Appendix — Robinson v. California (No. 06-1683)

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Number: 061683::1 22 2007

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Joseph Robinson,

PETITIONER

California, Plumas County, Jeff Cunan, Garrett Olney,

Ira Kaufman, William Pangman, and Gary McGowan,

RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI — DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT

COURT OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Joseph Robinson

10608-B Bethel Road

Frederick, MD 21702

josephrob@earthlink.net

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURT

OPINIONS AND ORDERS

United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

1. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RE Fe ic cin cance a reek a tes Sd Wcc's bens 4000 3

2. CRE <P ee oc ekda cic ccacxcnsse 12

United States Court of A Is

for the Ninth Circuit

1. MEMORANDUM - 2/28/07..................cc005: 14

2. CORR, © a ccascccce 17

(Denial of petition for rehearing en banc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joseph Robinson, CIV.S-04-1888 GEB DAD PS

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND

v. RECOMMENDATIONS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

This action Came before the court on October 14,

2005, for hearing on the motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the

alternative summary judgment, filed on behalf of

defendants Plumas County; Greg Hagwood; James

Reichle; Jeff Cunan; and Gary McGowan.[1] Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, appeared telephonically on his own

behalf at the hearing on the motion. Kristina M. Hall

appeared on behalf of defendants. For the reasons

explained below, the undersigned will recommend that

defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and

plaintiff's second amended complaint be dismissed

without further leave to amend. [2]

[1] These are the only remaining defendants in this action.

Defendants State of California; Ira Kaufman; William

Pangman; Garrett Olney; and Doug Prouty have been dismissed

by earlier order of the district court. (See Order filed January

21, 2005.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency

of the complaint. See North Star Int’l v. Arizona

Corp. Comm’n. 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9" Cir. 1983).

Dismissal of the complaint or of any claim within it

“ can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory

or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri_ v. Pacifica Police

Dept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9™ Cir. 1990); See also

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d

530, 534 (9" Cir. 1984).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the court accepts as true all material allegations

in the complaint and construes those allegations, as

well as the reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,73(1984);

Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9" Cir.

1989). In a case where the plaintiff is pro se, the court

has an obligation to construe the pleadings liberally.

Bretz_v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026. 1027 n.1 (9™ Cir.

1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply

essential elements of a claim that are nor pled. Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471, (9" Cir. 1992); Ivev v.

Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F2.2d 266,

268, (9" Cir. 1982).

[2] As indicated on the record during the hearing, the privilege

of appearing telephonically in this matter is revoked as to

plaintiff, who is now required to personally appear at any future

proceedings.

ANALYSIS

This action arises from Plaintiff Joseph Robinson’s

conviction, following a jury trial in the Plumas County

Municipal and Superior Court, and his imprisonment

for possession of marijuana for sale, transporting

marijuana and offering to sell, furnish or give away

marijuana, all while being armed with a firearm. In

this civil action, plaintiff is challenging thiose criminal

proceedings on a variety of purported constitutional

grounds. [3]

As a preliminary matter, in his written opposition and

at the hearing on the motion, plaintiff voluntarily

requested that defendants District Attorney James

Reichle and Detective Greg Hagwood be dismissed

from this action.Defendants do not object to Plaintiff's

request. Therefore, the court will recommend that

[3] The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that

plaintiff did not waive his right to the assistance of counsel at

his preliminary examination and was erroneously denied

appointed counsel at that preliminary examination. The

undersigned has taken judicial notice of the unpublished

decision of the Court of Appeal attached to plaintiff's request

for judicial notice. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201,

the court may take judicial notice of its own files and state court

records. See OR erry Airport Auth. v. City

of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9" Cir. 1998). “When a

court takes judicial notice of another court’s opinion, it may do

so ‘not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the

existence of the opinion, which is not subject to a reasonable

dispute over its authenticity.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 690 (9" Cir. 2001) (quoting Southern Cross Overseas

Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d

410, 426-27 (3™ Cir. 1999)).

defendants Reichle and Hagwood be dismissed from

this action pursuant to plaintiff's voluntary request.

See Fed. Rules Civ. P. 41(a)(2).

The remaining defendants are Plumas County and

deputy district attorneys Jeff Cunan and Gary

McGowan. Plaintiff's second amended complaint

continues to allege that defendants wrongfully

convicted plaintiff in violation of his constitutional

rights. However, as was the case with plaintiff's

amended complaint, it appears that the second

amended complaint does not contain a short and plain

statement as required by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(2X2). As plaintiff has been advised

previously, while the Federal Rules adopt a flexible

pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim with at least some

degree of plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community

Redev. Agency, 733 F2.d 646, 649 (9" Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff is required to allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in

that support plaintiff's claim. Id.

The second amended complaint, consisting of six

“counts”, fails to meet these requirements. The first

and second counts are for “Conspiracy to Wrongfully

convict and Imprison Plaintiff’ and for “Wrongful

Conviction and Imprisonment”, respectively. The

third and fourth counts are for “Conspiracy to Violate

Plaintiff's Right to be Free from Unreasonable Search

and Seizure” and “Violation of Plaintiff's Right to be

Secure Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure”,

respectively. The fifth and sixth counts are for

“Conspiracy to Vbiolate Plaintiffs Right to the

Assistance of Counsel”, and “Violation of Plaintiff's

Right to the Assistance of Counsel”, respectively.

However, the allegations under those headings are

conclusory and sprinkled with references to the denial

of “reasonable bail”, the denial of the right to “present

a defense to the jury at trial”, violations of “due

process rights”, and so on. Thus, just like polaintiff’s

earlier pleadings, the precise nature of the attempted

claims in the second amended complaint is unclear.

As such, the second amended complait’s allegations

do not amount to a short, plain statement of acclaim

showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(1).

The attachment of the 23-page, 611-paragraph,

“statement of facts” to plaintiffs second amended

complaint does not impact the undersigned’s analysis

in this regard. That statement is not “short and plain”.

The order dismissing the amended complaint with

leave to amend expressly admonished plaintiff that a

similar 24-page. 593-paragraph declaration did not

amount to a short and plain statement of a claim.

Further, like the rest of the second amended complaint,

the attached statement of facts confusingly contains

numerous allegations regarding defendants whom

were long ago dismissed from this case.

Even if the second amended complaint were found to

comply with the requirements of Rule 8, it also clearly

fails to state a cognizable claim. While the second

amended complaint makes reference to 42 U.S.C.

Section 1983 (second Am. Compl. At 2), like the

amended complaint it still does not allege how the

conduct complained of has resulted in a deprivation of

a right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution or federal law by a person acting under

color of state law. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120

(9" Cir. 1992); Lopez v. Dept. of Health /services, 939

F.2d 881, 883 (9" cir. 1991). (See Order filed June 30,

2005, at 5-6.) Additionally, as discussed at the hearing

on the motion, the conduct attributed to defendants

Cunan and McGowan by plaintiff occurred entirely in

the course of their appearances as prosecutors assigned

to plaintiffs case in the state court criminal

proceedings. The fact that the state trial court erred as

a matter of state law by allowing prosecutors to

participate in hearings with respect to appointment of

counsel, thereby prohibiting plaintiff from presenting a

confidential financial statement at those hearings, does

not effect that conclusion. Regardless of the state trial

court’s errors, the prosecutors were performing

functions “intimately associated with the judicial phase

of a criminal proceeding”. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430 (1976). A prosecutor is entitled to

absolute immunity from a civil action for damages

under Section 1983 in connection with such conduct.

See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Imbler,

424 US. at 431; KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110-

13 (9 Cir. 2004).

Finally, as to defendant Plumas County the second

amended complaint still fails to sufficiently allege a

claim of municipal liability arising from any policy of

Plumas County. [4] See Monell v. Department of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Gillette v.

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9" Cir. 1992). In

this regard, plaintiff has again failed to even allege in

conclusory fashion that the injury complained of was

the consequence “of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy....” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Each of these

deficiencies also existed in the amended complaint and

plaintiff has been unable to correct them.

The undersigned also recognizes that the second

amended complaint makes reference to 42 U.S.C.

Section 1985(3). (See Second Am. Compl. At 2.)

However, plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts

from which a conspiracy between defendants could be

inferred. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. Of Medicine,

363 F.3d 916, 929-30 (9™ Cir. 1989. Additionally,

plaintiff's failure to allege a section 1983 deprivation

of rights precludes a Section 1985 conspiracy claim

predicated on the same allegations. See Olsen, 363

F.3d at 930; Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d

[4] Further, it would appear that to the extent that plaintiff is

attempting to state a Monell claim against the County of

Plumas, it is based solely on the actions of District Attorney

Reichle. However, in electing to prosecute a district attorney in

California acts on behalf of the state, not the county. Weiner v.

San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1031 9" Cir 2000) (“We

conclude that a California district Attorney is a state officer

when deciding whether to prosecute’ an individual.”); see also

Pitts v. County of Kern, 17 Cal. 4" 340 (1998). State officials

are not subject to suit under section 1983. Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the

County of Plumas is not subject to liability under Section 1983

for the actions of District Attorney Reichle.

1175, 1182 (9" Cir. 1989). The second amended

complaint must be dismissed for these reasons as well.

