Appendix — D. A. S. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Chao

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APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DECIDED MAY 26, 2004 AND

AMENDED OCTOBER 14, 2004

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 03-40668

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL, INC.,

Petitioner,

V.

Elaine L. CHAO, United States Secretary of Labor, Mine

Safety and Health Administration, and Federal Mine Safety

and Health Review Commission,

Respondents.

Argued: May 10, 2004

Decided: May 26, 2004

Amended: October 14, 2004

Before: FEINBERG, MESKILL, and CABRANES,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The principal questions presented by this appeal are

(1) whether, in enacting the Federal Mine Safety and Health

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Appendix A

Amendments Act of 1977 (“the Mine Act” or “the Act”),

Pub.L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, codified at 30 U.S.C.

§ 801 ef seg., Congress intended to regulate mines like that

operated by petitioner, the products of which are sold only

to intrastate purchasers; and (2) if so, whether Congress has

the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate such

mines.

BACKGROUND

The Mine Act charges the Secretary of Labor with

promulgating mandatory safety and health standards for the

nation’s mines and enforcing those standards by means of

regular inspections. See 30 U.S.C. § § 811, 813. Section 4 of

the statute provides that regulations promulgated by the

Secretary of Labor under the Act apply to “[eJach coal or

other mine, the products of which enter commerce, or the

operations or products of which affect commerce... .”

Id. § 803. The Act defines “commerce” as “trade, traffic,

commerce, transportation, or communication among the

several States... .” /d. § 802(b).

After inspectors of the Mine Safety and Health

Administration within the Department of Labor inspected

the mine operated by petitioner D.A.S. Sand & Gravel, Inc.

(“DAS”) and cited it for several regulatory violations under

the Act, DAS contested the citations before an Administrative

Law Judge of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review

Commission (“the Commission”).'

1. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is

an adjudicatory body independent of the Department of Labor that

(Cont'd)

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Appendix A

DAS argued primarily that Section 4 of the Act does not

apply to mines like that operated by DAS—a New York mine

the products of which are undisputedly sold only to

purchasers within the State of New York. See Secretary of

Labor v. D.A.S. Sand & Gravel, Inc., 25 FMSHRC 364, 367

(July 7, 2003) (“D.A.S.”). The administrative law judge

rejected DAS’s argument that DAS’s mine is not subject to

regulation under the Mine Act, see id. at 367-69, and DAS’s

subsequent petition to the Commission for discretionary

review’ was denied on August 18, 2003. DAS timely appealed

to our Court pursuant to Section 106 of the Mine Act, 30

U.S.C. § 816, which provides us with jurisdiction to review

decisions of the Commission.

(Cont'd)

adjudicates claims challenging the Department of Labor’s

enforcement of the Mine Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 823; see also Ingalls

Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir. , Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep't

of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 267-68, 117 S.Ct. 796, 136 L.Ed.2d 736

(1997); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 204, 114

S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994).

2. The Act provides that an aggrieved party may seek a second

level of review from the Commission after an initial adverse decision,

but that such a second review is discretionary. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d).

Unless a petition for discretionary review has been granted, the

original administrative law judge’s decision becomes a final decision

of the Commission forty days after its issuance. /d.

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Appendix A

DISCUSSION

I. Congressional Intent

DAS argues, first, that the Commission misinterpreted

the Mine Act by holding that the Act applies to mines the

products of which are sold entirely intrastate, such as the

mine operated by DAS. Petitioner claims that, because the

Act defines “commerce” as occurring “among the several

States ...,” id. § 802(b), and DAS, the operator of a New

York mine, sells the mine’s products entirely within the State

of New York, the mine operated by DAS does not qualify as

a mine “the products of which enter commerce, or the

operations or products of which affect commerce,” id. § 803.

