Reply Brief — Harrisonville v. WS Dickey Clay Mfg. Co.

Supreme Court brief1933

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Text

No. 559.

In the

October Term, 1932.

City or HarRIsONVILLE, Missouri, Petitioner,

vs.

W. 5. Dickey Clay MANuFACTURING CoMPANY.,

Respondent.

CERTIORARI.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF

OF RESPONDENT.

” Maurice H. WINGER,

“ LELAND Hazarp,

1100 Waltower Building,

Kansas City, Missouri,

Attorneys for Respondent.

Offices Suprome Court,

FILE

FILE COPY MAR 20 13

GHARLES ELMORE

Supreme Court of the United States

SMITH-GRIEVES, LAW PRINTERS, KANSAS CITY, MO

PRE REE AP MA BION EE NG EIB GSPN NG I IE HST A SR

—

SUBJECT INDEX. a

PAGE i

Respondent's additional statement of the case........ 1 :

Summary of the argwmemt................22.0005- 3 4

Argument... 6. ee eee cece ete eee ee eee eee eee 6 &

The question of permanent or temporary nuisance. 6 é

The financial ability of the City to comply with a

is M.S is ened Re rawc eee « 28 &

IRIS ea cca encceceuskacecsune is 28

Goccel gable newer tan.........--5..5..... 30 ;

NY INE ne esec etre enicesccnss 33

EET EE ee ee 34

In any event the limitations upon financial powers

of the City probably do not apply............. 39

Cement TIE. 5 as oss nine reese 41

The injunction in question does not compel ex-

ercise of legislative power. .................. 43

The decisions of the courts below upon questions

of fact and matters of discretion will not be

Ce ee 46

i Beet a eka ea aneidku eee eae e wa ao 47

NE TEL i 5. ca x die eek mk on Sos wn wr eed 9

I a ea hawk ke wee ne eaten ew adiere se 51

SE si ar Ka W Grab ste Rake whe Ree owe cae

¥,

wee ROP ote vn. — is

= DESO EI REITER MOH RS apni

Table of Cases Cited.

PAGE

Attorney General ex rel. y. City of Grand Rapids,

175 Mich. 503, 141 N. W. 890.............. 18

Anderson y. Ripley County, 181 Mo. 46, 80 S. \,

saith RE a er ite ERIN ie Wes ep 35

Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist

Church, 137 U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Eg.

784

ait Rude SECA Mah ay Aa uaa beat, AON 18, 41

Battle v. Willcox, 128 S, ¢ 500, 122 S. E. 516... 32

Blankenship vy. Kansas Explorations, 325 Mo. 998,

sf od. I a tt 20

Bloc. y. Baltimore, 149 Md. 39, 129 Atl. 887.... 26

Boehmer y. Pennsylvania R, Co., (N. Y.) 40 S.

Ct. 409, 252 U. S. 496. 64 L. a _ 46

Bollinger et al. y. American Asphalt Roof Corpora-

tion, 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S. W. (2d) 544..... 19

Chapman vy. City of Rochester, 110 N. Y. 273. 18

Ong TR Nee ait ins 17

Connor v. City of Nevada, 188 Mo. 148. 86 5. W.

sing A eT OIRO Sy ps 39

Donahoe y. Kansas City, 136 Mo. 657, 38S, \v. 57143

Farmers & Merchants Trust Co. v. Hillcrest Realty

Co., 285 Mo. 552, 234 S. W. hice cp CET 34

Fireball Gas Tank & Ilinuminating Co., (Mo.)

36 S. Ct. 86, 239 U. S. 156, 60 L. Ed. 191... 47

Fisher v. American Reduction Co., 189 Pa. 419,

bialiind gee oe CGE Ie RR lees est 24

Hanlin v. Meat Co.. 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S \v.

sR ee ey TS ee nal eet Sat 22

re a ; Nas Pe ~ wee 3 io? wa eee PUP Pet for LPI ee 1 TROL eed

TABLE OF CASES CITE D—Continued.

PAGE

Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 284 S. W. 521..22, 23

Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571...... rig

Lamar Water and Electric Light Company vy. City

of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 26 S. W. 1025....... 35

McCarthy v. City of Kelso, 129 Wash. 121, 223

Pas Ro ees ace aan ed oy Ae Ce es 40)

Missouri v. Illinois and the Sanitary District of

Chicago, 180 U. S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. Ed.

WO oes a ee ee tee 16, 18

Munk v. Columbus Sanitary Works, 7 Ohio N. P.

Sac, 5 (ile Ee Sy B.S aoe es een 25

Page vy. National Gas Corporation, 286 U. S. 269,

be 5, Ct Fe es, ss ee be a 13

Piney v. Berry, Gt Des Sorc rae 13, 22

Saleno v. The City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30

BW Ps cs ta ene eee cohen teal oe atie 36

Salton Sea Cases, 1/2 Fed. 792 (C. C. A.9)...... 45

Schoen v. Kansas City, 065 Mo. App. 134......... #3

Schueler v. City of Kirkwood, 191 Mo. App. 575,

Cee. Wis PR RG ee een eee ae 31

Simpson v. Dupont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 467, 85

Bi ee, cae h kad ane eee ae Pelee ee 25

Smith v. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S. W. 597.... = 14

Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F. (2d) 736....... 47

State ex rel. Board of Health v. White, 90 N_ J.

ma Cee, Ee io sos as Faw als 26

State ex rel. v. Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254, 169

Pe WE es vo oo a ae ee ae ee 42

State ex rel. Pyle, Admr., v. City of University

City et al., 320 Mo. 451, 8S. W. (2d) 73...... 40

The Linseed King, (N. Y.) 52 S. Ct. 450, 285 U.

Ds Py. PO Bi, Se ore ee aay eerie 47

a

TABLE OF CASES C ITE D—Continued.

PAGE

Union Trust Co. v. Pagenstecher, 221 Mo.

121, 119 S. W. Ad teyee nen > cies sus Ok, Se

United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct.

soc igi Ne ~ CeE 13

Constitution and Statutes Cited.

Ramet. Go, See. 08, Art. 00................ a

Const. Mo., Sec. 12, Art. 10 (Appendix C)..... .35-36

R. S. Mo. 1929, Secs. 860, 862 (Appendix A).... 7,50

or wee Oe, Oe OD .... 27

mo eo. 0909, See FOS1.................... 30

R. S. Mo. 1929, Sec. 7037 (Appendix B)......... 34

R. S. Mo. 1929,.Sec. 7038.............00000.,, 33

om oem Wee, Sec. FERS... kk... 34, 37

A EERE ae 39

ek Oc kw x's sk os cwakcconcac,, 43, 45

Dillon, Municipal Corporations.................. 36

Pomeroy, Specific Enforcement of Contracts (3d

ee en nwa nndax..c..., 7

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1932.

City oF HaArRISONVILLE, Missouri, Petitioner,

vs.

W. S. Dickey Clay MANUFACTURING COMPANY,

Respondent.

No. 559.

CERTIORARI.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF

OF RESPONDENT.

Respondent’s Additional Statement of the Case.

Respondent makes reference to the statement of the

case contained in respondent’s brief opposing petition

for writ of certiorari, and does not here repeat the state-

ment therein contained. It is admitted by petitioner that

a nuisance exists in the watercourse on respondent’s

land. The record indicates the extent of this nuisance,

and coritains the admission of respondent’s engineer that

a possible 40,000 gallons per day of raw, putrescible

a ee ‘

shar ees ae ag Bett papers). 49 yee 7 F

Rei Nee M MS SPE AYRE NI SONNEI OAT PE ORE TESTERS RR nanan

2

sewage matter may flow into Town Creek (R. 87). A

finding as to the existence of the nuisance and its char-

acter is contained in the decree of the trial court; also

that the nuisance is unnecessary and may be abated by

reasonable means available to the city (R. 15).

It appears from the record that the nuisance may be

due in part to defective operation of the existing sew-

age disposal plant, also to type of design which per-

mits the entire sewage of the City to be passed around

the existing disposal plant and discharged into the water-

course (R. 51). Petitioner admits that as to defective

operation of the existing plant petitioner should not. be

heard to complain of the decree,

Petitioner’s statement of the normal Operation of an

Imhoff tank should be supplemented by a statement con-

cerning complete sewage reduction. The following is a

paraphrase of the expert testimony on the point (R.

49-52).

The purification of sewage is simply a process of oxida-

tion. The organic matter in sewage consumes oxygen.

When the demand for oxygen existing in such organic

matter has been satisfied, the sewage is purified, i. e., it

is no longer putrescent. The Imhoff tank settles out

solids, leaving suspended in the liquid which flows out

of the tank forty to forty-five per cent of the organic

matter—more if the Imhoff tank is inefficiently built or

operated. Petitioner makes the statement in its supple-

mental and reply brief that the contents of the digestion

chamber of the Imhoff tank constitute the most noxious

part of the sewage. This is not the case. The organic

matter in suspension in the liquid part of the sewage

Which passes directly through the Imhoff tank is just

as putrescent, odorous and noxious as the solid matter

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which settles in the tank. The organic matter which

passes through the Imhoff tank must be further exposed

to oxidation by some process. It may be confined in

sand filters or confined in beds in which, by mechanical

agitation, the process of oxidation will be accelerated or,

if a body of running water is large enough, the oxidation

will occur there by the reason of the presence of dis-

solved oxygen in water. In the case at bar the stream

would have to be forty to fifty times larger than it is to

supply the oxygen necessary to purify the quantity of

sewage in question. [ffective sewage disposal simply

means complete oxidation. When that has been accom-

plished by any of the several available processes, then

the liquid r»sidue is harmless and inoffensive.

We proceed to a discussion of the issues which peti-

tioner says are of sufficient importance to warrant the

attention of this court. We discuss those issues in the

order contained in petitioner’s supplemental and_ reply

brief.

Summary of the Argument.

I.

