Appendix — Freeman v. Duke Power Co.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

NORTH CAROLINA

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:00CV00665

DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division

Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

Defendants.

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:02CV90630

CINDY THAXTON, an individual,

and GREGORY KWASCHA,

an individual,

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JUDGMENT

Tilley, Chief Judge

For the reasons stated in a contemporaneously filed

Memorandum Opinion, in the 1:00CV00665 action,

Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED, .

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED,

Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave to Take

Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion

to Consolidate [Doc. #31] is MOOT.

In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to

2a

Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to

Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.

This is the 15" day of August, 2003.

/s/

United States District Judge

3a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

NORTH CAROLINA

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

V. 1:00CV00665

DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division

Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

Defendants.

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. : 1:02CV00630

CINDY THAXTON, a# individual,

and GREGORY KWASCHA,

an individual,

Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tilley, Chief Judge

In the 1:00CV00665 action, the following motions

are currently pending before the court: Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand [Doc. #7], Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

#11], Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave

to Take Discovery [Doc. #25], Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

the Complaint [Doc. #28], Defendant’s Motion to |

Consolidate [Doc. #31]..

In the 1:02CV00630 case, the following motions are

pending: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #3],

Defendant’s Motion to Consolidate [Doc. #5] and Plaintiff's

Motion to Remand [Doc. #8].

ee aa

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For the reasons set forth below, in the 1:00CV00665

action, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED,

Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave tu Take

Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion to

Consolidate [Doc. #31 is MOOT].

In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to

Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.

I.

The allegations of the complaint, stated in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff, are as follows: Plaintiff Albert

Freeman was employed by Duke Power from 1983 to 1999 as

a Transmission Line Helper and as a Distribution Line

Technician C in Burlington, North Carolina. In 1984, Mr.

Freeman obtained a limited contractor’s license and

‘moonlighted’ as an electrician during his off duty hours. Mr.

Freeman also alleges that Duke Power was aware of his

moonlighting and ‘utilized Freeman’s services as an

electrician in the rewiring of Duke Power buildings.’ (Cmp. {

7.)

In 1990, Duke Power transferred a district manager,

Ed Holt, to Burlington. Holt did not like ‘moonlighting’ and

accused Mr. Freeman of moonlighting during his Duke Power

work day. Around January 26, 1994, Mr. Freeman was

suspended and discharged from his employment as a lineman

for Duke Power “for allegedly ‘removing a service drop and

meter and disconnecting service to a customer without

authorization from Duke Power Company’” while he was

moonlighting. (Cmp. § 11). The union filed a grievance on

Mr. Freeman’s behalf. Mr. Freeman, the Union, and Duke

Power settled the grievance and entered into a Grievance

Resolution on June 20, 1994. Pursuant to this agreement,

Duke Power agreed to reinstate Mr. Freeman with no loss of

service but with no back pay. The Union agreed to withdraw

the grievance. The parties also agreed that if Mr. Freeman

engaged “directly or indirectly in the business of electrical

contracting while employed with Duke Power, Duke Power

Sa

could terminate Mr. Freeman’s employment for that reason,”

and Duke Power’s decision “shall be final and shall not be

subject to review under any grievance or arbitration provision

under any Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect at the

time of his discharge.” (Cmp. §] 12.) This agreement was

signed by the Duke Power area manager for

Burlington/Reidsville, the business manager for the Union,

and Mr. Freeman.

In June 1996, Duke Power again suspended Mr.

Freeman “allegedly for engaging in the business of electrical

contracting.” (Cmp. § 14). Mr. Freeman denied having

breached the June 1994 Grievance Resolution Agreement. In

July 1996, Duke Power, the Union, and Mr. Freeman entered

into an Amendment to the Grievance Resolution, which

provided that Mr. Freeman was prohibited from “being or

becoming employed on a full or part-time basis with any

person, firm, or corporation engaging in the business of

electrical contracting.” (Cmp. § 16). In July 1999, Mr.

Freeman was terminated for allegedly violating the Amended

Grievance Resolution. Mr. Freeman denies that he violated

the Amended Grievance Resolution. The Union did not file a

grievance on behalf of Mr. Freeman.

Mr. Freeman filed the action against Duke Power in

the General Court of Justice Superior Court Division,

Alamance County on June 30, 2000. Mr. Freeman alleges

numerous causes of action including: breach of contract,

wrongful discharge, a violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the

North Carolina State Constitution, and bad faith discharge.

Mr. Freeman filed the action against Cindy Thaxton,

Regional Human Resources Manager for Duke Power, and

Gregory Kwascha, Burlington Area Manager for Duke

Power, in the General Court of Justice Superior Court

Division, Alamance County on June 28, 2002. In that case,

Mr. Freeman seeks recovery for interference with contract

and unfair deceptive trade practices. The defendants in both

actions filed timely notices of removal.

Il.

