Reply Brief — A. M. P. v. C. W. M.

No. 04-152

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

AMP, DDM, JM, DCM, KMR, and SMK,

Petitioners,

V.

CWM and ACM, by PAM, and DHM,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A Writ OF CERTIORARI

TO THE MINNESOTA Court OF APPEALS

REPLY BRIEF

Lewis A. REMELE, JR.

Counsel of Record

CHARLES E. LUNDBERG

ALAN I. SILVER

Davip A. TURNER

BASSFORD REMELE, P.A.

33 South Sixth Street

Suite 3800

Minneapolis, MN 55402-3707

(612) 333-3000

Counsel for Petitioners

189789 ce)

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............ ii

I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO

GRANT THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

8 Perr Ts per err ert 2

A. Petitioners were proper parties to the

Seer rer eee Te 2

B. Petitioners properly raised the federal

constitutional question in the proceedings

eee Tee ee rer Ty Teeter Tere 3

C. The fact that Petitioners agreed with the

Trustees does not deprive Petitioners of

their right to seek relief from this Court.

Torre TTCCeT TELE T TT TTT CT TCT TTT 5

Il. THE PETITION PRESENTS IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

THAT HAVE NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD

BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT. ........ 8

ee ee err eee eee Ter Tee ee eee 9

il

De,

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES:

Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization

& Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954) ........... 4,5

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) .... 5

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) ....2, 6,9

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

UB. SOG CIDSeE 0 3. 0is bee eee eeebess 7,8

New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63

i Pere ee ee er ee ae 5

STATE CASES:

In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec. 20,

I9G1, 765 A.24 746 GAS. BOGE) 0 vc cenvcscsess 9

In re Trust Created by Hill, 509 N.W.2d 168 (Minn.

| ee ee oe ero ey re 3

In re Trusteeship of Trust Created under Trust

Agreement Dated Dec. 31, 1974,674 N.W.2d 222

Cpe. 52. A. Dee a kh os cewek cheeses 1

Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1978) .... l

iii

Cited Authorities

Page

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

Fourteenth Amendment ..................... 1, 4, 5,8

STATE STATUTES:

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save cy aut a5 bo beet ae eeu awe 1

2 & bl, rer rere eee rrr Sie ee ]

cease ket ouavins e845 anaes 1

I 5c ech vind hae skeen wean 2,3

FEDERAL RULES:

ES I een ee re terres er Ap

ainsi ao kl wan ew bd hh ee 6 ee 3

l

Petitioners AMP, DDM, JM, DCM, KMR, and SMK

(“Petitioners”) have petitioned this Court to issue a writ of

certiorari to review the decision of the Minnesota Court of

Appeals reported as /n re Trusteeship of Trust Created under

Trust Agreement Dated December 31, 1974,674 N.W.2d 222

(Minn. Ct. App. 2004), petition for further review denied

(Minn. Apr. 20, 2004). (App. to Cert. Pet. (“App.”) at A-1.)

Petitioners now respectfully submit this Reply to the Brief

in Opposition of Respondents CWM, PAM, and DHM

(“Respondents”).

Respondents devote a significant part of their brief to

analysis of traditional state-law questions such as the

operation of the Florida Determination of Parentage Act,

Fla. Stat. ch. 742, and the common-law doctrine of collateral

estoppel. This Court is not the proper forum for these

questions. The proceedings in this Court do not concern

paternity, parentage, or presumptions.' Rather, this case

concerns a group of trust beneficiaries, with undisputed

property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Clause, whose rights will be summarily cut off

1. This is not to say that Petitioners waive any objections to

Respondents’ interpretation and characterization of the state-law

questions that are not before this Court. For example, Respondents

claim that Florida law makes determinations of parentage “conclusive

for all purposes.” (Br. in Opp’n at 13.) However, neither of the statutes

that Respondents cite for this proposition, Fla. Stat. §§ 742.011 and

.091, states that any paternity presumption is “conclusive for all

purposes” or that a child born to a married couple is presumed to be

the biological issue of the couple. Also, the case that Respondents

cite for the same proposition, Knauer v. Barnett, 360 So. 2d 399

(Fla. 1978), is a statutory-interpretation case concerning a statute,

Fla. Stat. § 731.29 (1973), that has been repealed, 1974 Fla. Laws

ch. 74-106, § 3.

2

as a result of a proceeding in a foreign state in which they

had no right to participate.

In their brief, Respondents allege that there are

jurisdictional defects in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

and that the Petition presents no constitutional issue worthy

of consideration. In reality, Petitioners have satisfied all

requirements for invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.

Moreover, as Petitioners demonstrated in the Petition, the

court of appeals’ decision will deprive them of their property

without due process unless the decision is reversed, and

courts in different states are misinterpreting and misapplying

this Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.

110 (1989), to the detriment of trust beneficiaries’ property

rights, which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

I.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Respondents have challenged this Court’s jurisdiction

to consider and grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Because Petitioners have satisfied all the jurisdictional

requirements for filing their Petition, Respondents’ claims

are without merit.