The sewage plant in question discharges raw, untreated

sewage into the watercourse on respondent’s land, and

creates a condition of gross pollution, also contaminates

with foul odors and noxious gases the air on respond-

ent’s premises and about the dwelling house thereon. Re-

spondent’s land is improved with barns, silos and other

structures costing twenty-five or thirty thousand dol-

lars, and is maintained as a farm for registered Here-

ford cattle of the value of $20,000.00 or more. The

watercourse and one hundred acres or more of pasture

land through which it runs is the heart of this farm,

+

which consists, however, of a considerably larger tract

of land than the one hundred acres affected by the con-

taminated water supply. Petitioner admits the existence

of the nuisance, and admits ‘hat the sewage disposal

plant maintained by petitioner is incapable of reducing

the sewage sufficiently to eliminate the nuisance, Peti-

tioner also admits that improvements and additions to

the plant could be made which would eliminate the

nuisance, but contends that since the nuisance is caused

by a physical structure enduring in its nature, the re-

spondent has no cause of action except for damages.

Respondent contends, and the courts below found, that

the City is unreasonably maintaining an unnecessary

nuisance; that the existing plant can be easily improved,

and that the improvements required to eliminate the

nuisance will be such as are in general use in other mu-

nicipalities in the State of Missouri of about the same

size as the petitioner—some smaller, Respondent con-

tends that damages at law would not constitute an ade-

quate remedy, and that the City has no right to persist

in the maintenance of a sewage system which was neg-

ligently constructed in the first instance, and is being

negligently maintained. The courts below enjoined the

City from discharging putrescible sewage matter into

the watercourse, and allowed a_ reasonable time—six

months—in which to abate the nuisance,

II,

Petitioner contends that the injunction js improper be-

cause the City has no financial resources with which

to improve its sewage disposal plant. Respondent con-

tends that if this were true it would not constitute a

defense. If the City cannot maintain an adequate dis-

posal plant, meeting reasonable standards in general use

by other municipalities, then it has no right to gather

its sewage in mains and project it into the watercourse,

thus leaving the entire burden upon respondent. How-

ever, respondent does not accept petitioner’s position that

the City is without financial powers, and shows that

City has the following powers:

1. To issue bonds for at least one-half the cost of

one method of improving the existing plant.

2. To levy a special public sewer tax under Missouri

statutes to pay for the cost of such an improvement.

3. To levy special benefit assessments upon the land

in joint sewer districts to pay the cost of such an im-

provement.

4. To contract for the construction, lease or use of

adequate sewage disposal facilities, and pay under such

contract over a period of ten years; that the total con-

tract price will not be an indebtedness within consti-

tutional limitations, and that a general tax sufficient to

meet such contract payments will not fall within constitu-

tional limitations for general taxation purposes.

III.

Furthermore the respondent contends that limitations

upon the financial powers of the City are not applicable

to indebtedness or expenditures involved by reason of

a judgment, judicial decree, or other compulsion. Such

limitations are applicable only to the voluntary acts of the

City.

IV.

Petitioner asks this court to reverse the decisions be-

low upon the ground that the inconvenience to the City

will be great as compared with the injury to the respond-

—

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ent. The doctrine of balancin

not obtain in Missouri.

of judicial discretion whi

review on certiorari.

§ such considerations does

Furthermore, the matter is one

ch this court will not ordinarily

7:

The petitioner contends that the injunction encroaches

upon the legislative function. To make the point petitioner

assumes that the decree orders the City to perform positive

acts. The decree merely enjoins discharge of putrescible

sewage matter upon respondent's land. F urthermore, con-

struction and maintenance of sewers is a corporate and

not a governmental function.

ARGUMENT.

i

The Question of Permanent or Temporary Nuisance—The

Real Question Concerns Injunction of a Nuisance

Created by an Inadequate and Insufficient

Municipal Sewage Disposal Plant.

Petitioner urges this court to pass upon the question

of what constitutes a temporary as distinguished from a

permanent nuisance, asserting that that is a question of

sufficient importance to warrant the attention of the

Supreme Court of the United States. Petitioner in the

case at bar wishes to establish that the admitted nuisance

is permanent, not because the legal conception involved

in a permanent nuisance renders the nuisance any less

obnoxious, but rather because, according

permanent nuisance cannot be abated by an injunction

in equity The effect of applying petitioner’s position to

the facts in the case at bar would be to sanction perma-

nently the City’s act in constructing an inadequate sew-

to petitioner, a

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7

age system, and the consequent burden imposed thereby

upon respondent’s land.

Petitioner’s statement that respondent has an adequate

remedy at law for damages is insufficient. T rue, re-

spondent might have originally brought an action for

damages. The remedy, however, would not have been

adequate. The law throws every possible protection

around an owner of land. For example, a contract to

buy real estate is specifically enforceable, The purchaser

is not left to a remedy at law for damages. One reason,

among others, is that no two pieces of land are alike,

No landowner can be adequately compensated in money

for the loss of a particular parcel of land. Pomeroy,

Specific Enforcement of Contracts (3rd Fd.), Sec. 9.

The record in this case discloses, and the trial court

found that the tract of land in question is part of a farm

used for pasturage purposes; that the farm has been

improved by the construction of barns, silos and other

equipment at an expense of twenty-five to thirty thou-

sand dollars; that the land is used for pasturage of a

herd of Hereford cattle; that many of these cattle are

registered, and that the herd has a value of approxi-

mately twenty thousand dollars; that the contaminated

watercourse is the only effective water supply for the

entire farm (R. 177). It is impossible to compensate an

owner in money for the injury done to a stock farm of

such a character developed over a period of many years.

Furthermore, the statute of limitations has probably

run against a cause of action for damages. Actions for

trespass upon real estate are barred in five years in

Missouri. Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, Sec. 862

(see Appendix A). This period applies to actions at

law to recover for stream pollution. Kent. vy. City of

Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo. App., 1931) (not

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yet officially reported). Petitioner in its effort to defeat

the existing action urges that respondent has an ac-

tion at law for damages, but we are safe in saying that

limitations will be pleaded if that action should ever

arise. Respondent confidently brought this action in equity,

relying upon its right to enjoin an unnecessary nuisance.

If this action be now defeated, respondent probably will

be left with no remedy at all.

We repeat that the first object involved in petitioner's

effort to secure from this court a decision that the Har-

risonville disposal plant constitutes a permanent nuisance

is to compel the respondent land owners to submit per-

manently to the results of the nuisance and relieve the

City of whatever may be involved in the way of work

and labor, and the expenditure of money to abate the

nuisance. That such abatement is possible is admitted.

i)

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The second result of petitioner’s position would be far-

reaching. If the method of sewage disposal in the case

at bar constitutes a nuisance which the courts cannot

enjoin, then any less adequate method of disposal would

also be beyond the power of injunction. In other words, ,

despite the fact that standard methods for sewage dis-

posal are wholly effective, so that complete reduction

of the sewage may be accomplished, vet any city could

disregard such methods, and project its sewage wholly

untreated into any watercourse, leaving the landowner to

bear all of the consequences; that is the result that peti-

tioner asks this court to create by holding that the

nuisance which petitioner is now maintaining may not be

enjoined in equity.

We believe that the controlling principles in this field

are already established by this court. The important ques-

tion is not as to what constitutes a permanent nuisance,

and what constitutes a temporary nuisance. The im-

ALONE Lae

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9

portant question is: may the City exercise its function

of sewage disposal in such manner as to create an Unl-

necessary nuisance.

Petitioner’s argument seeks to make magic words out

of the phrases: permanent nuisance and temporary nui-

sance. If the nuisance is permanent, says the petitioner,

injunction will not lie; if temporary, injunction will lie.

These words should not be the basis for the decision.

The question is: May a municipality build any kind of

sewage disposal device, however crude or inadequate,

discharge the effluent into the watercourse of an adjoin-

ing land owner, pay him damages for the diminished

value of the land caused by the pollution and odors,

and then go its way in peace; or must a city in disposing

of its sewage have regard for standard methods of sew-

age disposal in general use by other cities of like size

methods which eliminate any need for pollution in the

adjoining landowner’s water course? In other words,

may the city be as negligent as it pleases in constructing

its sewage disposal plant or must it use reasonable stand-

ards of care: Upon this question the controlling factor

is not whether the nuisance be permanent. Let us illustrate

with the facts in the case at bar. Suppose the respondent

had brought a suit for damages against the city and had

recovered for diminished value of the land and for the

discomfort, inconvenience and other injuries caused by

the pollution, noxious odors, fumes and gases. Then

suppose respondent had brought a second action for dam-

ages. Now if the nuisance were permanent, i. e., if all

the damage which could occur were inherent in the

original situation then the first action would be a bar

to the second action. If, however, the nuisance were tem-

porary, i. e., if all possible damage were not inherent

in the original situation, then the first action would not

rect ree ——

be a bar to the second. In reaching the first result, the

courts speak of the nuisance as permanent, in reaching

the second result they speak of the nuisance as temporary.

Furthermore, limitations are always involved. If all pos-

sible damage were inherent in the original situation, limi-

tations run from the date the offending cause began to

operate; if not, then limitations do not apply.

10

Therefore, the words permanent and temporary are i

words which describe a legal result. If a first action for

damages operates as a bar to a second action for dam-

ages for the reason that a plaintiff has had a full and

complete recovery in the first action, then the nuisance

is called permanent. If the first action does not operate

as a bar to a second action for damages for the reason

that a plaintiff did not have a full and complete recovery

in the first action, then the nuisance is called temporary. :

Again, if all possible damage were inherent at the moment j

the offending cause began to operate then a right to dam-

ages will be barred by limitations unless asserted within

the statutory period; in such cases the nuisance is called

permanent. If, on the other hand, all possible damages

were not inherent at the moment the offending cause be-

gan to operate then a right to damages will not be barred

by limitations: in other words, limitations will not run

from that initial moment. In such cases the nuisance is

called temporary.