Because of these deficiencies, plaintiff's second

amended complaint must be dismissed. Granting leave

to amend would be futile in light of the nature of the

deficiencies noted above. See Schmier v. United

States court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d

817, 824 (9" Cir. 2002). Therefore, the undersigned

will recommend that the second amended complaint be

dismissed without further leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that:

1. Defendants Reichle and Hagwood be dismissed

from this action pursuant to plaintiff's voluntary

request. See Fed R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2);

2. the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(bX6) be granted as to defendants Plumas

County, Jeff Cunan and Gary McGowan; and

3. Plaintiff's second amended complaint be dismissed

without further leave to amend.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to the case,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)\(1). Within ten (10) days after being served

with these findings and recommendations, any party

may file written objections with the court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

See Martinez v. Y1st, 951 F2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 21, 2005

Dale A. Drozd

United States Magistrate Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joseph Robinson, 2:04-1888 GEB DAD PS

Plaintiff,

ORDER

VS.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the above-entitled

action. The matter was referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to Local Rule72-302(c)(21).

On October 24, 2005, the magistrate judge filed

findings and recommendations herein which were

served on all parties and which contained notice to all

parties that any objections to the findings and

recommendations were to be filed within ten days.

Plaintiff has filed objections to the findings and

recommendations and defendants have filed a reply.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)(1XC) and Local Rule 72-304, this court

conducted a de novo revies of this case. Having

carefully reviewed the entire file, the court finds the

findings and recommendations to be supported by the

record and by proper analysis.

Accordingly, IT {S HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed October

24, 2005, are adopted in full;

2. Defendants Reichle and Hagwood are dismissed

from this action pursuant to plaintiff's voluntary

request. See Fed R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2);

3. the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b\6) is granted as to defendants Plumas

County, Jeff Cunan and Gary McGowan;

4. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed

without further leave to amend; and

5. The clerk is directed to close this case.

Dated: November 22, 2005

Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

United States District Judge

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH ROBINSON, No. 05-17291

Plaintiff-A»pellant, D.C. No. CV-04-01888-

GED/DAD

Vv.

MEMORANDUM*

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of California

Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 20, 2007**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not

prededent except as provided by 9" Cor. R. 36-3.

** Robinson’s request for oral argument is denied because the

panel unanimously finds tis case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, AND McKEOWN,

Circuit Judges.

Joseph Robinson appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment in favor of defendants in his 42

U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging California state

judicial and prosecutorial defendants violated his

constitutional rights during his criminal prosecution.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291.

we review de novo, Botello v. Gammic, 413 F.3d 971,

975 (9" cir. 2005Xabsolute immunity to public

officials); Nat’! Audobon Soc’y, Inc v. Davis, 307 F.3d

835, 846 (9" Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment

immunity), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s

claims against the state court judges, because they are

entitled to absolute immunity for judicial actions taken

within their jurisdiction. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd.

Of Me., 363 F.3d 916, 922-33 (9" Cir. 2004). Likewise

the district court properly concluded the prosecutors

were entitled to absolute immunity, because they were

performing functions “intimately associated with the

judicial phase” of Robinson’s criminal trial. See k7/ v.

Moor, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (9" Cir. 2004) (internal

Quotations and citations omitted).

The district court also properly failed to adequately

allege that the defendants conspired to violate his civil

rights, see Olsen,363 F.3d at 929, or that Plumas

County maintained a policy or custom of violating

civil rights, see Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342,

1346-47 (9" Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s

claims against the State of California as barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57

F.3d 828,831 (9" Cir. 1995).

Robinson’s remaining contentions lack merit.

AFFIRMED

FILED

February 28, 2007

Cathy A Catterson, Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH ROBINSON, No. 05-17291

Plaintiff-Appellant, § D.C. No. CV-04-01888-

GED/DAD

v. Eastern California

(Sacramento)

ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, and McKEOWN,

Circuit Judges

The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel

rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en banc. See Fed. R.

App. P. 35.

The petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en

banc are denied.

FILED

May 7, 2007

Cathy A Catterson, Clerk

U.S. Court of Appeals

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Joseph Robinson, hereby declare that I am over the age of 18

years and that I am a party to within entitled cause of action,

and, further, that on the date below I served the following

documents with this proof of service by post paid first-class

United States Mail in a sealed envelope.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI - LOWER COURT OPINIONS

To the following addresses:

State of California William Pangman

California Attorney General Sierra County Superior Court

P.O. Box 944255 P.O. Box 476

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Downieville, CA 95936

Garrett Olney Ira Kaufman

Piumas County Superior Court Plumas County Superior Court

520 Main Street; Room 104 520 Main Street; Room 304

Quincy, CA 95971 Quincy, CA, 95971

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant

Attention: Terrence Cassidy

P.O. Box 255428

Sacramento, CA 95865

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk Originals and

1 First Street, N.E. Forty Copies

Washington, DC 20543

Further, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct and that the aforementioned documents were

mailed as above described.

Date: June 15, 2007, Joseph Robinson

Jie bot

i SUF AMO Crurt iS

ae ie Pe Beith

4 061683" 29 29007

Number: y eee aces

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Joseph Robinson,

PETITIONER

California, Plumas County, Jeff Cunan, Garrett Olney,

Ira Kaufman, William Pangman, and Gary McGowan,

RESPONDENTS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI — STATEMENT OF FACTS THAT

SHOW INTENT, MALICE AND CONSPIRACY

Joseph Robinson

10608-B Bethel Road

Frederick, MD 21702

josephrob@earthlink.net

The following STATEMENT OF FACTS shows that

Respondents Olney, Kaufman, Pangman, Cunan and

McGowan violated Petitioner’s right to counsel to

wrongfully convict and imprison Petitioner, and that

they acted knowingly, willingly and maliciously with

agreement and intent to wrongfully convict and

imprison Petitioner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

. On Wednesday, October 27, 2000, Plumas County Sheriff

Len Gardner arrested Robinson.

On Friday, September 29, 2000 Plumas County District

Attorney James Reichle and Prosecutor Jeff Cunan filed a

complaint charging Robinson with cultivation and

possession-for-sale of marijuana.

Robinson appeared in court for a bond hearing.

Theiler was the judge.

Robinson requested a bond hearing.

Theiler set Robinson’s could bond hearing for Monday,

October 2 at 3 P.M.

Over the weekend, Robinson arranged for three prominent

local citizens to appear and testify for Robinson at the bond

hearing on Monday, October 2.

On Monday, October 2, 2000 Robinson appeared in court

for a bond hearing.

Robinson’s three witnesses made the 45-minute trip from

the Indian Valley to Quincy to testify for Robinson in the

scheduled 3 P.M. bond hearing.

10. Kaufman was the judge.

11. Cunan was the prosecutor.

12. Kaufman knew that Robinson was present in court for a 3

P.M. bond hearing.

13. Cunan knew that Robinson was present in court for a 3 P.M.

bond hearing.

14. Kaufman knew that Robinson’s three witnesses were

present and ready to testify for Robinson at the scheduled 3

P.M. bond hearing.

15. Cunan knew that Robinson’s three witnesses were present

and ready to testify for Robinson at the scheduled 3 P.M.

bond hearing.

16. Kaufman and Cunan delayed Robinson’s case until the end

of the day.

17. When Kaufman and Cunan finally called Robinson’s case,

Robinson informed Kaufman that Robinson was ready to

proceed with the scheduled bond hearing.

18. Kaufman informed Robinson that Kaufman had the duty to

assure that Robinson obtained all of Robinson’s rights and

that Robinson got a fair trial.

19. Kaufman said he would appoint an attorney for Robinson if

Robinson desired counsel.

20. Kaufman opined that it was advantageous for a criminal

defendant to have counsel sooner rather than later.

21. Kaufman informed Robinson that Kaufman had practiced as

a criminal defense lawyer for over twenty-five years in Los

Angeles, Plumas County and all over California and that

Kaufman had never seen any body represent themselves as

well as an attorney.

22. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had the right to

be represented by an attorney at all stages of the

proceedings.

23. Kaufman informed Robinson that if Robinson could not

afford an attorney Kaufman would appoint an attorney for

Robinson at no cost.

24. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had the right to

subpoena witnesses.

25. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had the right to

present evidence in court in defense of the charges.

26. Kaufman recommended that Robinson have an attorney.

27. Kaufman advised that Robinson have an attorney.

28. Cunan did not object to the foregoing opinion, information,

recommendation and advice.

29. Robinson informed Kaufman that Robinson wished the

assistance of counsel so that Robinson could retain control

over the policy decisions of the case.

30. Kaufman offered to appoint Attorney Dale Wood to

represent Robinson and make all of the policy decisions for

Robinson.

31. Robinson requested an immediate OR hearing.

32. Kaufman informed Robinson that appointing counsel for

Robinson was Kaufman’s first priority.

33. Robinson agreed to accept counsel if Robinson could

proceed with the OR hearing immediately.

34. Kaufman informed Robinson that Kaufman was not inclined

to release Robinson on his own recognizance.

35. Robinson repeated Robinson’s request for an OR hearing.

36. Kaufman provided Robinson with a copy of Robinson’s

OR/BAIL RECOMMENDATION REPORT.

37. Kaufman recessed Robinson’s case.

38. When Kaufman resumed Robinson’s case, Kaufman

inquired what Robinson wanted.

39. Robinson informed Kaufman that Robinson wished to

proceed with his OR hearing.

40. Kaufman inquired whether Robinson wished to proceed

with the OR hearing.

41. Robinson said, “Yes”.

42. Kaufman again offered to appoint an attorney to represent

Robinson.

43. Robinson again requested the assistance of counsel.

44. Kaufman refused to appoint an attorney to assist Robinson.

45. Kaufman offered to appoint an attorney to represent

Robinson.

46. Kaufman informed Robinson that Kaufman wanted to delay

Robinson’s OR hearing until Friday, October 6, 2004 so that

Wood could be present.

47. Robinson informed Kaufman that Robinson wished to

proceed with an OR hearing.

48. Kaufman inquired whether Robinsca wished Kaufman

to appoint counsel for Robinson.

