Appendix — Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission
Supreme Court brief1998
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
i Supreme Court, u.¢
i roa
No. Os 1883 JuL 28 1998
OFFICE
IN THE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
LANDGATE, INC.,
Petitioner,
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
BENJAMIN M. REZNIK
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN M. BOWMAN
JEFFER, MANGELS, BUTLER
& MARMARO, LLP
2121 Avenue of the Stars
Tenth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
(310) 203-8080
July 28, 1998 Counsel for Petitioner.
uly ,
Washington, D.C. * THIEL PRESS «+ (202) 328-3286
;
:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A - Opinion of the Supreme
Court of California April 30, 1998 (Mosk,
J.) (reversing California Court of Appeal
opinion and remanding with instructions to
enter order granting Commission's motion
for summary judgment)
APPENDIX B - Opinion of the California
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District
February 7, 1997 (affirming in part and
reversing in part the judgment of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court on
Landgate's takings claim)
APPENDIX C - Opinion of the California
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District
December 18, 1992 (affirming the
judgment of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court granting a writ of mandate
vacating the Commission's disapproval of
Landgate's application)
APPENDIX D - Order of the Los Angeles
County Superior Court August 9, 1993
(granting summary adjudication of issues in
favor of Landgate)
APPENDIX E - Partial Judgment of the
Los Angeles County Superior Court
October 16, 1991 (granting a peremptory
writ of mandate vacating the Commission's
disapproval of Landgate's application)
la
55a
9la
100a
103a
APPENDIX A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
FILED: Apr 30, 1998
SUPREME COURT
Robert Wandruff Clerk
LANDGATE, INC., ) $059847
et al., )
) Ct. App. 2/1 B084315
Plaintiffs and )
Appellants, ) L.A. County
) Super. Ct. No.
V. ) BC 024391
)
CALIFORNIA COASTAL )
COMMISSION, )
)
Defendant )
and Appellant )
)
In First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987)
482 U.S. 304, 321,' the court held that “where the govern-
ment's activities have already worked a taking of all use
l/_ The full name of this case is First English Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. We will hereinafter follow the
common practice of referring to the case as First English.
= SEE DISSENTING OPINIONS =
2a
of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which a taking was effective." In so holding, the court
cautioned that the holding did not extend to "the quite different
questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like which are not before us." (/bid.) In the
present case, we consider whether a delay in the issuance of a
development permit partly owing to the mistaken assertion of
jurisdiction by a government agency is a type of "temporary
taking" contemplated in First English, or if it is more in the
nature of a "normal delay" that does not constitute a taking.
The Court of Appeal held that a temporary taking had indeed
occurred. We conclude that the present case falls squarely into
the category of a normal delay rather than a temporary taking,
and therefore reverse the Court of Appeal.
Because of the complexities of this case, a somewhat
detailed recitation of the facts is in order. The case centers on
the efforts of plaintiff Landgate’ to build a large home in the
Malibu Hills. Landgate's predecessor in interest owned two
long, thin parcels or "lots" oriented in a north-south direction.
The northern portions were sloped, the southern portions flat.
One of the lots contained a single family home on the southern
portion. The coast lay to the south of these lots.
In the mid-1980's, the County of Los Angeles (the County)
planned to provide an east-west road that would run through
the two lots. The landowner and the County agreed that, in
2/ According to Landgate's first amended complaint, Peter and Punte
Bogart "owned and controlled" Landgate, and held a life estate in the
subject property.
3a
exchange for the owner's dedicating portions of the parcels for
the roadway easement, the County would reconfigure the lots
into a single, sloped 2.45-acre lot north of the road and a
single, flat 1.56-acre lot south of the road, each still zoned for
a single family home. The County completed the road
improvement, designated as De Butts Terrace, and formally
approved a lot re-configuration, which was recorded July 5,
1989.
The lois in question are and at all relevant times were in the
coastal zone (Pub. Resources Code, §30103) and therefore
subject to the development restrictions imposed by the
California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act), Public Resources
Code section 30000 et seq. The act requires local
governments within the coastal zone to prepare Local Coastal
Programs (LCP) containing a Land Use Plan (LUP) and a set
of implementing ordinances designed to promote the act's
objectives of protecting the coastline and its resources and
maximizing public access. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 30001.5,
30512, 30513.) In general, the act provides that, until a
certified LCP is approved by the Coastal Commission
(Commission), authority to approve development lies with the
Commission. (/d., § 30519.) At the time the pertinent events
took place, the Commission had approved the County's LUP
for Malibu but had not yet approved the LCP. Therefore, the
Commission retained jurisdiction over the issuance of coastal
development permits for the area in which the subject property
is located.
In October 1990, Landgate bought the sloped northern lot
and received County approval in concept for grading and
building plans for a single-family home to be built on the
property. Landgate applied to the Commission for permits to
build the house and related structures. Landgate’s permit
application sought approval of a 9,036-square-foot home and
4a
guest house, a swimming pool and septic tank and 8,500 cubic
yards of grading. As originally proposed, the house was 44
feet above existing grade. Before the Commission's initial
consideration of the development, Landgate modified its
proposal by reducing the house to 7,500 square feet,
eliminating the guest house and reducing the proposed grading
to 4,300 cubic yards.
At its December 1990 and February 1991 meetings, the
Commission was presented with staff reports objecting to
several aspects of the project. First, staff was concerned with
visual impacts of the house, since it was located next to
Escondido Canyon, "a highly scenic area which includes a
hiking trail to Escondido Falls. The proposed project is
located south and west of Escondido Canyon and is visible
from the Escondido Falls Trail and the Escondido Falls." The
preservation of scenic and recreational resources of the coastal
area is encouraged by both the Coastal Act and the Malibu
LUP. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30251.) Staff concluded
that the visual impact of Landgate's proposed development
would be significant both because of its location on the lower,
northern lot closer to the trail and falls, and because of the
44-foot height, 9 feet above the allowable height contained in
the Malibu LUP.
Second, staff found the amount of grading required of the
proposed project to be objectionable. "In essence, the
applicant is creating a large level pad area on a hillside lot,
instead of designing the house to conform with the natural
topography." The grading plan was contrary to the Malibu
LUP, which called for the minimization of grading for all new
development "to ensure the potential negative effects of runoff
and erosion on [visual] resources are minimized." Staff found
that these problems would be alleviated if the house was built
on the southern side of De Butts Terrace.
5a
These concerns and objections were inextricably linked to
staff's third concern, that the Commission had not approved the
lot line adjustment obtained from the County by Landgate's
predecessor in interest. As noted, prior to the approval of the
lot line adjustment, the length of the lots ran in a north to south
direction standing side-by-side east to west. If the old lots had
remained, then development could have been directed to the
more topographically and visually suitable southern portion of
the property. Staff further concluded that the lot line
adjustment had been illegal. It reached its conclusion as
follows: It first observed that section 30106 of the Public
Resources Code contains a broad definition of "development"
for which a coastal development permit is necessary.
" "Development’ means, on land, in or under water, the
placement or direction of any solid material or structure;
discharge or disposal of any drenched material or any gaseous,
liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging,
mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density or
intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to,
subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act... and any
other division of land, including lot splits, except where the
land division is brought about in connection with the purchase
of such land by a public agency for public recreational use . .
.." ([bid., italics added.) Staff then cited a 1986 memorandum
from the Attorney General circulated to the Commission
concluding that "[a] lot line adjustment is a form of a lot split.
In some instances, a lot line adjustment may be so minor as to
warrant the Commission finding that it is de minimis and
qualifies for a waiver pursuant to section 30624.7. In other
instances a lot line adjustment may be such that it does bring
about a major change in the density or intensity of use of land.
In such a case it would fall within the definition of
development in section 30106, and would necessarily require
a coastal development permit.”
6a
The staff report then considered whether the lot line
adjustment in question "involves a major change in the density
or intensity of land-use." It concluded that while a lot line
adjustment did not alter the density of development it would
alter its intensity: "The topography north of De Butts Terrace
is relatively steep and not suited to development. This
proposed project would change the intensity of land-use in this
area by allowing development of the north side of the road. .
_. Staff believes that the least environmentally damaging site
for development is on the coastal [i.e. southern] side of De
Butts Terrace and that the original lot configuration of long
thin parcels extending across the road should not be altered.”
The Commission considered the various issues raised by
staff at its December 13, 1990, meeting and voted to continue
the matter because of questions concerning the legality of the
lot line adjustment. According to the declaration of Landgate's
engineer/representative in support of its motion (Petrovsky
Declaration), "once the lot line adjustment issue was raised . .
_ staff would not negotiate with regard to issues of the size of
home, grading, etc. Instead, the legality of the lot became the
focus of their attention." Landgate reapplied for a coastal
development permit proposing the same project as described
above, but adding a request for Commission approval of the
County lot line adjustment.
At its February 1991 meeting the Commission denied
Landgate's application. It adopted staff findings that the
proposed house and related structures would produce
excessive soil, grading, and visual degradation.’ Immediately
3/ According to Commission regulations, a vote by the Commission
that is "consistent with [the] staff recommendation and not otherwise
modified, . . . shall be deemed to adopt the findings and conclusions
(continued...)
7a
after the vote, Commissioner Glickfeld commented on Los
Angeles County's perceived unwillingness to comply with the
Coastal Act: “I really regret the situation that this applicant
has been put in because of Los Angeles County's refusal to
comply with the Coastal Act and I hope that . . . our staff
counsel could be directed to communicate that very clearly
with Los Angeles County, bring their response back to us and
pursue, if necessary, litigation to insist that the County of Los
Angeles comply with the law in this matter." The chief counsel
stated that he would prepare a letter to the County.
In March 1991, Landgate filed a petition for writ of
mandate against the Commission asserting that the
Commission had no jurisdiction over the lot line adjustment.
The petition was conjoined with a complaint asserting a taking
of property without just compensation and a denial of civil
rights, seeking damages and declaratory relief. The mandate
petition and takings complaint were severed, with the latter
reserved for later adjudication.
Meanwhile, in April 1991, the Commission heard
Landgate's request for reconsideration of its project. Grounds
for reconsideration of an application exist when “there is
relevant new evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could not have been presented at the hearing . . .
or that an error of fact or law has occurred which has the
potential of altering the initial decision.” (Pub. Resources
Code, § 30627, subd. (b)(3).) At that meeting, Landgate’s
representative presented a new version of the proposed
3/ (..continued)
recommended by the staff." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13092,
subd. (d).) Thus, the Commission, in denying the application consistent
with the staff report, is deemed to have adopted the staff's proposed
findings discussed above.
8a
residence that would be only 32 feet above the existing natural
grade, would have 1,000 cubic yards of grading, and would
make other changes in order to conform the appearance of the
house to its natural surroundings. Commission staff opined
that the new proposal was more appropriately presented to the
Commission as a new project, but did not constitute "new
evidence" or “error of fact or law" that would be grounds for
reconsidering its February 1991 denial of the project. Staff
also told the Commission that "part of the basis for your denial
[of the project] was a lot line adjustment and . . . we told them
even if they make these modifications we'll still recommend
denial." The Commission's legal counsel told the Commission:
"Without a lot line adjustment some of these revisions are I
think irrelevant." He also stated: "This project does not work,
if you please, without that lot line adjustment." He further
stated that, in light of the action that Landgate had filed before
the request for reconsideration contesting the Commissicn's
jurisdiction over the lot line adjustment, "my advice would be
to continue to maintain the position you have maintained
before and allow the court system to determine the dispute that
presently exists between the Commission and [Landgate]} with
regard to that." The Commission voted to deny
reconsideration.
The above mentioned litigation proceeded and in October
1991 the trial court granted Landgate's petition for writ of
mandate. Specifically, the trial court set aside the
Commission's action of February 1991 denying Landgate's
application and ordered the Commission to reconsider the
application. The court found that, in view of the factual
circumstances in this case, the definition of "development" as
found in Public Resources Code section 30106 “does not
include the lot line adjustment approved and recorded by the
County of Los Angeles in 1989 with regard to the subject
property. Therefore, upon remand to the Commission, the
9a
Commission must consider [Landgate's] application without
any reference or consideration of a lot line adjustment. The
Commission is to consider the subject property to be a legal
lot." The court did not order the approval of any particular
development proposal.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in an
unpublished decision in December 1992. In arriving at its
conclusion, the court found significant the fact that Landgate
had purchased a lot that had been approved by the County and
had been recorded, that the Commission had approved the
construction of the road, De Butts Terrace, that made the then-
existing lot configuration impractical and necessitated the lot
line adjustment, and that the Commission's position with
respect to the lot line adjustment would render Landgate's
property valueless. In essence, it held that Public Resources
Code section 30106 did not authorize the Commission to
invalidate a legally recorded lot line adjustment to which the
Commission, by its actions and inaction, had given tacit
approval, when an innocent purchaser would stand to lose all
value from its lot from such invalidation. The court also
questioned the Commission's assertion that any building on
Landgate's lot was inconsistent with the Coastal Act, citing
other development north of De Butts Terrace that the
Commission had approved. In its conclusion, it emphasized
that the Commission "retained its ability to regulate and
approve any proposed building on the lot."
In February 1993, the Commission again considered
Landgate's project, which had been modified by reducing
grading to 2,893 cubic square yards, by reducing height to 35
feet above existing grade, and by reducing the fill slope, among
other changes. It required further changes in the project to
address the visual impacts and erosion problems that it had
earlier found to be objectionable. Specifically, it imposed a
10a
height limitation of 28 feet above existing grade on the
proposed residence, required a drainage plan as well as color
restrictions and landscape requirements consistent with the
scenic preservation with which the Commission was
concerned. Landgate did not challenge these conditions.
Subsequently, Landgate moved for summary adjudication
of its still-unresolved takings claim. It contended that the
Commission's erroneous assertion of permit jurisdiction over
the lot line adjustment prevented it from making any
economically viable use of its property for the period prior to
the Commission's approval of its project in February 1993.
The Commission moved for summary judgment, contending
that its jurisdictional error did not constitute a taking of
Landgate's property. The trial court granted Landgate's
motion, ruling that the Commission had temporarily taken
Landgate's property from February 1991 to February 1993.