The correctness of this analysis will be disclosed by a

consideration of petitioner’s cases in which it will appear

that in no case has an injunction against the negligent

maintenance of a cause of nuisance been denied for the

reason that the nuisance was permanent rather than

temporary.

It may be considered that if the respondent in this case

had brought an action for damages and had recovered for

en Aes Ons CREPE BRE TE

11

diminished value of the land and other injuries, then if

all possible damage were inherent at the moment the City’s

sewage plant began to operate that action would have

been a bar to a second action for damages, and possibly

to a later action for injunction; but, because respondent

could have brought such an action does not mean that

respondent was confined to that action and no other. Re-

spondent’s position is that no action for damages or series

of actions for damages provide an adequate remedy;

that the City is negligently maintaining a nuisance which

proceeds from unnecessary causes; that the City is not

complying with standards of care, reasonable and usual

in the matter of sewage disposal; that therefore injunc-

tion will lie against such conduct.

Now let us examine the four cases upon which peti-

tioner relies.

In Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo.

App. 1931; not yet officially reported petition herein,

page 25), no question was raised as to negligent con-

struction or maintenance of the sewage structure. The

action was for damages; the structure was completed

and in operation in 1914; the action was brought in 1926.

It was held that the action was barred by the five-year

statute of limitations. It appeared also that the City had

acquired from a prior owner an easement for the sew-

age outfall in consideration of the agreement of the City

to waive taxes upon the property in question. It appeared

also that the cause of the injury was an increased flow

of sewage caused by the construction of a new sewage

district, but that plaintiff had failed to allege this cause

of action in the petition, and had set it up in a reply,

which, under the Missouri law, may contain rebuttal mat-

ter only and will not be taken to aid the petition in

stating a cause of action.

12

The case does not deal in any respect with negligent

maintenance of a sewage disposal plant and is disposed

of upon grounds entirely unconnected with that question.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the case,

and noted the fact that the decision rests upon points not

involved in the case at bar. That court said:

“Upon any one of two or more grounds specified in

the opinion that case was rightly decided.” (R. 193.)

In Hayes v. Railroad, 177 Mo. App. 201, 162 S. W.

266 (1914) (petition herein, p. 26), petitioner overlooks

the significance of the result. In that case a railroad

embankment was constructed without sufficient openings

to allow passage of water in times of high water. A

Missouri statute required such openings in all such em-

bankments. Suit was brought for damages from over-

flow which occurred more than five years after the em-

bankment was built. The court held that the action was

not barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The

court held the nuisance temporary because the embank-

ment without the openings, was not a legal structure.

The court said:

“This Act is a legislative declaration that railroad

embankments are not to be regarded as permanent

structures or nuisances to the extent of not requir-

ing adequate openings to be made to afford sufficient

drainage. An embankment without such opening is,

since said legislative enactment, however it may have

been before, an abatable nuisance to the extent of

remedying the defects, and the damages caused there-

by are to be sued for and recovered by successive

actions as and when they cecur within the statutory

period of limitation after the same actually accrues.

* * * In the case of Charles v. Railroad, 124 Mo.

App. 293, 301, 101 S. W. 680, the court held that

“py

inlet BAT

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13 e

because of a decree of court in a condemnation

proceeding providing for an opening through a rail-

road embankment which the railroad had failed to

make, the court would not regard the same as a

permanent structure, all damages arising from which

must be sued for in one action, as the railroad prob-

ably would, and if not, could be made to construct

the opening. The decree in that case was aot more

effectual in that respect than is the statute in this

case.”

The case is contrary to petitioner’s contention that

the nuisance is permanent because the structure is.

enduring. In the case at bar the structure, though en-

during, is inadequate—so inadequate as to make its

maintenance negligent. That this inadequacy is estab-

lished by court decree rather than by statute is im-

material, as the court pointed out in the passage just

quoted. The court in the Hays case quoted with ap-

proval the following passage from Pinney v. Berry, 61

Mo. 359 (1875):

“But it is obvious that this rule (recovering the

whole damage in one action) has no application to

such nuisances as may be removed the day after the

verdict, or for the continuance of which a second

or third may be maintained, or which may be abated

at the instance of the injured party, by the order

of a competent court.”

The trial court in the case at bar found, as a fact,

such inadequacy. The appellate court confirmed the

finding. This court will not disturb that finding upon

a review on certiorari. United States v. Johnston, 208

U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496, 69 L. Ed. 925 (1925); Page

v. National Gas Corporation, 286 U. S. 269, 52 S. Ct.

507, 76 L. Ed. 1096 (1932).

14

In Smith v. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S. W. 597

(1912) (petition herein, p. 27), a suit was brought for

damages and injunction against the City of Sedalia for

discharge of the effluent from its sewer plant onto plain-

tiff’s land. A prior suit had been instituted for damages

on account of the same facts (Smith v. Sedalia, 152 Mo.

283, 53 S. W. 907 (1899). This prior suit was. still

pending. The real holding of the case is that the prior

suit constituted a bar to the second suit. No question

was raised in either case as to the adequacy of the sewage

disposal plant or as to the negligent manner of its con-

struction or operation. The litigation occurred 20 years

ago, at which time methods of effective sewage disposal

were not in as general use as they are today.

The court in the second case held that the plaintiff had

elected, in his first suit, to confirm the right of the city

to the use of plaintiff’s land by bringing an action broad

enough to cover damages for the diminished value of

the land. The court held that a recovery of damages for

the appropriation of the stream had the effect of con-

firming the right of the city to sewer into the stream as

effectively as if that right had been obtained through

condemnation. The first suit was an election by the

plaintiff to adopt that form of relief. The court said:

“Both suits brought by plaintiff are, substantially,

actions for damages for injury to his land resulting

from a wrongtul appropriation by the defendant city.

He concedes the right of the city to condemn, and

complains because it has not done so, insisting in

effect that the city shall put him in the position to

claim permanent damages; but by his 1893 suit he

has put himself in position to claim the same measure

of damage in full compensation for the injury.

I]. Holding as we do that the injury is permanent,

and that damages in full compensation can be

7

awarded in the suit pending in Johnson County,

such damages to be measured by the decrease in

market value of the land caused by the sewer, it is

obvious that plaintiff cannot have such compensation

and also maintain a suit for injunction. A recovery

of damages as indicated would have the effect of

confirming the right of the city to sewer into the

stream as effectually as if the right had been obtained

through condemnation (Doyle v. Railroad, 113 Mo.

280).”

The decision is correct. Obviously a property owner

could not institute an action for the entire damage suf-

fered, including diminished value of the land, and then

afterwards seek an injunction. The case so holds; but

it does not hold that a property owner who elects in the

first instance to seek an injunction against a nuisance,

can not have that remedy. Petitioner misconstrues the

effect of the decisions allowing recovery in one action

for all damages. Petitioner apparently believes that be-

cause such a recovery may be had at law, that is the only

remedy available. None of the cases cited by petitioner

establish such a principle.

Likewise in Horine v. Peoples Sewer Company, 200

Mo. App. 233, 204 S. W. 735 (1918) (petition herein, p.

29), no issue was raised as to the adequacy of the sewage

disposal facilities or as to the management, construction

or maintenance thereof. Plaintiff simply sued to enjoin

the discharge of the sewage without any showing as to

whether the plant maintained by the city was as effective

as possible, and it does not appear whether the city had

done all that could be done to minimize the nuisance.

Furthermore, it appears in the case that the city had ac-

quired a prescriptive right over a long period of years,

and that as in the case of Smith v. Sedalia, supra, a prior

16

action at law for damages was pending. The court said

that it would not enjoin the further operation of the sew-

age plant “when it clearly appears that any injury caused

to plaintiff by the sewer can be fully compensated by a

pending action at law.” (Italics ours.)

Thus, upon examination, it appears that the four cases

relied upon by petitioner to defeat respondent’s action for

injunction do not establish the proposition that under no

circumstances will the Missouri courts enjoin the main-

tenance of a municipal sewage plant. In none of those

cases was the question of negligent construction or negli-

gent operation of a sewage plant involved. Those cases

hold that a property owner may have one action for

damages in which all damages past or future may be

recovered at law, but they do not hold that upon a show-

ing of insufficient or negligent construction or operation

injunction will not lie. Upon that point the cases cited

in respondent’s brief opposing petition for writ of certio-

rari are clear (pp. 5-11). In addition to those authorities,

respondent invites attention to the following cases:

In Missouri vy. Illinois and the Sanitary District of

Chicago, 180 U. S. 208, 21 S. Ct. 331, 45 L. Ed. 493

(1901), there was an original proceeding in this court

to enjoin the discharge of the sewage from the city of

Chicago through an artificial canal into the Mississippi

River. The decision of this court was rendered upon a

demurrer to plaintiff’s petition. This court said of the

petition:

“The object of the bill is to subject this public

work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that

the method of its construction and maintenance will

create a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health

of a neighboring state and its inhabitants.”

wae,

ert

i Pace aaa eee

The demurrer to the bill was overruled, and the de-

fendants given leave to file answers. Thus it is plain

that this court held that there is an inherent jurisdiction

in equity to pass upon the reasonableness of methods

adopted by a municipality to dispose of its sewage. In

the Illinois case, supra, this court cited with approval the

decision in Chapman vy. City of Rochester, 110 New York

273, 18 N. E. 88 (1888).

In the Chapman case plaintiff, living in the suburbs of

defendant city, collected the waters of a stream which arose

in the city and flowed across his property, in an artificial

basin for domestic uses. The city constructed sewers,

discharging surface water and sewage into the stream

above plaintiff, rendering its water unfit for use, etc.

In an action for damages and injunction against continu-

ance of the nuisance, plaintiff recovered $1200.00 present

damages and the injunction prayed, and judgment was

affirmed, the court saying:

“These and other facts well warranted the con-

clusion of the trial court that the act of the defend-

ant, in thus emptying its sewers, constituted an of-

fensive and dangerous nuisance. Moreover, the plain-

tiff is found to have sustained a special injury to

his health and property from the same cause; and

we find no reason to doubt that he is entitled, not

only to compensation for damages thereby occasioned,

but also to such a judgment as will prevent the

further perpetration of the wrong complained of.