When we review an agency’s interpretation of a statute,

we must first determine “whether Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If Congress

has spoken unambiguously, “that is the end of the matter;

for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” /d. at 842-

43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In determining whether a particular

provision is unambiguous, we consider “the particular

statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design

of the statute as a whole, and where appropriate, its legislative

history.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham,

355 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) (interpreting the Energy Policy and

Conservation Act, as amended by the National Appliance

Energy Conservation Act). In the-instant case, all three of

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Appendix A

these factors—the language of Section 4, the language and

design of the Mine Act as a whole, and the Act’s legislative

history—lead us to conclude that the language of Section 4

of the Mine Act unambiguously expresses Congress’s intent

to regulate mines to the full extent of its power under the

Commerce Clause.

Turning first to the plain language of the statute, it is

well established that “the statutory term ‘affecting ...

commerce,’ .. . when unqualified, signal[s] Congress’ intent

to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause.”

Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854, 120 S.Ct. 1904,

146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,

Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003)

(reaffirming in an opinion interpreting the Federal Arbitration

Act that the “familiar term ‘affecting commerce’” consists

of “words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest permissible

exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power’); accord

United States v. Lake, 985 F.2d 265, 267-68 (6th Cir.1993)

(holding that the language of the Mine Act, its broad remedial

purpose, and its legislative history establish that Congress

intended to exercise its full power under the Commerce

Clause); Marshall v. Kraynak, 604 F.2d 231, 232 (3d

Cir.1979) (stating that “[i]n enacting [Section 4 of the Mine

Act], Congress intended to exercise its authority to regulate

interstate commerce to ‘the maximum extent feasible through

legislation’ ”) (citation omitted).

The language and design of the Mine Act as a whole

support our interpretation of Section 4. In Section 2 of the

Act, Congress articulated findings that led to the Act’s

adoption, including “an urgent need to .. . improv(e] the

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working conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other

mines,” because “the disruption of production and the loss

of income” caused by mining accidents and mining-related

illnesses “unduly impede[] and burden[] commerce.”

30 U.S.C. § 801(c), (f). Moreover, Congress found that “the

existence of unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices

in the Nation’s coal or other mines is a serious impediment

to the growth of the coal or other mining indusiry. .. .”

Id. § 801(d). The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]hese

congressional findings [contained in the preamble to the Mine

Act] were based on extensive evidence showing that the

mining industry was among the most hazardous of the

Nation’s industries.” Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602

n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (citing evidence

contained in the legislative history of the Act).

These provisions support the position of the

administrative law judge that the Act evinces Congress’s

intent “to regulate the business of mining because of the

nature of mining activity and not because of the business

economics that determine the geographic service area of a

particular mine.” D.A.S., 25 FMSHRC at 369. Accordingly,

these provisions provide no support for DAS’s argument,

see Petitioner’s Br. at 10, that Congress, in adopting the Mine

Act, did not intend to regulate mines like that operated by

D.A.S.

Finally, the legislative history of the Mine Act

corroborates our interpretation of Section 4. The Senate

Report accompanying the bill that would become the Mine

Act reads, in relevant part:

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Appendix A

[I]t is the Committee’s intention that what is

considered to be a mine and to be regulated

under this Act be given the broadest possibl[e]

interpretation, and it is the intent of this

Committee that doubts be resolved in favor of

inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the

Act.

S.Rep. No. 95-181, at 14 (May 15, 1977), reprinted in 1997

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3414.

Accordingly, having considered “the particular statutory

language [of Section 4], as well as the language and design

of the statute as a whole, and .. . the legislative history,”

Abraham, 355 F.3d at 198, we conclude that Section 4

unambiguously indicates that Congress intended to regulate

mines to the full extent of its power under the Commerce

Clause.

Il. Commerce Clause Power

Because we hold that Congress intended to regulate

mines to the full extent of its authority under the Commerce

Clause, we turn now to the question whether the Commerce

Clause permits Congress to regulate DAS’s mine - whose

products are sold entirely intrastate.

Petitioner argues that regulation of mines the products

of which are sold entirely intrastate is beyond the power of

Congress under the Commerce Clause. However, the

Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause does

not preclude Congress from regulating the activities of an

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Appendix A

economic actor whose products do not themselves enter

interstate commerce, where the activities of such local actors

taken together have the potential to affect an interstate market

the regulation of which is within Congress’s power. See

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87

L.Ed. 122 (1942); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.