A. Petitioners were proper parties to the trust

proceeding.

The Trustees started this action with a Petition for Order

to Determine Beneficiaries under Minn. Stat. § 501B.16.

That statute provides that “a person interested in the trust”

may petition the district court for, among other things, an

3

order “to determine the persons having an interest in the

income or principal of the trust and the nature and extent of -

their interests.” Minn. Stat. § 501B.16(3) (emphasis added).

Under Minnesota law, a person with an interest in a trust,

such as a beneficiary, may participate as a separate party,

independent of the trustee, in a proceeding under section

501B.16 commenced by the trustee. See, e.g., In re Trust

Created by Hill, 509 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).

Petitioners are beneficiaries of the Trusts at issue in this

matter. Accordingly, Petitioners appeared in this action, were

represented by their own counsel, and submitted separate

briefing to the district court and the court of appeals.

Petitioners’ appearances at all stages of the trust proceeding

are noted in the record. (App. A-1, A-21, & A-31.) Therefore,

as persons who each have an interest in the Trusts, Petitioners

were proper parties to the trust proceeding.

The Supreme Court Rules provide: “All parties to the

proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be

reviewed are deemed parties entitled to file documents in

this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 12.6. “Parties interested jointly,

severally, or otherwise in a judgment may petition separately

for a writ of certiorari.” Sup. Ct. R. 12.4. Because Petitioners

were proper parties to the trust proceeding, Petitioners have

standing to file documents in the Court, including a petition

for a writ of certiorari.

B. Petitioners properly raised the federal

constitutional question in the proceedings below.

In their separate brief filed with the Minnesota Court of

Appeals, Petitioners cited authority from this Court holding

that “[d]ue process requires that those whose rights are to be

4

affected be afforded an opportunity to be heard” and argued

that any determination of the rights of beneficiaries based

on a foreign proceeding in which neither the beneficiaries

nor the trustees had the right to participate would constitute

a fundamental denial of due process. (Cert. Pet. at 5 n.8

(quoting brief).) Petitioners made the same Fourteenth

Amendment due-process argument in their separate

Petition for Further Review to the Minnesota Supreme Court.

(/d. at 6 n.10 (quoting brief).) Therefore, Petitioners,

independent of the Trustees, properly raised the federal

question in the proceedings below.

Respondents characterize Petitioners’ briefing of the

federal question as “short” and insufficient. (Br. in Opp’n

at 8.) But Respondents’ claim is unpersuasive in light of this

Court’s opinion in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State

Board of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).

There, the petitioner timely raised its contention that its

property was not taxable by the State of Nebraska because

the property had attained no taxable situs in that state.

Id. at 599. However, the petitioner erroneously based its

contention on the Commerce Clause instead of the Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause. See id. at 598-99. This

Court nonetheless considered the due-process argument:

While the question of whether a commodity en

route to market is sufficiently settled in a state

for purpose of subjection to a property tax has

been determined by this Court as a Commerce

Clause question, the bare question of whether an

instrumentality of commerce has tax situs in a

state for the purpose of subjection to a property

5

tax is one of due process. However, appellant

timely raised and preserved its contention that its

property was not taxable because such property

had attained no taxable situs in Nebraska. Though

inexplicit, we consider the due process issue

within the clear intendment of such contention and

hold such issue sufficiently presented.

Id. (citing New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S.

63, 67 (1928)) (footnotes omitted). Here, Petitioners’ brief

to the court of appeals and Petition for Further Review

to the Minnesota Supreme Court show Petitioners’ clear

intent to ask the state courts to consider the Fourteenth

Amendment due-process implications of holding that the

earlier Florida proceeding—in which Petitioners had no right

to participate—is binding on the Trusts and the beneficiaries.

In light of Braniff Airways and other opinions of this Court,’

Petitioners properly raised the due-process issue in the

proceedings below and, therefore, preserved the issue for

consideration by this Court.

C. The fact that Petitioners agreed with the Trustees

does not deprive Petitioners of their right to seek

relief from this Court.

Respondents claim that because Petitioners supported

the Trustees’ position, Petitioners somehow were not seeking

relief on their own behalf and, therefore, have preserved

no issue for review by this Court. (Br. in Opp’n at 7.)

2. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3

(1973) (addressing due-process argument despite state supreme

court’s failure to address argument when it was clear from the record

petitioner repeatedly raised constitutional claim in lower courts).

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Respondents cite no authority from this Court that expressly

supports such a claim.’

Petitioners sought relief on their own behalf because they

were represented by independent counsel and submitted

separate briefing to the district court and court of appeals

that demanded relief in their own right. (See, e.g., Br. of Resp.

