Opposition Brief — Wood v. City Council of Manassas

No. 98-47 * Se ee

In The ———__

Suprene Court of the United States

~

October 1997 Term

WILLIAM DOYLE WOOD,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANASSAS, VIRGINIA; BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY and THE

MANASSAS REGIONAL AIRPORT ADMINISTRATION

BOARD,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Virginia

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT BOARD

OF SUPERVISORS OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY

SHARON E. PANDAK

Prince William County Attorney

ROBERT B. DICKERSON

Assistant County Attorney

GIFFORD R. HAMPSHIRE*

Assistant County Attorney

One County Complex Court

Prince William, Virginia 22192

(703) 792-6620

Attorneys for Respondent

Board of Supervisors of

Prince William County

* Counsel of Record

147712 (800) 274-3321 * (800) 359-6859 AP tlate

ervices, inc.

A DIVISION OF COUNSEL PRESS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ

of Certiorari when the decisions of the Virginia courts rest on

adequate nonfederal grounds and Wood presents no argument

that the decisions of the Virginia courts conflict with the

decisions of this Court, another state court of last resort or a

United States court of appeals?

2. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ

of Certiorari concerning Wood’s claim against Prince William

County when his claim was dismissed consistent with the

precedents of this Court?

3. Should this Court exercise its discretion to grant a Writ

of Certiorari when the allegations of Wood’s Complaint

constituted merely preliminary activities that did not amount to

a taking of the property?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

(Questions Prenenwnd 5 i065 is oo sie ee i

Sate OF COMMON Bio ii ae ee ii

‘aes Of Cines oii eh ie ill

POSS OF PRINCE oe isc pod ee I

wien Of ie Cage. a cae Mee ee |

Reasons for Denying the Writ .................... 4

I. Wood's Claim Against The County Was Dismissed

On Independent And Adequate State Grounds.

Ee es Cee ee ey eo ne te 4

II. Wood's Petition Fails To Establish A Basis For

The Exercise Of This Court’s Discretionary

Jurisdiction Pursuant To Rule 10. .......... 4

III. Wood’s Taking Claim Is Premature Because He

Has Not Used Available State Inverse

Condemnation Procedures Nor Sought A Final

Decision Concerning The Applicability Of Local

Ordinances As Required By Williamson Regional

Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank. ........ 7

A. Wood Did Not Use Available Inverse

Condemnation Procedures. ............ 7

B. Virginia’s Inverse Condemnation Procedures

Were Adequate And Available To Wood. . 8

aaa ec aeeerrecaae

iii

Contents

Page

C. Wood Did Not Obtain A Final Decision On

The Applicability Of Ordinances To His

NS ei he ca che hbov'ey kaw a ¥ ha tee 8

CN EERE RSID Oe ae aT Oe NISS EE 9

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ............. 5, 6

Allen .. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) ............. 8

Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) ...... 4

County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments &

Townhouses, 214 Va. 587, 203 S.E. 2d 117 (1974)

eR wae es Le ak wl 6 w cee Ge web Cel dacs ay

Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) ..... 5, 6

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church vy. Los

ee, SU Std ee CAD ED cae 5 av cee sia'e ccs 5

_ Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003

SNS ah abe ea cy he ct as ce b'e eee 68 6

Northern Va. Law Sch. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp.

WU OD 6 oe yack ves'd ck ns vee cues 8

Ee

Contents

Page

Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478. 362 S.E. 2d 715 (1987)

CY EONAR CE Ln pop 4 hk pele CRMC aCS Lt ee Ce 7

Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n y,

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) ............ 7,8

Statutes Cited:

ee ge Bs Sepupeinrtieg mame uit ye AR Oe

VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187 .................. 7,8

VA Code Ann. Sections 15.1-550 through 554 ..... 1&4, 8

VA Code Ann. Sections 15.2-1245 through 1248 .... 4

Rule Cited:

Supreme Court Rule 10

l

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

This Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to Section

28 U.S.C. § 1257 because Wood’s failure to present a claim to

the Board was a jurisdictional matter that he has steadfastly

refused to comply with, thereby denying the courts jurisdiction

of his claim pursuant to state law.!