In its statement of decision, the trial court declared that
"Landgate's third cause of action for taking of property
without just compensation . . . is meritorious as a matter of law
_. , because Landgate has been deprived, at least temporarily,
of all economically viable or productive use of its property
insofar as Landgate, at least temporarily, could not legally
obtain any valid permits fot approvals to construct any project
on its property as a result of the Commission's actions." The
trial court also denied the Commission's motion for summary
judgment. After a bench trial on the issue of damages, the trial
court awarded takings damages of $155,657 for the period
between February 1991 and February 1993. The Commission
appealed the grant of summary adjudication and the award of
attorney fees. Landgate filed an appeal contesting the amount
of damages and filed a separate notice of appeal from the trial
court's award of costs and attorneys fees.
lla
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary adjudication in Landgate's favor. It appeared to
accept the Commission's assertion that reasonable mistakes
made by a government agency in the development approval
process do not necessarily constitute takings. But, as it stated:
"[W]hat we cannot accept is the Commission's characterization
of the treatment of Landgate here as the reasonable result of a
'‘mistake.' Nothing in the record suggests that the lot line
adjustment issue arose out of anything other than the
Commission's ongoing jurisdictional spat with the County of
Los Angeles combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from
building on its parcel. Instead, the overwhelming sense of the
record is that by its insistence that the lot itself was illegal, the
Commission put Landgate in a situation which was not of its
own making and which Landgate could do nothing to cure. In
short, this is not a case of bureaucratic bungling, but the
declaration of war between governmental behemoths in which
the inevitable casualty was to be a noncombatant, Landgate."
It also affirmed the trial court's award of damages. We granted
review to address the important question of whether the
Commission's apparently mistaken assertion of jurisdiction of
the lot line adjustment in this case led to a temporary taking of
Landgate's property.‘
4/ We note at the outset that this case comes to us after a grant of
Landgate's summary adjudication motion on its claim that its property
was taken without just compensation and a denial of the Commission's
motion for summary judgment. Thus, we undertake independent review
of the record to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists as to the
takings claim. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 951, 973, fn. 7.)
12a
IL.
A.
Before addressing the present issue, we briefly summarize
pertinent takings jurisprudence. In determining whether a
government regulation works a taking of property under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United
States Supreme Court has generally eschewed any "set
formula" for determining how far is too far, preferring to
engage in " ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" (Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(Lucas).) The court has stated that the "economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations."
(Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S.
104, 124.) The court has also stated that "the Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ‘does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests.’ " (Lucas,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1016.) The court has furthermore
described "at least two discrete categories of regulatory action
as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first
encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to
suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property. In general (at least
with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose
behind it, we have required compensation. . . . [{] The second
situation in which we have found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land.“ (/d. at p. 1015.)
In Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 275, we
had held that the sole remedy for government regulation that
13a
effects a taking of property is an administrative mandamus
overturning the regulation rather than an award of damages.
That holding was repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court in First English, supra, 482 U.S. 304. In First English,
the plaintiff operated a campground on which lay a number of
buildings that had been destroyed by flood. An interim Los
Angeles County ordinance prohibited construction or
reconstruction of any building or structure in an interim flood
protection area that included the plaintiff's land. The court
assumed for purposes of the appeal that the ordinance deprived
the plaintiff of all economically beneficial use of its property.
It then held that such deprivation constituted a temporary
taking of the property for which compensation must be paid.
""TT]emporary’ takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of
his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings,
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation." (/d.
at p. 318.) Thus, the court held that "where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property,
no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the
duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective." (/d. at p. 321.)
The First English court emphasized the narrowness of its
holding. "We. . . point out that the allegation of the complaint
which we treat as true for purposes of our decision was that
the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its
property. We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of
course do not deal with the quite different questions that
would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zonitig ordinances, variances, and the like
which are not before us." (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p.
321.)
Consistent with this implied limitation on the temporary
takings doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has also
l4a
"made it quite clear that the mere assertion of regulatory juris-
diction by a governmental body does not constitute a
regulatory taking. [Citation.] The reasons are obvious. The
requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in
a certain use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the
property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit
system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the
landowner free to use the property as desired." (United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985) 474 U.S. 121, 126-
127.) Stated in other terms, whereas "the Fifth Amendment's
just compensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole’ " (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 318-319, fn.
omitted), a rational permit regulation scheme is imposed on the
public as a whole to ensure the orderly development of real
property, benefiting as well as burdening property owners.
Finally, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
question whether property has been taken is not ripe for
decision until a government agency has rendered a final
decision on the use to which the property in question may be
put. “Our reluctance to examine taking claims until . . . a final
decision has been made is compelled by the very nature of the
inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause. Although
[t]he question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of
considerable difficulty’ [citation], this Court consistently has
indicated that among the factors of particular significance in
the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action
and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. [Citations.] Those factors
simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has
arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply
the regulations at issue to the particular land in question."
15a
(Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473
U.S. 172, 190-191; see also McDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 348.)
The present case poses the issue of whether a legally
erroneous decision of a government agency during the
development approval process resulting in delay constitutes a
temporary taking of property. Virtually every court that has
examined the issue has concluded, for various reasons and
under various theories, that a regulatory mistake resulting in
delay does not, by itself, amount to a taking of property. (See
Littoral Development Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation
etc. Com. (1994) 33 Cal.App.4th 211, 221-222 (Littoral
Development Co.), Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 1060; 1080; Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1996) 678 So.2d 1365; 1367; Cannone v.
Noey (Alaska 1994) 867 P.2d 797; 801; Dumont v. Town of
Wolfeboro (N.H. 1993) 622 A.2d 1238; 1244; Tabb Lakes,
Lid. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 796; 801-802; Steinbergh
v. City of Cambridge (Mass. 1992) 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1274-
1277; Smith v. Town of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1992) 615 A.2d
1252; 1257-1258; 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States (1992)
26 Ct.Cl. 575; Lujan Home Builders v. Orangetown (1991)
568 N.Y.2d 850, 851.)
In Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, supra, 604 N.E.2d
1269 (Steinbergh), for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts considered the claim of a landlord suing the city
for takings damages stemming from a city regulation that
restricted the conversion of rental units into condominiums.
The court had, in a previous decision, declared that the
regulation exceeded the city's statutory authority under the
state's rent control statute and was therefore invalid. The
:
s
%
16a
plaintiff claimed that he suffered damages from the decline in
the condominium market during the period of the delay that
resulted from the necessity of mounting a legal challenge to the
invalid rent regulation. The court first concluded that the
regulation in question was neither a physical invasion of
property nor a deprivation of all viable use, nor a substantial
interference with the property owner's distinct investment-
based expectations. (See id. at p. 1274.) The court likened
the delay experienced in the case to delay "that commonly
occurs in seeking regulatory approvals for changes in local
ordinances and by-laws, which are government-imposed
processes that have not traditionally been viewed as
constituting regulatory takings." (/d. at p. 1275.) "It is, of
course, true that in this case the delay was caused, not by the
necessity of obtaining mandated governmental approvals, but
by the process of presenting a judicial challenge to a municipal
regulation. That legal challenge resulted in invalidation of the
regulation as beyond the authority of the city to adopt, but not
because the municipal regulation was unconstitutional as
violating rights to due process or equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs make no reasoned argument that, simply because
a municipal regulation is not authorized by law, there is a
compensable temporary taking of property, even though the
regulation restricts the sale and reduces the market value of the
property until the regulation is successfully challenged in
court." (/bid.)
The Steinbergh court then considered the argument that
the invalidated regulation did not " ‘substantially advance
legitimate state interests’ " and therefore was a taking of
property under the test articulated by the Supreme Court.
(Steinbergh, supra, 604 N.E.2d at p. 1275, quoting Agins v.
Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260.) Although it had found in
its previous decision that the condominium conversion
regulation was insufficiently connected with rent control, and
Na a a a a Se)
17a
therefore not impliedly authorized by the state rent control
Statute, it rejected the argument that this state law defect
translated into a constitutional flaw. It found that the
regulation was “a ‘logical and sufficiently well-founded
approach to dealing’ with a problem [of removal of rental units
from the market] for us to find . . . that the ‘essential nexus'
between the state's interest and its chosen means is present in
this case." (Steinbergh, supra, 604 N.E.2d at p. 1277.)
Therefore, despite the invalidity of the regulation, it concluded
that the plaintiffs had not met their constitutional burden of
demonstrating that the regulation failed to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest.
Our own Court of Appeal has reached a similar conclusion.
(See Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, supra, 31
Cal.App.4th 1060, 1080; Littoral Development Co., supra, 33
Cal.App.4th 211.) In Littoral Development Co., the Court of
Appeal considered a regulatory taking claim against the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
(BCDC). It had decided in a previous decision that BCDC,
which was given jurisdiction over development of property
adjacent to San Francisco Bay subject to "tidal action" (Gov.
Code, § 66610, subd. (a)), had incorrectly asserted jurisdiction
over the landward two-thirds of the plaintiffs property in
Marin County, thereby delaying the construction of a hotel on
that property. It had accordingly reversed the trial court's
decision upholding that jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it rejected
the takings claim, stating: "Under the circumstances, we
cannot find any regulatory ‘taking’ of any property, merely
because delay resulted from factual or legal uncertainties which
temporarily clouded the respective limits of BCDC's and Marin
County's regulatory jurisdiction. ... [9] While we recognize
that, on very different facts, a transient and impermanent
interference in real property use due to egregious bureaucratic
overreaching may arguably constitute a compensable
18a
temporary taking, BCDC's actions here were facially valid and
supported by a plausible though erroneous legal argument
which the trial court accepted. We decline to hold that such a
taking occurred here or occurs every time a land-use agency
makes an erroneous decision which is ultimately overturned in
part on appeal." (Littoral Development Co., supra, 33
Cal. App.4th at pp. 221-222.) It also found significant that the
plaintiff still had some unspecified use of the property during
the pendency of legal proceedings. (/bid.)
We substantially agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, with our Court of Appeal, and with the other
courts cited above that an error by a governmental agency in
the development approval process does not necessarily amount
to a taking even if the error in some way diminishes the value
of the subject property, any more than the commission of state
law error during a criminal trial is an automatic violation of the
due process clause. (See, e.g., Estelle v. Maguire (1991) 502
U.S. 62, 71-73; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312,
393.) If the error is of a particular constitutional type -- the
passage and enforcement of a law or regulation that deprives
property of all value -- then the teaching of First English is
that such an error is a compensable taking. But government
land use regulations and decisions such as those cited above in
Steinbergh and Littoral Development Co., which, despite their
ultimately determined statutory defects, are part of a
reasonable regulatory process designed to advance legitimate
government interests, are not takings of property under the
Supreme Court's doctrine reviewed above. (See Agins v.
Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 260.)
An analogous situation may be found when the government
initiates condemnation proceedings against an undeveloped
tract of land, thereby bringing the development process to a
standstill. We have held that when a government agency later
19a
abandoned such proceedings, it was not liable under the
takings clause, even when the proceedings caused substantial
delay in the development approval process and led to losses in
the property's value. (Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, 24
Cal.3d at pp. 271, 277-278 [eminent domain proceeding active
for almost one year before abandonment].) The United States
Supreme Court affirmed this aspect of our Agins decision,
agreeing that we had "correctly rejected the contention that the
municipality's good-faith planning activities, which did not
result in successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so
burdened the appellants’ enjoyment of their property as to
constitute a taking. [Citation.] Even if the appellants’ ability to
sell their property was limited during pendency of the
condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or
develop their property when the proceedings ended. Mere
fluctuations in value during the process of governmental
decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are ‘incidents of
ownership. They cannot be considered as a ‘taking’ in the
constitutional sense.'" (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at
p. 263, fn. 9, italics added.) Just as an aborted condemnation
proceeding that delays development is an incident of ownership
and not a taking, so the mistaken assertion of jurisdiction over
a development is part of the development approval process,
and development delays that result therefrom may be imposed
on the developer rather than the general taxpayer without
violating the United States Constitution.’
5/_ The principle that a government agency will not be liable in
damages for state law errors committed in the development approval
process is congruent with Government Code section 818.4, which
provides that a public entity cannot be held liable "for an injury caused
by the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization where the public
(continued...)
20a
The Court of Appeal did not hold that all governmental
mistakes in the land use process amounted to takings. The
Court of Appeal held rather, as noted above, that the
Commission's February 1991 decision to deny Landgate's
devc,opment application and its position on the lot line issue
was not the “reasonable result of a 'mistake' " but rather arose
out of a “jurisdictional spat with the County of Los Angeles
combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from building on
its parcel," and a "declaration of war between governmental
behemoths in which the inevitable casualty was to be a
noncombatant, Landgate."
The Court of Appeal erred in its attempt to divine, through
the statements of Commissioners and commission staff and
through circumstantial evidence, the "true," illegitimate, motive
for the Commission's decision to deny Landgate's development
permit. The proper inquiry is not into the ‘ ubjective motive of
the government agency, but whether there is, objectively,
sufficient connection between the land use regulation in
question and a legitimate governmental purpose so that the
latter may be said to substantially advance the former. (See
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825,
836-837 (Nollan);, Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S.
374, 391 (Dolan).) This type of objective inquiry is consistent
with the principle that courts do not delve into the individual
purposes of decision-makers in a quasi-adjudicative
proceeding, but rather look to the findings made by the
government agency and determine whether these are based on
substantial evidence. (City of Fairfield v. Superior Court
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 779; Topanga Assn. for a Scenic
5/ (...continued)
entity or an employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to
determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied,
suspended or revoked."
2la
Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506,
515-516; see also United States v. Morgan (1941) 313 US.
409, 422.) Thus, we must determine not whether a sinister
purpose lurked behind the Commission's decision, but rather
whether the development restrictions imposed on the subject
property substantially advanced some legitimate state purposes
so as to justify the denial of the development permit.
Moreover, the cases suggest that judicial review of
governmental conditions imposed upon development will be
more deferential when the conditions are simply restrictions on
land use and not requirements that the property owner convey
a portion of his property (see Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p.
841; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 388-391) or pay
development fees imposed on a property owner on an
individual and discretionary basis (Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 876). In the present case, neither
conveyances nor individualized development fees are at issue.
The Commission's denial of Landgate's permit in February
1991 did indeed appear to substantially advance legitimate
governmental interests and to be supported by substantial
evidence. The Commission's findings articulated three
objections to the project as proposed. First, the Commission
was concerned that the large house, 44 feet above natural
grade and 9 feet above the maximum allowable height set forth
in the Malibu LUP, would be unsightly when viewed from
Escondido Trail and Escondido Falls. Second, the
Commission was concerned that excessive grading on the
north slope, where the house was to be built, was contrary to
the Malibu LUP, which called for the minimization of grading
for all new development "to ensure the potential negative
effects of runoff and erosion on [visual] resources are
minimized." These are unquestionably legitimate government
purposes (see Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, supra, 12 Cal.4th
sith iii ial
22a
at p. 886 [promotion of scenic and aesthetic objectives within
the scope of the police power]) and there is substantial
evidence in the record in support of the reasonableness of the
Commission's position. Indeed, Landgate does not challenge
the conditions ultimately imposed by the Commission requiring
the reduction of building height and total amount of grading.