542, 547, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975) (“Even

activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated

by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct

by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the

States... .”). No one disputes Congress’s power to regulate

the mining industry under the Mine Act. Accordingly, just as

in Wickard a farmer who grew wheat solely for personal

consumption was subject to regulations applicable to the

nationwide wheat market, see Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28,

63 S.Ct. 82, the mine operated by DAS is subject to the

regulations imposed on the mining industry under the Mine

Act. See Lake, 985 F.2d at 269 (“Even if the coal production

at defendant’s mine was small and sales were entirely local,

under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wickard and Fry,

defendant’s efforts are deemed to affect interstate commerce,

since such small efforts, when combined with others, could

influence interstate coal pricing and demand.”). Because we

hold that the Commerce Clause allows Congress the authority

to regulate DAS’s mine, and because we hold that Congress

intended to wield its regulatory authority to the full extent

provided it by the Commerce Clause, the mine is within the

scope of Section 4 of the Mine Act, and is therefore subject

to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.

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Appendix A

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we hold (1) that Section 4 of the Mine

Act unambiguously expresses Congress’s intent to regulate

the mining industry to the full extent of its power under the

Commerce Clause, and (2) that Congress’s power under the

Commerce Clause includes the power to regulate mines

whose products are sold entirely intrastate, such as that

operated by DAS. Accordingly, we affirm the Decision of

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.

10a

APPENDIX B — NOTICE OF THE FEDERAL MINE

AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

DATED AUGUST 18, 2003

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND

HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 9500

Washington, D.C. 20001

August 18, 2003

Docket Nos. YORK 2001-67-M

YORK 2002-30-M

YORK 2002-59-M

YORK 2003-11-M

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND

HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, MSHA,

on behalf of ANDREW J. GARCIA,

Petitioner

V.

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL,

Respondent

NOTICE

On August 4, 2003, a petition for discretionary review

was filed by D.A.S. Sand and Gravel with the Federal Mine

Safety and Health Review Commission under section

113(d)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,

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Appendix B

30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. at § 823(d)(2). That section provides

that review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge

may be granted upon specified grounds and upon the

affirmative vot: of two Commissioners. Such review is

discretionary. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A). However, no two

members of the Commission voted to grant the petition or

otherwise order review under 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(B).

Consequently, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge

is final as of 40 days after its issuance. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1).

s/ Jean H. Ellen

Jean H. E'len

Chief Docket Clerk

12a

APPENDIX C — DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MINE

AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

DATED AUGUST 18, 2003

FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND

HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Suite 9500

Washington, D.C. 20001

July 7, 2003

CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDINGS

Docket No. YORK 2001-67-M

A.C. No. 30-03254-05508

Docket No. YORK 2042-59-M

A.C. No. 30-03254-05510

Docket No. YORK 2002-30-M

A.C. No. 30-03254-45509

Docket No. YORK 2003-1 2003-11-M

A.C. No. 30-03254-05511

D.A.S. Sand & Gravel

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND

HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, MSHA,

on behalf of ANDREW J. GARCIA,

Petitioner

V.

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL,

Respondent

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Appendix C

DECISION

Before: Judge Schroeder

These cases are before me on Petitions by the Secretary

for the assessment of Civil Penalties for the alleged violation

of mine safety regulations. The cases were consolidated

without opposition in the interest of economical adjudication.

A hearing was held in Rochester, New York, on April 23,

2003. Both sides were given an opportunity to submit written

argument on the legal and factual issues raised at the hearing.

After giving the record and the several presentations of

counsel careful consideration, I make the following findings

and conclusions:

Factual Findings

Jurisdiction

D.A.S. Sand and Gravel is a small business engaged in

the extraction of sand and gravel from a native deposit for

sate to the general public. David Scheer has been the owner,

president and chief executive since 1998. It is not disputed

that D.A.S. has sold sand and gravel only to buyers within

New York State although purchasers may have used the

materials for purposes with multi-state consequences, e.g.,

road construction. Equipment used in the business has been

purchased from suppliers in other states.

