Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Parish v. Virginia

——

Supreme Coun, U.S.

FILED

MAR 15 2011

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Wnited States

69

No. 10-817

Anne Boston Parish,

Petitioner,

Commonwealth of Virginia,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court of Virginia

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Anne Boston Parish

208 West Walnut Street

Alexandria, Virginia 2230]

abparish@msn.com

703-299-1795

Pro Sé

March 15th, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. 1

INTRODUCTION ...........

LAW AND ARGUMENT i

CONCLUSION. 8

CERTIFICATION .... | 1]

i]

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1967)....................... 6, 7

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3rd 972,988 (9th Cir. 2005)......... 6

Hulvey v. Roberts, 106 Va. 189.55 S.E. 585 (1906)........... D

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 1038, 115 (1935) ........ 7

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-216 (1942) ..000. 7,9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 666 (1984) ....... 5

U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25 (1983)... 6

COURT RULES

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15 (Motion to Strike)........... l.2, 2, 4,6

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1:1 (Finality of Judgment)................ Loo

BN We SM gots sxe vuswadsnadiveeaneinurarica abies turonndenetehiaaes 4,11

The Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct...............0.0......00264- >)

Standards of the American Bar Association..................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

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Fifth Amendment............... Seek cane ren mate eS Ee ear ee l

Sixth Amendment...................... ecghe dea tecie ea cactaaeaeas 5, 6, 7

PURER TIRED FARIUPTICRIIIOIE,. a... nc sccccces cas cncccccssnnescnsssononoseen: ]

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INTRODUCTION

The Constitution states only one command twice.

The Fifth Amendment says to the federal government

that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law.” The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment, states the same eleven

words to describe the legal obligation of all states. It

was Thomas Jefferson’s fervent belief that anything is

possible. It is possible and vital this conviction is

reversed, dismissed or remanded to the lower Court.

The Virginia Supreme Court erred when it ruled in

finding the evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to

support Petitioner's conviction. The opinion of the Court

of Appeals of Virginia was presumed “to be correct and

would be reversed only upon a showing that it is plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.”

A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered

evidence “is a matter submitted to the sound discretion

of the lower Court and will be granted only under

unusual circumstances after particular care and caution

has been given to the evidence presented.” This period

is referred to as the time for which the case is “in the

breast of the court”, and during this time the court has

complete discretion to suspend, vacate, or amend its

judgment or decree. Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A: 15; 1:1: Motion

to Strike or to Set Aside Verdict; Judgment of Acquittal

or New Trial must satisfy a four prong after-discovered

test to suspend, vacate, or amend its judgment or decree.

This Petition of Rehearing satisfies the four prong

after-discovered test (that fell within the legal

obligation of the lower Court) to grant a new trial

due to its unusual circumstances.

oD

The United States Supreme Court has an

obligation to reverse, dismiss or remand to the

lower Court.

1. The Evidence was discovered after the

trial:

A. Defense counsel directed key witness, Mr.

Akbar, not to come to Court. Petitioner

was told after the trial, (Appendix E).

B. Mr. Roger Owens the USPS Manager,

called Petitioner. Miss Roth was

modifying the charges; after the trial,

(July 3, 2009).

C. Defense counsel did not assist Petitioner

within the “21 day rule” of judgment (June

22, 2009) Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1:1

requesting a motion for a new trial that

was within the twenty-one-days-from-

conviction limitation on presentation of

newly discovered evidence of innocence,

after the trial.

D. An electronic mail from Mr. Greenspun

states his withdrawal from the case,

within the 21 days from judgment was

sent to Petitioner after the trial.

pdg@mail.greenspunlaw.com

To Anne Parish, James Abrenio

Ed 7/08/09 1:58

Anne:

Given the letter to Judge Brown, I will not

take any other actions on your behalf. I have never

received information that Ms. Roth wants to drop

the charge since the trial result. We knew, as did you,

that she was not pushing the charges vigorously,

but the prosecutor insisted on proceeding despite

Ms. Roth’s attitude. That was his decision.

(Abbreviated )

Peter [s]

~

wy

3

The Evidence could not have _ been

discovered, through the exercise of due

diligence, prior to the trial:

A.

B.

Defense counsel did not display due

diligence in ethical and moral, conduct

or competence set forth by the American

Bar Association within the 21 days to

defend Petitioner after the trial.

Defense counsel’s intentional wrong, and

refusal to defend Petitioner, was viewed

as bad faith and grounds for reversing

a conviction on appeal after the trial.

The Evidence is not merely cumulative,

corroborative, or collateral:

A.

Defense counsel refused to defend the

Petitioner, when advised that Miss Roth

had come forward to modify her charge

is grounds for reversing a conviction on

appeal after the trial.

Defense Counsel, a scholar of the law,

withheld legal procedural or protocol/

technicality for a Judgment Motion.

A letter written within the 21 days of

judgment needed, to be in front of a

Judge in Court, not merely written to a

Judge after the trial (Appendix H).

The evidence is material to the extent that

it_is likely to produce different results

from a new trial:

A.