The defendants have filed motions to consolidate

these cases. For purposes of considering the motions to

dismiss, the cases will be consolidated. In light of the fact

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that the motions to dismiss will be granted, see discussion

below, the Defendants’ Motions to Consolidate are MOOT.

Mr. Freeman has filed motions to remand the cases to

the Superior Court of Alamance County. Title 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c) requires that a case must be remanded to the state

court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that

the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c) (West Supp. 2002). In the motion to remand, Mr.

Freeman asserts that the complaints are based purely on state

law and do not raise any federal issues. Defendants,

however, assert that federal jurisdiction in these cases is

proper because the complaint alleges a breach of a contract

between “an employer and a labor organization representing

employees in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act”

(“LMRA”).

Generally, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule requires

that the federal question appear on the face of the plaintiffs

properly pleaded complaint in order for a federal court to

exercise jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 U.S.

386, 392 (1987). In this case, Mr. Freeman has alleged

numerous state law causes of action. Against Duke Power,

Mr. Freeman has alleged breach of contract, wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy, direct claims under

Article 1, Section | and Article 1, Section 19 of the North

Carolina Constitution, and bad faith discharge. As to Mr.

Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha, Mr. Freeman has alleged

interference with contract and unfair and deceptive trade

practices.

On the face of Mr. Freeman’s complaint, he appears

to raise only state law claims. However, the general rule that

the federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff's

complaint is subject to an important exception; “an

‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule is

the further principle that ‘a plaintiff may not defeat removal

by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.’” Rivet v.

Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)

(citations omitted). Ifa plaintiff has “artfully pleaded” so that

federal jurisdiction appears improper, the case may

nevertheless be removed if federal law completely preempts a

plaintiff's state-law claim because “[o]nce an area of state

law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly

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based on that pre-empted state-law claim is considered, from

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under

federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.

The defendants assert that Mr. Freeman’s complaint,

alleging state law causes of action, is actually a suit for

breach of labor contract under the LMRA and that federal

jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer

and a labor organization representing employees in

an industry affecting commerce as defined in this

chapter... may be brought in any district court of the

United States having jurisdiction of the parties,

without respect to the amount of controversy or

without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

Mr. Freeman asserts that he is not seeking relief based on a

collective bargaining agreement but that the Grievance

Resolution and the Amended Grievance Resolution (“the

agreements”) are independent contracts unrelated to the

Collective Bargaining Agreement that can be enforced

pursuant to state law.

The Fourth Circuit, however, has rejected Mr.

Freeman’s argument. The Fourth Circuit has held that a

settlement agreement that results from an employee grievance

filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is not an

independent employment contract enforceable pursuant to

state law. Rather, such an agreement is a modification or

“rider” to the collective-bargaining agreement, which raises a

federal question. Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc.,

110 F. 3d 245, 249 (4" Cir. 1997).

In Davis, the plaintiff had been discharged due to

excessive absenteeism. She filed a grievance through the

Union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Bell

Atlantic, the Union, and Mrs. Davis reached a settlement

agreement providing for reinstatement without backpay or

damages. The agreement also provided that Ms. Davis would

retain the service credit she had received prior to the

discharge. Finally, the agreement provided that Ms. Davis

would be subject to immediate dismissal for future tardies or

absences. Id. Ms. Davis was tardy on numerous occasions

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following the execution of the settlement agreement and was

terminated.

Ms. Davis filed suit in state court alleging that Bell

Atlantic had breached the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement and the settlement agreement and also filed a state

law tort claim for wrongful discharge. Bell Atlantic removed

the case the federal court, and district court denied Ms.

Davis’ motion to remand on the grounds that the state law

claims were preempted by the LMRA. Id.

The Fourth Circuit rejected Ms. Davis’ argument that

her claim for breach of the settlement agreement was an

independent state law claim. Id. at 247. The Fourth Circuit

found that the settlement agreement’s validity was based

upon the collective bargaining agreement because the

settlement agreement was reached only through the grievance

procedure specified in the collective bargaining agreement.

The Court also noted that the settlement specified that Ms.

Davis would be credited for her service prior to her initial

discharge, and that the service credit “relate[d] to the

underlying work relationship between Davis and Bell Atlantic

require[d] reference to the collective-bargaining agreement

for interpretation and application.” Id. at 249.

Mr. Freeman’s case mirrors the facts before the

Fourth Circuit in Davis. Mr. Freeman, as Ms. Davis,

challenged his initial discharge through the initial grievance

procedure specified in the collective bargaining agreement.

The agreements between Duke Power, Mr. Freeman, and the

Union, like the settlement agreement in Davis, provided that

Mr. Freeman would be credited for his service prior to the

discharge, would not receive back pay, and would be

terminated for any future violation of the agreements. As in

Davis, the agreements are not independent contracts

enforceable under state law but are riders to the collective

bargaining agreement. Mr. Freeman’s complaint raises issues

that “arise under” federal law and federal jurisdiction is

proper. The motions to remand are DENIED.

