Appendix Vol III — Media General, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

Supreme Court brief2005

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04102 U JAN 2 8 2005

| ” |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

No

MEDIA GENERAL, INC.

Petitioner,

Vv.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

‘Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

APPENDIX VOLUME III

GEORGE L. MAHONEY CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

MEDIA GENERAL, INC. Counsel of Record

333 E. Franklin St. SUSAN ENGEL

Richmond, VA 23219 MICHAEL SHUMSKY

| KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP

JOHN R. FEORE, JR. 655 Fifteenth St., N.W.

MICHAEL D. Hays Washington, DC 20005

M. ANNE SWANSON (202) 879-5000

Dow, LOHNES &

ALBERTSON, PLLC

1200 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

January 2005

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

CONTENTS

Document Page

VOLUME I

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Majority Opinion (June 24, 2004) ........ceseesesseeneeteeeeees la

DISSORTING OI ..scccsssceccsossccnscssesocsccsansassecessoncennases 107a

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

QO, FTO ssccsicenstnuittsnsiinssintiisasvinintninneiasinsaiinsnnndaaneanes 19la

Order Granting Stay (Sept. 3, 2003)...........ssscsssseesneeees 194a

Order Denying Transfer (Sept. 15, 2003).........:eseeeee 197a

VOLUME II

Federal Communications Commission

Report and Order .............scccssocssssrccsenssssessessssnsssosseaneess 206a

VOLUME III

Report and Order (CONUINUEA).........:cseeeseeesereeneeeseeeeeees 486a

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking..........ccccseeseereeseeeees 652a

Statement of Chairman Powell..............scsssccsssseeeseeeees 663a

Statement of Commissioner Abernathy ...........:sesseeeeees 666a

Statement of Commissioner Martin ..........:ccceseceeeseeeeees 673a

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Copps anna 677a

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Adelstein........ 714a

486a

b. Choice of Media

401. We have determined which media to include in the

Diversity Index based on the survey information derived from

the “Consumer Survey on Media Usage” prepared by Nielsen

Media Research (FCC MOWG Study No. 8). This survey tells

us how consumers perceive the various media as sources of

news and information. The key threshold implication of this

study is that consumers use multiple media as sources of news

and current affairs, and hence that different media can be

substitutes in providing viewpoint diversity. For example,

consider a citizen who acquires local news from television,

newspapers, and radio. Suppose that a group of citizens in the

consumer’s home town wishes to oppose a bond issue for a new

sports stadium, and that the local newspaper and television

stations favor the bond issue and choose not to cover the

position of opponents. If the opponents nevertheless get radio

coverage for their position, they would be able to reach this

particular citizen. Indeed, one might think that part of the radio

coverage might address the fact that other media are “ignoring”

the story. This could then raise the profile of the story to a

level that might attract newspaper or television coverage. We

put forward this hypothetical sequence of events not because

we think that it describes a process that will happen with

respect to any particular controversy. Rather it is a useful

illustration of the process by which markets with multiple

independent media outlet owners operate, particularly in an

environment in which citizens generally do not depend on a

single medium for their local news and current affairs.

402. FCC MOWG Study No. 8 asked respondents to identify

the sources, if any, “used in the past 7 days for local news and

current affairs.” The same question was posed for national

news and current affairs. The choices offered were television,

newspaper, radio, Internet, magazines, friends/family, other,

none, don’t know, and refuse. The survey then asked follow-up

questions regarding the first five choices. For each one of the

five sources, respondents who did not mention a source were

487a

asked specifically if they used that source for local news and

current affairs. The survey posed analogous questions with

regard to national news and current affairs. Based on the initial

and follow-up questions, the survey presents “summary data”

on sources of local and of national news and current affairs

information.

403.In an ex parte communication filed May 28, 2003,

Media General submitted a critique of MOWG Study No. 8 by

Prof. Jerry A. Hausman. Hausman argues that the Nielsen

Survey has a number of serious flaws and questions its

usefulness in any rule-making concerning cross-ownership of

newspapers and broadcast stations.””’ First, he claims that the

low response rate of the survey may lead to biased results.”

Second, he argues that survey questions about hypothetical

‘future circumstances are unreliable. He cites anumber of cases

where respondents, presented with relatively simple questions,

are unlikely to consider the full, complete implications if a

particular form of media were to become unavailable.” Third,

he argues that the survey asks no questions that address the

newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership issues.”

404. We recognize Professor Hausman’s concerns, but we

believe that the Nielsen survey sample of 3,136 households

provides us with useful information. In addition, Professor

903 ; ee :

Statement by Jerry Hausman, Media General Notification of Ex Parte

Communication (May 28, 2003)

YO4

See Hausman at 3.

905 . ;

For example, he cites where the Nielsen survey asks whether

respondents would be more likely to use cable or satellite news channels for

news if broadcast TV channels were not available. He notes that the

question does not ask the respondent to consider a number of important

factors, such as whether VHF and UHF news programs would cease to exist

or whether only cable and satellite news programs would remain. Since it is

not clear what hypothetical world the respondents are assuming. Hausman

argues, the results of the survey are not reliable. Hausman, at 4-5.

906

Hausman at 6.

488a

Hausman provides no evidence that the sample is, in fact,

biased. Concerning Hausman’s second point, we agree that

answers to hypothetical questions are less useful than

information about actual behavior. MOWG Study No. 8

provides a substantial amount of information on reported actual

behavior. It is this information, not the hypotheticals, on which

we rely to conclude that media can be substitutes in providing

viewpoint diversity and to construct our Diversity Index.

Regarding Hausman’s third point, although the Nielsen survey

may not directly ask respondents for their views concerning

specific cross-ownership scenarios, we find that the results of

the survey are useful in a number of areas, such as which forms

of media are most heavily used for news. While questions could

have been posed that contained more specificity concerning

cross-ownership rules, we understand that such complexities -

could have made the survey design more difficult, as well as

possibly lowered the response rate. Overall, while Hausman

claims that the Nielsen survey does not “provide a basis for the

measurements necessary for the specification of policy,””” the

survey does, in fact, help us establish an “exchange rate”’ for

converting newspaper, television, radio, and other media into

common units so we can measure the extent of concentration in

the “market of ideas.” Finally, we emphasize that the

Commission has not relied solely on the results of the Nielsen

survey, but has used a number of studies and its own expert

judgment on media in reaching its decision.

405. The data in the Nielsen study indicate that television,

newspapers, radio, Internet, and magazines are the leading

sources of news and current affairs programming.” Indeed, the

summary data tables list only those five sources. In the initial

questions, less than one percent of respondents cite “other” as a

source. Based on the initial question, the average respondent

uses two of the five major sources for news and current affairs,

907

Hausman at 3.

°* MOWG Study No. 8 at Tables 97 and 98.

489a

whether the category is local or national. Taking account of the

follow-up questions, the average respondent uses three of the

five major sources for news and current affairs, again regardless

of whether the category is national or local.” These data

strongly suggest that citizens do use multiple media as sources

of viewpoint diversity, and that media can be viable substitutes

for one another for the dissemination of news, information and

viewpoint expression. On the basis of this finding, we proceed

to an analysis of local media markets and whether there are

particular kinds of cross-media transactions in particular kinds

of markets that would likely result in high levels of

concentration. To assist in making that determination, we rely

in part on our Diversity Index.

406. Our Diversity Index focuses on availability of sources

of local news and current affairs. As we explained in our

policy goals section above, we are concerned with promoting

viewpoint diversity in local media markets. Owners of media

outlets clearly have the ability to affect public discourse.

Consumers have numerous sources of national news and

information available to them. Three major commercial

broadcast networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, provide this

material and are available to 98% of US television

households.’'” Several nonbroadcast networks also provide

national news and current affairs information also are widely

available. Subscribership to CNN is 77.4% of US television

households.’'' The comparable figures for Headline News, Fox

News, MSNBC, and CNBC are 74.1%, 71.8%, 68.4%, and

909 - —

The average respondent uses 2.93 different media for local and 2.71

different media tor national news and current affairs.

910 :

See OPP Working Paper 37 at 48. In January 2002, there were 105.5

million television households in the U.S. See Television Advertising

Bureau, Trends in Television at www.tvb.org.

oT See Kagan World Media, Cable Television Investor (July 29, 2002) at

14.

490a

74.9%, respectively.’'> Local newspapers generally provide

information on national issues, and a variety of major

newspapers have national footprints. They include USA

Today, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and

otfiers. Moreover, a wide range of newspapers are available

on-line at no charge. National news magazines, such as Time,

Newsweek, US News and World Report, and more specialized

political journals, such as Weekly Standard and New Republic

are also widely available.”'’ Therefore we do not believe that

governmental regulation is needed to preserve access to

multiple sources of national news and public affairs

information.

407.The Diversity Index incorporates information on

respondents’ usage of television, newspapers, radio, and the

Internet. Respondents also reported getting local news and

information from magazines.’'* We exclude magazines,

however, from our Diversity Index. First, as the description

above makes clear, most (but not all) news magazines have a

national rather than a local focus. Although there are

exceptions (e.g., the Washingtonian and Texas Monthly), the

figures in MOWG Study No. 8 on magazines use appear to be

overstated. This simplification and assumption is supported by

other aspects of the study. For example, unlike newspapers,

radio, and television, almost no one cited magazines as their

primary source of news and current affairs. MOWG Study No.

8 includes a question asking respondents to identify their single

primary source of local or national news and current affairs.

9! Td. The total television households figure (105.5 million) is for January

2002 and is from Television Advertising Bureau, Trends in Television at

www.tvb.org.

913 ;, : ea a ’

See Appendix B for a summary list of major national news sources. We

note that some of the sources for national news and information are owned

by the same companies but we continue to believe that consumers have

numerous independently owned sources of national news and information.

4

14 .. , .

Six percent of respondents answered that they received their local news

and information from magazines.

49 la

The figure for magazines is 0.6%.”'> A 2000 study by the Pew

Research Center for the People and the Press provides similar

results.”’° The study examines “Trends in Regular News

Consumption” and finds that 12% of respondents, but only

4.2% of responses cite news magazines. An even lower share,

5% of respondents and 1.7% of responses, cite business

magazines. Moreover, these figures include consumption of

national as well as local news. The share of the sample

utilizing magazines for local news is smaller, perhaps

considerably so. The Pew Center data support our inference

that magazines play a negligible role overall as a source of local

news. We must also note that, although the actual local news

figure is small, because both the MOWG Study No. 8 and Pew

Center figures combine local and national news, the precise

magnitude of the local news figure is uncertain. Hence we are

unable to assign to magazines a weight (even a small weight) in

which we would have confidence. Nonetheless, the decision to

exclude magazines will be re-examined in the next biennial

review, and we will take the opportunity to gather additional

survey data at that time on magazine usage.

408. For similar reasons, we also exclude cable from our

Diversity Index. As discussed in the following section, we are

concerned that some consumers may have confused broadcast

and cable television. Thus, we believe some consumers who

replied that they receive their local news from cable may have

been viewing broadcast channels over the cable platform. We

also recognize, however, that cable systems do provide local

news and current affairs information through PEG channels

and, in some markets, local news channels. However, we do

not have accurate data for this measure. Because we do not

9!9 MOWG Study No. 8, Table 20.

7! Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, /nternet Sapping

Broadcast News Audience, http://people-

press.org/repo:ts/display.php3?PageI D=203.

rr

492a

have reliable data on this point, we exclude cable from the DI

to simplify our general analysis.?"’

c. Weighting Different Media

409. We have concluded that various media are substitutes in

providing viewpoint diversity, but we have no reason to believe

that all media are of equal importance. Indeed the responses to

the survey make it clear that some media are more important

than others, suggesting a need to assign relative weights to the

various media. In view of our focus on local news and current

affairs, we choose to base our weights on survey responses to

the question asking respondents to identify the sources, if any,

“used in the past 7 days for local news and current affairs.”?"*

We recognize that this is not a perfect measure, and that it

requires some adjustment. We justify these adjustments and

assumptions, however, by emphasizing that we are using the DI

only to inform us of general market trends, not for precise

measurements.

410. As noted above, the average respondent uses three

different media for local news and current affairs information.

It is likely that, for a given respondent, the three are not all of

equal importance. If media differ in importance systematically

across respondents (e.g., if television were most important to

everyone, and everyone made only minor use of radio to

acquire news and current affairs information), then it would be

misleading to weight all responses equally.

411. Unfortunately, we do not have data on this question

specifically with regard to local news and current affairs. The

available “primary source” data address local and national news

together and do show that different media have different

importance, in the sense that primary usage differs across

917 : es ae

As with magazines, we will review this issue in the next biennial review,

and may collect at that time more accurate survey data on consumers’ use of

cable for local news and current affairs.

918

MOWG Study No. 8, Table 97.

493a

media.”'” Because “primary source” data are not available for

local news and current affairs alone, we use the data identifying

sources of local news and public affairs programming to weight

the various media to reflect relative usage. As noted below,

this leads to lower shares for television and higher shares for

radio than the “primary source” shares reflect.

412. The local response summary data, Table 97 of MOWG

Study No. 8, include five categories of media—Internet,

magazines, radio, newspaper, television. Magazines account

for 6.8% of responses to the questions on source of local news

and current affairs. We exclude magazines as explained above

and normalize the shares of the four remaining media to sum to

100%. The resulting weights are television (33.8%),

newspapers (28.8%), radio (24.9%), and Internet (12.5%).?”"

The local response summary data do not break down the

television responses between broadcast television and

cable/satellite television. Nor do these data separate out usage

of daily and weekly newspapers. We make use of other FCC

MOWG Siudy No. 8 questions to apportion the newspaper

shares further.

413. Although the responses to one question in MOWG

Study No. 8 suggests that cable is a significant source of local

news and current affairs, other data from che study casts some

doubt on this result. The following discussion explains the

reasoning that leads us to exclude cable/satellite television from

the current analysis of local news and current affairs for

diversity purposes. As a threshold matter, DBS currently

provides little or no local nonbroadcast content. We do,

however, recognize that cable provides some such content and

that it is becoming a more important source of local news and

information. Some markets do have commercial local news

9! 1d., Table 20.

| Sa ae ‘ ; . ; os

The “primary use” weights, excluding magazines, are television (57.8%),

newspapers (25.8%), radio (10.3%), and Internet (6.1%). When magazines

are included their weight is 0.6%. /d.

494a

channels on cable.””' Moreover, at least one national cable

news service (CNN Headline News) provides a five-minute

local “cut-in” every half hour in some markets. Additionally,

local public, educational, and governmental (“PEG’’) channels

provide some local news and information, although the extent

of their impact is enclear. MOWG Study No. 8 asked

respondents who get local news and current affairs from

television (table 8) to indicate if the source is “broadcast

television channels,” cable or satellite news channels,” “some

other channel,” “don’t know,” or “refuse.” Virtually all

responses fell into the first two categories, with 46.4% of

respondents who get local news from television identifying

cable as their source.’””

414.Our experience suggests that the local cable news

response is too high. A review of the responses reported in

tables 6, 16, and 18 of MOWG Study No. 8 support this

assumption. Table 18 provides responses from all who get

news (local or national) from cable to the question “what are

the names of the news channels you watched in the past 7 days

on cable or satellite for local or national news or current

affairs?” The list from which respondents can choose includes

CNN, Fox News Channel, MSNBC, Local Cable News

Channels, Headline News, CNBC, Other, Don’t Know, and

Refuse. The last two choices get minimal response, but 27.5%

of responses are “Other.” This suggests that some people may

be counting retransmitted broadcast signals on cable or satellite

as cable or satellite channels.”**> Moreover, joint examination

= Roughly one-third of cable subscribers, 22.3 million, had access to a

local or regional news channel in J uly 2002. See OPP Working Paper 37 at

126.

