Appendix — Khashan v. WFS Financial Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 353 (2004) (No. 04-202)

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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[Filed February 24, 2000]

Nos. 04-55015

CV-03-08771-AHM

WES FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

MIKAIL KHASHAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER and TALLMAN,

Circuit Judges.

A review of the record demonstrates that this court lacks

jurisdiction over this appeal because the order challenged in

the appeal is not reviewable. See 28 U.S.C. § 447(d); Kunziv.

Pan American World Airway, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.

987) (order remanding for lack of federal jurisdiction is not

reviewable), Consequently, this appeal is dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction.

2a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[Filed March 30, 2004]

Nos. 04-55015

CV-03-08771-AHM

WES FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

MIKAIL KHASHAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER

Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER and TALLMAN,

Circuit Judges.

Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of this court’s

February 24, 2004, order dismissing this appeal for lack of

jurisdiction is denied.

No motion for reconsideration, rehearing, clarification, stay

of mandate, or any other submissions shall be entertained in

this closed docket.

3a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Filed December 5, 2003]

NO.: CV-03-8771 AHM

WES FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC,

Plaintiff,

Ve

MIKAIL KHASHAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO THE SUPERIOR

COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF

LOS ANGELES

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2000, Mikail Khashan (“defendant’’)

entered into a contract with Jim Allen Motors for the-pur-

chase of a BMW. Pursuant to the contract, Defendant agreed

to pay for the vehicle by making monthly payments. Jim

Allen Motors subsequently assigned its rights under the

contract to WFS Financial Services, Inc. (“Plaintiff’). On or

about January 14, 200 1, Plaintiff defaulted on his payments.

On February 21, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant

in Los Angeles Superior Court. The Complaint alleged five

causes of action under California law: (1) breach of contract;

(2) common count; (3) claim and delivery; (4) conversion;

and (5) possession of personal property. On December 2,

2003, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal, removing the

case to this Court based on counterclaims and third-party

claims arising under federal law. Specifically, Defendant

asserted counterclaims against Plaintiff for violations of 11

U.S.C. §727, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

4a

Defendant also asserted third-party claims against Plaintiff's

lawyers, Thomas Prenovost and Gregory Masler, Plaintiff's

law firm, Prenovost, Normandin, Bergh & Dawe, Jim Allen

Motors, Judge Alan G. Buckner, process server Delbert

Salgado and Sano Attorney Services for violations of 18

U.S.C. § 1961,42 U.S.C. §1983, 11 U.S.C. § 727 and 15

U.S.C. § 1601.

ANALYSIS

A federal court must determine its own jurisdiction even if

neither party objects to it. Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80

F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996). A defendant may remove a civil

case to federal court if the case could have originally been

commenced in federal court, subject to a few exceptions not

applicable here. Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S.

470 (1998). A federal court has original jurisdiction “where

the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000. . . and is between. . . citizens of different States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a). A federal court also has original juris-

diction over claims “arising under” federal law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331.

Defendant concedes that removal jurisdiction is not based

on diversity. See Def’s Statement Concerning Removal ¥ 2.

Therefore, the only basis for removal jurisdiction is the

presence of a federal question. However, federal question

jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint and

cannot be based on a federal law asserted for the first time in

a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim. Caterpillar,

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386? 392 (1987); Metro Ford

Truck Sales. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 327 (Sth

Cir. 1998).

In this case, the Complaint states causes of action arising

exclusively under California law; the Complaint does not

assert any claims arising under federal law. The fact that

Defendant’s counterclaims and third-party claims are based

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on alleged violations of federal law is not sufficient to confer

federal question jurisdiction and thus there is no proper basis

for removal, Id. Accordingly) the Court REMANDS this case

to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of

Los Angeles,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: December, 2003.

A. HOWARD MATZ

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[December 18, 2003]

NO.: CV-03-8771 AHM

WES FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC,

Plaintiff,

wi

MIKAIL KHASHAN,

Defendant, Appellant.

