Opposition Brief — Cincinnati Reds v. Bridewell

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No. 95-1105 Supreme Ci ak Ug

FILE p

In The FEB 12 1996

Supreme Court of the United States cus

te

October Term, 1995

THE CINCINNATI REDS,

Petitioner,

vS.

ROBERT BRIDEWELL, e7 al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

PETER M. FOX

Counsel of Record

KIRCHER, ROBINSON,

NEWMAN & WELCH

Attorneys for Respondents

1014 Vine Street

Suite 2520

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

(513) 381-3525

be (800) 3 APPEAL « (800) 5 APPEAL + (800) BRIEF 21

i

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the operator of a professional baseball team, which during

its off-season employs approximately 120 employees and

participates in the operation of a stadium staging professional

football games, operate more than seven months in any calendar

year for purposes of the amusement or recreational

establishment exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented ..cscccccecceaséessuunee i

Table of Comtemts ..ccccscesctstcsen venue ii

Table of Citatioge ..csssccccsces veeenpeaenee iv

Statement of Jurisdiction ....cccccccscccccsece |

Statute Invelved tw ossccccseceeeeesuueene 2

Statement of the Case ..cssescccsencsaueeuean 3

Reasons Why The Petition Should

Be Demied ..ccccscscesetnsneneeesennee 5

I. An Operator of a Professional Baseball

Team Which, During its Off-Season

Employs Approximately 120 Employees

And Participates in the Operation of a

Stadium Staging Professional Football

Games, Operates for More than Seven

Months In Any Calendar Year for

Purposes of the Amusement or

Recreational Establishment Exemption of

the Fair Labor Standards Act ....... 5

Page

A. The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is

Not In Conflict With Decisions Of

Sy ee 5

B. The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is

Consistent With Established

EE ee 9

ia The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is

Consistent With Congressional Intent

In Amending The Exemption For

Amusement or Recreational

err eee 12

EEE SES te es 16

iv

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page(s)

Cases Cited:

H Vv. w P ines,

21 Wage & Hour Cases (BNA) 32 (D. Wyo. 1972)

rev'd, sub. nom. Brennan v. Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc.,

478 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1973)

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 228,

Pe Ree PEC EIEE > baba 65 de Bee N bade actas 11,12

64 F.3d $90 (lith Cir. 1995) .....cccceee. $,6,7,6,9

Phillips, Inc. v. Walling,

324 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945) ... 14

Wirtz v. Fr 1 i.

17 Wage & Hour Cases 308 (BNA) (D.NJ. 1966) .. 9,10

Statutes Cited:

ry pik i oh = _ POET EPO STC eee os eT eee ere 14

29 U.S. GEIMME) co tsvavercsizendinccses 12, 13

SURE CI occur vcicensanen 5,11, 14

Other Authorities:

Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 1361,

Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,974 (January 24, 1975)

(June, 1973-September, 1978 Transfer Binder]

Page(s)

10, 11

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Complaint was filed cn March 26, 1993. in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio

alleging a failure to pay time-and-one-half for overtime work

under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or “the Act")

Jurisdiction of the District Court was based upon 29 U S$ C

§216, 28 USC. §§1331, 1337

On May 25, 1993, Petitioner, the Cincinnati Reds

("the Reds"), filed a motion for summary judgment alleging it

was exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA

pursuant to an exemption for amusement or recreational!

establishments that do not operate more than seven months in

any calendar year 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(3) District Court

Judge Herman J. Weber referred the motion for summary

judgment to Magistrate Judge Robert A Steinberg for report

and recommendation

On February 14, 1994, Magistrate Judge Steinberg

issued a Report and Recommendation. In his

recommendation, Magistrate Judge Steinberg granted the

Reds’ motion for summary judgment for the years of 1991.

1992, and 1993. However, he found material issues of fact

precluded the granting of summary judgment for the year

1990, since the Reds season was extended by the team's

participation in the 1990 World Series.

