Appendix — Freeman v. Duke Power Co.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:00CV00665
DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division
Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
Defendants.
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. 1:02CV90630
CINDY THAXTON, an individual,
and GREGORY KWASCHA,
an individual,
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Defendants. )
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JUDGMENT
Tilley, Chief Judge
For the reasons stated in a contemporaneously filed
Memorandum Opinion, in the 1:00CV00665 action,
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED, .
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED,
Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave to Take
Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion
to Consolidate [Doc. #31] is MOOT.
In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to
2a
Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to
Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.
This is the 15" day of August, 2003.
/s/
United States District Judge
3a
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
V. 1:00CV00665
DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division
Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
Defendants.
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v. : 1:02CV00630
CINDY THAXTON, a# individual,
and GREGORY KWASCHA,
an individual,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tilley, Chief Judge
In the 1:00CV00665 action, the following motions
are currently pending before the court: Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand [Doc. #7], Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.
#11], Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave
to Take Discovery [Doc. #25], Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
the Complaint [Doc. #28], Defendant’s Motion to |
Consolidate [Doc. #31]..
In the 1:02CV00630 case, the following motions are
pending: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #3],
Defendant’s Motion to Consolidate [Doc. #5] and Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand [Doc. #8].
ee aa
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For the reasons set forth below, in the 1:00CV00665
action, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED,
Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave tu Take
Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion to
Consolidate [Doc. #31 is MOOT].
In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to
Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.
I.
The allegations of the complaint, stated in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, are as follows: Plaintiff Albert
Freeman was employed by Duke Power from 1983 to 1999 as
a Transmission Line Helper and as a Distribution Line
Technician C in Burlington, North Carolina. In 1984, Mr.
Freeman obtained a limited contractor’s license and
‘moonlighted’ as an electrician during his off duty hours. Mr.
Freeman also alleges that Duke Power was aware of his
moonlighting and ‘utilized Freeman’s services as an
electrician in the rewiring of Duke Power buildings.’ (Cmp. {
7.)
In 1990, Duke Power transferred a district manager,
Ed Holt, to Burlington. Holt did not like ‘moonlighting’ and
accused Mr. Freeman of moonlighting during his Duke Power
work day. Around January 26, 1994, Mr. Freeman was
suspended and discharged from his employment as a lineman
for Duke Power “for allegedly ‘removing a service drop and
meter and disconnecting service to a customer without
authorization from Duke Power Company’” while he was
moonlighting. (Cmp. § 11). The union filed a grievance on
Mr. Freeman’s behalf. Mr. Freeman, the Union, and Duke
Power settled the grievance and entered into a Grievance
Resolution on June 20, 1994. Pursuant to this agreement,
Duke Power agreed to reinstate Mr. Freeman with no loss of
service but with no back pay. The Union agreed to withdraw
the grievance. The parties also agreed that if Mr. Freeman
engaged “directly or indirectly in the business of electrical
contracting while employed with Duke Power, Duke Power
Sa
could terminate Mr. Freeman’s employment for that reason,”
and Duke Power’s decision “shall be final and shall not be
subject to review under any grievance or arbitration provision
under any Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect at the
time of his discharge.” (Cmp. §] 12.) This agreement was
signed by the Duke Power area manager for
Burlington/Reidsville, the business manager for the Union,
and Mr. Freeman.
In June 1996, Duke Power again suspended Mr.
Freeman “allegedly for engaging in the business of electrical
contracting.” (Cmp. § 14). Mr. Freeman denied having
breached the June 1994 Grievance Resolution Agreement. In
July 1996, Duke Power, the Union, and Mr. Freeman entered
into an Amendment to the Grievance Resolution, which
provided that Mr. Freeman was prohibited from “being or
becoming employed on a full or part-time basis with any
person, firm, or corporation engaging in the business of
electrical contracting.” (Cmp. § 16). In July 1999, Mr.
Freeman was terminated for allegedly violating the Amended
Grievance Resolution. Mr. Freeman denies that he violated
the Amended Grievance Resolution. The Union did not file a
grievance on behalf of Mr. Freeman.
Mr. Freeman filed the action against Duke Power in
the General Court of Justice Superior Court Division,
Alamance County on June 30, 2000. Mr. Freeman alleges
numerous causes of action including: breach of contract,
wrongful discharge, a violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the
North Carolina State Constitution, and bad faith discharge.
Mr. Freeman filed the action against Cindy Thaxton,
Regional Human Resources Manager for Duke Power, and
Gregory Kwascha, Burlington Area Manager for Duke
Power, in the General Court of Justice Superior Court
Division, Alamance County on June 28, 2002. In that case,
Mr. Freeman seeks recovery for interference with contract
and unfair deceptive trade practices. The defendants in both
actions filed timely notices of removal.
Il.
