Appendix — Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission

Supreme Court brief1998

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

i Supreme Court, u.¢

i roa

No. Os 1883 JuL 28 1998

OFFICE

IN THE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

LANDGATE, INC.,

Petitioner,

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

BENJAMIN M. REZNIK

(Counsel of Record)

JOHN M. BOWMAN

JEFFER, MANGELS, BUTLER

& MARMARO, LLP

2121 Avenue of the Stars

Tenth Floor

Los Angeles, California 90067

(310) 203-8080

July 28, 1998 Counsel for Petitioner.

uly ,

Washington, D.C. * THIEL PRESS «+ (202) 328-3286

;

:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A - Opinion of the Supreme

Court of California April 30, 1998 (Mosk,

J.) (reversing California Court of Appeal

opinion and remanding with instructions to

enter order granting Commission's motion

for summary judgment)

APPENDIX B - Opinion of the California

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District

February 7, 1997 (affirming in part and

reversing in part the judgment of the Los

Angeles County Superior Court on

Landgate's takings claim)

APPENDIX C - Opinion of the California

Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District

December 18, 1992 (affirming the

judgment of the Los Angeles County

Superior Court granting a writ of mandate

vacating the Commission's disapproval of

Landgate's application)

APPENDIX D - Order of the Los Angeles

County Superior Court August 9, 1993

(granting summary adjudication of issues in

favor of Landgate)

APPENDIX E - Partial Judgment of the

Los Angeles County Superior Court

October 16, 1991 (granting a peremptory

writ of mandate vacating the Commission's

disapproval of Landgate's application)

la

55a

9la

100a

103a

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

FILED: Apr 30, 1998

SUPREME COURT

Robert Wandruff Clerk

LANDGATE, INC., ) $059847

et al., )

) Ct. App. 2/1 B084315

Plaintiffs and )

Appellants, ) L.A. County

) Super. Ct. No.

V. ) BC 024391

)

CALIFORNIA COASTAL )

COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant )

and Appellant )

)

In First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987)

482 U.S. 304, 321,' the court held that “where the govern-

ment's activities have already worked a taking of all use

l/_ The full name of this case is First English Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. We will hereinafter follow the

common practice of referring to the case as First English.

= SEE DISSENTING OPINIONS =

2a

of property, no subsequent action by the government can

relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period

during which a taking was effective." In so holding, the court

cautioned that the holding did not extend to "the quite different

questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in

obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,

variances, and the like which are not before us." (/bid.) In the

present case, we consider whether a delay in the issuance of a

development permit partly owing to the mistaken assertion of

jurisdiction by a government agency is a type of "temporary

taking" contemplated in First English, or if it is more in the

nature of a "normal delay" that does not constitute a taking.

The Court of Appeal held that a temporary taking had indeed

occurred. We conclude that the present case falls squarely into

the category of a normal delay rather than a temporary taking,

and therefore reverse the Court of Appeal.

Because of the complexities of this case, a somewhat

detailed recitation of the facts is in order. The case centers on

the efforts of plaintiff Landgate’ to build a large home in the

Malibu Hills. Landgate's predecessor in interest owned two

long, thin parcels or "lots" oriented in a north-south direction.

The northern portions were sloped, the southern portions flat.

One of the lots contained a single family home on the southern

portion. The coast lay to the south of these lots.

In the mid-1980's, the County of Los Angeles (the County)

planned to provide an east-west road that would run through

the two lots. The landowner and the County agreed that, in

2/ According to Landgate's first amended complaint, Peter and Punte

Bogart "owned and controlled" Landgate, and held a life estate in the

subject property.

3a

exchange for the owner's dedicating portions of the parcels for

the roadway easement, the County would reconfigure the lots

into a single, sloped 2.45-acre lot north of the road and a

single, flat 1.56-acre lot south of the road, each still zoned for

a single family home. The County completed the road

improvement, designated as De Butts Terrace, and formally

approved a lot re-configuration, which was recorded July 5,

1989.

The lois in question are and at all relevant times were in the

coastal zone (Pub. Resources Code, §30103) and therefore

subject to the development restrictions imposed by the

California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act), Public Resources

Code section 30000 et seq. The act requires local

governments within the coastal zone to prepare Local Coastal

Programs (LCP) containing a Land Use Plan (LUP) and a set

of implementing ordinances designed to promote the act's

objectives of protecting the coastline and its resources and

maximizing public access. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30001.5,

30512, 30513.) In general, the act provides that, until a

certified LCP is approved by the Coastal Commission

(Commission), authority to approve development lies with the

Commission. (/d., § 30519.) At the time the pertinent events

took place, the Commission had approved the County's LUP

for Malibu but had not yet approved the LCP. Therefore, the

Commission retained jurisdiction over the issuance of coastal

development permits for the area in which the subject property

is located.

In October 1990, Landgate bought the sloped northern lot

and received County approval in concept for grading and

building plans for a single-family home to be built on the

property. Landgate applied to the Commission for permits to

build the house and related structures. Landgate’s permit

application sought approval of a 9,036-square-foot home and

4a

guest house, a swimming pool and septic tank and 8,500 cubic

yards of grading. As originally proposed, the house was 44

feet above existing grade. Before the Commission's initial

consideration of the development, Landgate modified its

proposal by reducing the house to 7,500 square feet,

eliminating the guest house and reducing the proposed grading

to 4,300 cubic yards.

At its December 1990 and February 1991 meetings, the

Commission was presented with staff reports objecting to

several aspects of the project. First, staff was concerned with

visual impacts of the house, since it was located next to

Escondido Canyon, "a highly scenic area which includes a

hiking trail to Escondido Falls. The proposed project is

located south and west of Escondido Canyon and is visible

from the Escondido Falls Trail and the Escondido Falls." The

preservation of scenic and recreational resources of the coastal

area is encouraged by both the Coastal Act and the Malibu

LUP. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30251.) Staff concluded

that the visual impact of Landgate's proposed development

would be significant both because of its location on the lower,

northern lot closer to the trail and falls, and because of the

44-foot height, 9 feet above the allowable height contained in

the Malibu LUP.

Second, staff found the amount of grading required of the

proposed project to be objectionable. "In essence, the

applicant is creating a large level pad area on a hillside lot,

instead of designing the house to conform with the natural

topography." The grading plan was contrary to the Malibu

LUP, which called for the minimization of grading for all new

development "to ensure the potential negative effects of runoff

and erosion on [visual] resources are minimized." Staff found

that these problems would be alleviated if the house was built

on the southern side of De Butts Terrace.

5a

These concerns and objections were inextricably linked to

staff's third concern, that the Commission had not approved the

lot line adjustment obtained from the County by Landgate's

predecessor in interest. As noted, prior to the approval of the

lot line adjustment, the length of the lots ran in a north to south

direction standing side-by-side east to west. If the old lots had

remained, then development could have been directed to the

more topographically and visually suitable southern portion of

the property. Staff further concluded that the lot line

adjustment had been illegal. It reached its conclusion as

follows: It first observed that section 30106 of the Public

Resources Code contains a broad definition of "development"

for which a coastal development permit is necessary.

" "Development’ means, on land, in or under water, the

placement or direction of any solid material or structure;

discharge or disposal of any drenched material or any gaseous,

liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging,

mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density or

intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to,

subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act... and any

other division of land, including lot splits, except where the

land division is brought about in connection with the purchase

of such land by a public agency for public recreational use . .

.." ([bid., italics added.) Staff then cited a 1986 memorandum

from the Attorney General circulated to the Commission

concluding that "[a] lot line adjustment is a form of a lot split.

In some instances, a lot line adjustment may be so minor as to

warrant the Commission finding that it is de minimis and

qualifies for a waiver pursuant to section 30624.7. In other

instances a lot line adjustment may be such that it does bring

about a major change in the density or intensity of use of land.

In such a case it would fall within the definition of

development in section 30106, and would necessarily require

a coastal development permit.”

6a

The staff report then considered whether the lot line

adjustment in question "involves a major change in the density

or intensity of land-use." It concluded that while a lot line

adjustment did not alter the density of development it would

alter its intensity: "The topography north of De Butts Terrace

is relatively steep and not suited to development. This

proposed project would change the intensity of land-use in this

area by allowing development of the north side of the road. .

_. Staff believes that the least environmentally damaging site

for development is on the coastal [i.e. southern] side of De

Butts Terrace and that the original lot configuration of long

thin parcels extending across the road should not be altered.”

The Commission considered the various issues raised by

staff at its December 13, 1990, meeting and voted to continue

the matter because of questions concerning the legality of the

lot line adjustment. According to the declaration of Landgate's

engineer/representative in support of its motion (Petrovsky

Declaration), "once the lot line adjustment issue was raised . .

_ staff would not negotiate with regard to issues of the size of

home, grading, etc. Instead, the legality of the lot became the

focus of their attention." Landgate reapplied for a coastal

development permit proposing the same project as described

above, but adding a request for Commission approval of the

County lot line adjustment.

At its February 1991 meeting the Commission denied

Landgate's application. It adopted staff findings that the

proposed house and related structures would produce

excessive soil, grading, and visual degradation.’ Immediately

3/ According to Commission regulations, a vote by the Commission

that is "consistent with [the] staff recommendation and not otherwise

modified, . . . shall be deemed to adopt the findings and conclusions

(continued...)

7a

after the vote, Commissioner Glickfeld commented on Los

Angeles County's perceived unwillingness to comply with the

Coastal Act: “I really regret the situation that this applicant

has been put in because of Los Angeles County's refusal to

comply with the Coastal Act and I hope that . . . our staff

counsel could be directed to communicate that very clearly

with Los Angeles County, bring their response back to us and

pursue, if necessary, litigation to insist that the County of Los

Angeles comply with the law in this matter." The chief counsel

stated that he would prepare a letter to the County.

In March 1991, Landgate filed a petition for writ of

mandate against the Commission asserting that the

Commission had no jurisdiction over the lot line adjustment.

The petition was conjoined with a complaint asserting a taking

of property without just compensation and a denial of civil

rights, seeking damages and declaratory relief. The mandate

petition and takings complaint were severed, with the latter

reserved for later adjudication.

Meanwhile, in April 1991, the Commission heard

Landgate's request for reconsideration of its project. Grounds

for reconsideration of an application exist when “there is

relevant new evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable

diligence, could not have been presented at the hearing . . .

or that an error of fact or law has occurred which has the

potential of altering the initial decision.” (Pub. Resources

Code, § 30627, subd. (b)(3).) At that meeting, Landgate’s

representative presented a new version of the proposed

3/ (..continued)

recommended by the staff." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13092,

subd. (d).) Thus, the Commission, in denying the application consistent

with the staff report, is deemed to have adopted the staff's proposed

findings discussed above.

8a

residence that would be only 32 feet above the existing natural

grade, would have 1,000 cubic yards of grading, and would

make other changes in order to conform the appearance of the

house to its natural surroundings. Commission staff opined

that the new proposal was more appropriately presented to the

Commission as a new project, but did not constitute "new

evidence" or “error of fact or law" that would be grounds for

reconsidering its February 1991 denial of the project. Staff

also told the Commission that "part of the basis for your denial

[of the project] was a lot line adjustment and . . . we told them

even if they make these modifications we'll still recommend

denial." The Commission's legal counsel told the Commission:

"Without a lot line adjustment some of these revisions are I

think irrelevant." He also stated: "This project does not work,

if you please, without that lot line adjustment." He further

stated that, in light of the action that Landgate had filed before

the request for reconsideration contesting the Commissicn's

jurisdiction over the lot line adjustment, "my advice would be

to continue to maintain the position you have maintained

before and allow the court system to determine the dispute that

presently exists between the Commission and [Landgate]} with

regard to that." The Commission voted to deny

reconsideration.

The above mentioned litigation proceeded and in October

1991 the trial court granted Landgate's petition for writ of

mandate. Specifically, the trial court set aside the

Commission's action of February 1991 denying Landgate's

application and ordered the Commission to reconsider the

application. The court found that, in view of the factual

circumstances in this case, the definition of "development" as

found in Public Resources Code section 30106 “does not

include the lot line adjustment approved and recorded by the

County of Los Angeles in 1989 with regard to the subject

property. Therefore, upon remand to the Commission, the

9a

Commission must consider [Landgate's] application without

any reference or consideration of a lot line adjustment. The

Commission is to consider the subject property to be a legal

lot." The court did not order the approval of any particular

development proposal.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in an

unpublished decision in December 1992. In arriving at its

conclusion, the court found significant the fact that Landgate

had purchased a lot that had been approved by the County and

had been recorded, that the Commission had approved the

construction of the road, De Butts Terrace, that made the then-

existing lot configuration impractical and necessitated the lot

line adjustment, and that the Commission's position with

respect to the lot line adjustment would render Landgate's

property valueless. In essence, it held that Public Resources

Code section 30106 did not authorize the Commission to

invalidate a legally recorded lot line adjustment to which the

Commission, by its actions and inaction, had given tacit

approval, when an innocent purchaser would stand to lose all

value from its lot from such invalidation. The court also

questioned the Commission's assertion that any building on

Landgate's lot was inconsistent with the Coastal Act, citing

other development north of De Butts Terrace that the

Commission had approved. In its conclusion, it emphasized

that the Commission "retained its ability to regulate and

approve any proposed building on the lot."

In February 1993, the Commission again considered

Landgate's project, which had been modified by reducing

grading to 2,893 cubic square yards, by reducing height to 35

feet above existing grade, and by reducing the fill slope, among

other changes. It required further changes in the project to

address the visual impacts and erosion problems that it had

earlier found to be objectionable. Specifically, it imposed a

10a

height limitation of 28 feet above existing grade on the

proposed residence, required a drainage plan as well as color

restrictions and landscape requirements consistent with the

scenic preservation with which the Commission was

concerned. Landgate did not challenge these conditions.

Subsequently, Landgate moved for summary adjudication

of its still-unresolved takings claim. It contended that the

Commission's erroneous assertion of permit jurisdiction over

the lot line adjustment prevented it from making any

economically viable use of its property for the period prior to

the Commission's approval of its project in February 1993.

The Commission moved for summary judgment, contending

that its jurisdictional error did not constitute a taking of

Landgate's property. The trial court granted Landgate's

motion, ruling that the Commission had temporarily taken

Landgate's property from February 1991 to February 1993.