Both Petitioner and Respondents filed motions to

review the Report and Recommendation with District Court

Judge Weber. On March 24, 1994, District Judge Weber

affirmed Magistrate Judge Steinberg’s grant of summary

judgment to the Reds for the years of 1991, 1992 and 1993.

and he granted summary judgment to the Reds for the year

1990

2

Respondents appealed to the United States Court of |

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on April 22, 1994. On October

12, 1994, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion reversing and |

remanding to the District Court The Sixth Circuit held that

the Reds did not qualify for the amusement and recreational

establishment exemption to the FLSA because they operated

more than seven months during the year. No petition for

rehearing was filed

Petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to

review the judgment of the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28

USC. §1254(1)

STATUTE INVOLVED

Section 13(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(3), provides in pertinent part

(a) The provisions of section 206 [relating

to minimum wages] and section 207 [relating

to mandatory overtime pay] of this title shall

not apply with respect to --

(3) any employee employed by an

establishment which is an amusement

or recreational establishment ._.if (A) it

does not operate for more than seven

months in any calendar year, or (B)

during the preceding calendar year, its

average receipts for any six months of

such year were not more than 33 1/3

percentum of its average receipts for

the other six months of such year ...

Respondents are cleaning and maintenance employees

of Petitioner, the Cincinnati Reds. During the baseball season,

Respondents work in excess of 40 hours during some weeks

and are not paid overtime compensation

The Reds operate a major league baseball franchise

which conducts 81 regular season home games at Riverfront

Stadium, which is owned by the City of Cincinnati The Reds

regular season begins in April of each year and ends in October

The Cincinnati Bengals, a professional football franchise,

also play their home games at Riverfront Stadium The Bengals’

season begins in August and extends to December or january

They play four to six games at Riverfront Stadium between mid-

October and December

The Reds operate the scoreboard and message boards

during Bengal home games. They display advertising at

Riverfront Stadium year round They clean the stadium

concourse prior to the Bengals’ games which occur after the

Reds season has ended, and they rent to the Bengals trash

removal equipment for use after such games. They also clean

private boxes in the stadium after such games. The Reds

receive revenues for all of these services

The Reds also contract for concessionaires to work both

Bengals’ and Reds’ games. The Reds do not receive revenues

for concessions sold at Bengals’ games, but the Reds have

granted Cincinnati Coca-Cola Bottling Company the exclusive

right to sell soft drinks at both Reds’ and Bengals’ games in

exchange for advertising rights on Reds’ radio broadcasts, in

baseball programs, and on signage at Riverfront Stadium

4

The Reds employ over 700 employees during the

baseball season and approximately 120 employees in the off-

season.

5

REASONS WHY THE PETITION

SHOULD BE DENIED

I. AN OPERATOR OF A PROFESSIONAL

BASEBALL TEAM WHICH, DURING ITS OFF-

SEASON EMPLOYS APPROXIMATELY 120

EMPLOYEES AND PARTICIPATES IN THE

OPERATION OF A STADIUM STAGING

PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL GAMES,

OPERATES FOR MORE THAN SEVEN

MONTHS IN ANY CALENDAR YEAR FOR

PURPOSES OF THE AMUSEMENT OR

RECREATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT

EXEMPTION OF THE FAIR’ LABOR

STANDARDS ACT.

A. The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is Not In

Conflict With Decisions Of Other Circuits

Petitioner argues that the decision of the Sixth Circuit in

the instant case is in direct conflict with the Decision of the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Jeffery v. Sarasota White

Sox, 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995). The decisions, however, are

not in conflict. Jeffery involved the Sarasota White Sox, a

wholly owned subsidiary of the Chicago White Sox. The

Sarasota White Sox had a lease to occupy and utilize a sports

complex owned by the City of Sarasota, Florida. The Sarasota

White Sox played minor league baseball games at the complex

from April to August of each year. The Chicago White Sox

held spring training in the complex in March of each year.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the Sarasota White Sox

met the seasonality requirements of 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(3) for

6

two of the four years at issue in the case based upon the relative

percentages of their receipts during six month periods in prior

years. It held that the Sarasota White Sox qualified as a

seasonal establishment for the other two years based upon the

length of its operation during those years. In measuring the

length of the Sarasota White Sox's operation of the Sarasota

sports complex, the Eleventh Circuit specifically included the

time period that the Chicago White Sox, a separate employer,

held its spring training:

The evidence shows that spring training in the

sports complex in Sarasota begins and ends in

March of each year. Defendant begins play in

April and continues play up to the end of

August each year. Accordingly, Defendant's

operation at the baseball complex in Sarasota

lasts approximately five months each year which

is two months less than the seven month period

afforded under 29 U.S.C. §213(a)(3).