The defendants have filed motions to consolidate
these cases. For purposes of considering the motions to
dismiss, the cases will be consolidated. In light of the fact
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that the motions to dismiss will be granted, see discussion
below, the Defendants’ Motions to Consolidate are MOOT.
Mr. Freeman has filed motions to remand the cases to
the Superior Court of Alamance County. Title 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c) requires that a case must be remanded to the state
court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (West Supp. 2002). In the motion to remand, Mr.
Freeman asserts that the complaints are based purely on state
law and do not raise any federal issues. Defendants,
however, assert that federal jurisdiction in these cases is
proper because the complaint alleges a breach of a contract
between “an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act”
(“LMRA”).
Generally, the “well-pleaded complaint” rule requires
that the federal question appear on the face of the plaintiffs
properly pleaded complaint in order for a federal court to
exercise jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 392 (1987). In this case, Mr. Freeman has alleged
numerous state law causes of action. Against Duke Power,
Mr. Freeman has alleged breach of contract, wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, direct claims under
Article 1, Section | and Article 1, Section 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution, and bad faith discharge. As to Mr.
Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha, Mr. Freeman has alleged
interference with contract and unfair and deceptive trade
practices.
On the face of Mr. Freeman’s complaint, he appears
to raise only state law claims. However, the general rule that
the federal question must appear on the face of the plaintiff's
complaint is subject to an important exception; “an
‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
the further principle that ‘a plaintiff may not defeat removal
by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.’” Rivet v.
Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)
(citations omitted). Ifa plaintiff has “artfully pleaded” so that
federal jurisdiction appears improper, the case may
nevertheless be removed if federal law completely preempts a
plaintiff's state-law claim because “[o]nce an area of state
law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly
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based on that pre-empted state-law claim is considered, from
its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under
federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
The defendants assert that Mr. Freeman’s complaint,
alleging state law causes of action, is actually a suit for
breach of labor contract under the LMRA and that federal
jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA.
Section 301 of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter... may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount of controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Mr. Freeman asserts that he is not seeking relief based on a
collective bargaining agreement but that the Grievance
Resolution and the Amended Grievance Resolution (“the
agreements”) are independent contracts unrelated to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement that can be enforced
pursuant to state law.
The Fourth Circuit, however, has rejected Mr.
Freeman’s argument. The Fourth Circuit has held that a
settlement agreement that results from an employee grievance
filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is not an
independent employment contract enforceable pursuant to
state law. Rather, such an agreement is a modification or
“rider” to the collective-bargaining agreement, which raises a
federal question. Davis v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc.,
110 F. 3d 245, 249 (4" Cir. 1997).
In Davis, the plaintiff had been discharged due to
excessive absenteeism. She filed a grievance through the
Union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Bell
Atlantic, the Union, and Mrs. Davis reached a settlement
agreement providing for reinstatement without backpay or
damages. The agreement also provided that Ms. Davis would
retain the service credit she had received prior to the
discharge. Finally, the agreement provided that Ms. Davis
would be subject to immediate dismissal for future tardies or
absences. Id. Ms. Davis was tardy on numerous occasions
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following the execution of the settlement agreement and was
terminated.
Ms. Davis filed suit in state court alleging that Bell
Atlantic had breached the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement and the settlement agreement and also filed a state
law tort claim for wrongful discharge. Bell Atlantic removed
the case the federal court, and district court denied Ms.
Davis’ motion to remand on the grounds that the state law
claims were preempted by the LMRA. Id.
The Fourth Circuit rejected Ms. Davis’ argument that
her claim for breach of the settlement agreement was an
independent state law claim. Id. at 247. The Fourth Circuit
found that the settlement agreement’s validity was based
upon the collective bargaining agreement because the
settlement agreement was reached only through the grievance
procedure specified in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court also noted that the settlement specified that Ms.
Davis would be credited for her service prior to her initial
discharge, and that the service credit “relate[d] to the
underlying work relationship between Davis and Bell Atlantic
require[d] reference to the collective-bargaining agreement
for interpretation and application.” Id. at 249.
Mr. Freeman’s case mirrors the facts before the
Fourth Circuit in Davis. Mr. Freeman, as Ms. Davis,
challenged his initial discharge through the initial grievance
procedure specified in the collective bargaining agreement.
The agreements between Duke Power, Mr. Freeman, and the
Union, like the settlement agreement in Davis, provided that
Mr. Freeman would be credited for his service prior to the
discharge, would not receive back pay, and would be
terminated for any future violation of the agreements. As in
Davis, the agreements are not independent contracts
enforceable under state law but are riders to the collective
bargaining agreement. Mr. Freeman’s complaint raises issues
that “arise under” federal law and federal jurisdiction is
proper. The motions to remand are DENIED.
Il.
Since jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 301 of the
LMRA, it is now necessary to determine whether the state
9a
law claims alleged by Mr. Freeman are preempted by § 301 :
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California, 463 U.S. 1
(1983), the Supreme Court explained that “the pre-emptive
force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state
cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization.” Id. at 23.