Goldsmid v. Commissioners, L. R. I Eq. 161, L. R.

| Ch. 349. In view of the principle upon which these

and like decisions turn, the objections of the learned

counsel for the defendant, against the judgment ap-

pealed from, are quite unimportant. The filth of

the city does not flow naturally to the lands of the

plaintiff, as surface water finds its level, but is

carried thither by artificial arrangements prepared

18

by the city, and for which it is responsible. * * *

In fine, the case comes within the general rule which

gives to a person injured by the pollution of air

or water, to the use of which in its natural condi-

tion he is entitled, an action against the party,

whether it be a natural person or a corporation who

causes that pollution.”

The above language is quoted in part with approval by

the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri vy.

Illinois, supra.

Missouri vy. Illinois is cited by the Supreme Court of

Michigan in Attorney General ex rel. vy. City of Grand

Rapids, 175 Michigan 503, 141 N. W. 890 (1913). In

that case an injunction was sustained against the city

to prevent the emptying of the city’s sewage into a

stream so as to constitute a nuisance to riparian own-

ers lower down the stream. The court expressly vepudi-

ated the doctrine that the necessity of the city excused

the nuisance, saying:

“The doctrine that necessity is no defense to an

unreasonable pollution of a watercourse is supported

by the following cases: Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio

St. 263, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 276, 87 N. E. 174;

Hunter v. Taylor Coal Co., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 190;

Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N. J. Eq.

65, 33 Atl. 286; H. B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner,

117 Tenn. 180, 9 L. R. A. €N. S.) 923, 100 S. W.

116, 10 Ann. Cas. 581; Day v. Louisville Coal &

Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167,

as &. E. 776."

In Baltimore and Potomac R. R. Co. vy. Fifth Baptist

Church, 137 U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 784

(1891), the case of a nuisance caused by the proximity

of the railroad company’s shops to the church property

PN SNCS AIR

7

ROE

19

came before this court for a second time. The first case

under the same title is reported in 108 U. S. 317, 2 S.

Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739 (1883) (respondent’s brief op-

posing petition for writ of certiorari, p. 9). The sec-

ond case adds nothing to the principle outlined in the

first case, viz., that the power of eminent domain may

not be exercised unreasonably. The case is significant,

however, in showing that although the offending struc-

ture in that case was enduring (an engine house and

repair shop), yet this court did not treat the nuisance

as permanent in the sense that the first recovery of dam-

ages was a final recovery. This court permitted recov-

ery in two subsequent actions, both involved in the sec-

ond case, and it expressly held that the damages awarded

in the second case should not be minimized by the amount

of the initial recovery. That this court regarded the en-

gine house in that case as a continuing or temporary

nuisance in the sense that repeated recoveries could be

had is clear from the following quotation;

“The cases at bar afford a good illustration of

the rule of law, and of its application, as stated by

Blackstone: ‘Indeed every continuance of a nuisance

is held to be a fresh one; and therefore a fresh ac-

tion will lie, and very exemplary damages will prob-

ably be given, if, after one verdict against him, the

defendant has the hardiness to continue it.’ 3° BI.

Com. 220.”

In Bollinger et al. v. American Asphalt Roof Corpo-

rtion, 224 Mo. App. 98, 19 S. W. (2d) 544 (1929),

plaintiffs maintained a home, and boating business, on the

Blue River near Kansas City, Mo. Defendant operated

a factory near by and discharged into the stream oil

and noxious fluids and odorous compounds and caused

soot, smoke, fumes and odors to be discharged into the

20

air, thus rendering the stream unfit for plaintiff’s busi-

ness and so contaminating the air as to render plain-

tiff’s home and place of business untenable and useless.

The factory had been built and put in operation by Oc-

tober 1, 1920. The suit was commenced September 30,

1926. Defendant contended that the injury was perma-

nent and had continued for more than five years and

hence that plaintiff’s suit for damages was barred by

limitations. The court held that the nuisance was not

permanei. because “‘abatable.” The court said on this

point :

“By their very nature the things involved in the

manner of use of the plant are abatable, and the

evidence shows that some of them in this case were,

in fact, abated in part, for example, by the erection

of a 60-foot condenser stack in 1923, for the dis-

position of fumes and smoke * * *.”

So in the case at bar all that is required is the addi-

tion of certain features to the existing sewage plant to

abate the nuisance (R. 51).

A nuisance is not permanent because the source is a

tangible structure rather than an intangible act, method

or use. A nuisance is permanent only when the cause,

whether a physical structure or not, is unchangeable or

unabatable.

In Blankenship v. Kansas Explorations, 325 Mo, 998,

30 S. W. (2) 471 (1930), plaintiff brought action

against defendant for the diminished value of plaintiff's

mill caused by the dumping of sludge and debris from

defendant’s mine into plaintifi’s mill pond. The Missouri

Supreme Court treated the nuisance created by the

accumulation of sludge and debris in the mill pond as

permanent, and allowed recovery of damages for the

diminished value of plaintiff's property, or the cost of

AYRE VERIO S A SEEN EN MAR OTT PRE

ues —

21

removing the debris from the mill pond, whichever sum

might be less. The following passage contains a good sur-

vey of the Missouri authorities.

“It (the deposit in the mill pond) is not a structure

upon defendant’s land or a process of operation go-

ing on upon defendant’s land, but a deposit upon

plaintiffs’ land, which plaintiffs cannot by judicial

process compel defendant to remove.

In Hanlin v. Meat Co., supra, the defendant,

operating a meat packing plant, emptied into a stream

running over plaintiff's land offensive substances and

fluids, which polluted the stream, and destroyed a

well adjacent thereto, It was held that pollution of

the stream could be abated by the defendant, and

was of a temporary nature, but also held that the

injury to the well was permanent because it had

\ been destroyed.

In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, supra, the

plaintiff's complaint was the overflow of his prop-

erty by surface water from a sewer. He was per-

mitted to bring successive actions. The ground

upon which the injury was held temporary was, that

the cause of it was not permanent in a legal sense,

but could be abated by the city, by the enlargement

of drainage pipes or diversion of the water.

Nee +

Ivie vy. McMunigal was a case where the complaint

was of damage from smoke, cinders and dirt falling

- upon plaintiff’s dwelling house from defendant's

i foundry. Permanent damages were held to be not

recoverable on the ground that it was a nuisance

i such as could be removed the day after verdict, or

could be abated by the order of a competent court.

or, if continued, a second or third action for dam-

ages was maintainable.

In Schoen v. Kansas City, the injury complained of,

pollution of the water of a stream by emptying a

sewer therein, was the result of a temporary delay

a

in the construction of a sewer. The ruling proceeded

upon the theory that the cessation of the work was

not. permanent, and that when the work should be

continued the nuisance would cease.

In Pinney v. Berry, the plaintiff complained of the

erection and maintenance of a dam across a creek

which caused the water to flow up a branch on

plaintiff’s land, cutting off communication with a

part of his land, filling the branch with mud, leaves,

etc., and creating a nuisance which injured the health

of his family. The plaintiff was permitted to prove

that his property was rendered less valuable per

acre and that a spring was destroyed, and the value

of the spring. The petition contained no allegation

as to the destruction of a spring, and objection to

the evidence was made upon that ground. No in-

structions were asked or given by either party. It

was ruled that the trial court erred in allowing the

plaintiff to prove the value of his land before and

after the creation of the nuisance. After stating

what was said to be the rule of damages for neg-

ligent injury to real property the court said: ‘But

it is obvious that this rule has no application to

such nuisances as may be removed the day after the

verdict, or for the continuance of which a second

or third action may be maintained, or which may

be abated at the instance of the injured party by the

order of a competent court.’ ”

22

Citations of the cases digested in the foregoing passage 3

are:

Hanlin v. Meat Co., 174 Mo. App. 462, 160 S. W.

547 (1913).

Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 284 S. W. 321

(1926) (not officially reported).

Ivie v. McMunigal, 66 Mo. App. 437 (1896).

Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo. App. 134 (1896).

Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359 (1875).

tt S PY PERRO

Thus the distinction between a permanent nuisance

and a temporary nuisance turns upon whether or not

the abatement can be effected by acts to be done by de-

fendant, under judicial compulsion, if necessary, at the

source of the nuisance. In the Blankenship case, supra,

the court probably could not order by mandatory in-

junction that the defendant go upon plaintiff’s land and

remove the sludge and debris from the mill pond. On

the other hand, in the Kelly case and the Pinney case,

supra, as in the case at bar, the defendant can “the day

after verdict’? abate the nuisance by immediate action

lying within the power of the defendant. The nuisance

in the case at bar could be removed almost immediately

by cessation of the outflow from the sewer plant into the

watercourse. Therefore, it is a temporary nuisance.

The nuisance in the Blankenship case, consisting of a

permanent deposit in the mill pond on plaintiff’s land,

could not be immediately abated. In the case at bar an

injunction against the city will for all practical purposes

terminate the nuisance. In the Blankenship case an in-

junction against further discharge of slag and debris

from the mine would not have cured the permanent solid

deposits of such matter that had already accumulated

in plaintiff’s mill pond; therefore the nuisance was per-

manent.

In Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, supra, a second

action for damages caused by overflow from the city’s

storm sewer was instituted. The plaintiff had recovered

damages in a prior action and after that recovery an

improvement had been made in the drainage system.

In the second action plaintiff claimed further damages

from overflow despite the improvement. The court held

the nuisance temporary, and permitted the maintenance of

the second action. The court said:

24 |

“It appears that the cause of the overflow is not

permanent in a legal sense. It could be abated by the

enlargement of the discharge pipes or the diversion

of the water, and when this is true the wrong will be

treated as temporary in character. Carson v. City of

Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289; Foncannon vy. City of

Kirksville, 88 Mo. App. 279; Schoen v. Kansas City,

65 Mo. App. 134; Scott v. City of Nevada, 56 Mo.

App. 189; Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo. App.