The Virginia Courts erred, with prejudice,

not to enforce the Commonwealth rule

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1:1.

The dismal of Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15; 1.1

is an improvident exercise of misconduct;

an_error of law and grounds for

reversing a decision on appeal. The

4

right to a new trial was not granted

as due process would allow when the

Honorable Judge Brown denied a new

trial dismissing a letter dated July 6th,

2009 (Appendix H) in accordance to Va.

Sup. Ct. R. 3A: 15 was within the 21

days of judgment and met all criteria

for granting a motion for a new trial.

If this conviction is affirmed, it will set a precedent

that any two persons can make up a tale and for any

reason have an innocent person wrongfully arrested.

The Commonwealth of Virginia has opened the “flood

gates” for innocent people to be wrongfully arrested and

maliciously prosecuted. With lack of any fact and without

any evidence a person may now be wrongfully arrested

and convicted solely on the “unfounded information” of

two people making up a tale out of prejudice, hate or

mean spirited and nothing more.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rule 44, a petition for rehearing is

limited to intervening circumstances of a substantial

or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds

not previously presents (Rule 44). On February 22,

2011, this Court issued an Order denying the Petitioner,

Anne Boston Parish, (“Petitioner”), Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. The Petitioner now timely seeks this Petition

for Rehearing.

The Petitioner's Petition for A Wnt of Certiorari

was mailed to this Court on December 17, 2010. On

September 24, 2010 the Supreme Court of Virginia issued

their decision to deny Petitioner a rehearing to set aside

judgment rendered on July 22, 2010. The Commonwealth

of Virginia did not follow its governance, yet their

prosecutorial misconduct and demonstrated overt

2

constitutional prejudice that further gives confidence

in the erosion of the Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.

Under the standards, set forth by the American Bar

Association, the United States Constitution, and Bill of

Rights the insubordination of the lower Court evokes

contempt. This case is an egregious departure

from constitutional law and grounds for reversal,

dismissal or remanded to the lower Court. The

Virginia Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s rehearing

is a failure to consider the facts and law relating to a

particular matter; an arbitrary or unreasonable departure

from constitutional precedents and settled judicial

custom. The Commonwealth’s judicial performance

was paradoxical and highly arrogant with counsel’s

conduct not functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment.

The lower Court of Virginia dismissal of the

“Fundamental of Fairness” standards shall, by virtue of

this United States Constitution, have original jurisdiction

in cases of Writ of Certiorari, and shall compel a lower

court to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties

correctly. The question of jurisdiction is dependent upon

the decision of a constitutional question in the lower

court. Jurisdiction may be conferred upon the United

States Supreme Court by virtue of the constitutional that

the constitutionality of the law was called in question

and decided in the lower Court, Hulvey v. Roberts 106

Va. 189. 55 S.E. 585 (1906).

In a retrospective analyzes of ineffective assistance

of counsel, after the trial and within the “21 days

of judgment” counsel’s conduct so undermined the

functioning of the adversary process that this trial

could not be relied upon as having produced a just

result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

666 (1984). The ineffective assistance of counsel was

o

pretentious and a violation of Petitioner's Constitutional

Sixth Amendment. Mr. Greenspun’s lack of assistance for

a new trial calls into question his obligation to perform

at a level of competence and consequently Compromised

the outcome. Mr. Greenspun’s failure to defend Petitioner

was fundamentally wrong. He ostentatiously sent an

electromic mail to Petitioner, stating, “He would not

assist. Petitioner within the critical 21 days of judgment

to secure a new trial.” In Cronic, the Court described

this type of a situation an unreasonable departure from

constitutional law from which prejudice is presumed.

When counsel does not assist the accused, at a critical

stage of the proceeding, or when counsel entirely fails to

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial

testing, courts will presume prejudice U.S. vo. Cronic,

466 U.S. at 659 & n.25. (1983).

There are numerous cases that will be cited to

support the departure of constitutional law inherent

in this case. It is equally significant to note that the

Virginia Court of Appeals erred when liberally dismissing

a letter to Judge Brown dated July 6, 2009, (Appendix

Hf). This error went to the heart of the case and was

within the draconian twenty-one days-from-conviction

limitation on presentation of newly discovered evidence

of innocence Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:15 that was a violation

of the Petitioner's constitutional rights for a new trial.

The Prosecutor's actions in Hayes v. Brown

illustrates how a prosecutor's unethical conduct resulted

in a tainted and unjust trial. Hayes v. Brown, 399

F.3rd 972,988 (9th Cir. 2005). Further in Alcorta

v. Texas, 355 U.S, 28, 31 (1957) the United States

Supreme Court announced that prosecutors have an

independent duty to correct information they know to be

false Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957).

ry

/

Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court

established that a prosecutor's failure to correct false

testimony was unconstitutional Alcorta. vo. Texas, 355

U.S. 28, 31 (1957). This departure from constitutional

law is not only significant but salient, and corroborates

Mr. Greenspun’s and the Commonwealth’s pompous

departure from reporting new evidence, after the trial

and within the 2] days from Judgment, as acts so

unconstitutional it led to an unfavorable outcome and

conviction for this Petitioner, an innocent person. ‘The

United States Supreme Court in an effort to determine

whether trial testimony was correct first granted relief in

Mooney v. Holohan, for the use of false testimony by a

prosecutor to seek aconviction Mooney v. Holohan, 294

U.S. 103, 115 (1935). In Mooney v. Holohan, it was

alleged the prosecutor withheld evidence that would have

exposed perjury Id. at 110. The United States Supreme

Court. held the State knowing use of false testimony was

“inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice,”

and hence, unconstitutional Id. at 112.

Seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,

215-216 (1942) the United States Supreme Court held

that suppression of evidence favorable to the accused

was sufficient to create constitutional error. The United

States Supreme Court reversed, holding that’ these

allegations indicated that defendant’s constitutional

rights had been violated Id at 216.

Qn appeal, the lower Court and Mr. Greenspun’s

decision not to seek a continuance was unconstitutional.

Similarly to Pyle v. Kansas, Mr. Akbar was the one

person who could exonerate the Petitioner. (Appendix

kK). Mr. Greenspun had a moral and ethical obligation

to uphold the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution to defend Petitioner. It was Mr. Greenspun’s

responsibility to ensure the key witness be present in

$

court or request a continuance of trial. Neither of these

two options was executed. When this was brought

to the Courts attention, after the trial, it was the

lower Court obligation to grant a new trial.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s published opinion

affects every citizen in the United States. This conviction

will sanction and gives great preeminence to State and

Federal government agencies to convict an innocent

person without evidence or fact. This wrongful conviction

will promote and tolerate the proliferation of bias,

prejudice, ignorance and hate. To ignore this wrongful

conviction is to affirm and establish a precedent

that is a violation of the Petitioner’s constitutional

rights of the United States Constitution.

Mr. Greenspun’s electronic message affirms _ the

Commonwealth’s desire to prosecute the Petitioner.

The arrogance and lack of discipline that is inherent

within the Commonwealth of Virginia’s failed justice

system is unconstitutional. The lower Court just got

it wrong.

° There is or never was any evidence to

substantiate the conviction more so this case

began with a heinous made up offense and

pitted an unpopular minority female, assisted

by an inadequate defense, against a determined

prosecutor zealously seeking a conviction.

° In this “low profile” case, the pressure to

convict involved standard cases to which no

one pays close attention. Conduct explained

in this way may include disregard for due

process safeguards, to overt pressure on

witnesses to give evidence that) will support

the conviction of the selected suspect, to

‘)

falsification of evidence, all in the name of

securing. a conviction of someone the police

have decided ts guilty.

° A marginalized female who can be made to

bear public fear, embarrassment, humiliation

and the loathing is the necessary clement of a

wrongtul conviction. “The ends may justify the

means” rests on the assumption that the police

have found, and the state is prosecuting, the

right person

° The challenge is to be morally ethical and

intellectually honest during an investigation,

fair during trial, and above all, humble enough

to admit error. Anyone can make a mistake;

the evil lies in refusing to admit it

° The role of the police to generate the evidence

is only half of the equation. The other half

rests on the role of the police and their high

status within the administration of justice

Without the intervention ofthe United States Supreme

Court, a ruling to affirm this case will bless lawyers,

judges and courtrooms akin to cite this particular case

that will sanction any two persons, without an iota of

evidence or fact to accuse one person of a false charge,

to be wrongfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted. It

is Incumbent upon all those who evaluate the causation

of this wrongful conviction to consider the internal

prejudice within the parameters of this case

In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-216 (1942)

the United States Supreme Court held that suppression

of evidence favorable to the accused was sufficient

to create constitutional error. Any misuse of public

authority threatens the equilibrium of a system resting

so fundamentally on the consent of the governed, but

the threat is most acute when the misconduct injuries

10

a citizen directly-especially if it denies the Petitioner

a constitutionally protected nght. This) conviction

Hluminates the importance of the United States Supreme

Court. Justices to grant instant Petition for Writ) of

Certiorari. It is possible and vital this conviction

is reversed, dismissed or remanded to the lower

Court.

lor the reasons stated above, the Petitioner respectfully

requests that this United States Supreme Court Grant the

Petition for Rehearing and grant Petitioner its previously

submitted Petition for Writ of Certioran

Respectfully submitted,

ANNE BOSTON PARISH

Pro se

208 West Walnut Street

Alexandria, Virginia 22301

703-299-1795

abparish@msn.com

1]

CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 44

Anne Boston Parish certifies that pursuant to Rule 44, the

grounds for this Petition for Rehearing are restricted to

intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling

effect or to other substantial grounds not) previously

presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and that

this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and

not for delay

Respectfully submitted

Anne Boston Parish

ANNE BOSTON PARISH

Pro se

208 West Walnut Street

Alexandria, Virginia, 22301

(103-299-1795

abparish@msn.com