Brief for the United States — Williams v. United States
Supreme Court brief1933
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INDEX
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Opinion below _ . - - - . ‘ 1
Jurisdiction 1
Questions presented ‘ 2
Jonstitutional provisions involved ‘ 2
Statement 2
Summary of Argument 3
Argument 4
Conclusion ; 10
Appendix : . 12-13
CITATIONS
Cases:
Bakelite Corporation, Ex parte, 279 U.S. 488__.. 4, 5,8, 10
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 . ’ 7
Federal Radio Commission vy. General Electric Co., 281 U.S.
464 - 9
Gordon v. United States, 2 Wallace, 561, 117 U.S. 697__. 9
Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dallas, 409 : 9
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 9
Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 : 8
Montgomery v. United States, 49 C.Cls. 574__-- ce 9
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 9
Sanborn, In re, 148 U.S. 222 9
United States v. Ferreira, 13 Howard, 40. - if)
Widmayer v. United States, 42 C.Cls. 519. 9
Constitutional provisions:
Article I, Seetion 8. 2 12
Article IIT:
Section 1 . Nes 12
Section 2 - 13
Statutes:
Act of February 27, 1801, ¢. 15, Sees. 3, 11, 12, 2 Stat. 103,
105, 107 ; 10
Act of March 3, 1839, c¢. 88, Secs. 11, 13, 5 Stat. 353,
354-355. ......... ; ae Ppa oe ae 9
Act of March 3, 1887, ¢. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 507 9
Act of February 17, 1909, ce. 134, 35 Stat. 622. a 10
Act of June 25, 1910, ¢. 409, 36 Stat. 837 9
Act of June 30, 1932, ¢. 314, 47 Stat. 382, 399-403. __- 3
District of Columbia Code, Sees. 3, 42, 60, 221. ; 10
Judicial Code, See. 151_- oaa eke aan 9
168499—33 )
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Inthe Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1932
No. 728
THOMAS S. WILLIAMS
v.
THE UNITED STATES
No. 729
DANIEL W. O’ DONOGHUE
Uv.
THE UNITED STATES
No. 730
WituiaAmM Hirz
Vv,
THE UNITED STATES
ON CERTIFICATES FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Claims has rendered no opinion.
JURISDICTION
The certificates of the Court of Claims were filed
February 24, 1933. The jurisdiction of this Court
(1)
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2
rests on Section 3(a) of the Act of February 13,
1925.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The questions certified in the three cases may be
combined as follows:
1, Does Section 1, Article IL], of the Constitu-
tion of the United States apply to the Court of
Claims and to the Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia and forbid a re-
duction of the compensation of the Judges thereof
during their continuance in office ?
2. Does the provision of Section 2, Article ITI,
of the Constitution, wherein it is stated that ‘*The
judicial Power shall extend * * * to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a
party’’, apply to the Court of Claims, and does this
provision authorize the creation and establishment
of that Court?
3. Can the compensation of a Judge of the Court
of Claims or of the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia be lawfully
diminished during his continuance in office ?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The provisions of the Constitution involved in
these cases are set forth in the Appendix (infra,
pp. 12-13).
STATEMENT
The facts stated in the certificates may be sum-
marized as follows (No. 728, R. 1-4; No. 729, R. 1-3;
No. 730, R. 1-3):
3
The plaintiffs are a Judge of the Court of Claims,
a Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, and a Justice of the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, respectively. By the Act
of June 30, 1932, ¢. 314, 47 Stat. 382, 399-403, the
salaries of certain officers and employes of the
United States were reduced. By a ruling of the
Comptroller General this statute was held applica-
ble to the Judges of the Court of Claims, and to
the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals of the Distriet of Columbia. Pursuant
to this ruling, the plaintiffs have since July 1, 1932,
been paid at the reduced rate provided in che
statute.
The plaintiffs brought separate suits in the Court
of Claims for the difference between the amount
which they received at the time the respective suits
were brought and the amount each would have re-
ceived during that period had his compensation
not been reduced, The defendant demurred to each
petition and the Court of Claims thereupon certi-
fied to this Court the questions which have been
stated above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The plaintiffs contend that they are Judges of
constitutional courts created by Congress under
the provisions of Section 1 of Article IIT of the
Constitution and that accordingly their salaries
may not be diminished during their continuanee in
office. Obviously the constitutional provisions in
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question must be construed in the light of their
history and of the development of our institutions
and not without reference to the distinction which
has so clearly been drawn between constitutional
and legislative courts.
This Court’s decision in Ex parte Bakelite Cor-
poration, 279 U.S. 488, is a direct and conclusive
authority against the contention of the plaintiffs.