An essential element of the D.A.S. operation is the use

of a front-end loader. A loader is used to remove native

materials and transport them to a sorter. After the sorted

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Appendix C

material is moved to stockpiles by belt, a loader is used to

move material from an appropriate stockpile to a buyer’s

truck. At least three front-end loaders in various mechanical

condition were identified in the record as used by D.A:S.

The majority of the citations issued by MSHA in these cases

involve mechanical defects alleged to be present in the

front-end loaders.

An MSHA inspector visited the Respondent’s business

on two occasions relevant to these cases, September 19, 2000,

and November 8, 2001. There was no apparent change in the

way the business was conducted between those two dates.

Respondent does not claim any significant changes in the

period since the last inspection.

Citations

The facts regarding specific alleged violations of mine

safety regulations can be best grouped by business function.

The allegations concern (1) front-end loaders, (2) handrails,

(3) electric faults, (4) guards, and (5) record keeping.

Respondent’s evidence was directed more to the potential

significance of the violations than to the actual occurrence

of a violation.

(1) Front-end loaders

Of the fifteen (15) citations at issue, nine deal with some

aspect of the front-end loaders used by the Respondent. Three

citations, 7724561, 7741669, and 7741667 allege that

back-up alarms were not functional. Back-up alarms are the

noise- makers that are intended to alert people other than the

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Appendix C

driver that the vehicle is in reverse and the driver is probably

unable to clearly see the immediate area behind the vehicle.

The MSHA inspector, William Korbel, testified that he

observed the vehicles in operation backing up and did not

hear a back-up alarm. He also testified the vehicles constitute

a very significant safety risk to other persons in the area,

both those on foot and those in other vehicles. It was his

opinion that the operator was at risk even in low speed

impacts to other vehicles because of the persistent failure to

wear seat belts. Mr. Scheer testified to facts intended not to

dispute the violations (failure to have working backup alarms)

but to lessen the perceived risk of injury. He testified the

business is small. The customers are usually repeat buyers

that are familiar with the operations that involve the front-

end loaders. People do not wander around the grounds on

foot, but stay in the truck they drove to pick up sand or gravel.

Mr. Scheer did not deny knowing the regulatory requirement

for a back-up alarm.

Four citations, 7724562, 7724564, 7724574, and

7741668, deal with the brakes on the front-end loaders, either

the parking brakes or the services brakes. Mr. Korbel testified

he observed the vehicles, had operating tests performed on

both level ground and inclines, and found serious defects in

the brakes. Mr. Scheer testified to facts which he believed

minimized the likelihood of injury from inadequate brakes.

He testified most of the work with front-end loaders is

performed on level ground at very low speeds by people

familiar with the operation. It was his opinion that the weight

of the machines made stopping the engine an effective

braking technique. He did concede that some ramps and

inclines are part of the area used by the frontend loaders.

He also conceded that the area is sometimes wet and slick.

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Appendix C

Two Citations, 7741666 and 7724560, deal with the

failure to use seat belts in operating the front-end loaders.

Mr. Korbel testified that on his first visit to D.A.S. in

September 2000, the seat belts were stuffed under the seat to

keep them out of the way. A similar scene greeted him on his

return in October 2001. Mr. Scheer did not dispute the failure

to wear seat belts, but merely testified as to the slow speeds

in limited circumstances in which the vehicles were operated

as lessening the likelihood of injury from failure to wear seat

belts. He did not dispute his knowledge of the regulatory

requirement to use seat belts.

(2) Hand Rails

One citation, 7724567, was issued for failure to have

adequate handrails on an elevated catwalk. A slack rope was

draped across an opening of approximately twenty-five feet.

The deck was more than ten feet in the air. Workers were

required to be on the deck on a regular basis for service of

the sorter. Mr. Korbel testified the rope was more of a tripping

hazard than a safety aid for people working on the deck. Mr.

Scheer testified he was instructed to use a rope by a MSHA

inspector, whose name he could not recall. He testified the

risks of injury were small because the deck is used only for

short periods of time by people familiar with the location.