84, 125 S. W. 824; Howard County v. Railway, 130

Mo. 652, 32 S. W. 651; White v. City of Springfield.

189 Mo. App. 228, 173 S. W. 1090.

The first suit was filed within 5 years from the

date of the completion of the work of the street

which is charged to have caused this condition, and

the present suit was filed within 5 years of the date

of the first suit. If the conditions existing were

illegal and abatable—that is to say, if the nuisance

is subject to abatement by order of a competent

court—then the plaintiff has a right to successive

actions from damage resulting therefrom.”

It is apparent that the nuisance in the case at bar

is temporary. The real question is whether the plain-

tiff must be left to a series of actions at law or may have

injunctive relief. The record shows, and the courts

have found, that the city has not employed reasonable

and usual means to reduce its sewage. Under such

circumstances there is no doubt of the power of a court q

of equity to enjoin the nuisance.

In Fisher vy. American Reduction Co., 189 Pa. 419,

42 Atlantic 36 (1899), the plaintiff sought to enjoin

the operation of a reduction plant. The plant was con-

structed and operated under contract with the city of

Pittsburgh. The plant was located in the most unob-

jectionable place that could be found within the city limits,

25

and operated efficiently as possible with the type of equip-

ment available. It appeared, however, that noxious odors

could be reduced by additional equipment which would

make for a speedier reduction of the sewage. The court

entered a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant

to dispose of the garbage as fast as it was brought to

the spot, and take other practical steps which would ren-

der the operation of the plant less objectionable.

In Munk v. Columbus Sanitary Works, 7 Ohio N. P.

342, 5 Ohio D. E. C. 548 (1897), the court found that

the defendant in the operation of a garbage plant was

creating a nuisance, and a decree was entered restrain-

ing the defendant from so operating the plant as to cause

the injuries complained of. The operation of the order

was postponed until a fixed date in the future and the

defendant was directed in the meantime to make such

alterations in the plant that it could be operated without

creating the nuisance, with the further provision that

if the defendant did not at once, in good faith, take

steps to prevent the nuisance, the injunction would be-

come effective immediately.

In Simpson v. Dupont Powder Co., 143 Ga. 467, 85

S. E. 344 (1915), a municipal corporation was proceed-

ing under contract with a crematory company to erect

an incinerator for the consumption of the garbage of

the city. The erection of the crematory was in progress

when a suit was filed in which it was established that

the location of the incinerator at the point selected would

create a nuisance injuring residents in the community

by causing offensive odors, and the gathering of flies

in the vicinity. It was shown that other locations were

available for the incinerator in which injury would not

be done to property owners. The completion of the

crematory was enjoined.

carrey

26

In Block vy. Baltimore, 149 Maryland 39, 129 Atlantic

887 (1925), suit was brought by adjoining land owners

against the city and the owners of a garbage reduction

plant. The plaintiffs in their bill alleged that nearby

waters were so polluted as to be of no use for any pur-

pose, and that surrounding territory was rendered almost

uninhabitable by odors emitted from the plant. It was

held that since the plaintiffs suffered special damage and

there was no adequate remedy at law, they were entitled

to the injunction.

In State ex rel. Board of Health v. White, 90 N. J.

Eq. 621, 110 Atlantic 43 (1919), it appeared that the

defendant had contracted with the city of Asbury Park

to remove its garbage. He hauled the garbage to his

sixty-acre farm some distance from the populous section,

and there cooked or steamed the garbage and fed it to

his pigs. Plaintiff complained of the nauseating odors.

Injunction was granted.

In some of the cases injunction was granted against

disposal of municipal sewage or garbage regardless of

a showing as to whether the city was using every means

reasonably available to avoid a nuisance. We do not

seek to go that far in the case at bar. The whole bur-

den of plaintiff's testimony at the trial was to show that

there are effective means for the reduction of sewage

which leave the effluent clear, colorless, odorless, and non-

putrescent. The effluent from such a plant will not create

a nuisance, even in a very small watercourse. The

principle for which we contend and the one adopted

by the courts below is that a city must exercise its tunc-

tion of sewage disposal in a reasonable manner and if

it is creating an unnecessary nuisance by failure to

adopt reasonable means for disposal, injunction will lie.

Failure to apply this principle would leave with the city

ALLL SL on

St Seg eB i Be

27

the power of arbitrary and oppressive conduct toward

land owners in the environs. For example, the city

of Harrisonville in the case at bar might have constructed

a plain tank of concrete consisting of four walls and a bot-

tom. Sewage flowing into such a tank and out into the

watercourse would undergo but slight reduction. The Im-

hoff Tank in question is merely a modification of such a

structure so designed as to retard the flow of sewage for

a period during which a process of settling occurs. The

ease and efficiency with which sewage may be completely

reduced makes such a structure an unreasonable method

for the reduction of sewage. If the city had used avail-

able methods, methods which are in general use; methods

which can still be applied without abandoning the par-

tially effective structure now in existence, then there

might be a question concerning the right of the plain-

tiff to enjoin the trespass. The city has not used rea-

sonable means.

The principle for which we contend is not a limitation

upon the power of eminent domain. Any power is sub-

ject to such limitations as are involved in its reasonable

exercise. It is the function and the power of the courts

to determine those limitations. This would be true in

the case at bar if the city had exercised a power of

eminent domain to condemn the watercourse in ques-

tion. The fact is that the city did not proceed by con-

demnation (R., p. 7), although it could have done so

under Section 7023, R. S. Mo. 1929, which is as fol-

lows:

“The board of aldermen may make regulations

and pass ordinances for the prevention of the in-

troduction of contagious diseases in the city, and

for the abatement of the same, and may make quar-

antine laws and enforce the same within five miles

me |

28

of the city. They may purchase or condemn and

hold for the city, within or without the city limits,

within five miles therefrom, all necessary lands for

hospital purposes, waterworks, sewer carriage and

outfall, and erect, establish and regulate hospitals,

workhouses, poorhouses, and provide for the govern-

ment and support of the same, and make regulations

to secure the general health of the city, and to

prevent and remove nuisances: Provided, how-

ever, that the condemnation of any property out-

side of the city limits shall be regulated in all re-

spects as the condemnation of property for rail-

road purposes is regulated by law: and provided

further, that the police jurisdiction of the city shall

extend over such land and property to the same

extent as over public cemeteries, as provided in this

article.”

Even if the city had exercised this power, it would

have been subject to the limitation involved in reason-

able and adequate methods of sewage reduction. The

power of eminent domain is not the power to be arbi-

trary or negligent.

II.

The Financial Ability of the City to Comply with the Decree.

(A) Bonding Power.

Petitioner assumes that the cost of complying with

the injunction against “discharge of putrescible sewage

matter” into the watercourse will be $25,000.00 or $30,-

000.00. This assumption is based upon the estimated

cost of certain types of complete sewage disposal given

by respondent’s engineer in the course of his descrip-

tion of usual methods of complete sewage disposal (R.

51, 52). Petitioner introduced no evidence at the trial

a st 2s Si PRES 9 Ser ae aca

ncaa

29

as to cost of complete sewage disposal. Indeed the peti-

tioner at the trial was somewhat equivocal in tender-

ing a plea of municipal poverty as an excuse for main-

taining the nuisance. This colloquy occurred (R. 99,

100) :

“The Court: Let’s get at the point here. Are you

trying to show the City of Harrisonville is poor?

Mr. Barnett: Yes, sir, not only poor, but that it

may not, within the limits of the law, by the sale

of additional bonds get the money to build this sec-

ondary plant. Our purpose in this testimony is to

show the court what the financial condition is of

the City. Of course, whether or not the City can

or cannot create greater indebtedness after that is

a question of law, regulated by the Constitution and

the statutes, but this is to give the court the facts

about our present financial condition.

The Court: Now is it your statement that the City

could encroach unreasonably upon the land of a

property owner and then defend its conduct, justify

it, upon the ground that it was not financially able

to do a reasonable thing?

Judge Glenn: No, Your Honor, it is not.

The Court: In other words, that a poor town could

do an unreasonable thing and a rich town could not.

Judge Glenn: We do not take that position, but

this: If it is possible for this court to make an order

for us to put an additional plant in there, this court

would have to take into consideration the fact that

—whether we have exceeded our constitutional limit

of indebtedness before the court could force us to

do it; in other words, if the court could force us to

do something the Constitution said we couldn’t. But

as to the damage we have done, the party can sue

us and get a judgment and the court can cause a

levy in addition to a constitutional limit, but the

City can’t vote a bonded indebtedness.

The Court: I understand the theory that you can

ee

&

30

pay damages, but you can’t arrange to prevent dam-

ages, is that it?

Judge Glenn: This other way, we would have to

vote bonds to do this, and we have exceeded our

constitutional limit—that is, we haven’t exceeded it,

but we have already bonded the City to the maximum.

The Witness: Section 12 gives five per cent for

the building of sewers. We have now under that

five per cent some $42,500.00.”

Thus the petitioner at the trial disavowed an intent

to shield a wrong behind poverty, but urged that the

City was incapacitated by an exhausted bonding power.

It now appears by petitioner’s admission that the City

can raise at least half of the minimum estimated cost

of one of the suggested methods of abating the nuisance

by use of bonding power (petitioner’s brief, p. 51).

Let us examine other methods available to the City.

(B) Special Public Sewer Tax.

One of the several methods of paying for the con-

struction of a disposal plant is provided by Section 7031,

Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, which is as follows:

“The board of aldermen shall have power to cause

a general sewer system to be established, which shall

be composed of three classes of sewers, to-wit: Pub-

lic, district and private sewers. Public sewers. shall

be established along the principal courses of drain-

age, at such points, to such extent, of such dimen-

sions and under such regulations as may be pro-

vided by ordinance, and these may be extensions

or branches of sewers already constructed, or entirely

new throughout, as may be deemed expedient. The

board of aldermen may levy a tax on all property

made taxable for state purposes over the whole city,

to pay for the constructing. reconstructing and_re-

31

pairing of such work, which tax shall be called ‘spe-

cial public sewer tax,’ and shall be such amount as

may be required for the sewer provided by ordinance

to be built; and the fund arising from said tax shall

be appropriated solely to the constructing, recon-

structing and repairing of said sewer.”