The third Commission objection, the improper lot line
adjustment, was principally based not on formal, jurisdictional
or bureaucratic grounds, but on the view that such adjustment
would lead to an intensification of the environmental impacts
with which the Commission was concerned. Based on our
review of the record, as discussed above, the Commission's
position appears reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence. It found that the placement of the house on the
north slope would make it more unsightly, bringing it closer to
Escondido Trail and Escondido Falls, and would also
obviously increase the need for grading -- and with it the
potential fer erosion -- in order to create a flat pad for the
proposed residence on a sloping surface. The Commission's
preference for construction on the flat south side of De Butts
Terrace was therefore reasonable. In sum, the denial of a
development permit in February 1991 on the three enumerated
grounds advanced legitimate governmental interests in
minimizing erosion and unsightly development in the coastal
area.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeal that anything in
the record establishes that the Commission was motivated in its
decisions by a "jurisdictional spat" with Los Angeles County.
The Court of Appeal quotes the statement made by one of the
commissioners after denial of the application that “the county's
refusal to recognize our right to review lot line adjustments"
was “an issue that had come before the Commission many
times in the Malibu area." She added that it was "really time
23a
to become extremely serious about this" and asked that staff
counsel be directed to communicate with the County on the
topic. But the fact that the commissioner expressed frustration
over the County's failure to recognize the Commission's
jurisdiction does not suggest that the primary or even
secondary reason for the Commission's vote was to teach Los
Angeles County some sort of jurisdictional lesson.
Nor are we persuaded by the Court of Appeal's conclusion
that the Commission's decision must not have been based on
legitimate environmental concerns because it “could have
imposed special conditions on matters such as height in
February 1991, but failed to issue the permit until after the lot
line question was resolved in February 1993." From the
Commission's point of view, the environmental impacts of the
project could have been reduced if the original lot line
configuration was maintained. Once the Commission was
confronted by a court ruling that made restoration of the
original configuration impossible, it settled for what it regarded
as the next best alternative: permitting development on the
north side of De Butts Terrace, but with conditions imposed to
reduce these environmental impacts. There is therefore no
inconsistency between the Commission's environmental
concerns and the respective positions it adopted throughout
the development approval process.
The Court of Appeal also concluded that since the
Commission may have approved or was going to approve two
~ homes on the same sloping north side as Landgate’s parcel,
"those approvals are clear indications that but for the lot line
adjustment, Landgate's application to build a house and related
structures on its property could and would, through the normal
negotiation process, have been approved by February 1991 or
shortly thereafter." But it is clear that the Commission had a
policy to concentrate development in the area on the flat south
meer merce
24a
side of De Butts Terrace. The fact that there may have been
exceptions to this policy, based on considerations particular to
these specific projects, for reasons not present in the current
administrative record and about which we can only speculate,
does not negate the fact that the Commission had a rational
policy preference for concentrating development on the south
side of De Butts Terrace.
It would be, of course, a different question if, even though
the Commission's position on the lot line adjustment
substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, that position
was so unreasonable from a legal standpoint as to lead to the
conclusion that it was taken for no purpose other than to delay
the development project before it. Such a delaying tactic
would not advance any valid government objective. Here,
however, as discussed, the Commission's position on the lot
line adjustment issue was based on a construction of Public
Resources Code section 30106 and the meaning of the term
"development" contained therein that was not unreasonable.
As discussed, that section defines development over which the
Commission will have jurisdiction broadly to include "change
in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not
limited to, . . . lot splits." Without deciding questions not
before us,° the Commission's conclusion, following the
Attorney General's advice, that section 30106 gave it authority
to deny the lot line adjustment was "supported by a plausible
though [perhaps] erroneous legal argument" and therefore not
the basis of a taking. (Littoral Development Co., supra, 33
—————€Eak-App-4th at p- 221)
-
6/ The Court of Appeal's prior, unpublished decision regarding the lot
line issue is now final and may not be relitigated. (See Kavanau v. City
of Santa Monica (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 779.) We do not necessarily
endorse that decision, nor are we bound by its reasoning. (Jd. at pp.
777-779.)
25a
Indeed, the Court of Appeal's earlier decision on the lot
line issue was based not on the Commission's general lack of
authority over such issues, or even on the fact that invalidation
of the lot line would deprive Landgate of property, but rather
on the court's determination that the Commission's earlier
course of conduct had constituted a kind of acquiescence to
the lot line adjustment. Although the Court of Appeal may
have been correct on that point, and the Commission mistaken
given the peculiar facts of this case, its position was not so
objectively unreasonable as to give rise to the inference that it
was adopting that position solely for purposes of delay or some
other illegitimate reason.
Cc.
Landgate's argument that the Commission temporarily took
its property rests on somewhat different grounds than those on
which the Court of Appeal holding was based. Landgate
argues that regardless of whether the Commission's lot line
adjustment condition substantially advanced a legitimate state
interest, the imposition of such condition was nonetheless a
taking because it temporarily deprived Landgate's property of
all value. Landgate contends that from the: time the
development permit was denied in February 1991 until the time
it was approved in February 1993 after the lot line issue had
been resolved by litigation, the development process was at a
standstill, effectively depriving the property of all economic
benefit. Landgate cites the Petrovsky Declaration, discussed
above, as evidence that the Commission refused to continue
negotiation with Landgate as long as the jurisdictional dispute
over the lot line adjustment was pending. Landgate argues that
the Commission's actions amount to a denial of all
economically beneficial use of the land and thus is a categorical
taking (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1016) even if only
temporary. (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 320.)
26a
Of course, each time there is a delay in the development
process, the delay may be said to temporarily deprive the
developer of undeveloped property of use of that property.
From the would-be developer's point of view, the impact of
ordinary delay due to a governmental mistake on the one hand,
and denial of all feasible use on the other, may be identical.
But as discussed above, for purposes of the takings doctrine
the two types of governmental action are quite different. (See
First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 321.)
Landgate asserts, however, that what is at issue in this case
was not a normal development delay due to the Commission's
mistake, but in fact a final Commission decision to ban all
development of Landgate's property, a position the
Commission was forced to abandon only because it lost on the
jurisdictional question. More specifically, Landgate contends
the Commission's position that the former lot lines be
preserved, combined with its insistence that no development
take place north of De Butts Terrace, rendered Landgate's lot
valueless, because its lot was situated wholly to the north of
De Butts Terrace. To state the argument differently, if, for
example, a municipality's ordinance denies a parcel of real
property all economically feasible use, it would arguably be no
defense to a temporary takings claim to show that the
ordinance was eventually invalidated for being inconsistent
with the municipality's general plan.’ Similarly, Landgate
_ T/ The Commission and some of its amici curiae argue that a
government exercise of power that is beyond its jurisdictional authority
can never be a taking. The argument is based on the principle that the
takings clause only authorizes compensation for "a taking of private
property for public use," and that when a government's action is ultra
vires because the agency has exceeded its statutory authority, it cannot
as a matter of law be said to have taken property for public use. Some
(continued...)
27a
contends in effect that its failure to make progress toward
developing its property between February 1991 and February
1993 was due not to an interim uncertainty created by the
jurisdictional dispute with the Commission, but to a decision by
the Commission in February 1991, and subsequently, to deny
all economically feasible use of Landgate's property, a denial
that was the administrative equivalent of an ordinance banning
all development on the subject property, such as was found in
First English.
In considering whether the Commission's actions
constituted in fact a denial of all economically feasible use, we
first note that the Supreme Court has characterized the circum-
stances under which a categorical taking occurs under these
circumstances as "extraordinary" and "relatively rare." (Lucas,
supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1017, 1018.) In Lucas, for example,
the court was confronted with South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act, which authorized a government agency to
establish a coastal zone in which no development could occur,
and which "had the direct effect of barring [the property
7/ (...continued)
federal courts appear to accept this rationale, holding that the Tucker
government agency that exceeds its statutory authority can ever be a
compensable taking.
28a
owner] from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his
two parcels." (/d. at p. 1007.) The property owner bears the
burden of showing that the government action in question
denied it economically beneficial use of its land. (/d. at
p. 1016, fn. 6.)*
Landgate ignores the critical difference between this case
and Lucas and First Englis;. An understanding of this
difference begins with the principle that "the mere assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not
constitute a regulatory taking." (United States v. Riverside
Bay Homes, Inc., supra, 474 U.S. at p. 126.) Part of that
regulatory process is the imposition of certain procedural
conditions and substantive requirements on development.
These conditions can include such matters as the filing of a
proper subdivision map (Gov. Code, § 66426), installation of
proper sewer facilities, (id., § 66483), or the requirement that
the development undergo the process mandated by the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). A necessary corollary of
the above quoted principle is that a government agency may
deny a development permit when the reasonable conditions
imposed on development are not met without that denial
constituting a taking. As the United States Supreme Court has
stated, an essential prerequisite to the assertion of a takings
claim is "a final and authoritative determination of the type and
intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property." (McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
supra, 477 U.S. at p. 348.) If a would-be developer fails to
meet legitimate conditions for obtaining a development permit,
8/ We also note that in First English on remand, the Court of Appeal
held that no taking of property had resulted because the owner was still
permitted significant use. (First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 1353, 1372.)
29a
then a government agency's refusal to issue such a permit
would by no means be a "final and authoritative determination
of the intensity of development legally permitted on the subject
property," but merely a conditional denial. And, as reviewed
in the preceding part of this opinion, the imposition of a
development condition is not a constitutional violation merely
because that condition is subsequently shown to have been
erroneously imposed. ;
In California, one of the conditions of obtaining a permit
for development within the coastal zone is the procurement of
a coastal permit. The Commission's authority to approve
development is concurrent with the authority of local
jurisdictions, and thus compliance with the Subdivision Map
Act does not excuse compiiance with the Coastal Act. (See
Pub. Resources Code, § 30106; see also South Central Coastal
Regional Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co. (1982)
128 Cal.App.3d 830, 844-846.) This approval requirement
extends to "any . . . division of land" that affects the density or
intensity of development. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106.)
As discussed, Landgate's development was denied because of
the Commission's plausible, though perhaps legally erroneous,
position that Landgate or its predecessor failed to comply with
one of the conditions of obtaining a coastal development
permit by illegally reconfiguring the lot boundaries. Its
rejection of Landgate's development was at most conditional --
nothing in the record suggests that the Commission would
have denied a development that fell within legally recognized,
and environmentally more favorable, boundaries.
The nature of the Commission's actions comes into clearer
focus if we alter the facts of this case slightly. Suppose the
original owner of two lots that ran lengthwise in a north to
south direction, east and west of each other, which we will
designate as lots A and B, decided to reconfigure the lots into
30a
two lots running lengthwise east to west, north and south of
each other, lots C and D. The owner submitted development
plans for lot C, but the Commission denied development
because in its view such a lot did not legally exist, and because
to recognize such a lot would have certain detrimental
environmental consequences. This decision cannot be fairly
characterized as a deprivation of all value of lot C, but simply
as a refusal to reconfigure lots A and B. Even if it turned out
that the Commission had incorrectly asserted its jurisdiction, it
would have committed the state law error of improperly
refusing to reconfigure lots A and B, not the constitutional one
of denying development on lot C. Or to put it another way,
the Commission's denial cf development on lot C is not a final
decision on that development until the disp: te over whether lot
C legally existed was resolved. Just as the denial of a permit
for failing to properly submit to the CEQA process would not
be a taking, even if the government's application of CEQA
regulations prove to be flawed (see Pub. Resources Code, §
21168.9 [writ of mandate the sole remedy for violations public
agency noncompliance with CEQA]), so the denial of
development due to a determination, subsequently held to be
erroneous, that the development did not conform to the
property's legal boundary is not a taking.
The present case differs from the above hypothetical in that
"lot C" was sold to a subsequent purchaser rather than kept by
the original owner. But it cannot be the case that this
subsequent purchase had a constitutional significance,
converting the Commission's assertion of its regulatory
jurisdiction_to approve lot reconfigurations into a taking of
property.”
9/ We note that the innocent purchaser of an illegal lot is not left
without a remedy. There may well be private remedies available. (See,
(continued...)
3la
The present case also differs from the hypothetical because
a road was built through lots A and B, thereby supporting
Landgate's argument that even if the Commission had
jurisdiction over a lot line adjustment, it had implicitly waived
its right to deny that adjustment by acquiescing to construction
of the road. But the existence of the road, while it may have
been grounds for finding that the Commission erred in failing
to recognize the legal existence of "lot C," did not convert the
Commission's state law error into a taking. Again, the
Commission could legitimately require that a lot on which
development was requested be legal, when, as here, there are
legitimate reasons for so requiring. Therefore, when the
Commission determined that Landgate's lot was not legal, it
could legitimately litigate the lot line question without
offending the takings clause. The Commission could not be
said to have reached a final and authoritative determination of
the development on Landgate's lot until after the dispute about
the legality of the lot had been resolved.
Of course, as explained in the preceding part of this
opinion, a government agency may not evade the takings
clause by fabricating a dispute over the legality of a lot, or by
otherwise arbitrarily imposing conditions on development in
order to delay or discourage that development. The
9/ (...continued)
¢.g., Goodspeed v. Associated Almond Growers (1929) 208 Cal. 121,
122 [sale of a parcel in violation of the Subdivision Map Act may be
rescinded].) The innocent purchaser of an illegal lot may also have the
options of negotiating with other private landowners to obtain a legal
lot, and negotiating with the government agency to develop the property
in such a way as to meet the agency's underlying concerns. Because
Landgate's lot was ultimately judged to be legal, we do not know, and
need not determine, which of these options Landgate could have
pursued.
32a
government agency's assertion of authority, whether or not
erroneous, must advance some legitimate government purpose.
But as discussed above, the Commission's actions in this case
met this constitutional prerequisite.