In its statement of decision, the trial court declared that

"Landgate's third cause of action for taking of property

without just compensation . . . is meritorious as a matter of law

_. , because Landgate has been deprived, at least temporarily,

of all economically viable or productive use of its property

insofar as Landgate, at least temporarily, could not legally

obtain any valid permits fot approvals to construct any project

on its property as a result of the Commission's actions." The

trial court also denied the Commission's motion for summary

judgment. After a bench trial on the issue of damages, the trial

court awarded takings damages of $155,657 for the period

between February 1991 and February 1993. The Commission

appealed the grant of summary adjudication and the award of

attorney fees. Landgate filed an appeal contesting the amount

of damages and filed a separate notice of appeal from the trial

court's award of costs and attorneys fees.

lla

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of

summary adjudication in Landgate's favor. It appeared to

accept the Commission's assertion that reasonable mistakes

made by a government agency in the development approval

process do not necessarily constitute takings. But, as it stated:

"[W]hat we cannot accept is the Commission's characterization

of the treatment of Landgate here as the reasonable result of a

'‘mistake.' Nothing in the record suggests that the lot line

adjustment issue arose out of anything other than the

Commission's ongoing jurisdictional spat with the County of

Los Angeles combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from

building on its parcel. Instead, the overwhelming sense of the

record is that by its insistence that the lot itself was illegal, the

Commission put Landgate in a situation which was not of its

own making and which Landgate could do nothing to cure. In

short, this is not a case of bureaucratic bungling, but the

declaration of war between governmental behemoths in which

the inevitable casualty was to be a noncombatant, Landgate."

It also affirmed the trial court's award of damages. We granted

review to address the important question of whether the

Commission's apparently mistaken assertion of jurisdiction of

the lot line adjustment in this case led to a temporary taking of

Landgate's property.‘

4/ We note at the outset that this case comes to us after a grant of

Landgate's summary adjudication motion on its claim that its property

was taken without just compensation and a denial of the Commission's

motion for summary judgment. Thus, we undertake independent review

of the record to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists as to the

takings claim. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15

Cal.4th 951, 973, fn. 7.)

12a

IL.

A.

Before addressing the present issue, we briefly summarize

pertinent takings jurisprudence. In determining whether a

government regulation works a taking of property under the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United

States Supreme Court has generally eschewed any "set

formula" for determining how far is too far, preferring to

engage in " ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" (Lucas v.

South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1015

(Lucas).) The court has stated that the "economic impact of

the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to

which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-

backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations."

(Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S.

104, 124.) The court has also stated that "the Fifth

Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ‘does not

substantially advance legitimate state interests.’ " (Lucas,

supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1016.) The court has furthermore

described "at least two discrete categories of regulatory action

as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public

interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first

encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to

suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property. In general (at least

with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the

intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose

behind it, we have required compensation. . . . [{] The second

situation in which we have found categorical treatment

appropriate is where regulation denies all economically

beneficial or productive use of land.“ (/d. at p. 1015.)

In Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 275, we

had held that the sole remedy for government regulation that

13a

effects a taking of property is an administrative mandamus

overturning the regulation rather than an award of damages.

That holding was repudiated by the United States Supreme

Court in First English, supra, 482 U.S. 304. In First English,

the plaintiff operated a campground on which lay a number of

buildings that had been destroyed by flood. An interim Los

Angeles County ordinance prohibited construction or

reconstruction of any building or structure in an interim flood

protection area that included the plaintiff's land. The court

assumed for purposes of the appeal that the ordinance deprived

the plaintiff of all economically beneficial use of its property.

It then held that such deprivation constituted a temporary

taking of the property for which compensation must be paid.

""TT]emporary’ takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of

his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings,

for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation." (/d.

at p. 318.) Thus, the court held that "where the government's

activities have already worked a taking of all use of property,

no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the

duty to provide compensation for the period during which the

taking was effective." (/d. at p. 321.)

The First English court emphasized the narrowness of its

holding. "We. . . point out that the allegation of the complaint

which we treat as true for purposes of our decision was that

the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its

property. We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of

course do not deal with the quite different questions that

would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building

permits, changes in zonitig ordinances, variances, and the like

which are not before us." (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p.

321.)

Consistent with this implied limitation on the temporary

takings doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has also

l4a

"made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory juris-

diction by a governmental body does not constitute a

regulatory taking. [Citation.] The reasons are obvious. The

requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in

a certain use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the

property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit

system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the

landowner free to use the property as desired." (United States

v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985) 474 U.S. 121, 126-

127.) Stated in other terms, whereas "the Fifth Amendment's

just compensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government

from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,

in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a

whole’ " (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 318-319, fn.

omitted), a rational permit regulation scheme is imposed on the

public as a whole to ensure the orderly development of real

property, benefiting as well as burdening property owners.

Finally, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the

question whether property has been taken is not ripe for

decision until a government agency has rendered a final

decision on the use to which the property in question may be

put. “Our reluctance to examine taking claims until . . . a final

decision has been made is compelled by the very nature of the

inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause. Although

[t]he question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of

the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of

considerable difficulty’ [citation], this Court consistently has

indicated that among the factors of particular significance in

the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action

and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable

investment-backed expectations. [Citations.] Those factors

simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has

arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply

the regulations at issue to the particular land in question."

15a

(Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473

U.S. 172, 190-191; see also McDonald, Sommer & Frates v.

Yolo County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 348.)

The present case poses the issue of whether a legally

erroneous decision of a government agency during the

development approval process resulting in delay constitutes a

temporary taking of property. Virtually every court that has

examined the issue has concluded, for various reasons and

under various theories, that a regulatory mistake resulting in

delay does not, by itself, amount to a taking of property. (See

Littoral Development Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation

etc. Com. (1994) 33 Cal.App.4th 211, 221-222 (Littoral

Development Co.), Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside (1995)

31 Cal.App.4th 1060; 1080; Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1996) 678 So.2d 1365; 1367; Cannone v.

Noey (Alaska 1994) 867 P.2d 797; 801; Dumont v. Town of

Wolfeboro (N.H. 1993) 622 A.2d 1238; 1244; Tabb Lakes,

Lid. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 796; 801-802; Steinbergh

v. City of Cambridge (Mass. 1992) 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1274-

1277; Smith v. Town of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1992) 615 A.2d

1252; 1257-1258; 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States (1992)

26 Ct.Cl. 575; Lujan Home Builders v. Orangetown (1991)

568 N.Y.2d 850, 851.)

In Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, supra, 604 N.E.2d

1269 (Steinbergh), for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts considered the claim of a landlord suing the city

for takings damages stemming from a city regulation that

restricted the conversion of rental units into condominiums.

The court had, in a previous decision, declared that the

regulation exceeded the city's statutory authority under the

state's rent control statute and was therefore invalid. The

:

s

%

16a

plaintiff claimed that he suffered damages from the decline in

the condominium market during the period of the delay that

resulted from the necessity of mounting a legal challenge to the

invalid rent regulation. The court first concluded that the

regulation in question was neither a physical invasion of

property nor a deprivation of all viable use, nor a substantial

interference with the property owner's distinct investment-

based expectations. (See id. at p. 1274.) The court likened

the delay experienced in the case to delay "that commonly

occurs in seeking regulatory approvals for changes in local

ordinances and by-laws, which are government-imposed

processes that have not traditionally been viewed as

constituting regulatory takings." (/d. at p. 1275.) "It is, of

course, true that in this case the delay was caused, not by the

necessity of obtaining mandated governmental approvals, but

by the process of presenting a judicial challenge to a municipal

regulation. That legal challenge resulted in invalidation of the

regulation as beyond the authority of the city to adopt, but not

because the municipal regulation was unconstitutional as

violating rights to due process or equal protection of the laws.

The plaintiffs make no reasoned argument that, simply because

a municipal regulation is not authorized by law, there is a

compensable temporary taking of property, even though the

regulation restricts the sale and reduces the market value of the

property until the regulation is successfully challenged in

court." (/bid.)

The Steinbergh court then considered the argument that

the invalidated regulation did not " ‘substantially advance

legitimate state interests’ " and therefore was a taking of

property under the test articulated by the Supreme Court.

(Steinbergh, supra, 604 N.E.2d at p. 1275, quoting Agins v.

Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260.) Although it had found in

its previous decision that the condominium conversion

regulation was insufficiently connected with rent control, and

Na a a a a Se)

17a

therefore not impliedly authorized by the state rent control

Statute, it rejected the argument that this state law defect

translated into a constitutional flaw. It found that the

regulation was “a ‘logical and sufficiently well-founded

approach to dealing’ with a problem [of removal of rental units

from the market] for us to find . . . that the ‘essential nexus'

between the state's interest and its chosen means is present in

this case." (Steinbergh, supra, 604 N.E.2d at p. 1277.)

Therefore, despite the invalidity of the regulation, it concluded

that the plaintiffs had not met their constitutional burden of

demonstrating that the regulation failed to substantially

advance a legitimate state interest.

Our own Court of Appeal has reached a similar conclusion.

(See Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, supra, 31

Cal.App.4th 1060, 1080; Littoral Development Co., supra, 33

Cal.App.4th 211.) In Littoral Development Co., the Court of

Appeal considered a regulatory taking claim against the San

Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission

(BCDC). It had decided in a previous decision that BCDC,

which was given jurisdiction over development of property

adjacent to San Francisco Bay subject to "tidal action" (Gov.

Code, § 66610, subd. (a)), had incorrectly asserted jurisdiction

over the landward two-thirds of the plaintiffs property in

Marin County, thereby delaying the construction of a hotel on

that property. It had accordingly reversed the trial court's

decision upholding that jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it rejected

the takings claim, stating: "Under the circumstances, we

cannot find any regulatory ‘taking’ of any property, merely

because delay resulted from factual or legal uncertainties which

temporarily clouded the respective limits of BCDC's and Marin

County's regulatory jurisdiction. ... [9] While we recognize

that, on very different facts, a transient and impermanent

interference in real property use due to egregious bureaucratic

overreaching may arguably constitute a compensable

18a

temporary taking, BCDC's actions here were facially valid and

supported by a plausible though erroneous legal argument

which the trial court accepted. We decline to hold that such a

taking occurred here or occurs every time a land-use agency

makes an erroneous decision which is ultimately overturned in

part on appeal." (Littoral Development Co., supra, 33

Cal. App.4th at pp. 221-222.) It also found significant that the

plaintiff still had some unspecified use of the property during

the pendency of legal proceedings. (/bid.)

We substantially agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts, with our Court of Appeal, and with the other

courts cited above that an error by a governmental agency in

the development approval process does not necessarily amount

to a taking even if the error in some way diminishes the value

of the subject property, any more than the commission of state

law error during a criminal trial is an automatic violation of the

due process clause. (See, e.g., Estelle v. Maguire (1991) 502

U.S. 62, 71-73; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312,

393.) If the error is of a particular constitutional type -- the

passage and enforcement of a law or regulation that deprives

property of all value -- then the teaching of First English is

that such an error is a compensable taking. But government

land use regulations and decisions such as those cited above in

Steinbergh and Littoral Development Co., which, despite their

ultimately determined statutory defects, are part of a

reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate

government interests, are not takings of property under the

Supreme Court's doctrine reviewed above. (See Agins v.

Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 260.)

An analogous situation may be found when the government

initiates condemnation proceedings against an undeveloped

tract of land, thereby bringing the development process to a

standstill. We have held that when a government agency later

19a

abandoned such proceedings, it was not liable under the

takings clause, even when the proceedings caused substantial

delay in the development approval process and led to losses in

the property's value. (Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, 24

Cal.3d at pp. 271, 277-278 [eminent domain proceeding active

for almost one year before abandonment].) The United States

Supreme Court affirmed this aspect of our Agins decision,

agreeing that we had "correctly rejected the contention that the

municipality's good-faith planning activities, which did not

result in successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so

burdened the appellants’ enjoyment of their property as to

constitute a taking. [Citation.] Even if the appellants’ ability to

sell their property was limited during pendency of the

condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or

develop their property when the proceedings ended. Mere

fluctuations in value during the process of governmental

decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of

ownership. They cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the

constitutional sense.'" (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at

p. 263, fn. 9, italics added.) Just as an aborted condemnation

proceeding that delays development is an incident of ownership

and not a taking, so the mistaken assertion of jurisdiction over

a development is part of the development approval process,

and development delays that result therefrom may be imposed

on the developer rather than the general taxpayer without

violating the United States Constitution.’

5/_ The principle that a government agency will not be liable in

damages for state law errors committed in the development approval

process is congruent with Government Code section 818.4, which

provides that a public entity cannot be held liable "for an injury caused

by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or

refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license,

certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization where the public

(continued...)

20a

The Court of Appeal did not hold that all governmental

mistakes in the land use process amounted to takings. The

Court of Appeal held rather, as noted above, that the

Commission's February 1991 decision to deny Landgate's

devc,opment application and its position on the lot line issue

was not the “reasonable result of a 'mistake' " but rather arose

out of a “jurisdictional spat with the County of Los Angeles

combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from building on

its parcel," and a "declaration of war between governmental

behemoths in which the inevitable casualty was to be a

noncombatant, Landgate."

The Court of Appeal erred in its attempt to divine, through

the statements of Commissioners and commission staff and

through circumstantial evidence, the "true," illegitimate, motive

for the Commission's decision to deny Landgate's development

permit. The proper inquiry is not into the ‘ ubjective motive of

the government agency, but whether there is, objectively,

sufficient connection between the land use regulation in

question and a legitimate governmental purpose so that the

latter may be said to substantially advance the former. (See

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825,

836-837 (Nollan);, Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S.

374, 391 (Dolan).) This type of objective inquiry is consistent

with the principle that courts do not delve into the individual

purposes of decision-makers in a quasi-adjudicative

proceeding, but rather look to the findings made by the

government agency and determine whether these are based on

substantial evidence. (City of Fairfield v. Superior Court

(1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 779; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic

5/ (...continued)

entity or an employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to

determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied,

suspended or revoked."

2la

Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506,

515-516; see also United States v. Morgan (1941) 313 US.

409, 422.) Thus, we must determine not whether a sinister

purpose lurked behind the Commission's decision, but rather

whether the development restrictions imposed on the subject

property substantially advanced some legitimate state purposes

so as to justify the denial of the development permit.

Moreover, the cases suggest that judicial review of

governmental conditions imposed upon development will be

more deferential when the conditions are simply restrictions on

land use and not requirements that the property owner convey

a portion of his property (see Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p.

841; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 388-391) or pay

development fees imposed on a property owner on an

individual and discretionary basis (Ehrlich v. City of Culver

City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 876). In the present case, neither

conveyances nor individualized development fees are at issue.