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William Doyle Wood (“Wood”) filed his Motion for

Judgment, Petition in Inverse Condemnation and for Declaratory

Judgment (“Motion for Judgment’) on approximately June 19,

1997. The Motion for Judgment asserted a monetary claim

against the County. On July 17, 1997 the County mailed a

copy of its Demurrer and Plea in Bar (“Demurrer”) to Wood.

The Demurrer asked the court to dismiss Wood’s suit because

of Wood’s failure to follow the requisite Statutory jurisdictional

procedures for bringing a monetary claim against the Board of

County Supervisors of Prince William County (“County”).

Section 15.1-554 VA Code Ann. provides that no action

Shall be maintained by any person against a county upon any

claim or demand until such person shall have first presented his

claim to the board of supervisors of such county. Moreover,

Virginia case law provides that the claims procedure is a

jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing any monetary claim against

the County in court.”

Instead of complying with those jurisdictional procedures,

Wood brought his case directly to the circuit court which

1. VA Code Ann. Section 15.1-554.

2. County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments &

Townhouses, 214 Va. 587, 203 S.E. 2d 117 (1974).

2

properly dismissed his Motion for Judgment because the court

lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to well established

Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Virginia found no error in

the circuit court’s interpretation of the Virginia statutory and

case law on that issue.

Contrary to Wood’s Statement of the Case, Wood did not

allege takings by conspiracy and physical invasion of his

property. Wood’s Motion for Judgment contained three counts;

specifically inverse condemnation, nuisance and trespass. The

Motion for Judgment did not contain counts for conspiracy

and physical invasion. On appeal to the Supreme Court of

Virginia, Wood again asserted that his claim was only in the

three counts of nuisance, trespass and taking by inverse

condemnation.

The Court also should note that the “low level overflights

of [Wood's] abutting property” referenced in Wood’s Statement

of the Case were not alleged in his Motion for Judgment.

Consequently, the circuit court had no such allegations before

it when rendering its decision.

The circuit court dismissed the case against the City of

Manassas (“City”) and the Manassas Regional Airport

Administration Board (“Airport Board”) because the Motion

for Judgment only alleged preliminary activities by the City

and Airport Board that did not constitute a cause of action upon

which relief could be granted The circuit court made no findings

of fact, and considered only those allegations set forth in the

documents before the court.

Although this matter was correctly dismissed as it pertains

to the County because of Wood’s refusal to comply with

Virginia's established procedures for seeking compensation from

counties, the Court also should note that the County’s Demurrer

Sr ae ee

asked that Wood’s Motion for Judgment be dismissed on several

other grounds. The circuit court did not rule expressly on those

arguments, presumably because of Wood’s failure to take the

steps necessary to provide the court with jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, even if the circuit court had not granted the

County’s jurisdictional demurrer, the record clearly indicates

that Wood’s suit would have been dismissed as it pertained to

the County for the same reason that the matter was dismissed as

it concerned the City. Additional factors set forth in the County’s

Demurrer also would have required the circuit court to dismiss

this frivolous suit. Specifically, the County does not own or

control the airport which is the center of this suit’, Wood lacks

standing*, the County has sovereign immunity, and Wood’s suit

is SO vague that it is impossible to comprehend what County

actions allegedly harmed him.

The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that there was

no reversible error by the circuit court after reviewing the record

of the case and considering all arguments concerning the appeal

petition.

3. As acknowledged in Wood’s Motion for Judgment, the City owns

and operates the airport. Further, the undisputed affidavit of the Mayor of

the City of Manassas, which was admitted into evidence by the circuit court,

provides that the County does not own or operate the airport. Rather, through

its ownership of the Airport and its appointment of Airport Board members,

the City controls the operations of the airport. The Airport Board was created

by the City of Manassas as an advisory body, and the members of the Airport

Board are appointed by the City.