49. Kaufman stated again that Wood would be in court on

Friday.

50. Kaufman opined that Wood is an excellent attorney.

51. Robinson agreed to accept Wood as the attorney of record if

Robinson could have an immediate OR hearing without

Wood.

52. Kaufman appointed Wood to be the attorney of record in

Robinson’s case and agreed that Robinson could proceed

with the scheduled OR hearing without Wood.

53. Cunan did not object.

54. Kaufman appointed Wood for Robinson without any

consideration of finances.

55. Cunan did not object.

56. Kaufman failed to contact Wood.

57. Kaufman failed to provide Robinson with a phone number

to contact Wood.

58. Kaufman again informed Robinson that Kaufman was

inclined to keep Robinson in jail and not release Robinson

on OR.

59. Robinson requested that Kaufman provide for Robinson the

information upon which Kaufman would base his decision.

60. Kaufman stated that Hagwood provided “information”.

61. Kaufman stated that he signed the search warrant for

Robinson’s home.

62. Kaufman stated that he possessed a copy of the affidavit in

support of that warrant.

63. Kaufman stated that Hagwood requested that Kaufman

deviate from the bail schedule and set Robinson’s bail at

$500,000 instead of the $50,000.

64. Kaufman stated that Hagwood provided more

“information”.

65. Robinson requested that Kaufman provide Hagwood’s

“information” for Robinson.

66. Kaufman stated that he did not have Hagwood’s

“information” with him.

67. Kaufman stated that Kaufman could not remember

Hagwood’s “information”.

68. Kaufman stated that Kaufman wanted to deal with the facts.

69. Robinson stated that Robinson knew of no fact that would

preclude his OR.

70. Kaufman said “Okay”.

71. Cunan said nothing.

72. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan of the three criteria

California Penal Code Section 1275 states as relevant to the

amount of bail.

73. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that, in the setting

of bail, there should be no suggestion of revenue for the

government or punishment to the defendant.

74. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that the primary

purpose of bail is to ensure a defendant will attend court

when his presence is required.

75. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that the bail shall

not be unreasonable.

76. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that Robinson had

a declaration that addressed the issues related to the setting

of bail.

77. Kaufman interrupted Robinson by requesting input from

Cunan.

78. Cunan stated that the $500,000 bail was “unreasonable”.

79. Cunan requested a $50,000 bail for Robinson.

80. Kaufman requested input from FP obinson.

81. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that any bail above

zero is unreasonable in Robinson’s case.

82. Kaufman disagreed with Robinson.

83. Kaufman did not state any fact or present any evidence to

show that any bail was required to secure Robinson’s

presence in court.

84. Cunan did not state any fact or present any evidence to show

that any bail was required to secure Robinson’s presence in

court.

85. Robinson requested that Kaufman withhold Kaufman’s

judgment until after Robinson’s bail hearing.

86. Kaufman stated: “We’re not going to hold a bail hearing

today.”

87. Robinson objected on the ground that Robinson’s three

witnesses had traveled from the Indian Valley (90 minute

round trip) and waited since about 2:30 PM to testify for

Robinson.

88. Kaufman refused to allow Robinson to have a bond hearing.

89. Robinson objected on the grounds that Robinson was

entitled to a bond hearing within five days of arrest. (This

was the end of the fifth day.)

90. Kaufman requested that Cunan respond.

91. Cunan stated: “We’re having the hearing today.”

92. Robinson said: “Thank you.”

93. Kaufman said: “We’re not going through the whole hearing

today.”

94. Cunan said: “The hearing has begun.”

95. Kaufman said: “The hearing has begun.”

96. Kaufman immediately ended the hearing by deciding to set

bail at $50,000 and setting Robinson’s case off until Friday,

October 6, 2000, at 1000 hours.

97. Robinson requested an opportunity to be heard.

98. Kaufman refused to allow Robinson to have an opportunity

to be heard.

99. Robinson requested the opportunity to make an objection on

the record.

100. Kaufman allowed Robinson to state an objection for the

record.

101. Robinson objected to Kaufman and Cunan that

Robinson has not had an OR/bond hearing.

102. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that, at

Robinson’s previous court appearance, when Robinson

requested a bond hearing, Judge Theiler had scheduled

Robinson’s bond hearing for today.

103. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that Robinson

was prepared to proceed with Robinson’s bond hearing.

104. Kaufman again refused to allow Robinson to have a

bond hearing.

105. Robinson accused Kaufman and Cunan of being

punitive.

106. Kaufman said: “It’s not punitive”.

107. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that remaining

in jail without a bond hearing was hard on Robinson and

that there was no reason for it.

108. Kaufman dropped Robinson’s case and called another

matter.

109. When Kaufman resumed Robinson’s case, Kaufman

stated that Kaufman knew Robinson’s witnesses.

110. Kaufman requested that Robinson’s three witnesses

agree to return and continued Robinson’s bond hearing

until 11 A.M. the next day.

111. Kearns and Tucker agreed to return at 1] A.M. the next

day.

112. Hamblin stated that he had a prior engagement.

113. Kaufman and Cunan stipulated that Hamblin could

appear by letter.

114. Robinson requested that Kaufman produce Robinson’s

accuser to testify for Robinson.

115. Kaufman refused to produce Robinson’s accuser.

116. Wood refused the appointment.

117. Wood failed to visit Robinson in jail.

118. Wood failed to contact Robinson.

119. On October 3, 2000 Robinson appeared in court for his

bond hearing.

120. Kaufman was the judge.

121. Cunan was the prosecutor.

122. Two of Robinson’s witnesses (Kearns, Tucker) were

present.

123. Robinson’s third witness (Hamblin) was accounted for

through letter.

124. Wood was neither present nor accounted for.

125. Cunan failed to inform Robinson that Wood had refused

the appointment.

126. Kaufman failed to inform Robinson that Wood had

refused the appointment.

127. Wood failed to inform Robinson that Wood had refused

the appointment.

128. No body in Plumas County ever informed Robinson that

Wood had refused the appointment.

129. Robinson discovered that Wood refused the appointment

in a 2004 telephone conversation with a person who

answered Wood’s business phone: (530) 587-3450.

130. Cunan objected to proceeding with Robinson’s bond

hearing without Attorney of Record Wood.

131. Kaufman agreed with Cunan that Robinson could not

have a bond hearing without Wood.

132. The true purpose of Kaufman and Cunan for appointing

Wood to represent Robinson as the attorney of record was to

prevent Robinson from having a bond hearing.

133. Robinson qualified for an own recognizance release.

134. Robinson required a fair and immediate bond hearing to

obtain a release on his OR.

135. Robinson dismissed Wood so that Robinson could have

a bond hearing immediately.

136. Kaufman advised Robinson to have the assisiance of

counsel in this type of case.

137. Kaufman said that it is a very serious and complex case.

138. Kaufman said that it might be a “case of first impression

in the state of California”.

139. Kaufman said there might be some “interesting and

articulate and intricate legal issues.”

140. Kaufman said that Robinson would benefit from the

assistance of counsel.

141. Robinson informed Kaufman and Cunan that Robinson

would like to have the assistance of counsel.

142. Robinson said that Robinson did not want an attorney to

be appointed as attorney of record.

143. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had to

“meet certain financial requirements” to qualify for

appointed counsel.

144. Kaufman stated that Robinson had not filled out a

financial declaration.

145. Kaufman stated that, because Robinson was in custody,

Kaufman assumed Robinson could not afford to pay for

counsel.

146. Kaufman inquired whether Robinson wanted counsel or

wanted to represent himself.

147. Robinson responded: “I always told you I wanted to

represent my self.”

148. Kaufman said: “I know.”

149. Kaufman admitted that he knew that Robinson was

really interested in an OR hearing.

150. Kaufman admitted that he had talked Robinson into an

attorney the day before.

151. Kaufman said: “Let’s proceed.”

152. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had “certain

Constitutional rights”.

153. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had the

right to be represented by an attorney at all the stages of the

proceedings.

154. Kaufman informed Robinson that, if Robinson could not

afford to hire an attorney, the court would appoint an

attorney for Robinson at no cost.

155. Kaufman informed Robinson that Robinson had the

right to present evidence in court in defense of the charges.

156. Kaufman warned Robinson of the dangers of proceeding

with out an attorney.

157, Kaufman inquired: “So, you want to represent yourself,

Mr. Robinson?”

158. Though Robinson had already informed Kaufman more

than once that Robinson would like to retain control over

the case and have the assistance of counsel, Robinson

wished an immediate bond hearing, so Robinson responded:

“Yes”.

159. Kaufman and Cunan finally allowed Robinson to

proceed with Robinson’s bond hearing.

160. Jim Hamblin’s letter was entered into evidence.

161. Hamlin is Chief of the Indian Valley Fire and Rescue.

162. Robinson was a member of the volunteer fire

department.

163. Hamblin’s letter was very favorable to Robinson’s

reliability and character.

164. Delma Kearns was Robinson’s real estate agent.

165. Delma Kearns testified that she has personal knowledge

that Robinson is reliable and that Robinson has a reputation

for reliability, honesty and integrity.

166. Ken Tucker owns and manages the grocery store in

Greenville, California and is an officer of the Indian Valley

Fire and Rescue.

167. Ken Tucker testified that Robinson has a reputation for

honesty, inteprity, dependability and reliability.

168. Kaufman stated that: “The reason for the point count

system is to try to bring more consistency into the system so

that someone who faces the same type of charge with the

same type of record gets the same bail/OR.”

169. Robinson testified to facts that showed that Robinson’s

marijuana was for a lawful medical purpose.

170. Robinson testified to facts that showed that Robinson is

not a flight risk.