In light of the foregoing, the difference between this case
and First English becomes clear. Here, there was a
postponement of development pending resolution of a
threshold issue of the development approval process -- whether
the lot was legal -- and not a final decision denying
development. In First English, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court assumed that the ordinance in question
categorically denied all property owners within its purview
the right to develop their property. Development was assumed
to be denied in First English, in other words, even though
there was no dispute about a threshold issue in the
development approval process, as there was in this case, that
would be a legitimate basis for postponing approval of
development. The postponement of Landgate's development
therefore does not constitute a temporary taking of property as
that doctrine was conceived in First English.
Landgate indeed appears to argue that any impasse in the
regulatory process that must be resolved through a judicial
proceeding is a temporary taking rather than a normal delay in
development. But First English merely stands for the
proposition that once a government action finally denies all
economically viable use of property, the fact that the
government later rescinds that action after a judicial
proceedings does not relieve it of its duty to pay compensation.
(First English, supra, 482-U.S- at p- 321.) Nothing in First
English, however, is inconsistent with the recognition that a
judicial determination of the validity of certain preconditions
to development is a normal part of the development process,
33a
and the fact that a developer must resort to such a
determination does not constitute a per se temporary iaking.
In fact, a review of our case law reveals numerous
instances in which developers have sought a writ of mandate
against public agencies over questions regarding lot
configuration, compliance with the Subdivision Map Act,
compliance with CEQA, and over other threshold questions
that must be resolved before it can be determined whether a
development should be permitted to proceed. The resolution
of these cases often turns on the construction and application
of complex statutory schemes and results in significant delays
in the development process. In some cases, the developer
succeeded in overturning the public agency's decision on these
threshold development questions. (See, e.g., Morehart v.
County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725 [county
misconstrues its authority to merge parcels of land under Gov.
Code, § 66410 et seq.]; Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. County
of Santa Clara (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 593 [county wrongly
denies certificate of compliance with Subdivision Map Act
pursuant to Gov. Code, § 66499.35 for parcels created prior
to 1893]; Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido
(1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 892, 911 [city misapplies Gov. Code,
§ 66452.6 in failing to extend subdivision map due to
development moratorium]; San Dieguito Partnership v. City
of San Diego (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 748 [city misapplies Gov.
Code, § 66412 in requiring particular lot line adjustment to
comply with Subdivision Map Act]; Great Western Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 403
[city misconstrues Subdivision Map Act to permit discretion in
approving final subdivision map when all the conditions of the
tentative map have becn met].) In other instances, the courts
have upheld the government's position on these threshold
development questions. (See, e.g, Gomes v. County of
Mendocino (i995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977 [county had properly
34a
applied Gov. Code, § 66499.20'% in determining underiying
land patents had been eliminated by subsequent subdivision];
Harroman Co. v. Town of Tiburon (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 388
{town's downzoning of plaintiffs property inconsistent with
present general plan but consistent with new draft general plan
affirmed pursuant to Gov. Code, § 65589.5]); John Taft Corp.
v. Advisory Agency (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 749 [county's
determination that parcels recognized by a United States
Government Survey Map in 1878 not exempted from
Subdivision Map Act upheld]; South Central Coast Regional
Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., supra, 128
Cal. App.3d 830 [developer obtaining tentative subdivision map
prior to enactment of Coastal Act not exempted from Act's
requirements}; Bel Mar Estates v. California Coastal Com.
(1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 936 [Commission correctly construed
Statutory authoniy to deny development]; Skrogings v.
Kovatch (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 54 [county properly exercises
authority under Subdivision Map Act to deny further lot splits
before installation of public sewer system].)
Landgate does not appear to contend that litigation over
threshold development questions is a taking of property if the
government agency prevails in such litigation. But to conclude
that such litigation is a normal part of the regulatory process
when the public agency prevails but a per se temporary taking
when the public agency loses has no basis in either logic or
Supreme Court precedent.
In sum, Landgate has not demonstrated that the
development delay between February 1991 and February 1993
was due to anything other than a bona fide dispute over the
legality of Landgate's lot and the Commission's jurisdictional
authority over the lot line adjustment. Such delay is an
incident of property ownership and not a taking of property.
(See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 263, fn. 9.)
35a
Although Landgate was in the unfortunate position of suffering
from a delay not of its own making, the same can be said of
any governmental mistake or, for that matter, any of a number
of possible bottlenecks in the development process. (See, e.g.,
Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of
California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112 [development postponed
several years due to association's litigation regarding the
adequacy of the environmental impact report]); Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553
[same]; Friends of La Vina v. County of Los Angeles (1991)
232 Cal. App.3d 1446 [same].) Because nothing in the record
demonstrates that the Commission's actions amounted to a
regulatory taking of Landgate’s property, the trial court should
have granted its motion for summary judgment on Landgate's
taking claim, and denied Landgate's motion for summary
adjudication.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of
Appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal shall remand to the trial court
with directions to grant the Commission's motion for summary
judgment against Landgate's takings claim and to deny
Landgate's motion for summary adjudication.
MOSK, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
36a
COPY
LANDGATE, INC. v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION
S059847
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.
The takings clause of the federal Constitution guarantees
property owners "just compensation" when their property is
"taken for public use." (U.S. Const., Sth Amend.) In First
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304,
322 (First English), the United States Supreme Court held that
a property owner could recover compensation for a temporary
taking.
First English involved a Los Angeles County ordinance
that the plaintiff alleged prohibited all use of its property.
(First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 308.) The plairsi¥
asserted that the ordinance constituted a taking of its proverty
for public use, and it sought just compensation. (/bid.) The
triai court and California Court of Appeal ruled that plaintiff
was not entitled to compensation unless the County opted to
retain the ordinance following a judicial determination that the
ordinance constituted a taking. (/d. at pp. 308-309.) In other
words, these courts held that no taking could occur during the
period of litigation over the validity of the ordinance. The
United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, even if
the County withdrew the ordinance as a result of the litigation,
it still owed compensation for the temporary period the
ordinance was in effect. (/d. at p. 322.)
37a
Here, the California Coastal Commission (Commission)
made clear that it opposed the lot line adjustment that created
Landgate's lot, and therefore opposed all development of
Landgate's property regardless of the magnitude of the
development. The Commission's decision denying Landgate's
application for a development permit had the same impact on
Landgate as the ordinance in First English had on the plaintiff
in that case. Landgate sued the Commission and successfully
established that the Commission's decision was wrong under
state law and also that it constituted a taking. The
Commission then approved development of Landgate's
property, thereby preventing Landgate from asserting a
permanent taking. Under these circumstances, First English
makes clear that the Commission must pay compensation for
the temporary taking that occurred while its total ban on
development of Landgate's property was in effect.
The majority notes that the high court did not decide in
First English whether “normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like"
would amount to a temporary taking. (First English, supra,
482 U.S. at p. 321.) The majority argues that this case
involves a “normal delay" in the permit approval process, not
a temporary taking. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 2, 31-32.) I
disagree. When a regulatory agency prohibits all use of a
particular property, and the property owner is forced to sue the
agency to get it to change its position, its stonewalling is not
fairly characterized as a "normal delay" in the permit approval
process. Here, the Commission's denial of Landgate's
development permit was not, as the majority argues,
"conditional," merely calling for some reasonable act of
compliance by Landgate. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) Rather,
the Commission made clear that it would not approve any
development on Landgate's lot regardless of the circumstances.
Nor did the Commission in this case temporarily delay the
7=e_e__
38a
permit app: oval process “pending resolution of a threshold
issue." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31.) Rather, the Commission
flatly denied the permit, and its decision was final in every
sense. The Commission was not planning to take any further
action. Landgate had to sue the Commission to get relief.
In his dissent in First English, Justice Stevens articulated
the precise argument on which the majority relies here.
Specifically, Justice Stevens asserted, as does the majority here
(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31-32), that litigation over the validity
of a land-use restriction is simply a "normal delay[]" in the
permit approval process and therefore cannot give rise to a
temporary taking. (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 334
(dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Justice Stevens stated: "The
Court's analysis . . . appears to erect an artificial distinction
between ‘normal delays' and the delays involved in obtaining a
court declaration that the regulation constitutes a taking. [9]
In my opinion, . . . [I]itigation challenging the validity of a
land-use restriction gives rise to a delay that is just as
normal' as an administrative procedure seeking a variance or
an approval of a controversial plan." (Id. at pp. 334-335 (dis.
opn. of Stevens, J.), italics added, fns. omitted.) Thus, Justice
Stevens would have held that litigation over the validity of a
land-use regulation, like other "normal delays" in the pexmit
approval process, cannot give rise to a temporary taking even
if the regulation deprives the property owner of all use of its
property. The majority of the high court considered Justice
Stevens's argument and rejected it. Now, the same argument
has found new life in the majority opinion here.
I agree with the majority "that a government agency may
deny a development permit when the reasonable conditions
imposed on development are not met . . . ." (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 27.) I also agree that "a judicial determination of the
validity of certain preconditions to development is a normal
39a
part of the development process, and . . . does not constitute
& per se temporary taking." (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 31-32,
Original italics.) Nevertheless, if the "preconditions to
development" have the effect of prohibiting all use of the
property regardless of the circumstances, then they constitute
a taking. If those preconditions are permanent, then the taking
is permanent; if those preconditions are temporary, then the
taking is temporary. The majority cites numerous cases (maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 32-33) in which litigation delay was "a
normal part of the regulatory process." (Maj. opn., ante, at p.
33.) I find these cases irrelevant to the issue before us. First,
these cases do not address whether the litigation delay
constituted a temporary taking. Second, I do not argue that,
in this case, the litigation delay by itself gave rise to the
temporary taking; rather, I argue that the Commission's total
and final ban on all use of Landgate's property (which existed
during the litigation delay) gave rise to the temporary taking.
As long as that total ban was in effect, the temporary taking
continued.
In First English, the court held that "where the
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use
of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective." (First English, supra,
482 U.S. at p. 321.) The majority would limit this holding to
cases involving "the passage and enforcement of a Jaw or
regulation that deprives property of all value." (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 17, italics added.) I find no basis in First English
for this limitation. Here, the policies reflected in the
Commission's adjudicative decision, like the ordinance at issue
in First English, "worked a taking of all use of property," and
40a
nothing "can relieve [the Commission] of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective." (First English, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 321.)
Accordingly, I dissent.
CHIN, J.
I CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
4la
COPY
LANDGATE, INC. v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION
S059847
DISSENTING OPINION BY BROWN, J.
The more things change, the more they remain the same.
That is certainly true with respect to this court's takings
jurisprudence. Almost 20 years ago, Justice Brennan,
dissenting in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego
(1981) 450 U.S. 621, 636, charged this court with sacrificing
the right to just compensation guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment on an altar "of policy judgments made by the...
judicial branch{}." (/d. at p. 661, fn. omitted.) Although the
deference commanded by the high court's precedents is not
always “absolute,” when it has made an attempt to resolve
definitively a difficult point of constitutional law that is
applicable to the very issue before us, we ought either to
respect its judgment or provide a reasoned basis for refusing to
do so. To do otherwise, in Charles Fried's words, is "judicial
impudence." (Fried, Jmpudence (1992) Sup.Ct.Rev. 155, 157,
192-193.)
I dissent.
Viewing pure democracy as incompatible with personal
security or the rights of property (Madison, The Federalist No.
42a
10 (Rossiter ed. 1961) p. 81),' the drafters of our Constitution
went to extraordinary lengths "to control the governed" and
to "oblige [the government] to controi itself." (Madison, The
Federalist No. 51, supra, at p. 322.) By adopting the
Constitution, the people of the United States “manifested a
determination to shield themselves and their property from the
effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are
exposed." (Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
138.)
The prohibition of the takings clause is one expression of
the constitutional commitment to limiting government and
maximizing individual liberty. The protection of private
property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment presupposes the
property is sought for legitimate purposes, out of a desire to
improve the public condition. It nevertheless prohibits
appropriation of property -- even for such beneficial purposes
-- without just compensation. The difficulty inherent in trying
to reconcile popular self-government with private ownership
of property has propelled the Supreme Court's takings doctrine
along an erratic course, from protection of property rights as
a matter of fixed principle to ad hoc balancing tests and back
to categorical rules. The result has been justifiably criticized
as muddled.
"[R]ecent cases," according to one scholar, “have done
little to clarify the [Takings] Clause, and the doctrine remains
in perplexing disarray." (McUsic, Looking Inside Out:
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings (1998) 92
l/ Had the Federalists lost the argument, our Republic might more
closely resemble P.J. O'Rourke's wry description. "The whole idea of
our government is this: If enough people get together and act in
concert, they can take something and not pay for it." (O'Rourke,
Parliament of Whores (1991) p. 232.)
43a
Nw. ULL. Rev. 591, 592, fn. 2 [citing treatises and law review
articles over the past 15 years]; Schroeder, Never Jam To day:
On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence (1996) 84 Geo.
L.J. 1531.) Despite the general impossibility of its takings
jurisprudence, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(1992) SOS U.S. 1003 (Lucas), the United States Supreme
Court made a heroic effort to bring a measure of clarity to an -
analytical framework that has grown doctrinally more difficult
as it has become politically more fundamental. After
embracing an intractably complex, ad hoc "balancing test" in
Penn Central Transporiation Co. v. New York City (1978) 438
U.S. 104, 124 (Penn Central), the court in Lucas enunciated
the clear rule which should govern our decision in this case:
"In 70-odd years of succeeding ‘regulatory takings’
jurisprudence [i.e., following Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon
(1922) 260 U.S. 393], we have generally eschewed any ' "set
formula " ' for determining how far is too far, preferring to
‘engag[e] in. . . ad hoc, factual inquiries.' [Citations.] We
have, however, described at least two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.
The first encompasses regulations that compel the property
owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property... . [9]
The second situation in which we have found categorical treat-
ment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land. [Citations.]" (Lucas,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1015, italics added.)
If Lucas means what it says, it establishes a categorical
rule. No amount of judicial legerdemain can transform its
objective, bright-line standard into a license for courts to
engage in prohibited forms of "case-specific inquiry into the
public interests advanced in support of" (Lucas, supra, 505
U.S. at p. 1015) a given restraint.
44a
After paying grudging lip service to Lucas's categorical
rule, the majority falls back on Penn Central's squishy, “multi-
factor" test, a standard so amorphous it is capable of producing
virtually any result. This is the very test Lucas overruled pro
tanto in cases, like this one, where the restraint at issue denies
all economic use. The torturous logic by which today's
majority decides an order of the coastal commission -- one that
finally and unqualifiedly denied the landowners here all use of
their property for over two years -- was a mere "temporary
delay" is worth examining in detail.