(3) Electric Faults

Two citations, 7724568 and 7724570, were issued for

electrical problems. One citation involved the alleged failure

to include adequate circuit overload protection in the sorter

motor circuits. The other citation involved an alleged failure

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Appendix C

to perform and document ground resistance or continuity

tests of the sorter electrical circuits. Mr. Korbel testified the

lack of circuit overload protection presented a risk of fire.

The lack of testing of the circuits, in his opinion, made

monitoring of the adequacy of electrical protection very

difficult, and hence, the prevention of serious shock hazards

was made more difficult. The electric current levels are

sufficient to cause serious injury or death if shock hazards

are not avoided. Mr. Scheer testified the electric circuits were

created by a qualified electrical contractor familiar with

MSHA requirements. He denied instructing the contractor

to omit necessary, but expensive, components in the circuits.

He attempted to articulate a theory under which ground

resistance or continuity tests were unnecessary. He claimed

extensive knowledge of electrical circuits and their hazards

because of work experience prior to owning a sand and gravel

facility. I found his testimony confusing and unpersuasive.

(4) Guards

Two citations, 7741670 and 7741671 were issued for

failure to maintain guards on the conveyer belt tail pulleys.

Mr. Korbel testified the tail pulleys were at a working level

and had exposed pinch points that presented a significant

risk of injury to hands and feet of workers. Mr. Scheer did

not dispute the lack of guards at the time of inspection and

merely testified as to the small number of persons exposed

to the risk because of the small! size of his business.

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Appendix C

(5) Record Keeping

One citation, 7741672, was issued for failure to maintain

records of ordering parts to correct previously identified

safety risks. Mr. Scheer did not testify as to any reason for

failure to maintain the necessary records.

Legal Conclusions

The legal issues in these cases divide easily into two

groups: (1) those associated with the jurisdiction of the

Secretary over the activities of D.A.S., and (2) those

associated with the obligation of the Secretary to provide

evidence of particular violations of mine safety regulations

with an appropriate sanction. Unless the Secretary is

successful on the first issue, the second issue need not be

decided.

Jurisdiction

In contesting jurisdiction of the Secretary, D.A.S. argues

it does not operate a “mine” as that term is used in the Mine

Safety Act. D.A.S. contends its products are not introduced

into interstate commerce as required under the Act.'

Mr. Scheer testified the essential economic realities of

transportation costs compared to value make it impossible

for a sand and gravel pit to sell to buyers more than

1. Section 4 of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977

provides “[e]ach coal or other mine, the products of which enter

commerce, or the operations of products of which affect commerce,

and each operator of such mine, and every miner in such mine shall

be subject to the provisions of this Act.

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Appendix C

a relatively short distance from the material source.

The location of the D.A.S. source, goes the argument, makes

it economically impossible for any of its product to cross a

state line.

With one exception noted below, all of the Respondent’s

arguments were raised and answered in favor of jurisdiction

in the Secretary in the case of Secretary of Labor v. Tide

Creek Rock, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 210 (February 2002). Tide

Creek involved a small, family-run, crushed stone operation

quite similar to the D.A.S. facility. Judge Barbour specifically

noted:

It is true that Tide Creek is small and most of

its product is sold locally. However, even under

these circumstances, it has been found that

interstate commerce is affected because of the

cumulative effect small scale operation can have

in interstate pricing and demand.

D.A.S. attempts to avoid the effect of this and similar

cases over the years by relying on a recent decision of the

Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2003),

which involved the use of an abandoned sand and gravel pit

for a municipal waste dump. The Supreme Court overturned

the position of the Corps of Engineers on the requirement

for a permit under the Clean Water Act to allow the filling of

the abandoned pit. The language used by the Supreme Court

is enticing. Chief Justice Rehnquist discusses limitations on

federal power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution

in terms that suggest the Court intends a retreat from prior

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Appendix C

holdings on the limits of this power. But a careful reading of

the case leads to the conclusion the decision was not intended

to limit authority of the federal government such as that

exercised by the Secretary in this case.