171. Robinson testified to facts that showed that Robinson

had no significant criminal history.

172. Robinson testified to facts that showed that Robinson

has a history of numerous timely California court

appearances without failure to appear.

173. Kaufman and Cunan knew that, according to the

guidelines used by Plumas County, Robinson qualified for

an unconditional release on Robinson’s own recognizance.

174. Cunan presented no evidence that Robinson was a flight

risk.

175. Cunan presented no evidence that Robinson was a

danger to the community.

176. Cunan presented no evidence that justified any bond.

177. Cunan presented no evidence whatsoever.

178. Cunan requested that Kaufman charge Robinson a bail

to get out of jail.

179. Cunan did not state any lawful reason for the bail.

180. Kaufman and Cunan agreed to charge Robinson with a

$50,000 bail to get out of jail.

181. Kaufman failed to state the facts upon which Kaufman

relied to make the determination that Robinson did not

qualify for an OR release.

182. Kaufman failed to state the facts upon which Kaufman

relied to make the determination that $50,000 was a

reasonable bail. |

183. Kaufman failed to state any lawful reason for his refusal

to release Robinson on OR.

184. Kaufman and Cunan violated Robinson’s right to a

reasonable bail to further their conspiracy to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson.

185. Robinson’s family loaned Robinson $50,000 for the

unreasonable bond.

186. Kaufman knew that Robinson’s family was the source of

Robinson’s bond.

187. Cunan knew that Robinson’s family was the source of

Robinson’s bond.

188. On October 12, 2000, the Plumas County Sheriff

released Robinson from jail on a $50,000 bond.

189. After release from jail, when Robinson converted one of

his three properties at a loss, after paying debts related to the

other two properties, paying debts caused by the recent raid

of Robinson’s home, purchasing a vehicle necessary for

Robinson to appear in court and paying miscellaneous other

personal debts and obligations, Robinson had only enough

money left for the bare necessities of life.

Fs,

190. All of the attorneys with whom Robinson spoke

demanded tens of thousands of dollars in advance to take

Robinson’s case.

191. Some estimates ran over $100,000 through trial.

192. Robinson could not afford to pay for the assistance of

counsel.

193. With $50,000 of family money tied up in the

unreasonable bond, Robinson’s family was unwilling to

loan Robinson more money for an attorney.

194. Robinson placed his other two properties on the market

to pay for an attorney.

195. On October 18, 2000 Robinson met with District

Attorney Reichle and Prosecutor Cunan in the office of the

district attorney.

196. Robinson complained to Reichle and Cunan that

Hagwood lied to obtain the search warrant.

197. Cunan said that he did not care whether Hagwood lied to

obtain the warrant.

198. Robinson informed Reichle and Cunan that their

inequity would cause a lawsuit.

199. Reichle and Cunan laughed and said that they could do

whatever they want because they were immune from civil

suit.

200. That same day, Robinson memorialized the meeting in a

letter to Reichle.

201. In that letter Robinson stated that Reichle and Cunan

had stipulated to the following:

a) Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for

medical purposes.

b) Most Californians that have the right to obtain and use

marijuana for medical purposes are not able to produce

marijuana and do not have a caretaker that is able to produce

marijuana.

c) Most Californians that have the right to obtain and use

marijuana for a medical purpose must purchase marijuana to

obtain marijuana.

202. In that letter Robinson stated that Reichle and Cunan

took the position that it was lawful for Californians with

physician recommendation to purchase marijuana for

medical purposes, but it is a felony for any body to provide

medical marijuana for people who have the lawful right to

obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to

California statute and physician recommendation.

203. In that letter Robinson stated that, when Robinson

informed Reichle and Cunan that their inequity would cause

a lawsuit, Reichle and Cunan laughed, and Cunan said that

he and Reichle were immune from judgment.

204. In Cunan’s October 24, 2000 response to Robinson’s

October 18, 2000 letter, Cunan admits that he did laugh.

205. On October 25, 2000 California Medical Research

Center Executive Dale Schafer and Physician Marion Fry

signed declarations that showed Robinson intended to

distribute his excess marijuana for a medical purpose.

206. On October 26, 2000, Robinson filed a written motion

for the appointment of counsel, asserting that he could not

afford an attorney.

207. On November 20, 2000, Robinson filed judicial notice

of the law and facts that justified his cultivation for

distribution of marijuana for a medical purpose.

208. On November 22, 2000 Robinson appeared in court to

move the court to appoint counsel for Robinson.

209. Garrett Olney was the judge.

210. Gary McGowan was the prosecutor.

211. Olney knew that a defendant in a criminal case had the

Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.

212. Olney knew that Robinson was a defendant in a criminal

case.

213. McGowan knew that a defendant in a criminal case had

the Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.

214. McGowan knew that Robinson was a defendant in a

criminal case.

215. Before Robinson had an opportunity to speak,

McGowan requested that Olney refuse to appoint counsel to

assist Robinson.

216. McGowan said that he did not believe that Robinson

would financially qualify for a court appointed attorney.

217. A defendant’s financial declaration is confidential, not

open to the prosecutor.

218. A defendant’s hearing to determine financial eligibility

for appointed counsel is confidential, not open to the

prosecutor.

219. Olney knew that Robinson’s financial declaration and

hearing were confidential, not open to the prosecutor.

220. McGowan knew that Robinson’s financial declaration

and hearing were confidential, not open to the prosecutor.

221. Olney knew that Robinson had a right to a private

hearing without McGowan.

222. McGowan knew that Robinson had a right to a private

hearing without McGowan.

223. Olney allowed McGowan to remain in the courtroom

during the hearing upon the issue of Robinson’s financial

eligibility for appointed counsel.

224. McGowan chose to remain in the courtroom during the

hearing upon the issue of Robinson’s financial eligibility for

appointed counsel.

225. McGowan remained in the courtroom to conspire with

Olney to violate Robinson’s right to counsel.

226. McGowan was not in his prosecutorial capacity when he

remained in the courtroom.

227. McGowan was in his individual capacity when he took

part against Robinson in the hearing on Robinson’s financial

eligibility for appointed counsel.

228. Olney and McGowan agreed to violate Robinson’s right

to the assistance of counsel.

229. Olney asked McGowan for input.

230. McGowan participated in the hearing on Robinson’s

financial eligibility for appointed counsel.

231. McGowan argued that Robinson did not ony

qualify for appointed counsel.

232. McGowan did not present any evidence.

233. Olney required Robinson to complete the confidential

financial declaration in front of McGowan.

234. Olney interrogated Robinson upon financial matters in

front of McGowan.

235. Robinson informed Olney and McGowan that Robinson

could not afford an attorney.

236. Robinson presented plausible explanation and argument

relating to private counsel’s lack of interest in the case.

237. According to California law, the test of indigence is

whether a private attorney would be interested in

representing a defendant considering the defendant’s present

economic circumstances.

238. Olney knew the foregoing test of indigence.

239. McGowan knew the foregoing test of indigence.

240. The evidence before Olney and McGowan clearly

showed that Robinson met the foregoing test of indigence.

241. No evidence was presented that showed Robinson did

not meet the foregoing test of indigence.

242. Olney knew that Robinson met the foregoing test of

indigence.

243. McGowan knew that Robinson met the foregoing test of

indigence.

244. The lawful test for indigence is not whether a defendant

is a pauper or on public assistance.

245. Olney knew that the lawful test of indigence was not

whether a defendant is a pauper or on public assistance.

246. McGowan knew that the lawful test of indigence was

not whether a defendant is a pauper or on public assistance.

247. Olney decided that Robinson had to be at the level of

welfare to qualify for appointed counsel.

248. McGowan agreed with Olney that Robinson had to be at

the level of welfare to qualify for appointed counsel.

249. The ruling agreed upon by Olney and McGowan, that

Robinson had to be at the level of welfare to qualify for

appointed counsel, is without support in California law.

250. The law provides for proceedings to recoup the cost of

counsel if a defendant does have the ability to pay for part

or all of the costs.

251. Olney knew that the law provides for proceedings to

recoup the cost of counsel i* a defendant does have the

ability to pay part or all of the costs of counsel.

252. McGowan knew that the law provides for proceedings to

recoup the cost of counsel if a defendant does have the

ability to pay part or all of the costs of counsel.

253. Olney knew that, since Gideon v Wainwright in 1963, a

defendant in a felony criminal case in state court had the

absolute right to the assistance of counsel.

254. McGowan knew that, since Gideon v Wainwright in

1963, a defendant in a felony criminal case in state court

had the absolute right to the assistance of counsel.

255. Olney and McGowan agreed not to appoint counsel for

Robinson.

256. Olney knew that deprivation of the assistance of counsel

would be bad for Robinson.

257. McGowan knew that deprivation of the assistance of

counsel would be bad for Robinson.

258. Olney and McGowan refused to appoint an attorney to

assist Robinson to further their conspiracy to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson

259. On November 30, 2000 Robinson again filed a written

motion requesting the assistance of counsel.

260. In this motion, Robinson objected to Olney’s refusal to

appoint counsel to assist Robinson.

261. In this motion, Robinson stated that he had no money to

pay an attorney.

262. Robinson also filed a motion for O.R. release

263. On December 7, 2000 Robinson appeared in court for a

preliminary hearing.

264. William Pangman was the judge.

265. Cunan was the prosecutor.

266. Pangman informed Robinson that Robinson had the

Constitutional right to an attomey, and that, if Robinson

could not afford an attorney, an attorney would be appointed

for Robinson, and that, if it were ultimately determined that

Robinson could afford some or all of the costs of legal

counsel, then Robinson would have to reimburse the County

of Plumas.

267. Cunan heard Pangman infomm Robinson of his

Constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.