The Commission's denial of Landgate's permit in February

1991 did indeed appear to substantially advance legitimate

governmental interests and to be supported by substantial

evidence. The Commission's findings articulated three

objections to the project as proposed. First, the Commission

was concerned that the large house, 44 feet above natural

grade and 9 feet above the maximum allowable height set forth

in the Malibu LUP, would be unsightly when viewed from

Escondido Trail and Escondido Falls. Second, the

Commission was concerned that excessive grading on the

north slope, where the house was to be built, was contrary to

the Malibu LUP, which called for the minimization of grading

for all new development "to ensure the potential negative

effects of runoff and erosion on [visual] resources are

minimized." These are unquestionably legitimate government

purposes (see Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, supra, 12 Cal.4th

sith iii ial

22a

at p. 886 [promotion of scenic and aesthetic objectives within

the scope of the police power]) and there is substantial

evidence in the record in support of the reasonableness of the

Commission's position. Indeed, Landgate does not challenge

the conditions ultimately imposed by the Commission requiring

the reduction of building height and total amount of grading.

The third Commission objection, the improper lot line

adjustment, was principally based not on formal, jurisdictional

or bureaucratic grounds, but on the view that such adjustment

would lead to an intensification of the environmental impacts

with which the Commission was concerned. Based on our

review of the record, as discussed above, the Commission's

position appears reasonable and supported by substantial

evidence. It found that the placement of the house on the

north slope would make it more unsightly, bringing it closer to

Escondido Trail and Escondido Falls, and would also

obviously increase the need for grading -- and with it the

potential fer erosion -- in order to create a flat pad for the

proposed residence on a sloping surface. The Commission's

preference for construction on the flat south side of De Butts

Terrace was therefore reasonable. In sum, the denial of a

development permit in February 1991 on the three enumerated

grounds advanced legitimate governmental interests in

minimizing erosion and unsightly development in the coastal

area.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeal that anything in

the record establishes that the Commission was motivated in its

decisions by a "jurisdictional spat" with Los Angeles County.

The Court of Appeal quotes the statement made by one of the

commissioners after denial of the application that “the county's

refusal to recognize our right to review lot line adjustments"

was “an issue that had come before the Commission many

times in the Malibu area." She added that it was "really time

23a

to become extremely serious about this" and asked that staff

counsel be directed to communicate with the County on the

topic. But the fact that the commissioner expressed frustration

over the County's failure to recognize the Commission's

jurisdiction does not suggest that the primary or even

secondary reason for the Commission's vote was to teach Los

Angeles County some sort of jurisdictional lesson.

Nor are we persuaded by the Court of Appeal's conclusion

that the Commission's decision must not have been based on

legitimate environmental concerns because it “could have

imposed special conditions on matters such as height in

February 1991, but failed to issue the permit until after the lot

line question was resolved in February 1993." From the

Commission's point of view, the environmental impacts of the

project could have been reduced if the original lot line

configuration was maintained. Once the Commission was

confronted by a court ruling that made restoration of the

original configuration impossible, it settled for what it regarded

as the next best alternative: permitting development on the

north side of De Butts Terrace, but with conditions imposed to

reduce these environmental impacts. There is therefore no

inconsistency between the Commission's environmental

concerns and the respective positions it adopted throughout

the development approval process.

The Court of Appeal also concluded that since the

Commission may have approved or was going to approve two

~ homes on the same sloping north side as Landgate’s parcel,

"those approvals are clear indications that but for the lot line

adjustment, Landgate's application to build a house and related

structures on its property could and would, through the normal

negotiation process, have been approved by February 1991 or

shortly thereafter." But it is clear that the Commission had a

policy to concentrate development in the area on the flat south

meer merce

24a

side of De Butts Terrace. The fact that there may have been

exceptions to this policy, based on considerations particular to

these specific projects, for reasons not present in the current

administrative record and about which we can only speculate,

does not negate the fact that the Commission had a rational

policy preference for concentrating development on the south

side of De Butts Terrace.

It would be, of course, a different question if, even though

the Commission's position on the lot line adjustment

substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, that position

was so unreasonable from a legal standpoint as to lead to the

conclusion that it was taken for no purpose other than to delay

the development project before it. Such a delaying tactic

would not advance any valid government objective. Here,

however, as discussed, the Commission's position on the lot

line adjustment issue was based on a construction of Public

Resources Code section 30106 and the meaning of the term

"development" contained therein that was not unreasonable.

As discussed, that section defines development over which the

Commission will have jurisdiction broadly to include "change

in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not

limited to, . . . lot splits." Without deciding questions not

before us,° the Commission's conclusion, following the

Attorney General's advice, that section 30106 gave it authority

to deny the lot line adjustment was "supported by a plausible

though [perhaps] erroneous legal argument" and therefore not

the basis of a taking. (Littoral Development Co., supra, 33

—————€Eak-App-4th at p- 221)

-

6/ The Court of Appeal's prior, unpublished decision regarding the lot

line issue is now final and may not be relitigated. (See Kavanau v. City

of Santa Monica (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 779.) We do not necessarily

endorse that decision, nor are we bound by its reasoning. (Jd. at pp.

777-779.)

25a

Indeed, the Court of Appeal's earlier decision on the lot

line issue was based not on the Commission's general lack of

authority over such issues, or even on the fact that invalidation

of the lot line would deprive Landgate of property, but rather

on the court's determination that the Commission's earlier

course of conduct had constituted a kind of acquiescence to

the lot line adjustment. Although the Court of Appeal may

have been correct on that point, and the Commission mistaken

given the peculiar facts of this case, its position was not so

objectively unreasonable as to give rise to the inference that it

was adopting that position solely for purposes of delay or some

other illegitimate reason.

Cc.

Landgate's argument that the Commission temporarily took

its property rests on somewhat different grounds than those on

which the Court of Appeal holding was based. Landgate

argues that regardless of whether the Commission's lot line

adjustment condition substantially advanced a legitimate state

interest, the imposition of such condition was nonetheless a

taking because it temporarily deprived Landgate's property of

all value. Landgate contends that from the: time the

development permit was denied in February 1991 until the time

it was approved in February 1993 after the lot line issue had

been resolved by litigation, the development process was at a

standstill, effectively depriving the property of all economic

benefit. Landgate cites the Petrovsky Declaration, discussed

above, as evidence that the Commission refused to continue

negotiation with Landgate as long as the jurisdictional dispute

over the lot line adjustment was pending. Landgate argues that

the Commission's actions amount to a denial of all

economically beneficial use of the land and thus is a categorical

taking (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1016) even if only

temporary. (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 320.)

26a

Of course, each time there is a delay in the development

process, the delay may be said to temporarily deprive the

developer of undeveloped property of use of that property.

From the would-be developer's point of view, the impact of

ordinary delay due to a governmental mistake on the one hand,

and denial of all feasible use on the other, may be identical.

But as discussed above, for purposes of the takings doctrine

the two types of governmental action are quite different. (See

First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 321.)

Landgate asserts, however, that what is at issue in this case

was not a normal development delay due to the Commission's

mistake, but in fact a final Commission decision to ban all

development of Landgate's property, a position the

Commission was forced to abandon only because it lost on the

jurisdictional question. More specifically, Landgate contends

the Commission's position that the former lot lines be

preserved, combined with its insistence that no development

take place north of De Butts Terrace, rendered Landgate's lot

valueless, because its lot was situated wholly to the north of

De Butts Terrace. To state the argument differently, if, for

example, a municipality's ordinance denies a parcel of real

property all economically feasible use, it would arguably be no

defense to a temporary takings claim to show that the

ordinance was eventually invalidated for being inconsistent

with the municipality's general plan.’ Similarly, Landgate

_ T/ The Commission and some of its amici curiae argue that a

government exercise of power that is beyond its jurisdictional authority

can never be a taking. The argument is based on the principle that the

takings clause only authorizes compensation for "a taking of private

property for public use," and that when a government's action is ultra

vires because the agency has exceeded its statutory authority, it cannot

as a matter of law be said to have taken property for public use. Some

(continued...)

27a

contends in effect that its failure to make progress toward

developing its property between February 1991 and February

1993 was due not to an interim uncertainty created by the

jurisdictional dispute with the Commission, but to a decision by

the Commission in February 1991, and subsequently, to deny

all economically feasible use of Landgate's property, a denial

that was the administrative equivalent of an ordinance banning

all development on the subject property, such as was found in

First English.

In considering whether the Commission's actions

constituted in fact a denial of all economically feasible use, we

first note that the Supreme Court has characterized the circum-

stances under which a categorical taking occurs under these

circumstances as "extraordinary" and "relatively rare." (Lucas,

supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1017, 1018.) In Lucas, for example,

the court was confronted with South Carolina's Beachfront

Management Act, which authorized a government agency to

establish a coastal zone in which no development could occur,

and which "had the direct effect of barring [the property

7/ (...continued)

federal courts appear to accept this rationale, holding that the Tucker

government agency that exceeds its statutory authority can ever be a

compensable taking.

28a

owner] from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his

two parcels." (/d. at p. 1007.) The property owner bears the

burden of showing that the government action in question

denied it economically beneficial use of its land. (/d. at

p. 1016, fn. 6.)*

Landgate ignores the critical difference between this case

and Lucas and First Englis;. An understanding of this

difference begins with the principle that "the mere assertion of

regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not

constitute a regulatory taking." (United States v. Riverside

Bay Homes, Inc., supra, 474 U.S. at p. 126.) Part of that

regulatory process is the imposition of certain procedural

conditions and substantive requirements on development.

These conditions can include such matters as the filing of a

proper subdivision map (Gov. Code, § 66426), installation of

proper sewer facilities, (id., § 66483), or the requirement that

the development undergo the process mandated by the

California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub.

Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). A necessary corollary of

the above quoted principle is that a government agency may

deny a development permit when the reasonable conditions

imposed on development are not met without that denial

constituting a taking. As the United States Supreme Court has

stated, an essential prerequisite to the assertion of a takings

claim is "a final and authoritative determination of the type and

intensity of development legally permitted on the subject

property." (McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,

supra, 477 U.S. at p. 348.) If a would-be developer fails to

meet legitimate conditions for obtaining a development permit,

8/ We also note that in First English on remand, the Court of Appeal

held that no taking of property had resulted because the owner was still

permitted significant use. (First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 1353, 1372.)

29a

then a government agency's refusal to issue such a permit

would by no means be a "final and authoritative determination

of the intensity of development legally permitted on the subject

property," but merely a conditional denial. And, as reviewed

in the preceding part of this opinion, the imposition of a

development condition is not a constitutional violation merely

because that condition is subsequently shown to have been

erroneously imposed. ;

In California, one of the conditions of obtaining a permit

for development within the coastal zone is the procurement of

a coastal permit. The Commission's authority to approve

development is concurrent with the authority of local

jurisdictions, and thus compliance with the Subdivision Map

Act does not excuse compiiance with the Coastal Act. (See

Pub. Resources Code, § 30106; see also South Central Coastal

Regional Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co. (1982)

128 Cal.App.3d 830, 844-846.) This approval requirement

extends to "any . . . division of land" that affects the density or

intensity of development. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106.)

As discussed, Landgate's development was denied because of

the Commission's plausible, though perhaps legally erroneous,

position that Landgate or its predecessor failed to comply with

one of the conditions of obtaining a coastal development

permit by illegally reconfiguring the lot boundaries. Its

rejection of Landgate's development was at most conditional --

nothing in the record suggests that the Commission would

have denied a development that fell within legally recognized,

and environmentally more favorable, boundaries.

The nature of the Commission's actions comes into clearer

focus if we alter the facts of this case slightly. Suppose the

original owner of two lots that ran lengthwise in a north to

south direction, east and west of each other, which we will

designate as lots A and B, decided to reconfigure the lots into

30a

two lots running lengthwise east to west, north and south of

each other, lots C and D. The owner submitted development

plans for lot C, but the Commission denied development

because in its view such a lot did not legally exist, and because

to recognize such a lot would have certain detrimental

environmental consequences. This decision cannot be fairly

characterized as a deprivation of all value of lot C, but simply

as a refusal to reconfigure lots A and B. Even if it turned out

that the Commission had incorrectly asserted its jurisdiction, it

would have committed the state law error of improperly

refusing to reconfigure lots A and B, not the constitutional one

of denying development on lot C. Or to put it another way,

the Commission's denial cf development on lot C is not a final

decision on that development until the disp: te over whether lot

C legally existed was resolved. Just as the denial of a permit

for failing to properly submit to the CEQA process would not

be a taking, even if the government's application of CEQA

regulations prove to be flawed (see Pub. Resources Code, §

21168.9 [writ of mandate the sole remedy for violations public

agency noncompliance with CEQA]), so the denial of

development due to a determination, subsequently held to be

erroneous, that the development did not conform to the

property's legal boundary is not a taking.

The present case differs from the above hypothetical in that

"lot C" was sold to a subsequent purchaser rather than kept by

the original owner. But it cannot be the case that this

subsequent purchase had a constitutional significance,

converting the Commission's assertion of its regulatory

jurisdiction_to approve lot reconfigurations into a taking of

property.”

9/ We note that the innocent purchaser of an illegal lot is not left

without a remedy. There may well be private remedies available. (See,

(continued...)

3la

The present case also differs from the hypothetical because

a road was built through lots A and B, thereby supporting

Landgate's argument that even if the Commission had

jurisdiction over a lot line adjustment, it had implicitly waived

its right to deny that adjustment by acquiescing to construction

of the road. But the existence of the road, while it may have

been grounds for finding that the Commission erred in failing

to recognize the legal existence of "lot C," did not convert the

Commission's state law error into a taking. Again, the

Commission could legitimately require that a lot on which

development was requested be legal, when, as here, there are

legitimate reasons for so requiring. Therefore, when the

Commission determined that Landgate's lot was not legal, it

could legitimately litigate the lot line question without

offending the takings clause. The Commission could not be

said to have reached a final and authoritative determination of

the development on Landgate's lot until after the dispute about

the legality of the lot had been resolved.

Of course, as explained in the preceding part of this

opinion, a government agency may not evade the takings

clause by fabricating a dispute over the legality of a lot, or by

otherwise arbitrarily imposing conditions on development in

order to delay or discourage that development. The

9/ (...continued)

¢.g., Goodspeed v. Associated Almond Growers (1929) 208 Cal. 121,

122 [sale of a parcel in violation of the Subdivision Map Act may be

rescinded].) The innocent purchaser of an illegal lot may also have the

options of negotiating with other private landowners to obtain a legal

lot, and negotiating with the government agency to develop the property

in such a way as to meet the agency's underlying concerns. Because

Landgate's lot was ultimately judged to be legal, we do not know, and

need not determine, which of these options Landgate could have

pursued.

32a

government agency's assertion of authority, whether or not

erroneous, must advance some legitimate government purpose.

But as discussed above, the Commission's actions in this case

met this constitutional prerequisite.