- The corresponding figure for national news (from table 16) is 51.1

percent.

923

Because all cable systems carry local broadcast stations pursuant to our

signal carriage rules, and because DBS carriers provide local broadcast

signals in many markets, also pursuant to our signal carriage rules, it is

495a

of the responses reported in tables 6, 16, and 18 make it

possible to infer that 94.3% of those who get news from cable

(the table 18 universe) claim to get at least some local news

from cable. However, only 6.1% of responses mention local

cable news channels.’ This disparity makes us question the

responses regarding local news via cable and satellite channels

and supports our conclusion that weighting cable 46.4% is too

high. An additional reason that leads us to question cable as a

local news source is that, of those local cable channels that

meet Nielsen’s minimum reporting standards, they are the least

watched of any broadcast or cable stations in the market.”

Given the low viewing of PEG channels and the facts that only

one-third of cable subscribers have access to a local cable news

channel and we do not have an accurate cable figure to use, we

believe excluding cable from the Diversity Index on a national

basis is a reasonable assumption. We will review the status of

cable as a local news provider in the 2004 biennial review. Our

review will include a follow-up to MOWG Study No. 8, which

will include more detailed questions regarding the use of

nonbroadcast video media for local news and current affairs.

415. With regard to newspapers, MOWG Study No. 8

indicates that 61.5% of those who cite newspapers as a source

of local news and current affairs acquire that information from

possible, even likely, that the “other” category actually reflects viewing of

retransmitted broadcast signals. If we assume that viewers are likely to be

familiar with local broadcast signals, it is not likely that the “don’t know”

category includes broadcast signal viewing.

%°4 Local cable news channels are, unlike the Internet, not available

everywhere, but only in select markets. Only approximately one-third of

cable subscribers have access to such channels. See OPP Working Paper

37 at 126. The ownership limits apply nationwide, and the diversity index

is intended to help us define these ownership limits. This was an

additional reason for excluding cable from the DI while counting the

Internet.

Y

-

= Nielsen Television Index (Nov. 2000).

496a

dailies only, 10.2% from local weeklies only, and 27.3% from

both.” This works out to a share of 70.3% daily and 29.7%

weeklies. We use these weights to divide the total newspaper

share (28.8%) among daily and weekly newspapers. Our next

biennial review will provide an opportunity for re-examination

of the role of weekly newspapers. Accounting for the

additiona! information on newspapers results in a revised set of

weights. They are: broadcast television 33.8%, daily

newspapers 20.2%, weekly newspapers 8.6%, radio 24.9%, and

Internet 12.5%.

416. Various commenters agree that MOWG Study No. 8

S.pports the conclusion that citizens do, in fact, see different

media as alternative sources of news. For example, NAA

opines that the study, “a comprehensive survey...shows that the

public makes ample use of a broad assortment of outlets” and

that it “demonstrates that the public relies heavily ona range of

alternative media.”””’ Fox opines that the study “demonstrates

that consumers are utilizing the wide variety of media available

to them to obtain both local and national news and

information.” Later, this commenter states that this study,

along with another Study discussed in the comments

“demonstrates that consumers are adept both at using various

sources to obtain information and at using multiple sources

simultaneously.”””* Critics of MOWG Study No. 8 include

AFL-CIO and AFTRA, both of whom rely on a paper by Baker,

attached to the AFL-CIO comments.””” The Baker submission

refers to the fact that MOWG Study No. 8 reports responses to

a number of hypothetical questions regarding how respondents

would behave if the availability to them of certain media were

to change. Baker observes that the study “looks at what people

*°° MOWG Study No. 8, Table 7.

= NAA Comments at 8.

aa Fox Comments at 11, 25.

_ See AFL-CIO Comments at 12 and Baker Study at 12-14 ; AFTRA

Comments at 8.

497a

say they will do” and goes on to assert that “[E]conomists

usually prefer looking at what people do.””*? We agree that

answers to hypothetical questions are less useful than

information about actual behavior. MOWG Study No. 8

provides a substantial amount of information on reported actual

behavior. It is this information, not the hypotheticals, on which

we rely to conclude that media can be substitutes in providing

viewpoint diversity and to construct our Diversity Index. It is

worth noting in this connection that much of the information we

have on radio listening and television viewing is also based on

reports by listeners and viewers of their behavior. Moreover,

the information in MOWG Study No. 8 on the range of media

that citizens use for news and information is quite similar to the

results of a recent independent survey by the Pew Research

Center.”

417.The most detailed analysis of MOWG Study No. 8

comes from the Consumer Federat.on of America.”” CFA

agrees that citizens get viewpoint diversity from multiple

media. Their comments refer to the “two dominant political

media—daily newspapers and television,” although CFA

asserts that these media “appear to play very different roles.”

As noted above, television has the largest weight in the Di

(33.8%) and daily newspapers also loom large at 20.2%.

Although the radio weight is somewhat higher at 24.9%, the

fact that markets generally have far more radio stations than

daily newspapers make our weights consistent with CFA’s

conclusion that newspapers are among the two most influential

media. CFA finds that the Internet plays a small but growing

role in citizen acquisition of news and information, a finding

not inconsistent with the relatively low weight of Internet in our

°) Baker Study at 14.

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Sources for

Campaign News, Fewer Turn to Broadcast TV and Papers, (Apr. 27, 2003)

- ht p://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=243.

931

~ See generally CFA Comments at 94-147.

498a

DI. CFA quotes statistics on daily use of television,

newspapers, radio, and Internet that yield usage shares not too

different from our DI weights. Drawing on two surveys, CFA

suggests that people spend 4 minutes per day on average

gathering news from the Internet, 25 minutes reading

newspapers, 15 minutes listening to radio news, and “over half

an hour” watching television news.’ Ascribing half an hour to

television leads to shares of 40.5% for television, 33.8% for

newspapers, 20.3% for radio, and 5.4% for Internet. These are

fairly close to our DI weights of 33.8%, 28.8%, 24.9%, and

12.5% for television, newspapers, radio, and Internet,

respectively.

418. Although CFA does not dispute the proposition that

different media address the same issues and stories, it asserts

that they do so in different ways, suggesting, inter alia, that

television is “the primary source for breaking news,” that

newspapers have a larger role in “the follow-up function,” and

that talk shows are a new and significant element of radio’s role

in disseminating viewpoints.’ Although CFA does not

discuss the role of radio as a source of breaking news, we

acknowledge that different media do present information in

different ways. CFA also argues that, particularly for “high use

respondents” (the one-third of respondents in MOWG Study

No. 8 whose total media use was above the sample average)

there is evidence that the media are complements rather than

substitutes, j.e., people who use more of one medium tend to

use more of the others. For the “low use respondents” (the one-

half of respondents whose total media use was below the

sample median), in many cases there are negative correlations

in usage across many pairs of media. CFA suggests that this is

consistent with substitution.”*> Thus, CFA appears to conclude

933 1. at 109.

934 1a at 112, 100.

935 1d. at 142-145.

499a

that media are substitutes for some citizens and complements

for others.

419.We disagree with CFA's conclusion that the DI is

invalid because some citizens may consider certain media

outlets complements rather than substitutes. In the technical

economic sense, two goods are substitutes if an increase in the

price of good A (which leads to a decrease in consumption of

good A) leads to an increase in the consumption of good B. In

the context of our diversity goal, we are concerned with the

question of what happens when one or more media outlets

refuses to transmit a particular viewpoint. If most citizens

accessed only one type of outlet, e.g., radio but not newspapers

or television, then our diversity goal would prompt us to

analyze separately the structure of the “radio marketplace of

ideas.” If, on the other hand, most citizens access multiple

media, then we can rely on the reasonable probability that, if,

e.g., the local newspaper refused to cover a particular story,

citizens would be exposed to that story via independently-

owned other media, such as radio or television. In other words,

evidence that media are complements in the sense that, for at

least some citizens, there is a positive correlation between use

of one medium and use of another, does not invalidate the

premise underlying the DI.

d. Weighting Outlets Within the Same Medium

420. Having decided on relative weights for the various

media, we next confront whether and how to weight different

media outlets within each category. The decision of whether to

do weighting turns on whether our focus is on the availability

of outlets as a measure of potential voices or whether it is on

usave (7.e., which outlets are currently being used by consumers

for news and information). We have chosen the availability

measure, which is implemented by counting the number of

independent outlets available for a particular medium and

assuming that all outlets within a medium have equai shares. In

the context of evaluating viewpoint diversity, this approach

500a

reflects a measure of the likelihood that some particular

viewpoint might be censored or foreclosed, i.e., blocked from

transmission to the public.

421. The underlying assumption here is that all qutlets have

at least similar technical coverage characteristics. This is a

good, but not perfectly accurate assumption. Our signal

carriage rules more or less equalize the covemge of all

television stations in a particular DMA,””° and it appears that

newspapers (even those with limited current circulation) can

expand their circulation area at relatively low cost. That is,

assuming that additional readers are interested in the content,

additional delivery personnel and vending machines are readily

available at low cost. However, the assumption is less certain

for radio. For example, a Class C FM station and a daytime

AM station, in fact, have different coverage characteristics.

The Class A station cannot expand its coverage to match that of

the Class C FM station and thus reach additional listeners who

might otherwise not have access to the views expressed on this

outlet. Nevertheless, we believe the assumption to be

reasonable across all cases. Arbitron radio metros are smaller

than many radio station service areas and so would have the

effect of truncating the service areas of more powerful stations.

In addition, even though radio’s total diversity share is 24.9%,

on average there are enough radio stations so that the per-

Station share is fairly small. Any distortion in share by

overestimating the reach of small radio stations is therefore

small.

422. Even though we choose to assign the same weight to

each outlet of a particular medium, we reiterate the importance

of assigning different weights to different media. As noted

above in ¥ 409 et seq., different media are of different

936 ae :

We make this assumption for the purposes of constructing the DI; the

actual differences in coverage are accounted for in the rules themselves, e.g.,

the UHF discount in the national rule, and our waiver policy in the local TV

and CML rules will look to the actual reach of stations.

SOla

importance. The differences in usage across media documented

in MOWG Study No. 8 are in part reflections of the differential

impact on the user of television, radio, newspapers, etc. We

believe that the overall impact of a medium is substantially .

determined by the physical attributes of its distribution

technology, along with user preferences. A radio station owner

is able to change format, say from classic rock to all-news, and

thus change its impact on the marketplace of ideas. But a radio

station switching to all-news does not thereby turn itself into

the equivalent of a television station nor does its impact on the

marketplace of ideas become that of a television station.

Conversely, if a home shopping television station began to

carry substantial local news programming, the impact on the

marketplace of ideas would be greater than that of the former

classic rock radio station.

423. The case for a usage measure is that it reflects actual

behavior. However, current behavior is not necessarily an

accurate predictor of future behavior. Moreover, in order to

implement a usage measure accurately, it would be necessary

for us to define which content should be considered local news

and current affairs. Current behavior, e.g., viewing or listening

to a broadcast station, is based on the content provided by the

station in question. However, media outlets can change the

amount of news and current affairs that they offer, perhaps in

response to competitive conditions in the “viewpoint diversity”

marketplace. Such changes are unpredictable, so current

market shares (e.g., of viewing or listening) may not be good

predictors of future behavior. Indeed, advocates of a

concentration approach to diversity analysis have noted the

weakness of the usage approach, pointing out that “[E]vidence

of past production does not, as a matter of logic, necessarily

give a proper picture of acompany’s future ability to compete.’

Only in examining ‘its structure, history and probably future,

does one provide’ the appropriate setting for judging the

502a

probably anticompetitive effect of the merger’”’ 7 ‘This point

has particular force when dealing with competition in the

marketplace of ideas because media outlets can rapidly expand

their distribution of content (including local news and current

affairs) at very low marginal cost. Of course, availability of

media can also change. However, this is less likely to occur

than is change in the program schedule or station format.

Moreover, availability is far more likely to increase than

decrease. Although a broadcast station owner could turn in the

station license and take it out of service, this happens rarely if

ever. A more likely scenario is an increase in media

availability as a new station enters the market.

424. If we were to adopt a usage measure designed to reflect

our concern with local news and current affairs, we would need

information on viewing/listening/reading of local news and

current affairs material. To implement this procedure, it would

be necessary first to determine which programming constituted

news and current affairs. We believe that this type of content

analysis would present both legal/Constitutional and data

collection problems. News and current affairs content is not

necessarily limited to regularly-scheduled news programs. So

we could be faced with deciding which other programs were

news and currevit affairs, whether some portion of a program

not primarily news should count as news, and, indeed, whether

portions of a news report devoted, e.g., to movie reviews should

count as news. Overall ratings or (in the case of newspapers)

subscription data would not suffice. Someone who subscribes

to a daily newspaper but only reads the (nationally-distributed)

comics and the classified advertisements is undoubtedly getting

a valuable service, but it is not clear that the service has

anything to do with news and current affairs. Similarly, a

television station that attracts large audiences by virtue of its

°37 Maaurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of

Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 249, 277 (2001) (quoting U.S. v. General

Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974)).

503a

movies and national sports programming provides an important

service, but it would be misleading to judge the station's

importance as a local news outlet by its overall ratings.

425. Ultimately, our goal is not to prescribe what content

citizens access, but to ensure that a wide range of viewpoints

have an opportunity to reach the public. This goal, the

limitations of current usage as a predictor of future usage, and

the content classification requirements for implementing a

usage measure all lead us to adopt an “equal share” approach to

weighting outlets within the same medium. ~

426. We deviate from this approach only in the case of the

Internet. We use subscription shares to divide the Internet

category among the two current significant sources of Internet

access—telephone companies and cable companies. In order to

determine the number of subscribers to telephone company

based Internet access, it is necessary to add together “dial-up”

and DSL subscribers. Dial-up service is available to anyone

with a telephone line and offers a low-capacity connection (up

to 56 kbps). DSL service offers much higher speed

connections, but, due to the requirements of the technology and

certain physical limitations of the telephone distribution

network, it is not available everywhere. Cable companies offer

high speed Internet access, and most cable plant has been

upgraded to support this service. Some applications, such as

viewing video clips of news and other content, are not fully

supported by dial-up services. Trade and industry sources

estimate that, as of the end of 2002, 85 million households had

access to cable high speed Internet service and 11.3 million

subscribed.” This leaves over 15 percent of households

without access to cable modem service. Moreover, it is not

clear how the areas in which cable modem service is

unavailable compare to the areas in which DSL is unavailable.

We therefore think it prudent to use subscriber figures to

3K. ated ;

See Cable and Telecommunications Industry Overview 2002 Yearend, at

http://www .ncta« ‘om/industry_overview.