64 F.3d at 596

The Jeffery decision also addressed the fact that Plaintiff

in that case was employed beyond the seven month exemption

period:

The fact that Plaintiff was employed in the off-

season months relative to the preparation and

maintenance of the baseball fields does not alter

the Court's finding that Defendant's operation

does not last longer than seven months in any

calendar year. The focus on the exemption is

not on the length of time Plaintiff performed his

work. Rather, the focus is on length of the

Defendant's seasonal operation. It is the

-

revenue producing operation of the Sarasota

White Sox as a professional baseball franchise

which affords it the protection of the exemption.

29 USC. §213(a)(3) does not require

Defendant to completely shut down or terminate

every employee at the end of each baseball .

season.

64 F.3d at 596

(Internal Citations Omitted)

Petitioner claims this language from the Jeffery decision is in

conflict with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's decision in the

instant case, which states in part:

in hat employs an

insignificant _number of workers year-round

ivabl ify for the exemption, the

fact that the Reds employ 120 year-round

workers compels the conclusion that they

"operate" year-round.

68 F.3d at 139

(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner implies that the Sixth Circuit's decision holds that an

employer that arguably is an amusement or recreational

establishment operates longer than the seven month exemption

period if it employs "some workers" in its off-season. As the

introductory clause of the sentence quoted above makes clear,

that is not the Sixth Circuit's holding. The Sixth Circuit's

decision specifically contemplates the possibility that a seasonal

employer might qualify for the exemption despite employing

some employees during its off-season

The Sarasota White Sox of the Jeffery case may be such

an employer. The Jeffery decision contains little information

about the activities of the Sarasota White Sox during their off-

season, but the information it does contain suggests that those

activities are limited. In three of the years at issue in Jeffery, the

Sarasota White Sox earned $1,106, $2,614, and $323: in

receipts during their off-seasons (compared with $476,339,

$540,506, and $607,646 during their seasons). The decision

also states that the Sarasota White Sox employed the Plaintiff,

a groundscrew worker, during their off season, but does not

state whether the White Sox employed any other workers

during their off-season.

In contrast, the instant case contains substantial

information about the activities of the Cincinnati Reds in their

off-season, and those activities demonstrate that the Cincinnati

Reds continue to operate during the off-season. The Reds

employ approximately 120 employees during its off-season.

They participate in the operation of Riverfront Stadium at

Bengals' home games during November and December by

cleaning the Stadium, renting the Bengals’ cleaning equipment,

operating the scoreboard and message boards, providing

contracted for concessions, and exhibiting advertising.

While the Court's opinion places particular emphasis

upon the number of workers employed during the Reds' off-

season, its conclusion is not based upon that one particular fact:

It is clear from the stipulated facts that the Reds

do indeed operate for more than seven months

per year.

68 F.3d at 139

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Cincinnati Reds continued

9

to operate during their off-season. The stipulated facts of the

case demonstrate that the Reds participate in the operation of

Riverfront Stadium during their off-season for purposes of

staging professional football games. The conclusion that the

Reds continue to operate during their off-season through such

activities is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion

that the Sarasota White Sox's operation of the Sarasota sports

complex included the exhibition games played there by the

Chicago White Sox.

The decisions of the Sixth Circuit in the instant case and

the Eleventh Circuit in Jeffery are not in conflict. Neither

decision holds that an amusement or recreational establishment

operates more than seven months by employing some workers

in its off-season. Both decisions find that an alleged amusement

or recreational establishment's operation includes its

participation in the operation of a sports stadium that is staging

sporting events of another employer.

B. The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is

Consistent With Established Precedent

Petitioner claims that the Sixth Circuit decision in the

instant case is at odds with well established precedent

interpreting the amusement or recreational establishment

exemption. The cases cited by Petitioner in support of this

proposition, however, do not hold that an employer can qualify

for the existing amusement or recreational exemption while

continuing to operate during its off-season to the extent that

Petitioner does.