In light of the foregoing, the difference between this case

and First English becomes clear. Here, there was a

postponement of development pending resolution of a

threshold issue of the development approval process -- whether

the lot was legal -- and not a final decision denying

development. In First English, on the other hand, the

Supreme Court assumed that the ordinance in question

categorically denied all property owners within its purview

the right to develop their property. Development was assumed

to be denied in First English, in other words, even though

there was no dispute about a threshold issue in the

development approval process, as there was in this case, that

would be a legitimate basis for postponing approval of

development. The postponement of Landgate's development

therefore does not constitute a temporary taking of property as

that doctrine was conceived in First English.

Landgate indeed appears to argue that any impasse in the

regulatory process that must be resolved through a judicial

proceeding is a temporary taking rather than a normal delay in

development. But First English merely stands for the

proposition that once a government action finally denies all

economically viable use of property, the fact that the

government later rescinds that action after a judicial

proceedings does not relieve it of its duty to pay compensation.

(First English, supra, 482-U.S- at p- 321.) Nothing in First

English, however, is inconsistent with the recognition that a

judicial determination of the validity of certain preconditions

to development is a normal part of the development process,

33a

and the fact that a developer must resort to such a

determination does not constitute a per se temporary iaking.

In fact, a review of our case law reveals numerous

instances in which developers have sought a writ of mandate

against public agencies over questions regarding lot

configuration, compliance with the Subdivision Map Act,

compliance with CEQA, and over other threshold questions

that must be resolved before it can be determined whether a

development should be permitted to proceed. The resolution

of these cases often turns on the construction and application

of complex statutory schemes and results in significant delays

in the development process. In some cases, the developer

succeeded in overturning the public agency's decision on these

threshold development questions. (See, e.g., Morehart v.

County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 [county

misconstrues its authority to merge parcels of land under Gov.

Code, § 66410 et seq.]; Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. County

of Santa Clara (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 593 [county wrongly

denies certificate of compliance with Subdivision Map Act

pursuant to Gov. Code, § 66499.35 for parcels created prior

to 1893]; Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido

(1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 892, 911 [city misapplies Gov. Code,

§ 66452.6 in failing to extend subdivision map due to

development moratorium]; San Dieguito Partnership v. City

of San Diego (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 748 [city misapplies Gov.

Code, § 66412 in requiring particular lot line adjustment to

comply with Subdivision Map Act]; Great Western Sav. &

Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 403

[city misconstrues Subdivision Map Act to permit discretion in

approving final subdivision map when all the conditions of the

tentative map have becn met].) In other instances, the courts

have upheld the government's position on these threshold

development questions. (See, e.g, Gomes v. County of

Mendocino (i995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977 [county had properly

34a

applied Gov. Code, § 66499.20'% in determining underiying

land patents had been eliminated by subsequent subdivision];

Harroman Co. v. Town of Tiburon (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 388

{town's downzoning of plaintiffs property inconsistent with

present general plan but consistent with new draft general plan

affirmed pursuant to Gov. Code, § 65589.5]); John Taft Corp.

v. Advisory Agency (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 749 [county's

determination that parcels recognized by a United States

Government Survey Map in 1878 not exempted from

Subdivision Map Act upheld]; South Central Coast Regional

Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., supra, 128

Cal. App.3d 830 [developer obtaining tentative subdivision map

prior to enactment of Coastal Act not exempted from Act's

requirements}; Bel Mar Estates v. California Coastal Com.

(1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 936 [Commission correctly construed

Statutory authoniy to deny development]; Skrogings v.

Kovatch (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 54 [county properly exercises

authority under Subdivision Map Act to deny further lot splits

before installation of public sewer system].)

Landgate does not appear to contend that litigation over

threshold development questions is a taking of property if the

government agency prevails in such litigation. But to conclude

that such litigation is a normal part of the regulatory process

when the public agency prevails but a per se temporary taking

when the public agency loses has no basis in either logic or

Supreme Court precedent.

In sum, Landgate has not demonstrated that the

development delay between February 1991 and February 1993

was due to anything other than a bona fide dispute over the

legality of Landgate's lot and the Commission's jurisdictional

authority over the lot line adjustment. Such delay is an

incident of property ownership and not a taking of property.

(See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 263, fn. 9.)

35a

Although Landgate was in the unfortunate position of suffering

from a delay not of its own making, the same can be said of

any governmental mistake or, for that matter, any of a number

of possible bottlenecks in the development process. (See, e.g.,

Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of

California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112 [development postponed

several years due to association's litigation regarding the

adequacy of the environmental impact report]); Citizens of

Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553

[same]; Friends of La Vina v. County of Los Angeles (1991)

232 Cal. App.3d 1446 [same].) Because nothing in the record

demonstrates that the Commission's actions amounted to a

regulatory taking of Landgate’s property, the trial court should

have granted its motion for summary judgment on Landgate's

taking claim, and denied Landgate's motion for summary

adjudication.

For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of

Appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of

Appeal. The Court of Appeal shall remand to the trial court

with directions to grant the Commission's motion for summary

judgment against Landgate's takings claim and to deny

Landgate's motion for summary adjudication.

MOSK, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J.

KENNARD, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

36a

COPY

LANDGATE, INC. v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL

COMMISSION

S059847

DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.

The takings clause of the federal Constitution guarantees

property owners "just compensation" when their property is

"taken for public use." (U.S. Const., Sth Amend.) In First

Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304,

322 (First English), the United States Supreme Court held that

a property owner could recover compensation for a temporary

taking.

First English involved a Los Angeles County ordinance

that the plaintiff alleged prohibited all use of its property.

(First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 308.) The plairsi¥

asserted that the ordinance constituted a taking of its proverty

for public use, and it sought just compensation. (/bid.) The

triai court and California Court of Appeal ruled that plaintiff

was not entitled to compensation unless the County opted to

retain the ordinance following a judicial determination that the

ordinance constituted a taking. (/d. at pp. 308-309.) In other

words, these courts held that no taking could occur during the

period of litigation over the validity of the ordinance. The

United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, even if

the County withdrew the ordinance as a result of the litigation,

it still owed compensation for the temporary period the

ordinance was in effect. (/d. at p. 322.)

37a

Here, the California Coastal Commission (Commission)

made clear that it opposed the lot line adjustment that created

Landgate's lot, and therefore opposed all development of

Landgate's property regardless of the magnitude of the

development. The Commission's decision denying Landgate's

application for a development permit had the same impact on

Landgate as the ordinance in First English had on the plaintiff

in that case. Landgate sued the Commission and successfully

established that the Commission's decision was wrong under

state law and also that it constituted a taking. The

Commission then approved development of Landgate's

property, thereby preventing Landgate from asserting a

permanent taking. Under these circumstances, First English

makes clear that the Commission must pay compensation for

the temporary taking that occurred while its total ban on

development of Landgate's property was in effect.

The majority notes that the high court did not decide in

First English whether “normal delays in obtaining building

permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like"

would amount to a temporary taking. (First English, supra,

482 U.S. at p. 321.) The majority argues that this case

involves a “normal delay" in the permit approval process, not

a temporary taking. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, 31-32.) I

disagree. When a regulatory agency prohibits all use of a

particular property, and the property owner is forced to sue the

agency to get it to change its position, its stonewalling is not

fairly characterized as a "normal delay" in the permit approval

process. Here, the Commission's denial of Landgate's

development permit was not, as the majority argues,

"conditional," merely calling for some reasonable act of

compliance by Landgate. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) Rather,

the Commission made clear that it would not approve any

development on Landgate's lot regardless of the circumstances.

Nor did the Commission in this case temporarily delay the

7=e_e__

38a

permit app: oval process “pending resolution of a threshold

issue." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.) Rather, the Commission

flatly denied the permit, and its decision was final in every

sense. The Commission was not planning to take any further

action. Landgate had to sue the Commission to get relief.

In his dissent in First English, Justice Stevens articulated

the precise argument on which the majority relies here.

Specifically, Justice Stevens asserted, as does the majority here

(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31-32), that litigation over the validity

of a land-use restriction is simply a "normal delay[]" in the

permit approval process and therefore cannot give rise to a

temporary taking. (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 334

(dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Justice Stevens stated: "The

Court's analysis . . . appears to erect an artificial distinction

between ‘normal delays' and the delays involved in obtaining a

court declaration that the regulation constitutes a taking. [9]

In my opinion, . . . [I]itigation challenging the validity of a

land-use restriction gives rise to a delay that is just as

normal' as an administrative procedure seeking a variance or

an approval of a controversial plan." (Id. at pp. 334-335 (dis.

opn. of Stevens, J.), italics added, fns. omitted.) Thus, Justice

Stevens would have held that litigation over the validity of a

land-use regulation, like other "normal delays" in the pexmit

approval process, cannot give rise to a temporary taking even

if the regulation deprives the property owner of all use of its

property. The majority of the high court considered Justice

Stevens's argument and rejected it. Now, the same argument

has found new life in the majority opinion here.

I agree with the majority "that a government agency may

deny a development permit when the reasonable conditions

imposed on development are not met . . . ." (Maj. opn., ante,

at p. 27.) I also agree that "a judicial determination of the

validity of certain preconditions to development is a normal

39a

part of the development process, and . . . does not constitute

& per se temporary taking." (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 31-32,

Original italics.) Nevertheless, if the "preconditions to

development" have the effect of prohibiting all use of the

property regardless of the circumstances, then they constitute

a taking. If those preconditions are permanent, then the taking

is permanent; if those preconditions are temporary, then the

taking is temporary. The majority cites numerous cases (maj.

opn., ante, at pp. 32-33) in which litigation delay was "a

normal part of the regulatory process." (Maj. opn., ante, at p.

33.) I find these cases irrelevant to the issue before us. First,

these cases do not address whether the litigation delay

constituted a temporary taking. Second, I do not argue that,

in this case, the litigation delay by itself gave rise to the

temporary taking; rather, I argue that the Commission's total

and final ban on all use of Landgate's property (which existed

during the litigation delay) gave rise to the temporary taking.

As long as that total ban was in effect, the temporary taking

continued.

In First English, the court held that "where the

government's activities have already worked a taking of all use

of property, no subsequent action by the government can

relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period

during which the taking was effective." (First English, supra,

482 U.S. at p. 321.) The majority would limit this holding to

cases involving "the passage and enforcement of a Jaw or

regulation that deprives property of all value." (Maj. opn.,

ante, at p. 17, italics added.) I find no basis in First English

for this limitation. Here, the policies reflected in the

Commission's adjudicative decision, like the ordinance at issue

in First English, "worked a taking of all use of property," and

40a

nothing "can relieve [the Commission] of the duty to provide

compensation for the period during which the taking was

effective." (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 321.)

Accordingly, I dissent.

CHIN, J.

I CONCUR:

BAXTER, J.

4la

COPY

LANDGATE, INC. v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL

COMMISSION

S059847

DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J.

The more things change, the more they remain the same.

That is certainly true with respect to this court's takings

jurisprudence. Almost 20 years ago, Justice Brennan,

dissenting in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego

(1981) 450 U.S. 621, 636, charged this court with sacrificing

the right to just compensation guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment on an altar "of policy judgments made by the...

judicial branch{}." (/d. at p. 661, fn. omitted.) Although the

deference commanded by the high court's precedents is not

always “absolute,” when it has made an attempt to resolve

definitively a difficult point of constitutional law that is

applicable to the very issue before us, we ought either to

respect its judgment or provide a reasoned basis for refusing to

do so. To do otherwise, in Charles Fried's words, is "judicial

impudence." (Fried, Jmpudence (1992) Sup.Ct.Rev. 155, 157,

192-193.)

I dissent.

Viewing pure democracy as incompatible with personal

security or the rights of property (Madison, The Federalist No.

42a

10 (Rossiter ed. 1961) p. 81),' the drafters of our Constitution

went to extraordinary lengths "to control the governed" and

to "oblige [the government] to controi itself." (Madison, The

Federalist No. 51, supra, at p. 322.) By adopting the

Constitution, the people of the United States “manifested a

determination to shield themselves and their property from the

effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are

exposed." (Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,

138.)

The prohibition of the takings clause is one expression of

the constitutional commitment to limiting government and

maximizing individual liberty. The protection of private

property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment presupposes the

property is sought for legitimate purposes, out of a desire to

improve the public condition. It nevertheless prohibits

appropriation of property -- even for such beneficial purposes

-- without just compensation. The difficulty inherent in trying

to reconcile popular self-government with private ownership

of property has propelled the Supreme Court's takings doctrine

along an erratic course, from protection of property rights as

a matter of fixed principle to ad hoc balancing tests and back

to categorical rules. The result has been justifiably criticized

as muddled.

"[R]ecent cases," according to one scholar, “have done

little to clarify the [Takings] Clause, and the doctrine remains

in perplexing disarray." (McUsic, Looking Inside Out:

Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings (1998) 92

l/ Had the Federalists lost the argument, our Republic might more

closely resemble P.J. O'Rourke's wry description. "The whole idea of

our government is this: If enough people get together and act in

concert, they can take something and not pay for it." (O'Rourke,

Parliament of Whores (1991) p. 232.)

43a

Nw. ULL. Rev. 591, 592, fn. 2 [citing treatises and law review

articles over the past 15 years]; Schroeder, Never Jam To day:

On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence (1996) 84 Geo.

L.J. 1531.) Despite the general impossibility of its takings

jurisprudence, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

(1992) SOS U.S. 1003 (Lucas), the United States Supreme

Court made a heroic effort to bring a measure of clarity to an -

analytical framework that has grown doctrinally more difficult

as it has become politically more fundamental. After

embracing an intractably complex, ad hoc "balancing test" in

Penn Central Transporiation Co. v. New York City (1978) 438

U.S. 104, 124 (Penn Central), the court in Lucas enunciated

the clear rule which should govern our decision in this case:

"In 70-odd years of succeeding ‘regulatory takings’

jurisprudence [i.e., following Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon

(1922) 260 U.S. 393], we have generally eschewed any ' "set

formula " ' for determining how far is too far, preferring to

‘engag[e] in. . . ad hoc, factual inquiries.' [Citations.] We

have, however, described at least two discrete categories of

regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry

into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.

The first encompasses regulations that compel the property

owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property... . [9]

The second situation in which we have found categorical treat-

ment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically

beneficial or productive use of land. [Citations.]" (Lucas,

supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1015, italics added.)

If Lucas means what it says, it establishes a categorical

rule. No amount of judicial legerdemain can transform its

objective, bright-line standard into a license for courts to

engage in prohibited forms of "case-specific inquiry into the

public interests advanced in support of" (Lucas, supra, 505

U.S. at p. 1015) a given restraint.

44a

After paying grudging lip service to Lucas's categorical

rule, the majority falls back on Penn Central's squishy, “multi-

factor" test, a standard so amorphous it is capable of producing

virtually any result. This is the very test Lucas overruled pro

tanto in cases, like this one, where the restraint at issue denies

all economic use. The torturous logic by which today's

majority decides an order of the coastal commission -- one that

finally and unqualifiedly denied the landowners here all use of

their property for over two years -- was a mere "temporary

delay" is worth examining in detail.