Beneficiaries AMP, et al. to Minn. Ct. App. at 36.) The fact

that Petitioners found merit in the Trustees’ position does

not deprive Petitioners of their right to petition this Court to

reverse the decision of the court of appeals, nor does it

3. Respondents make several unpersuasive arguments under

Minnesota law in support of this claim. For example, Respondents

maintain that Petitioners could not, on their own behalf, have

“mount[ed] a judicial challenge to the [Respondents’]} status as JHM’s

legitimate children” because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

(Br. in Opp’n at 10-11.) Respondents furthermore cla m that

Petitioners “could not raise their own alleged due-process issues

before the Minnesota Supreme Court.” (/d. at 9.) First, Respondents

did not raise these or any other preclusion arguments in their

Opposition to Petitions for Further Review submitted to the Minnesota

Supreme Court. On the contrary, in their brief to the Minnesota

Supreme Court Respondents argued the merits of Petitioners’ due-

process claim, stating that this Court “has specifically rejected this

[due-process] argument” and citing Michael H. v. Gerald D.,

491 U.S. 110 (1989), as authority. (Opp’n to Pets. for Further

Review at 3.) Second, the court of appeals based its decision only on

the effect of the 1991 Florida divorce proceeding (App. A-13) and

not on the 1989 Minnesota trust matter that Respondents argue bars

Petitioners’ claim (Br. in Opp’n at 10). As the court of appeals stated

in its opinion, the 1989 trust matter concerned a fourth trust that is

“not at issue here.” (App. A-4.) Thus, the 1989 trust matter and

Respondents’ preclusion arguments under state law are immaterial

to the proceedings before this Court, which concern only Petitioners’

federal due-process challenge to the decision of the court of appeals.

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deprive the Court of jurisdiction to consider Petitioners’ due-

process arguments.

The Supreme Court Rules provide that “[pJarties

interested jointly, severally, or otherwise in a judgment may

petition separately for a writ of certiorari.” Sup. Ct. R. 12.4

(emphasis added). Petitioners have an interest in the judgment

of the court of appeals because, to the extent that it requires

payment of distributions to persons who are not proper

beneficiaries of the Trusts, the judgment deprives Petitioners

of their property without due process. See Mullane v. Cent.

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)

(“[T]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the

opportunity to be heard.” (quotation omitted)). Petitioners’

property interest is entirely distinct from the Trustees’

property interest. Thus, contrary to Respondents’ claim

(Br. in Opp’n at 8 n.6), Petitioners’ participation in this matter

is not dependent on the Trustees’ continued participation.

In the final analysis, Petitioners properly raised their due-

process argument below and are entitled to seek relief in this

Court. Therefore, there is no jurisdictional defect in the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

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II.

THE PETITION PRESENTS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THAT HAVE NOT BEEN,

BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT.

Respondents claim that the Minnesota Court of Appeals’

decision raises no question worthy of review and is consistent

with long-established precedent. (Br. in Opp’n at 6.)

Respondents’ claim is belied by the undisputed facts.

The court of appeals held that to the extent that the 1991

Florida divorce proceeding determines by operation of law

the paternity of DHM, CWM, and ACM, such a determination

is binding on the Trusts. (App. A-15.) The court of appeals’

opinion concluded—and Respondents do not dispute—that

Petitioners had no right to participate in the 1991 Florida

divorce proceeding. (App. A-11; Br. in Opp’n at 11.)

Respondents furthermore cannot—and do not—dispute that

Petitioners have a property interest in the Trusts, protected

by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.

See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. Respondents likewise

cannot—and do not—dispute that paying distributions to

people who are not proper beneficiaries improperly depletes

the Trusts’ assets and deprives not only Petitioners but also

all proper beneficiaries of their property interests. Therefore,

the court of appeals’ decision deprives Petitioners of their

property without due process of law and in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

In addition to the due-process implications of the

court of appeals’ decision, which are worthy of consideration

in their own right by this Court, this case presents other

important questions, namely the scope and applicability of

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this Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.

110 (1989). In holding that Petitioners could not ask the

district court to determine the proper beneficiaries of the

Trusts because of the effect of the Florida proceeding, the

court of appeals cited to and relied on Jn re Trust Created by

Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, 765 A.2d 746 (N.J.

2001) (“Jn re Johnson Trust”). (App. A-16.) There, the

New Jersey Supreme Court, relying exclusively on Michael

H., rejected a due-process claim made by a trust

beneficiary. 765 A.2d at 362-63. But, as Petitioners have

shown, the instant case and Michael H. are not comparable.

(Cert. Pet. at 9.) Thus, state courts have misunderstood and

misapplied Michael H. Therefore, the meaning and scope of

Michael H., especially when that case is applied in matters

such as this where the property interest is so great, are

important questions of constitutional law that can only be

settled by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis A. REMELE, JR.

Counsel of Record

| CHARLES E. LUNDBERG

ALAN I. SILVER

Davip A. TURNER

BASSFORD REMELE, P.A.

33 South Sixth Street

Suite 3800

Minneapolis, MN 55402-3707

(612) 333-3000

Counsel for Petitioners