It is expressly held that this statute applies to a plant

for the disposal of sewage as well as to lines and mains

for the collection of sewage. Schueler v. City of Kirk-

wood, 191 Mo. App. 575, 177 S. W. 760 (1915).

The comprehensive nature of the statutory power will

be noted; especially the power to levy the tax for recon-

struction or repair of an existing general sewer system.

The statute is clearly applicable to the case at bar.

( insel for petitioner erroneously state that the fore-

© vig statute has been held unconstitutional (petitioner’s

brief, p. 52). The case of Union Trust Co. v. Pagen-

stecher, 221 Mo. 121, 119 S. W. 1103 (1909), does not

hold the statute unconstitutional; it holds that a tax of

$2.50 per $100 levied in that case was invalid because

not submitted to vote of the people under Sec. 11, Art.

10 of the Constitution of Missouri. The court holds the

special public sewer tax to be a general municipal tax.

Therefore the provision of the constitution above cited

was applicable. Under that constitutional provision, no

tax in excess of fifty cents on the hundred dollars valua-

tion can be levied in a city of the class in question unless

such excess be authorized by two-thirds of the qualified

voters. In the Union Trust Co. case the matter of the

tax had never been submitted to the voters at all. Hence,

the tax, but not the statute, was invalid.

This point must be well noted, otherwise petitioner’s

erroneous statement that the statute is unconstitutional

will be confusing.

ne gee —

32

The City of Harrisonville is at perfect liberty today

to submit to the voters of the City of Harrisonville a

proposition to reconstruct or repair the City’s disposal

plant, and two-thirds of the qualified voters may authorize

the board of alderman to levy whatever tax may be sub-

mitted for that purpose.

The following quotation from the Union Trust Co. case,

supra, gives the pertinent provisions of the Missouri Con-

stitution and the holding of the court:

“The section (Sec. 11, Art. 10, Mo. Const.) so far

as applicable, reads: ‘In cities and towns having

less than ten thousand and more than one thousand

inhabitants, said rate shall not exceed fifty cents on

the hundred dollars valuation; * * * provided, * * *

for the purposes of erecting public buildings in * * *

cities * * * the rates of taxes herein limited may

be increased when the rate of such increase and the

purpose for which it is intended shall have been sub-

mitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of the

qualified voters of such * * * city * * * voting at

such election, shall vote therefor.’ ”

The court then concluded that “before a legal tax in

excess of fifty cents on the hundred dollars can be levied

the question must receive the approval of two-thirds of

the qualified voters who vote at an election held for that

purpose.” The court construes the phrase “public build-

ings” to mean “public works.” See Battle v. Willcox, 128

S. C. 500, 122 S. FE. 516 (1924).

Petitioner speaks as if the Missouri Constitution im-

posed an absolute limitation upon the City in the matter

of raising funds. Such is not the case. The constitution

simply prohibits a tax rate in towns of petitioner’s class

of more than fifty cents per hundred dollars of valuation

NS SRE I eR PI ea ta he : WERE

33

unless two-thirds of the voters approve for specified pur-

poses.

The existing litigation is controlled, of course, by

the city officials and their counsel. They have elected not

to submit to the voters of the City a proposal to abate

the unnecessary nuisance. Until they do that, the petitioner

cannot urge in this court or any other court a matter

of financial inability. The City officials should not assume

that the voters wish to perpetuate the stench and pollution

in the watercourse. They should assume that the voters

would take seriously the trial court’s statement that (R.

182):

“The City in the exercise of its function should

be anxious to avoid disposing of its sewage in such

way as to occasion needless harm and injury to the

people who hold property in its environs.”

(C) Special Assessments.

Petitioner confuses this method with the special pub-

lic sewer tax discussed in (B) just above.

Sec. 7038, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, is as

follows:

“Whenever the city shall deem it necessary, it may,

by ordinance, provide for the construction of a septic

tank or other sewage reduction device for the pur-

pose of purifying the discharge from any district or

joint district sewer. In such case the cost thereof

shall be assessed against the lands in the district or

joint district for which the same is provided in the

same manner as is provided for the assessing of

the cost of district sewers.”

This statute provides a third method. A disposal plant

may be constructed and paid for by special assessments

levied upon a benefit district. The benefit district may

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34

comprise several district sewers; indeed, all the dis-

trict sewers in “the natural drainage area.”’ (See Sec.

7037, R. S. Mo. 1929, Appendix B.) See also Farmers

& Merchants Trust Co. v. Hillcrest Realty Co., 285 Mo.

552, 234 S. W. 1023 (1920).

Counsel for petitioner stated in oral argument in the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that the sewer system

of Harrisonville is a public sewer system. However that

may be, the statute in question clearly gives the power to

the City to lay out the City into districts or joint dis-

tricts for the purpose of collecting the sewage into a

disposal plant, and to levy benefit assessments against

those districts or joint districts to pay for the improve-

ment. The fact that the original sewer mains may have

been laid as a public sewer system would not preclude

dividing the city into districts for disposal purposes.

(D) General Revenue.

By authority of Sec. 7276, Revised Statutes of Mis-

souri 1929 (quoted in petitioner’s brief, p. 13), the City

may acquire a sewage disposal plant and pay therefor

out of general revenue over a ten-year period. Petitioner

contends that the general revenue of the City is insuf-

ficient for that purpose. Petitioner states that the City’s

general revenue is only $6,000.00 per annum (petitioner's

brief, p. 50). We find no support in the record for this

statement. The record (pp. 102-107) contains statement

of certain accounts, but a careful examination fails to

disclose any showing as to amount of general revenue for

any period whatever.

Petitioner argues that the general revenue must be

first applied to paying the City’s “general operating ex-

pense” (petitioner’s brief, p. 51). There is, however,

no showing in the record of the amount of fixed operat-

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35

ing expenses of the City. Petitioner cites Anderson Vv.

Ripley County, 181 Mo. 46, 80 S. W. 263 (1904) (peti-

tioner’s brief, p. 51). That case dealt with a statute pre-

scribing the purposes for which the revenues of a county

should be applied. Petitioner cites no authority controlling

disposition of funds of the City in this case.

There is nothing in the record to show that the City

may not manage its finances in such manner as to pro-

vide the funds for this method. Of course it is easy for

the City officials to believe the task impossible because,

evidently, they have no will for the job. On the other

hand they did not hesitate recently to spend $100,000.00

for a water plant (R. 102, 108).

Furthermore, with respect to raising funds to make

payments under the contract authorized by Section 7276,

supra, the City is not limited to its constitutional power

to levy taxes at the rate of 50c per hundred; neither

would the total sum that might fall due within the period

of that contract constitute an indebtedness within the

meaning of Article 10, Section 12, of the Constitution

of Missouri. Lamar Water and Electric Light Com-

pany v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188, 26 S. W. 1025

(1894).

In that case a city of the fourth class entered into a

contract with respect to a water works. The contract

called for 20 annual payments of $3,000.00. For the

purposes of meeting the annual payments, the City levied

a tax “not exceeding 40c¢ on the $100.00 valuation on

all taxable property in the City, * * *.” This tax of 40c

per hundred dollars valuation was in addition to a gen-

eral tax of 50c per hundred dollars of valuation. The

case is a landmark in Missouri, and establishes two

propositions :

1. That an annual tax authorized by Section 12, Ar-

36

ticle 10, of the Missouri Constitution (Appendix C) to

retire indebtedness is not within the limitations of Sec-

tion 11 of Article 10 of the Missouri Constitution limit-

ing the general tax levy to 50c¢ on the $100.00 valuation

for cities of the fourth class.

2. That the total sum of a contract indebtedness pay-

able in installments over a period of years is not an

indebtedness within the limitation of Article 10, Sec-

tion 12, of the Missouri Constitution.

In establishing the second point, the court quoted the

following passage from Dillon on Municipal Corpora-

tions:

“Under the constitutional provisions in Iowa, Il-

linois, Indiana and Pennsylvania, referred to, it is

held that a corporation may make a contract (at

least for necessaries) covering a series Of years,

upon which an obligation to pay may arise from

year to year as the thing contracted for is furnished,

and in such case, the whole amount which may ulti-

mately become due does not constitute a debt within

the constitutional prohibition. But in order to ascer-

tain whether the corporation by such contract is

transgressing the limit, regard is had only to the

amount which may fall due within a certain year

or other period; and if the revenues for that year

or other period are sufficient, over and above the

payment of the other expenses, to pay such amount,

there is no debt incurred within the constitutional

prohibition.” 1 Dillon’s Municipal Corporations (4

Ed.), 1890, Sec. 136a.”

In Saleno v. The City of Neosho, 127 Mo. 627, 30 S.

W. 190 (1895), a contract by a city to pay a fixed price

annually for 20 years for water was held not to create

an indebtedness for the total sum of the 20 annual pay-

Paik tea nerroscats Mand BW Fac MS Se

ments within the limitations of Section 12, Article 10,

of the Missouri Constitution.

It may be argued by petitioner that in both of the

cases supra the contracts with respect to water were con-

tracts for services rather than for the acquisition of

properties. We need not consider whether that would

be a sound distinction for the reason that the contract

which the City is authorized to make under Section 7276,

Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929 (quoted in full in

petitioner's brief, p. 13), empowers the City to “provide

for the gathering, handling and disposition, either by it-

self or by contract with others for the gathering, han-

dling and disposition of * * * refuse matter and mu-

nicipal waste * * *; to acquire by purchase, construc-

tion, lease, gift or otherwise within or without the cor-

porate limits of such cities an incinerator or incinerators

for the destruction of such * * * refuse matter and

municipal waste; to acquire by any of such means a

purification plant or plants or sewage disposal plant for

the purification of all sewage accumulating in such

cities.” (Italics ours. )

Thus within the exact terms of the statute, the City in

the case at bar may lease rather than acquire ownership

of the necessary sewage disposal facilities and in that

manner bring itself within the exact facts which were

involved in the Lamar case and the Neosho case, supra.