First, the majority resuscitates the Penn Central test in this

case by ignoring another equally clear precedent. In First

Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304

(First Lutheran), the United States Supreme Court concluded

that temporary takings are compensable, repudiating this

court's contrary holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24

Cal.3d 266. The majority dismisses the holding in First

Lutheran as “narrow[]"; confined to its facts; requiring the

existence of a final administrative decision before the presence

of a constitutional violation can be determined; a case which

did not hold that the "mere" assertion of regulatory jurisdiction

constituted a taking; and so on. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-

14.) But even if we accept all of the majority's quibbles, both

Lucas and First Lutheran indisputably apply here.

Mystifyingly, the majority then instructs us that "[v]irtually

every court that has examined the issue has concluded . . . that

a regulatory mistake resulting in delay does not, by itself,

amount to a taking of property." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)

True enough. But none of the 10 cases cited in support of this

patently obvious conclusion refutes the plaintiff property

owners’ claim for just compensation in this case.

45a

Two of these "noncompensable delay" cases preceded

Lucas, in the remainder, the court found either that the agency

had not reached a final decision or that the regulation did not

deny the owner ail beneficial use. (See Littoral Development

Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1995) 33

Cal. App.4th 211, 221-222 [no final decision]; De/ Oro Hills v.

City of Oceanside (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 1060, 1065 [no final

decision]; Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.

1996) 678 So.2d 1365, 1366 [no denial of all economic use];

Cannone v. Noey (Alaska 1994) 867 P.2d 797, 801 [same];

Dumont v. Town of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1993) 622 A.2d 1238,

1244 [same]; Tabb Lakes, Lid. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10

F.3d 796, 798 [no final decision]; Steinbergh v. City of

Cambridge (Mass. 1992) 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 [no denial of

all economic use]; Smith v. Town.of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1992)

615 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 [same]; /902 Atlantic Lid. v.

United States (1992) 26 Ct.Cl. 573 [pre-Lucas decision

applying Penn Central analysis]: Lujan Home Builders y.

Orangetown (1991) 568 N.Y.2d 850, 851 [due process rather

than takings analysis]. )

Lucas itself teaches that its categorical rules do not apply

unless the restraint at issue deprives the property owner of all

economic use. (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1015-1019.)

Other takings cases make clear the high court's "insistence on

knowing the nature and extent of permitted development

before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that

purport to limit it." (MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo

County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 351 (MacDonald), see also

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton

Bank (1985) 473 US. 172, 186 (Williamson County)

("Because respondent has not yet obtained a final decision

regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and

subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the

procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensa-

46a

tion, respondent's claim is not ripe."].) As the court has stated,

however, the role served by the ripeness requirement in the

takings context is "prudential": to make clear "the economic

impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it

interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations.

[Citations.] Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the

administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position

regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the

particular land in question." (Williamson County, supra, 473

U.S. at p. 191; see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &

Reclamation Assn., Inc. (1981) 452 U.S. 264 (Hodel).)

Only recently, the court underlined the limited contours of

"ripeness" in the takings context. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency (1997) US. {117 S.Ct. 1659],

it said that cases such as Williamson County, MacDonald, and

Hodel “addressed the virtual impossibility of determining what

development will be permitted on a particular lot of land when

its use is subject to the decision of a regulatory body invested

with great discretion, which it has not yet even been asked to

exercise. No such question is presented here." (/d. atp.

[117 S.Ct. 1667], italics added; see also Lucas, supra, 505

U.S. at pp. 1011-1012.) It is that administrative flexibility that

lies behind and justifies the prudential ripeness rule in the

takings context. Those concerns simply have no bearing in this

case, however, where the commission made clear the extent to

which it would permit plaintiffs to develop their lot: Not at all.

The cases relied on by the majority are thus wide of the only

issue presented. Did the commission's definitive refusal to

permit plaintiffs to make any use of their property -- a refusal

that continued until, after two years of litigation, plaintiffs

obtained judicial relief -- “den[y] all economically beneficial or

productive use of [their] land." (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p.

1015.)

47a

This is not a case in which the property owners contend, as

the majority would have it, that "a regulatory mistake resulting

in delay . . ., by itself, amount[s] to a taking of property." (Cf.

maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) That is not, and never has been, the

law of takings. Rather, plaintiffs' argument -- and the essential

meaning of both Lucas and First Lutheran -- is that a final

decision by a regulatory agency that denies ail economically

beneficial use of the property, even temporarily, is a per se

compensable Fifth Amendment taking.” If that is so, then

plaintiffs’ property has been "taken," however temporarily, by

the commission's order, and the payment of "just"

compensation is constitutionally compelled. As both the trial

court and the Court of Appeal concluded, that is what

happened here.

The majority dodges the otherwise inevitable result by

changing the question: "The present case poses the issue of

whether a legally erroneous decision of a government agency

during the development approval process resulting in delay

constitutes a temporary taking of property." (Maj. opn., ante,

at p. 14.) “Legally erroneous"? "Process"? "Delay"? Of

course mere "delay" in a "process" resulting from an

"erroneous decision" does not qualify as a constitutional

violation. If it did, every "mistake" by government land use

2/ As Lucas itself and following cases have pointed out, there is one

recognized exception even to the court's categorical takings rule. If the

government can demonstrate that controlling principles of "background

law" -- typically embodied in a state's nuisance law -- do not permit the

use at issue, compensation is not required. (See 505 U.S. at p. 1029

["A law or decree with such an effect [i.e., prohibiting all economically

beneficial use] must . .. do no more than duplicate the result that could

have been achieved in the courts -- by adjacent landowners . . . under

the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its

complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public

generally. . . ." (Fn. omitted.)].)

48a

authorities leading to any delay in the owner's use of her

property would require compensation. A massive raid on the

public fisc would ensue. Suppose, however, the question were

differently, more evenhandedly, framed as one that "poses the

issue of whether a regulatory decision barring any use of

property until the agency's decision is overturned by a court

constitutes a temporary taking of property?” What result then?

That, rather than the majority's tendentious formulation, is the

issue presented by this case.

In any event, the majority's trick question has already been

asked and answered. As Justice Chin points out in his dissent

(see dis. opn. of Chin, J., ante, at pp. 2-3), the identical

position espoused by the majority -- that litigation over the

validity of a land use restriction is simply a "normal delay" in

the permit approval process and thus cannot give rise to a

temporary taking -- was advanced by Justice Stevens in his

dissenting opinion in First Lutheran. (See 482 U.S. at pp.

334-335.) The precise issue has thus already been considered

and rejected by the high court. (See dis. opn. of Chin, J., ante,

at p. 3.)

If Lucas lays down a categorical rule; and if, as First

Lutheran concludes, a final order that temporarily deprives a

property owner of all economically beneficial use is a

compensable taking, these propositions ought to readily yield

a clear answer, one that does not depend on the majority's

elaborate, even arduous, preliminary discussion. (Cf. Florida

Rock Industries, Inc. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1560,

1564-1565 [Lucas "teaches that the economic impact factor

alone may be determinative; in some circumstances, no

balancing of factors is required. If a regulation categorically

prohibits a/l economically beneficial use of land -- destroying

its economic value for private ownership -- the regulation has

an effect equivalent to a permanent physical occupation. There

49a

is, without more, a compensable taking." (Fns. omitted,

second italics added.)]}.)

What the Supreme Court's categorical rule in Lucas means

for property owners, and what the majority refuses

to acknowledge, is that after Lucas, Justice Holmes's famous

apothegm in the Rock Island Railroad case, that "Men must

turn square corners when they deal with the Government"

(Rock Island & c. R. R. v. United States (1920) 254 U.S. 141,

143) is now reciprocal. Following Lucas, in a limited class of

cases, regulators whose final action denies an owner ail

beneficial economic use of land are on notice that, if their

decisions prove wrong when tested in court, the government

may face a damages judgment for a temporary taking even if

the restraint is later rescinded. In this context at least, it is

government that must turn square corners when it attempts to

overregulate the use of private property or is in danger of

“forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."

(Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49; Lucas,

supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1018.)

To further confuse the discussion, the majority plunges into

a lengthy disquisition on the connection between the land use

regulation at issue here and the legitimate governmental

purposes it arguably advances. This, of course, is the

formulation developed in Dolan v. City of Tigard ( 1994) 512

U.S. 374, and Nollan v. Californ.a Coastal Comm'n (1987)

483 U.S. 825, a "nexus" test that is precluded by the

categorical rule in Lucas. Indeed, the very nature of Lucas’s

categorical rule appears to bar a court from conducting a case-

specific inquiry into those interests that might justify the

restraint imposed on the plaintiffs’ use of their property by the

commission's order. (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1015 ["We

have ... described ... two discrete categories of regulatory

50a

action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the

public interest advanced in support of the restraint."].)

Although Justice Holmes's caution that when regulation

"goes too far it will be recognized as a taking" is foundational

to much takings jurisprudence (Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon,

supra, 260 U.S. at p. 415), the high court "ha[s] never set

forth the justification for this rule." (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at

p. 1017.) As Justice Scalia explains: "Perhaps it is simply ...

that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's

point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.

[Citation.] . . . Surely, at least, in the extraordinary

circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial

use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual

assumption that the legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits

and burdens of economic life’ [citation] in a manner that

secures an ‘average reciprocity of advantage’ to everyone

concerned [citation]. And the functional basis for permitting

the government ... to affect property values without

compensation ... does not apply to the relatively rare situations

where the government has deprived a landowner of all

economically beneficial uses." (505 U.S. at pp. 1017-1018,

italics in original.)

"On the other side of the balance," the Lucas majority

continued, "affirmatively supporting a compensation

requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of

land without economically beneficial or productive options for

its use -- typically, as here, by requiring land to be left

substantially in its natural state -- carry with them a heightened

risk that private property is being pressed into some form of

public service under the guise of mitigating serious public

harm. [Citations.] As Justice Brennan explained: 'From the

government's point of view, the benefits flowing to the public

from preservation of open space through regulations may be

Sla

equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal

condemnation or increasing electricity production through a

dam project that floods private property.'" (505 U.S. at p.

1018.) In short, Justice Scalia concluded, "there are good

reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the

owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice ail

economically beneficial use in the name of the common good,

that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered

a taking." (505 U.S. at p. 1019, fn. omitted, italics in original.)

It is evident the majority is unwilling to come to terms with

the true meaning and operative effect of Lucas and First

Lutheran. At every turn, its opinion reflects the abiding

conviction that takings jurisprudence has not advanced a single

step beyond the "regulatory friendly" analysis of Penn Central.

At every opportunity, the majority reverts to Penn Central's ad

hoc factual inquiry. Limning all this reasoning is the

vocabulary of "balance." Instead of confronting the meaning of

Lucas as it applies in this case, the majority chatters endlessly

of "delay ... owing to the mistaken assertion of jurisdiction"

(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1-2), " ‘normal delay' " (id. at p. 2),

“normal delay rather than a temporary taking" (ibid_), “legally

erroneous decision ... during the development ... process

resulting in delay" (id. at p. 14), “reasonable regulatory process

designed to advance legitimate government interests" (id. at p.

18), "[mJere fluctuations in value during the process of

government decisionmaking" (ibid.), "mistaken assertion of

jurisdiction" (ibid.), "normal development delay" (id. at p. 25),

“conditional denial" (id. at p. 28), "condition . . . erroneously

imposed" (ibid.), "plausible . . . though perhaps legally

erroneous" (ibid.), "postponement of development" (id. at p.

31), "bona fide dispute" (id. at p. 33), "delay [as] an incident

of property ownership" (ibid.), and plaintiffs' “unfortunate

position of suffering from a delay." (/d. at p. 34.) Thus is

reality ruthlessly revised. (Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal

52a

Comm'n, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 831 ["To say that the

appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's

premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest

but rather. . . 'a mere restriction on its use,'. . . is to use words

in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary

meaning."].)

The majority's discussion concludes with a proposition that

is flatly incompatible with Lucas: "[W]e must determine not

whether a sinister purpose lurked behind the [c]ommission's

decision, but rather whether the development restrictions

imposed . . . substantially advanced some legitimate state

purposes so as to justify the denial of the development

permit." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, italics added.) Had Lucas

never been decided; had the commission not denied plaintiffs

all use of their property; had Penn Central's ad hoc test the

slightest relevance to this case, the majority's conclusion might

have some bearing here. But none of these things is true.

The remainder of the majority opinion continues to joust

with its own strawman. Yet, to repeat: The test is not

"whether the development restrictions imposed on the subject

property substantially advanced some legitimate state

purposes." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) That formula, lifted

from Penn Central, simply is no longer relevant under the

circumstances here; indeed, the inquiry is barred by Lucas.

And the majority's conclusion -- that though the commission

may have been "mistaken given the peculiar facts of this case,

its position was not so objectively unreasonable as to give rise

to the inference that it was adopting that position solely for

purposes of delay or some other illegitimate reason" (maj.

opn., ante, at p. 24) -- is obstinately beside the point.

The majority persistently misstates and mischaracterizes

both the issue before us and governing takings law. In the end,

oR eer

oP

53a

however, the majority is finally forced to concede the meaning

of First Lutheran: " {It}. . . stands for the proposition that once

a government action finally denies all economically viable use

of property, the fact that the government later rescinds that

action after a judicial proceeding does not relieve it of its duty

to pay compensation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31, italics added )

Yes, exactly; and that is this case. As plaintiffs point out,

were that not the law, the holding of Lucas would be

emasculated. If any "threshold," "jurisdictional" assertion by

a government land use agency that has the effect of barring all

economically beneficial use of property can be converted into

"the recognition that a judicial determination of the validity of

certain preconditions to development is a normal part of the

development process" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 32, italics in

original), then, in California, at least for now, Lucas is a dead

letter.

CONCLUSION

When the answer to every question about what the public

needs or wants or should have is always "more," the demand

for free public goods is infinite. Against this relentless siphon,

the takings clause, and the courts' ardent defense of it, stands

as a last lonely bulwark of property rights. It is, and will

continue to be a difficult rampart to maintain. That difficulty

is built right into our constitutional structure. But, in one area

at least we have arrived at a clear understanding: when the

government denies all economically viable use of property,

even temporarily, it may not achieve its ends "by a shorter cut

than the constitutional way of paying for the change." (Penna.

54a

Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at p. 416.) In these

limited circumstances, government must turn square comers --

except in California.

BROWN, J.

I CONCUR:

BAXTER, J.