However, the Supreme Court has also made it clear
that “not every dispute concerning employment, or
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the
federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
211 (1985). The Supreme Court has explained that
determining whether a state law claim “is inextricably
intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor
contract.” Id. at 213 Ifthe state law claim requires an
interpretation of the labor contract, then the state law claims
would be pre-empted. Thus, it is necessary to consider the
causes of action alleged by Mr. Freeman and decide whether
resolution of the state law claims would require interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement or riders to the
agreement.
Mr. Freeman’s first state law claim alleges that Duke
Power breached his employment contract. Determining
whether Duke Power breached the contract will necessarily
involve interpretation of the contract. Thus, it is clear that a
breach of counter claim would be preempted. See Allis-
Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-12 (1985) (explaining
the preemptive effect of § 301 as applied to breach of counter
claims).
Similarly, Mr. Freeman’s tortuous interference with
contract claim against Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha is
preempted by § 301. The claim stated is for tortuous
interference with contract, the elements of which are as
follows: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third
person; (2) defendants had knowledge of the contract; (3)
' The collective defendants have attached the grievance settlement
agreements and the collective bargaining agreement to their moving
papers. Mr. Freeman has filed a motion to strike. Because it is
unnecessary to consider these attachments, the motion to strike is
MOOT.
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defendants intentionally induced the third person not to
perform the contract; (4) in doing so defendants acted without
justification; and (5) plaintiff was damaged thereby. United
Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.
2d 375, 387 (1988). In the complaint, Mr. Freeman alleges
that Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha “exceeded their
authority,” recommended his dismissal “without proper
investigation and without a thorough review of the facts”, and
“acted outside the scope of their employment.” Comp. § 11,
12, 17. It will be necessary to analyze the collective
bargaining agreement to determine the scope of supervisory
authority, the requirements of a proper investigation prior to
recommending dismissal, and whether Mr. Freeman’s actions
violated the riders to tic collective bargaining agreement.
The tortuous interference with contract claim is preempted.
Next, Mr. Freeman asserts that he was wrongfully
discharged in violation of public policy. North Carolina has
recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based on public
policy as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 381
S.E. 2d 445 (1989). In the original complaint Mr. Freeman
alleged that he was a “member of Local Union 962,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which
Union had, at all times relevant hereto, a collective
bargaining agreement with the Defendant Duke Power.”
Comp. 4 4. Because wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy is an exception to the at-will doctrine, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has held that contract employees
cannot state a cause of action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128
N.C. App. 334, 343, 497 S.E.2d 82, 88 (1998) (citations
omitted) (explaining that [w]rongful termination may be
asserted “only in the context of employees at will,” and not
by an employee “employed for a definite term or... subject to
discharge only for ‘just cause””’).
Mr. Freeman filed a motion to amend his complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to allege
that he was an “at will employee.”” Determining whether Mr.
? The Motion to Amend is DENIED. The Fourth Circuit has
explained that proposed amendments may be denied on the basis of
futility if the claims the plaintiff seeks to add would not survive a
lla
Freeman was an at will employee who could bring a wrengful
discharge action would require consideration of the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and the grievance
settlement agreements. As such, Mr. Freeman’s claim that he
was wrongfully discharged is preempted by § 301. Mr.
Freeman also alleges that Ms. Thaxton and Mr. Kwascha’s
conduct regarding his termination constitute an unfair and
deceptive trade practice under North Carolina law. Assuming
that an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim would not be
preempted by § 301, Mr. Freeman has failed to state a claim
for relief. To state a claim for relief for unfair and deceptive
trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff
must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice by the
defendant, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which
proximately caused actual injury to plaintiff. Miller v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 295, 435 S.E.2d
537 (1993). As the North Carolina Supreme Court has
explained, the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act was
intended to benefit consumers, Pearce v. American Defender
Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1986).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has explained that
“employer-employee relationships do not fail within the
intended scope” of Chapter 75 because “[e]mployment
practices fall within the purview of other statutes adopted for
that express purpose.” Buie v. Daniel International, 56
N.C.App. 445, 448, 289 S.E.2d 118, 119-120 (1982). It is
undisputed that Mr. Freeman’s claims arise from his
employment. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the unfair
and deceptive trade practices act claim is GRANTED.
Mr. Freeman has also alleged a claim for bad faith
discharge and direct claims under Article I, Section 1 and 10.
North Carolina does not recognize an independent tort for bad
faith discharge. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C.
348, 359, 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (1992). Duke Power’s
Motion to Dismiss the bad faith discharge claim is
GRANTED and the claim is DISMISSED.
Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina
Constitution provides:
motion to dismiss. See Burns v. AAF -McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292,
294-95 (4 Cir. 1999).
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We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are
created equal; that they are endowed by their creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are
life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own
labor, and the pursuit of happiness.