504a

calculate how to divide the Internet category between cable and

telephone companies. _

427.Table 78 of FCC MOWG Study No. 8 provides

information on Internet access. Respondents who said they

have home access to the Internet were asked a follow-up

question regarding how they access the Internet. The answers

(in percentages) were as follows: cable line 18.9 percent, DSL

line 14.7 percent, telephone line 66.1 percent, other 3.5 percent,

don’t know 5.9 percent, and refuse 0.5 percent. The responses

sum to 109.6 percehi. If we take the 99.7 percent of

respondents who picked cable, DSL, or telephone line as the

base, and if we combine telephone and DSL, the resulting

shares are 19 percent cable and 81 percent telephone. We

recognize that, given the relatively small share of Internet in the

total diversity market (12.5% weight), using subscriber shares

rather than equal availability for Internet providers has a very

small impact on our Diversity Index calculation. 9% In this

regard, however, we reject the argument made by some

commenters that we should not include the Internet at all. They

argue that people only utilize the Internet to access their

newspapers’ and local broadcast stations’ websites and,

939 ; ; : ”

As explained in the next section, “Calculation Methodology,” our

diversity index is calculated by squaring relevant market shares. If we were

to assume that the two Internet sources had equal shares, the contribution to

the index of Internet would be 78 points. The assumption we use as

described in the text leads to a contribution to the index of 109 points. We

do not attribute common ownership to Internet Service Providers, e.g., even

if Cox owns a television station and the local cable ISP in a market, we will

not combine their market shares for the purposes of the Diversity Index

calculation. We will assume (subject to examination at the next biennial

review and to future findings we might make in our cable modem

proceeding), that iSPs do not restrict subscriber access to Internet content

based on the identity of the content provider. We also note that, as

explained above, we are looking at the availability of news and information

sources generally -- and websites particularly -- not their popularity.

S0Sa

therefore, the Internet does not add to diversity.” Although

many local newspapers and broadcast stations maintain

websites with news content, that does not begin to plumb the

extent of news sources on the Internet. Some websites compile

news from numerous sources, many of which an individual may

not have know of or known how to access (e.g., The Drudge

Report). Others are unique to the Internet (e.g., Salon).

Moreover, we include the Internet because, as previously

indicated, we are looking at availability of media, not the

popularity of specific publications, stations, cable channels, or

websites. There is a virtual universe of information sources on

the Internet and there are websites not maintained by existing

news media conveying information on everything from fringe

political groups to local civic events. We cannot pretend that

these are not in the “diversity” mix simply because only a small

number of people may visit them.

e. Calculation Methodology

428. The Diversity Index is structured like an HHI, i.e., it is

simply the sum of squared market shares. As explained above,

squaring market shares, unlike measures based on the “raw”

market shares, permits construction of an index that takes

account of the market shares of all providers in the “market” for

viewpoint diversity. As noted above, the geographic market we

are using is local. We currently define television markets in

terms of the Nielsen DMA. DMAs are exhaustive

Classifications, covering the entire United States, and it is

straightforward to count the number of television stations in a

DMA. Weare including public as weil as commercial stations.

Public stations provide viewpoint diversity; indeed that is a

specific part of their mandate. Although they do not have the

940

See, e.g., AFL-CIO Comments at 12-14, (citing Consumer Union

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-235, Douglas Gomery, The FCC's

Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule: An Analysis (Econ. Policy

Inst., Feb. 2001)); AFTRA Comments at 10; UCC at al Comments at 23.

506a

same programming incentives that commercial stations do, their

partial reliance on viewer contributions means that they, like

commercial stations, must be sensitive to the demands of their

audience. We choose not to include television stations from

outside the DMA in question, even if they obtain a measurable

audience share in the DMA. Our focus is on local news and

current affairs and it is not reasonable to assume that stations

outside of the DMA in question will devote significant

resources to news and current affairs programming targeted to

that DMA. Our cable television signal carriage rules generally

permit a television broadcast station within a DMA to obtain

cable carriage throughout the DMA, and our DBS signal

carriage rules generally ensure that all television stations within

a DMA are treated the same with respect to satellite

retransmission.” For this reason, we assume that all television

broadcast stations in a DMA are available throughout the

DMA. As explained above, each broadcast television station

receives an equal share of the broadcast television weight.

429. We combine the television stations in each DMA with

the radio stations in the Arbitron radio metro with which the

DMA is paired. There are 287 Arbitron radio metros in the

country. Each one is smaller than the DMA within which it

lies.”** Arbitron radio metros do not cover the entire country.

More sparsely populated areas are not included in radio metros;

approximately one-half of radio stations are not in a metro

market. As explained below in the cross-media limits section

of this Order, we use the Diversity Index to help us identify

markets that are “at risk” for excessive concentration in the

“viewpoint diversity market.” Once those markets have been

identified, and cross-media limits imposed, the actual

implementation of the cross-media diversity limits will not

require information on a local radio market, only on the

941 coe 47 CER. § 76.56 (Cable) and § 76.66 (DBS).

942 ‘ , cs ‘ P ,

Most radio metros lie wholly within a single DMA; virtually all of the

others are predominantly within a single DMA.

507a

television market (DMA) within which the radio stations are

located that are part of a proposed merger. As detailed in the

cross-media limits section, the analysis that we use to identify

at-risk markets is based on examination of a substantial sample

of the 287 Arbitron radio metro markets.

430). Daily newspaper publication and circulation data are not

collected based on Arbitron radio metros. A different market

concept, developed by the Department of Commerce, is used by

the industry. The basic building block is the “Metropolitan

Statistical Area,” or “MSA.” The Department of Commerce

recognizes 318 metropolitan areas, which include 248 MSAs,

58 “PMSAs” (primary metropolitan statistical areas), and 12

“NECMAs (“New England county metropolitan statistical

areas”). For Diversity Index calculation purposes, these areas

are matched to Arbitron radio metros. Each daily newspaper

that is locally published in the metropolitan area is included in

the market. The daily newspaper share of the Diversity Index

is divided evenly among all daily newspapers included in the

market. In the absence of market-specific information on

weekly newspaper availability, we make the most conservative

assumption that there is one independently-owned weekly

newspaper in each local market, and assign to it the entire

weekly newspaper share.”

431. In terms of calculating the Index, within each medium

we combine commonly-owned outlets and calculate each

owner’s share of the total availability of that medium. We then

multiply that share by the share of the medium in question in

the total media universe (television plus newspaper plus radio

plus Internet). Once these shares in the overall “diversity

market” have been calculated, we add together the shares of

properties that are commonly-owned (e.g., a newspaper and a

943, . ' er

In fact, there were 7,689 weekly newspapers in 2000, so it is likely that

the average market has at least one weekly. See NAA, supra note 200 at

htp://www.naa.org/infolfacts02/13_ facts2002.him.

508a

television station), square the resultant shares, and sum them to

get the base Diversity Index for the market in question.”

4. Cross-Media Limits

432. In this Section we modify our rules by adopting a new

set of cross-media limits (“CML”) in lieu of our former

newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership

rules.. The CML have been designed specifically to check the

acquisition by any single entity of a dominant position in local

media, markets -- not in economic terms, but in the sense of

being able to dominate public debate -- through combinations

of cross-media properties. Because we have traditionally relied

upon blanket prohibitions on certain cross-media combinations,

we have never before had to confront head-on the challenge of

identifying specifically which types of markets give us the

greatest cause for concern in terms of preserving diversity of

viewpoint, and which types of transactions are most

problematic in this regard. This effort is compiicated by the

nature of the public interesi we are seeking to protect —

diversity — which is as elusive as it is cherished.

433.Our modification of the newspaper/broadcast and

television/radio cross ownership rules into a set of cross-media

limits or CML is our first comprehensive attempt to answer this

difficult and complex set of questions. The CML derives from

data in the record regarding the relative reliance by consumers

of various types of media outlets for news and information. To

help us analyze that data, we use a methodological tool — a

diversity index or “DI” — that allows us to measure the degree

to which any local market could be regarded as concentrated

for purposes of diversity. Based on an analysis of a large

sample of markets of various sizes, the diversity index suggests

that the vast majority of local media markets are healthy, well-

functioning, and diverse.

944 Meare aoe

Appendix C, Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets, contains the

Diversity Index calculations for the ten markets examined in MOWG Study

No. 1, based on the market structure as of November 2002.

509a

434. Moreover, because we are adopting herein intra-service

competition caps for radio and television properties, those caps

will ensure that local markets will continue to be served by a

diversity of voices within each of these respective services. By

the nature of the exercise, markets defined for competition

purposes are no broader than, and generally are narrower than,

markets defined for diversity purposes. Thus, our radio and

television competition caps will not only serve to promote and

protect competition within the radio and television services,

they will also be protective of diversity interests when

television-only or radio-only transactions are at issue. For

example, in a market with 12 TV stations, our intra-service

caps guarantee at least six different owners of television

stations. If there are forty radio stations in the market, our

radio cap will ensure at least six different owners of radio

properties.

435. We recognize, however, that our intra-service caps will

not address diversity concerns that may result from cross-media

combinations. Although our local radio and television caps

will ensure a significant number of independent voices in larger

markets, cross-media combinations in very small markets might

result in problematical levels of concentration for diversity

purposes. Accordingly, we are herein supplementing our two

intra-service local rules with a narrowly drawn set of cross-

media limits to reach those combinations that are not already

prohibited by our television or radio caps, but which would

give rise to serious diversity concerns. The cross-media limits

are based on a set of assumptions drawn directly from the

record evidence in this proceeding and premises that are

consistent with past Commission policy and practice. Although

we rely in part on our data analysis to help define the CML, we

clearly respect that diversity is inherently subjective and cannot

be reduced to scientific formula. We do believe, however, that

greater use of empirical data and evaluation of that data can

significantly strengthen the reasoning that underlies our expert

judgment. The CML, therefore, ultimately rests on our

RR i te ee

510a

independent judgments about the kinds of markets that are most

at-risk for viewpoint concentration, and the kinds of

transactions that pose the greatest threat to diversity.

a. Competition Caps Protect Diversity

436. As set forth above, we have adopted a cap both on the

number of television stations that any one owner may hold ina

market, and on the number of radio stations that any one owner

may hold in a market. These caps were designed to promote

and protect competition within these two distinct services. The

caps are, therefore, based on product market definitions that

consider only those products or services that may be regarded

as reasonable substitutes for competition purposes. We

recognize, however, that although radio and television outlets

may not compete in economic terms with other types of speech

outlets, e.g., newspapers, they all inhabit the mass media

landscape that Americans turn to for news and information. In

that sense, whatever the confines of their markets for

competition purposes, many different outlets serve core

democratic functions as purveyors of ideas, outlets for opinion,

and distributors of news.

437. The data in the record evidence this difference. As set

forth above, radio and television compete in economic terms in

separate and distinct product markets. Both radio and

television outlets, however, inhabit the larger speech market, as

do several other types of entities. For example, MOWG Study

No. 8, a consumer survey on media usage, reveals that, when

asked to identify their primary source of all news and

information -- both local and national -- , approximately 40% of

Americans responded that broadcast television was their

primary source and approximately 10% of Americans

responded that radio was their primary source. > However,

nearly 24% of responderts identified daily newspapers as their

primary source of news and information, 18% identified cable

°45 MOWG Study No. 8, Table 20.

Slla

news networks, 6% identified the Internet, and 2% identified

weekly newspapers or magazines.’ These figures track

closely results from a Pew Research Center survey asking

similar questions about Americans’ use of media for news and

information. When asked where they turned for their primary

source of election news, 39% of respondents said broadcast

television, 24% said cable television, 24% said newspapers, 9%

said radio, and 5% said the Internet.”*’ Other studies confirm

that, today, Americans substitute among and between many

different sources for news and information on a regular basis.””*

The record reflects, in short, that the “viewpoint” market in

which television and radio stations participate is broader than

the economic product markets, as defined by standard

competition theory, in which either competes. ”” As a result,

intra-service caps designed to ameliorate competition concerns

necessarily also will protect against undue concentration of

speech outlets for diversity purposes.

438.Our diversity index helps to illustrate this point.

Pursuant to our new local radio rule, no single owner, even in

the smallest markets, will own more than 50% of the radio

outlets. In larger markets, the percentage of radio outlets that

can be held by any one entity is considerably smaller. Thus,

using the most extreme set of facts, and using Altoona,

Pennsylvania, as our test case, the diversity index focused on

local news and information alone (again, the most conservative

assumption) reveals a relatively minimal impact on viewpoint

diver: ty even should the radio outlets become split between

only .vo owners. The current base case DI for local news and

946 Id

a.

*” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Sources for

Campaign News, Fewer Turn to Broadcast TV and Papers (Apr. 27, 2003)

at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3? PagelD=243.

YAR

See, e.g., UCLA Internet Report.

y

9

49

Fox Comments, Owen Statement.

512a

information for Altoona is 960.”” If the local radio market

were to become restructured into a duopoly, the DI would rise

to only 1,156.”! Again, this hypothetical posits the most

extreme restructuring of radio outlets in the smallest market

among those in our test cases. The change in the diversity

index will be far smaller as a result of radio transactions in

larger markets or where the restructuring is less extreme.

439. Similarly, pursuant to our new local television rule, ne

single owner will be permitted to own more than two television

outlets in most markets. Using Altoona again, a two-TV

combination raises the base DI for local news and information

by only 64 points.”” Indeed, using a set of randomly sampled

markets of varying sizes, the average change in DI as a result of

an owner of one television property buying another to create a

television duopoly in a small market with only five licensed

television stations is 91.” In markets with twenty licensed

television stations the change in DI as a result of the creation of

a television duopoly is only six.” Thus, although our intra-

service television and radio caps are designed to protect and

promote competition, they have a corollary benefit of also

guarding against concentration in the viewpoint markets, at

least with respect to intra-service combinations.

9 See Appendix C, Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets.

951

Id.

on running this sample case, we assume that a duopoly would be

permitted in the market even though, in fact, a new duopoly would not be

permitted in Altoona under our new local television cap (Altoona has five

stations and one existing duopoly; a second therefore would violate our top

four restriction).

93 See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

94 Id. We note, also, that our local television ownership cap includes a

prohibition on top-four combinations. This will have the effect of

prohibiting combinations of the local television stations most likely to

produce and carry significant local news programming. Thus, although the

top-four restriction is based on competition theory, the rule will also have

beneficial effects on local diversity.

Sl3a

440. We recognize, however, that cross-media combinations

that may impact the range and diversity of voices in local

markets will not be captured by our television and radio caps.

We therefore adopt, as described below, new cross-media limits

targeted specifically and solely at the types of transactions that

would give us the most concern and which are not already

prohibited by our intra-service caps.

b. Foundations of the Cross-Media Limits

441. We begin with the proposition that, because this rule

will limit the speech opportunities not only for broadcasters,

but also for other entities that may seek to own and operate

broadcast outlets (including those with the fullest First

Amendment protection — newspapers), we should draw the rule

as narrowly as possible in order to serve our public interest

goals while imposing the least possible burden on the freedom

of expression.” We also recognize that the tools that we are

using to evaluate market diversity involve as much art as

science. “Diversity” is not susceptible to microscopic

examination; it cannot be mapped with any known formal

system or reduced to mathematical equations. Although we

attempt to measure it and assign some quantitative value to it in

order to understand relative diversity of different types of

markets, we recognize that this process is_ inherently

approximate.” ° We must exercise great care, therefore, before

categorically prohibiting any particular transaction or set of

transactions as a prophylactic matter.

442. Nonetheless, it is apparent, based on the record in this

proceeding, that certain types of transactions in certain markets

” See FOEF Comments at 41-42; WVRC Comments at 43-44.

Using the Diversity Index allows us to see different market

characteristics in markets of different sizes. We have also found, however,

that differentiating markets by the number of newspapers present is too blunt

while differentiating markets by the number of radio stations is too fine.