2418486.01

LANDGATE, INC., et al.,

CALIFORNIA COASTAL

COMMISSION,

55a

APPENDIX B

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

COURT OF APPEAL -

SECOND DISTRICT

FILED Feb-7 1997 :

JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk

SHIRLEY BEAUX, Deputy Clerk

Plaintiffs and

Appellants, B084315

V. (Super. Ct. No. BC 024391)

Defendant

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

and Appellant. )

)

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1,

this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II

and IV.

56a

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County. Richard C. Hubbell, Judge. Reversed in part,

affirmed in part and remanded.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E.

Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jan S. Stevens,

Assistant Attorney General, Peter Kaufinan and Joseph

Barbieri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Reznik & Reznik, Fred N. Gaines and Kevin M. Kemper

for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

ee ee ee panduade

572

In October 1990, Landgate, Inc. applied to the California

Coastal Commission for a coastal development permit to build

a house and related structures on its lot in the Malibu hills.

The Commission asserted that the lot--approved by the County

of Los Angeles when owned by Landgate's predecessor in

interest--was unlawful because it lacked Commission approval.

The Commission denied Landgate's coastal permit application.

Landgate successfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of

mandate challenging the permit denial and successfully

defended on appeal the trial court's grant of the writ. Landgate

then returned to the trial court to resolve the remaining

"taking" claims.

The Commission appeals from the judgment awarding

compensation for inverse condemnation, prejudgment interest,

and attorney fees and costs. The Commission claims the trial

court erred in granting Landgate's motion for summary

adjudication on its third cause of action, which alleged that the

Commission had, by its February 1991 permit denial, deprived

Landgate of all economically viable use of its land and thus

temporarily "taken" that land without paying the

constitutionally required "just compensation." The Commission

also argues the trial court erred in awarding Landgate

$155,657 in temporary taking damages following trial on the

subject of damages.

Landgate cross-appeals, claiming (1) it was entitled to

Code of Civil Procedure section 1036 expenses incurred in the

writ of mandate proceeding,(2) the court should have adopted

the fair rental value method of assessing damages, and (3) the

court erred in dismissing Landgate's 42 United States Code

section 1983 cause of action and refusing to allow Landgate to

identify Commission members and Commission staff personnel

individually as Doe defendants in that claim.

58a

In the published portion of this opinion, we affirm the trial

court's ruling that the Commission's denial of the permit

temporarily deprived Landgate of all economically viable use

of its lot and thus constituted a categorical taking under the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. We also

reverse and remand with respect to the trial court's denial of

Landgate's request for Code of Civil Procedure section 1036

expenses incurred for the writ of mandate proceeding.

In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we reverse that

portion of the damages award attributable to property taxes for

the relevant period, affirm the balance of the award, and affirm

the dismissal of Landgate's 42 United States Code section

1983 cause of action and the grant of the Commission's motion

to quash service of summons on individual Commissioners and

staff members.

FACTS

Before 1973, a large unimproved tract in the Malibu hills

was approved for subdivision into approximately two-acre lots,

each zoned for a single-family home. After the subdivision,

Landgate's predecessor in interest owned two parcels which

ran north and south. The northern portions were sloped, the

southern portions were flat. One of the lots contained a single

family home on its flat southern portion. Both lots lie within

the coastal zone in the County of Los Angeles.

In the mid 1980's, the County planned to improve an east-

west road through the two lots. The proposed road would

divide the two lots into one northern lot and one southern lot.

The landowner and the County agreed that, in exchange for the

owner's dedicating portions of the parcels for the roadway

59a

easement, the County would reconfigure the lots into a single,

sloped lot north of the road and a single, flat lot south of the

road, each still zoned for a single family home.

The County completed the road improvement and formally

approved the lot reconfiguration, which was recorded July 5,

1989. At that point, the Commission had approved the

County's Malibu land use plan, but at all relevant times had not

certified a County Malibu local coastal program. The lots’

owner did not seek or receive Commission approval of the lot

line adjustment. The Commission did not challenge the -

County's approval of the reconfiguration.

In October 1990, Landgate bought the sloped northern

2.45 acre lot and applied for and received County approval in

concept of grading and building plans for a single-family home

to be built on the property.' Landgate applied to the

Commission for a permit to build the house and related

structures and the Commission scheduled the matter for its

December meeting in San Diego.

Landgate's October 12, 1990, permit application sought

approval of the house and related structures. The plans called

for a 9,036 square foot home, a guest house and swimming

pool and 8,500 cubic yards of grading. In a November 1 letter,

Commission staff requested additional materials in connection

with the application. In late November, Landgate's

representative first learned from staff that the lot line

adjustment was going to be an issue in connection with the

1/ Landgate's first amended petition/complaint, filed November 19,

1993, added Peter and Punte Bogart, who “owned and controlled"

Landgate as plaintiffs. The Bogarts held a life estate in the subject lot.

We refer to the Bogarts and Landgate collectively as "Landgate."

60a

application. Before the original staff report was prepared,

Landgate modified its proposal by reducing the house to 7,500

square feet, eliminating the guest house and changing other

structures, and reducing proposed grading to 4,300 cubic

yards,

According to the November 1990 staff report,

development along the road or "overview" for which the

Landgate house was proposed was “limited to two existing

single family residences." Although there was "no existing or

planned-for development along the inland or northern side of

the overview[,] ... there [was] a three-lot subdivision ... which

was approved with conditions at the December, 1990...

Commission hearings. This subdivision is just north and west

of the overview."

At its December 13 meeting in San Diego, the Commission

first considered the now-reduced project, which, according to

the staff report, proposed to build on a illegal lot and violated

visual resources (views from a trail ir a tributary of Escondido

Canyon below the south side of the road) and landform

alteration (grading) requirements. The Commission voted to

continue the matter due to questions concerning the legality of

the lot under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub.

Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.) because the Commission had

not approved the County's lot line adjustment.

According to the declaration of its engineer/representative

in support of Landgate's motion ("Petrovsky Declaration"),

"once the lot line adjustment issue was raised ... the

[Commission] staff would not negotiate with regard to the

issues of the size of home, grading, etc. Instead, the legality of

the lot became the focus of their attention." Landgate then

reapplied for a coastal development permit, adding a request

for Commission approval of the County lot line adjustment.

6la

At its February 7, 1991, meeting, the Commission denied

Landgate's application, finding, among other things and over

Landgate's objection, that the lot itself constituted an

impermissible "development" under the Coastal Act because it

was created without Commission approval, and that the

proposed house and related structures would produce

excessive soil, grading, and visual degradation.”

At the hearing, the District Director, who presented staff's

recommendations, told the Commission, "The lot line

adjustment changed the configuration of the two lots so that

instead of being long, narrow lots, you now have two lots with

the lot line being located at the center line of [the road].

[{]] What this does is it results in two lots, one of which is on

the down slope side of [the road] and is much steeper than the

area located on the up slope side of [the road]. [] Staff would

suggest that this lot line adjustment not be approved, that it

would be preferable to concentrate the development on the

two lots on the up slope side of [the road] where the property

is more level."

After Petrovsky, Mr. Bogart, and others spoke, one

Commissioner asked the District Director whether he was

"right ... to say that if the lot line adjustment came before us,

you would have recommended denial?" The District Director

2/ "'Development' means ... the placement or erection of any solid

material or structure; discharge or disposal or any dredged material or

of any gaseous, liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing,

dredging, mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density

or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision

. . . and any other division of land, including lot splits,.. . ;

construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any

structure..." (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106.)

62a

replied, “That is correct." Shortly thereafter, the Commission

denied the application.

Immediately after the vote, another Commissioner said

that the issue of "the County's refusal to recognize our right to

review lot line adjustments" was "an issue that ha[{d] come

before [the Commission] many, many times in the Malibu

area." She added it was “really time to become extremely

serious about this" and asked that staff counsel be directed to

communicate with the County on the topic. The Commission's

Chief Counsel said he would draft the letter for the Chairman's

signature.

On April 11, 1991, the Commission denied Landgate's

reconsideration request, which included a newly modified

proposal reducing the height to 32 feet above natural grade

and reducing grading to approximately 500 cubic yards. After

Landgate's representative described the revised project, staff

advised the Commission that Landgate was not requesting

reconsideration in terms required by statute, but was describing

a new project, for which it was free to apply.’

The District Director told the Commission, "One of the

problems I think is that staff has indicated that in your denial

of this project part of the basis for your denial was the lot line

adjustment and that we told them even if they make these

modifications we'll still recommend denial." Chief Counsel told

3/ Public Resources Code section 30627, subdivision (b)(3) provides:

"The basis of the request for reconsideration shall be either that there

is relevant new evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,

could not have been presented at the hearing on the matter or that an

error of fact or law has occurred which has the potential of altering the

initial decision."

63a

the members, "[W]ithout the lot line adjustment some of these

revisions are I think irrelevant." Counsel also told the

Commission, "This project does not work, if you please,

without that lot line adjustment."

The Commission's Executive Director advised the members

that “even with this new information [that Landgate was

proposing], had it been presented at [or before the February

1991 meeting], . . ., without your willingness to change the lot

line, [the] information wouldn't have led to a different result.”

The Commission followed staff's recommendation to deny the

reconsideration.

Landgate sued and, among other relief, petitioned for

issuance of a writ of mandate directed to the Commission. On

October 24, 1991, the trial court issued the writ, vacating the

Commission's denial of the project and ordering it to

reconsider the application assuming the lot reconfiguration

valid. The Commission scheduled the matter for its November

14, 1991, San Diego meeting. Landgate prepared for and

traveled to the meeting, but the Commission continued the

matter until its December meeting without conducting a

hearing.

On November 21, 1991, the Commission filed a return

Stating the parties were exploring settlement involving

approval of a smaller project on Landgate's lot. According to

the return, the parties were exploring a resolution of the

litigation, including Landgate's presentation of a downsized

project in exchange for Landgate's agreement to drop its

remaining causes of action and withdraw certain portions of its

claim for costs and attorney fees. Instead, the Commission

appealed the grant of the writ. We affirmed the order issuing

the writ of mandate, holding that under the facts of this case,

the lot line adjustment was not a new "development" within the

64a

meaning of the Coastal Act. We held that the Commission had

no jurisdiction to deny the permit on that ground.

On February 16, 1993, the Commission approved

Landgate's application for a 7,500 square foot, 35 foot high,

single-family residence, with a swimming pool, garage, and

septic system. Grading involved 2,983 cubic yards. The

approval was subject to special conditions which included

submission of revised plans for the Executive Director's

approval. The plans were to show that the height of the house

did "not exceed ... 28[] feet above existing grade or finished

grade, whichever is more restrictive."

According to the relevant staff report, the proposed

residence was 30 feet in height when nearest the road, 35 feet

in height from existing grade in the section extending down the

hillside, and would be 15 feet above existing grade for part of

where it paralleled the road. In addition, according to staff,

"the only development visible from the [Escondido Canyon

Trail] ... is the roofline of the tower of an existing residence

and a home under construction, both on the Overview

ridgeline. However, at least one single-family residence has

been approved on the Overview, as well as the Shriner three-

lot subdivision to the west on [the same road as the Landgate

property]. The Shriner subdivision includes lots above and

below the road." Other statements in the report reflect other

project approvals in the area overlooking the trail.

After issuance of our remittitur, Landgate sought summary

adjudication on its third cause of action ("Taking of Property

Without Just Compensation"). Landgate argued its claim was

meritorious and without defense because (1) Landgate had

been "deprived, at least temporarily, of all economically viable

or productive use of its property" because, “at least

temporarily, [it] could not legally obtain any valid permits or

65a

approvals to construct any project on its property as a result of

the Commission's actions." Landgate also argued (2) the

Commission's actions did not "substantially advance any

legitimate State interest," and (3) it had been "deprived, at least

temporarily, of all reasonable investment-backed expectations

with regard to its property" because it “at least temporarily,

could not legally obtain any valid permits or approvals to

construct any project on its property as a result of the

Commission's actions." The trial court granted Landgate's

motion, ruling that the Commission's actions had at least

temporarily deprived Landgate of all economically viable use

of its property. The court awarded Landgate $155,657 in

damages. The Commission appeals.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

As relevant, Code of Civil Procedure section 437¢ provides

that a party may move for summary adjudication as to a cause

of action if that party contends there is no merit to an

affirmative defense to that cause of action. The motion is to be

granted only if it completely disposes of that affirmative

defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A plaintiff

meets his burden of showing there is no defense to a cause of

action if he has proved each element of his cause of action. If

the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the

defendant to show that one or more triable issues of material

facts exist as to the cause of action or the defense thereto.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (0)(1).)

"In reviewing an order granting, or denying, a motion

seeking a summary adjudication of particular issues, we are

governed by the rules applicable generally to a review of

66a

summary judgments.’ ([Citation.] ‘An appellate court

determines de novo whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party was entitled to .... summary

adjudication as a matter of law.' [Citation.]" (Hansen

Mechanical, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th

722, 726-727.)

Temporary Taking

In its third cause of action, Landgate alleged that the

Commission's permit denial constituted a taking of property

under both the federal and state constitutions. The Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that

private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just

compensation." This prohibition was made applicable to the

States by the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Chicago,

Burlington &c. R'D v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226.) Article

I, section 19 of the California Constitution provides that

"[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for public use

only when just compensation ... has first been paid to, or into

court for, the owner...."

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S.

1003, offers the best guidance for resolution of this temporary

taking claim. In Lucas, the high court confronted South

Carolina's 1988 Beachfront Management Act, "which had the

direct effect of barring [Lucas] from erecting any permanent

habitable structures on his two [beachfront] parcels." (/d. at p.

1007.) The issue was "whether the Act's dramatic effect on the

67a

economic value of Lucas's lots accomplished a taking of

private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

requiring the payment of ‘just compensation.’ [Citation. ]"

([bid.)

Lucas had bought his two lots after the state enacted its

original coastal zone management act in 1977, under which he

was not required to obtain a permit in advance of any

development. He intended to build two single-family homes,

as owners of adjacent parcels had already done. Lucas

commissioned architectural drawings. The 1988 Act ended his

plans by prohibiting development of lands located, like his,

within an area seaward of a coastal erosion baseline established

pursuant to the statute.

Lucas filed suit. He did not challenge the state's authority

under the police power to enact the ban. Instead, he claimed

the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value

entitled him to compensation. The trial court agreed, finding,

among other things, that when Lucas bought the lots both were

zoned for his intended use and no restrictions were placed

thereon by state or local law. The trial court also found that

the Act decreed a permanent ban on construction on Lucas's

lots, eliminated the unrestricted use, and rendered them

valueless, thus concluding that the properties had been "taken"

by operation of the Act. The court ordered the state to pay

just compensation of $1,232,387.50.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, troubled by

Lucas's failure to challenge the validity of the Act itself. In the

absence of such an attack, "the court believed itself bound to

accept the ‘uncontested ... findings’ of the [state] legislature

that new construction in the coastal zone--such as [Lucas]

intended--threatened this public resource. [Citation.]" (Lucas

v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at p.