Wirtz v. Freehold Racing Assn., 17 Wage & Hour Cases

308 (BNA) (D.NJ. 1966) was decided under the Fair Labor

Standards Act prior to the 1966 amendment creating the current

10

exemption for amusement and recreational establishments

Prior to that amendment, the FLSA contained an exemption for

seasonal amusement and recreational establishments that was a

constituent part of the exemption for retail establishments. The

exemption required such an establishment to be a retail

establishment and, in addition, to be an amusement or

recreational establishment that operated on a "seasonal basis."

It did not require the amusement or recreational establishment

to meet objective tests of its receipts during a six month period

to be less than 33% of its earnings in the other six months or

not to operate for more than seven months, as required by the

current exemption. Freehold Racing Association does not

interpret the current exemption's requirement that an

amusement or recreational establishment not operate more than

seven months in any calendar year.

Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 1361, Lab. L. Rep

(CCH) 30,974 (January 24, 1975) [June, 1973-September,

1978 Transfer Binder], does apply the current exemption for

amusement and recreational establishments, but does not allow

such an establishment to operate for more than seven months.

The opinion letter states that a city beach, which was open less

than seven months per year, may qualify for the exemption,

despite employing some life guards beyond seven months,

maintaining equipment:

[t]he fact that some of the life guards work

more than seven months in the year maintaining

the equipment would not serve to deny the

exemption under section 13(a)(3) provided the

establishment (the beach) is not open as a

recreational facility (i.e., protected swimming)

for more than seven months in any calendar

year.

11

It is clear from this Opinion Letter that the beach was not open

more than seven months per year, and there is no indication in|

the Opinion Letter that the beach operated in any other fashion

beyond the seven month period. The holding that the beach was

not disqualified from the exemption on the basis of employing

some workers during its off season is not at odds with the Sixth

Circuit's decision in the instant case.

Hodgson v. Yellowstone Park Lines, 21 Wage & Hour

Cases (BNA) 32 (D.Wyo. 1972) rev'd, sub. nom. Brennan v

Yellowstone Park Lines, Inc., 478 F.2d 285 (10th Cir 1973)

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 228, 38 L.Ed.2d 147

(1973) involved two companies that operated hotels, inns,

lodges, cabins, and restaurants in Yellowstone National Park

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that because of the

geographical distance between the facilities, each facility was a

separate establishment, and only those employees employed by

one of the individual facilities were exempt from overtime

compensation. Certain "central employees" (office, laundry,

print shop, warehouse, garage, ice plant, fire watch, and

maintenance and repair) who provided services to more than

one of the facilities were held not covered by the exemption

478 F.2d at 290.

The Tenth Circuit noted in a footnote that "It is

undisputed that defendants meet the seasonal requirements of

§213(a)(3)." 478 F.2d at 287, ftnt. 1. The District Court

decision demonstrates why that issue was not disputed: each of

the facilities opened on or after May 7 and closed on or before

October 11. 21 Wage & Hour Cases (BNA) at 34. In addition,

the District Court held that the companies’ overall Yellowstone

operation, which the District Court treated as a single

establishment, met the receipts test of §213(a)(3)(B). Their

receipts during the season were 98% of their total receipts. Id

Given this overall percentage of seasonal receipts, it is probable

12

that the individual facilities, which the Tenth Circuit found to be

separate establishments, would also have met the receipts test.

Petitioner notes that Defendants in Yellowstone Park

Lines employed approximately 50 workers during the off-season

(as compared with over 2000 during the season). Nothing in

either the District Court's or Circuit Court's decisions suggests

that any off-season employees were employed by the individual

facilities that the Tenth Circuit found to be separate

establishments.

The cases Petitioner cites as being at odds with the

decision of the Sixth Circuit all concern the employment of

workers by an alleged amusement or recreational establishment

during its off-season. None of those cases involved an

establishment that continued to operate a business beyond the

seven month exemption period. Those cases are not at odds

with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in the instant case.