268. Robinson informed Pangman and Cunan that Robinson

could not afford an attorney.

269. Robinson requested that Pangman appoint an attorney

for Robinson.

270. Pangman knew that Robinson had the Constitutional

right to the assistance of counsel.

271. Cunan knew that Robinson had the Constitutional right

to the assistance of counsel.

272. Pangman required that Robinson complete a financial

statement to qualify for appointed counsel.

273. Pangman knew that Robinson’s financial declaration

was confidential, not open to the prosecutor.

274. Cunan knew that Robinson’s financial declaration was

confidential, not open to the prosecutor.

275. Pangman allowed Cunan to remain in the courtroom

when Pangman required Robinson to complete the financial

declaration to qualify for the appointment of counsel.

276. Cunan chose to remain in the courtroom when Pangman

required Robinson to complete a financial declaration to

qualify for appointment of counsel.

277. Cunan remained in the courtroom to conspire with

Pangman to violate Robinson’s right to the assistance of

counsel.

278. Cunan was not in his prosecutorial capacity when he

remained in the courtroom.

279. Cunan was acting in his individual capacity when he

took part against Robinson in the hearing to determine

Robinson’s financial eligibility for appointed counsel.

280. Pangman asked Cunan for input.

281. Cunan argued against the appointment of counsel for

Robinson.

282. Because Cunan was present, Robinson wrote N/A

throughout the financial statement.

283. Robinson reiterated that he had no cash.

284. Robinson informed Pangman and Cunan that all the trial

attorneys Robinson contacted wanted money in advance to

take the case.

285. Robinson informed Pangman that no attorney was

willing to take a lien against his property.

286. Cunan presented no evidence to show that Robinson

could afford an attorney.

287. Pangman and Cunan agreed not to appoint an attorney

for Robinson.

288. After the preliminary hearing began, Robinson

continued to request a court appointed attorney.

289. Pangman and Cunan refused to provide an attorney to

assist Robinson to further their conspiracy to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson.

290. On December 14, 2000 before the second day of the

preliminary hearing begun on December 7 and continued to

December 14, Robinson filed a notice of agenda in which

the first item was the appointment of an attorney to assist

Robinson.

pees

291. California Penal Code Section 866.5 states that the

defendant in a criminal case may not be examined at the

preliminary hearing unless the defendant is represented by

counsel or has waived his right to counsel.

292. On December 14, 2000 Robinson appeared in court for

the second day of preliminary hearing.

293. Pangman was the judge.

294. Cunan was the prosecutor.

295. Pangman knew California Penal Code Section 866.5

states that the defendant in a criminal case may not be

examined at the preliminary hearing unless the defendant is

represented by counsel or has waived his right to counsel.

296. Cunan knew California Penal Code Section 866.5 states

that the defendant in a criminal case may not be examined at

the preliminary hearing unless the defendant is represented

by counsel or has waived his right to counsel.

297. Pangman knew that Robinson did not have an attomey.

298. Cunan knew that Robinson did not have an attorney.

299. Pangman knew that Robinson had requested

appointment of an attorney.

300. Cunan knew that Robinson had requested appointment

of an attorney.

301. Pangman knew that Robinson had not waived his right

to the assistance of counsel.

302. Cunan knew that Robison had not waived his right to the

assistance of counsel.

303. Pangman and Cunan agreed to examine Robinson at the

preliminary hearing without counsel or a waiver of counsel,

in direct, knowing, willing, and malicious violation of

California Penal Code Section 866.5.

304. Robinson testified that he began growing marijuana for

his personal use after the passage of the Compassionate Use

Act in 1996, that, in 2000, he obtained written approval

from a physician to use marijuana, that he was growing

more marijuana than he and his coworkers could use, and

that he planned to sell the excess marijuana through the

California Medical Research Center to provide marijuana

for patients who could not grow it for themselves.

305. Pangman and Cunan examined Robinson at the

preliminary hearing without an attorney to further their

conspiracy to wrongfully convict and imprison Robinson.

306. The Plumas County Court lost jurisdiction over the

person of Robinson when Cunan and Pangman failed and

refused to complete the court for the preliminary hearing.

307. Kaufman, Pangman, Olney, Reichle, Cunan and Prouty

knew that Cunan and Pangman failed to complete the court

for the preliminary hearing.

308. Kaufman, Pangman, Olney, Reichle, Cunan and Prouty

knew that failing to complete the court for the preliminary

hearing deprived the court of jurisdiction over the person of

Robinson.

309. Kaufman, Pangman, Olney and Cunan proceeded

against Robinson without jurisdiction over the person of

Robinson to further their conspiracy to wrongfully convict

and imprison Robinson.

310. On December 15, 2000 Reichle and Cunan filed a

complaint charging Robinson with cultivation, possession

for sale, transportation and offer for sale of marijuana.

311. On December 20, 2000 Robinson appeared in court to

request appointment of counsel and for a bond hearing.

312. Kaufman was the judge.

313. Cunan was the prosecutor.

314. Robixson moved the court to appoint counsel for

Robinson.

315. Kaufman knew that Robinson had the Constitutional

right to the assistance of counsel.

316. Cunan knew that Robinson had the Constitutional right

to the assistance of counsel.

317. Kaufman knew that violation of Robinson’s right to the

assistance of counsel would be bad for Robinson.

318. Cunan knew that violation of Robinson’s right to the

assistance of counsel would be bad for Robinson.

319. Kaufman knew that Robinson had the right to make a

confidential financial declaration not open to the prosecutor.

320. Cunan knew that Robinson had the right to make a

confidential financial declaration not open to the prosecutor.

321. Kaufman allowed Cunan to remain in the courtroom.

322. Cunan chose to remain in the courtroom.

323. Cunan remained in the courtroom to conspire with

Kaufman to violate Robinson’s right to the assistance of

counsel.

324. Cunan was not in his prosecutorial capacity when he

remained in the courtroom.

325. Cunan was in his individual capacity when he remained

in the courtroom.

326. Kaufman prejudicially indicated that he would refuse to

appoint counsel for Robinson.

327. Kaufman stated two reasons for his prejudicial refusal to

appoint counsel for Robinson.

328. Kaufman stated that he intended to refuse to appoint

counsel for Robinson because Kaufman was not sure

whether Robinson was truly indigent.

329. Kaufman said that the more important reason for his

refusal to appoint counsel for Robinson was that Robinson

was running a competent case, and Robinson was competent

to continue, and Kaufman did not think an attorney would

add anything, and would, in fact, be a detriment to

Robinson.

330. There is no support in California law for Kaufman’s

refusal to appoint counsel because Robinson was competent

to continue and Kaufman did not think an attorney would

add anything, and would, in fact, be a detriment.

331. Kaufman offered Robinson an opportunity to be heard.

332. Robinson reiterated his request for the appointment of

counsel.

333. Robinson began to state his reasons for that request.

334. Cunan interrupted Robinson.

335. Kaufman allowed Cunan to interrupt Robinson.

336. Cunan argued against the appointment of counsel for

Robinson for financial reasons.

337. Kaufman and Cunan agreed that Robinson could have as

many attorneys as Robinson wanted in whatever capacity

Robinson wanted, but that Robinson = would have to pay

for the assistance of counsel.

338. Kaufman and Cunan had no evidence that Robinson

could afford to pay for an attorney.

339. Kaufman and Cunan agreed to violate Robinson’s nght

to the assistance of counsel.

340. Robinson moved the court for a release upon Robinson’s

own recognizance.

341. Plumas County, California uses an O.R./BAIL

REDUCTION REPORT to determine whether a defendant

qualifies for a release on his own recognizance.

342. The recommendation guidelines state that, to qualify for

a regular own recognizance release, a defendant must:

a. be booked on a single criminal case and have no pending

criminal cases;

b. score at least 7 points on the point scale;

c. have a verified local address;

d. not be booked on a Failure to appear or have failed to appear

within the past year.

e. receive a positive recommendation from at least one

reference and must have no __ negative comments regarding

reliability from either a reference or a probation officer.

Kaufman knew that Plumas County uses the OR/BAIL

REDUCTION REPORT to determine whether a defendant

qualifies for release on his own recognizance.

343. Cunan knew that Plumas County uses the OR/BAIL

REDUCTION REPORT to determine whether a defendant

qualifies for release on his own recognizance.

344. Kaufman knew the aforementioned recommendation

guidelines for a defendant to qualify for an OR release.

345. Cunan knew the aforementioned recommendation

guidelines for a defendant to qualify for an OR release.

346. Cunan and Kaufman stipulated that Robinson scored 15

on the point scale of the OR/BAILREDUCTION REPORT.

347. Cunan and Kaufman knew that Robinson:

a) was booked on a single criminal case and had no pending

criminal cases;

b) scored 15 points on the point scale;

c) had a verified local address;

d) was never booked on a failure to appear and had never failed

to appear;

e) received a positive reference related to reliability from three

prominent citizens;

f) received no negative recommendations.

348. Cunan and Kaufman had no evidence that Robinson was

a flight risk and was not a danger to the community.

349. Kaufman knew that Robinson qualified for an own

recognizance release.

350. Cunan knew that Robinson qualified for an own

recognizance release.

351. Cunan and Kaufman agreed to refuse to release

Robinson on Robinson’s own recognizance.

352. Cuanan and Kaufman did not state any reason for their

agreement to continue to charge Robinson with a financial

bond.

353. Kaufman and Cunan charged Robinson an unreasonable

bond of $15,000 to further their conspiracy to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson.

354. $35,000 was returned to Robinson’s family.

355. In early 2001, Robinson’s family retained Sacramento

Attorney John Duree with a payment of about $12,000.