Mr. Freeman asserts that the “moonlighting” provision of the
settlement agreements violates the “fruits of their own labor”
provision of Article I, Section! of the North Carolina
Constitution. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however,
has previously rejected the argument holding that Article I,
Section | “does not give [the plaintiff] a remedy against a
corporate defendant” in a private dispute. Teleflex
Information Systems, Inc. v. Arnold, 132 N.C. App. 689, 693,
513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1999) (citing Real Estate Licensing Board
v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 13, 228 S.E.2d 493, 496 (1976)
and explaining that the “fundamental provisions of our State
Constitution, such as Article I, Section 1, were inserted to
guarantee the right to pursue ordinary and simple occupations
free from governmental regulation”) (emphasis added)
(international quotations omitted). Duke Power’s Motion to
Dismiss the Article I, Section 1 claim is GRANTED and the
claim is DISMISSED.
Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution, often referred to as the Law of the Land Clause,
is considered the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. Lorbacher v. Housing Authority
of the City of Raleigh, 127 N.C.App. 663, 674-75, 493 S.E.2d
74, 81 (1997). A direct claim under the North Carolina
Constitution can be made in the absence of an adequate legal
remedy. Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289. As
discussed below, Mr. Freeman was entitled to seek relief
pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. He is not without an
adequate legal remedy and thus cannot state a claim directly
under the North Carolina Constitution. Duke Power’s Motion
to Dismiss the Article I, Section 19 claim is GRANTED and
the claim is DISMISSED.
IV.
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, it is necessary to
Finally, because Mr. Freeman’s state law claims are
|
13a
determine whether Mr. Freeman has stated a viable claim
under § 301 which allows an aggrieved employee the right to
bring a suit in federal court. To state a claim against an
employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement
under § 301, the employee must first “attempt to exhaust
exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by
the bargaining agreement.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184
(1967). If those administrative remedies have been -
exhausted, the plaintiff must also establish that “the union as
bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its
handling of the employee’s grievance.” Id. at 186.
In this case, it is not necessary to consider whether
Mr. Freeman has satisfied these two prongs because he did
not file his action within the applicable time period. A six
month statute of limitations controls a suit brought under §
301 alleging a breach of contract against the employer and
failure if proper representation against the union. DelCostello
v. Int’] Bhd of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). Mr.
Freeman was terminated in July 1999. His action in the state
court was filed June 30, 2000, outside the six month statute of
limitations. The defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
V.
In summary, in the 1:00CV00665 action, Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand [Doc. #7] is DENIED, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. #11] is GRANTED, Plaintiff's
Motion to Exclude Evidence and for Leave to Take
Discovery [Doc. #25] is MOOT, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
the Complaint [Doc. #28] is DENIED, Defendant’s Motion to
Consolidate [Doc. #31] is MOOT.
In the 1:02CV00630 case, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. #3] is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion to
Consolidate [Doc. #5] is MOOT, and Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand [Doc. #8] is DENIED.
This is the 15" day of August, 2003.
/s/
United States District Judge
1b
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-2146
DUKE POWER COMPANY,
a Division of Duke Energy
Corporation; DUKE
ENERGY CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-2147
CINDY THAXTON; GEORGE
KWASCHA, |
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CA-00-665-1; CA-02-630-1)
Argued: June 4, 2004
Decided: September 27, 2004
Before WIDENER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and
David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Fred Thurman Hamlet, Sr., Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Dena Beth Langley, NEXSEN
PRUET ADAMS KLEEMEIER, P.L.L.C., Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Brian S. Clarke, NEXSEN PRUET ADAMS
KLEEMEIER, P.L.L.C., Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this
circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The district court dismissed both of Albert Freeman’s state
law actions, one against Duke Power Company (Duke Power)
and one against Cindy Thaxton and George Kwascha, on the
bases that all of the state law claims raised in the two cases
were either preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA) and failed to state claims under the
LMRA, or, if not preempted, failed to state a claim under
state law. Freeman appeals, and we affirm.
I.
Because the district court granted the defendants’ motions to
dismiss the plaintiff's complaints for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we take the
allegations in the compiaints as true and construe the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Franks v. Ross, 313
F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002). Albert Freeman worked for
Duke Power as a Transmission Line Helper and as a
Distribution Line Technician C from 1983 until 1999
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
Duke Power and Freeman’s union, Local Union 962,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Union). In
1984, Freeman obtained a limited electrical contractor’s
license and "moonlighted" as an electrician during his off-
Keira se
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duty time performing small electrical jobs. Duke Power
was aware of Freeman’s moonlighting activities and took no
employment action against him between 1984 and 1994.
In January 1994, Freeman was suspended and discharged
from employment as a lineman "for allegedly removing a
service drop and meter and disconnecting service to a
customer without authorization from Duke Power Company."