Therefore, we use the number of television stations as an identifier of market

size.

Sl4a

present an elevated risk of harm to the range and breadth of

viewpoints that may be available to the public.””’ Using our

diversity index analysis and our independent judgment

regarding desired levels of diversity, we first identify “at-risk”

markets that might already be thought to be moderately

concentrated for diversity purposes. We then identify the types

of transactions that pose the greatest risk to diversity, and

impose specific limits on those transactions in at-risk markets.

Finally, because certain transactions in less concentrated

markets pose a high risk of rapid concentration, we impose

separate restrictions on transactions outside of the at-risk

markets.

c. Identifying At-Risk Local Markets

443. We begin by identifying those markets most susceptible

to high levels of viewpoint concentration; i.e., those markets

where our diversity concerns cut most deeply. At the outset,

consistent with our past practice and precedent, we focus in this

regard on local, not national, viewpoint market(s).””* Evidence

in the record before us supports the conclusion that the number

of outlets for national news and information is large and

growing, and that government regulation is thus unnecessary to

protect lai

444. With respect to local markets, our ten city study and our

DI test cases reveal that most local markets today are well-

functioning, healthy markets for speech.” For example, as of

2000, the largest media market in the country, New York City,

had 184 different media outlets owned by 114 different

asa ‘f. 1975 Multiple Ownership Second Report and Order, supra note 33

(in which we required divestiture in “egregious” newspaper/broadcast

cases).

998 See Policy Goals Section III, supra, and the Diversity Index, Section

VI(C\(3), supra.

9 See Appendix B, National News Sources.

960 cee MOWG Study No. 1.

96 . .

owners.” Perhaps —_ more impressively, ihe

Burlington/Piattsburgh market — market 141 out of 287 — had

53 outlets owned by 34 different owners.’ Even Altoona,

Pennsylvania, market 255, had 23 outlets owned by 15 different

owners.” That is, in the 255th ranked market, there currently

are fifteen different independent voices.

445. Not all voices, however, speak with the same volume.

Using our Diversity Index, we have examined the concentration

of media outlets in the ten markets that were the subject of our

Ten City Study using weighted voices. New York has a base

DI for local news and information of 373; Lancaster,

Pennsylvania, has a DI of 939; and Myrtle Beach, South

Carolina, has a DI of 989." Indeed, the average DI for all ten

markets, which range from the largest to near the smallest, is

758.” A DI of 758 is the equivalent of 13 equally-sized firms.

446. Moreover, to ensure that the results of our ten city study

were not anomalous, we have calculated the average DI for a

different set of randomly selected markets, both large and

961 Td. Even though both MOWG Study No. | and Appendix C (Diversity

Indices in Ten Sample Markets Study) used the same media markets, the

number of outlets and owners in individual markets as described in MOWG

Study No. | are different from the number of outlets and owners in

Appendix C, Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets, for two reasons.

First. MOWG Study No. | used outlet and ownership data that was current

in 2000, in order to make a comparison between 1960 and 1980. The

Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets Study used more current outlet and

ownership data from 2002, in order to be more up-to-date. In addition,

MOWG Study No. | included the “embedded” radio metro markets that are

physically in the NYC metro, for illustrative purposes. The Diversity

Indices in Ten Sample Markets Study used only the radio stations assigned

to the NYC metro, for analytical purposes.

962

Id.

as Id.

— Id.

ne

5l6a

small.”°° The average DI for markets in which there are 20

television stations is 612; the average DI for markets in which

there are 15 television stations is 595; the average DI for

markets in which there are 10 television stations is 635; and the

average DI for markets in which there are 5 television stations

is 911 — all well below the point at which one would

characterize them as highly concentrated if one were using the

analogous HHI to measure competition in the market.””’

447. We believe the analogy to the HHI is apt. The HHI is

an indicator of economic concentration; it provides an

analytical framework for determining when and if an entity or

group of entities is likely to wield market power in an economic

market. Our DI, which was inspired by and modeled after the

HHI, similarly is an indicator of viewpoint concentration.

Using the DI as an analytical tool, we can assign approximate

weights to different types of media outlets, account for the

diversity effects of commonly-owned properties, and measure

relative concentration between and among markets. The DI can

help us, therefore, identify the point at which an entity or group

of entities is likely to wield inordinate power in the marketplace

of ideas.

448. Although competition theory does not provide a hard-

and-fast rule on the number of competitors necessary to ensure

that the benefits of competition are realized, a market that has

ten or more equally- sized firms normally can be considered

fully competitive.” A 1000 DI correlates to market in which

there are roughly ten firms with approximately equal market

power. An 1800 DI would correspond to a market with SiX

70 See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

967 14

968 ‘4 market with 10 or more equally-sized firms has an HHI of 1000 or

less. DOJ/FTC regards markets in this region to be unconcentrated.

Mergers resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse

competitive effects and ordinarily require no further analysis. See DOJIFTC

Merger Guidelines § 1.51.

517a

roughly equal voices. Using our DI analysis of sample markets,

we note that it is not until we reach markets with three or fewer

licensed television stations that the average DI exceeds 1000,

the point at which the market normally would be characterized

as moderately concentrated for competition purposes.”

449. Our DI analysis of these sample markets, however, is

not the end of our inquiry. Because of the importance we

associate with maintaining diversity among the three principal

platforms — newspaper, radio and television — for the

expression of viewpoint at the local level, and because these

same three outlets produce a large share of local news

content,’”” we previously have used a “voice test” focused on

one or more of these outlets for measuring diversity. Indeed,

the Sinclair court suggested that our choice of an eight-voice

test, then used in conjunction with the local television rule, was

an exercise of agency discretion entitled to some deference.””'

Although we no longer are willing to base our rules upon the

comparatively rudimentary eight-voice test, we continue to

believe that unacceptable diversity losses can occur in very

small markets when the principal distribution platforms for

local news content come under common ownership and control.

In larger markets, we expect that the number of distribution

outlets for local news content will be larger, and that consumers

will have greater access to secondary outlets for news and

information.”

9 See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios. The average DI for markets

with three television stations is 1027; the average DI for markets with two

television stations is 1316; and the average DI for markets with a single

television station is 1707.

ite CFA Comments at 32-39; UCC Comments at 23.

97) Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 162.

972 as ne

E.g., Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All

Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 15 FCC Red 20913, 20918

(2000) (broadband access in rural areas limited); 200] Price Survey Report,

17 FCC Red 6301, 6318 (2002) (low capacity cable systems in rural areas

Sees =

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518a

450. Finally, we are concerned not merely with the absolute

level of diversity that might already exist in any market or type

of market, but also with the degree to which diversity might be

sacrificed as a result of likely transactions. Accordingly, in

defining “at-risk” markets, we have used our DI and sampled

the effect of transactions, in large and small markets, involving

heavily used sources of local news and information.””* In so

doing, we have focused on the types of transactions that most

likely will lead to large DI changes and rapid concentration.

Our line-drawing effort is informed by the approach the DOJ

has taken in assessing competition issues. Although DOJ

policy is to review any transaction in a moderately concentrated

market that would result in a change in HHI of 100 points or

more, we have found no case in many years in which DOJ has

filed suit to block a merger that produced less than a 400 or

more point HHI change.”’* Based on our analysis, cross-media

combinations involving newspaper and television, newspaper

and radio, or radio and television properties do not produce a

offer fewer channels and are less likely to have stand-alone local or regional

cable news channels).

97 See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

974 Under the FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines, an HHI between 1000 and 1800

suggests a moderately concentrated market, and an HHI above 1800

suggests a highly concentrated market. Where the post-merger market

would be in the moderately concentrated range, the Guidelines suggest that a

merger that increases the HHI by more than 100 points will, absent other

factors, present antitrust concerns. Where the post-merger market would be

in the highly concentrated range, the Guidelines suggest that a merger

producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points, absent other

factors, is presumed to create or enhance market power or facilitate its

exercise. FTC/DOJ Merger Guidelines § 1.51. However, in the cases we

found over the past 15 years, the FTC or the DOJ has filed suit to block a

merger only when the change in the HHI is at least four times greater than

the Guideline’s standards. See, e.g., FTC v. Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc., 691

F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill., E. Div. 1988); U.S. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 1996

W.L. 634212 (D. Del. 1996). In the majority of cases, the proposed merger

would have resulted in a change in the HHI in excess of 1,000 points.

519a

change in the DI of anything even approaching that magnitude

other than in markets with three or fewer television stations.’””

For example, a newspaper/radio combination in markets with

only two licensed television stations produces a DI change of

more than 300 points, a television/radio combination in markets

of that size produces a DI change of 301 points, and a

newspaper/television combination in markets of that size

produces a DI change of 731 points. A newspaper/television

combination in a market with three licensed television stations

produces a DI change of 331 points.””°

451. These changes, of course, reflect approximations based

upon sample data and are provided only to be illustrative of the

diversity losses that can occur as a result of cross-media

combinations in small markets. Nonetheless, based on all of

the foregoing, we conclude that a market with the equivalent of

ten or more equally-sized firms cannot be regarded as even

moderately concentrated for diversity purposes. In light of that

conclusion, and in consideration of the properties of small

markets and on our analysis of potential transactional impacts

in those markets, we conclude that markets with three or fewer

licensed television stations should be regarded as “at-risk”

markets for purposes of diversity concentration. Markets of

that size, we expect, will be moderately concentrated and

subject to rapid concentration if cross-media combinations are

created involving radio, television and/or newspaper

properties.”’’ Accordingly, we will prohibit certain cross-

— See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

°”° The calculated changes in the Diversity Index for these markets are

premised on the assumption that the radio markets have consolidated to the

maximum extent permissible under our new local radio ownership rule. On

this basis, this is a “worst case” estimation of the impact of newspaper/radio

and television/radio combinations under the Diversity Index.

977 § market with an HHI of more than 1800 is regarded as highly

concentrated. We noted above that a DI of 1800 would correspond to six

equally-sized “voices.” Because of the amorphous nature of diversity as an

interest and the difficulty of measuring it with precision, we decline to draw

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520a

media combinations involving those properties in markets with

three or fewer television stations.’”*

d. Local Cross-Media Limits in At-Risk Markets

452. With respect to the limits themselves, we tread lightly in

view of the sensitive First Amendment interests at stake and the

deregulatory purpose of Section 202(h). Our intent is to draw

our rules narrowly, focusing on those transactions that are

likely to have a substantial impact on the diversity of voices

available in the market. The record shows that broadcast

television, daily newspapers, and broadcast radio are the three

media platforms that Americans turn to most often for local

news and information.””” They are, accordingly, the focus of

our diversity concerns, and we decline to impose any cross-

media limit on transactions involving media properties other

than radio, television, and newspaper outlets.

453. Further, we are establishing rules of nationwide

applicability. We desire, therefore, to provide the industry and

the public with clear, easy to administer rules reflective of

common market trends and characteristics. We recognize that,

in any given market, the lines we draw here may appear under-

or over-inclusive. Indeed, that quality inheres in the nature of

an absolute line prohibiting transactions that would take a market beyond the

1800 DI (i.e., six voice) level. The rules we are adopting herein, however,

are intended to protect against markets becoming highly concentrated — in a

qualitative sense — for diversity purposes.

978 When we originally crafted the newspaper/broadcast rule we required

divestiture of either a newspaper or a broadcast station in a limited number

of so-called “egregious” cases. We defined the relevant market in those

cases as the area encompassed by the city-grade signal of the relevant

broadcast station. Divestiture was required where the only daily newspaper

was published in a community within the city-grade signal of the only

commercial television (or only commercial radio station in cases where no

local TV station also existed) where the newspaper and the broadcast station

were commonly owned. See generally 1975 Second Report and Order,

supra note 33.

979 Soe MOWG Study No. 8, Table 97.

S2la

proscriptive rules themselves. Nonetheless, our analysis of the

record in this proceeding gives us confidence that our rules will

prevent the transactions that would seriously impair the

availability of diverse viewpoints in any local market while

permitting efficiency enhancing combinations. Again, although

they have a methodological foundation in the DI, these

judgments are based on agency expertise and experience

dealing with broadcast markets and the media industries

generally. Accordingly, except as specifically prohibited

herein, cross-media combinations will not be subject to

anything other than routine Commission review, 1.e., unless the

transaction is barred by the CML or our other ownership rules,

the combination is permissible under our rules, and we will not

apply the DI to it.”

454. As explained below, combinations of daily newspaper

and broadcast properties in at-risk markets present a serious

threat to local viewpoint diversity.”"! We therefore, adopt a

rule prohibiting common owuership of broadcast stations and

daily newspapers, and TV/radio combinations, in markets with

three or fewer television stations. In order to determine which

markets have 3 or fewer broadcast television stations, we will

rely on Nielsen television Designated Market Areas (DMAs).

We include for these purposes, commercial and noncommercial

television stations assigned to the DMA. This is consistent

with our overall measurement of the DI, explained above, as we

9X0 ‘ . ‘ ‘ . idea .

Bright lines provide the certainty and predictability needed for

companies to make business plans and for capital markets to make

investments in the growth and innovation in media markets. Conversely,

case-by-case review of even below-cap mergers on diversity grounds would

lead to uncertainty and undermine our efforts to encourage growth in

broadcast services. Accordingly, petitioners should not use the petition to

deny process to relitigate the issues resolved in this proceeding.

oy See, e.g., NABOB/Rainbow, PUSH Comments at 23-24; Gray

Comments at 16-19.

a

5§22a

assume that all television stations in the DMA are viewable in

the radio metro with which it is paired.”*”

455. A number of parties have questioned whether a cross-

ownership rule applicable to entities other than broadcasters,

e.g., newspaper owners, would be constitutional.”** We

continue to believe that a narrowly-drawn rule prohibiting or

limiting common ownership of broadcast properties and daily

newspapers is consistent with our constitutional framework.

Our current newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule has been

upheld by the Supreme Court against constitutional challenge”

and, as discussed above, broadcast/newspaper and

radio/television cross-ownership rules, like broadcast

ownership rules, are reviewed under the rational basis

standard.”*° We believe that our new cross-media limits satisfy

this standard because they are “a reasonable means of

promoting the public interest in diversified mass

communications,”””” and they are founded on a substantial

record. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the court’s concern in

another context, where a higher standard of constitutional

scrutiny applied, that our rules should focus on those markets

and transactions that are likely to result in substantial, rather

than only incremental, changes in diversity.” Our new cross-

ownership rules accomplish this because they are narrowly

tailored to restrict cross-ownership only in select markets.

456. Television-Newspaper. Nielsen survey data reveal that

daily newspapers and broadcast television remain the two most

982 .

See 4 428, supra.

Qx3 ; é

Media General Comments at 37; Tribune Comments at 17-28; Fox

Comments at 50-51.

7B See NCCB, supra, note 20.

8 See Legal Framework, Section II, 4§ 13-16, supra.

986

Id.

87 NCCB, 436 U.S. at 802.

988 Time Warner II, 240 F.3d at 1135.

523a

important sources of local news and information.’ The

importance of these outlets is reflected in our DI. As noted

above, a combination of a daily newspaper and a television

station in a market with only three television stations leads to

an average DI change of 331 points. These combinations in

markets with only two or one television station lead to DI

changes of 731 and 910 DI points, respectively. In these at-risk

markets, a single combination of a daily newspaper and a

television station could quickly jeopardize the range of

viewpoints available to consumers in the market. We therefore,

adopt a rule prohibiting the combination of a daily newspaper

and a broadcast television facility in any market with three or

fewer television properties. To trigger the rule, we will count

all television stations assigned to the DMA that contains the

newspaper's community of publication. We presume that

broadcast television stations are generally carried throughout

the DMA to which the station is assigned. Our rules will not,

however, bar a broadcast television station in such a market

from starting a new newspaper, as that would expand, not

decrease, diversity.