ORDER DENYING “REQUEST FOR

RECONSIDERATION” AND CONDITIONALLY

ORDERING DEFENDANT TO SHOW CAUSE

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On December 4, 2003 the Court issued an Order remanding

this case to state court. Defendant has sought-reconsideration.

The request is DENIED as utterly without merit.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

On December 17,2003 defendant Mikail Khashan (“Khas-

han’) filed a “Request for Reconsideration” in which he

asserted:

“From the language and the face of the [Court’s] order it is

apparent, evident and obvious that the above court or any

staff member of the court or someone affiliated with this

court has engaged itself in chamber, back room or closed

door conversation and negotiation with plaintiff or a member

of plaintiffs attorneys, or a party named as_ counter-

defendant, or anyone associated or affiliated with plaintiff, or

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a former or present state or federal judge, or someone in any

capacity and in the absence of the defendant and without his

knowledge and consent.”

Khashan then purported to “DEMAND” that this court

answer 10 questions that explicitly challenge the court’s

integrity and impartiality. By filing these demands,

Khashan has appeared to engage in all of the following:

(1) Unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of this

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §1927.

(2) Presenting a paper—in essence, a motion—for such

improper purposes as to harass and cause unnecessary

delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Fed.R.Civ.P.11{b).

(3) Willfully acting in bad faith, motivated by vindic-

tiveness, obduracy and the improper ourpose of venting

his anger by attacking the very integrity of the court.

Unless by December 24, 2003. Khashan signs and files a

declaration apologizing for filing his ceutemptuous “De-

mand” he is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing, and

by not later than January 5, 2004, why he should not be

sanctioned in the amount of $1,000 pursuant to the Court’s

inherent authority and its powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and

Rule 11. .

IT IS SO ORDERED

A. HOWARD MATZ

United States District Judge

MIKAIL KHASHAN

11862 BALBOA BLVD. #190

GRANADA HILLS CA 91344

Counter-claimant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Filed December 3, 2003]

Case No.: CV-03-08771 AHM

Counter-claim for

18 U.S.C. §1962 RICO ACT;

42 U.S.C. §1983 CIVIL RIGHTS

VIOLATION;

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692;

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C § 1601;

VIOLATION OF 11 U.S.C § 727;

DEFEMATION;

SOLICITATION OF PERJURY;

FRAUD.

COUNTERCLAIM

COMES NOV, the defendant and counterclaimant, Mikail

Khashan, for its counterclaim shows the Court as follows:

galt 3a

PMP Pr PS

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

Counterclaimant, KHASHAN, is an individual and alleges

the matters set out in this counterclaim on information and

belief except for those allegations that pertain to defendant

which are based on personal knowledge.

Defendant is an individual residing within the City of Los

Angeles, County of Los Angeles State of California. Each of

the counter-defendants were aware of the facts of the other

defendants in support of illegal acts of the enterprise and each

counter-defendant is culpable of the acts of misprision of a

felony by the other counter-defendants and party’s to the

actions stated herein. None of the counter-defendants have

signed the oath of the office and are thus without jurisdiction.

9a

The court system is an enterprise and judges are not

cloaked with immunity when acting out of personal

vindictiveness. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859

(Sth Cir.1981): When a judge has acted out of personal

motivations and has used his judicial office as an offensive

weapon to vindicate personal objectives, these non-judicial

acts, are not cloaked with judicial immunity from suit under

Section 1983.

Counter-defendant ALAN G. BUCJNER (“BUCKNER”)

is and was a resident of the State of California, and is and was

a judge of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles

during all times pertinent herein he acted under color of that

capacity and all acts complained of were in furtherance of the

conspiracy alleged and was intended to and did constitute

precatory acts of racketeering and intended to and did cause

counterclaimant’s damages. Cross-defendant WFS FINAN-

CIAL SERVICES, INC. (“WFS”) is a California Corporation

that engages in financing automobiles and other related

services in the County of Los Angeles.

