Opposition Brief — Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

TR ie SEP 15 2004

LERK

Inu The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

4

AGNES BERNARDO, PAMELA COLIP and

SAUNDRA DUFFY-HAWKINS,

Petitioners,

Vv.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF

AMERICA, PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SAN DIEGO

AND RIVERSIDE COUNTIES,

Respondents.

®

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Court Of Appeal Of California,

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

¢

RESPONSE TO PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

DARA KLASSEL

Counsel of Record

JAMES E. MCELROY

SHANNON R. NUGENT

LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. MCELROY

625 Broadway, Suite 1400

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 232-6686

Counsel for Respondents

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules, Rule 29(6), Re-

spondent Planned Parenthood of San Diego and Riverside

Counties is a not-for-profit corporation that does not have

a parent corporation and is not owned in any part by a

publicly held company. Respondent Planned Parenthood

Federation of America is a not-for-profit corporation that

does not have a parent corporation and is not owned in

any part by a publicly held company.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-

CARI FITAD »i:susniecnsninensiolnasianiiceabentensicibenanieries Sete 1

II. BERNARDO FAILS TO STATE ANY COM-

PELLING REASON FOR REVIEW................ 2

A. REVIEW OF THE COURTS’ APPLICA-

TION OF EVIDENCE TO CALIFORNIA

SUBSTANTIVE LAW DOES NOT IM-

PLICATE A FEDERAL QUESTION AND

IS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVIEW.......... 2

B. THERE IS NO IMPORTANT QUESTION

OF FEDERAL LAW THAT NEEDS TO

BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT.............. 3

BER. COCTIWR TEATRO i cess cdeneeniacevinneen eamionaanaawed 9

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.

BO, OO BEX, IGIR, 44 1.16. BG TAL ....0.00550050000000005050000 4,7

BE& K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516

eo al antin nialemapihcannsicraeatnesins 4

Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.

ee oe dar iheuaeieensanaevantsaieaninnae 5

Bovin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000).............. eee 7

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)................ 6, 8, 9

Equilon Enterprises LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,

29 Cal.4th 53, 52 P.3d 685, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507

os ass pa ccenbenaeintian 4, 5, 6, 7,9

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) ............... 6

McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787,

86 L.Bid.2d 384 (1985) ..............scscccsscsresssenresecseeessesesseees 6

Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick, ” F.3d

EI ss ic ai cn china sansliekeatanievusnabanenane 7

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886

SRE ay ea AS Ea A eo he Cn ne Oe I 6

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84

AR; FAD, 1 TT Be GS (2G) oacscccesssccccnsssersosccccrescseens 6

Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard,

Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 1157 (1986).................. 5

Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,

I so. ss ccachuneinbarecadnnanoccapacassssdsnssnenanaasets 5

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

Page

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92

ea I IIE sinhe sat enalecieeasinnnlainanioarictincitaedakiehilbanhicienins 4

Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National

Electrical Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th

_: BRERA RRA Ae CPi ated Ore Rae Suit AONE Nee 5,6

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia

Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 113 S.Ct.

RE Rare ee HE CD iinnnncrcissaniststiasictctninveiesnansavene 5

Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2002)... 7

The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)................. 6

Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793. (1987) ......cccccccccccccconscccccscsscsees 7

Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 33

EEA RIED sesinsisasisicaadnstheeindstainientienstewbinbidsnninss 7

Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th

Be IE siscinwicsnshadisissonstinsintdiudoansctipieldiitaiabaideiamnbiladiaiakiiassuiletans 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

California Business and Professions Code section

ERIN Ra ON A REO R CO TN DLE The Oe 1

California Business and Professions Code section

Fe RE nsitsasihizeakasihsihsaisesipninhitiecnatcelelliadibtapleninlsauibeaianaeabiaiilaaiien 1

California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.....passim

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner (Bernardo) brought an action in the Supe-

rior Court of California, in the County of San Diego alleg-

ing violations of California Business and Professions Code

(B & P Code) sections 17200 and 17500 (California’s unfair

competition and false advertising laws) and seeking to

restrain Respondents Planned Parenthood Federation of

America and Planned Parenthood of San Diego and

Riverside Counties (Planned Parenthood) from publishing

their opinion that the credible scientific evidence does not

establish a link between induced abortion and breast

cancer. Bernardo iurther sought an order requiring

Planned Parenthood to communicate Bernardo’s view on

the issue — that the scientific evidence does establish such

a link — to all former and prospective abortion patients.