457. One additional issue in the cross-interest context is the

definition of “daily newspaper” for the purposes of

newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership. Currently, Note 6 to the

multiple ownership rule defines a daily newspaper as “one

~ which is published four or more days per week, which is in the

English language and which is circulated generally in the

ORY ‘ . :

Approximately 28.8 percent of Americans rely on newspapers as a

source of local news and information, and 33.8 percent use broadcast

television for this purpose. These figures are derived from normalizing the

_ figures in MOWG Study No. 8, Table 097. Because respondents were

asked what sources they had used in the previous 7 days for local news an

information, and because many respondents listed more than a single source,

the totals in the Table add up to more than 100%. Also, magazines were

excluded from the normalizing process as they typically are not sources of

local news.

524a

community of publication. *” Commenters raised the issue of

the English language requirement when applied in Puerto Rico

where the Spanish language is the dominant language.”

Caribbean argues that the Commission expressly rejected

requests to exempt Puerto Rico from the rule at the time of its

adoption and recognized that the goals underlying the rule were

of equal concern in Puerto Rico as on the mainland.” Both

Caribbean and Arso argue that the exclusion of foreign

language newspapers also allows for the exercise of market

power by the dominant newspapers in Puerto Rico which, due

to the exclusion of non-English newspapers, could be owned in

tandem with broadcast stations in the market.”

458.The exclusion of non-English language daily

newspapers in areas where the dominant language of the market

is not English creates a discrepancy in treatment that must be

ended. As Caribbean notes, in adopting the original

newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, the Commission

recognized that the need for diversity in Puerto Rico was the

same as that elsewhere. Since the definition of a daily

newspaper was adopted in 1975, the percentage of households

in which Spanish has spoken has approximately doubled.” It

is appropriate, therefore, at this point in time, that we apply the

CML to non-English daily papers in markets in which the

language that they are printed in 1s the dominant language of

their market.”” While the example of Puerto Rico was

9% 47 CER. § 73.3555 Note 6.

™ Arso Comments at 1-4; Caribbean Comments in MM Docket No. 01-235

at 22-35.

992 : ‘ ;

Caribbean Comments in MM Docket No. 01-235 at 22.

993 ,

Id. at 30-38. Arso Comments at 3-4.

4 . —_—

In 2000, Spanish was the language spoken at home in 10.5 % ot

American households. See www.census.gov. In 1980, the percentage was

5.3%. This is derived from data contained in INFORMATION PLEASE

ALMANAC (Otto Johnson ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995) at 835.

995

As previously indicated, to trigger the rule, we will count all television

5§25a

addressed in the comments, there may be other communities to

which this will apply now or in the future. Those whose

primary language is not English deserve the same protections of

diversity and competition as do English speakers. Accordingly,

for purposes of applying the CML to newspaper/broadcast

transactions we will change the definition of daily newspapers

to include non-English dailies printed in the primary language 7

of the market.

459. Radio-Newspaper. Although broadcast radio generally

has less of an impact on local diversity than broadcast

television, according to the results of our Nielsen survey,

discussed above, in at-risk markets the combination of a daily

newspaper with one or more broadcast radio facilities can

nonetheless have significant negative implications for the range

of viewpoints available. Indeed, markets with three or fewer

television stations have, on average, only 21 radio stations.’”°

Under our radio cap, a single owner in a market with 21

stations could own six stations, or 29% of all the radio outlets

in the market. Combining such a station group with, perhaps,

the only daily newspaper could, therefore, seriously impair the

range of independent viewpoints available in the market”’

Again, based on a sample of markets with three or fewer

television outlets, we find that the change in DI as a result of a

newspaper-radio combination, assuming that the radio owner

has reached the radio ownership cap under our new local rules,

stations assigned to the DMA that contains the newspaper’s community of

publication. For the purposes of evaluating whether the non-English daily is

printed in the primary language of the “market,” however, the market shall

be defined as the newspaper's community of publication.

996 |

BIA Master Access Data Base (Nov. 2002).

99

Although any given market may have more than one daily newspaper,

and of course every radio owner does not buy stations up to the regulatory

limit, we are adopting general rules of nationwide applicability.

Accordingly, we are positing for these purposes that the market is as

concentrated as possible consistent with our other local rules.

526a

would be 242 points or higher.” Given that markets of three

television outlets begin with an average DI of 1027, which we

regard as the beginning of the moderately concentrated range, a

242 point DI increase moves the market substantially toward a

highly concentrated state. We therefore, adopt a rule

prohibiting the combination of a daily newspaper and a

broadcast radio facility in any market with three or fewer

television properties.” To trigger the rule for newspaper/radio

combinations we will retain our current standard. That

standard requires complete encompassment of the newspaper's

community of publication by the requisite signal strength

contour of the commonly owned radio station(s).”

8 See Appendix D (Diversity Index Scenarios).

Again, we note that this rule does not apply in the event that a broadcast

licensee seeks to found a new daily newspaper in the market.

1000 :' ; :

For AM radio stations that standard is complete encompassment of the

newspaper’s community of publication by the predicted or measured 2mV/m

contour computed in accordance with § 73.183 or § 73.186 of the

Commission’s Rules. For FM radio stations the standard is complete

encompassment of the newspaper’s community of publication by the |

mV/m contour computed in accordance with § 73.313 of the Commission's

Rules. Previously, we discussed the inherent flaws in defining radio markets

using a contour-based definition, and decided to move to a geographic based

definition. Specifically, we found that a contour based definition for

defining radio markets can create inconsistencies in counting stations that

comprise a market, counting stations that an entity owns in a market, and

determining a radio market’s size and geographic area. See Local

Radio/Problems with the Existing Radio Market Definition and Counting

Methodologies, Section VI(B)(1)(a)(ii)(a), supra. However, such problems

do not arise in the context of using contours to determine whether the cross-

media limits rule is triggered. Here, we are concerned with the physical

proximity of the broadcast station and the newspaper's community of

publication, or in the case of radio/television cross-ownership, we are

concemed with the relative distance between two specific stations. Because

the cross-media rule relies, in part, on a geographic location, i.e. the

community of publication or the communities of license, parties cannot take

advantage of such discussed inconsistencies to circumvent the rules.

Moreover, we are not relying on a contour-based definition to define a cross-

media market; we are only using it to determine whether the rule is

cee

5§27a

460. Television-Radio. Combinations involving daily

newspapers and broadcast properties are not the only cross-

media combinations that present diversity concerns in at-risk

markets. Approximately one-fourth of Americans rely on radio

as a source of local news and information, and one-third use

broadcast television for this purpose.'”’' Cross-media

combination* involving television and radio properties also,

therefore, are likely to give rise to systematic diversity concerns

in at-risk markets. Our DI analysis confirms this fact.'"’’ We

therefore adopt a rule prohibiting the combination of broadcast

radio and broadcast television facilities in any market with

three or fewer television properties. In such markets, we will

not permit an owner of a TV station to own any radio stations

in the market, and vice versa. Although this modification is

more stringent than our current radio/T V cross-ownership rule

in a limited number of markets,'””* the overall thrust of our

CML approach has been to eliminate regulatory restrictions

where they are unnecessary."

461. The television/radio cross-ownership rule is triggered

when the radio station’s community of license is in the

commonly owned television station’s DMA. Similar to

requests for waiver of the newspaper/broadcast cross-

ownership rule, parties seeking waiver of the television/radio

triggered.

l MOWG Study No. 8, Table 097. The figures above are derived from

normalizing the figures in Table 097. Because respondents were asked

what sources they had used in the previous 7 days for local news and

information, and because many respondents listed more than a single source,

the totals in the Table add up to more than 100%. Magazines were excluded

from the normalizing process because they typically are not used for local

news.

1002 ,. , : , a :

See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

1003

47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c).

, 1004 ; ' Aree nee :

We discuss grandfathering of existing combinations in these markets

below. See Grandfathering and Transition Section VI(D), infra.

528a

cross-ownership rule can rebut this by showing that the

stations’ signals do not overlap and the television station is not

carried on cable systems in the radio station’s market.

5. Additional Cross-Media Limits in Small to

Medium-Size Markets

462. Although markets with four or more licensed television

stations do not qualify, in our judgment, as at-risk markets, a

combination of a daily newspaper with a television duopoly and

a significant radio presence can, in small to medium-size

markets result in substantial changes in the level of diversity.

For example, assuming that owners of broadcast properties are

constrained only by our local radio and television caps (i.e.,

they may acquire stations up to the cap in either service), a

newspaper owner might attempt to acquire a television duopoly

and several radio properties within the same market. Referring

again to our sample markets we find that, in a five-television

market, a combination of a newspaper, a television duopoly,

and as many radio stations as permitted by the applicable local

radio cap results in an average DI change of 846 points.

Indeed, even in an eight-television market, the resulting

average DI change from such a newspaper/TV duopoly/radio

combination DI is 734 points. Given that eight-television

markets begin, on average, with a DI of almost 900 points,

changes of this magnitude can lead quickly to a highly

concentrated market.

463. We notice a dramatic difference, however, in the base

DI, and in the DI changes that result from a combination

involving a newspaper, a TV duopoly, and a radio station

group, between our sample markets that have four to eight

television stations and those that have nine or more television

stations. The base DI for markets with eight television stations

is still almost 900 points — nearly in the moderately

concentrated range; there is almost a 200 point difference

between these markets and those with nine television stations,

which, in our sample, have a base case DI of 705 points. In

5§29a

addition, although a newspaper/TV duopoly/radio combination

produces a change of over 700 points in an eight television

market, bringing the DI up to approximately 1600 points, the

change is fewer than 500 DI points in a nine television market,

bringing the DI up to only 1200 points. These numbers accord

with our experience and judgment regarding the operation of

small to medium-size markets, and are supported by other

evidence in the record.'"”

464. We also note significant differences between the DI

changes that result from newspaper/TV combinations in

markets with between four and eight television stations and

those with nine or more television stations. Using our sample

markets, a newspaper combining with a television duopoly ina

market with only five television stations leads to an increase in

the DI of 376 points. Even in markets with eight television

stations, the average DI increase as a result of such a

combination is over 300 points. In markets with nine television

stations, however, the DI increase from a merger of a

newspaper with a television duopoly is only 172 points; it is

about 100 points in markets with ten televisions.'"° The

potential for rapid concentration that may result from a

combination of a newspaper with a television duopoly in

markets with between four and eight licensed television stations

(“small markets”’) leads us to conclude that it would be prudent,

in these markets, to impose additional local ownership

restrictions as part of our CML.

1005

See, e.g. Buckley Comments at 4-5; UCC Comments at 16-17, 40-41.

"° Because of the number of radio stations in the markets observed for our

sample of seven-television-station markets, the DI increases in those markets

are smaller than those in eight TV markets. This deviation does not

undermine, in our judgment, the more general conclusions that we draw

from the data and from our DI methodology regarding the markets most at

risk for viewpoint concentration (i.e., we do not deem markets with seven

television stations, in general, to be less at risk than markets with eight

television stations).

530a

465. We are cognizant, however, of the fact that substantial

public interest benefits may flow from broadcast/newspaper

combinations. As discussed above, television stations that are

co-owned with daily newspapers tend to produce more, and

arguably better, local news and public affairs programming

than stations that have no newspaper affiliation. Because of the

news resources available to local newspapers, we expect similar

benefits to be associated with newspaper ownership of radio

stations (e.g., radio stations affiliated with a local newspaper

may have an enhanced ability to produce local, all-news radio

programming and to cover local political and cultural events in

greater depth than stations unaffiliated with a newspaper).

Accordingly, we are not inclined to prohibit outright

newspaper/ broadcast combinations in markets with 4 — 8

television stations (referred to below as “small to medium size

markets’’).

466. Balancing these interests, we believe it appropriate, in

small to medium size markets (those with between four and

eight television stations) to allow the following: 1) one entity

may own a combination that includes radio, television and

newspaper properties, but the entity may not exceed 50% of

either of the applicable local radio or the local television caps

in the market: 2) a radio station group owner that also owns a

newspaper in the market, but which does not own any

television properties in the market, may acquire radio stations

up to 100% of the applicable radio cap. In these small to

medium size markets, therefore, we will prohibit: television

broadcasters that also own a daily newspaper in the market

from having a television duopoly in that market; a broadcaster

with a duopoly from obtaining a daily newspaper in the same

DMA; a newspaper owner from purchasing more than a single

television station within the DMA; and a radio station owner

that also owns a daily newspaper and a television station in the

S3la

market from exceeding 50% of the applicable radio cap for the

market.”

467. We believe that this CML achieves an appropriate

balance in small to medium size markets between fostering the

production of high quality local programming and protecting

diversity. To begin with, the public interest benefits of

newspaper ownership (the benefits of cross-fertilization

between media) likely are realized primarily in the first

broadcast station co-owned in either service. Although there

may be economic benefits to the owner from more extensive

combinations, it is not as clear that those benefits will accrue to

the public in any meaningful way; at least the public interest

component of these benefits is likely to decline incrementally

as the number of stations increases. Given that no owner will

be permitted, in accordance with our local television cap, to

hold more than two television stations in a small to medium

size market, a limit of one station in these markets for owners

of local newspapers will maximize the public interest benefits,

while reducing any loss of diversity. Although the loss of

diversity that might result were that owner to add a significant

radio presence in the market warrants a further 50% limit in the

number of radio properties that owner might hold, such is not

the case if the combination does not include any television

properties.

468. Again, our DI and a set of sample markets help to

illustrate the fact that our modified 50% CML for newspaper

1007 ,

For these purposes, we use the Arbitron or contour-overlap market

definitions discussed above in determining whether the newspaper and a

radio station serve the same market. We are not imposing a limitation that

would preclude a top four television station in a market from being

combined in common with a newspaper or radio station similar to the

restriction imposed in the local television rule context. . The top four

restriction imposed under the local TV ownership rule ts specifically

designed to protection competition, as fully discussed in that section. The

cross-media limit, on the other hand, is designed to protect viewpoint

diversity, not economic compeiition.

oS a ee Nag Moe te

See Sia acetate a til tla SU ecard icra

532a

combinations in small to medium size markets will significantly

reduce any loss of diversity that might result from efficiency-

enhancing newspaper/broadcast combinations. In a five-

television station market, a combination involving a

newspaper, a TV duopoly and a radio station group at the radio

cap would result in an average DI increase of 846 points, which

would take the market to 1757 points, near the highly

concentrated range.” If the combination is limited to a single

television station and no more than 50% of the applicable radio

cap, the DI change is 393 points, a decrease of 453 points. In

an eight-television market, a combination involving a

newspaper, a TV duopoly, and a radio station group at the cap

results in an increase in the average DI of over 700 points. By

limiting the combination to 50% of both the television cap and

the radio cap, the DI increase is reduced to 314 points.