Cross-defendant PRENOVOST, NORMANDIN, BERGH

& DAWE (“THE FIRM”) is a California Corporation that is

engaged in practice of law with offices in the County of Los

Angeles. At the time of this action, THE FIRM was the

attorney representing cross-defendant WFS.

Counter-defendant GREGORY S. MASSLER (“MASS-

LER”) is and was a resident of the State of California, and is

and was an attorney at law and an officer of the Superior

Court for the County of Los Angeles and-employed by THE

FIRM during all times pertinent herein he acted under color

of that capacity and all acts complained of were in

furtherance of the conspiracy alleged and was intended to and

did constitute precatory acts of racketeering and intended to

and did cause counterclaimant’s damages.

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Counter-defendant THOMAS J. PRENOVOST (“PRENO-

VOST’) is and was a resident of the State of California, and

is and was an attorney at law and an officer of the Superior

Court for the County of Los Angeles and employed by THE

FIRM during all times pertinent herein he acted under color

of that capacity and all acts complained of were in

furtherance of the conspiracy alleged and was intended to and

did constitute precatory acts of racketeering and intended to

and did cause counterclaimant’s damages.

Cross-defendant JIM ALLEN MOTORS (“JIM ALLEN”)

is an unknown business which is engaged in sell or financing

of automobiles in the State of California during all times

pertinent herein he acted under color of that capacity and all

acts complained of were in furtherance of the conspiracy

alleged and was intended to and did constitute precatory

acts of racketeering and intended to and did cause coun-

terclaimant’s damages.

Cross-defendant SANO ATTORNEY SERVICES

(“SANO”) is a California business and is engaged in process

serving, and other related services in the County of Los

Angeles, while in the course of its employment with THE

FIRM during all times pertinent herein they acted under color

of that capacity and all acts complained of were in

furtherance of the conspiracy alleged and was intended to and

did constitute precatory acts of racketeering and intended to

and did cause counterclaimant’s damages.

Cross-defendant DELBERT SALGADO (“SALGADO”) is

an individual who is and was engaged in business of process

serving, and other related services in the County of Los

Angeles, while in the course of his employment with SANO

during all times pertinent herein he acted under color of that

capacity and all acts complained of were in furtherance of the

conspiracy alleged and was intended to and did constitute

precatory acts of racketeering and intended to and did cause

counterclaimant’s damages.

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This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1331 in that this counterclaim arises under the laws

of the United States.

Defendant is subject to jurisdiction of this court and venue

lies with this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §139(b).

This court has pendent jurisdiction over those claims

asserted herein that arise under the laws of the State of

California.

Each of the counter-defendants sued herein was in some

manner responsible for the actions which form the basis for

this counterclaim as set forth, herein below.

Counterclaimant is informed and believe, and thereon

allege, that at all times herein relevant, each of the counter-

defendants was the agent and/or employee of the remaining

counter-defendants, and at all times were acting within

the purpose, furtherance, and scope of said agency and/or

employment.

On July 15, 2000, Counterclaimant purchased a 1998

BMW 740IL, from EURO AMERICA MOTORS (“EURO”)

in City of Santa Monica.

At the time counterclaimant signs the agreement with

EURO, he agreed to purchase the vehicle for the cash value

of $34,500.00. KHASHAN then gave $6,000.00 down

payment to EURO. Furthermore, counterclaimant further

agreed to make a monthly payment of $796.88 for the terms

of 48 months or four (4) years.

On or about March 22, 2001, counterclaimant filed for

relief under Chapter 7 Bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 727.

On or about August 22, 2001, KHASHAN’S was dis-

charged against all his debtors including WFS.

12a

On or about December 15, 2001, counterclaimant’s chapter

7 bankruptcy case was closed by the order of Bankruptcy

Judge, Honorable Kathleen Lax.

On February 27, 2002, WFS filed a complaint in the

Superior Court for the State of California, County of Los

Angeles case # BC268963. WFS alleges that KHASHAN for

valuable consideration, made, executed and delivered to JIM

ALLEN MOTORS. a written Motor Vehicle Contract and

Security Agreement. WFS claims that KHASHAN defaulted

in the terms, conditions and covenant of the Contract by

failing and refusing to make the monthly payment then due

and owing.