Planned Parenthood brought a Motion to Strike

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)

under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

(‘anti-SLAPP statute’). This statute provides in pertinent

part:

A cause of action against a person arising from

any act of that person in furtherance of the per-

son’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution shall be

subject to a special motion to strike, unless the

court determines that the plaintiff has estab-

lished that there is a probability that the plain-

tiff will prevail on the claim. (App. 105a-108a)

The Superior Court granted Planned Parenthood’s

motion dismissing the Bernardo’s Complaint. (App. 84a-

104a) The trial court found that the lawsuit arose from

Planned Parenthood’s exercise of the right to free speech

on a public issue (this was not an issue in dispute) and that

Bernardo failed to present evidence to establish a probability

2

of prevailing on the merits. Pursuant to the anti-SLAPP

statute, Planned Parenthood was awarded its attorneys’

fees and costs.

Bernardo appealed both the order striking her com-

plaint and the order awarding attorneys’ fees. The appel-

late court affirmed the lower court’s orders. Pursuant to

the anti-SLAPP statute, Planned Parenthood was awarded

its fees and costs on appeal. (App. 2a-66a) Bernardo was

denied review by the California Supreme Court. (App. 1a)

II. BERNARDO FAILS TO STATE ANY COMPEL-

LING REASON FOR REVIEW

A. REVIEW OF THE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF

EVIDENCE TO CALIFORNIA SUBSTANTIVE

LAW DOES NOT IMPLICATE A FEDERAL

QUESTION AND IS NOT GROUNDS FOR

REVIEW

Bernardo claims that grounds for review exist because

application of California Code of Civil Procedure section

425.16 to strike her complaint and to award fees and costs

to Planned Parenthood violated her right to petition, Due

Process, and Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitution

and that, as a result, important questions of federal law

were raised which must now be decided by this Court.

However, as is readily apparent in reading the Peti-

tion, her entire argument hinges on the underlying factual

findings by the state courts and their determination that

the evidence, viewed most favorable to her, could not

sustain her claims under California’s substantive law

governing unfair competition and false advertising. In

fact, she devoted much of her petition for review to setting

forth the evidence she contends was improperly interpreted

3

and improperly applied to her claims by the lower courts.

She is in effect arguing that the courts made erroneous

factual findings with regard to the evidence she submitted

in support of her state law claims and that the courts

misapplied section 425.16 to her evidence. However, “a

petition for writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the

asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the

misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” (Supreme

Court Rules, Rule 10.) Moreover, the criticisms Bernardo

has concerning whether or not the evidence she presented

could support her claims involves no question of federal

law, rather it involves only whether she stated a claim

under California law.

B. THERE IS NO IMPORTANT QUESTION OF

FEDERAL LAW THAT NEEDS TO BE SET-

TLED BY THIS COURT

California’s anti-SLAPP statute is a fee-shifting

statute that provides an automatic award of attorneys’ fees

to a prevailing defendant. The fee award provision does

not come into play until it has already been established

that (1) plaintiff’s complaint arises out of defendant’s

exercise of First Amendment rights, and (2) plaintiff

cannot state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.

(CCP § 425.16(b).)

Bernardo challenges California’s anti-SLAPP statute

on federal constitutional grounds including the right to

petition, the right to Due Process, and the right to Equal

Protection. Her “right to petition” claim asserts that by

imposing a mandatory award of fees on the losing plaintiff,

the anti-SLAPP statute operates to deprive her of her

First Amendment right to petition the court. Her “Due

Process” and “Equal Protection” claims are grounded in

4

her assertion that there is “no meaningful standard for

liability” under the statute, that there is no subjective

intent requirement under the statute, and that the stan-

dard is different for successful plaintiffs and successful

defendants. The same claims have been summarily denied

by the California Supreme Court in Equilon Enterprises

LiC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 52 P.3d 685,

124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 (2002).