First, the majority resuscitates the Penn Central test in this
case by ignoring another equally clear precedent. In First
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304
(First Lutheran), the United States Supreme Court concluded
that temporary takings are compensable, repudiating this
court's contrary holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24
Cal.3d 266. The majority dismisses the holding in First
Lutheran as “narrow[]"; confined to its facts; requiring the
existence of a final administrative decision before the presence
of a constitutional violation can be determined; a case which
did not hold that the "mere" assertion of regulatory jurisdiction
constituted a taking; and so on. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13-
14.) But even if we accept all of the majority's quibbles, both
Lucas and First Lutheran indisputably apply here.
Mystifyingly, the majority then instructs us that "[v]irtually
every court that has examined the issue has concluded . . . that
a regulatory mistake resulting in delay does not, by itself,
amount to a taking of property." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)
True enough. But none of the 10 cases cited in support of this
patently obvious conclusion refutes the plaintiff property
owners’ claim for just compensation in this case.
45a
Two of these "noncompensable delay" cases preceded
Lucas, in the remainder, the court found either that the agency
had not reached a final decision or that the regulation did not
deny the owner ail beneficial use. (See Littoral Development
Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1995) 33
Cal. App.4th 211, 221-222 [no final decision]; De/ Oro Hills v.
City of Oceanside (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 1060, 1065 [no final
decision]; Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1996) 678 So.2d 1365, 1366 [no denial of all economic use];
Cannone v. Noey (Alaska 1994) 867 P.2d 797, 801 [same];
Dumont v. Town of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1993) 622 A.2d 1238,
1244 [same]; Tabb Lakes, Lid. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10
F.3d 796, 798 [no final decision]; Steinbergh v. City of
Cambridge (Mass. 1992) 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 [no denial of
all economic use]; Smith v. Town.of Wolfeboro (N.H. 1992)
615 A.2d 1252, 1257-1258 [same]; /902 Atlantic Lid. v.
United States (1992) 26 Ct.Cl. 573 [pre-Lucas decision
applying Penn Central analysis]: Lujan Home Builders y.
Orangetown (1991) 568 N.Y.2d 850, 851 [due process rather
than takings analysis]. )
Lucas itself teaches that its categorical rules do not apply
unless the restraint at issue deprives the property owner of all
economic use. (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1015-1019.)
Other takings cases make clear the high court's "insistence on
knowing the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that
purport to limit it." (MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 351 (MacDonald), see also
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank (1985) 473 US. 172, 186 (Williamson County)
("Because respondent has not yet obtained a final decision
regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the
procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensa-
46a
tion, respondent's claim is not ripe."].) As the court has stated,
however, the role served by the ripeness requirement in the
takings context is "prudential": to make clear "the economic
impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations.
[Citations.] Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the
administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the
particular land in question." (Williamson County, supra, 473
U.S. at p. 191; see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc. (1981) 452 U.S. 264 (Hodel).)
Only recently, the court underlined the limited contours of
"ripeness" in the takings context. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (1997) US. {117 S.Ct. 1659],
it said that cases such as Williamson County, MacDonald, and
Hodel “addressed the virtual impossibility of determining what
development will be permitted on a particular lot of land when
its use is subject to the decision of a regulatory body invested
with great discretion, which it has not yet even been asked to
exercise. No such question is presented here." (/d. atp.
[117 S.Ct. 1667], italics added; see also Lucas, supra, 505
U.S. at pp. 1011-1012.) It is that administrative flexibility that
lies behind and justifies the prudential ripeness rule in the
takings context. Those concerns simply have no bearing in this
case, however, where the commission made clear the extent to
which it would permit plaintiffs to develop their lot: Not at all.
The cases relied on by the majority are thus wide of the only
issue presented. Did the commission's definitive refusal to
permit plaintiffs to make any use of their property -- a refusal
that continued until, after two years of litigation, plaintiffs
obtained judicial relief -- “den[y] all economically beneficial or
productive use of [their] land." (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p.
1015.)
47a
This is not a case in which the property owners contend, as
the majority would have it, that "a regulatory mistake resulting
in delay . . ., by itself, amount[s] to a taking of property." (Cf.
maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) That is not, and never has been, the
law of takings. Rather, plaintiffs' argument -- and the essential
meaning of both Lucas and First Lutheran -- is that a final
decision by a regulatory agency that denies ail economically
beneficial use of the property, even temporarily, is a per se
compensable Fifth Amendment taking.” If that is so, then
plaintiffs’ property has been "taken," however temporarily, by
the commission's order, and the payment of "just"
compensation is constitutionally compelled. As both the trial
court and the Court of Appeal concluded, that is what
happened here.
The majority dodges the otherwise inevitable result by
changing the question: "The present case poses the issue of
whether a legally erroneous decision of a government agency
during the development approval process resulting in delay
constitutes a temporary taking of property." (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 14.) “Legally erroneous"? "Process"? "Delay"? Of
course mere "delay" in a "process" resulting from an
"erroneous decision" does not qualify as a constitutional
violation. If it did, every "mistake" by government land use
2/ As Lucas itself and following cases have pointed out, there is one
recognized exception even to the court's categorical takings rule. If the
government can demonstrate that controlling principles of "background
law" -- typically embodied in a state's nuisance law -- do not permit the
use at issue, compensation is not required. (See 505 U.S. at p. 1029
["A law or decree with such an effect [i.e., prohibiting all economically
beneficial use] must . .. do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts -- by adjacent landowners . . . under
the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally. . . ." (Fn. omitted.)].)
48a
authorities leading to any delay in the owner's use of her
property would require compensation. A massive raid on the
public fisc would ensue. Suppose, however, the question were
differently, more evenhandedly, framed as one that "poses the
issue of whether a regulatory decision barring any use of
property until the agency's decision is overturned by a court
constitutes a temporary taking of property?” What result then?
That, rather than the majority's tendentious formulation, is the
issue presented by this case.
In any event, the majority's trick question has already been
asked and answered. As Justice Chin points out in his dissent
(see dis. opn. of Chin, J., ante, at pp. 2-3), the identical
position espoused by the majority -- that litigation over the
validity of a land use restriction is simply a "normal delay" in
the permit approval process and thus cannot give rise to a
temporary taking -- was advanced by Justice Stevens in his
dissenting opinion in First Lutheran. (See 482 U.S. at pp.
334-335.) The precise issue has thus already been considered
and rejected by the high court. (See dis. opn. of Chin, J., ante,
at p. 3.)
If Lucas lays down a categorical rule; and if, as First
Lutheran concludes, a final order that temporarily deprives a
property owner of all economically beneficial use is a
compensable taking, these propositions ought to readily yield
a clear answer, one that does not depend on the majority's
elaborate, even arduous, preliminary discussion. (Cf. Florida
Rock Industries, Inc. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1994) 18 F.3d 1560,
1564-1565 [Lucas "teaches that the economic impact factor
alone may be determinative; in some circumstances, no
balancing of factors is required. If a regulation categorically
prohibits a/l economically beneficial use of land -- destroying
its economic value for private ownership -- the regulation has
an effect equivalent to a permanent physical occupation. There
49a
is, without more, a compensable taking." (Fns. omitted,
second italics added.)]}.)
What the Supreme Court's categorical rule in Lucas means
for property owners, and what the majority refuses
to acknowledge, is that after Lucas, Justice Holmes's famous
apothegm in the Rock Island Railroad case, that "Men must
turn square corners when they deal with the Government"
(Rock Island & c. R. R. v. United States (1920) 254 U.S. 141,
143) is now reciprocal. Following Lucas, in a limited class of
cases, regulators whose final action denies an owner ail
beneficial economic use of land are on notice that, if their
decisions prove wrong when tested in court, the government
may face a damages judgment for a temporary taking even if
the restraint is later rescinded. In this context at least, it is
government that must turn square corners when it attempts to
overregulate the use of private property or is in danger of
“forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
(Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49; Lucas,
supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1018.)
To further confuse the discussion, the majority plunges into
a lengthy disquisition on the connection between the land use
regulation at issue here and the legitimate governmental
purposes it arguably advances. This, of course, is the
formulation developed in Dolan v. City of Tigard ( 1994) 512
U.S. 374, and Nollan v. Californ.a Coastal Comm'n (1987)
483 U.S. 825, a "nexus" test that is precluded by the
categorical rule in Lucas. Indeed, the very nature of Lucas’s
categorical rule appears to bar a court from conducting a case-
specific inquiry into those interests that might justify the
restraint imposed on the plaintiffs’ use of their property by the
commission's order. (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1015 ["We
have ... described ... two discrete categories of regulatory
50a
action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the
public interest advanced in support of the restraint."].)
Although Justice Holmes's caution that when regulation
"goes too far it will be recognized as a taking" is foundational
to much takings jurisprudence (Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
supra, 260 U.S. at p. 415), the high court "ha[s] never set
forth the justification for this rule." (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at
p. 1017.) As Justice Scalia explains: "Perhaps it is simply ...
that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's
point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.
[Citation.] . . . Surely, at least, in the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial
use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life’ [citation] in a manner that
secures an ‘average reciprocity of advantage’ to everyone
concerned [citation]. And the functional basis for permitting
the government ... to affect property values without
compensation ... does not apply to the relatively rare situations
where the government has deprived a landowner of all
economically beneficial uses." (505 U.S. at pp. 1017-1018,
italics in original.)
"On the other side of the balance," the Lucas majority
continued, "affirmatively supporting a compensation
requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave the owner of
land without economically beneficial or productive options for
its use -- typically, as here, by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state -- carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm. [Citations.] As Justice Brennan explained: 'From the
government's point of view, the benefits flowing to the public
from preservation of open space through regulations may be
Sla
equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge through formal
condemnation or increasing electricity production through a
dam project that floods private property.'" (505 U.S. at p.
1018.) In short, Justice Scalia concluded, "there are good
reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice ail
economically beneficial use in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered
a taking." (505 U.S. at p. 1019, fn. omitted, italics in original.)
It is evident the majority is unwilling to come to terms with
the true meaning and operative effect of Lucas and First
Lutheran. At every turn, its opinion reflects the abiding
conviction that takings jurisprudence has not advanced a single
step beyond the "regulatory friendly" analysis of Penn Central.
At every opportunity, the majority reverts to Penn Central's ad
hoc factual inquiry. Limning all this reasoning is the
vocabulary of "balance." Instead of confronting the meaning of
Lucas as it applies in this case, the majority chatters endlessly
of "delay ... owing to the mistaken assertion of jurisdiction"
(maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1-2), " ‘normal delay' " (id. at p. 2),
“normal delay rather than a temporary taking" (ibid_), “legally
erroneous decision ... during the development ... process
resulting in delay" (id. at p. 14), “reasonable regulatory process
designed to advance legitimate government interests" (id. at p.
18), "[mJere fluctuations in value during the process of
government decisionmaking" (ibid.), "mistaken assertion of
jurisdiction" (ibid.), "normal development delay" (id. at p. 25),
“conditional denial" (id. at p. 28), "condition . . . erroneously
imposed" (ibid.), "plausible . . . though perhaps legally
erroneous" (ibid.), "postponement of development" (id. at p.
31), "bona fide dispute" (id. at p. 33), "delay [as] an incident
of property ownership" (ibid.), and plaintiffs' “unfortunate
position of suffering from a delay." (/d. at p. 34.) Thus is
reality ruthlessly revised. (Cf. Nollan v. California Coastal
52a
Comm'n, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 831 ["To say that the
appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's
premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest
but rather. . . 'a mere restriction on its use,'. . . is to use words
in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary
meaning."].)
The majority's discussion concludes with a proposition that
is flatly incompatible with Lucas: "[W]e must determine not
whether a sinister purpose lurked behind the [c]ommission's
decision, but rather whether the development restrictions
imposed . . . substantially advanced some legitimate state
purposes so as to justify the denial of the development
permit." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, italics added.) Had Lucas
never been decided; had the commission not denied plaintiffs
all use of their property; had Penn Central's ad hoc test the
slightest relevance to this case, the majority's conclusion might
have some bearing here. But none of these things is true.
The remainder of the majority opinion continues to joust
with its own strawman. Yet, to repeat: The test is not
"whether the development restrictions imposed on the subject
property substantially advanced some legitimate state
purposes." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) That formula, lifted
from Penn Central, simply is no longer relevant under the
circumstances here; indeed, the inquiry is barred by Lucas.
And the majority's conclusion -- that though the commission
may have been "mistaken given the peculiar facts of this case,
its position was not so objectively unreasonable as to give rise
to the inference that it was adopting that position solely for
purposes of delay or some other illegitimate reason" (maj.
opn., ante, at p. 24) -- is obstinately beside the point.
The majority persistently misstates and mischaracterizes
both the issue before us and governing takings law. In the end,
oR eer
oP
53a
however, the majority is finally forced to concede the meaning
of First Lutheran: " {It}. . . stands for the proposition that once
a government action finally denies all economically viable use
of property, the fact that the government later rescinds that
action after a judicial proceeding does not relieve it of its duty
to pay compensation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 31, italics added )
Yes, exactly; and that is this case. As plaintiffs point out,
were that not the law, the holding of Lucas would be
emasculated. If any "threshold," "jurisdictional" assertion by
a government land use agency that has the effect of barring all
economically beneficial use of property can be converted into
"the recognition that a judicial determination of the validity of
certain preconditions to development is a normal part of the
development process" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 32, italics in
original), then, in California, at least for now, Lucas is a dead
letter.
CONCLUSION
When the answer to every question about what the public
needs or wants or should have is always "more," the demand
for free public goods is infinite. Against this relentless siphon,
the takings clause, and the courts' ardent defense of it, stands
as a last lonely bulwark of property rights. It is, and will
continue to be a difficult rampart to maintain. That difficulty
is built right into our constitutional structure. But, in one area
at least we have arrived at a clear understanding: when the
government denies all economically viable use of property,
even temporarily, it may not achieve its ends "by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change." (Penna.
54a
Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. at p. 416.) In these
limited circumstances, government must turn square comers --
except in California.
BROWN, J.
I CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
2418486.01
LANDGATE, INC., et al.,
CALIFORNIA COASTAL
COMMISSION,
55a
APPENDIX B
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
COURT OF APPEAL -
SECOND DISTRICT
FILED Feb-7 1997 :
JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk
SHIRLEY BEAUX, Deputy Clerk
Plaintiffs and
Appellants, B084315
V. (Super. Ct. No. BC 024391)
Defendant
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
and Appellant. )
)
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1,
this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II
and IV.