68a

1010.) The South Carolina court ruled that when a land use

regulation is "designed ‘to prevent serious public harm,'

[citations], no compensation is owing under the Takings

Clause regardless of the regulation's effect on the property's

value."(/bid.)

The United States Supreme Court rejected the state court's

approach. The high court referred to its history in the area of

uncompensated taking by overregulation and concluded, "In

70-odd years of . . . ‘regulatory takings' jurisprudence [after the

decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S.

393], we have generally eschewed any "set formula” for

determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engagfe] in ...

essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' [Citations.] We have,

however, described at least two discrete categories of

regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry

into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.

The first encompasses regulations that compel the property

owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property.... [J] The

second situation in which we have found categorical treatment

appropriate is where regulation denies all economically

beneficial or productive use of land. [Citations.] As we have

said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated

when land[]use regulation ‘does not substantially advance

legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically

viable use of his land. [Citation.]" (Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1015-1016; fns.

omitted.)

After this court affirmed that the Commission had no

jurisdiction to deny the permit on the basis of the lot line

adjustment, the Commission granted the conditioned permit

described above. In ruling on Landgate's later motion for

summary adjudication on the taking issue, the trial court found

that the Commission's February 1991 denial of the permit

69a

application “deprived [Landgate], at least temporarily, of all

economically viable or productive use of its property insofar as

Landgate ... could not legally obtain any valid permits or

approvals to construct any project on its property as a result of

the Commission's actions."

Petrovsky stated in his declaration that he had handled at

least 15 Commission matters before Landgate's and was "very

familiar with the procedures and requirements for construction

in the Coastal Zone." He explained that normally the

application for a project marked the beginning of negotiations

concerning the size of a home, grading, and other construction-

related factors. "Through a negotiated process, a resolution is

typically reached with regard to the size of the home, amount

of grading and other issues."

We agree that the Commission's permit denial caused a

taking of Landgate's property. The Commission argues that its

1991 permit denial was not, in the language of Lucas, one of

those “extraordinary circumstance[s]" in which government

actions are found to deprive landowners of all economically

viable use. (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra,

505 U.S. at p. 1017.) The Commission does not argue that a

viable use of the land remained after the permit denial. Instead,

the Commission contends the two-year hiatus was the result of

its "mistake" concerning the lot line adjustment, which resulted

in the kind of typical temporary delay which is

noncompensable under the takings clause.‘ The

4/ The Commission relies on a number of noncompensable delay cases

which we find factually driven and distinguishable or not binding on

this court. For example, in De! Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside (1995)

31 Cal.App.4th 1060, the landowner/developer raised a facial challenge

to a voter-enacted growth control ordinance which permitted only

(continued...)

70a

4/ (...continued)

staged development. The undisputed facts established that the property

was eventually sold and used for the planned purpose.

In Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 197

Cal.App.3d 862, the landowner bought four, adjoining vacant lots in

1979. In July 1980, the city planning commission and recreation and

parks commission designated an area which included the lots for study

for possible acquisition as a park. The area was included in the

recreation and open space element of the city's master plan. In

September 1980, the landowner applied for a building permit to build

four houses on his lots. The planning department required preparation

of an environmental impact report. The Landowner hired a consultant

to prepare the document. In October 1981, the park study was

completed and the two city agencies recommended purchase of only a

portion of the subject area. The area to be bought did not include the

four lots. Two months later, the planning commission amended the

master plan to permit construction on lots not to be acquired, and the

following month rescinded its requirement of an EIR for the

landowner's proposed project. In connection with preparation of the

negative declaration the planning department decided would suffice as

environmental review, the department asked the landowner for certain

supporting information. It took the landowner more than three years to

submit the information. In October 1985, the city issued an amended

negative declaration in response to public comment. Meanwhile, the

landowner had filed suit in 1982. The landowner sued before the

environmental review was completed and the record did not show

whether any final action had been taken on the new building permit the

landowner had filed after his original application had been cancelled

because of his failure to supply information. When the city's motion for

summary judgment was heard in February 1986, the new application

had not yet been acted on.

In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 796, the

landowner began filling wetlands without a permit and then sued for

compensation for an alleged taking when the United States Army Corps

(continued...)

Tila

Commission points out that the regulatory process is complex

(including disputes over sufficiency of the applicant's submitted

information, geographical boundaries of an agency's

jurisdiction and of a landowner's property, and, as in this case,

an agency's authority to require a permit) and that “regulatory

agencies ... sometimes make mistakes in resolving these

issues."

We recognize, as Petrovsky suggested, that the regulatory

process necessarily involves reasonable delay to the landowner.

We realize, as well, that mistakes sometimes, but certainly not

inevitably, occur as part of the review process. What we

cannot accept is the Commission's characterization of the

treatment of Landgate here as the reasonable result of a

"mistake." Nothing in the record suggests that the lot line

adjustment issue arose out of anything other than the

Commission's ongoing jurisdictional spat with the County of

Los Angeles combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from

building on its parcel. Instead, the overwhelming sense of the

record is that by its insistence that the lot itself was illegal, the

Commission put Landgate in a situation which was not of

4/ (...continued)

of Engineers issued a cease and desist order. The appellate court held,

inter alia, that the delay caused by the cease and desist order was neither

extraordinary nor in bad faith and, even if the landowner’s ability to sell

the property was affected by the order, the order only delayed

development. (/d. at p. 800.)

In contrast, in this case, Landgate applied for a permit to build the

house and was negotiating with Commission staff before the lot line

adjustment issue arose. Landgate had bought a lot approved by the

County. The Commission's action, taken in excess of its jurisdiction,

left Landgate not only unable to use its land but unable even to

negotiate for a different project.

72a

Landgate's own making and which Landgate could do nothing

to cure. In short, this was not a case of bureaucratic bungling,

but a declaration of war between governmental behemoths in

which the inevitable casualty was to be a noncombatant,

Landgate. The Commission, with apparent indifference to the

consequences on its applicant, denied the permit without the

jurisdiction to do so. The direct effect was to prevent

Landgate from, as the trial court put it, "construct[ing] any

project on its property."*

The facts of this case speak for themselves. When it denied

the coastal permit, the Commission went too far and denied

Landgate all economically viable use of its property, preserving

it as open space. As Lucas states, "[T]he fact that regulations

that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or

productive options for its use--typically, as here, by requiring

land to be left substantially in its natural state--carry with them

a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into

some form of public service under the guise of mitigating

serious public harm. [Citations.]" (Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1018.)

5/ It appears that Landgate tried to meet Commission staff's concerns

about the County-approved reconfiguration by modifying its original

application, so that at the February 1991 meeting, the project included

a request for Commission review of the reconfiguration. We question

whether, despite its apparent desire to comply with staff's wishes,

Landgate was in a position to rightfully ask for that review. It did not

own both of the original lots, and did not own any land south of the

road. Thus, the effect of its "reapplication" and, indeed, certain aspects

of the staff report for the February 1991 meeting gave an unreal quality

to the process with staff's conclusion "that the least environmentally

damaging site for development is on the coastal [south] side of [the

road} and that the original lot configuration of long thin parcels

extending across the road should not be altered."

73a

As in Lucas, the trial court here found that the permit

denial deprived Landgate of all economically viable use of its

land. Our review of the record leads us to the same conclusion.

Faced with the lot line adjustment issue to which it had not

contributed and which had the effect of prematurely ending the

normal negotiating process, Landgate was put in an

unworkable position. When its permit to build a single family

residence was denied because of that same issue, Landgate was

left with no economically viable use of its land.

The Commission contends, in the alternative, that its

assertion of permit jurisdiction did not constitute a taking

because Landgate did not establish its right to a permit before

the alleged taking) The Commission posits that its denial was

based independently on the project's conflict with Coastal Act

policies regarding grading and visual intrusion and, therefore,

even had it not reached the lot line adjustment issue, the

Commission's permit denial would have been proper. Thus,

the Commission argues, Landgate did not establish its

entitlement to a permit until after additional changes were

made and Landgate accepted permit conditions imposed at the

February 1993 meeting. As a result, the argument continues,

the February 1991 denial did not constitute a taking.

As we already have noted, in his declaration in support of

the summary adjudication motion, Petrovsky, experienced in

matters involving the Commission's process, explained that

typically the application for a project marked the beginning of

ultimately successful negotiations concerning the size of a

home, grading, and other construction-related factors.

However, Commission staff ceased normal negotiations with

the applicant after staff raised the lot line adjustment issue, an

issue over which Landgate claimed the Commission lacked

jurisdiction. Staffs position remained unchanged and was

74a

conveyed to the Commission, which denied the permit

pursuant to staff's recommendation.

The Petrovsky Declaration and statements of Commission

staff, chief counsel, and Commissioners quoted in our factual

summary above support our conclusion that the lot line

adjustment was pivotal in the permit denial and in the denial's

complete prohibition of any development on Landgate's lot.

So long as the Commission held to its finding that the

reconfiguration remained a subject for its review, Landgate

could not negotiate to obtain the permit necessary to build a

house on its County-approved lot. Not until two years after its

original denial did the Commission approve a project for the

Landgate property.

The Commission's ultimate approval of the house for the

Landgate property, after the reconfiguration issue had been

laid to rest, validates our conclusion that the lot line adjustment

issue was the determinative basis for the denial. Despite the

Commission's current protestations to the contrary, hindsight

shows clearly that visual impact and grading issues were not

pivotal in the 1991 permit denial if only because in 1993,

shortly after the remittitur was final in the preceding appeal,

the Commission approved a single family residence for the

property. At that point, the project was described as a 7,500

square foot, 35-foot high, single family residence, with

swimming pool, garage, and septic system and grading of

2,983 cubic yards. The only difference between these facts and

the rejected 1991 project was a grading reduction of

approximately 1,300 cubic yards, apparently proposed by

Landgate °

6/ According to the relevant staff report, project plan changes were:

"reduction in grading from 4300 [cubic yards] to 2983 [cubic yards],

(continued...)

75a

It is true, as the Commission points out, that its ultimate

approval of the project was conditioned and that the conditions

included a height limitation, which appears to have resulted in

some reduction in height. However, as Landgate points out,

the Commission could have imposed special conditions on

matters such as height in February 1991, had it not been so

intent on reviewing the County's lot line adjustment.

Additional substantiation that the lot line adjustment was

the basis for the permit denial comes from the fact that, as we

interpret relevant staff reports, the Commission had approved

at least two homes on the same sloping north side of the road

as Landgate's parcel. Those approvals are clear indications

that but for the lot line adjustment issue, Landgate's application

to build the house and related structures on its property could

and would, through the normal negotiation process, have been

approved by February 1991 or shortly thereafter. Instead, the

Commission's unlawful preoccupation with the lot line

adjustment made it impossible for Landgate to move forward

with an economically viable use of its property. We thus reject

the Commission's suggestion that no taking occurred because

6/ (...continued)

reduction in the size of fill slopes, change in the driveway entry design

from a rectangular courtyard concept to a hammerhead turnaround,

elimination of the guest house, relocation of the pool to up near the

road, and elimination of a subterranean area of the residence." As we

interpret this language, the grading reduction was thus largely the result

of changing the driveway design, eliminating the guest house, relocating

the pool, and eliminating a subterranean part of the house.

We note as well that the final grading number was considerably

higher than the approximately 500 cubic yards described by Landgate

at the April 1991 Commission hearing when Landgate's reconsideration

request was denied.

76a

Landgate could not establish their entitlement to a coastal

permit.

Il

Damages

Following a bench trial, the court awarded Landgate

temporary taking damages of $155,657. It first set the period

of the taking as beginning with the date of Commission's

permit denial (February 7, 1991) and ending with the date the

Commission issued a permit (February 16, 1993).” The court

then determined that the "temporary lost value" of the property

was $675,000, based on the conclusion that the property was

worth $675,000 when bought for that price (a figure both

experts agreed represented the property's value before the

permit denial) and had been "rendered worthless" by the denial

(as testified by Landgate's expert).* The court then multiplied

$675,000 by a 10 percent rate of return (as recommended by

Landgate's expert) for the period of the taking. The court next

added $17,214 in property taxes (which it found had been paid

on the property over the two years) plus a 10 percent rate of

return thereon. We affirm.

Z/ The court thus rejected Landgate's claim to taking damages

allegedly incurred before the permit denial and after the permit was

issued. Landgate does not appeal that aspect of the award.

8/ The Commission's expert testified the property lost 50 percent of

its value because of the permit denial.

77a

A. The Method of Calculation

Both parties claim trial court error with respect to the

damages award. The Commission raises three challenges: (1)

the court improperly based its calculations on the entire value

of the property; (2) it improperly used 10 percent as the market

rate of return; and (3) it awarded compensation for property

taxes that were based on an inaccurate assessed property value.

Landgate says the court should have used the fair rental value

method as the basis for the damages calculation, i.e., the award

should have been “based upon what the property would have

been worth to [Landgate] had [Landgate] developed the

property as ... planned..." Landgate's expert placed that value

at $744,155.

The Commission acknowledges that pertinent case law

reveals "there is io general formula for awarding damages for

a temporary taking, and that an owner's indemnity may be

measured in various ways depending on the circumstances..."

The Commission espouses as applicable here the formula set

forth in Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove (11th Cir 1987)

833 F.2d 267, 271. After acknowledging that the question to

be asked when calculating compensation for a taking is the

owner's loss, the Wheeler court formulated its approach. “In

the case of a temporary regulatory taking, the landowner’s loss

takes the form of an injury to the property's potential for

producing income or an expected profit. [Citation.] The

landowner’s compensable interest, therefore, is the return on

the portion of fair market value that is lost as a result of the

regulatory restriction. Accordingly, the landowner should be

awarded the market rate return computed over the period of

the temporary taking on the difference between the property's

fair market value without the regulatory restriction and its fair

market value with the restriction. [Citation.]" (/bid )

78a

We find Wheeler factually distinguishable. The property

was under contract between sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler, and

a developer/buyer. The buyer had made a $1,000 down

payment, had seen the project through an Alabama city's

planning commission approval, and had paid for and received

city building permits to construct an apartment complex, when

the city council enacted an ordinance banning construction of

apartment buildings. The Wheelers and the developer sued the

city. The sale apparently had fallen through. One of the issues

on appeal was the question of allocation of damages between

the plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs were, however, clearly interested

in the land only as a matter of investment, unlike the situation

in this case. The loss of potential income was pivotal to the

appellate court, which criticized the trial court's analysis

because it did not take into account the Wheelers’ "loss as

measured by the formula we set forth ... that is, the loss in

income-producing potential..." (Wheeler v. City of Pleasant

Grove, supra, 833 F.2d at p. 271.)