If we were advising the City of Harrisonville, we

would advise the City that it could contract for the

construction of necessary sewage disposal facilities to

be paid for in ten annual installments, or it could con-

tract by lease or otherwise for a service of sewage dis-

posal to be provided by private enterprise.

The function of sewage disposal is frequently per-

formed by private enterprise for compensation. One rea-

38

son, among others, for such enterprise is the well known

fact that the residue from sewage disposal furnishes a

by-product which has commercial value as fertilizer.

The contract price, either for acquisition of the plant or

to cover lease, rental or service over a period of years

(in the latter case the statute does not limit the period

to ten years) can be provided by the levy of a tax suf-

ficient to pay the annual installment in each year; and

for that purpose the City is not limited to a tax of 50c

per $100.00 of valuation.

Let us summarize the powers of the City applicable to

a reconstruction or repair of its sewage disposal plant:

(1) The City has by its own admission an available

bonding power of $12,583.00, plus the increase in that

figure due to retirement of bonds which may have oc-

curred since June 17, 1930, the date of the trial and

the date on which petitioner computes the above figure

(R. 34, 102; petitioner’s brief, p. 51).

(2) The City may submit to the voters a proposal to

reconstruct or repair the sewage disposal plant and the

voters may authorize whatever general tax is necessary

for that purpose.

(3) The City may tax the cost of such improvement

as special benefit assessments to the land in joint sewer

districts created for that purpose.

(4) The City may contract for the improvement and

pay the contract price from general revenues.

Finally there appears to be no reason why a combina-

tion of these methods may not be used.

Even if there were doubt concerning the City’s powers,

the officials should not at this stage resolve such doubt

against the trial court’s decree. They should first make the

attempt to comply, and if blocked by some legal barrier

39

present that matter to the trial court where jurisdiction

for such purposes was expressly reserved (R. 15, 16).

Ill.

In Any Event the Limitations Upon Financial Powers of the

City Probably Do Not Apply to Matters Affecting

Compliance with the Decree.

Limitations of the amount of municipal indebtedness

apply only to debts created by voluntary act or contract,

and not to obligations or liabilities imposed upon the cor-

poration by law or against its will; 44 C. J. 1127.

It is well established in Missouri that a judgment

against a municipality for a tort liability can not be de-

feated by pleading that the city has exhausted its debt

making power.

In Connor vy. City of Nevada, 188 Mo. 148, 86 S. W.

256 (1905), a judgment was rendered against the city

for personal injuries occasioned by failure of the city

to properly maintain a public street. The city pleaded

that under the terms of Sections 11 and 12 of Article 10

of the Constitution of Missouri the debt making and tax-

ing power of the city had been exhausted, and therefore

the city could not be made liable for additional indebted-

ness. The court in rejecting the contention said:

“The clause of the constitution in question deals

with the subject of incurring indebtedness which

arises ex coutractu and which is very different in its

nature from suffering liability for a tort. The lan-

guage of Section 12 is that the city shall not be

allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any

purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the

income and revenue provided for such year without

the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof vot-

ing at an election to be held for that purpose. This

Lge dae epee

Se Re es

40

language shows that it is indebtedness incurred by

assent, agreement or contract. The word debt has a

well recognized meaning in law distinguished from

liability for damages. After a claim for damages is

reduced to a judgment it becomes, in a_ technical

sense, a debt, but it is a debt imposed by law, not

one assumed by contract.”

In State ex rel. Pyle, Administrator, v. City of Uni-

versity City et al., 320 Mo. 451, 8S. W. (2) 73 (1928),

the city sought to defeat a similar liability upon the same

grounds. The contention was again rejected. The court

said:

“Suits against municipalities, based on negligence,

involve wrongful acts, whether of omission or com-

mission. It was said in Conner v. Nevada, supra:

‘A city cannot scape liability from an obligation

arising ex delicto on the ground that its indebtedness

has already reached the constitutional limit.’ Again

it was there said: ‘Then when we turn again to the

clause in our constitution on which appellant. relies,

we see that it refers only to the contracting of debts,

and makes no reference to liability for torts; it leaves

that matter as the common law left it.’ To what then

has the statute reference? It speaks of constitutional

limits, but it is evident from the cases in this and

other states that the constitution does not limit the

rate of taxation where a tort is involved. Moreover,

municipalities should not escape responsibility for

their wrongful acts. Any other construction of the

statute might permit them to so escape, and would,

if collection of taxes for that purpose was thwarted.

The constitutional limitation, as we have held, refers

only to debts arising out of contractual relations,

leaving the matter as it was at common law.”

In McCarthy yv. City of Kelso, 129 Wash. 121, 223

Pac. 151 (1924), it is held that a constitutional limitation

41

upon debt making power would not apply to excuse the

city for failure to comply with an order of the state board

of health requiring the construction of a water filtration

plant, there being no other method whereby wholesome

water could be supplied to the city. The court said:

“Having held that the constitutional limitation does

not apply to an indebtedness for the maintenance of

a jail, a quarantine, a fire department, and impound-

ing stock because such indebtedness is necessary for

the preservation of property and the safety of the

inhabitants, we see no reason why the constitutional

limitation should prevent the city from incurring an

indebtedness for the construction of a water filtration

plant for the preservation of the health and lives of

its citizens.”

IV.

Comparative Injuries.

Petitioner contends that the alleged cost of improving

the Harrisonville sewage plant should be offset against

the amount of damages awarded respondent for loss of

rents. This argument assumes that the only damage re-

spondent has suffered is the difference between rent ac-

tually received for the premises and the theoretical rental

value if the water in the stream were unpolluted. The

decisions cited in this brief make frequent reference

to the impossibility of determining accurately the injury

suffered by a landowner from pollution in a stream and

from noxious odors, gases and fumes. Damages caused

by such nuisances include such intangible factors as dis-

comfort, inconvenience and annoyance, Baltimore and Po-

tomac Railroad Company v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137

U. S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 784 (1891). Indeed

it is the very impossibility of adequately fixing compen-

42

sation in money for the injuries received from such

sources which furnishes one ground for equitable juris-

diction.

The real measure of respondent’s damage is the sub-

stantial destruction of a fine stock farm so long as the

watercourse remains contaminated and polluted.

Furthermore, the doctrine of comparative injuries or

balanced equities does not obtain in Missouri. In the

case of State ex rel. v. Powder Mfg. Co., 259 Mo. 254,

169 S. W. 267 (1914), a suit to abate a nuisance, the

Missouri Supreme Court disposed of the doctrine in the

following language:

“Counsel for respondents say that we should con-

sider the ‘relative advantages and disadvantages to

the parties concerned.’ If it is meant by that assertion

that substantial, certain and irreparable damages to

the plaintiff which might be prevented by injunction

are to be left without remedy because of the fact that

greater damages and disadvantages would result to

the defendant, a wrongdoer, by the issuing of the in-

junction, we are driven to emphatically say no. * * *

‘But we have nothing to do with this question as

to the comparative importance of the conflicting in-

terests, or the inconvenience to the defendants by the

stoppage of their works, if they infringe the material,

substantial rights of others. It is the province and

imperative duty of the court to ascertain and enforce

the legal rights of the complainant, no matter what

the consequence to defendants may be. This duty no

court could evade if it would.’”

eens eB an aS

43

\ ] ee

. rs)

The Injunction in Question Does not Compel Exercise of

Legislative Power.

Petitioner makes the point that “the judiciary may not

properly compel exercise of legislative power.” Petition-

er’s argument consists of two false premises. The first

erroneous premise is stated as follows: “It must be con-

ceded, therefore, that the decision to build a secondary

plant is the exercise of a legislative function” (Petition-

er’s Brief in support of petition, p. 46). It is far from

clear why the above statement should be conceded when

the authorities cited by petitioner establish the exact

opposite of its statement.

The first authority cited by petitioner in support of its

contention that the decision to build a sewage disposal

plant is a legislative function, is 44 C. J. 1084, Sec.

4002 (p. 44 of Petitioner’s Brief). The passage quoted

by petitioner states that some courts have held that the

construction of municipal drains and sewers is a corpo-

rate or municipal as distinguished from a governmental

function, while other courts have held that it is a govern-

mental or legislative function. But the only Missouri

case cited by the authors is Donahoe v. Kansas City, 136

Mo. 657, 38 S. W. 571 (1897), and it is cited in sup-

port of the following:

“Some authorities hold that the construction and

maintenance of municipal drains and sewers is a cor-

porate or municipal, as distinguished from a govern-

mental function.”

In the Donahoe case a workman brought action against

the city to recover damages for injuries received while

digging a trench for a sewer. The court held for the

44

plaintiff on the ground that the maintenance of sewers

is a corporate rather than a governmental function. The

court said:

“But as soon as the corporation has determined

to construct a public work, it enters upon an under-

taking which, in all its details, should be subordi-

nated to the rule requiring the use of care, for the

work is then ministerial. (/b., Sec. 141, p. 267.)

In Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U. S. 21,

it is said: ‘But the construction and repair of sewers,

according to the general plan so adopted, are simply

ministerial duties; and for any negligence in so con-

structing a sewer, or keeping it in repair, the mu-

nicipality which has constructed and owns the sewer

may be sued by a person whose property is there-

by injured.’

‘The work of constructing gutters, drains, and

sewers is ministerial, and when, as is usually the

case, the undertaking is a corporate one, the cor-

poration is responsible in a civil action for damages

caused by the careless or unskillful manner of per-

forming the work.’ 2 Dillon’s Municipal Corporations

(4 Ed.), Sec. 1049.