469. Similarly, whereas a combination involving a

newspaper and a television duopoly alone will, on average,

raise the DI of a five-television station market by 376 points, a

combination involving a newspaper and a single television

station in a market of that size will raise the DI, on average,

only 223 points. The difference is more dramatic in markets

with eight licensed television stations, where the average DI

increase drops from 308 points to only 152 points for a

newspaper/TV duopoly combination. Newspaper/radio group

combinations result in significantly lower levels of viewpoint

concentration wken the combination does not include any TV

properties. Accordingly, we will permit newspaper/radio

combinations in small to medium size markets, provided they

comply with the local radio rule.

470. Similarly, our DI analysis indicates that radio/television

combinations in small to medium size markets result in

relatively small DI changes. For example, in a market with

only four television stations, a radio television combination,

1008 1 ader the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines, an HHI above 1800 suggests a

highly concentrated market.

533a

even assuming the radio owner holds the maximum number of

stations permitted under our local radio cap, results in a DI

change of fewer than 150 points.” Such a combination in a

market with eight television stations results in a DI change of

fewer than 100 points.'°"”

471. We have engaged in this analysis using our DI and a

randomly selected sample of markets not with the idea of

slavishly following the numbers that our index generated, but to

confirm and support the judgments we make regarding the

kinds of markets that are most susceptible to viewpoint

concentration, and the kinds of transactions that are most likely

to have a significant impact on the level of diversity available

in any given market. As noted above, we do not believe that

markets with between four and eight television stations can be

regarded as moderately concentrated for viewpoint purposes or

otherwise “at risk.” We do, however, believe, and our DI

confirms, that these markets are approaching a level of

viewpoint concentration that we would regard as moderate, and

we are concerned that some combinations involving the three

major sources of local news and public affairs information in

these markets would lead to inordinate diversity losses.

Accordingly, we will permit television/radio combinations in

small to medium size markets, provided they comply with the

local radio and television rules.

472. In markets with 9 or more TV stations, we will permit

any newspaper and broadcast cross-media combinations that

comply with our local TV ownership rule and local radio rule.

These tiers are derived from our DI analysis and our judgment

as to what markets are sufficiently diverse so that combined

newspaper/broadcast ownership would not unduly harm

diversity.

i” See Appendix D, Diversity Index Scenarios.

vo on

534a

473. With respect to markets with nine or more TV stations

(“large markets”), we impose no cross-media restrictions To

begin with, markets of this size today tend to have robust media

cultures characterized by a large number of outlets and a wide

variety of owners. New York City, for instance, which has 23

licensed television stations, 61 radio stations, and 21 daily

newspapers, had 61 different owners of broadcast stations and

daily newspapers as of November 2002.'"'' Using our diversity

index as a measure, New York City today has a base DI of only

373.'"'* More striking, perhaps, is the example provided by

Kansas City, Missouri, which has only nine licensed television

stations. Our Ten City Study reveals that Kansas City had 35

different owners and our Diversity Index analysis shows that

Kansas City has a base DI today of only —

474. Again, to ensure that the results of our Ten City Study

were not anomalous, we conducted a DI analysis on a random

sample of markets of various sizes, including markets with nine

licensed television stations, markets with ten television stations,

markets with fifteen television stations, and markets with

twenty television stations. Among our sample markets, the

average DI for those with nine television stations is 705; the

average DI for those with ten television stations is 635; the

average for those with fifteen television stations is 595, and the

average DI for those with twenty television stations is 612.'°""

That is, markets with nine or more television stations today are

very much un-concentrated.

475. The local radio and local television caps adopted herein

will help to ensure that large markets continue to be served by a

large number of different local media owners. For example,

OM See Appendix C, Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets.

1012

Id..

1013

See MOWG Study No. | and Appendix C, Diversity Indices in Ten

Sample Markets.

14 See Appendix D (Diversity Index Scenarios).

535a

positing Kansas City, Missouri, again as a typical market of

nine television stations, and assuming that four television

duopolies could in fact be created in that market, and further

assuming maximum radio consolidation under our new local

radio rule, there should still remain five different owners of

television stations and seven different owners of radio

stations.'”'” There currently also are five daily newspaper

owners serving the market. Therefore, even assuming that, in

the absence of any cross-media limit in the market, the owners

of the radio, television, and newspaper properties combine to

the maximum extent possible, there would remain at least seven

different owners of local media in the market, each with a

significant presence. In accordance with the mandate of

Section 202(h), we do not believe that we can justify a

restriction in a market where the worst case scenario (indeed,

one that may not even be possible given existing combinations

in the market), still results in a market with at least seven

different owners of the major sources of local news and

information.

476.More_ realistically, although some _ cross-media

combinations are likely to occur in the absence of a restriction,

constraints imposed by existing groups and the presence of

public stations that cannot be acquired by commercial entities

make it highly unlikely that Kansas Gity>or any market, will

consolidate to the level described in the preceding paragraph.

In order to get a better sense, therefore, for the actual affect of

various cross-media combinations in markets with nine or more

Ol See Appendix C (Diversity Indices in Ten Sample Markets). That is, in

a market with nine television stations, four duopolies can, in theory, be

created, leaving one singleton station, so that five owners of television

stations would remain. If there are forty-four radio stations in the market,

and group owners assembled the largest combinations possible under the

radio cap (seven), there would remain at least seven group owners; six with

groups of s'x stations and one with a group of two stations.

536a

television stations, we use our DI in sample markets and test

. . . 016

hypothetical combinations.'”!

477. Beginning in markets with nine licensed television

Stations, we see that, on average, the change in DI that would

result from a television owner acquiring a radio group

consisting of the maximum number of radio stations

permissible under our local radio rule is only 64 points.'"!” If

instead it were the owner of a daily newspaper acquiring that

radio group, the DI change would be 198 points, leaving the

market below 1000 DI.'°'* If the owner of a daily newspaper

were to purchase a television station instead of a large radio

group in a market of this size, the DI would increase only 86

points.'”'” Indeed, the largest combination possible in the

market — a combination that would include a daily newspaper, a

television duopoly, and a large radio group — would result in a

DI increase of 473 points, taking the average nine television

market to a base DI of under 1200 points, only marginally in

the range that we would consider moderately concentrated. ‘°””

478. As detailed in Appendix D (Diversity Index Scenarios),

in markets with ten television stations, the average base DI is

635 and the increase that would result from the assemblage of

the largest media combination possible would be 292 points —

leaving the market un-concentrated.'°*' In markets with fifteen

television stations, the average base DI is 595 and a

newspaper/television duopoly/large radio group combination

would increase the DI only 302 points.'’’* Similar results

obtain in markets with twenty television stations.

cae See Appendix D (Diversity Index Scenarios).

1017 Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

1022

ld.

1018

1019

1020

1021

S37a

479. This analysis is premised on the creation of very large

combinations of media properties at the local level. Even so,

the results show that markets with nine or more televisiorr

stations are un-concentrated today and are unlikely to become

highly concentrated even in the absence of cross-media limits.

Section 202(h) requires that we justify broadcast ownership

limits on more than supposition or inchoate fears; our

governing law requires that we target our structural limits at

real and demonstrable harms. Based on the foregoing, we

cannot, therefore, justify cross-media restrictions in markets

with nine or more licensed television stations.

480. The tiers adopted above — “at-risk” markets, “small to

medium size” markets, and “large” markets — are derived from

our DI analysis and our independent judgment regarding market

operation and the effect of various combinations on diversity.

Our diversity concerns are greatest in at-risk markets and we

have accordingly prohibited all forms of cross-media

combinations in those markets. In small to medium markets we

have imposed specific limitations on particular kinds of

combinations that would, in our estimation, most likely result in

unacceptable harm to viewpoint diversity. In large markets, our

analysis indicates that no cross-media limit is necessary, nor

can one be justified, given the large number of outlets and

owners that typify these markets and the operation of our intra-

service television and radio caps.

481. Conclusion. Although we generally prohibit television-

radio, and newspaper-broadcast, cross-ownership in at-risk

markets. and we limit newspaper-broadcast combinations in

small to medium size markets, we recognize that special

circumstances may render these cross-media limits unnecessary

or counter-productive in particular markets. Accordingly, we

will continue to entertain requests for waiver of these cross-

media limits and, in particular, will give special consideration

to walver requests demonstrating that an otherwise prohibited

combination would, in fact, enhance the quality and quantity of

538a

broadcast news available in the market.'"?’ In addition, of

course, we will review our entire local broadcast ownership

framework, including our new cross-media limits, beginning

next year, in our 2004 biennial review. We will not, however.

permit collateral attack upon our rules in individual cases on

diversity grounds based upon more particularized showings

using the DI in a given market. The rules we adopt herein are

rules of general applicability. The lines that have been drawn

and the judgments that have been made reflect our conclusions

regarding the probable effects of given transactions in the run

of cases. Those conclusions necessarily rely upon

generalizations, approximations, and assumptions that will not

hold true in every case. Indeed, many of these assumptions

would not be true in a particular context or specific market. As

we stated above, the Diversity Index itself is a blunt tool

capable only of capturing and measuring large effects and

general trends in typical markets. It is of no use, therefore, for

parties to attempt to apply the DI to a particular transaciion in a

particular market. ;

D. Grandfathering and Transition Procedures

1. Grandfathering Provisions

482. Existing Combinations. There may be some existing

combinations of broadcast stations that exceed the new

ownership limits due to the modifications of both the local TV

and the local radio ownership rules. Because the modified local

TV rule permits increased common ownership of local TV

Stations, we expect few existing ownership combinations to

1023 ,_. ae

As is the case with our new local television ownership rules, we will

require that a licensee who obtains a waiver of our cross-media limits show

at renewal time the benefits that have accrued to the public as a consequence

of the waiver. At the end of the broadcast station’s (or stations’) license

term(s), the licensee of the station(s) must certify to the Commission that the

public interest benefits of the Commission's grant of the waiver are being

fulfilled. This certification must include a specific, factual showing of the

program-related benefits that have accrued to the public. Cost savings or

other efficiencies, standing alone, will not constitute a sufficient showing.

539a

violate the rule adopted herein. However, some existing same-

market combinations may not comply with the modified TV

ownership rule because of the elimination of the Grade B

overlap exclusion that is in the current rules. In addition, there

may be instances in which a party currently owns a

radio/television combination that may not comply with the new

cross-media limits."""*

483. As for radio, we are modifying the definition of many

radio markets, replacing the existing signal-contour based

definition with a geographic based market definition.'””? This

may result in a different number of stations being considered as

participating in a local radio market. Because our radio

ownership rule is based on a tiered system, if fewer stations

comprise the radio market, and the market falls into a smaller

tier, then the number of stations an entity may own would

decrease. We also are attributing in-market radio JSAs, which

could increase the number of radio stations that count toward

an entity's numerical ownership limit.

484. We are persuaded by the record to grandfather existing

combinations of radio stations, existing combinations of

television stations, and existing combinations of

radioftelevision stations.""’° As such, we will not require

024... ais

While we are not aware of any existing newspaper/broadcast

conibinations that have been previously grandfathered or approved by the

Commission that would be barred under the new rules, to the extent such

combinations do exist, they will be subject to the grandfathering and

transferability provisions described in this section.

02> We are retaining a modified contour-based definition outside of

Arbitron markets until we have completed a rulemaking to define geographic

radio markets in these areas. The grandfathering and transition procedures

adopted herein apply to Arbitron and non-Arbitron areas. In areas not

defined by Arbitron, through the completion of the rulemaking, licensees

should apply the modified contour-based market definition for these

purposes.

1026 We requested comment on grandfathering issues in the Radio NPRMs:

Radio Market Definition NPRM, 15 FCC Red at 25081-82 4 11; Local Radio

540a

entities to divest their current interests in stations in order to

come into compliance with the new ownership rules.'"*’ As

suggested by commenters, doing so would unfairly penalize

parties who bought stations in good faith in accordance with the

Commission’s rules.'"** Also, we also are sensitive to

commenters’ concerns that licensees of current combinations

should be afforded an opportunity to retain the value of their

investments made in reliance on our rules and orders. We also

agree with the commenters that argue that compulsory

divestiture would be too disruptive to the industry."""? On

Ownership NPRM, 16 FCC Rcd at 19888 4 65.

1027 ' ;

Secret proposes that we grandfather general radio station ownership

limits for markets rather than grandfathering specific ownership

combinations. In the alternative, it proposes that we permit any broadcaster

to own at least as many stations as the largest group owns presently in the

specific market. Secret Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 4. Secret’s

approach is administratively problematic, requiring the Commission to

create and monitor a range of numerical limits in all of the Arbitron metros,

as well as in non-Arbitron areas. Moreover, it would create disparate

treatment in radio markets, not based on competitive analysis or public

interest assessment, but based solely on existing combinations. Because

these existing combinations were created using the current contour-based

market definition, which we find does not promote our competition goals,

some combinations may raise competition concerns and may violate the new

rules. To allow additional groups to obtain the same \.umerical limits would

only exacerbate such concerns.

18 See, e.g., NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 50: WVRC

Comments in MM Docket No. 0i-317 at 35; Cumulus Comments in MM

Docket No. 01-317 at 20; Eure Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 5:

HBC Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 13, n.2; MBC Comments in

MM Docket No. 01-317 at 11-12; Clear Channel Reply Comments in MM

Docket No. 01-317 at n.5; MBC Reply Comments in MM Docket No. 01-

317 at 4; Zimmer Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 7; Weigle

Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 6; NAB Comments in MM Docket

No. 00-244 at 29-30; Entercom Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 7.

‘°° NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 50; MBC Reply

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 4; Zimmer Comments in MM

Docket No. 01-317 at 7-8; NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at

29-30. We disagree with the commenters that support divestitures of current

combinations. See Dick Broadcasting Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317

¢

'

54la

balance, any benefit to competition from forcing divestitures is

likely to be outweighed by these countervailing considerations.

485. While commenters overwhelming support

grandfathering existing combinations, many nonetheless argue

that grandfathering will create competitive imbalances which

favor existing group owners - those that assembled

combinations under the current rules - and disfavor those that

cannot assemble competing combinations because of new

, ae 30 F : ‘ or

ownership restrictions.'”"” Like all grandfathering decisions, ‘

some disparity will exist between grandfathered owners and

non-grandfathered owners. We do not believe this fact

outweighs the equitable considerations that persuade us to

grandfather existing combinations.

486. We expect that the issue of grandfathering existing {

combinations will affect predominately radio group owners

because of the changes we make herein to the radio market

definition. We recognize that a geographic based radio market

definition may result in a fewer number of stations in certain

markets. In those instances, parties may not be able to acquire

the same number of stations as the largest owner in a particular

1031 Siific }

market. However, those combinations were created based

at 6-7; Idaho Wireless Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 8; NABC

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 17. The Commission has required

divestitures of existing combinations pursuant to changes in media

ownership rules in “egregious cases.” 1975 Multiple Ownership Second

Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1049.

030 NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 48; WVRC Comments in

MM Docket No. 01-317 at 26; Blakeney Comments in MM Docket No. 01-

317 at 2; Cox Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 12; Daugherty

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 4; Davis Comments in MM Docket

No. 01-317 at 2; MBC Reply Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 3; }

NABOB Reply Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 8; Secret

Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 3; NAB Comments in MM Docket

No. 00-244 at 8, 9, n.15; Brill Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 1;

Aurora Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 27; Great Scott Reply ,

Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 2.

1031 |

At the same time, however, we believe that the impact on radio owners

542a

upon the contour-based definition that we find herein fails to

adequately address our competition goals in local radio

markets. To allow additional broadcasters to obtain such

combinations would disserve our goals. Our decision to

grandfather existing combinations simply reflects the

substantial equitable considerations discussed above,

considerations that we conclude outweigh our interest in

improving the precision of our radio market definition in these

particular cases.