56a
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Richard C. Hubbell, Judge. Reversed in part,
affirmed in part and remanded.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E.
Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jan S. Stevens,
Assistant Attorney General, Peter Kaufinan and Joseph
Barbieri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Reznik & Reznik, Fred N. Gaines and Kevin M. Kemper
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
ee ee ee panduade
572
In October 1990, Landgate, Inc. applied to the California
Coastal Commission for a coastal development permit to build
a house and related structures on its lot in the Malibu hills.
The Commission asserted that the lot--approved by the County
of Los Angeles when owned by Landgate's predecessor in
interest--was unlawful because it lacked Commission approval.
The Commission denied Landgate's coastal permit application.
Landgate successfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of
mandate challenging the permit denial and successfully
defended on appeal the trial court's grant of the writ. Landgate
then returned to the trial court to resolve the remaining
"taking" claims.
The Commission appeals from the judgment awarding
compensation for inverse condemnation, prejudgment interest,
and attorney fees and costs. The Commission claims the trial
court erred in granting Landgate's motion for summary
adjudication on its third cause of action, which alleged that the
Commission had, by its February 1991 permit denial, deprived
Landgate of all economically viable use of its land and thus
temporarily "taken" that land without paying the
constitutionally required "just compensation." The Commission
also argues the trial court erred in awarding Landgate
$155,657 in temporary taking damages following trial on the
subject of damages.
Landgate cross-appeals, claiming (1) it was entitled to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1036 expenses incurred in the
writ of mandate proceeding,(2) the court should have adopted
the fair rental value method of assessing damages, and (3) the
court erred in dismissing Landgate's 42 United States Code
section 1983 cause of action and refusing to allow Landgate to
identify Commission members and Commission staff personnel
individually as Doe defendants in that claim.
58a
In the published portion of this opinion, we affirm the trial
court's ruling that the Commission's denial of the permit
temporarily deprived Landgate of all economically viable use
of its lot and thus constituted a categorical taking under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 19 of the California Constitution. We also
reverse and remand with respect to the trial court's denial of
Landgate's request for Code of Civil Procedure section 1036
expenses incurred for the writ of mandate proceeding.
In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we reverse that
portion of the damages award attributable to property taxes for
the relevant period, affirm the balance of the award, and affirm
the dismissal of Landgate's 42 United States Code section
1983 cause of action and the grant of the Commission's motion
to quash service of summons on individual Commissioners and
staff members.
FACTS
Before 1973, a large unimproved tract in the Malibu hills
was approved for subdivision into approximately two-acre lots,
each zoned for a single-family home. After the subdivision,
Landgate's predecessor in interest owned two parcels which
ran north and south. The northern portions were sloped, the
southern portions were flat. One of the lots contained a single
family home on its flat southern portion. Both lots lie within
the coastal zone in the County of Los Angeles.
In the mid 1980's, the County planned to improve an east-
west road through the two lots. The proposed road would
divide the two lots into one northern lot and one southern lot.
The landowner and the County agreed that, in exchange for the
owner's dedicating portions of the parcels for the roadway
59a
easement, the County would reconfigure the lots into a single,
sloped lot north of the road and a single, flat lot south of the
road, each still zoned for a single family home.
The County completed the road improvement and formally
approved the lot reconfiguration, which was recorded July 5,
1989. At that point, the Commission had approved the
County's Malibu land use plan, but at all relevant times had not
certified a County Malibu local coastal program. The lots’
owner did not seek or receive Commission approval of the lot
line adjustment. The Commission did not challenge the -
County's approval of the reconfiguration.
In October 1990, Landgate bought the sloped northern
2.45 acre lot and applied for and received County approval in
concept of grading and building plans for a single-family home
to be built on the property.' Landgate applied to the
Commission for a permit to build the house and related
structures and the Commission scheduled the matter for its
December meeting in San Diego.
Landgate's October 12, 1990, permit application sought
approval of the house and related structures. The plans called
for a 9,036 square foot home, a guest house and swimming
pool and 8,500 cubic yards of grading. In a November 1 letter,
Commission staff requested additional materials in connection
with the application. In late November, Landgate's
representative first learned from staff that the lot line
adjustment was going to be an issue in connection with the
1/ Landgate's first amended petition/complaint, filed November 19,
1993, added Peter and Punte Bogart, who “owned and controlled"
Landgate as plaintiffs. The Bogarts held a life estate in the subject lot.
We refer to the Bogarts and Landgate collectively as "Landgate."
60a
application. Before the original staff report was prepared,
Landgate modified its proposal by reducing the house to 7,500
square feet, eliminating the guest house and changing other
structures, and reducing proposed grading to 4,300 cubic
yards,
According to the November 1990 staff report,
development along the road or "overview" for which the
Landgate house was proposed was “limited to two existing
single family residences." Although there was "no existing or
planned-for development along the inland or northern side of
the overview[,] ... there [was] a three-lot subdivision ... which
was approved with conditions at the December, 1990...
Commission hearings. This subdivision is just north and west
of the overview."
At its December 13 meeting in San Diego, the Commission
first considered the now-reduced project, which, according to
the staff report, proposed to build on a illegal lot and violated
visual resources (views from a trail ir a tributary of Escondido
Canyon below the south side of the road) and landform
alteration (grading) requirements. The Commission voted to
continue the matter due to questions concerning the legality of
the lot under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub.
Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.) because the Commission had
not approved the County's lot line adjustment.
According to the declaration of its engineer/representative
in support of Landgate's motion ("Petrovsky Declaration"),
"once the lot line adjustment issue was raised ... the
[Commission] staff would not negotiate with regard to the
issues of the size of home, grading, etc. Instead, the legality of
the lot became the focus of their attention." Landgate then
reapplied for a coastal development permit, adding a request
for Commission approval of the County lot line adjustment.
6la
At its February 7, 1991, meeting, the Commission denied
Landgate's application, finding, among other things and over
Landgate's objection, that the lot itself constituted an
impermissible "development" under the Coastal Act because it
was created without Commission approval, and that the
proposed house and related structures would produce
excessive soil, grading, and visual degradation.”
At the hearing, the District Director, who presented staff's
recommendations, told the Commission, "The lot line
adjustment changed the configuration of the two lots so that
instead of being long, narrow lots, you now have two lots with
the lot line being located at the center line of [the road].
[{]] What this does is it results in two lots, one of which is on
the down slope side of [the road] and is much steeper than the
area located on the up slope side of [the road]. [] Staff would
suggest that this lot line adjustment not be approved, that it
would be preferable to concentrate the development on the
two lots on the up slope side of [the road] where the property
is more level."
After Petrovsky, Mr. Bogart, and others spoke, one
Commissioner asked the District Director whether he was
"right ... to say that if the lot line adjustment came before us,
you would have recommended denial?" The District Director
2/ "'Development' means ... the placement or erection of any solid
material or structure; discharge or disposal or any dredged material or
of any gaseous, liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing,
dredging, mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density
or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision
. . . and any other division of land, including lot splits,.. . ;
construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any
structure..." (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106.)
62a
replied, “That is correct." Shortly thereafter, the Commission
denied the application.
Immediately after the vote, another Commissioner said
that the issue of "the County's refusal to recognize our right to
review lot line adjustments" was "an issue that ha[{d] come
before [the Commission] many, many times in the Malibu
area." She added it was “really time to become extremely
serious about this" and asked that staff counsel be directed to
communicate with the County on the topic. The Commission's
Chief Counsel said he would draft the letter for the Chairman's
signature.
On April 11, 1991, the Commission denied Landgate's
reconsideration request, which included a newly modified
proposal reducing the height to 32 feet above natural grade
and reducing grading to approximately 500 cubic yards. After
Landgate's representative described the revised project, staff
advised the Commission that Landgate was not requesting
reconsideration in terms required by statute, but was describing
a new project, for which it was free to apply.’
The District Director told the Commission, "One of the
problems I think is that staff has indicated that in your denial
of this project part of the basis for your denial was the lot line
adjustment and that we told them even if they make these
modifications we'll still recommend denial." Chief Counsel told
3/ Public Resources Code section 30627, subdivision (b)(3) provides:
"The basis of the request for reconsideration shall be either that there
is relevant new evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
could not have been presented at the hearing on the matter or that an
error of fact or law has occurred which has the potential of altering the
initial decision."
63a
the members, "[W]ithout the lot line adjustment some of these
revisions are I think irrelevant." Counsel also told the
Commission, "This project does not work, if you please,
without that lot line adjustment."
The Commission's Executive Director advised the members
that “even with this new information [that Landgate was
proposing], had it been presented at [or before the February
1991 meeting], . . ., without your willingness to change the lot
line, [the] information wouldn't have led to a different result.”
The Commission followed staff's recommendation to deny the
reconsideration.
Landgate sued and, among other relief, petitioned for
issuance of a writ of mandate directed to the Commission. On
October 24, 1991, the trial court issued the writ, vacating the
Commission's denial of the project and ordering it to
reconsider the application assuming the lot reconfiguration
valid. The Commission scheduled the matter for its November
14, 1991, San Diego meeting. Landgate prepared for and
traveled to the meeting, but the Commission continued the
matter until its December meeting without conducting a
hearing.
On November 21, 1991, the Commission filed a return
Stating the parties were exploring settlement involving
approval of a smaller project on Landgate's lot. According to
the return, the parties were exploring a resolution of the
litigation, including Landgate's presentation of a downsized
project in exchange for Landgate's agreement to drop its
remaining causes of action and withdraw certain portions of its
claim for costs and attorney fees. Instead, the Commission
appealed the grant of the writ. We affirmed the order issuing
the writ of mandate, holding that under the facts of this case,
the lot line adjustment was not a new "development" within the
64a
meaning of the Coastal Act. We held that the Commission had
no jurisdiction to deny the permit on that ground.
On February 16, 1993, the Commission approved
Landgate's application for a 7,500 square foot, 35 foot high,
single-family residence, with a swimming pool, garage, and
septic system. Grading involved 2,983 cubic yards. The
approval was subject to special conditions which included
submission of revised plans for the Executive Director's
approval. The plans were to show that the height of the house
did "not exceed ... 28[] feet above existing grade or finished
grade, whichever is more restrictive."
According to the relevant staff report, the proposed
residence was 30 feet in height when nearest the road, 35 feet
in height from existing grade in the section extending down the
hillside, and would be 15 feet above existing grade for part of
where it paralleled the road. In addition, according to staff,
"the only development visible from the [Escondido Canyon
Trail] ... is the roofline of the tower of an existing residence
and a home under construction, both on the Overview
ridgeline. However, at least one single-family residence has
been approved on the Overview, as well as the Shriner three-
lot subdivision to the west on [the same road as the Landgate
property]. The Shriner subdivision includes lots above and
below the road." Other statements in the report reflect other
project approvals in the area overlooking the trail.
After issuance of our remittitur, Landgate sought summary
adjudication on its third cause of action ("Taking of Property
Without Just Compensation"). Landgate argued its claim was
meritorious and without defense because (1) Landgate had
been "deprived, at least temporarily, of all economically viable
or productive use of its property" because, “at least
temporarily, [it] could not legally obtain any valid permits or
65a
approvals to construct any project on its property as a result of
the Commission's actions." Landgate also argued (2) the
Commission's actions did not "substantially advance any
legitimate State interest," and (3) it had been "deprived, at least
temporarily, of all reasonable investment-backed expectations
with regard to its property" because it “at least temporarily,
could not legally obtain any valid permits or approvals to
construct any project on its property as a result of the
Commission's actions." The trial court granted Landgate's
motion, ruling that the Commission's actions had at least
temporarily deprived Landgate of all economically viable use
of its property. The court awarded Landgate $155,657 in
damages. The Commission appeals.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
As relevant, Code of Civil Procedure section 437¢ provides
that a party may move for summary adjudication as to a cause
of action if that party contends there is no merit to an
affirmative defense to that cause of action. The motion is to be
granted only if it completely disposes of that affirmative
defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A plaintiff
meets his burden of showing there is no defense to a cause of
action if he has proved each element of his cause of action. If
the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show that one or more triable issues of material
facts exist as to the cause of action or the defense thereto.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (0)(1).)
"In reviewing an order granting, or denying, a motion
seeking a summary adjudication of particular issues, we are
governed by the rules applicable generally to a review of
66a
summary judgments.’ ([Citation.] ‘An appellate court
determines de novo whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party was entitled to .... summary
adjudication as a matter of law.' [Citation.]" (Hansen
Mechanical, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
722, 726-727.)
Temporary Taking
In its third cause of action, Landgate alleged that the
Commission's permit denial constituted a taking of property
under both the federal and state constitutions. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation." This prohibition was made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Chicago,
Burlington &c. R'D v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226.) Article
I, section 19 of the California Constitution provides that
"[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for public use
only when just compensation ... has first been paid to, or into
court for, the owner...."
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S.
1003, offers the best guidance for resolution of this temporary
taking claim. In Lucas, the high court confronted South
Carolina's 1988 Beachfront Management Act, "which had the
direct effect of barring [Lucas] from erecting any permanent
habitable structures on his two [beachfront] parcels." (/d. at p.
1007.) The issue was "whether the Act's dramatic effect on the
67a
economic value of Lucas's lots accomplished a taking of
private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
requiring the payment of ‘just compensation.’ [Citation. ]"
([bid.)
Lucas had bought his two lots after the state enacted its
original coastal zone management act in 1977, under which he
was not required to obtain a permit in advance of any
development. He intended to build two single-family homes,
as owners of adjacent parcels had already done. Lucas
commissioned architectural drawings. The 1988 Act ended his
plans by prohibiting development of lands located, like his,
within an area seaward of a coastal erosion baseline established
pursuant to the statute.
Lucas filed suit. He did not challenge the state's authority
under the police power to enact the ban. Instead, he claimed
the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value
entitled him to compensation. The trial court agreed, finding,
among other things, that when Lucas bought the lots both were
zoned for his intended use and no restrictions were placed
thereon by state or local law. The trial court also found that
the Act decreed a permanent ban on construction on Lucas's
lots, eliminated the unrestricted use, and rendered them
valueless, thus concluding that the properties had been "taken"
by operation of the Act. The court ordered the state to pay
just compensation of $1,232,387.50.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, troubled by
Lucas's failure to challenge the validity of the Act itself. In the
absence of such an attack, "the court believed itself bound to
accept the ‘uncontested ... findings’ of the [state] legislature
that new construction in the coastal zone--such as [Lucas]
intended--threatened this public resource. [Citation.]" (Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at p.
