents this does not establish their
identity. Applying these rules as established by the appli-
cable decisions of this Court the trial court found that there
were several features in the claims at issue not disclosed
in the German patent; that the German patent was inopera-
tive; that there was no substantial identity of invention
claimed in the foreign patent to that claimed in the claims
at issue, and that accordingly there was no forfeiture under
the statute (Vol. II, pp. 1033; 1075; 1088). See also the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals’ findings (Vol. II, pp. 1168-1172). Of
course the German patent in this case was not pricr art,
since the two patents were co-pending (Vol. I, p. 1089). In
view of the decisions in the Victor Talking Machine case,
supra, and the Fire Ball Gas Tank case, supra, the earlier
decision in Siemens v. Sellers, 123 U. S. 276, cannot be read
in qualification of the rules so clearly laid down in the
later decisions of this Court which expressly limit the deci-
sion in Stemens v. Sellers to the facts that were under
consideration in that case which disclosed identity of in-
vention. Furthermore the question of identity is largely
one of fact. Victor Talking Machine case, supra (at pp.
322-323).
PRT IRC OS Lp EEE HO
23
CONCLUSION.
The decision below is correct. It is in accord with the
applicable decisions of this Court and is not in conflict with
the decision of any other Circuit Court of Appeals. The
questions presented involve the application of well settled
rules of law to facts peculiar to this case, are not of
general importance and are not worthy of review in this
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
Tsomas D. THACHER,
Huca M. Morris,
S. Mortimer Warp, Jr.,
Counsel for Respondents.
September, 1934.
24
APPENDIX.
CLAIMS RELIED ON, AS GRANTED, WITH
DISCLAIMER APPLIED.
(Under {fa of the disclaimer [Vol. ITI, p. 227], the speci-
fication and claims are directed only to combinations and
methods as embodied respectively in apparatus wherein
and methods whereby sound is translated by light to or
from a film strip moving uniformly past said light.)
Claim 5.
In phonographic apparatus in which the sound
record is formed on an elongated ribbon of incon-
siderable mass, having feeding perforations there-
in, the combination of means for supporting and
progressing the record ribbon from one point to
another point and past an intermediate point at
which the record is made on the ribbon in record-
ing or from which the record is taken from the
ribbon in reproducing, including a toothed cylinder
over a portion of which the ribbon passes adjacent
to said intermediate point, the teeth of said cyl-
inder engaging the perforations of the ribbon, a
fly-wheel associated with said cylinder, and means
for rotating said cylinder, under control of said
fly-wheel at uniform speed. ,
Claim 7.
_
~
In phonographic apparatus in which the sound
record is formed on an elongated carrier of incon-
siderable mass, the combination of means for sup-
porting and progressing the elongated carrier from
one point to another point, and past an intermedi-
ate point at which the record is made on the car-
rier in recording or from which the record is taken
from the carrier in reproducing, including a cyl-
inder over a portion of the periphery of which the
Ne ee ee re
25
carrier passes adjacent to said intermediate point,
a fly-wheel, a shaft on which said cylinder and fly-
wheel are both secured, a driving member coaxial
with said shaft, a resilient connection between said
driving member and fly-wheel, and stop means for
limiting the amount of yielding of said resilient
connection.
Claim 9.
The method of translating sound or similar vib-
rations to or from a film record by the use of light
varied in accordance with the sound, which com-
prises flexing the film arcuately longitudinally at
the point of translation and rapidly and uniformly
moving the film in a circumferential direction past
said point.
—wherein the uniformity of movement of the film past the
translation point is effected by subjecting the portion of the
film passing said point to the control of the inertia of a
rotating weighty mass (see disclaimer {[b).
Claim 13.
An apparatus for reproducing speech, music or
the like sounds from vibrations recorded on a film,
by the use of a line of light varied in accordance
with the sound, comprising a photoelectric cell,
means for imparting to the film a rapid and uni-
form motion longitudinally of the film past said
cell, a source of light projection for providing said
light, and an objective lens in the path of said
light and spaced from the film for directing said
light as a converging narrow line impinging on
the film at a point in the region of the focal point
of said lens, said light passing through the film
and on to said cell, the space between said lens
and the film being free of obstructions to said
light.
26
—wherein a flywheel is operatively connected with the film
through means which imparts uniformity of motion of the
flywheel to the film (see disclaimer fc).
Claim 17.
In phonographic apparatus in which the sound
record is formed on an elongated carrier of in-
considerable mass, the combination of means for
supporting and progressing the elongated carrier
from one point to another point, and past an inter-
mediate point at which the record is made on
the carrier in recording or from which the rec-
ord is taken from the carrier in reproducing,
including a cylinder over a portion of the peri-
phery of which the carrier passes adjacent to
said intermediate point, a fly wheel operatively
associated with said cylinder, said carrier pro-
gressing means operating to advance the carrier
past said intermediate point at uniform speed
under the control of said fly wheel.
—wherein a sprocket engaging the carrier forms a part
of the carrier progressing means and a substantial portion
of the periphery of the cylinder is in contact with the
carrier in its travel from the intermediate point to said
sprocket (see disclaimer fd).
Claim 18.
SORES ESE ET
The method of translating sound or similar
vibrations to or from a film record by the use of
light varied in accordance with the sound com-
prising rapidly advancing the film past the point
of translation, and subjecting the motion of the
film in passing said point, to the control of inertia
means to effectively eliminate irregularities in the
movement of the film.
27
—wherein the inertia control is effected by passing the film
over a rotating member and so applying inertia thereto
as to eliminate substantially all irregularities in its rota-
tion (see disclaimer fle).
Claim 19.
The method according to claim 18, and in which
the film is yieldingly pressed into contact with a
supporting area immediately adjacent the point of
translation, such pressure cooperating with the
inertia control in the elimination of irregularities
in the film motion.
—wherein the inertia control is effected by passing the film
over a rotating member and so applying inertia thereto
as to eliminate substantially all irregularities in its rota-
tion (see disclaimer fe).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.