Moreover, the Wheeler plaintiffs did not raise a Fifth

Amendment takings claim. Instead, they brought suit under

federal civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985) and

alleged due process violations under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove (Sth Cir.

1981) 664 F.2d 99.) Thus, in contrast to this case, the Fifth

Amendment takings question of whether any economically

viable use of the land remained was not at issue.

Landgate, on the other hand, asks too much of the decision

in First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482

U.S. 304. First Lutheran was a remedies case. The case

began its appellate trek after the trial court granted the

County's motion to strike the amended complaint's allegations

that County enactment of an interim ordinance banning

construction or reconstruction in a mountain area flooded a

79a

year earlier had denied plaintiff all use of property it owned in

the flooded area. (The property was a camp improved with

buildings.) The high court held that the just compensation

clause of the Fifth Amendment requires government to pay for

temporary regulatory takings.

Landgate offers First Lutheran as support for its claim that

the rental value method should have been adopted by the trial

court in this case. While First Lutheran does not reject a

rental value method, and indeed discusses it in the context of

compensation awards for direct temporary takings of built-out

properties by the federal government during World War II, the

court used the World War II cases to make its point that

temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use

of his property, are not different in kind from permanent

takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires

compensation. [Citation.]" (First Lutheran Church v. Los

Angeles County, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 318.) As Landgate

acknowledges, however, the court refused to sanction any

specific method of calculating damages resulting from a

temporary regulatory taking.

Moreover, the cases cited in First Lutheran, and by

Landgate, involved developed property with an existing use, or

a readily calculable value based on an existing lease, not, as

here, a vacant parcel intended for development into a single

family residence. The state of the property in those cases

eliminated the need to speculate about value. In contrast,

Landgate's argument requires a court to assume the existence

of the house it intended to build. The trial court would have

been justified under the circumstances in rejecting the rental

value approach because it was too speculative.

Neither the Commission nor Landgate cites binding case

law or statute concerning the measure of damages for a

80a

temporary taking of an undeveloped residential parcel, and we

are not prepared to declare that a particular method of

calculation must be applied where such a taking occurs.

Choice of the proper method seems to depend on the particular

facts of a case. The trial court's choice of the "garden variety

appraisal" approach was appropriate in this case.”

The court was entitled to reject Landgate's expert's

conclusion that rental value was the appropriate measure and

to accept the Commission's expert's testimony that using a lost

rental value method on a proposed structure was illogical.

Similarly, the court was entitled to reject the investment-based

Wheeler approach, as Landgate's expert had done, and accept

the alternative suggested by the Commission's expert.

In the absence of controlling authority to the contrary and

in light of supporting expert testimony, we find nothing

irrational or unreasonable in the trial court's choice of which

method of calculation was appropriate in this case. On the

contrary, we conclude the court's choice was proper.

B. Rate of Return

The Commission contends the trial court should have used

the 5 percent rate of return suggested by its expert, rather than

the 10 percent offered by Landgate's expert. The Commission

claims the choice of 10 percent "was not supported by

substantial evidence because it was based on a mistaken

9/ The Commission's expert described his alternative as "a common

ordinary garden variety appraisal which is exactly what I would do if a

governmental agency were acquiring the property for two years for a

construction site."

8la

assumption about the rate of prejudgment interest in inverse

condemnation cases."

Landgate's expert testified in her deposition that she based

her 10 percent figure on "prejudgment interest." At trial she

testified that she based her choice of 10 percent on "a market

rate of interest which I assumed at 10 percent based upon

rental, based upon borrowing cost and also pre[judgment]

interest as well of 10 percent per year." As we understand this

evidence, the trial court would have been justified in

concluding that the expert's choice of a 10 percent rate of

return was not, as the Commission asserts, based solely on the

prejudgment interest rate. As a result, the Commission's

contention fails.

C. Property Tax Award

The trial court found that Landgate "expended $17,214 on

property taxes for the subject property over the two year

taking period." The Commission claims insufficient evidence

supported that finding, but takes issue only with the amount of

the award, arguing that since, according to its expert's

testimony, the assessed value of the property was $337,500,

not $675,000, the property tax for the period was only $8,648.

The critical question, however, was not a theoretical

assessment of the property's value, but the amount actually

incurred or paid in taxes during the relevant period. While

such an amount is easily established, for example, with

cancelled checks or a tax bill, the record does not show what

Landgate paid or incurred in taxes. Landgate asks us to take

judicial notice of a "Certificate of Payment" from the Los

Angeles County Tax Collector attached as an exhibit to its

respondent's brief. The Commission replies that the certificate

82a

shows neither the amount of taxes actually assessed nor the

amount actually paid. We decline Landgate's request for

judicial notice because it is pointless. The certificate deals only

with assessed value and does not establish the fact or amount

of the liability. There was no substantial evidence to support

the award of property taxes.

Il

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1036.E

On its cross-appeal, Landgate also contends the trial court

erred in denying its request for attorney fees incurred in the

writ of mandate proceeding.

After prevailing on its petition for writ of mandate in the

trial court, Landgate moved for attorney fees and costs under

Code of Civil Procedure section 1036 (hereinafter section

1036). The trial court denied the attorney fees request and

awarded $619.50 (of $63,647.18 requested) in costs. We

awarded Landgate its costs on appeal in its successful defense

of the trial court's ruling. The Commission ultimately paid

Landgate $1,434.01 for litigation costs arising from the

mandate proceedings.

Following the damages trial, Landgate sought just under

$403,000 in attorney fees ($266,100) and costs ($136,714.27)

for the entire action pursuant to section 1036, including costs

and $155,351 in attorney fees for the trial and appellate

defense in the writ of mandate proceeding. The trial court

denied fees and costs for the writ proceeding and awarded

Landgate $122,395.73 in attorney fees ($99,269) and costs

($23,126.73) incurred during the inverse condemnation

proceeding.

83a

At the time of the trial court's determinations, section 1036

provided, as pertinent: "In any inverse condemnation

proceeding brought for the taking of any interest in real

property, the court rendering judgment for the plaintiff by

awarding compensation for such taking, . . . , shall determine

and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment

., Such sum as will, in the opinion of the court ...,reimburse

such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and

expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and

engineering fees, actually incurred because of such

proceeding."'° (Emphasis added. )

Landgate's pleading in the trial court was titled, "Verified

Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory

Relief, Taking Without Just Compensation and Deprivation of

Civil Rights." (Some caps. omitted.) Landgate moved to

"sever" the proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section

598, so that the first two causes of action, for writ of mandate

and declaratory relief, could be heard first, receiving calendar

preference, and the remaining causes of action be tried, or

otherwise addressed, in the normal course of events. ''

10/ Effective January 1, 1996, section 1036 was amended, as relevant,

to extend its application to "any appellate proceeding in which the

plaintiff prevails on any issue in that proceeding."

Ll/ = Code of Civil Procedure section 598 grants a court discretion

following notice and a hearing, upon written motion, timely made, to

order "that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the

trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case" "when the

convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and

efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby."

(continued...)

84a

Landgate says it was entitled to section 1036 costs and fees

for the entire proceeding, inciuding the writ of mandate

proceeding, because success on its claim that the Commission

had overstepped its jurisdiction and the consequent invalidation

of the permit denial was, under California case law, a

prerequisite to litigation of its right to damages.

The Commission does not dispute Landgate’s assertion that

resolution of the mandate claim was a prerequisite to pursuing

its inverse condemnation claim.'? Instead, the Commission

says that Landgate's argument is “irrelevant to the issue of

reimbursement under section 1036" because the statutory

language describes eligible expenses only as those "‘actually

incurred’ in the inverse condemnation proceeding" and

ll/ (...continued)

"Severance is, in effect, the ‘flip side’ of consolidation: i.e., it is the

procedure whereby the court may order separate trials of issues or

parties joined in a single action. [§] Where a separate trial is ordered on

the issue of liability, the procedure is commonly referred to as

‘bifurcation.’ But it is still a severance and governed by the Code

provisions applicable to severance. (The objective of bifurcation ... is

to avoid wasting time and money on the trial of damages issues if the

liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.) [Citation.]" (Weil &

Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (Rutter 1996) Case

Management & Trial Setting, § [12:406], p. 12(1)-76.) Code of Civil

Procedure section 598 bifurcation also "prevents possible prejudice to

a defendant where a jury might look past liability to compensate a

plaintiff through sympathy for his or her damages." (Id. at § [12:414],

p. 12(1)-78.)

12/ Indeed, in the trial court, the Commission argued in support of its

demurrer to all seven causes of action that "Landgate must establish the

invalidity of the Commission's action before secking to recover on an

inverse condemnation claim." (Some caps. omitted.)

85a

Landgate's expenses in the mandate proceeding were not so

incurred. The statutory language actually provides that the

specified expenses are to be reimbursed if "actually incurred

because of [any inverse condemnation proceeding.]" (Code

Civ.Proc., § 1036, emphasis added.)

Since Landgate had to resolve the propriety of the permit

denial before it could litigate whether that denial constituted a

taking, entitling Landgate to just compensation, resolution of

the mandate claim was part of the inverse condemnation

proceeding and any statutory fees and costs incurred in

resolving the mandate claim were "actually incurred because

of" such proceeding.'* (Code Civ. Proc., § 1036.)

13/ Because we hold that section 1036 requires reimbursement of

attomey fees and costs incurred in the mandate litigation, we need not

address the Commission's assertion, predicated on a contrary

conclusion, that the trial court was required to apportion between the

mandate and inverse condemnation proceeding expenses. We note,

however, that none of the cases cited by the Commission addressed a

situation where, as here, a landowner succeeded on a mandate claim for

a taking by overregulation, a prerequisite to a later successful finding

that a taking had occurred and an award of damages therefor. Instead,

the cited cases required allocation of attorney fees or attorney fees and

costs (1) where the litigation involved inverse and direct condemnation,

on one hand, and nuisance-personal injury claims, on the other, in

which the appellate court remanded because it could not tell which

attorney fees had been awarded on which claims (Greater Westchester

Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86

[airplane overflights, landowners' lawsuits consolidated with City's

direct condemnation suits and bifurcated into condemnation and

nuisance trials]), (2) where a landowner's claims of nuisance,

negligence and trespass for flooding was bifurcated into liability and

damages segments (Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation

Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914), (3) where the appellate court

affirmed a judgment based on a jury's findings of liability and damages

(continued...)

86a

The Commission's claim that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the mandate expenses misses the mark.

Section 1036 provides that a court "shall determine and award

or allow" such sum as will, in its opinion reimburse the

plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) The section thus requires an award

(Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th

368,390); the amount of the award is a matter of discretion.

On remand, Landgate will have to establish the reasonableness

of its fees and costs.

The Commission also asserts that Landgate's claim for fees

and costs in the mandate proceeding is barred under the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We agree that

to the extent Landgate was awarded and paid non-section 1036

costs in the mandate proceeding, and did not challenge the

reasonableness thereof by filing a cross-appeal in the mandate

proceeding, that issue is resolved. However, in light of our

holding that Landgate is entitled to section 1036 expenses for

the mandate proceeding, on remand the trial court will review

Landgate's substantiation of those expenses to determine, in its

discretion, whether Landgate has sufficiently identified those

expenses and whether the amounts claimed are reasonable,

pursuant to the statute.

13/ (..continued)

in landowner's claims of inverse condemnation and nuisance for

flooding and reversed and remanded only because the trial court

improperly calculated the amount of prejudgment interest due on the

damages award (Jmperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.

(1985) 167 Cal App.3d 263), or (4) where a city's direct condemnation

and landowner's inverse lawsuits were consolidated and then bifurcated

into liability and damages phases (Los Angeles v. Waller (1979) 90

Cal.App.3d 766 [appellate court addressed reasonableness of trial

court's section 1036 award)).

87a

We reject the Commission's implicit argument that

Landgate is barred from claiming section 1036 expenses

because it did not claim its entitlement to them on a cross-

appeal from the mandate action. At that point, had Landgate

made a section 1036 expenses claim to this court, we would

have denied its request as premature, because Landgate had

not yet shown a taking had occurred. Landgate has now

established the taking element and is entitled to section 1036

expenses in such reasonable amount as the trial court may find.

IV

Title 42 United States Code Section 1983

Landgate claims the trial court erred by sustaining the

Commission's demurrer to Landgate's cause of action for

violation of civil rights under Title 42, United States Code,

section 1983 (hereinafter section 1983), and compounded the

error by granting the Commission's motion to quash service on

individual commissioners and staff members after Landgate

amended its section 1983 claim to name them as individual

defendants.

In its seventh cause of action, Landgate claimed the

Commission's 1991 permit denial violated section 1983. The

claim was asserted against the Commission only. The trial

court sustained the Commission's demurrer on the ground that

the State and its agencies were not "persons" within the

meaning of section 1983 (Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of

California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642, 661). The section

1983 claim was dismissed February 24, 1991. The trial court's

action was proper because the State and its agencies are not

“persons” within the meaning of the federal civil rights act.

(Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58,

71; Pyne v. Meese (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 392, 405.)

On February 14, 1992, Landgate sought to amend its

complaint by naming individual Commission members and staff

as Does | through 17." On February 18, the trial court stayed

trial court proceedings until appellate proceedings were

concluded. On February 19, a Deputy Attorney General

informed Landgate's counsel the Attorney General was not

authorized to accept service for any individuals and that

Landgate would have to serve individual defendants

individually. The stay was lifted on April 23, 1993, and

Landgate resumed efforts to serve the individuals. Counsel for

the parties agreed that a motion to quash was the best way to

resolve the propriety of Landgate's move. The Commission

moved to quash on the ground that the claims against the

individuals were time barred. On October 5, the trial court

granted the motion.

We find no error in the trial court's grant of the

Commission's motion to quash. The limitations period in

California for asserting a claim under section 1983 is one year.

(City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34

Cal.App.4th 1293, 1297; Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa (9th

Cir. 1995) 49 F.3d 583, 585.) Landgate does not specify a date

on which its section 1983 cause of action accrued. Contrary

to its suggestion that the statute did not begin to run until "the

state court render[ed] a final decision" on its permit

application, the cause of action arises when the agency issues

a final decision ripe for review. (Norco Constr., Inc. v. King

County (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1143, 1146.) Thus,

Landgate's naming of individual defendants on February 14,

1992, occurred more than a year after the February 7, 1991,

14/ This amended complaint does not appear in the record.

89a

permit denial. Its section 1983-based cause of action was time

barred.

We reject Landgate's assertion that its claims against

individual commissioners and sta

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.