Il.

Since jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 301 of the

LMRA, it is now necessary to determine whether the state

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law claims alleged by Mr. Freeman are preempted by § 301 :

In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction

Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1

(1983), the Supreme Court explained that “the pre-emptive

force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state

cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization.” Id. at 23.

However, the Supreme Court has also made it clear

that “not every dispute concerning employment, or

tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining

agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the

federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,

211 (1985). The Supreme Court has explained that

determining whether a state law claim “is inextricably

intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor

contract.” Id. at 213 Ifthe state law claim requires an

interpretation of the labor contract, then the state law claims

would be pre-empted. Thus, it is necessary to consider the

causes of action alleged by Mr. Freeman and decide whether

resolution of the state law claims would require interpretation

of the collective bargaining agreement or riders to the

agreement.

Mr. Freeman’s first state law claim alleges that Duke

Power breached his employment contract. Determining

whether Duke Power breached the contract will necessarily

involve interpretation of the contract. Thus, it is clear that a

breach of counter claim would be preempted. See Allis-

Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1985) (explaining

the preemptive effect of § 301 as applied to breach of counter

claims).

Similarly, Mr. Freeman’s tortuous interference with

contract claim against Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha is

preempted by § 301. The claim stated is for tortuous

interference with contract, the elements of which are as

follows: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third

person; (2) defendants had knowledge of the contract; (3)

' The collective defendants have attached the grievance settlement

agreements and the collective bargaining agreement to their moving

papers. Mr. Freeman has filed a motion to strike. Because it is

unnecessary to consider these attachments, the motion to strike is

MOOT.

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defendants intentionally induced the third person not to

perform the contract; (4) in doing so defendants acted without

justification; and (5) plaintiff was damaged thereby. United

Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.

2d 375, 387 (1988). In the complaint, Mr. Freeman alleges

that Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha “exceeded their

authority,” recommended his dismissal “without proper

investigation and without a thorough review of the facts”, and

“acted outside the scope of their employment.” Comp. § 11,

12, 17. It will be necessary to analyze the collective

bargaining agreement to determine the scope of supervisory

authority, the requirements of a proper investigation prior to

recommending dismissal, and whether Mr. Freeman’s actions

violated the riders to tic collective bargaining agreement.

The tortuous interference with contract claim is preempted.

Next, Mr. Freeman asserts that he was wrongfully

discharged in violation of public policy. North Carolina has

recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based on public

policy as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381

S.E. 2d 445 (1989). In the original complaint Mr. Freeman

alleged that he was a “member of Local Union 962,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which

Union had, at all times relevant hereto, a collective

bargaining agreement with the Defendant Duke Power.”

Comp. 4 4. Because wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy is an exception to the at-will doctrine, the North

Carolina Court of Appeals has held that contract employees

cannot state a cause of action for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy. Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128

N.C. App. 334, 343, 497 S.E.2d 82, 88 (1998) (citations

omitted) (explaining that [w]rongful termination may be

asserted “only in the context of employees at will,” and not

by an employee “employed for a definite term or... subject to

discharge only for ‘just cause””’).

Mr. Freeman filed a motion to amend his complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to allege

that he was an “at will employee.”” Determining whether Mr.

? The Motion to Amend is DENIED. The Fourth Circuit has

explained that proposed amendments may be denied on the basis of

futility if the claims the plaintiff seeks to add would not survive a

lla

Freeman was an at will employee who could bring a wrengful

discharge action would require consideration of the terms of

the collective bargaining agreement and the grievance

settlement agreements. As such, Mr. Freeman’s claim that he

was wrongfully discharged is preempted by § 301. Mr.

Freeman also alleges that Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha’s

conduct regarding his termination constitute an unfair and

deceptive trade practice under North Carolina law. Assuming

that an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim would not be

preempted by § 301, Mr. Freeman has failed to state a claim

for relief. To state a claim for relief for unfair and deceptive

trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff

must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice by the

defendant, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which

proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff. Miller v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 295, 435 S.E.2d

537 (1993). As the North Carolina Supreme Court has

explained, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act was

intended to benefit consumers, Pearce v. American Defender

Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1986).

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has explained that

“employer-employee relationships do not fail within the

intended scope” of Chapter 75 because “[e]mployment

practices fall within the purview of other statutes adopted for

that express purpose.” Buie v. Daniel International, 56

N.C.App. 445, 448, 289 S.E.2d 118, 119-120 (1982). It is

undisputed that Mr. Freeman’s claims arise from his

employment. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the unfair

and deceptive trade practices act claim is GRANTED.

Mr. Freeman has also alleged a claim for bad faith

discharge and direct claims under Article I, Section 1 and 10.

North Carolina does not recognize an independent tort for bad

faith discharge. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C.