68a
1010.) The South Carolina court ruled that when a land use
regulation is "designed ‘to prevent serious public harm,'
[citations], no compensation is owing under the Takings
Clause regardless of the regulation's effect on the property's
value."(/bid.)
The United States Supreme Court rejected the state court's
approach. The high court referred to its history in the area of
uncompensated taking by overregulation and concluded, "In
70-odd years of . . . ‘regulatory takings' jurisprudence [after the
decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S.
393], we have generally eschewed any "set formula” for
determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engagfe] in ...
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' [Citations.] We have,
however, described at least two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.
The first encompasses regulations that compel the property
owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property.... [J] The
second situation in which we have found categorical treatment
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land. [Citations.] As we have
said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated
when land[]use regulation ‘does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land. [Citation.]" (Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 1015-1016; fns.
omitted.)
After this court affirmed that the Commission had no
jurisdiction to deny the permit on the basis of the lot line
adjustment, the Commission granted the conditioned permit
described above. In ruling on Landgate's later motion for
summary adjudication on the taking issue, the trial court found
that the Commission's February 1991 denial of the permit
69a
application “deprived [Landgate], at least temporarily, of all
economically viable or productive use of its property insofar as
Landgate ... could not legally obtain any valid permits or
approvals to construct any project on its property as a result of
the Commission's actions."
Petrovsky stated in his declaration that he had handled at
least 15 Commission matters before Landgate's and was "very
familiar with the procedures and requirements for construction
in the Coastal Zone." He explained that normally the
application for a project marked the beginning of negotiations
concerning the size of a home, grading, and other construction-
related factors. "Through a negotiated process, a resolution is
typically reached with regard to the size of the home, amount
of grading and other issues."
We agree that the Commission's permit denial caused a
taking of Landgate's property. The Commission argues that its
1991 permit denial was not, in the language of Lucas, one of
those “extraordinary circumstance[s]" in which government
actions are found to deprive landowners of all economically
viable use. (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, supra,
505 U.S. at p. 1017.) The Commission does not argue that a
viable use of the land remained after the permit denial. Instead,
the Commission contends the two-year hiatus was the result of
its "mistake" concerning the lot line adjustment, which resulted
in the kind of typical temporary delay which is
noncompensable under the takings clause.‘ The
4/ The Commission relies on a number of noncompensable delay cases
which we find factually driven and distinguishable or not binding on
this court. For example, in De! Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 1060, the landowner/developer raised a facial challenge
to a voter-enacted growth control ordinance which permitted only
(continued...)
70a
4/ (...continued)
staged development. The undisputed facts established that the property
was eventually sold and used for the planned purpose.
In Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco (1987) 197
Cal.App.3d 862, the landowner bought four, adjoining vacant lots in
1979. In July 1980, the city planning commission and recreation and
parks commission designated an area which included the lots for study
for possible acquisition as a park. The area was included in the
recreation and open space element of the city's master plan. In
September 1980, the landowner applied for a building permit to build
four houses on his lots. The planning department required preparation
of an environmental impact report. The Landowner hired a consultant
to prepare the document. In October 1981, the park study was
completed and the two city agencies recommended purchase of only a
portion of the subject area. The area to be bought did not include the
four lots. Two months later, the planning commission amended the
master plan to permit construction on lots not to be acquired, and the
following month rescinded its requirement of an EIR for the
landowner's proposed project. In connection with preparation of the
negative declaration the planning department decided would suffice as
environmental review, the department asked the landowner for certain
supporting information. It took the landowner more than three years to
submit the information. In October 1985, the city issued an amended
negative declaration in response to public comment. Meanwhile, the
landowner had filed suit in 1982. The landowner sued before the
environmental review was completed and the record did not show
whether any final action had been taken on the new building permit the
landowner had filed after his original application had been cancelled
because of his failure to supply information. When the city's motion for
summary judgment was heard in February 1986, the new application
had not yet been acted on.
In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. U.S. (Fed. Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 796, the
landowner began filling wetlands without a permit and then sued for
compensation for an alleged taking when the United States Army Corps
(continued...)
Tila
Commission points out that the regulatory process is complex
(including disputes over sufficiency of the applicant's submitted
information, geographical boundaries of an agency's
jurisdiction and of a landowner's property, and, as in this case,
an agency's authority to require a permit) and that “regulatory
agencies ... sometimes make mistakes in resolving these
issues."
We recognize, as Petrovsky suggested, that the regulatory
process necessarily involves reasonable delay to the landowner.
We realize, as well, that mistakes sometimes, but certainly not
inevitably, occur as part of the review process. What we
cannot accept is the Commission's characterization of the
treatment of Landgate here as the reasonable result of a
"mistake." Nothing in the record suggests that the lot line
adjustment issue arose out of anything other than the
Commission's ongoing jurisdictional spat with the County of
Los Angeles combined with a desire to prevent Landgate from
building on its parcel. Instead, the overwhelming sense of the
record is that by its insistence that the lot itself was illegal, the
Commission put Landgate in a situation which was not of
4/ (...continued)
of Engineers issued a cease and desist order. The appellate court held,
inter alia, that the delay caused by the cease and desist order was neither
extraordinary nor in bad faith and, even if the landowner’s ability to sell
the property was affected by the order, the order only delayed
development. (/d. at p. 800.)
In contrast, in this case, Landgate applied for a permit to build the
house and was negotiating with Commission staff before the lot line
adjustment issue arose. Landgate had bought a lot approved by the
County. The Commission's action, taken in excess of its jurisdiction,
left Landgate not only unable to use its land but unable even to
negotiate for a different project.
72a
Landgate's own making and which Landgate could do nothing
to cure. In short, this was not a case of bureaucratic bungling,
but a declaration of war between governmental behemoths in
which the inevitable casualty was to be a noncombatant,
Landgate. The Commission, with apparent indifference to the
consequences on its applicant, denied the permit without the
jurisdiction to do so. The direct effect was to prevent
Landgate from, as the trial court put it, "construct[ing] any
project on its property."*
The facts of this case speak for themselves. When it denied
the coastal permit, the Commission went too far and denied
Landgate all economically viable use of its property, preserving
it as open space. As Lucas states, "[T]he fact that regulations
that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or
productive options for its use--typically, as here, by requiring
land to be left substantially in its natural state--carry with them
a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm. [Citations.]" (Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 1018.)
5/ It appears that Landgate tried to meet Commission staff's concerns
about the County-approved reconfiguration by modifying its original
application, so that at the February 1991 meeting, the project included
a request for Commission review of the reconfiguration. We question
whether, despite its apparent desire to comply with staff's wishes,
Landgate was in a position to rightfully ask for that review. It did not
own both of the original lots, and did not own any land south of the
road. Thus, the effect of its "reapplication" and, indeed, certain aspects
of the staff report for the February 1991 meeting gave an unreal quality
to the process with staff's conclusion "that the least environmentally
damaging site for development is on the coastal [south] side of [the
road} and that the original lot configuration of long thin parcels
extending across the road should not be altered."
73a
As in Lucas, the trial court here found that the permit
denial deprived Landgate of all economically viable use of its
land. Our review of the record leads us to the same conclusion.
Faced with the lot line adjustment issue to which it had not
contributed and which had the effect of prematurely ending the
normal negotiating process, Landgate was put in an
unworkable position. When its permit to build a single family
residence was denied because of that same issue, Landgate was
left with no economically viable use of its land.
The Commission contends, in the alternative, that its
assertion of permit jurisdiction did not constitute a taking
because Landgate did not establish its right to a permit before
the alleged taking) The Commission posits that its denial was
based independently on the project's conflict with Coastal Act
policies regarding grading and visual intrusion and, therefore,
even had it not reached the lot line adjustment issue, the
Commission's permit denial would have been proper. Thus,
the Commission argues, Landgate did not establish its
entitlement to a permit until after additional changes were
made and Landgate accepted permit conditions imposed at the
February 1993 meeting. As a result, the argument continues,
the February 1991 denial did not constitute a taking.
As we already have noted, in his declaration in support of
the summary adjudication motion, Petrovsky, experienced in
matters involving the Commission's process, explained that
typically the application for a project marked the beginning of
ultimately successful negotiations concerning the size of a
home, grading, and other construction-related factors.
However, Commission staff ceased normal negotiations with
the applicant after staff raised the lot line adjustment issue, an
issue over which Landgate claimed the Commission lacked
jurisdiction. Staffs position remained unchanged and was
74a
conveyed to the Commission, which denied the permit
pursuant to staff's recommendation.
The Petrovsky Declaration and statements of Commission
staff, chief counsel, and Commissioners quoted in our factual
summary above support our conclusion that the lot line
adjustment was pivotal in the permit denial and in the denial's
complete prohibition of any development on Landgate's lot.
So long as the Commission held to its finding that the
reconfiguration remained a subject for its review, Landgate
could not negotiate to obtain the permit necessary to build a
house on its County-approved lot. Not until two years after its
original denial did the Commission approve a project for the
Landgate property.
The Commission's ultimate approval of the house for the
Landgate property, after the reconfiguration issue had been
laid to rest, validates our conclusion that the lot line adjustment
issue was the determinative basis for the denial. Despite the
Commission's current protestations to the contrary, hindsight
shows clearly that visual impact and grading issues were not
pivotal in the 1991 permit denial if only because in 1993,
shortly after the remittitur was final in the preceding appeal,
the Commission approved a single family residence for the
property. At that point, the project was described as a 7,500
square foot, 35-foot high, single family residence, with
swimming pool, garage, and septic system and grading of
2,983 cubic yards. The only difference between these facts and
the rejected 1991 project was a grading reduction of
approximately 1,300 cubic yards, apparently proposed by
Landgate °
6/ According to the relevant staff report, project plan changes were:
"reduction in grading from 4300 [cubic yards] to 2983 [cubic yards],
(continued...)
75a
It is true, as the Commission points out, that its ultimate
approval of the project was conditioned and that the conditions
included a height limitation, which appears to have resulted in
some reduction in height. However, as Landgate points out,
the Commission could have imposed special conditions on
matters such as height in February 1991, had it not been so
intent on reviewing the County's lot line adjustment.
Additional substantiation that the lot line adjustment was
the basis for the permit denial comes from the fact that, as we
interpret relevant staff reports, the Commission had approved
at least two homes on the same sloping north side of the road
as Landgate's parcel. Those approvals are clear indications
that but for the lot line adjustment issue, Landgate's application
to build the house and related structures on its property could
and would, through the normal negotiation process, have been
approved by February 1991 or shortly thereafter. Instead, the
Commission's unlawful preoccupation with the lot line
adjustment made it impossible for Landgate to move forward
with an economically viable use of its property. We thus reject
the Commission's suggestion that no taking occurred because
6/ (...continued)
reduction in the size of fill slopes, change in the driveway entry design
from a rectangular courtyard concept to a hammerhead turnaround,
elimination of the guest house, relocation of the pool to up near the
road, and elimination of a subterranean area of the residence." As we
interpret this language, the grading reduction was thus largely the result
of changing the driveway design, eliminating the guest house, relocating
the pool, and eliminating a subterranean part of the house.
We note as well that the final grading number was considerably
higher than the approximately 500 cubic yards described by Landgate
at the April 1991 Commission hearing when Landgate's reconsideration
request was denied.
76a
Landgate could not establish their entitlement to a coastal
permit.
Il
Damages
Following a bench trial, the court awarded Landgate
temporary taking damages of $155,657. It first set the period
of the taking as beginning with the date of Commission's
permit denial (February 7, 1991) and ending with the date the
Commission issued a permit (February 16, 1993).” The court
then determined that the "temporary lost value" of the property
was $675,000, based on the conclusion that the property was
worth $675,000 when bought for that price (a figure both
experts agreed represented the property's value before the
permit denial) and had been "rendered worthless" by the denial
(as testified by Landgate's expert).* The court then multiplied
$675,000 by a 10 percent rate of return (as recommended by
Landgate's expert) for the period of the taking. The court next
added $17,214 in property taxes (which it found had been paid
on the property over the two years) plus a 10 percent rate of
return thereon. We affirm.
Z/ The court thus rejected Landgate's claim to taking damages
allegedly incurred before the permit denial and after the permit was
issued. Landgate does not appeal that aspect of the award.
8/ The Commission's expert testified the property lost 50 percent of
its value because of the permit denial.
77a
A. The Method of Calculation
Both parties claim trial court error with respect to the
damages award. The Commission raises three challenges: (1)
the court improperly based its calculations on the entire value
of the property; (2) it improperly used 10 percent as the market
rate of return; and (3) it awarded compensation for property
taxes that were based on an inaccurate assessed property value.
Landgate says the court should have used the fair rental value
method as the basis for the damages calculation, i.e., the award
should have been “based upon what the property would have
been worth to [Landgate] had [Landgate] developed the
property as ... planned..." Landgate's expert placed that value
at $744,155.
The Commission acknowledges that pertinent case law
reveals "there is io general formula for awarding damages for
a temporary taking, and that an owner's indemnity may be
measured in various ways depending on the circumstances..."
The Commission espouses as applicable here the formula set
forth in Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove (11th Cir 1987)
833 F.2d 267, 271. After acknowledging that the question to
be asked when calculating compensation for a taking is the
owner's loss, the Wheeler court formulated its approach. “In
the case of a temporary regulatory taking, the landowner’s loss
takes the form of an injury to the property's potential for
producing income or an expected profit. [Citation.] The
landowner’s compensable interest, therefore, is the return on
the portion of fair market value that is lost as a result of the
regulatory restriction. Accordingly, the landowner should be
awarded the market rate return computed over the period of
the temporary taking on the difference between the property's
fair market value without the regulatory restriction and its fair
market value with the restriction. [Citation.]" (/bid )
78a
We find Wheeler factually distinguishable. The property
was under contract between sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler, and
a developer/buyer. The buyer had made a $1,000 down
payment, had seen the project through an Alabama city's
planning commission approval, and had paid for and received
city building permits to construct an apartment complex, when
the city council enacted an ordinance banning construction of
apartment buildings. The Wheelers and the developer sued the
city. The sale apparently had fallen through. One of the issues
on appeal was the question of allocation of damages between
the plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs were, however, clearly interested
in the land only as a matter of investment, unlike the situation
in this case. The loss of potential income was pivotal to the
appellate court, which criticized the trial court's analysis
because it did not take into account the Wheelers’ "loss as
measured by the formula we set forth ... that is, the loss in
income-producing potential..." (Wheeler v. City of Pleasant
Grove, supra, 833 F.2d at p. 271.)