& The Decision Of The Sixth Circuit Is

Consistent With Congressional Intent In

Amending The Exemption For Amusement

Or Recreational Establishments

Prior to 1966, the Fair Labor Standards Act contained

an exemption for certain retail or service establishments which

included some amusement or recreational establishments.

Section 213(a)(2) then provided as follows:

(2) any employee employed by any

retail or service establishment, more than 50 per

centum of which establishment's annual dollar

volume of sales of goods or services is made

within the State in which the establishment is

- located, if such establishment --

13

(i) is not in an enterprise described

in section 203(s) of this title, or

(11) is in such an enterprise and is a

hotel, motel, restaurant, or motion

picture theater; or is an amusement or

aed ottabelial ) ;

i

is, Or

(ii) | 18 in such an enterprise and is a

hospital, or an institution which is

primarily engaged in the care of the sick,

the aged, the mentally ill or defective,

residing on the premises of such

institution, or a school for physically or

mentally handicapped or gifted children,

or

(iv) is in such an enterprise and has

an annual dollar volume of sales

(exclusive of excise taxes at the retail

level which are separately stated) which

is less than $250,000.

A "retail or service establishment” shall mean an

establishment 75 per centum of whose annual

dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or

of both) is not for resale and is recognized as

retail sales or services in the particular industry,

29 U.S.C. §213(a)(2)

(pre 1966 amendment)

(emphasis supplied)

An amusement or recreational establishment could qualify for

14

this exemption by meeting the definition of a retail or service

establishment, by being an enterprise engaged in commerce

within the meaning of Section 203(s) of the Act, and by

operating on a "seasonal basis". The 1966 amendment removed

amusement and recreational establishments from the retail and

service establishment exemption and preserved it as a separate

exemption. It also replaced the general requirement of

operating on a seasonal basis with the requirement of meeting

one of two specific and objective tests. Under the post-1966

amended FLSA, an amusement or recreational establishment

cannot qualify for an exemption unless:

"(A) it does not operate for more than seven

months in any calendar year, or (B) during the

preceding calendar year, its average receipts for

any six months of such year were not more than

33 1/3 per centum of its average receipts for the

other six months of such year..."

29 U.S.C. §213(a)(3)

It is well established that exemptions to the Fair Labor

Standards Act are to be narrowly construed. Phillips, Inc. v.

Walling, 324 U.S. 492, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945).

The Sixth Circuit's decision narrowly construes Section

213(a)(3)(A) to literally require an amusement or recreational

establishment not to operate more than seven months in any

calendar year in order to qualify for the exemption.

Petitioner requests Section 213(a)(3) be interpreted to

allow Petitioner to, among other things, perform functions

relating to the staging of football games during its off-season

and still qualify for the exemption. Such continued operation is

inconsistent with a narrow construction of Section 213(a)(3),

and conflicts with Congressional intent of establishing an

15

objective and definite tests to replace the requirement of

operating on a seasonal basis.

Petitioner contends that the Sixth Circuit's decision

would require an amusement or recreational establishment to

close down its business and discontinue operations after seven

months in order to qualify for the exemption. Such is not the

case. An amusement or recreational establishment that chooses

to operate after seven months can qualify for the exemption by

meeting the receipts test of Section 213(a)3)(B). An

establishment that cannot meet that test because its "off-season"

Operations are too substantial is not truly seasonal and under the

FLSA is not entitled to an exemption.

Finally, Petitioner contends that the decision of the Sixth

Circuit would adversely affect the operations of numerous

professional sports organizations. There is no evidence in the

record of any professional sports organization other than

Petitioner that refuses to pay overtime compensation to its

maintenance and cleaning employees. There is no reason to

believe any other professional sports organization denies such

employees overtime compensation. The vast majority of such

organizations would be ashamed to deny overtime

compensation to ordinary workers who clean up the trash that

fans leave behind, even as those organizations are throwing

millions of dollars at star athletes and pocketing millions for

themselves. Petitioner requests this Court to hold that the laws

of the United States allow them to treat employees in that way

The Court should not do so.

16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully

request that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

PETER M. FOX

Counsel of Record

KIRCHER, ROBINSON,

NEWMAN & WELCH

Attorneys for Respondents

1014 Vine Street, Suite 2520

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Phone: (513) 381-3525

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