487. Transferability. We also asked for comments on

whether to allow licensees to assign or to transfer control of

grandfathered combinations that violate of the new ownership

rules.'°** In general, we will prohibit the sale of existing

combinations that violate the modified local radio ownership

rule, the local television ownership rule, or the cross media

limits."°* Therefore, parties must comply with the new

ownership rules in place at the time a transfer of control or

assignment application is filed. However, as discussed earlier,

in order to help promote diversity of ownership,'”** we will

allow sales of grandfathered combinations to and by certain

“eligible entities.” We do not agree with commenters that

advocate allowing grandfathered combinations to be freely

transferable in perpetuity, irrespective of whether the

will be mitigated because we are retaining, not decreasing, the current

numerical caps, counting non-commercial stations as participants in the

market, and counting any station licensed in the Arbitron market whether or

not it meets Arbitron’s minimum audience share requirements. In addition, a

geographic based definition will allow for more regional consolidation of

radio stations than our prior contour based approach.

°° Definition of Radio Markets NPRM, 15 FCC Red at 25081 11; Local

Radio Ownership NPRM, 16 FCC Rcd at 19888 4 65.

_ oe parte ' er ae

Likewise, modification of the facilities of a station in a grandfathered

combination will be prohibited if the proposed modification would create a

new violation of the ownership rules.

1034

See Policy Goals, Section III(A)(5), supra.

543a

combination complies with our adopted rules.'"*? As NABC,

Idaho Wireless, and ARD suggest, such an approach would

hinder our efforts to promote and ensure competitive

markets. ‘°° Grandfathered combinations, by definition, exceed

the numerical limits that we find promote the public interest as

related to competition. Moreover, in the case of radio

ownership, these combinations were created pursuant to a

market definition that we conclude fails to adequately reflect

competitive conditions. Unlike our decision not to require

existing station owners to divest stations, here, the threat to

competition is not outweighed by — countervailing

considerations. Buyers will be on notice that ownership

combinations must comply at the time of the acquisition of the

stations. Thus, they do not have the same expectations as

present owners who acquired stations under the current

ownership rules. In addition, because of the limited number of

broadcast licenses available, station spin-offs that would be

required upon sales of stations in a grandfathered group could

afford new entrants the opportunity to enter the media

marketplace. They could also give smaller station owners

already in the market the opportunity to acquire more stations

and take advantage of the benefits of combined operations.

Because divestitures are not required until a sale of the station

groups, owners have sufficient time to minimize any specific

_— Cumulus Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 9; Clear Channel

Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 5; Entercom Comments in MM

Docket No. 00-244 at 7: Citadel Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at

12: Viacom Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 8; NAB Comments in

MM Docket No. 00-244 at 29; Great Scott Reply Comments in MM Docket

No. 00-244 at 3; Zimmer Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 7; NAB

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 50; Clear Channe! Comments in

MM Docket No. 01-317 at 26; MBC Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317

at 12.

1036

NABC Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 17; Idaho Wireless

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 7; ARD Reply Comments in MM

Docket No. 00-244 at 2.

544a

complications due to joint operations.'”*’ Therefore, we reject

the argument that prohibiting transfers of station groups that

exceed the new ownership limits would be unacceptably

disruptive or would negatively impact the availability of bank

financing, as some commenters suggest.'”** Finally, requiring

future assignments and transfers to comply with our ownership

rules upon sale is consistent with Commission precedent. \"*” In

keeping with the policy we adopted in 1975, the prohibition on

the transfer of grandfathered stations will not apply to pro-

forma changes in ownership or to involuntary changes of

ownership due to a death or legal disability of the licensee.”

488. Eligible Transfer. We are adopting an exception to our

prohibition on the transfer of grandfathered combinations in

'°37 NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 9: Clear Channel

Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 6; Viacom Comments in MM

Docket No. 00-244 at 8; NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 51.

_ NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 50-51: Clear Channel

Comments in MM Docket No. 01-317 at 26, n.83: NAB Comments in MM

Docket No. 00-244 at 9; Entercom Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at

8

1039 See 1970 Multiple Ownership First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d at

323 4 2; 1975 Multiple Ownership Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d

at 1076 § 103; Local TV Ownership Report and Order, 14 FCC Red at

12965 § 146 (any transfer of permanently grandfathered television

combinations after 2004 must meet the television duopoly rule or waiver

policies in effect at the time of the transfer). Contrary to Clear Channel and

NAB’s assertions, our decision is consistent with the 1/992 Radio Ownership

Order, supra note 96. NAB Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 30:

Clear Channel Comments in MM Docket No. 00-244 at 7. In the /992

Radio Ownership Order, we relaxed the ownership limits, permitting entities

to own more stations in local markets based on numerical caps, and we also

adopted an audience share cap, which precluded acquisitions of stations if

the combined audience share at the time the application was filed exceeded

25%. At the time the rules went into effect, no entity owned more than the

numerical caps or owned stations with a combined audience share exceeding

25%. Therefore, grandfathering existing combinations was not at issue.

1040 1975 Multiple Ownership Second Report and Order, 50 FCC 2d at 1076

545a

violation of the new rules. This exception applies to

grandfathered radio and television combinations that exceed the

ownership limits adopted in this Order, cross-media

combinations in at-risk markets, and cross-media combinations

in small to medium sized markets that exceed the ownership

limits adopted in this Order. Entities may transfer control of or

assign a grandfathered combination to “eligible entities” as

defined herein.'*' In addition, “eligible entities” may sell

existing grandfathered combinations without restriction. As we

define in greater detail below, we limit “eligible entities” to

small business entities, which often include businesses owned

by women and minorities. We believe that facilitating new

entry by and growth of small businesses in the broadcast

industry will further our goals of promoting diversity of

ownership as well as competition and localism. "*?

489. We define an “eligible entity” as an entity that would

qualify as a small business consistent with SBA standards for

its industry grouping.'”* For example, the SBA small business

size standard for radio stations is $6 million or less in annual

revenue. For TV stations the limit is $12 million."“* In

1d ; , aa eee ee

We are not grandfathering existing combinations of stations that exceed

the ownership limits because of an attributable interest in a station pursuant

to an LMA or JSA. Existing LMAs and JSAs that result in a combination of

stations exceeding the ownership limits must be terminated at the time of the

sale or within two years, whichever comes first.

8° MMTC suggests we define a category of “eligible purchasers” based on

the eligibility standards set forth in S. 267 “Telecommunications Ownership

Diversity Act of 2003." Because that pending legislation contemplates

further definition of eligible purchasers by the Treasury Department after

passage. we do not rely on its terms and therefore, set forth our criteria based

on our judgment and the record of this proceeding.

* See 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (North American Industry Classification

System (NAICS) code categories). The definition of small business for the

radio industry is listed in NAICS code 515112, and the definition of a small

business for the TV industry is listed in NAICS code 515120.

104

To determine qualifications as a small business, SBA considers the

546a

addition, to tailor this exception to meet our public interest

objectives and ensure that the benefits of this proposal flow as

intended, we will further require that any transaction pursuant

to this exception may not result in a new violation of the rules.

Moreover, control of the eligible entity purchasing the

grandfathered combination must meet one of the following

control tests. The eligible entity must hold (1) 30% or more of

the stock/partnership shares of the corporation/partnership, and

more than 50% voting power, (2) 15% or more of the

stock/partnership shares of the corporation/partnership, and

more than 50% voting power, and no other person or entity

controls more than 25% of the outstanding stock, or (3) if the

purchasing entity is a publicly traded company, more than 50%

of the voting power.

490. In addition to the above, we will allow entities that meet

the definition of “eligible entity” to transfer any existing

grandfathered combination generally without restriction. We

believe that small businesses that qualify as eligible entities

require greater flexibility than do larger entities for the

disposition of assets. Restrictions on the sale of assets could

disproportionately harm the financial stability of smaller firms

compared to that of larger firms, which have additional revenue

streams. To prevent abuse of this policy, however, an eligible

entity may not transfer a grandfathered combination acquired

after the adoption date of this Order to an entity other than

another eligible entity unless it has held the combination for a

minimum of three years.'"* Also, we will prohibit eligible

entities from granting options to purchase, or rights of first

refusal to prevent non-eligible entities from financing an

revenues of the parent corporation and affiliates of the parent corporation,

not just the revenues of individual broadcast stations. See 13 C.F.R. §§

121.103, 121.108.

1045

We do not intend to restrict pro forma transfers of grandfathered

combinations or transfer of control to heirs or legatees by will or intestacy if

no new ownership violation would occur.

547a

acquisition in exchange for an option to purchase the

combination at a later date. Finally, any transaction pursuant to

this policy may not result in a new violation of the rules.

491.Radio LMA Combinations. As we discussed in the

context of attributable JSAs in the Local Radio Ownership

Section, there also may be instances in which an existing LMA

may affect a licensee’s compliance with the ownership limits

adopted herein. As we stated in instances of attributable JSAs,

because we do not want to unnecessarily adversely affect

current business arrangements between licensees and brokers,

we will give licensees two years from the effective date of this

Order to terminate any LMAs that result in a violation of the

new ownership limits, or otherwise come into compliance with

the new rules. If the licensee sells an existing combination of

stations within the two year grace period, it may not sell or

assign the LMA to the buyer if the LMA causes the buyer to

exceed the ownership limits adopted in this Order. Parties are

prohibited from entering into an LMA or renewing an existing

LMA that would cause the broker of the station to exceed the

ownership limits.

492.TV LMA Combinations. In our Local TV Ownership

Report and Order, we grandfathered LMA combinations that

were entered into prior to November 5, 1996, through the end

of our 2004 biennial review. We do not alter this policy. These

LMAs are not affected by the grandfathering policy adopted

herein.

493.7TV Temporary Waivers. A few licensees have been

granted temporary waivers of our local TV ownership rule, and

some have filed requests for an extension of waivers that are

currently pending, or have sought permanent Waivers. Any

licensee with a temporary waiver, pending waiver request, or

waiver extension request must, no later than 60 days after the

effective date of this Order or the date on which the waiver

expires, whichever is later, file one of the following: (i) a

statement describing how ownership of the subject station

—

548a

complies with the modified local TV ownership rule; or (ii) an

application for transfer or assignment of license of those

Stations necessary to bring the applicant into compliance with

the new rules.

494. Cross-Media Conditional Waivers. A few licensees

have been granted conditional waivers of the previous one-to-a-

market rule. Although we are eliminating the current

radio/television cross-ownership rules, we are adopting new

cross-media limits. Parties that currently have conditional

waivers for radio/television combinations must submit a

Statement to indicate whether the combination they hold (1) is

located in an at-risk market, (2) is located in a small to medium

size market, and (3) is in compliance with the cross-media

limits. For the combinations that comply with the cross-media

limits adopted herein, we will issue a letter replacing the

conditional grant with permanent approval. For any

combinations that violate the cross-media limits, we will issue a

letter indicating that the combination will continue to be

grandfathered until a decision in the 2004 Biennial Review is

final. As part of the 2004 Biennial Review, we will review and

reevaluate the status of such grandfathered combinations to

determine whether they should continue to be grandfathered.

On a case-by-case basis, we will consider the competition,

diversity, equity, and public interest factors the combinations

may raise.

495. Other Cross-Media Waivers. Our cross-media limits

are founded on the presumption that, by reason of cable

carriage, television stations are available throughout the DMA

to which they are assigned. We recognize, however, that this

may not be true in every case. Accordingly, those requesting

waiver of our cross-media limits may attempt to rebut this

presumption in individual cases. For example, a television

licensee assigned to a DMA to which only two other television

Stations are assigned (i.e., an at-risk market) may request a

waiver of the bar on its ownership of a daily newspaper

549a

published within that DMA by demonstrating that the

newspaper's community of publication neither receives

television service from the station over-the-air nor through

cable carriage.

2. Elimination of Flagging and Interim Policy

496.In August 1998, the Commission began “flagging”

public notices of radio station transactions that, based on an

initial analysis by the staff. propesed a level of local radio

concentration that implicated the Commission’s public interest

concern for maintaining diversity and competition." Under

this policy, the Commission flagged proposed transactions that

would result in one entity controlling 50% or more of the

advertising revenues in the relevant Arbitron radio market or

two entities controlling 70% or more of the advertising

revenues in that market.” Flagged transactions were subject

to a further competition analysis, the scope of which is

embodied in the interim policy we adopted in the Local Radio

Ownership NPRM.

497. We believe that the changes we make today to the

market definition will address many of the market

concentration concerns that led the Commission to begin

flagging radio station transactions and to adopt the interim

policy. By applying the numerical limits of the local radio

ownership rule to a more rational market definition, we believe

that. in virtually all cases, the rule will protect against excessive

concentration levels in local radio markets that might otherwise

threaten the public interest. To the extent an interested party

believes this not to be the case, it has a statutory right to file a

petition to deny a specific radio station application and present

evidence that makes the necessary prima facie showing that the

transaction is contrary to the public interest.'""* Accordingly,

1046 ©,

See Broadcast Applications, Rep. No. 24303 (Aug. 12, 1998).

8” See AMFM. Inc.. 15 FCC Red at 16066 © 7 n.10.

S* 47 U.S.C. § 309(d).

550a

effective upon adoption of this Order, the Commission will no

longer flag radio sales transactions or apply the interim policy

procedures adopted in the Local Radio Ownership NPRM in

processing them.

3. Processing of Pending and New Assignment

and Transfer of Control Applications.

498. The processing guidelines below will govern pending

and new commercial broadcast applications for the assi gnment

or transfer of control of television and radio authorizations

commencing as of the adoption date of this Order. These

guidelines also cover pending and new modification

applications that implicate our multiple ownership rules.

Applications filed on or after the effective date of this Order as

well as applications that are still pending as of such effective

date will be processed under the new multiple ownership rules,

including, where applicable, the interim methodology for

defining radio markets as adopted herein. The staff is directed

to issue a Public Notice containing these guidelines

contemporaneously with the adoption of this Order.

e New Applications. The Commission has

established a freeze on the filing of all

commercial radio and television transfer of

control and assignment applications that require

the use of FCC Form 314 or 315 (“New

Applications”). We will revise application Forms

301, 314 and 315 to reflect the new rules adopted

in the Order. The freeze will be in effect starting

with the Order’s adoption date until notice has

been published by the Commission in the Federal

Register that OMB has approved the revised

forms. Upon such publication, parties may file

New Applications, but only if they demonstrate

compliance with the new multiple ownership

rules adopted in the Order, including where

applicable, the interim methodology for defining

55la

radio markets outside Arbitron metros, or submit

a complete and adequate showing that a waiver of

the new rules is warranted. We will continue to

allow the filing of short-form (FCC Form 316)

applications at any time and will process them in

due course.

* Pending Applications. Applicants with long-

form assignment or transfer of control

applications (FCC Form 314 or 315) or with

modification applications (FCC Form 301) that

are pending as of adoption of the Order (“Pending

Applications”) may amend those Applications by

submitting new multiple ownership showings to

demonstrate compliance with the ownership rules

adopted in the Order, including where applicable,

the interim methodology for defining radio

markets outside of Arbitron metros, or by

submitting a request for waiver of the new

rules.” Parties may file such amendments once

notice has been published by the Commission in

the Federal Register that OMB has approved the

information collection requirements contained in

such amendments. Pending Applications that are

still pending as of the effective date of the new

rules will be processed under the new rules.