4. The property formerly owned by Wood now belongs to another

private property owner, just as it did when Wood filed this suit.

4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I.

WOOD’S CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY WAS

DISMISSED ON INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE

STATE GROUNDS.

As set forth in Appendix A- 2 of Wood’s Petition, the circuit

court dismissed Wood’s suit against the County for his failure

to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of VA Code Ann.

Sections 15.1-550 through 554.5 This independent and

adequate state law ground for dismissing Wood’s suit against

the County should prevent this Court from disturbing the

judgment of the circuit court. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211

U.S. 45, 53 (1908).

Il.

WOOD’S PETITION FAILS TO ESTABLISH A BASIS

FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S

DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO

RULE 10. .

Rule 10 provides that the Court may exercise its discretion

to grant a petition for writ of certiorari if a state court of last

resort has decided an important federal question in a way that

conflicts with another state court of last resort or of a United

States court of appeals. Importantly, Wood cites no authority

that challenges, or conflicts with, the authority of Virginia courts

to dismiss matters when a party refuses to follow jurisdictional

requirements. However, Wood appears to contend that the state

5. Effective October 1, 1997, Sections 15.-550 through 554 were

recodified without substantive change as VA Code Ann. Sections 15.2-1245

through 1248.

MEN aS ae lt AE Bal

court decisions in this case are in conflict with this Court’s

decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los

Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). His assertion is without merit.

In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los

Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 312, n.6 and 313 (1987), the Court

did not decide the issue of whether any alleged actions would

deny the property owner all use of its property. Instead, the

Court accented the state court assumption that a taking had

occurred a * ocused on the issue of whether compensation

was required for a temporary taking.

Moreover, contrary to the assertions of Wood, neither

Danfor:h v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) nor Agins v.

Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) were eroded or overruled by

First Lutheran. Instead, while discussing Danforth and Agins,

the Court confirmed that the preliminary activities in each case

did not work a taking even though such activities may have

depreciated the value of property. First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987).

In Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939), the

Court found that legislation authorizing the Secretary of War to

initiate condemnation actions was a preliminary act. The Court

found it inappropriate to sanction a taking based on preliminary

activities because until an actual taking occurs, the condemnor

can discontinue or abandon his efforts. Jd. at 284. For example,

the Court also noted that legislation may be modified, or

appropriations may fail. /d. at 286. Moreover, the Court held

that a reduction or increase in the value of the property by

reason of legislation for, or the beginning or completion of, a

project are incidentals of ownership. /d. at 285. Wood has alleged

only similar preliminary activities in his Motion for Judgment

and the Virginia courts properly found that such preliminary

activities do not constitute a taking.

6

In Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court

confirmed a state court decision sustaining a locality’s demurrer

to a taking claim based upon preliminary activities of the locality.

The Court reaffirmed Danforth and rejected the property

owner's contention that a municipality’s good faith planning

activities, which do not result in successful prosecution of an

eminent domain claim, do not burden property so as to constitute

a taking. /d. 263, n.9. In the pending matter, Wood has merely

alleged preliminary activities undertaken by the City as it studied

various possibilities for the future of the airport. As correctly

determined by the Virginia courts, these preliminary activities

do not constitute a taking. As acknowledged by the Court in

Danforth and Agins, governmental bodies may choose not to

proceed with condemnations and do not have to compensate

landowners just because the government may have contemplated

taking such property.

Finally, this Court’s rulings in Danforth and Agins,

concerning preliminary activities, was not eviscerated by its

ruling in Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 |

(1992). The offending statute in Lucas, on its face, clearly

prohibited virtually all use of the subject property. In contrast,

the actions alleged by Wood are of a preliminary nature that

manifest the City’s careful review of its options.

>

Il.