Process server, SALGADO, prepared an affidavit of serv-

ice of process claiming that he had served counterclaimant’s

wife at her resident and filed such under penalty of perjury

with the state court on or about April 30, 2002.

The service of the Summons and Complaint was defective

on defendant and was not in compliance with California Civil

Procedure §416.60 through §416.90.

Counterclaimant timely filed a Motion to Quash Service of

Summons (“THE MOTION”) on May 13, 2002.

SALGADO with the assistance of WFS’s attorneys

(MASSLER, and PRENOVOST) and for their own benefit

solicited perjury by knowingly preparing false, illegal and

fraudulent affidavit under penalty of perjury entitled

Declaration of Delbert Salgado In Support of Plaintiff's

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion To Quash Service of

Summons . . . with intent to deceit and mislead the state court

and counterclaimant.

On June 13, 2002, THE MOTION came before Judge

BUCKNER, who after listening to arguments agreed with

counterclaimant that process server SALGADO was dis-

honest in his conducts but denied the motion without legal

justification and for bad cause.

13a

On June 21, 2002, Counterclaimant timely filed a Notice of

Appeal and Notice of Election to Proceed, with the Appellate

Court, Second Appellate District, pursuant to California

Rules of Court, Rule 5.1.

On July 31, 2002, counterclaimant filed his Case Infor-

mation Statement and all supporting documents including a

Conformed Copy of Notice of Ruling with the State Appellate

Court.

Counterclaimant’s Case Information Statement was re-

jected by the Appellate Court for failure to attach an ‘Order

Appealing”’ signed by state court judge, BUCKNER.

Counterclaimant, on August 9, 2002, requested BUCK-

NER for a signed order denying THE MOTION in an effort

to satisfy and complete Appellate Court’s requirements.

BUCKNER, in an attempt to prevent counterclaimant from

having his day before the Appellate Court, in an effort to

delay and dismiss counterclaimant’s appeal process, and in

retaliation and abuse of his authority in a letter to

counterclaimant refused to sign the order justifying his own

ruling for denying counterclaimant’s motion to quash service

of summons.

On July 31, 2002, counterclaimant’s appeal was dismissed

for failure to complete Case Information Statement.

On July 12, 2002, counterclaimant timely filed a Motion

for an Order for Change of Venue (“VENUE MOTION’).

The hearing was scheduled by the state court clerk for

September 12, 2002, to be heard before Honorable Gary

Klausner in Department “1” of the Los Angeles Superior

Court.

BUCKNER in retaliation and an attempt to keep the matter

in his jurisdiction ordered the counterclaimant to reschedule

the hearing for September 5, 2002, in department “14”.

Counterclaimant filed Notice of Continuance of Hearing in

compliance with the court order, on August 1, 2002.

l4a

On July 27, 2002, pursuant to California Rules of Court,

Rule 303, counterclaimant timely and appropriately withdrew

his VENUE MOTION and replaced it with a Motion for an

Order to Transfer Action from Central District to San

Fernando District where defendant resides (TRANSFER

MOTION”), another polite way to inform BUCKNER to stop

his retaliatory techniques and to cease his personal vendetta

against counterclaimant.

On September 7, 2002, counterclaimant received a Notice

of Ruling, regarding previously withdrawn and off calendared

VENUE MOTION. BUCKNER had continued previously

withdrawn motion and made ruling in counterclaimant’s

absence denying his VENUE MOTION. BUCKNER addi-

tionally made other rulings in the matter that was neither

appropriately nor judicially scheduled for hearing.

Counterclaimant making every effort to have his case heard

before any judge other than BUCKNER, having become

frustrated of judge’s retaliatory techniques, and abuse of his

authority, filed a declaration of prejudice pursuant to

California Civil Procedure §170.6, on September 10, 2002.