Moreover, the Wheeler plaintiffs did not raise a Fifth
Amendment takings claim. Instead, they brought suit under
federal civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985) and
alleged due process violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove (Sth Cir.
1981) 664 F.2d 99.) Thus, in contrast to this case, the Fifth
Amendment takings question of whether any economically
viable use of the land remained was not at issue.
Landgate, on the other hand, asks too much of the decision
in First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482
U.S. 304. First Lutheran was a remedies case. The case
began its appellate trek after the trial court granted the
County's motion to strike the amended complaint's allegations
that County enactment of an interim ordinance banning
construction or reconstruction in a mountain area flooded a
79a
year earlier had denied plaintiff all use of property it owned in
the flooded area. (The property was a camp improved with
buildings.) The high court held that the just compensation
clause of the Fifth Amendment requires government to pay for
temporary regulatory takings.
Landgate offers First Lutheran as support for its claim that
the rental value method should have been adopted by the trial
court in this case. While First Lutheran does not reject a
rental value method, and indeed discusses it in the context of
compensation awards for direct temporary takings of built-out
properties by the federal government during World War II, the
court used the World War II cases to make its point that
temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use
of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation. [Citation.]" (First Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles County, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 318.) As Landgate
acknowledges, however, the court refused to sanction any
specific method of calculating damages resulting from a
temporary regulatory taking.
Moreover, the cases cited in First Lutheran, and by
Landgate, involved developed property with an existing use, or
a readily calculable value based on an existing lease, not, as
here, a vacant parcel intended for development into a single
family residence. The state of the property in those cases
eliminated the need to speculate about value. In contrast,
Landgate's argument requires a court to assume the existence
of the house it intended to build. The trial court would have
been justified under the circumstances in rejecting the rental
value approach because it was too speculative.
Neither the Commission nor Landgate cites binding case
law or statute concerning the measure of damages for a
80a
temporary taking of an undeveloped residential parcel, and we
are not prepared to declare that a particular method of
calculation must be applied where such a taking occurs.
Choice of the proper method seems to depend on the particular
facts of a case. The trial court's choice of the "garden variety
appraisal" approach was appropriate in this case.”
The court was entitled to reject Landgate's expert's
conclusion that rental value was the appropriate measure and
to accept the Commission's expert's testimony that using a lost
rental value method on a proposed structure was illogical.
Similarly, the court was entitled to reject the investment-based
Wheeler approach, as Landgate's expert had done, and accept
the alternative suggested by the Commission's expert.
In the absence of controlling authority to the contrary and
in light of supporting expert testimony, we find nothing
irrational or unreasonable in the trial court's choice of which
method of calculation was appropriate in this case. On the
contrary, we conclude the court's choice was proper.
B. Rate of Return
The Commission contends the trial court should have used
the 5 percent rate of return suggested by its expert, rather than
the 10 percent offered by Landgate's expert. The Commission
claims the choice of 10 percent "was not supported by
substantial evidence because it was based on a mistaken
9/ The Commission's expert described his alternative as "a common
ordinary garden variety appraisal which is exactly what I would do if a
governmental agency were acquiring the property for two years for a
construction site."
8la
assumption about the rate of prejudgment interest in inverse
condemnation cases."
Landgate's expert testified in her deposition that she based
her 10 percent figure on "prejudgment interest." At trial she
testified that she based her choice of 10 percent on "a market
rate of interest which I assumed at 10 percent based upon
rental, based upon borrowing cost and also pre[judgment]
interest as well of 10 percent per year." As we understand this
evidence, the trial court would have been justified in
concluding that the expert's choice of a 10 percent rate of
return was not, as the Commission asserts, based solely on the
prejudgment interest rate. As a result, the Commission's
contention fails.
C. Property Tax Award
The trial court found that Landgate "expended $17,214 on
property taxes for the subject property over the two year
taking period." The Commission claims insufficient evidence
supported that finding, but takes issue only with the amount of
the award, arguing that since, according to its expert's
testimony, the assessed value of the property was $337,500,
not $675,000, the property tax for the period was only $8,648.
The critical question, however, was not a theoretical
assessment of the property's value, but the amount actually
incurred or paid in taxes during the relevant period. While
such an amount is easily established, for example, with
cancelled checks or a tax bill, the record does not show what
Landgate paid or incurred in taxes. Landgate asks us to take
judicial notice of a "Certificate of Payment" from the Los
Angeles County Tax Collector attached as an exhibit to its
respondent's brief. The Commission replies that the certificate
82a
shows neither the amount of taxes actually assessed nor the
amount actually paid. We decline Landgate's request for
judicial notice because it is pointless. The certificate deals only
with assessed value and does not establish the fact or amount
of the liability. There was no substantial evidence to support
the award of property taxes.
Il
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1036.E
On its cross-appeal, Landgate also contends the trial court
erred in denying its request for attorney fees incurred in the
writ of mandate proceeding.
After prevailing on its petition for writ of mandate in the
trial court, Landgate moved for attorney fees and costs under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1036 (hereinafter section
1036). The trial court denied the attorney fees request and
awarded $619.50 (of $63,647.18 requested) in costs. We
awarded Landgate its costs on appeal in its successful defense
of the trial court's ruling. The Commission ultimately paid
Landgate $1,434.01 for litigation costs arising from the
mandate proceedings.
Following the damages trial, Landgate sought just under
$403,000 in attorney fees ($266,100) and costs ($136,714.27)
for the entire action pursuant to section 1036, including costs
and $155,351 in attorney fees for the trial and appellate
defense in the writ of mandate proceeding. The trial court
denied fees and costs for the writ proceeding and awarded
Landgate $122,395.73 in attorney fees ($99,269) and costs
($23,126.73) incurred during the inverse condemnation
proceeding.
83a
At the time of the trial court's determinations, section 1036
provided, as pertinent: "In any inverse condemnation
proceeding brought for the taking of any interest in real
property, the court rendering judgment for the plaintiff by
awarding compensation for such taking, . . . , shall determine
and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment
., Such sum as will, in the opinion of the court ...,reimburse
such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and
expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees, actually incurred because of such
proceeding."'° (Emphasis added. )
Landgate's pleading in the trial court was titled, "Verified
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory
Relief, Taking Without Just Compensation and Deprivation of
Civil Rights." (Some caps. omitted.) Landgate moved to
"sever" the proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section
598, so that the first two causes of action, for writ of mandate
and declaratory relief, could be heard first, receiving calendar
preference, and the remaining causes of action be tried, or
otherwise addressed, in the normal course of events. ''
10/ Effective January 1, 1996, section 1036 was amended, as relevant,
to extend its application to "any appellate proceeding in which the
plaintiff prevails on any issue in that proceeding."
Ll/ = Code of Civil Procedure section 598 grants a court discretion
following notice and a hearing, upon written motion, timely made, to
order "that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the
trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case" "when the
convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and
efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby."
(continued...)
84a
Landgate says it was entitled to section 1036 costs and fees
for the entire proceeding, inciuding the writ of mandate
proceeding, because success on its claim that the Commission
had overstepped its jurisdiction and the consequent invalidation
of the permit denial was, under California case law, a
prerequisite to litigation of its right to damages.
The Commission does not dispute Landgate’s assertion that
resolution of the mandate claim was a prerequisite to pursuing
its inverse condemnation claim.'? Instead, the Commission
says that Landgate's argument is “irrelevant to the issue of
reimbursement under section 1036" because the statutory
language describes eligible expenses only as those "‘actually
incurred’ in the inverse condemnation proceeding" and
ll/ (...continued)
"Severance is, in effect, the ‘flip side’ of consolidation: i.e., it is the
procedure whereby the court may order separate trials of issues or
parties joined in a single action. [§] Where a separate trial is ordered on
the issue of liability, the procedure is commonly referred to as
‘bifurcation.’ But it is still a severance and governed by the Code
provisions applicable to severance. (The objective of bifurcation ... is
to avoid wasting time and money on the trial of damages issues if the
liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.) [Citation.]" (Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (Rutter 1996) Case
Management & Trial Setting, § [12:406], p. 12(1)-76.) Code of Civil
Procedure section 598 bifurcation also "prevents possible prejudice to
a defendant where a jury might look past liability to compensate a
plaintiff through sympathy for his or her damages." (Id. at § [12:414],
p. 12(1)-78.)
12/ Indeed, in the trial court, the Commission argued in support of its
demurrer to all seven causes of action that "Landgate must establish the
invalidity of the Commission's action before secking to recover on an
inverse condemnation claim." (Some caps. omitted.)
85a
Landgate's expenses in the mandate proceeding were not so
incurred. The statutory language actually provides that the
specified expenses are to be reimbursed if "actually incurred
because of [any inverse condemnation proceeding.]" (Code
Civ.Proc., § 1036, emphasis added.)
Since Landgate had to resolve the propriety of the permit
denial before it could litigate whether that denial constituted a
taking, entitling Landgate to just compensation, resolution of
the mandate claim was part of the inverse condemnation
proceeding and any statutory fees and costs incurred in
resolving the mandate claim were "actually incurred because
of" such proceeding.'* (Code Civ. Proc., § 1036.)
13/ Because we hold that section 1036 requires reimbursement of
attomey fees and costs incurred in the mandate litigation, we need not
address the Commission's assertion, predicated on a contrary
conclusion, that the trial court was required to apportion between the
mandate and inverse condemnation proceeding expenses. We note,
however, that none of the cases cited by the Commission addressed a
situation where, as here, a landowner succeeded on a mandate claim for
a taking by overregulation, a prerequisite to a later successful finding
that a taking had occurred and an award of damages therefor. Instead,
the cited cases required allocation of attorney fees or attorney fees and
costs (1) where the litigation involved inverse and direct condemnation,
on one hand, and nuisance-personal injury claims, on the other, in
which the appellate court remanded because it could not tell which
attorney fees had been awarded on which claims (Greater Westchester
Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86
[airplane overflights, landowners' lawsuits consolidated with City's
direct condemnation suits and bifurcated into condemnation and
nuisance trials]), (2) where a landowner's claims of nuisance,
negligence and trespass for flooding was bifurcated into liability and
damages segments (Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914), (3) where the appellate court
affirmed a judgment based on a jury's findings of liability and damages
(continued...)
86a
The Commission's claim that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the mandate expenses misses the mark.
Section 1036 provides that a court "shall determine and award
or allow" such sum as will, in its opinion reimburse the
plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) The section thus requires an award
(Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento (1995) 10 Cal.4th
368,390); the amount of the award is a matter of discretion.
On remand, Landgate will have to establish the reasonableness
of its fees and costs.
The Commission also asserts that Landgate's claim for fees
and costs in the mandate proceeding is barred under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We agree that
to the extent Landgate was awarded and paid non-section 1036
costs in the mandate proceeding, and did not challenge the
reasonableness thereof by filing a cross-appeal in the mandate
proceeding, that issue is resolved. However, in light of our
holding that Landgate is entitled to section 1036 expenses for
the mandate proceeding, on remand the trial court will review
Landgate's substantiation of those expenses to determine, in its
discretion, whether Landgate has sufficiently identified those
expenses and whether the amounts claimed are reasonable,
pursuant to the statute.
13/ (..continued)
in landowner's claims of inverse condemnation and nuisance for
flooding and reversed and remanded only because the trial court
improperly calculated the amount of prejudgment interest due on the
damages award (Jmperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist.
(1985) 167 Cal App.3d 263), or (4) where a city's direct condemnation
and landowner's inverse lawsuits were consolidated and then bifurcated
into liability and damages phases (Los Angeles v. Waller (1979) 90
Cal.App.3d 766 [appellate court addressed reasonableness of trial
court's section 1036 award)).
87a
We reject the Commission's implicit argument that
Landgate is barred from claiming section 1036 expenses
because it did not claim its entitlement to them on a cross-
appeal from the mandate action. At that point, had Landgate
made a section 1036 expenses claim to this court, we would
have denied its request as premature, because Landgate had
not yet shown a taking had occurred. Landgate has now
established the taking element and is entitled to section 1036
expenses in such reasonable amount as the trial court may find.
IV
Title 42 United States Code Section 1983
Landgate claims the trial court erred by sustaining the
Commission's demurrer to Landgate's cause of action for
violation of civil rights under Title 42, United States Code,
section 1983 (hereinafter section 1983), and compounded the
error by granting the Commission's motion to quash service on
individual commissioners and staff members after Landgate
amended its section 1983 claim to name them as individual
defendants.
In its seventh cause of action, Landgate claimed the
Commission's 1991 permit denial violated section 1983. The
claim was asserted against the Commission only. The trial
court sustained the Commission's demurrer on the ground that
the State and its agencies were not "persons" within the
meaning of section 1983 (Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of
California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642, 661). The section
1983 claim was dismissed February 24, 1991. The trial court's
action was proper because the State and its agencies are not
“persons” within the meaning of the federal civil rights act.
(Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58,
71; Pyne v. Meese (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 392, 405.)
On February 14, 1992, Landgate sought to amend its
complaint by naming individual Commission members and staff
as Does | through 17." On February 18, the trial court stayed
trial court proceedings until appellate proceedings were
concluded. On February 19, a Deputy Attorney General
informed Landgate's counsel the Attorney General was not
authorized to accept service for any individuals and that
Landgate would have to serve individual defendants
individually. The stay was lifted on April 23, 1993, and
Landgate resumed efforts to serve the individuals. Counsel for
the parties agreed that a motion to quash was the best way to
resolve the propriety of Landgate's move. The Commission
moved to quash on the ground that the claims against the
individuals were time barred. On October 5, the trial court
granted the motion.
We find no error in the trial court's grant of the
Commission's motion to quash. The limitations period in
California for asserting a claim under section 1983 is one year.
(City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 1293, 1297; Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa (9th
Cir. 1995) 49 F.3d 583, 585.) Landgate does not specify a date
on which its section 1983 cause of action accrued. Contrary
to its suggestion that the statute did not begin to run until "the
state court render[ed] a final decision" on its permit
application, the cause of action arises when the agency issues
a final decision ripe for review. (Norco Constr., Inc. v. King
County (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1143, 1146.) Thus,
Landgate's naming of individual defendants on February 14,
1992, occurred more than a year after the February 7, 1991,
14/ This amended complaint does not appear in the record.
89a
permit denial. Its section 1983-based cause of action was time
barred.
We reject Landgate's assertion that its claims against
individual commissioners and sta
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.