Applications proposing pro forma assignments

and transfers (FCC Form 316) will be processed

in the normal course.

. Pending Petitions and Objections. Petitions

to deny and informal objections that were

submitted to the Commission prior to the adoption

1049 _. \ ay ‘ .

The Commission may determine that the nature of the amendment

warrants a new public notice for the Pending Application.

552a

date of the Order and that raise issues unrelated to

competition against Pending Applications (as

defined above) will be addressed with respect to

those issues at the time we act on such

Applications. Petitions and informal objections

that were submitted to the Commission prior to

the adoption date of the Order and that contest

Pending Applications solely on grounds of

competition pursuant to the interim policy'’”’ will

be dismissed as moot.

Vil. NATIONAL OWNERSHIP RULES

499. In this section, we consider the national TV ownership

rule and the dual network rule. We conclude that we should

modify the former by raising the cap to 45%, and we retain the

latter.

A. National TV Ownership Rule

500. The current national TV ownership rule prohibits any

entity from owning televisions stations that in the aggregate

reach more than 35% of the country’s television households. '°>'

In the Notice, we sought comment on whether we should retain,

eliminate, or modify this rule.'""* We asked whether the

current rule is necessary in the public interest as the result of

W° See Local Radio Ownership NPRM, 16 FCC Red at 19894-97 €€ 84-89.

_ Section 73.3555(e)(1) of the Commission’s rules provides that “[n]Jo

license for a commercial TV broadcast station shall be granted, transferred

or assigned to any party (including all parties under common control) if the

grant, transfer or assignment of such license would result in such party or

any of its stockholders, partners, members, officers or directors. directly or

indirectly, owning, operating or controlling, or having a cognizable interest

in TV stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding

thirty-five (35) percent.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1). Reach is determined

by the number of television households in a DMA. 47 C.F.R.

§ 73.3555(e)(2).

°° Notice, 17 FCC Red at 18543-52 99 126-55.

553a

competition and whether it promotes the goals of competition,

diversity, and localism.'”* We also solicited comment on

whether UHF television stations should continue to be

attributed with only 50% of the television households in their

DMA market or whether cable and DBS carriage of UHF

signals eliminates the need for this “UHF discount.”'!°* We

conclude that the current rule cannot be justified and we raise

the cap to 45%. We retain the UHF discount.

501. In the /984 Multiple Ownership Report and Order, we

determined that repealing the national TV ownership rule

would not harm competition or diversity.'” Consistent with

our decision in 1984, we find that restricting national station

ownership is not necessary to promote either of those policy

objectives. We depart, however, from our 1984 decision to

repeal the rule because evidence in the record demonstrates that

the national television cap serves localism. The localism

rationale for retaining the national television cap was

articulated in our /998 Biennial Review Report. In that

decision we explained that preserving a balance of power

between the networks and their affiliates serves local needs and

interests by ensuring that affiliates can play a meaningful role

in selecting programming suitable for their communities.”

We continue to believe that to be the case and, consequently,

that a national cap is necessary to limit the percentage of

television households that a broadcast network may reach

13 Td. at 18544 § 129.

* Td. at 18544 J§ 130-31. See 47 CER. § 73.3555(e)(2)(i).

1984 Multiple Ownership Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 46, 50-56

{/§] 86, 97-114 (repealing the station ownership restriction and instituting a

six-year transitional ownership limitation of 12 stations). The Commission

subsequently reversed its decision to repeal the rule. /985 Muttiple

Ownership MO&O, 100 F.C.C.2d at 88-92 |] 33-40 (eliminating the sunset

provision and adding a 25% cap on national audience reach, calculated as a

percentage of all Arbitron ADI television households).

°° 1998 Biennial Review Report, 15 FCC Red at 11074-75 930.

1055

Be me

554a

through the stations it owns. Although the record supports

retention of a national Ownership cap, it does not support a cap

of 35%. The evidence before us shows that the Cap at the

Current level is not necessary to preserve the balance of

bargaining power between networks and affiliates. The record

also indicates that the Cap appears to have other drawbacks.

Most importantly, the Cap restrains some of the largest group

Owners — broadcast networks — from serving additional

communities with local news and public affairs programming

that is of greater quantity and at least equal, if not superior,

quality than that of affiliates. Moreover, we believe that a

modest relaxation of the cap will help networks compete more

effectively with cable and DBS operators and will promote free,

over-the-air television by deterring migration of expensive

programming to cable networks. Balancing these competing

interests, we raise the national cap from 35% to 45%.

1. Background

502. Since 1941, the Commission has limited the national

Ownership reach of television broadcast stations.'!°’ The

Commission has modified the restriction several times to keep

pace with the changing marketplace. — Jp 1984, the

Commission repealed the rule, concluding that it was not

necessary to promote competition or diversity, and instituted a

six-year transitional Ownership limit of twelve television

Stations nationwide.'”? On reconsideration, the Commission

affirmed its underlying conclusions, but it eliminated the sunset

7 Notice, 17 FCC Red at 18543 4 127.

ses See Broadcast Services Other Than Standard Broadcast, 6 Fed. Reg.

2282, 2284-85 (May 6, 1941) (imposing a national ownership limit of three

television stations); Rules Governing Broadcast Services Other Than

Standard Broadcast, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (May 23, 1944) (raising the

Ownership limit from three to five Stations); Amendment of Multiple

Ownership Rules, 43 F.C.c. 2797, 2801-02 q 14 (1954) (raising the

Ownership limit from five to seven Stations).

1059

1984 Multiple Ownership Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 46, 54-56

14] 86, 108-114.

555a

provision out of a concern that repealing the rule would create a

disruptive restructuring of the national broadcasting

industry.'""” The Commission retained the twelve station limit

and, in addition, prohibited an entity from reaching more than

25% of the country’s television households through the stations

it owned, '""!

503. In 1996, the Commission adopted the current 35% cap

in response to the Congress’ directive to raise the cap (from

25% to 35%) and to eliminate the rule that an entity could not

own more than twelve stations nationwide.'"* — The

Commission subsequently affirmed the 35% cap as part of its

1998 biennial review of media ownership regulations.'°°* In

affirming the cap, the Commission reasoned that it would be

premature to institute revisions to the national TV ownership

limit before fully observing the effects of changes to the local

TV ownership rules and the effects of raising the cap from 25%

to 35%.'°" The Commission also concluded that the national

TV ownership rule helps promote better service to local

communities by preserving the power of affiliates to negotiate

with the networks and to make independent programming

decisions.'"” In addition, the Commission concluded that the

national TV ownership rule facilitates competition in the

program production market and in the national advertising

market."

sons Multiple Ownership MO&O, 100 F.C.C.2d at 88-92, 97 4¥ 33-40,

52.

1061 Id.

Implementation of Sections 202(c)(1) and 202(e) of the

Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Nationai Broadcast Television Ownership

and Dual Network Operations), 11 FCC Red 12374 (1996).

13 1998 Biennial Review Report, 15 FCC Red at 11072-75 44 25-30.

Id. at 1072-74 JY 25-29.

1 Td. at 1074-75 J 30.

1066

Id. at 11073 9 26 n.78.

1062

1064

sea

5$56a

504. Several broadcast networks challenged the

Commission's decision to retain the national TV ownership

rule. In Fox Television Stations, Inc. y FCC, the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the

Commission’s 1998 decision to retain the rule was arbitrary and

Capricious, and it remanded the rule for further

consideration.'”*’ The court rejected the Commission’s “wait-

and-see” approach on the grounds that it was inconsistent with

the Commission’s statutory mandate to determine on a biennial

basis whether its rules are necessary in the public interest,!°™

The court also held that the Commission failed to demonstrate

that the national cap advanced competition, diversity, or

localism.

505. With respect to competition, in its 1998 Biennial Review

Report, the Commission provided a study and a table showing

that large group owners of television stations had acquired

additional stations and increased their audience reach since the

1996 Act’s passage.’ The court was not persuaded by the

Commission’s evidence that large group owners have undue

market power, and it agreed with the networks that the figures

alone, absent evidence of an adverse effect on the market, were

insufficient to support retention of the rule.'’”” The court also

found unsupported the Commission’s statement in the /998

Biennial Review Report that the national cap is necessary to

Safeguard competition in the national advertising or program

production markets."""' The court concluded that the

Commission’s analysis of the state of competition in the

television industry was incomplete and did not Satisfy the

67 580 F.3d 1027.

Id. at 1042.

1° Id. at 1041-42 (citing 1998 Biennial Review Report, 15 FCC Red at

11073 ¥ 27).

1070

1068

Id. at 1042.

"”! Id. (citing 1998 Biennial Review Report, 15 FCC Red at 11073 4 26

n.78).

5S7a

requirement under Section 202(h) to show that the rule is

necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. '°””

506. The court held that diversity and localism are valid

public interest goals within the context of broadcast regulation

and made it clear that the Commission could determine that the

national TV ownership rule was necessary in the public interest

under Section 202(h) if it served either interest.'"’* The court,

however, ruled that the Commission had not provided sufficient

evidence that either one of these goals was served.'””* The

court noted that the Commission, in its /998 Biennial Review

Report, “mentioned national diversity as a justification for

retaining the [national TV ownership rule], but did not

elaborate upon the point.”\°”” The court found the

Commission's statement did not explain why the rule is

necessary to further national diversity. The court also found

that the Commission failed to justify its departure in the 1998

decision from its 1984 decision, in which the Commission

concluded that the national TV ownership restriction should be

phased out after six years because: (1) the rule no longer was

necessary for national diversity given the abundance of media

outlets and (2) a national rule was irrelevant to local

diversity.'"”° In addition, the court held that the Commission

did not adequately demonstrate that the rule strengthens the

bargaining power of independently-owned affiliates and

thereby promotes program diversity, particularly in light of its

1984 conclusion that no evidence suggested that stations that

are not group-owned responded better to community needs or

1072

Id. at 1044.

1073

Id. at 1042.

1079 1d. at 1042-43.

Id. at 1042 (citing 1998 Biennial Review Report, 15 FCC Red at 11073

{| 26 n.78).

1078 Td. at 1034, 1042-45. See 1984 Multiple Ownership Report and Order,

100 F.C.C.2d at 27, 30-31, 37 Y§ 21-33, 43, 60.

1075

es

558a

spent proportionately more revenue on local programming.'°”’

However, the court acknowledged the Commission’s right to

reverse course, provided the reversal is supported by a reasoned

analysis.'°”* Recognizing that sufficient evidence may exist to

justify the national TV ownership rule, the court determined

that the appropriate remedy was to remand, rather than to

vacate, the rule.'””? We now consider whether the current rule

can be justified as necessary to promote competition, diversity

or localism.

2. The Current National TV Ownership Rule

Cannot Be Justified

507. Under Section 202(h), we must evaluate whether the

national TV ownership rule continues to be “necessary in the

public interest as the result of competition.”'"” To make this

determination, we consider whether the rule serves the public

interest by furthering our policy goals of competition, localism,

or diversity. The evidence demonstrates that a national TV

ownership limit is necessary to promote localism by preserving

the bargaining power of affiliates and ensuring their ability to

select programming responsive to tastes and needs of their local

communities. However, the evidence also demonstrates that

the current cap of 35% is not necessary to preserve that

balance.

a. Competition

508.In analyzing whether the current rule is necessary to

protect competition, we focus on whether and to what extent

market power exists in any relevant market, and what effect the

rule has on the existence and exercise of this market power. In

the 1984 decision to eliminate the national Ownership cap, the

"7 Fox Television, 280 F.3d at 1043 (citing 1984 Multiple Ownership

Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 35 q 53).

078 Id. at 1044-45,

Id. at 1048-49,

1996 Act, § 202(h).

1079

1080

§59a

Commission limited its competition analysis to the national

television advertising market." In this decision, we expand

our competition review to include the national program

acquisition market. The national cap affects economic

concentration in national markets by limiting the size of group

owners of television stations, but does not affect concentration

in the local video delivery market, and thus does not raise

competition concerns that were discussed in the local

ownership rule sections above. The national cap limits the

ability of group owners to purchase television stations in

individual local markets. The effect of this ownership

restriction on station performance in the video delivery market

is discussed in the localism section below.

509. Based on our analysis of the relevant markets, we find

that the current rule is not necessary to maintain competition in

the three economic markets we examine. As the record before

us indicates, the media marketplace is undergoing

unprecedented change. Broadcast stations are subject to

competition from cable and DBS,'"* and they face increased

competition for viewers, advertising revenues, station network

affiliations, and programming.’ We conclude that the 35%

cap is no longer necessary to protect competition in the media

marketplace and unnecessarily constrains the organization of,

and investment in, free, over-the-air (/.e., non-subscription)

broadcast television.

510. Broadcast competition framework, The evolution of

non-price competition in television has implications for the

economic organization of broadcast television networks.

Higher channel capacity cable systems and the growth in the

LON]

1984 Multiple Ownership Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d at 39-40 94

67-71.

10x2

~ See Modern Media Marketplace, supra Section IV.

1ON3 ee ee eee

Paxson notes that broadcasters face competition today from “a dizzying

array of diverse and high quality entertainment and news choices.” Paxson

Comments at 11.

ae Ba we ne ee

560a

number of cable networks, together with the programming

options offered by DBS, have intensified the competitive

pressure on broadcast television networks to slow the erosion of

viewer market share and to build strong network brand identity

reflecting program focus, quality and reputation.'"™

511.Two broadcast television network organizational

changes, which are viewed as responses to the growth in viewer

options, are noteworthy, namely, (1) the extensive backward

integration into program supply, and (2) the desire to increase

the extent of forward vertical integration through ownership of

additional local television stations. Transaction cost economics

Suggests that such organizational integration induced by

increased rivalry within the media industry may improve

economic efficiency.

512.Transaction cost economics adopts a contractual

approach in understanding the economic organization of

firms." The transaction—the exchange of goods or services

for money or other goods between parties—is the focal point of

economic analysis. Determining the governance structure that

minimizes the economic cost of effectuating a particular type of

transaction is a central objective of a transaction cost analysis.

Transaction cost economics identifies three, discrete

governance structures, namely, (1) the market; (2) hybrid

contracting; and (3) hierarchy, where transactions are placed

under unified ownership in a firm subject to administrative

controls and management.‘ Whether it is economically

1084 ,; ; ai

Reputation may constitute a mobility barrier that helps deflect

continuing market share erosion in the mass audience Strategic group. An

empirical study of the relationship between reputation and strategic groups

in the insurance industry is provided by T. D. Ferguson, D. L. Deephouse,

and W. L. Ferguson, Do Strategic Groups Differ in Reputation?, 21

STRATEGIC MGMT J. 1195, 1195-1214 (2000).

_— Oliver E. Williamson, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 54 (Oxford

Univ. Press 1999).

1086 14. at 378.

PCE oo Gs ere —

S6la

efficient (cost minimizing) to effectuate exchange using market

contracting or through hierarchy (vertical integration) depends

on certain behavioral assumptions, and key attributes of any

given transaction. =

513.In general, ordinary market contracting is an efficient

governance structure for transactions supported by general

purpose assets not dedicated to the specific output demand of a

given customer. As asset specificity deepens, market

contracting as a governance structure gives way to either hybrid

structures or hierarchy (vertical integration) as the least costly

to organize transactions." The pervasiveness of asset

1087 , — ;

From a transaction cost perspective, transactions differ one from another

in three important dimensions, namely, (1

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