In that ease both the Court of Claims and the courts
of the District of Columbia were considered and
expressly held to be legislative courts. Even if
that decision is to be regarded as decisive only
with respect to the Court of Customs Appeals with
which it was primarily concerned, the reasoning of
the opinion leaves no room for the contention made
by the plaintiffs here.
It is, of course, well recognized that a consti-
tutional court may not be empowered to determine
legislative or administrative questions. Congress
has repeatedly conferred such powers upon the
Court of Claims, and their exercise by that court
has not been questioned. Similar powers have
been vested in and exercised without question by
the courts of the District of Columbia.
ARGUMENT
The contention of the Judges: who instituted
these suits before the Court of Claims is that they
are Judges of constitutional courts created by Con-
gress under the provisions of Section 1 of Article
III of the Constitution of the United States, and
~
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that accordingly their salaries may not be dimin-
ished during their continuance in office.
Section 1 of Article IIIT of the Constitution pro-
vides:
The judicial Power of the United States
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Obviously these provisions of the Constitution
are not to be construed without reference to the
history and development of our institutions, and
to the distinction which in the application of these
provisions has been so clearly drawn between con-
stitutional and legislative courts.
In Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438,
this Court had occasion to interpret Section 1 of
Article I1I of the Constitution in the light of its
history and its application to courts of the United
States. The constitutional status of the Court of
Claims, and of the courts established by Congress
for the District of Columbia, was exhaustively ex-
amined, and it was concluded that all of these courts
were legislative courts, not constituted under Sec-
tion 1 of Article IIf of the Constitution, and there-
fore not subject to the limitations of that section.
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True, the ultimate decision in the Bakelite case was
that the Court of Customs Appeals is a legislative
court. But in reaching that conclusion this Court
found it necessary in its interpretation of Section
1 of Article IIL to trace the history of its appli-
cation in the development of our judicial institu-
tions and of the distinction repeatedly recognized
‘in the decisions of this Court between constitutional
courts and legislative courts.
It was necessary to that decision to analyize the
previous decisions of this Court in order to deter-
mine the characteristics of a legislative court. As
the result of careful and exhaustive analysis, legis-
lative courts were defined as: (1) courts created by
Congress by virtue of its power ‘*to exercise exclu-
sive legislation over the District made the seat of
the Government of the United States”*; (2) courts
created by virtue of the power of Congress to make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the ter-
ritory belonging to the United States; and (3)
courts created as special tribunals to examine and
determine various matters arising between the
Goverment and others, which from their nature
do not require judicial determination and vet are
susceptible of it.
It was necessary, in formulating this test and
analysis of the constitutional power of Congress to
establish legislative courts, to consider the courts
whieh Congress has thus established, and the deci-
sions of this Court characterizing them as legisla-
—
tive courts, including the Court of Claims and the
courts provided by Congress for the District of Co-
lumbia. The decision of the Court was rested upon
this analysis, and it was held that the courts pro-
vided by Congress for the District of Columbia,
created by virtue of the power of Congress to legis-
late for the District, were legislative courts, and
that the Court of Claims, created and maintained as
a special tribunal to examine and determine claims
for money against the United States, was also a
legislative court.
If we are right in regarding the conclusion of
this Court in the Bakelite case with respect to the
constitutional status of the Court of Claims and
of the courts established by Congress in the Dis-
trict of Columbia as necessary to the decision of
that case. then we see no escape from the conclusion
that that decision is controlling here upon the prin-
ciple of stare decisis.
The principles declared in the Bakelite decision
were reiterated and applied by this Court in
Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22, 50:
Thus the Congress, in exercising the pow-
ers confided to it, may establish ‘‘legis-
lative’? eourts (as distinguished from ‘‘con-
stitutional courts in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution can be
deposited’’) which are to form part of the
government of territories or of the District
of Columbia, or to serve as special tribunals
“to examine and determine various matters,
arising between the government and others,
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which from their nature do not require ju-
dicial determination and yet are susceptible
of it”. But ‘‘the mode of determining mat-
ters of this class is completely within con-
gressional control. Congress may reserve to
itself the power to decide, may delegate that
power to executive officers, or may commit
it to Judicial tribunals’’. Er parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 488, 451.
Both the majority and minority opinions in the
Crowell case accept the Bakelite case, supra, as
authoritative in its analvsis of the distinctions be-
tween legislative and constitutional courts. See
285 U.S. at 57-58, 86-91.
In Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501, this Court’s
attention was not drawn to the question whether
the Court of Claims is a statutory court or a con-
stitutional court. That question was neither pre-
sented in the briefs or argument nor considered in
the opinion, and accordingly this Court declared in
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, that the decision
in Miles v. Grahem could not be taken as disturbing
the earlier rulings of this Court or attributing to
the Court of Claims any status other than that of a
legislative court. Ex parté Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 455. ae
Accordingly, we believe that conclusion must
follow from the decision and the careful analysis
of prior decisions of this Court in Kx Parte Bake-
lite Corp., and trom the reaffirmation of the prin-
ciples upon which those decisions rest in Crowell v.