348, 359, 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (1992). Duke Power’s

Motion to Dismiss the bad faith discharge claim is

GRANTED and the claim is DISMISSED.

Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina

Constitution provides:

motion to dismiss. See Burns v. AAF -McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292,

294-95 (4 Cir. 1999).

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We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are

created equal; that they are endowed by their creator

with certain inalienable rights; that among these are

life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own

labor, and the pursuit of happiness.

Mr. Freeman asserts that the “moonlighting” provision of the

settlement agreements violates the “fruits of their own labor”

provision of Article I, Section! of the North Carolina

Constitution. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,

has previously rejected the argument holding that Article I,

Section | “does not give [the plaintiff] a remedy against a

corporate defendant” in a private dispute. Teleflex

Information Systems, Inc. v. Arnold, 132 N.C. App. 689, 693,

513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1999) (citing Real Estate Licensing Board

v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1976)

and explaining that the “fundamental provisions of our State

Constitution, such as Article I, Section 1, were inserted to

guarantee the right to pursue ordinary and simple occupations

free from governmental regulation”) (emphasis added)

(international quotations omitted). Duke Power’s Motion to

Dismiss the Article I, Section 1 claim is GRANTED and the

claim is DISMISSED.

Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina

Constitution, often referred to as the Law of the Land Clause,

is considered the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution. Lorbacher v. Housing Authority

of the City of Raleigh, 127 N.C.App. 663, 674-75, 493 S.E.2d

74, 81 (1997). A direct claim under the North Carolina

Constitution can be made in the absence of an adequate legal

remedy. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. As

discussed below, Mr. Freeman was entitled to seek relief

pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. He is not without an

adequate legal remedy and thus cannot state a claim directly

under the North Carolina Constitution. Duke Power’s Motion

to Dismiss the Article I, Section 19 claim is GRANTED and

the claim is DISMISSED.

IV.

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, it is necessary to

Finally, because Mr. Freeman’s state law claims are

|

13a

determine whether Mr. Freeman has stated a viable claim

under § 301 which allows an aggrieved employee the right to

bring a suit in federal court. To state a claim against an

employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement

under § 301, the employee must first “attempt to exhaust

exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by

the bargaining agreement.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184

(1967). If those administrative remedies have been -

exhausted, the plaintiff must also establish that “the union as

bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its

handling of the employee’s grievance.” Id. at 186.

In this case, it is not necessary to consider whether

Mr. Freeman has satisfied these two prongs because he did

not file his action within the applicable time period. A six

month statute of limitations controls a suit brought under §

301 alleging a breach of contract against the employer and

failure if proper representation against the union. DelCostello

v. Int’] Bhd of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). Mr.

Freeman was terminated in July 1999. His action in the state

court was filed June 30, 2000, outside the six month statute of

limitations. The defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are

GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.

V.

In summary, in the 1:00CV00665 action, Plaintiff's

Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED, Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED, Plaintiff's

Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave to Take

Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion to

Consolidate [Doc. #31] is MOOT.

In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to

Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to

Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.

This is the 15" day of August, 2003.

/s/

United States District Judge

1b

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 03-2146

DUKE POWER COMPANY,

a Division of Duke Energy

Corporation; DUKE

ENERGY CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 03-2147

CINDY THAXTON; GEORGE

KWASCHA, |

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CA-00-665-1; CA-02-630-1)

Argued: June 4, 2004

Decided: September 27, 2004

Before WIDENER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Fred Thurman Hamlet, Sr., Greensboro, North

Carolina, for Appellant. Dena Beth Langley, NEXSEN

PRUET ADAMS KLEEMEIER, P.L.L.C., Greensboro,

North Carolina, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Brian S. Clarke, NEXSEN PRUET ADAMS

KLEEMEIER, P.L.L.C., Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this

circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The district court dismissed both of Albert Freeman’s state

law actions, one against Duke Power Company (Duke Power)

and one against Cindy Thaxton and George Kwascha, on the

bases that all of the state law claims raised in the two cases

were either preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act (LMRA) and failed to state claims under the

LMRA, or, if not preempted, failed to state a claim under

state law. Freeman appeals, and we affirm.

I.

Because the district court granted the defendants’ motions to

dismiss the plaintiff's complaints for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we take the

allegations in the compiaints as true and construe the facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Franks v. Ross, 313

F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002). Albert Freeman worked for

Duke Power as a Transmission Line Helper and as a

Distribution Line Technician C from 1983 until 1999

pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between

Duke Power and Freeman’s union, Local Union 962,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Union). In

1984, Freeman obtained a limited electrical contractor’s

license and "moonlighted" as an electrician during his off-

Keira se

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duty time performing small electrical jobs. Duke Power

was aware of Freeman’s moonlighting activities and took no

employment action against him between 1984 and 1994.