(J.A. at 11-12.) The Union filed a grievance on Freeman’s
behalf pursuant to the grievance procedures of the CBA. In
settlement of the grievance, Duke Power, the Union, and
Freeman entered into a Grievance Resolution, under which
Duke Power agreed to reinstate Freeman to his lineman
position, the Union agreed to withdraw the grievance, and
Freeman agreed not to engage, directly or indirectly, in the
business of electrical contracting while employed with Duke
Power. The Grievance Resolution provided that Duke Power
could discharge Freeman if he engaged in electrical
contracting, and that the discharge decision would be final
and would not be subject to the grievance procedures of the
CBA in effect at the time of any future discharge.
In June 1996, Duke Power suspended and proposed to
discharge Freeman a second time, asserting that Freeman
violated the Grievance Resolution by engaging in electrical
contracting. Freeman asserted that he did not violate the
Grievance Resolution. In settling the dispute, the Union,
Duke Power, and Freeman entered into an Amendment
to the Grievance Resolution (Amendment) on July 3, 1996.
The Amendment prohibited Freeman from being or becoming
employed on a full- or part-time basis with any entity
engaged in the business of electrical contracting. In the
Amendment, Duke Power agreed not to terminate Freeman
for the then current alleged violation of the Grievance
Resolution, and Freeman agreed not to engage in the business
of electrical contracting in the future. The Amendment
provided that Duke Power could terminate Freeman’s
employment if he violated the Amendment, and that such
termination would be final and would not be subject to the
arbitration or grievance procedures under.the CBA then in
effect. In July 1999, Duke Power suspended and ultimately
discharged Freeman for allegedly violating the Amendment.
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The Union declined to file a grievance for Freeman.
Freeman brought an action in North Carolina state court
against Duke Power, alleging breach of contract, wrongful
discharge, violations of North Carolina’s constitution, and
bad faith discharge. He brought a separate state court action
against Cindy Thaxton and George Kwascha, his immediate
supervisors, for interference with contract and violation of
North Carolina’s unfair and deceptive trade practices act. The
defendants in both cases removed the cases to federal court
and filed motions to dismiss the cases for failure to state a
claim. The defendants also sought to consolidate the cases in
federal court. Freeman resisted the motions and moved to
remand the cases back to state court, to amend his complaint,
to exclude evidence attached to the defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and to conduct discovery.
The district court denied Freeman’s motion to remand the
cases to state court because the complaints in both cases
raised issues arising under federal law, specifically the
LMRA. The court determined that Freeman’s claims against
Duke Power for breach of contract and wrongful discharge
were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss because the claims were
brought beyond the applicable statute of limitation. The
district court denied Freeman’s motion to amend his
complaint to allege that he was an at-will employee because
the allegation would not have changed the fact that the claim
was preempted by the LMRA. The district court dismissed
the bad faith discharge and state constitutional claims as aad
failing to state claims cognizable under North Carolina law.
The district court determined that Freeman’s claim against
the individual defendants for interference with contract was
also preempted by the LMRA and subject to dismissal as
untimely. It determined that even if the unfair and deceptive
trade practices claim was not preempted by the LMRA, such
a claim was unavailable under North Carolina law in the
employment setting. The district court found that the
defendants’ motions to consolidate and Freeman’s motions to
exclude evidence and conduct discovery were all mooted by
the dismissals. Freeman appeals.
Sb
Il.
A. Removal Jurisdiction
Freeman argues on appeal that both of his cases should have
been remanded to state court because both complaints raised
only state law claims. Actions brought in state court are
removable to federal court if the complaint raises a federal
question. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a) (2000). To
determine whether a complaint raises a federal question, we
apply the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which prevents
a defendant from removing a case to federal court unless the
plaintiff's complaint, without consideration of any potential
defenses, establishes that the case arises under federal law.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2004). A
corollary to the wellpleaded complaint rule allows an action
to be removed, notwithstanding the absence of a federal
question in the plaintiff's complaint, if "a federal statute
wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through
complete pre-emption." /d. at 2495 (internal marks omitted).
Even though the action alleges only state law claims, if those
claims are completely preempted by federal law, the
complaint "is in reality based on federal law." Jd. (internal
marks omitted).
The preemptive force of § 301 of the LMRA is
unquestionably broad. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23-
24 (1983). Section 301 totally displaces state causes of action
related to contracts between employers and labor
organizations, as well as other claims the resolution of which
depends substantially on the interpretation of a CBA. See
Davis v. Bell Atlantic-W.V., Inc., 110 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir.
1997).
1. Action Against Duke Power
The Davis case is factually similar to Freeman’s case against
Duke Power, and its reasoning controls the outcome. In
Davis, an employee entered a settlement agreement with her
employer and union that settled a grievance brought pursuant
6b
to the CBA when the employer attempted to terminate the
employee for absenteeism. Davis, 310 F.3d at 246. The
settlement agreement reinstated the employee and provided
that the employee was subject to immediate termination,
without recourse to the grievance procedures in the CBA, if
she violated the settlement agreement. The employee was
subsequently terminated for violating the settlement
agreement, and she brought state law claims for breach of the
CBA, breach of the settlement, and wrongful discharge. /d.