WOOD’S TAKING CLAIM IS PREMATURE

BECAUSE HE HAS NOT USED AVAILABLE STATE

INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES NOR

SOUGHT A FINAL DECISION CONCERNING THE

APPLICABILITY OF LOCAL ORDINANCES AS

REQUIRED BY WILLIAMSON REGIONAL PLANNING

COMM’N v. HAMILTON BANK.

A. Wood Did Not Use Available Inverse Condemnation

Procedures.

Any taking claim is premature until the claimant shows

that the applicable inverse condemnation procedure is

unavailable or inadequate, and until the claimant has utilized

that procedure. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n

v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985). Virginia’s inverse

condemnation procedures were available to Wood as set forth

in VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187. A jurisdictional prerequisite

to those procedures is contained in VA Code Ann. Sections

15.-550 through 554. These statutes on their face, and as further

confirmed by Virginia case law®, require all claimants to formally

present their monetary claims to the governing body of a county

before granting the courts jurisdiction over such claims. Wood

chose not to comply with that jurisdictional requirement, even

after the County’s Demurrer highlighted the requirement that

he ignored when filing his suit against the County.

6. Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478, 481-82, 362 S.E. 2d 715, 717 (1987)

(“the language and context of [Sections 15.1-550 through 554] as well as

their arrangement and sequence demonstrates a legislative intent to provide

a comprehensive procedure for the presentation, auditing, challenge, defense,

and judicial review of monetary claims asserted against a county.”); and

County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments & Townhouses, 214

Va. 587 at 590-591, 203 S.E. 2d 117 at 120 (1974).

8

Wood refused to use the established procedures available

to assert his claim against the County. That refusal does not

open the door to the federal courts, and Wood cannot create a

federal claim by ignoring the available state process. Wood did

not use the available inverse condemnation procedures and,

consequently, his taking claim against the County is premature.

B. Virginia’s Inverse Condemnation Procedures Were

Adequate And Available To Wood.

Assuming arguendo that Wood actually used the available

inverse condemnation procedures, his claim would still be

premature because of an inability to show that Virginia’s inverse

condemnation procedures are inadequate.’ Whether or not a state

inverse condemnation remedy is “adequate” under Williamson

is not determined by whether the landowner ultimately prevails

or even by whether the state court judgment is sound. All that

is required is that the party be afforded the opportunity for a

full and fair hearing in state court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.

90, 101 (1980). The procedures under Sections 15.1-550 ef

seq. and 8.01-187 afforded Wood the opportunity for a full

and fair hearing in state court, but he elected not to follow

those procedures. His refusal to follow those procedures does

not show that those procedures are inadequate.

C. Wood Did Not Obtain A Final Decision On The

Applicability Of Ordinances To His Property.

Until a property owner obtains a final decision regarding

the application of contested ordinances to his property, its claim

is not ripe. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n yv.

Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). Wood nakedly

7. VA Code Ann. Section 8.01-187 has been held to constitute the

available state remedy for regulatory inverse condemnation claims. Northern

Va. Law Sch. v. City of Alexandria, 680 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1988).

9

alleges that he had plans for a mixed-use planned unit

development. However, Wood has not alleged that he was denied

permission to undertake such uses. In his Motion for Judgment,

Wood cryptically stated that the County “incorporated certain

derived information into the County’s policies and land use,

building and zoning of the County”. Wood’s pleadings are not

clear, but if he is alleging that some of these specific land use

and zoning policies of the County are restricting the use of his

property then it is incumbent upon him, or his successor, to

seek a final decision regarding the application of such regulations

to his use of his property. Having failed to seek such a decision,

a claim by him or his successor is not ripe.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

SHARON E. PANDAK

Prince William County Attorney

ROBERT B. DICKERSON

Assistant County Attorney

GIFFORD R. HAMPSHIRE*

Assistant County Attorney

One County Complex Court

Prince William, Virginia 22192

(703) 792-6620

Attorneys for Respondent

Board of Supervisors of

Prince William County

* Counsel of Record