Benson, that the Court of Claims is a legislative
9
court created by Congress as a special tribunal to
examine and determine claims against the United
States, and that the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, created by
virtue of the power of Congress ‘to exercise exclu-
sive legislation over the District ’’, are also legisla-
tive courts. This conclusion is buttressed by the
fact that Congress and this Court have so regarded
and treated them.
It is. of course, well recognized that a constitu-
tional court may not be empowered to determine
legislative or administrative questions.’ Congress
has repeatedly conferred such powers Upon the
Court of Claims, and their exercise by that court
has not been questioned.” Similar powers have
been vested in and exercised without question by
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of the
Distriet of Columbia,’ and the tenure of judicial
1 Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dallas 409; United States v. Ferreira,
13 Howard 40; Gordon v. United States, 2 Wallace 561, 117
US. 697; Federal Radio Commission V. General Electric Co.,
281 U.S. 464.
’ See Sections 12 and 14 of the Act of March 3, 1887,
. 359. 24 Stat. 505, 507; Act of June 25, 1910, c. 409, 36 Stat.
837: Judicial Code, Sec. 151; /u re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222;
Widmayer v. United States, 42 C.Cls. 519; Montgomery Vv.
United States, 49 C.Cls. 574.
’ Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428;
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693;
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S.
464. The advisory power of the District of Columbia courts
in patent cases began as early as the Act of March 3, 1839,
ce. 88. secs. 11, 13, 5 Stat. 353, 354-355.
5 ie
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10
office in the inferior courts of the District has been
limited by Congress to stated terms.‘
This Court has thus repeatedly recognized that
the power of Congress, in legislating for the courts
of the District of Columbia and for the Court of
Claims is free of the limitations imposed by Article
IIL of the Constitution. This does not mean that
the tribunals in question are not courts, or that
they do not exercise judicial power. The exercise
of judicial power is common to both legislative and
coustitutional courts and determines the status of
neither. As this Court said in Ex parte Bakelite
Corporation, 279 U.S. 438, 449:
it long has been settled that Article LIT does
not express the full authority of Congress to
create courts, and that other Articles invest
Congress with powers in the exertion of
which it may create inferior courts * * *,
oer ee)
CONCLUSION
Conclusion follows that Section 1 of Article
ITI of the Constitution does not apply to the Court
of Claims nor to the courts of the District of Colum-
bia so as to forbid a reduction of the compensation
of the Judges thereof during their continuance in
office, that the provision of Section 2 of Artiele IIT
of the Constitution does not apply to the Court of
Claims, and that the compensation of Judges of the
*Act of February 27, 1801, ¢. 15, sees. 3, 11, 12, 2 Stat.
103, 105, 107; D.C. Code, sees. 3. 42, 60, 221; Act of Feb-
ruary 17, 1909, ¢. 134, 35 Stat. 623.
isc: RNIN PUTA AS EER tre Me RRL aR RRS
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al pare as 2 EH AY ORAM SDAA SIE
se
Rise R2 ETS IE RE AREY
11
Court of Claims and of the courts of the District of
Columbia may be lawfully diminished during their
continuance in office. ;
In No. 728 the first two questions certified should
be answered in the negative and the third in the
affirmative. In Nos. 729 and 730 the first ques-
tion certified should be answered in the negative
and the second in the affirmative.
Respectfully submitted.
~ Tuomas D. THACHER,
Solicitor General.
~ Winuiam W. Scort,
~Rozert P. REEDER,
~ Erwin N. GRISWOLD,
J. R. FmiLMAN,
H. Brian HOoLiann,
Attorneys.
FET
APRIL 1933.
een |
APPENDIX
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides
in part:
The Congress shall have Power To lav and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; * * *,
* * * * *
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court ;
* * * * *
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not ex-
ceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Ces-
sion of particular States, and the Accept-
ance of Congress, become the Seat of the
government of the United States * * *.
* * * * *
To make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.
Article ILI of the Constitution provides in part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time or-
dain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
(12)
pe er
MP AE! hb SELLE TEL TI
13
their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Serv-
ices, a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority ;—to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other pub-
lie Ministers and Consuls ;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;—to
Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party ;—to Controversies between
two or more States ;—between a State and
Citizens of another State;—between Citi-
zeus of different States;—between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1933
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