As relevant-here, this court held that the claim for breach of
the settlement agreement was preempted because it depended
on rights conferred on the employee by the CBA.' The
settlement agreement derived from the CBA, in fact was
entered as a result of a grievance proceeding brought pursuant
to the CBA, and therefore its "entire vitality and legitimacy"
drew from the CBA. /d. at 248. In the case at bar, the Union
followed the grievance procedure in the CBA and entered
into settlement negotiations with Duke Power, on Freeman’s
behalf, that resulted in the Grievance Resolution and
Amendment in lieu of arbitration as provided by the CBA.
Without the CBA, the Grievance Resolution and Amendment
would not have existed. Settlements of employee grievances
that are entered pursuant to the terms of a CBA are labor
contracts within the meaning of § 301, which "preempts an
alleged breach of the Union-negotiated agreement that settled
an employee grievance." /d. at 249 (citing cases holding
same).
Freeman attempts to distinguish Davis on the basis that
certain terms used in the Davis settlement agreement were
defined in the CBA, whereas there are no terms in the
Grievance Resolution or the Amendment that need to be
defined by reference to the CBA. However, the Davis court
did not rely on the mutuality of terms for its holding. Jd.
("While an independent employment contract’s mere
Contrary to Freeman’s assertions that the Davis court’s
discussion of the settlement agreement was dicta because
Davis alleged breach of the CBA (Appellant’s Br. at 21 n.1),
the Davis court addressed the claims for breach of the CBA
and breach of the settlement agreement as distinct claims.
7b
borrowing of one or more terms from a [CBA] does not in
itself bring that contract within the scope of § 301
preemption, the settlement agreement here was not an
independent employment contract... . The Union’s [CBA]
remained in full force to govern [the employee’s]
employment relationship except insofar as it was modified by
the settlement agreement." (internal citations omitted)). The
court construed the settlement agreement as a rider to the
CBA. Id.
Although disputes arising over independent employment
contracts unrelated to a CBA are not preempted by § 301 of
the LMRA, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,
394-95 (1987), the Grievance Resolution and the Amendment
are not independent of the CBA. The employees in
Caterpillar had entered separate management contracts
and only later became subject to a CBA when they were
demoted. Their state law action was based on the
management contracts, not anything derivative of the CBA,
and thus was not preempted by the LMRA. /d. at 395 & n.9.
The same cannot be said in the instant case, as the Grievance
Resolution and Amendment derive their "entire vitality and
legitimacy" from the CBA. Davis, 110 F.3d at 248.
The district court also determined that § 301 of the LMRA
preempted Freeman’s wrongful discharge claim against Duke
Power. Freeman alleged in his complaint that Duke Power
wrongfully discharged him in violation of North Carolina
public policy as reflected in the state constitution, which
protects an individual’s right to "the enjoyment of the fruits
of [his] own labor." N.C. Const. art. I, § 1. Freeman’s
wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the LMRA if it
is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of
the labor contract. If the state tort law purports to define the
meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted."
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized a cause
of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
as a narrow exception to North Carolina’s long-standing
employment-at-will doctrine. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg.
Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. 1989). However, "[t}he tort of
8b
wrongful discharge arises only in the context of employment
at will." Claggett v. Wake Forest Univ., 486 S.E.2d 443, 448
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing wrongful discharge claim
brought by a university professor who was covered by a
contract). Contract employees are limited to contract
remedies. Resolution of the wrongful discharge claim would
require a determination of the type of employment
relationship between Freeman and Duke Power, regardless of
whether Freeman pleads that he is a contract employee or an
at-will employee. Such an analysis necessarily would involve
construction of the CBA, the Grievance Resolution, and the
Amendment to determine what type of employment
relationship existed between Freeman and Duke Power. The
wrongful discharge claim is therefore preempted by the
LMRA. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213.
Because Freeman’s claims of breach of contract and wrongful
discharge are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA and therefore
raise a federal question, the district court properly retained
jurisdiction over Freeman’s case against Duke Power, and no
remand to state court was in order.
2. Action Against Thaxton & Kwascha
Freeman brought state law claims of tortious interference
with contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices against
two of his supervisors, alleging that they intentionally
induced Duke Power to terminate his employment. The
district court determined that the interference with contract
claim was completely preempted by § 301 because it required
interpretation of Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory
authority as defined in the CBA, as well as a determination of
whether Freeman violated the Grievance Resolution and
Amendment. We agree.
As discussed above, a state law claim is completely
preempted by the LMRA if it relates to contracts between
employers and labor organizations, or if resolution of the
claim depends substantially on the interpretation of a CBA.