356. Duree agreed to present Robinson’s justification defense

to the jury.

357. Cunan, Kaufman and Olney knew Duree traveled to

Quincy from Sacramento.

358. Cunan, Kaufman and Olney required Duree to make

unnecessary trips to Quincy to render Duree ineffective by

squandering Robinson’s limited funds.

359. Cunan did not want Duree to present Robinson’s

justification defense to the jury.

360. Cunan did not want the jury to know the wording of the

Compassionate Use Act.

361. On April 9, 2001 Cunan filed a motion to prevent Duree

from presenting Robinson’s justification defense to the jury.

362. Cunan also moved the court to exclude a Proposition

215 defense.

363. Duree filed a motion to present evidence on a

justification defense.

364. Duree’s motion was predicated upon a defendant’s nght

to present a defense to a jury.

365. Duree’s motion was based upon the affidavits of Marion

Fry, M.D., medical marijuana expert Dale Shafer and

Robinson.

366. Duree’s motion presented conclusive evidence for all six

factual elements of a justification defense.

367. Cunan’s motion was predicated upon Cunan’s

conspiracy with Olney to wrongfully convict and imprison

Robinson.

368. Cunan’s motion was based solely upon Cunan’s opinion.

369. Cunan’s motion did not dispute that Duree’s motion

presented the required threshold evidence for all six factual

elements of a justification defense.

370. Robinson’s position was that distribution of marijuana

for a medical purpose was justified because California

Health & Safety Code Section 11362.5 declared that

Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for a

medical purpose when the use has been recommended by a

physician and because most people who have physician

recommendation to obtain and use marijuana for a medical

purpose need the distribution of marijuana to obtain

marijuana.

371. In 1996, the People of the State of California legislated

California Health & Safety Code Section 11362.5, also

known as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.

372. The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 states that its

purpose is to ensure that Californians have the right to

obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes when that

medica! use has been recommended by a physician.

373. The Compassionate Use Act of 1996 states that its

purpose is to encourage the federal and state governments to

implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable

distribution of marijuana to all patients with physician

recommendation.

374. Physicians issue prescriptions and make

recommendations to alleviate suffering.

375. Most people with physician recommendation to use

marijuana for medical purposes are not able to produce

marijuana and do not have anybody whois _ ready, willing

and able to produce marijuana and give it to them.

376. Nobody is able to produce marijuana instantaneously.

377. Distribution of marijuana is the only way to obtain

marijuana for all of the people with the lawful right to

obtain and use marijuana for a medical purpose when first

authorized by a physician to obtain and use marijuana.

378. Most people with the lawful right to obtain and use

marijuana for a medical purpose at all times would be

unable to obtain marijuana without production and

distribution for sale.

379. By the beginning of the year 2000, neither the federal

nor the state governments had provided for the distribution

of marijuana for a medical purpose.

380. By the beginning of the year 2000, only private

individuals provided for the distribution of marijuana for a

medical purpose.

381. Robinson did not cause this problem.

382. Robinson’s production and distribution of medical

marijuana alleviated suffering for people who obtained and

used it pursuant to California law and physician

recommendation.

383. Robinson’s production of marijuana caused no harm.

384. On April 13, 2001 Robinson appeared in court with

Duree for a hearing on Duree’s in limine motion for use of a

justification defense for the distribution of medical

marijuana to people with the lawful right to obtain and use

medical marijuana.

385. Olney was the judge

386. Cunan was the prosecutor.

387. Justification is a matter of fact.

388. A jury decides matters of fact.

389. Olney knew that justification is a matter of fact.

390. Cunan knew that justification is a matter of fact.

391. Olney knew that a jury decides matters of fact.

392. Cunan knew that a jury decides matters of fact.

393. Necessity may be used as a defense for any act.

394. Olney knew that justification may be used as a defense

for any act.

395. Cunan knew that justification may be used as a defense

for any act.

396. Olney and Cunan did not claim Duree had failed to

present the required threshold evidence for any of the six

factual evidence of a justification defense.

397. Olney and Cunan decided the distribution of medical

marijuana is not justified.

398. Olney and Cunan prevented Robinson from presenting

justification evidence to the jury to further their conspiracy

to wrongfully convict and imprison Robinson.

399. Olney and Cunan prevented Robinson from informing

the jury of the wording of the Compassionate Use Act to

further their conspiracy to wrongfully convict and imprison

Robinson.

400. Duree informed Robinson that Cunan and Olney had

rendered Duree ineffective.

401. Olney, Cunan and Duree had a private meeting.

402. Olney and Cunan agreed and announced in court that

Robinson qualified for release on bail pending appeal if

Robinson would waive his right to a jury trial and allow

Olney to decide whether Robinson is guilty or not guilty.

403. Robinson’s family refused to continue to pay for an

attorney whose cost was driven up by useless appearances

demanded by the same Plumas County Court Officers who

rendered that attorney useless by preventing the jury from

hearing evidence of justification or the wording of the

Compassionate Use Act of 1996.

404. Robinson arranged the sale of his primary residence to

raise money to pay for an attorney.

405. Duree agreed to accept a lien against that property for

payment.

406. United States government employees, in cooperation

and conspiracy with Plumas County officers and employees,

filed a lien against Robinson’s interest in that property.

407. United States Attorney Courtney Linn filed a forfeiture

action against Robinson’s primary residence.

408. When the sale of this property closed in mid-March,

2001, Robinson did not receive any money.

409. United States Government employees did _ seize

Robinson’s equity of $75,037.

410. Robinson informed Duree that Robinson had no more

funding to pay Duree.

411. Robinson and Duree negotiated a settlement for the

remainder of the approximately $18,000 in billings for the

one in limine motion.

412. On May 1, 2001 Robinson appeared in court with Duree

to remove Duree from the case and move the court for

assistance of counsel.

413. Olney was the judge.

414. Cunan was the prosecutor.

415. Robinson and Duree informed Olney and Cunan that

Duree had withdrawn from Robinson’s case.

416. Robinson moved the court for the assistance of counsel.

417. Robinson informed the court that Robinson did not have

the money to retain another attorney, that he was indigent.

418. Olney required Robinson to complete a financial

statement.

419. Robinson inquired whether the financial statement was

confidential.

420. Olney said, “That’s a good question.”

421. Cunan failed to respond.

422. The clerk said, “Yes it is.”

423. Olney began to question Robinson about finances in

front of Cunan.

424. Robinson objected and requested confidentiality.

425. Olney ordered Cunan to leave the courtroom.

426. Cunan departed.

427. Robinson confidentially completed a financial form.

428. Olney ruled that Robinson qualified for appointed

counsel.

429. Robinson informed Olney that Robinson would remain

the attorney of record and requested assistance of counsel.

430. Olney appointed Public Defender Doug Prouty.

431. Olney continued the assistance of counsel issue until

May 7, 2001.

432. When Robinson spoke with Prouty, Robinson inquired

whether Prouty was ready, willing and able to raise the

issues required for a fair trial, prepare for trial and ensure

Robinson’s right to a speedy trial.

433. Prouty informed Robinson that Prouty’s heavy public

defender caseload in addition to Prouty’s private caseload

would make it impossible for Prouty to be _ fair to all of his

current clients and proceed in a timely fashion with a legally

complicated case like Robinson’s.

434. Robinson requested that Prouty inform the court that

Prouty would not be able to be effective in Robinson’s case

in a timely manner.

435. On May 7, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to move

the court for the assistance of counsel.

436. Olney was the judge.

437. Cunan was the prosecutor.

438. Olney informed the court that his disqualification was

next and that all other issues must wait.

439. Cunan objected and stated that he wanted to get to

sentencing.

440. Olney continued the assistance of counsel issue until

May 21, 2001.

441. Robinson objected on the ground that two weeks was

insufficient time for the disqualification decision.

442. Olney insisted on a date of May 21, 2001.

443. On May 21, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to move

the court for the assistance of counsel.

444, Olney’s disqualification was not yet decided.

445. Olney continued the assistance of counsel issue until

June 4, 2001.

446. On June 4, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to move

the court for the assistance of counsel.

447. Olney was the judge.

448. McGowan was the prosecutor.

449. Prouty was present.

450. Olney informed the court that he had was requalified.

451. Robinson informed the court and Prouty that Robinson

wished to maintain control over his case and have the

assistance of counsel.

452. Olney stated that if counsel is to be appointed

then counsel is going to be in charge of the case.

453. Olney appointed Prouty to represent Robinson and take

control of the case.

454. Prouty informed Olney that Prouty could not accept the

appointment because Prouty could not render effective

assistance for Robinson.

455. Olney continued the issue of Prouty’s appointment until

June 5, 2001.

456. On June 5, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to move

the court for the assistance of counsel.

457. Olney was the judge.

458. Cunan was the prosecutor.

459. Prouty was present.

460. Prouty informed the court that he could not ethically or

legally accept the appointment.

461. Robinson informed the court that he would like to have

all of his rights upheld in this court.

462. Robinson inquired whether he had the right to appear in

court and present his own case.

463. Olney answered, “Yes”.

464. Robinson inquired whether he had the right to the

assistance of counsel.

465. Olney answered, “Yes”.

466. Robinson inquired whether he had to give up one right

to secure the other.

467. Olney answered, “Yes”.

468. Olney stated that Robinson must give up control of his

case to have the court appoint an attorney to represent him.

469. Olney told Prouty that Olney had no choice because

Prouty was the only attorney Olney could appoint for

Robinson.

470. Olney said that Prouty could renew his argument against

the appointment if he wished.

471. Prouty renewed his argument against appointment.

472. Prouty stated that he was extremely concerned about the

prejudicial effect this case may have on his other cases.