The right to petition is not absolute and provides little

or no protection baseless litigation. Equilon, at 64. “Sec-

tion 425.16 does not bar a plaintiff from litigating an

action that arises out of the defendant’s free speech or

petitioning.” Id. at 63. “It subjects to potential dismissal

only those causes of action as to which the plaintiff is

unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.”

Id. “It provides an efficient means of dispatching, early on

in a lawsuit, and discouraging, insofar as fees may be

shifted, a plaintiff’s meritless claims.” (citations omitted)

Id. This fulfills the legislative intent behind the statute of

“encouraging continued participation in matters of public

significance” (§ 425.16(a)). (See generally, Alyeska Pipeline

Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 262, 95 S.Ct. 1612,

1624, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 [explaining that the “circumstances

under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the

range of discretion of the courts in making those awards

are matters for Congress to determine”].)

Moreover, there are numerous federal statutes which

contain similar fee-shifting provisions. See, e.g., Pennsyl-

vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,

478 U.S. 546, 562, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986)

(noting that more than 100 federal statutes provide for

attorneys’ fees. As one federal appelHtate court so aptly

posited, “fee-shifting statutes have become common.”

5

Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical

Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358, 373 (7th Cir. 1987).

“They require the loser to pay the winner’s fees. Loser-

pays-winner statutes discourage litigation with a low

chance of success.” Jd. “[T]he proposition that the first

amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, prohib-

its or even has anything to say about fee-shifting statutes

in litigation seems too farfetched to require extended

analysis. Fee-shifting requires the party that creates the

costs to bear them.” (citations omitted) Id.

Bernardo relies on several cases to support her asser-

tion that a showing of “frivolousness” is necessary in order

to effect the attorneys’ fees provision of section 425.16

including, BE& K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516

(2002); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia

Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); Bill Johnson’s

Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); Wilson v.

Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal.4th 811 (2002); Oren

Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss &

Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 1157 (1986); and Pacific Gas and

Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.3d 1118 (1990).

Bernardo confuses the issue. Each of the cases she relies

on involves the imposition of liability (in the form of

asserting a cause of action for damages) against a litigant

who was unsuccessful in a prior proceeding. In contrast,

the fee-shifting provision of section 425.16 does not make a

party “liable” for filing a lawsuit. Equilon, supra, at 62,

citing and distinguishing, Professional Real Estate Inves-

tors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S.

49, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). As noted by the

California Supreme Court in Equilon, this Court has held

that a defendant may obtain an attorneys’ fee award where

the plaintiff’s suit is objectively “without foundation,” noting

that a finding of subjective bad faith is not a prerequisite.

6

Id., citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). Again,

fee-shifting statutes simply require the party that creates

the costs to bear them. Premier Electrical Construction

Co., supra, 814 F.2d at 373. None of the cases cited by

Bernardo purport to apply the reasoning therein to the

context of fee-shifting statutes.

Equally without merit is Bernardo’s inappropriate

reliance on cases requiring a plaintiff to meet a higher

evidentiary burden before imposing tort liability against a

defendant for actions involving First Amendment activi-

ties, including free speech (New York Times Co. v. Sulli-

van, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964);

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); The

Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)), the right to

petition (McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787,

86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985)), and freedom of association

(NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).

Bernardo’s flawed analysis ignores the fact that in the

case at bar, she brought a claim against Planned Parent-

hood arising out of Planned Parenthood’s First Amend-

ment activity. Section 425.16 was designed to curtail

baseless litigation that arises out of a defendant’s exercise

of First Amendment activities. In enacting section 425.16,

the California Legislature sought to prevent the use of

meritless litigation as a means to encroach upon or chill a

person’s exercise of First Amendment rights. This is

precisely the evil the above cases sought to address by

imposing a higher evidentiary standard on the plaintiff

whose claim, like Bernardo’s, arises out of defendant’s

exercise of First Amendment rights.

Finally, Bernardo’s Due Process and Equal Protection

claims do not raise any novel federal questions. Once it is

Me

7

determined that an act is in furtherance of protected

expression, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a

“reasonable probability of prevailing” in those claims to

survive dismissal. Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wor-

nick, 263 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Wilcox v.

Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446,

455 (1994). The standard is much like that used to deter-

mine a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, which

mandates dismissal when “no reasonable jury” could find

for the plaintiff. Jd. The standard requires a plaintiff to

present a sufficient legal basis for the claims and to set

forth evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a

claim. Jd.

The fact that recovery of fees is different for plaintiffs

and defendants under the statute does not raise Equal

Protection concerns. Typically, a law will withstand an

equal protection challenge if it bears a rational relation-

ship to a legitimate governmental end. Bovin v. Black, 225

F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000), citing, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.

793, 799 (1997). Bernardo as a party-litigant subject to

section 425.16 is not a “suspect class” for purposes of equal

protection. Nor does this fee-shifting statute impermissi-

bly burden the fundamental right of access to the courts.

Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 64; and see, Alyeska Pipeline

Co., supra, 421 U.S. at 262. Federal statutes which cap

prisoner-litigants’ attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases have

similarly been upheld. Bovin, supra, at 42. The Bovin

court noted that prisoners are not a suspect class for

purposes of Equal Protection and determined that the fee

cap on a prisoner’s recovery of attorneys’ fees was ration-

ally related to the legitimate government interests of

discouraging frivolous suits, protecting the public fisc, and

bringing prisoner incentives to litigate more in line with

non-prisoner incentives. Jd. (See also, Riley v. Kurtz, 361

8

F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2002), finding that capping pris-

oner’s recovery of fees is rationally related to reducing the

number of frivolous suits.) Similarly here, section 425.16 is |

designed to discourage unsubstantiated lawsuits that

arise out of a defendant’s exercise of First Amendment

rights of free speech and petition. This purpose provides a

rational basis for the disparity of treatment between the

parties.

Moreover, this Court has already approved the use of

differing standards for recovery of attorneys’ fees in the

context of Title VII cases depending on whether the

prevailing party is a plaintiff or defendant. Christians-

burg, supra, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. Under

§ 706(k) of Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff will ordinarily

be awarded attorneys’ fees barring special circumstances

justifying an exception. In Christiansburg, this Court held

that prevailing defendants however, would only be entitled

to fees where it can be shown that plaintiff’s action was

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even

though not brought in subjective bad faith. Jd. Differing

standards were found to be justified where the “equitable

considerations” bear differently depending on which party

prevails. Id. 434 U.S. at 419, 98 S.Ct. at 699. Similar to

the Title VII provision at issue in Christiansburg, the

attorneys’ fees provision of section 425.16(c), provides for

mandatory fees to a prevailing defendant, but only allows

fees for a prevailing plaintiff where it is shown that the

defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous or brought

for purposes of delay. (CCP § 425.16(c).) In this way it

shifts to plaintiff the costs defendant incurred having to

extricate himself from a meritless lawsuit adversely

affecting his right to engage in First Amendment activity.

This serves the Legislature’s declared purpose in enacting

the statute to “encourage continued participation in

matters of public significance” and to deter lawsuits which

A eter oe sleainer en ener

9

encroach on a person’s “right of petition or free speech in

connection with a public issue.” This concern is “wholly

absent” in the case of a plaintiff who successfully opposes

an anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, under Christiansburg, there

is no Equal Protection concern.

III. CONCLUSION

There are no compelling reasons which would justify

review of this matter. Bernardo simply disagrees with the

manner in which the state courts interpreted and applied

her evidence to the substantive law in the case. Because

her claims arose out of Planned Parenthood’s protected

First Amendment activity and she was unable to state and

substantiate a legally sufficient claim, she was subject to

the fee-shifting provisions of California Code of Civil

Procedure section 425.16(c). The statute has been upheld

as constitutional by the California Supreme Court.

Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 64. Moreover, there is a

plethora of analogous federal fee-shifting statutes which

have similarly passed constitutional muster.

Respondent Planned Parenthood respectfully requests

that this Court deny Bernardo’s Petition for Review.

Respectfully submitted,

DARA KLASSEL

Counsel of Record

JAMES E. MCELROY

SHANNON R. NUGENT

LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. MCELROY

625 Broadway, Suite 1400

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 232-6686

Counsel for Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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