See Davis, 110 F.3d at 247. To state a claim for tortious
interference with contract against Thaxton and Kwascha
under North Carolina law, Freeman had to establish that (1)
a ae ia ete cers seen gee,
9b
he had a valid contract with Duke Power that gave Freeman
contractual rights; (2) the defendants knew of the contract; (3)
the defendants intentionally induced Duke Power not to
perform the contract; (4) the defendants acted without
justification; and (5) Freeman was thereby damaged. Embree
Const. Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (N.C.
1992).
Freeman stated in his complaint that he had an employment
agreement with Duke Power that gave him certain legal rights
and privileges, that Thaxton and Kwascha intentionally
induced Duke Power to terminate the contract, and that
Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s conduct was outside of the scope
of their employment (as Freeman’s supervisors), in bad faith,
for a wrongful purpose, with malice, and without any legal
justification. (J.A. at 231-32.) A court would need to interpret
the Grievance Resolution, the Amendment, and the CBA in
an effort to determine Freeman’s contractual rights, the extent
of Thaxton’s and Kwascha’s supervisory authority, and
whether Duke Power failed to perform its obligations to
Freeman. We therefore hold that Freeman’s claim against
Thaxton and Kwascha for tortious interference with contract
was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. See Int’] Union,
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977
F.2d 895, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Clearly, the third element of
this cause of action [under Virginia law], requiring a breach
or termination of the contractual relationship, necessitates
interpretation of the [CBA]."); Steinbach v. Dillon Cos., 253
F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a tortious
interference claim alleging that a third party caused the
employer to wrongfully terminate an employee was
preempted by § 301 where the claim required a determination
of whether the employer failed to perform the contract);
Kimbro v. Pepsico, Inc., 215 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that an employee’s state law claims for tortious
interference with contract against a supervisor and a third
party were preempted by § 301 where the claims would
require interpretation of the CBA). The district court
properly exercised jurisdiction over Freeman’s case against
Thaxton and Kwascha.
10b
B. Dismissal for Failure, to State a Claim
Having determined that the district court properly exercised
jurisdiction over both of Freeman’s complaints, we turn now
- to the district court’s dismissal of each of his claims. Where
state law claims are preempted by the LMRA, the claim may
still survive if it states a claim under the federal statute. See
Allis Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 ("[The] claim niust
either be treated as a § 301 claim, . . . or dismissed as pre-
empted by federal labor-contract law.").
1. Claims Against Duke Power
a. Breach of Contract/Wrongful Discharge
The district court dismissed Freeman’s claims against Duke
Power for breach of contract and wrongful discharge for
failing to state a § 301 claim because both claims were
brought outside of the applicable statute of limitations,
borrowing the six-month limitation period contained in §
10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000). If a federal statute is silent as to the
applicable statute of limitations, we generally borrow the
most analogous state limitations period. See De/lCostello v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). To avoid
frustrating federal policy, however, courts should borrow a
limitations period from an analogous federal statute if that
statute clearly provides a closer analogy than available state
statutes. Jd. at 172.
The NLRA proscribes "unfair labor practices" and provides a
sixmonth period within which to bring an unfair labor
practices claim. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The six-month period
takes into account "the national interests in stable bargaining
relationships and finality of private settlements, and an
employee’s interest in setting aside what he views as an
unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system."
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (internal marks omitted).
In this case, Freeman twice settled grievances filed on his
behalf by the Union with Duke Power. The settlements
provided that Duke Power could terminate Freeman for
11b
engaging in electrical contracting, and that Duke Power’s
decision to do so "shall be final." (J.A. at 12.) Freeman’s
claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge
challenge Duke Power’s decision to terminate his
employment despite his agreement in the settlement
negotiations that Duke Power’s decision would be final.
Allowing Freeman to use the three-year statute of limitation
provided under North Carolina law for breach of contract
claims would undermine the NLRA’s delicate balance
between the competing interests of promoting the finality of
private settlements and avoiding unjust settlements. See
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. The district court appropriately
borrowed the NLRA’s six-month statute of limitation and
properly dismissed the breach of contract and wrongful
discharge claims as being brought outside of that period.
b. Direct Claims Under the State Constitution
Freeman asserted in the third count of his complaint that
Duke Power’s actions in limiting his ability to moonlight
violated the North Carolina constitutional provision
recognizing the inalienable right of all persons to "the
enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor." N.C. Const. art. I,
§ 1. North Carolina’s courts do not recognize a cause of
action based on article I, section 1 of the state constitution to
remedy private employment disputes. See Teleflex Info. Sys.,
Inc. v. Arnold, 513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(affirming summary judgment for employer in suit brought
by at-will employee claiming that his firing violated article I,
section 1 of the state constitution). Rather, the provision
limits the state’s ability to regulate an individual’s livelihood.