In January 1994, Freeman was suspended and discharged

from employment as a lineman "for allegedly removing a

service drop and meter and disconnecting service to a

customer without authorization from Duke Power Company."

(J.A. at 11-12.) The Union filed a grievance on Freeman’s

behalf pursuant to the grievance procedures of the CBA. In

settlement of the grievance, Duke Power, the Union, and

Freeman entered into a Grievance Resolution, under which

Duke Power agreed to reinstate Freeman to his lineman

position, the Union agreed to withdraw the grievance, and

Freeman agreed not to engage, directly or indirectly, in the

business of electrical contracting while employed with Duke

Power. The Grievance Resolution provided that Duke Power

could discharge Freeman if he engaged in electrical

contracting, and that the discharge decision would be final

and would not be subject to the grievance procedures of the

CBA in effect at the time of any future discharge.

In June 1996, Duke Power suspended and proposed to

discharge Freeman a second time, asserting that Freeman

violated the Grievance Resolution by engaging in electrical

contracting. Freeman asserted that he did not violate the

Grievance Resolution. In settling the dispute, the Union,

Duke Power, and Freeman entered into an Amendment

to the Grievance Resolution (Amendment) on July 3, 1996.

The Amendment prohibited Freeman from being or becoming

employed on a full- or part-time basis with any entity

engaged in the business of electrical contracting. In the

Amendment, Duke Power agreed not to terminate Freeman

for the then current alleged violation of the Grievance

Resolution, and Freeman agreed not to engage in the business

of electrical contracting in the future. The Amendment

provided that Duke Power could terminate Freeman’s

employment if he violated the Amendment, and that such

termination would be final and would not be subject to the

arbitration or grievance procedures under.the CBA then in

effect. In July 1999, Duke Power suspended and ultimately

discharged Freeman for allegedly violating the Amendment.

4b

The Union declined to file a grievance for Freeman.

Freeman brought an action in North Carolina state court

against Duke Power, alleging breach of contract, wrongful

discharge, violations of North Carolina’s constitution, and

bad faith discharge. He brought a separate state court action

against Cindy Thaxton and George Kwascha, his immediate

supervisors, for interference with contract and violation of

North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive trade practices act. The

defendants in both cases removed the cases to federal court

and filed motions to dismiss the cases for failure to state a

claim. The defendants also sought to consolidate the cases in

federal court. Freeman resisted the motions and moved to

remand the cases back to state court, to amend his complaint,

to exclude evidence attached to the defendants’ motions to

dismiss, and to conduct discovery.

The district court denied Freeman’s motion to remand the

cases to state court because the complaints in both cases

raised issues arising under federal law, specifically the

LMRA. The court determined that Freeman’s claims against

Duke Power for breach of contract and wrongful discharge

were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss because the claims were

brought beyond the applicable statute of limitation. The

district court denied Freeman’s motion to amend his

complaint to allege that he was an at-will employee because

the allegation would not have changed the fact that the claim

was preempted by the LMRA. The district court dismissed

the bad faith discharge and state constitutional claims as aad

failing to state claims cognizable under North Carolina law.

The district court determined that Freeman’s claim against

the individual defendants for interference with contract was

also preempted by the LMRA and subject to dismissal as

untimely. It determined that even if the unfair and deceptive

trade practices claim was not preempted by the LMRA, such

a claim was unavailable under North Carolina law in the

employment setting. The district court found that the

defendants’ motions to consolidate and Freeman’s motions to

exclude evidence and conduct discovery were all mooted by

the dismissals. Freeman appeals.

Sb

Il.

A. Removal Jurisdiction

Freeman argues on appeal that both of his cases should have

been remanded to state court because both complaints raised

only state law claims. Actions brought in state court are

removable to federal court if the complaint raises a federal

question. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a) (2000). To

determine whether a complaint raises a federal question, we

apply the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which prevents

a defendant from removing a case to federal court unless the

plaintiff's complaint, without consideration of any potential

defenses, establishes that the case arises under federal law.

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2004). A

corollary to the wellpleaded complaint rule allows an action

to be removed, notwithstanding the absence of a federal

question in the plaintiff's complaint, if "a federal statute

wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through

complete pre-emption." /d. at 2495 (internal marks omitted).

Even though the action alleges only state law claims, if those

claims are completely preempted by federal law, the

complaint "is in reality based on federal law." Jd. (internal

marks omitted).

The preemptive force of § 301 of the LMRA is

unquestionably broad. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.

Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23-

24 (1983). Section 301 totally displaces state causes of action

related to contracts between employers and labor

organizations, as well as other claims the resolution of which

depends substantially on the interpretation of a CBA. See

Davis v. Bell Atlantic-W.V., Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir.

1997).