The same rule was announced by this court in

Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, and seems to be

the general if not uniform doctrine upon this subject.

The sewers of the city are its private property;

the citizens are alone interested in them; the general

public of the state at large has no interest in them,

any more than they have in waterworks when owned

by a city, by which its citizens are supplied with

water, and in this very important particular differ

from the streets of the city, which are for the benefit

of the public generally.”

= — —— . FRAP RTI FOP

alee _

It is interesting to note that although petitioner cites

a part of Sec. 4002 of 44 C. J. 1084, it omits the part

of the same section which reads:

“Authority to construct and maintain drains and

sewers gives no right to create a nuisance, or to

construct drains or sewers or discharge sewage upon

private lands without permission, or without ac-

quiring the right to do so by lawful means and mak-

ing due compensation to the landowner for the in-

juries sustained.”” (See cases cited in notes 37 and

38.)

The second false premise of petitioner’s argument is

that the court has ordered the City to erect a new dis-

posal system. From time immemorial it has been the cus-

tom of courts of equity to enjoin a result, and to leave

it up to the wrongdoing defendant to choose the method

of stopping the enjoined result. This was the holding of

the Salton Sea cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909),

in which the court enjoined the flooding of lands in the

United States caused by floodgates maintained by defend-

ants in Mexico. It was conceded that the court had no

authority to order the doing of acts in Mexico, but the

court stated:

“\Vhy may not a court restrain a party over whom

it has jurisdiction from injuring property within

its jurisdiction? How does it affect the question of

jurisdiction or venue to say that the party on whom

the court must act may find it necessary to do things

outside the jurisdiction of the court in order to com-

ply with the order of the court? May this not often

happen, and would it not happen oftener, if it were

determined that such an excuse was sufficient to de-

feat the jurisdiction of the court.”

‘

=

z

e

DEAR OL PSE AANA MM OR

46

Finally, respondent returns in all seriousness to the

statement that the petitioner is not required by the

decree to do anything except cease the discharge of

putrescible sewage matter into the watercourse. Petitioner

is offended by the suggestion that the people of Har-

risonville may return to private disposal if they do not

wish to maintain a general disposal plant complying

with standard specifications. Petitioner says that this

thought is “so abhorrent to one’s sense of the requirements

of social and community life that it scarcely requires

further comment.” We wonder if the thought of human

excreta, visible in the stream, toul odors and noxious

gases, constantly offensive, is at all abhorrent to

the petitioner. There is great force in the statement of

the trial judge (Albert L. Reeves) that the City of Har-

risonville should not wish to dispose of its sewage in

such a way as to do harm and injury to persons living

in the environs. We submit that this court will take

cognizance of the fact that the trial judge, in all prob-

ability, is quite familiar with local situations in Missouri,

and that he knew full well that the City of Harrisonville

was trying to do a thing which other similar cities have

avoided doing. The City is trying to make respondent's

pasture land a part of its sewage disposal plant.

VI.

The decisions of the courts below upon questions of fact

and matters of discretion will not be disturbed on certiorari.

The courts below have found the existence of the

nuisance, and that by means, reasonably available, it may

be abated. Such findings of fact will not ordinarily be

disturbed on review in this court. Boehmer v. Pennsyl-

vania R. Co., (N. Y. 1920) 40 S. Ct. 409, 252 U. S. 496,

ee SOMES ow

wt

LE NaS AEA OR TID

47

64 L. Ed, 680; Fireball Gas Tank & Illuminating Co.,

(Mo. 1915) 36 S. Ct. 86, 239 U. S. 156, 60 L. Ed. 191;

The Linseed King, (N. Y. 1932) 52 S. Ct. 450, 285 U.

S, 5QR,; FO fa. Be. cc on

Likewise the determination of the courts below upon

any pertinent question of comparative injury will not

ordinarily be disturbed by this court. Such determination

is a matter of discretion. Smith v. Staso Milling Co.,

18 F. (2d) 730.

Conclusion.

Petitioner admits the existence of the auisance. The

admission involves all that the record shows as to a con-

dition of gross pollution in the watercourse on respond-

ent’s land. Petitioner admits that reasonable means in

general use are available for abating the nuisance.

Petitioner’s chief defense is that the City has no financial

power to raise the funds involved in remodeling the sew-

age system. The ground for review upon certiorari

under this head is an alleged conflict between the decision

of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals, and a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri

(Union Trust Co. v. Pagenstecher, 221 Mo. 121, 119 5.

\W. 1103 [1909]).

\We have shown that that case did not hold the statute

authorizing a Special Public Sewer Tax unconstitutional,

but simply held a tax levied under that statute in that case

invalid because the matter had not been submitted to a

vote, as required by Section 11, Article 10 of the Con-

stitution of Missouri. The trial court and the appellate

court did not even mention the Special Public Sewer Tax

in rendering the decision, but if that method of raising

48

revenue had been expressly relied upon there would have

been no conflict. Furthermore, we have shown three other

financial methods by which funds could be raised for

sewage disposal purposes. Therefore that ground for

certiorari must fall.

The petitioner states that the question of what con-

stitutes a permanent as distinguished from a temporary

nuisance is of such great importance that this court should

pass upon it. We have shown that the real question is

whether a city may maintain a method of sewage disposal,

however inadequate, and however injurious to adjoining

property owners, and escape all supervision by courts

of equity on the theory that the injured property

owner may have an action at law for damages. We

have shown that in the case at bar such a cause of

action is now barred by the five-year statute of limitations

in Missouri. However, this unfortunate result to the

respondent in this case would probably not be a con-

trolling factor. If the question proposed by petitioner is

one of great importance, then the factor which we believe

will control this court is the following:

If an equity court has no supervisory power, then any

municipality may create any kind of unnecessary nuisance

in the way of sewage disposal, taking the chance that a

jury in a suit for damages would be lenient so that the

cost of the inadequate and improper disposal method plus

the damages to be paid for projecting raw sewage onto

private property, would amount in the aggregate to less

than a sufficient and proper disposal plant would cost.

We do not believe that this court will announce a rule

which will make that the controlling factor in determing

what type of sewage disposal plants municipalities shall

construct. If the question is important enough to be

settled by this court, then the equitable jurisdiction which

ah ge eae a |

bs

&

i 49

the trial court and the appellate court have exercised

should be confirmed. The results of such a rule will be

salutary and will look solely toward the construction of

sewage disposal facilities which will not unnecessarily

injure private property owners and will tend to clean,

wholesome, sanitary conditions in the environs of

municipalities.

Petitioner urges that the decree encroaches upon the

legislative function. We have shown that the municipal

function of sewage disposal is not legislative. But even

if it were, it cannot be exercised so as to create a

nuisance. A judicial decree finding the existence of such

a nuisance and enjoining it does not encroach upon the

legislative function.

Petitioner urges that the courts below should have

balanced inconvenience to the municipality against the

damage to the respondent. We have shown that the

Missouri courts do not subscribe to such a doctrine. Even

if the doctrine obtained in Missouri, review of such a

matter of discretion is not the purpose of a writ of

certiorari.

+ a Rp

Respectfully submitted,

Maurice H. WINGER,

LELAND Hazarp,

1100 Waltower Building,

Kansas City, Missouri,

Attorneys for Respondent.

Josern T. OWENs,

WINGER, REEDER, BARKER,

GuMBINER & Hazarp,

1100 Waltower Building,

Kansas City, Missouri,

Of Counsel.

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APPENDIX A.

“Sec. 860. Period of Limitation Prescribed —Civil

actions, other than those for the recovery of real property,

can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in

the following sections, after the causes of action shall

have accrued: * * *

Sec. 862. What Within Five Years—Within five

years: First, all actions upon contracts, obligations or

liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in

Section 861, and except upon judgments or decrees of a

court of record, and except where a different time is

herein limited; second, an action upon a liability created

by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture; third, an

action for trespass on real estate; fourth, an action for

taking, detaining or injuring any goods or chattels, in-

cluding actions for the recovery of specific personal

property, or for any other injury to the person or rights

of another, not arising on contract and not herein other-

wise enumerated; fifth, an action for relief on the ground

of fraud, the cause of action in such case to be deemed

not to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved

party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constitut-

ing the fraud.” (Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929.)

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APPENDIX B.

“Sec. 7037. Joint District Sewers. Whenever the city

may deem it necessary that a sewer should be constructed

or reconstructed in any part of the city containing two or

more sewer districts, it may, by ordinance, unite such

sewer districts into a joint sewer district and cause a

sewer to be constructed therein in like manner in all

respects as is provided in Section 7032, in case of district

sewers, and should the board of aldermen, by ordinance,

unite two or more sewer districts into a joint sewer dis-

trict for the purpose of constructing a joint district sewer

therein, the action of the board of aldermen shall be

conclusive for all purposes, and no special tax-bill shall

be held invalid or be affected on account of the included

drainage area thereof, or the size, character or purpose

of such sewer: Provided, however, that no sewer district

shall be included in such joint district which is not con-

tained in the natural drainage area of the valley or

watercourse in which joint district sewer is proposed to

be constructed.” (Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1929.)

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APPENDIX C.

“No county, city, town, township, school district or

other political corporation or subdivision of the State

shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or

for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the

income and revenue provided for such year, without the

consent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting on

such proposition, at an election to be held for that pur-

pose; nor in cases requiring such assent shall any in-

debtedness be allowed to be incurred to an amount in-

cluding existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceed-

ing five per centum on the value of the taxable property

therein, to be ascertained by the assessment next before

the last assessment for State and county purposes, pre-

vious to the incurring of such indebtedness, * * * and

provided further, that any county, city, town, township,

school district or other political corporation or subdivision

of the State, incurring any indebtedness requiring the

assent of the voters as aforesaid, shall before or at the

time of doing so, provide for the collection of an annual

tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness

as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for

the payment of the principal thereof, within twenty

years from the time of contracting the same: * * *.”

(Sec. 12, Art. 10, Missouri Constitution. )

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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