Id. ("[T]he declaration of rights in [the North Carolina] State
Constitution was inserted ‘chiefly to protect the individual
from the State.’" (quoting North Carolina v. Ballance, 51
S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949))). Thus, the district court properly
dismissed Freeman’s state constitutional claim.
Likewise, Freeman’s direct cause of action under article I,
section 19 of the state constitution, providing that no person
shall be deprived of his property but by the law of the land,
also fails. Article I, section 19 is the North Carolina state
constitution’s equivalent of the federal Constitution’s
a RS ORE eas a ae ee ee
12b
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Both provisions
protect individuals only against governmental action. Thus,
Freeman has no cognizable action based on the state
constitution against his wholly private employer. See N.C.
Nat'l Bank v. Burnette, 256 S.E.2d 388, 394 (N.C. 1979)
("This constitutional [due process] shield does not protect
citizens from the actions or activities of other private
individuals."); Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 402 S.E.2d
653, 656-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("*[S]tate action’ is
required to trigger the protections of the ‘synonymous’ due
process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, § 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution."). The district court properly
dismissed Freeman’s third count.
c. Bad Faith Discharge
Freeman argues that North Carolina courts are "undecided" as
to whether a bad faith discharge claim is separately
cognizable in North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, however, unequivocally stated, in disagreeing with
two of the federal district court cases relied upon by Freeman,
that it "did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful
discharge in bad faith" in a prior case. Amos v. Oakdale
Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. 1992). The district
court properly dismissed Freeman’s fourth count against
Duke Power.
2. Claims Against Thaxton and Kwascha
a. Tortious Interference With Contract
Because the tortious interference claim is preempted,
Freeman’s claim must be dismissed unless it states a valid §
301 claim. Section 301 allows claims for "violations of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29
U.S.C. § 185 (2000). "Applying the most natural
interpretation of this language, we [have previously held]
that a suit against a non-signatory of a contract cannot be
considered a suit for violation of the contract." Covenant
Coal Corp., 977 F.2d at 897. Bound, as both it and we are by
prior controlling and unquestioned circuit precedent, the
district court properly dismissed Freeman’s claim against
13b
Thaxton and Kwascha for interference with contract.
b. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices
against Thaxton and Kwascha under North Carolina General
Statutes § 75-1.1, Freeman must establish that (1) the
defendants "committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice,
(2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and
(3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff." Dalton
v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001). "The purpose of
G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical
standards of dealings between persons engaged in business
and the consuming public within this State[,] and [it] applies
to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of
commerce." Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 311
(N.C. 1999) (internal marks omitted) (alterations in original).
The statute generally does not apply to employment
situations, see Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 711, though the
existence of an employment relationship will not necessarily
defeat a claim if the parties are otherwise involved in a
business relationship. See Sara Lee Corp., 519 S.E.2d at 312
(allowing an unfair trade practices claim brought by an
employer against an employee where the employee was
involved in buyer-selier transactions with his employer).
Freeman’s complaint alleges only that the individual
defendants acted to cause Duke Power to terminate
Freeman’s employment contract. (J.A. at 232-34.) Although
N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b) defines "commerce" broadly as
"business activities, however denominated," the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has cautioned that the act "is not
intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting,"
including most employment disputes. Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at
657 (distinguishing Sara Lee on the basis that the employee
in Sara Lee owed a fiduciary duty to his employer, and the
employee was entrenched in a buyer-seller relationship with
his employer, which fell squarely within the purview of the
unfair trade practices act). Freeman’s allegation that the
defendants caused Duke Power to terminate him fails to meet
the requirement that the defendants’ acts be in or affecting
commerce, see Durling v. King 554 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (N.C. Ct.
14b
App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment where "no
evidence was presented that the subject transactions had any
impact beyond the parties’ employment relationships"), and
; he therefore failed to state a claim under the state unfair
and deceptive trade practices act.
Il.
We affirm the district court’s order denying Freeman’s
motions to remand and dismissing Freeman’s complaints
against Duke Power and against Thaxton and Kwascha. We
also affirm the district court’s denial of the various pending
motions as the dismissal of all claims makes the motions
moot.
AFFIRMED
Ic
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
FILED
October 26, 2004
No. 03-2146
CA-00-665-1
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
DUKE POWER COMPANY, a division
Of DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
and DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-2147
CA-02-630-1
ALBERT L. FREEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
CINDY THAXTON, an individual,
and GREGORY KWASCHA,
an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.
On Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
The appellant’s petition for rehearing and rehearing
en banc was submitted to this Court. As no member of this
Court or the panel requested a poll on the petition for
rehearing en banc, and
ar aes as ee eer ee EN ee ee
2c
As the panel considered the petition for rehearing and
is of the opinion that it should be denied,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and
rehearing en banc is denied.
Entered for a panel comprised of Judge Widener,
Judge Shedd, and Judge Hansen.
For the Court,
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.