Concurrently, counterclaimant filed a Demand for Hearing

for Disqualification of BUCKNER in accordance with

California Civil procedure §170.3(4)(c)(1).

On or about September 29, 2002, counterclaimant received

three (3) Orders signed personally by BUCKNER Striking

counterclaimant’s every motion. BUCKNER made these

rulings out of spite and animosity toward counterclaimant

and in furtherance of the judicial conspiracy against

counterclaimant.

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VIOLATION OF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND

CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT,

18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.

(Against BUCKNER, MASSLER,

PRENOVOST AND SALGADO)

This court arises under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.

The Counter-Defendants were an enterprise within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 196(4) which is a “person” within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 196(3).

The counter-defendants were an enterprise within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 196(4) which is engaged in, or the

activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce by

virtue of the positions held whereby decisions made provide a

benefit, revenue, and income to parties involved in litigation

appearing before them.

The acts of the individual counter-defendants as set forth in

herein in detail repeated violations of both Federal and State

law. Therefore, these activities constitute a further component

of a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18

U.S.C. § 1961 AND (State Corruption Activities Act).

The acts of the individual counter-defendants as set forth

herein constitute repeated and continuing conduct that was

neither isolated nor sporadic, but that involved a callus dis-

regard for the law that has evolved gradually over the years.

The acts of the individual counter-defendants as set forth

herein demonstrate that said counter-defendants at all times

pertinent, and to the present, are conducting or participating

in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of a continuing criminal

enterprise, which enterprise is engaged in or affecting

interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, through a

pattern of racketeering activity, as alleged and described

fully herein through telephone communications and the U.S.

Postal Service.

l6a

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et seq.

(Against BUCKNER, MASSLER,

AND PRENOVOST)

The forgoing acts were done in derogation of coun-

terclaimant rights as enumerated and guaranteed in 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

The outrageous conducts set forth hereinabove were

undertaken without concern for the foreseeable impact same

would have on counterclaimant.

(VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692)

(Against WFS)

The counter-defendants, are seeking to collect the pur-

ported debts, have called counterclaimant on unlisted tele-

phone in violation of his right to privacy as guaranteed by the

United States Constitution and repeatedly made calls at

inconvenient times, and continuing their harassing efforts

even after plaintiff notified them in writing that he contested

the subject alleged discharged debts and to leave him alone.

Counter-defendants provided their debt collectors and other

third parties the number to counterclaimant unlisted

telephone. Counter-defendants have called counterclaimant at

unusual time on his unlisted telephone number and harassed

him even after they were informed not to call, in express

derogation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

(VIOLATION OF 11 U.S.C § 727)

(Against WFS AND THE FIRM)

The forgoing acts were done in derogation of coun-

terclaimant’s rights as enumerated and guaranteed in 11

U.S.C. § 727.

17a

The discharge debts prohibit any attempt to collect from

the debtor 2 debt that has been discharged. A creditor is not

permitted to contact a debtor by mail, phone, or otherwise, to

file or continue a lawsuit, to attach wages or other property,

or to take any other action to collect a discharged debt from

the debtor.

The chapter 7 discharge order eliminates a debtor’s legal

obligation to pay a debt that is discharged. Most, but not all,

types of debts are discharged if the debt existed on the date

the bankruptcy case was filed whether the debt was included

in the schedules or omitted from them.

Counter-defendants knew of the filing of chapter 7

bankruptcy and therefore, should have known that all debts

incurred prior, and during the bankruptcy proceedings were

discharged. Counter-defendants continued legal action and

continued to harass, annoy, demand, retaliate, ridicule, make

false reports and threatened the counterclaimant by damaging

his good name and credit worthiness.

VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1601

(Against WFS, MASSLER, PRENOVOST

AND THE FIRM))

The forgoing acts were done in derogation of plaintiff's

rights as enumerated and guaranteed in 15 U.S.C. § 1601.

The conduct of cross-defendants has caused cross-

complainant to suffer extreme emotional distress.