1. Action Against Duke Power

The Davis case is factually similar to Freeman’s case against

Duke Power, and its reasoning controls the outcome. In

Davis, an employee entered a settlement agreement with her

employer and union that settled a grievance brought pursuant

6b

to the CBA when the employer attempted to terminate the

employee for absenteeism. Davis, 310 F.3d at 246. The

settlement agreement reinstated the employee and provided

that the employee was subject to immediate termination,

without recourse to the grievance procedures in the CBA, if

she violated the settlement agreement. The employee was

subsequently terminated for violating the settlement

agreement, and she brought state law claims for breach of the

CBA, breach of the settlement, and wrongful discharge. /d.

As relevant-here, this court held that the claim for breach of

the settlement agreement was preempted because it depended

on rights conferred on the employee by the CBA.' The

settlement agreement derived from the CBA, in fact was

entered as a result of a grievance proceeding brought pursuant

to the CBA, and therefore its "entire vitality and legitimacy"

drew from the CBA. /d. at 248. In the case at bar, the Union

followed the grievance procedure in the CBA and entered

into settlement negotiations with Duke Power, on Freeman’s

behalf, that resulted in the Grievance Resolution and

Amendment in lieu of arbitration as provided by the CBA.

Without the CBA, the Grievance Resolution and Amendment

would not have existed. Settlements of employee grievances

that are entered pursuant to the terms of a CBA are labor

contracts within the meaning of § 301, which "preempts an

alleged breach of the Union-negotiated agreement that settled

an employee grievance." /d. at 249 (citing cases holding

same).

Freeman attempts to distinguish Davis on the basis that

certain terms used in the Davis settlement agreement were

defined in the CBA, whereas there are no terms in the

Grievance Resolution or the Amendment that need to be

defined by reference to the CBA. However, the Davis court

did not rely on the mutuality of terms for its holding. Jd.

("While an independent employment contract’s mere

Contrary to Freeman’s assertions that the Davis court’s

discussion of the settlement agreement was dicta because

Davis alleged breach of the CBA (Appellant’s Br. at 21 n.1),

the Davis court addressed the claims for breach of the CBA

and breach of the settlement agreement as distinct claims.

7b

borrowing of one or more terms from a [CBA] does not in

itself bring that contract within the scope of § 301

preemption, the settlement agreement here was not an

independent employment contract... . The Union’s [CBA]

remained in full force to govern [the employee’s]

employment relationship except insofar as it was modified by

the settlement agreement." (internal citations omitted)). The

court construed the settlement agreement as a rider to the

CBA. Id.

Although disputes arising over independent employment

contracts unrelated to a CBA are not preempted by § 301 of

the LMRA, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,

394-95 (1987), the Grievance Resolution and the Amendment

are not independent of the CBA. The employees in

Caterpillar had entered separate management contracts

and only later became subject to a CBA when they were

demoted. Their state law action was based on the

management contracts, not anything derivative of the CBA,

and thus was not preempted by the LMRA. /d. at 395 & n.9.

The same cannot be said in the instant case, as the Grievance

Resolution and Amendment derive their "entire vitality and

legitimacy" from the CBA. Davis, 110 F.3d at 248.

The district court also determined that § 301 of the LMRA

preempted Freeman’s wrongful discharge claim against Duke

Power. Freeman alleged in his complaint that Duke Power

wrongfully discharged him in violation of North Carolina

public policy as reflected in the state constitution, which

protects an individual’s right to "the enjoyment of the fruits

of [his] own labor." N.C. Const. art. I, § 1. Freeman’s

wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the LMRA if it

is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of

the labor contract. If the state tort law purports to define the

meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted."

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized a cause

of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

as a narrow exception to North Carolina’s long-standing

employment-at-will doctrine. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg.

Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989). However, "[t}he tort of

8b

wrongful discharge arises only in the context of employment

at will." Claggett v. Wake Forest Univ., 486 S.E.2d 443, 448

(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing wrongful discharge claim

brought by a university professor who was covered by a

contract). Contract employees are limited to contract

remedies. Resolution of the wrongful discharge claim would

require a determination of the type of employment

relationship between Freeman and Duke Power, regardless of

whether Freeman pleads that he is a contract employee or an

at-will employee. Such an analysis necessarily would involve

construction of the CBA, the Grievance Resolution, and the

Amendment to determine what type of employment

relationship existed between Freeman and Duke Power. The

wrongful discharge claim is therefore preempted by the

LMRA. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.

Because Freeman’s claims of breach of contract and wrongful

discharge are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and therefore

raise a federal question, the district court properly retained

jurisdiction over Freeman’s case against Duke Power, and no

remand to state court was in order.

2. Action Against Thaxton & Kwascha

Freeman brought state law claims of tortious interference

with contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices against

two of his supervisors, alleging that they intentionally

induced Duke Power to terminate his employment. The

district court determined that the interference with contract

claim was completely preempted by § 301 because it required

interpretation of Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory

authority as defined in the CBA, as well as a determination of

whether Freeman violated the Grievance Resolution and

Amendment. We agree.