473. Prouty stated that‘he had about 35 other Public Defender

clients.

474, Prouty stated that he understood Robinson’s case would

take a lot of time.

475. Prouty stated that he had no experience in medical

marijuana or justfication.

476. Olney interrupted Prouty with the assurance that Olney

would accommodate Prouty with any conflicting cases on

his calendar and that he would speak with Judge Kaufman

to advise him of Prouty’s involvement in this case and to

make the other work for Prouty as light as possible, so that

we can pursue this matter.

477. Prouty stated that he felt very strongly that this case

would have a negative prejudicial effect on his other cases if

he filed the motions Robinson had requested.

478. Olney informed Prouty that Prouty was “in charge of the

case” “the one who makes decisions whether the motions

are viable or not”.

479. In response to Prouty’s concern about effectively

representing Robinson because Prouty had never done a

necessity defense or a medical marijuana defense, Olney

assured Prouty that, “The law in that area is not all that

complicated.” and, “By all means, if you need some time to

acquire further specialized knowledge in the area, we'll

certainly do that.”

480. Cunan returned to the court.

481. Olney informed Cunan that he had appointed Prouty to

represent Robinson.

482. Olney restated the agreement negotiated between Duree,

Cunan and Olney whereby the court guaranteed bail

pending appeal for Robinson if Robinson agreed to waive

his right to a jury trial and accept a court trial.

483. Olney informed Robinson that, if Robinson insisted

upon his right to a jury trial rather than a court trial, if

convicted, there would be no bail pending appeal.

484. Olney asked Robinson to reconsider his demand for a

jury trial.

485. Robinson demanded a jury trial.

486. Olney stated that the next issue was the setting of a trial

date.

487. Olney declared that Robinson had the right to a speedy

trial within 60 days.

488. Olney suggested July 24, 2001.

489. Prouty informed Olney and Cunan that Robinson would

waive time to allow Prouty to properly get caught up to

speed on the case.

490. Cunan, Olney and Prouty knew that the usual practice

and policy was to allow a busy defense attorney time to

make pre-trial motions and to prepare for trial.

491. Cunan, Olney and Prouty knew that Olney could have

gone outside Plumas County to hire an attorney who was

ready, willing, and able to be effective and timely in

Robinson’s case.

492. Cunan stated that he would not waive time.

493. Cunan demanded that a trial date be set within 60 days

on the ground that the state was claiming the right to a

speedy trial.

494. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect the

individual from unfair government prosecution.

495. Cunan, Olney and Prouty knew that the purpose of the

Bill of Rights speedy trial clause is to protect the individual

from unfair government prosecution.

496. Cunan, Olney and Prouty knew that the right to a speedy

trial may be waived by the defendant for the benefit of the

defendant.

497. Cunan, Olney and Prouty knew that a trial within 60

days would deprive Robinson of the effective assistance of

counsel. aa

498. Olney ruled both the defendant and government have a

right to a speedy trial.

499. Olney set the trial for July 24, 2001.

500. Plumas County has the policy or practice of appointing

counsel for felony defendants under circumstances that

make it impossible for counsel to be effective.

501. Cunan, Olney and Prouty agreed to set the trial within

60 days, on July 24.

502. Olney set a motions date of June 29, 2001.

503. Olney and Cunan appointed Prouty under conditions

that made it impossible for Prouty to be effective to further

their conspiracy to wrongfully convict and imprison

Robinson.

504. On June 29, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to move

for the effective assistance of counsel.

505. Olney was the judge.

506. Cunan was the prosecutor.

507. Prouty was the attorney of record for Robinson.

508. Robinson moved the court to replace Prouty with an

attorney who was ready, willing and able to be effective in

Robinson’s case because Robinson requested that Prouty

prepare and file several motions for Robinson, including,

but not limited to, a motion to suppress all evidence

obtained through the unlawful warrant and a Penal Code

Section 866.5 motion to suppress Robinson’s unlawfully

obtained preliminary hearing testimony, and a motion for

change in venue, and Prouty failed and refused to file these

or any other motions for Robinson.

509. Olney cleared the courtroom.

510. Olney informed Robinson that it was Robinson’s

opportunity to be heard.

511. Robinson called Doug Prouty to the witness stand.

512. Prouty was present.

513. Prouty had personal knowledge of facts relevant to the

issue of whether Prouty was ready, willing and able to be

effective.

514. Olney knew that Prouty had personal knowledge of facts

relevant to the issue of whether Prouty was ready, Milling

and able to be effective.

515. Olney failed and refused to enforce Robinson’s

subpoena of Prouty so that Robinson could interrogate

Prouty on the record related to Prouty’s ability to be

effective.

516. Prouty agreed with Olney’s refusal to enforce

Robinson’s subpoena of Prouty.

517. Robinson testified to facts that showed Prouty did not

have the time to be effective in Robinson’s case.

518. Prouty did not testify.

519. Prouty was not subject to Robinson’s examination.

520. Olney failed and refused to replace Prouty with an

attorney who was ready, willing and able to be effective to

further the conspiracy to wrongfully convict and

imprison Robinson.

$21. On July 12, 2001 Robinson appeared in court to take

control of his case.

522. Robinson fired Prouty and proceeded without the

assistance of counsel because:

a) Robinson did not have the money to pay for the assistance of

counsel;

b) Olney had appointed Prouty under circumstances that made it

impossible for Prouty to be effective;

c) Prouty was not ready, willing and able to be effective;

d) Olney failed and refused to provide Robinson with a fair

opportunity to be heard on Robinson’s motion to replace Prouty

with effective counsel.

e) With Prouty as attorney of record, Robinson would be unable

to move the court.

523. Olney appointed Prouty as “advisory counsel”.

524. Before trial, Robinson filed a motion to exclude his

preliminary hearing testimony from trial.

525. In this motion, Robinson cited California Penal Code

Section 866.5.

526. Penal Code Section 866.5 declares that a defendant may

not be examined at the examination unless he is represented

by counsel or waives his right to counsel after being advised

at such examination of his right to the aid of counsel.

527. In this motion, Robinson informed Olney and Cunan

that Robinson was not represented by counsel at the

preliminary hearing, that Robinson had requested appointed

counsel at the preliminary hearing, that Robinson had not

waived his right to the assistance of counsel at the

preliminary hearing, and that Robinson was erroneously

found not to qualify for appointed counsel at the preliminary

hearing.

528. Olney and Cunan possessed the court records that

verified the foregoing.

529. Robinson argued that Olney, on 11/22, and Pangman, on

12/7, had failed to permit Robinson to provide confidential

financial data.

530. Robinson argued that Olney and Pangman had

incorrectly ruled thai Robinson did not qualify for court

appointed counsel.

531. Robinson argued that Robinson’s testimony at the

preliminary hearing was elicited unlawfully, in violation of

California Penal Code Section 866.5.

532. Robinson argued that his preliminary hearing testimony

must be excluded from trial.

533. Cunan filed an opposition to Robinson’s Penal Code

Section 866.5 motion.

534. In his opposition to Robinson’s 866.5 Motion, Cunan

knowingly, willingly and maliciously made the false claim

that Robinson had waived Robinson’s right to the assistance

of counsel prior to and through the preliminary hearing.

535. Cunan knowingly, willingly and maliciously made the

false claim that Robinson was advised of his right to counsel

at the preliminary hearing but chose instead to represent

himself.

536. The record shows that Robinson did not waive his right

to the assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing.

537. The record shows that Robinson made continuous

repeated requests, including two written motions, for the

assistance of counsel before, during and after the

preliminary hearing.

538. Cunan knew that Robinson did not have counsel at the

preliminary hearing.

539. -Cunan knew that Robinson did not waive counsel at the

preliminary hearing.

540. Cunan knew the wording of Penal Code Section 866.5.

541. Olney knew that Robinson did not have counsel at the

preliminary hearing.

542. Olney knew that Robinson did not waive counsel at the

preliminary hearing.

543. Olney knew the wording of Penal Code Section 866.5.

544. Prior to 1963, the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District, ruled that to take the examination at the

preliminary hearing of a defendant who is without counsel

and who has not waived the right to counsel and then use

that testimony at trial to convict the defendant violates “all

the rules of fair play”.

545. Olney and Cunan used Robinson’s unlawfully obtained

and edited preliminary hearing testimony against Robinson

at trial to further their conspiracy to wrongfully convict and

imprison Robinson.

546. On July 30, 2001 Robinson appeared in court for trial.

547. Olney and Cunan gave the jury the part of Robinson’s

preliminary hearing testimony, which, according to the jury

instructions of Olney and Cunan constituted an admission

of the charges against Robinson.

548. Olney and Cunan withheld from the jury the part of

Robinson’s preliminary hearing testimony that justified

Robinson’s production of marijuana for people with the

lawful right to obtain and use marijuana for medical

purposes.

549. Olney and Cunan prevented Robinson from informing

the jury of the law, facts and circumstances that justified his

distribution of medical marijuana.

550. Olney and Cunan prevented Robinson from informing

the jury of the wording of the Compassionate Use Act of

1996 that authorized people to obtain and use marijuana for

medical purposes.

551. Olney and Cunan ingtructed the jury to reach a guilty

verdict.

$52. Olney and Cunan violated all the rules of fair play, and

then some.

553. The jury returned a guilty verdict.

554. Olney and Cunan convicted Robinson without

jurisdiction over the person of Robinson to further their

conspiracy to wrongfully convict and imprison him.

555. On August 29, 200] Robinson appeared in court to

request bail pending appeal.

556. Robinson requested a release on bail pending appeal.

557. Olney and Cunan refused to release Robinson on bail

pending appeal because Robinson exercised his right to a

jury trial.