(DEFAMATION)

(Against WFS AND JIM ALLEN)

At all times herein relevant, counter-defendants, were the

agent and/or employee of the remaining counter-defendants,

and at all times were acting within the purpose, furtherance,

and scope of said agency and/or employment.

18a

Counter-defendants, WFS and JIM ALLEN, on several

occasions and continuing until and at least December 1, 2003,

repeated their untrue version of events surrounding the

purchased and financing of the 1998 BMW 740IL, as set

forth above.

Counter-defendant WFS through its attorneys and through

their agents and representatives, have acted on these untrue

allegations, without probable cause to do so and without

investigation the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and

have filed a civil complaint against counterclaimant and have

republished to third parties including all Credit Reporting

Agencies, a discharged debt in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 727.

The conduct of counter-defendants was intentional, reck-

less and negligent which maliciously reported and duplicated

report of the discharged debt. Therefore, counter-complainant

seeks the imposition of punitive and exemplary damages

against such counter-defendants.

SOLICITATION OF PERJURY

(Against All Cross-defendants)

On April 30, 2003, SALGADO, the process server, filed an

affidavit of proof of service under penalty of perjury claiming

that he had served cross-complainant’ wife at her resident.

The truth is that SALGADO spoke to cross-complainant’s

sister who refused to speak with him since he would not

properly identify himself. SALGADO, then dropped a copy

of state summons and complaint on cross-complainant’s

doorstep and never delivered KHASHAN’s sister with a

copy thereof.

Cross-complainant then filed a motion to quash service of

summons challenging the truthfulness and validity of the

service of summons.

19a

Cross-defendant WFS, through its attorneys, MASSLER,

PRENOVOST and THE FIRM, coached, trained and solicited

perjury so SALGADO would prepare another affidavit in

support of WFS’s Opposition to Motion to Quash Service of

Summons.

In his second affidavit, SALGADO, had willfully modified

and altered the contents of his affidavit to fit WFS and its

legal teams’ scam to deceit, defraud and to manipulate the

court, the counter-claimant and the judicial process.

Cross-defendant, BUCKNER knew of those conducts of

the other counter-defendants and he did nothing but supported

their malignant scam by denying cross-complaint’s motion

to quash.

Cross-defendant SALGADO knowingly and _ willfully

falsified documents in which he knew they were not accurate.

Cross-defendants MASSLER and PRENOVOST as attorneys

and court officer knew that that conducts of SALGADO were

willful and malicious.

Cross-defendants MASSLER and PRENOVOST knew that

their conducts in coaching and training SALGADO to lie and

to file a false and fraudulent affidavit was a violation of

State, Federal laws and against the Canon of Ethical and

Professional Conducts.

The actions of these counter-defendants were willful,

malicious, and oppressive, and entitle counter-complainants

to an award of punitive and exemplary damages to punish

these counter-defendants, to make an example of them, and to

deter such conduct.

FRAUD

(Against All Counter-defendants)

All counter-defendants knew or should have known that

their conducts and actions were contrary to the laws of this

state. The outrageous conduct set forth hereinabove was

20a

undertaken without concerns for the foreseeable impact same

would have on cross-complainant.

The conduct of all counter-defendants, were intentional,

reckless, and negligent. Therefore, cross-complainant seeks

the imposition of punitive and exemplary damages against

such counter-defendants.

The forgoing acts were done in derogation of cross-

complainants’ rights as enumerated and guaranteed in 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

WHEREFORE, defendant and counter-complainant prays

for judgment against the counter-defendants and each of them

as follows:

For a declaration that cross-defendant is not obligated

under the subject purchase contract;

For an accounting;

For special damages in an amount according to proof;

For general damages in an amount according to proof;

For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to

be determined by the trier of fact;

For treble damages against each named counter-

defendant, jointly and severally;

For all costs of suit incurred herein; and for further

relief as the court may deem just and proper.

December 1, 2003.

Mikail Khashan

Counter-claimant