As discussed above, a state law claim is completely

preempted by the LMRA if it relates to contracts between

employers and labor organizations, or if resolution of the

claim depends substantially on the interpretation of a CBA.

See Davis, 110 F.3d at 247. To state a claim for tortious

interference with contract against Thaxton and Kwascha

under North Carolina law, Freeman had to establish that (1)

a ae ia ete cers seen gee,

9b

he had a valid contract with Duke Power that gave Freeman

contractual rights; (2) the defendants knew of the contract; (3)

the defendants intentionally induced Duke Power not to

perform the contract; (4) the defendants acted without

justification; and (5) Freeman was thereby damaged. Embree

Const. Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (N.C.

1992).

Freeman stated in his complaint that he had an employment

agreement with Duke Power that gave him certain legal rights

and privileges, that Thaxton and Kwascha intentionally

induced Duke Power to terminate the contract, and that

Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s conduct was outside of the scope

of their employment (as Freeman’s supervisors), in bad faith,

for a wrongful purpose, with malice, and without any legal

justification. (J.A. at 231-32.) A court would need to interpret

the Grievance Resolution, the Amendment, and the CBA in

an effort to determine Freeman’s contractual rights, the extent

of Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory authority, and

whether Duke Power failed to perform its obligations to

Freeman. We therefore hold that Freeman’s claim against

Thaxton and Kwascha for tortious interference with contract

was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. See Int’] Union,

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977

F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Clearly, the third element of

this cause of action [under Virginia law], requiring a breach

or termination of the contractual relationship, necessitates

interpretation of the [CBA]."); Steinbach v. Dillon Cos., 253

F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a tortious

interference claim alleging that a third party caused the

employer to wrongfully terminate an employee was

preempted by § 301 where the claim required a determination

of whether the employer failed to perform the contract);

Kimbro v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2000)

(holding that an employee’s state law claims for tortious

interference with contract against a supervisor and a third

party were preempted by § 301 where the claims would

require interpretation of the CBA). The district court

properly exercised jurisdiction over Freeman’s case against

Thaxton and Kwascha.

10b

B. Dismissal for Failure, to State a Claim

Having determined that the district court properly exercised

jurisdiction over both of Freeman’s complaints, we turn now

- to the district court’s dismissal of each of his claims. Where

state law claims are preempted by the LMRA, the claim may

still survive if it states a claim under the federal statute. See

Allis Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 ("[The] claim niust

either be treated as a § 301 claim, . . . or dismissed as pre-

empted by federal labor-contract law.").

1. Claims Against Duke Power

a. Breach of Contract/Wrongful Discharge

The district court dismissed Freeman’s claims against Duke

Power for breach of contract and wrongful discharge for

failing to state a § 301 claim because both claims were

brought outside of the applicable statute of limitations,

borrowing the six-month limitation period contained in §

10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29

U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000). If a federal statute is silent as to the

applicable statute of limitations, we generally borrow the

most analogous state limitations period. See De/lCostello v.

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). To avoid

frustrating federal policy, however, courts should borrow a

limitations period from an analogous federal statute if that

statute clearly provides a closer analogy than available state

statutes. Jd. at 172.

The NLRA proscribes "unfair labor practices" and provides a

sixmonth period within which to bring an unfair labor

practices claim. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The six-month period

takes into account "the national interests in stable bargaining

relationships and finality of private settlements, and an

employee’s interest in setting aside what he views as an

unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system."

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (internal marks omitted).

In this case, Freeman twice settled grievances filed on his

behalf by the Union with Duke Power. The settlements

provided that Duke Power could terminate Freeman for

11b

engaging in electrical contracting, and that Duke Power’s

decision to do so "shall be final." (J.A. at 12.) Freeman’s

claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge

challenge Duke Power’s decision to terminate his

employment despite his agreement in the settlement

negotiations that Duke Power’s decision would be final.

Allowing Freeman to use the three-year statute of limitation

provided under North Carolina law for breach of contract

claims would undermine the NLRA’s delicate balance

between the competing interests of promoting the finality of

private settlements and avoiding unjust settlements. See

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. The district court appropriately

borrowed the NLRA’s six-month statute of limitation and

properly dismissed the breach of contract and wrongful

discharge claims as being brought outside of that period.

b. Direct Claims Under the State Constitution

Freeman asserted in the third count of his complaint that

Duke Power’s actions in limiting his ability to moonlight

violated the North Carolina constitutional provision

recognizing the inalienable right of all persons to "the

enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor." N.C. Const. art. I,

§ 1. North Carolina’s courts do not recognize a cause of

action based on article I, section 1 of the state constitution to

remedy private employment disputes. See Teleflex Info. Sys.,

Inc. v. Arnold, 513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)

(affirming summary judgment for employer in suit brought

by at-will employee claiming that his firing violated article I,

section 1 of the state constitution). Rather, the provision

limits the state’s ability to regulate an individual’s livelihood.