558. Olney and Cunan knowingly wrongfully sentenced

Robinson to three years in state prison.

559. Olney and Cunan imprisoned Robinson for 582 days.

560. Olney and Cunan refused to release Robinson on bail

pending appeal to further their conspiracy to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson.

561. On September 4, 2001 Robinson filed a notice of appeal.

562. The Plumas County Court Clerk sent a complete copy of

the record to Robinson’s appellate attorney.

563. The Plumas County Court Clerk sent a complete copy of

the record to California Attorney General Bill Lockyer.

564. Lockyer provided Deputy Attorney General Smith with

a complete copy of the record.

565. On April 25, 2002 Plaintiff filed his appeal in the Court

of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate

District. (Case Number C039311)

566. Robinson argued that the admission of his preliminary

hearing testimony at trial violated his right to counsel

because he was not represented by counsel and did not

waive his right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, but

repeatedly demanded the assistance of counsel.

567. Lockyer was served with Robinson’s appeal.

568. On July 24, 2002 Smith responded to Robinson’s

appeal.

569. Smith alleged that Robinson waived his right to counsel.

570. Smith knew that Robinson did not waive his right to

counsel at the preliminary hearing.

571. Smith lied to further the conspiracy to wrongfuily

imprison Robinson.

572. California has the practice of wrongful imprisonment.

573. On March 18, 2003 the Court of Appeal of the State of

California, Third Appellate District, reversed Robinson’s

conviction.

574. This Court concluded that the record does not support

Smith’s allegation that Robinson waived his right to

counsel.

575. A copy of this appellate ruling was served upon Plumas

County and the California Attorney General.

576. Cunan read the ruling.

577. Cunan spoke to Feather River Bulletin Reporter Tiffany

Wood about this appellate court reversal of Robinson’s

conviction.

578. On April 9, 2003 The Feather River Bulletin pubished

an article authored by Tiffany Wood entitled

“MARIJUANA GROWER MAY WIN APPEAL”.

579. In this article, Wood quotes Cunan: “I want to do

whatever it takeS to make =--* everyone involved in this

case understands that Mr. Robinson is guilty of the crimes

he was convicted of; that may or may not include refiling.”

580. On May 9, 2003 Attorney James Bisnow sent a letter to

Cunan on behalf of Robinson.

581. Bisnow requested that Cunan contact Bisnow to inform

Robinson of how Cunan intended to proceed.

582. This letter requests that Cunan respond.

583. Cunan failed to respond to Bisnow’s letter.

584. The California Attorney General did not appeal the

appellate court ruling to the Supreme Court of the State of

California.

585. On May 20, 2003 the appellate court remitted

Robinson’s case back to the Plumas County court.

586. A copy of the REMITTITUR was sent to Plumas

County District Attorney Cunan.

587. A copy of the REMITTITUR was sent to the Plumas

County Court.

588. A copy of the REMITTITUR was sent to the California

Attorney General.

589. On May 22, 2003 the REMITTITUR was filed in the

Plumas County Court.

590. Attorney John Duree spoke with Cunan on behalf of

Robinson.

591. Duree inquired whether Cunan would proceed against

Robinson.

592. Cunan did not provide a definite response.

593. California Penal Code section 1382 mandates that the

judge must dismiss an action if the defendant is not brought

to trial within 60 days of the filing of the REMITTITUR in

the trial court, and the prosecution cannot show good cause

for the delay.

594. July 21, 2003 was the 60" day following the filing of the

REMITTITUR in the Plumas County court.

595. Prior to July 21, 2003 Cunan had taken no action in

Robinson’s case.

596. Prior to July 21, 2003 Olney had taken no action in

Robinson’s case.

597. On July 21 2003 Olney issued a minute order in

Robinson’s case.

598. Olney ‘s minute order states that Robinson’s case would

be on calendar for “hearing” on August 18, 2003 at 1:30

P.M.

599. Olney failed to state the name of the party that moved

the court for this “hearing”.

600. Olney failed to state any cause of this “hearing”.

601. Olney failed to state any purpose for this “hearing”.

602. The Plumas County court knew or should have known

that Robinson had paroled to Maryland when paroled from

prison.

603. The Plumas County court sent notice of Olney’s 8/18/03

“hearing” to the California post office box that Robinson

had prior to being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned.

604. Robinson did not receive this notice.

605. Robinson contacted the Plumas county Court by

telephone to inquire whether any action had been taken in

Robinson’s case.

606. The clerk informed Robinson of Olney’s order for an

August 18, 2003 “hearing”.

607. Robinson inquired whether notice of Olney’s “hearing”

had been sent to Robinson.

608. The clerk informed Robinson that notice of Olney’s

“hearing” had been sent to Robinson’s defunct

Greenville, California post office box.

609. Robinson informed the clerk of Robinson’s current

Maryland address.

610. The clerk sent a copy of Olney’s order to Robinson in

Maryland.

611. Robinson notified his Maryland parole officer, settled

the lease on his home, put his property in storage, took an

unlimited leave of absence from his employment, loaded his

dog in his vehicle and drove to California to comply with

Olney’s order.

612. On August 18, 2003 Robinson appeared in court.

613. Olney was the judge.

614. Cunan was the prosecutor.

615. Olney and Cunan failed and refused to provide

Robinson with an opportunity to be heard.

616. Olney read the charges to Robinson.

617. Olney entered a plea of “not guilty” for Rooinson.

618. Olney and Cunan set trial date of September 27, 2003.

619. Olney and Cunan set a motions date of September 12,

2003.

620. Without request from Robinson and without financial

consideration, Olney and Cunan appointed Prouty to

represent Robinson.

621. Prouty informed Olney and Cunan that he was too busy

to take Robinson’s case.

622. Olney appointed Lassen County Attorney Traci Witry to

represent Robinson.

623. Olney recessed Robinson’s case to telephone Witry.

624. Olney informed Robinson Witry had accepted the

appointment.

625. Olney provided Robinson with Witry’s telephone

number.

626. Olney dismissed Robinson’s case for the day.

627. On Avwgust 28, 2003 Witry filed a motion to dismiss on

the ground of a violation of Robinson’s right to a speedy

trial.

628. On August 29, 2003 Cunan filed a response to Witry’s

motion to dismiss.

629. Cunan admitted that Robinson’s right to a speedy trial

had been violated.

630. Cunan admitted that there was no good cause for the

violation of Robinson’s right to a speedy trial.

631. Cunan admitted that the charges must be dismissed.

632. Cunan blamed “the court” for failure to properly notice

Robinson.

633. Inthe conclusion of Cunan’s response to Witry’s motion

to dismiss, Cunan _ states that Robinson “.....is entitled to

his Pyrrhic victory”.

634. Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “Pyrrhic

victory” as “a victory achieved at too great a cost”.

635. For the first time in this case, Robinson agreed with

Cunan: Robinson was entitled to the victory, and the

victory was achieved at too great a cost.

636. On September 3, 2003 Olney and Cunan dismissed all

charges against Robinson.

637. Robinson complained to the California Attorney

General, California Bar and California Commission on

Judicial Performance, and the Plumas County Grand bJury

that Plumas County Court Officers Kaufman, Pangman,

Olney, Cunan and McGowan conspired to wrongfully

convict and imprison Robinson by violating _his rights to

the assistance of counsel and to a jury trial.

638. None of the aforementioned agencies investigated

Robinson’s complaint.

639. California did nothing to prevent the Defendant Plumas

County Court Officers (PCCO) from violating Robinson’s

right to the assistance of counsel.

640. California did nothing to punish the PCCO for violating

Robinson’s right to the assistance of counsel.

641. California has done nothing to prevent the PCCO or

others in their positions from violating other people’s right

tc the assistance of counsel in the future.

642. California condoned the violation of Robinson’s right to

the assistance of counsel by the PCCO.

643. California has the practice and defacto policy of

condoning Constitutional rights violations by court officers.

644. California has the practice and defacto policy of

condoning wrongful convictions and imprisonments by

court officers.

645. California condones wrongful convictions and

imprisonments to further judicial/prosecutorial conspiracies

to wrongfully convict and imprison people

646. Plumas County Court Officers Olney, Kaufman,

Pangman, Mcgowan and Cunan blatantly conspired to

wrongfully convict and imprison Robinson through

knowing violation of his might to counsel, his right to

reasonable bail and his right to a jury trial because they

believed they were immune from civil liability and because

California does not prosecute, dismiss, punish or even

reprimand court officers who violate statutory and

Constitutional rights to wrongfully convict and imprison

people.

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct.

Date: June 15, 2007 Joseph Robinson

pu Me

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Joseph Robinson, hereby declare that I am over the age of 18

years and that I am a party to within entitled cause of action,

and, further, that on the date below I served the following

documents with this proof of service by post paid first-class

United States Mail in a sealed envelope.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI — STATEMENT OF FACTS THAT

SHOW INTENT, MALICE AND CONSPIRACY.

To the following addresses:

State of California William Pangman

California Attorney General Sierra County Superior Court

P.O. Box 944255 P.O. Box 476

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Downieville, CA 95936

Garrett Olney Ira Kaufman

Plumas County Superior Court Plumas County Superior Court

520 Main Street; Room 104 520 Main Street; Room 304

Quincy, CA 95971 Quincy, CA, 95971

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant

Attention: Terrence Cassidy

P.O. Box 255428

Sacramento, CA 95865

Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk Originals and

1 First Street, N.E. Forty Copies

Washington, DC 20543

Further, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct and that the aforementioned documents were

mailed as above described.

Date: June 15, 2007, Joseph oe i

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.