Id. ("[T]he declaration of rights in [the North Carolina] State

Constitution was inserted ‘chiefly to protect the individual

from the State.’" (quoting North Carolina v. Ballance, 51

S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949))). Thus, the district court properly

dismissed Freeman’s state constitutional claim.

Likewise, Freeman’s direct cause of action under article I,

section 19 of the state constitution, providing that no person

shall be deprived of his property but by the law of the land,

also fails. Article I, section 19 is the North Carolina state

constitution’s equivalent of the federal Constitution’s

a RS ORE eas a ae ee ee

12b

Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Both provisions

protect individuals only against governmental action. Thus,

Freeman has no cognizable action based on the state

constitution against his wholly private employer. See N.C.

Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 256 S.E.2d 388, 394 (N.C. 1979)

("This constitutional [due process] shield does not protect

citizens from the actions or activities of other private

individuals."); Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 402 S.E.2d

653, 656-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("*[S]tate action’ is

required to trigger the protections of the ‘synonymous’ due

process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article 1, § 19 of the North

Carolina Constitution."). The district court properly

dismissed Freeman’s third count.

c. Bad Faith Discharge

Freeman argues that North Carolina courts are "undecided" as

to whether a bad faith discharge claim is separately

cognizable in North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North

Carolina, however, unequivocally stated, in disagreeing with

two of the federal district court cases relied upon by Freeman,

that it "did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful

discharge in bad faith" in a prior case. Amos v. Oakdale

Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. 1992). The district

court properly dismissed Freeman’s fourth count against

Duke Power.

2. Claims Against Thaxton and Kwascha

a. Tortious Interference With Contract

Because the tortious interference claim is preempted,

Freeman’s claim must be dismissed unless it states a valid §

301 claim. Section 301 allows claims for "violations of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29

U.S.C. § 185 (2000). "Applying the most natural

interpretation of this language, we [have previously held]

that a suit against a non-signatory of a contract cannot be

considered a suit for violation of the contract." Covenant

Coal Corp., 977 F.2d at 897. Bound, as both it and we are by

prior controlling and unquestioned circuit precedent, the

district court properly dismissed Freeman’s claim against

13b

Thaxton and Kwascha for interference with contract.

b. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices

To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices

against Thaxton and Kwascha under North Carolina General

Statutes § 75-1.1, Freeman must establish that (1) the

defendants "committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice,

(2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and

(3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff." Dalton

v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001). "The purpose of

G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical

standards of dealings between persons engaged in business

and the consuming public within this State[,] and [it] applies

to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of

commerce." Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 311

(N.C. 1999) (internal marks omitted) (alterations in original).

The statute generally does not apply to employment

situations, see Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 711, though the

existence of an employment relationship will not necessarily

defeat a claim if the parties are otherwise involved in a

business relationship. See Sara Lee Corp., 519 S.E.2d at 312

(allowing an unfair trade practices claim brought by an

employer against an employee where the employee was

involved in buyer-selier transactions with his employer).

Freeman’s complaint alleges only that the individual

defendants acted to cause Duke Power to terminate

Freeman’s employment contract. (J.A. at 232-34.) Although

N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b) defines "commerce" broadly as

"business activities, however denominated," the Supreme

Court of North Carolina has cautioned that the act "is not

intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting,"

including most employment disputes. Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at

657 (distinguishing Sara Lee on the basis that the employee

in Sara Lee owed a fiduciary duty to his employer, and the

employee was entrenched in a buyer-seller relationship with

his employer, which fell squarely within the purview of the

unfair trade practices act). Freeman’s allegation that the

defendants caused Duke Power to terminate him fails to meet

the requirement that the defendants’ acts be in or affecting

commerce, see Durling v. King 554 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (N.C. Ct.

14b

App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment where "no

evidence was presented that the subject transactions had any

impact beyond the parties’ employment relationships"), and

; he therefore failed to state a claim under the state unfair

and deceptive trade practices act.

Il.

We affirm the district court’s order denying Freeman’s

motions to remand and dismissing Freeman’s complaints

against Duke Power and against Thaxton and Kwascha. We

also affirm the district court’s denial of the various pending

motions as the dismissal of all claims makes the motions

moot.

AFFIRMED

Ic

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FILED

October 26, 2004

No. 03-2146

CA-00-665-1

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division

Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-2147

CA-02-630-1

ALBERT L. FREEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

CINDY THAXTON, an individual,

and GREGORY KWASCHA,

an individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

The appellant’s petition for rehearing and rehearing

en banc was submitted to this Court. As no member of this

Court or the panel requested a poll on the petition for

rehearing en banc, and

ar aes as ee eer ee EN ee ee

2c

As the panel considered the petition for rehearing and

is of the opinion that it should be denied,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for a panel comprised of Judge Widener,

Judge Shedd, and Judge Hansen.

For the Court,

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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