The Supreme Court was faced with the question of

whether the jurisdictional definition in the Clean Water Act

of “navigable waters of the United States” included the ponds

which remained after the abandonment of a sand and gravel

pit. The Corps of Engineers argued that the regular use of

those ponds by migratory birds supplied a Commerce Clause

nexus sufficient for Congress to exercise power to regulate

the use of the ponds. Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that

the hypothetical limits of the power of Congress were not at

issue. At issue were the actual limits of the exercise of the

power of Congress with respect to the gravel pit ponds.

On this issue the Chief Justice replied that Congress has not

expressed an intent to exercise its power over the ponds,

assuming it had power to exercise. The opinion is actually

limited to a interpretation of the statutory language of the

Clean Water Act. Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically notes

that the potential constitutional issue is not being decided in

this case.

Nothing in the Solid Waste decision would inhibit

Congress from exercising Commerce Clause power over

health and safety in small sand and gravel pits. The question

is whether it chose to exercise that power. The legislative

history of the Mine Safety Act is very different from the Clean

Water Act on the issue of congressional intent to occupy the

field.

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Appendix C

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,

30 U.S.C. § 801 et.seg., was passed after a series of mine

disasters had illustrated the need for consistent and uniform

standards for the mining industry that would be enforced at

the federal level. Attempts to secure adequate state

enforcement of health and safety standards had been

unsuccessful, with some states doing more than others.

The Congress, in passing the Mine Safety Act, specifically

noted that the business of extracting minerals from the earth

is an inherently dangerous activity that must be carefully

administered if it is to serve the needs of both customers and

employees. To assure that consistent and uniform standards

and practices would be implemented, Congress included

in the Mine Safety Act a very broad definition of a mine.

The Senate Committee which drafted the bill that became

the Mine Safety Act noted “it is the Committee’s intention

that what is considered to be a mine and to be regulated under

this Act be given the broadest possible interpretation, and it

is the intention of this Committee that doubts be resolved in

favor of inclusion of a facility within the coverage of the

Act.” U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News

1977, 3401, 3414. This legislative intent was early recognized

and implemented by the courts. United States v. Lake, 985

F.2d 265 (C.A. 6, 1993), Marshall v. Kravnak, 604 F.2d 231

(C.A. 3, 1979)

It is clear to me that Congress intended to regulate the

business of mining because of the nature of mining activity

and not because of the business economics that determine

the geographic service area of a particular mine. For the

purpose of this case, I conclude that Congress exercised

sufficient authority under the Commerce Clause of the

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Appendix C

Constitution to make the Respondent’s sand and gravel

business subject to regulation by the Mine Safety and Health

Administration and this Commission.

Citations

In evaluating the claims by the Secretary, my

responsibility is to follow a two-step process: (1) determine

whether a regulation was violated, and (2) determine the

appropriate penalty for any violations under the criteria in

Section 110(i) of the Mine Safety Act. Secretary of Labor v.

Lexicon, Inc., 24 FMSHRC 1014, 1029 (Nov. 2002). D.A.S.

is a small company with no established history of prior

violations, but which has not established a practice of good

faith efforts to abate violations or correct safety problems.

The Respondent made no attempt to show that its financial

condition is such that payment of any particular level of Civil

Penalty would endanger its ability to stay in business.

(1) Front-end Loaders

In Citations 7724561, 7741669, and 7741667,

Respondent is alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14132,

which provides:

(b) (1) When the operator has an obstructed

view to the rear, self-propelled mobile equipment

shall have - (i) An automatic reverse-activated

signal alarm;

This regulation was violated. The front-end loaders must

be equipped with a functioning back-up alarm. It is a

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Appendix C

mandatory safety standard. It was known by the Respondent

to be a mandatory safety standard. Because of the setting in

which operations occurred, the gravity of the violation is

moderate. Because of the Respondent’s size, I consider the

penalties proposed by the Secretary to be excessive. I find

the appropriate penalty, after consideration of all the statutory

criteria, to be $600.00 for the three Citations.

In Citations 772462, 7724564, 7724574, and 7741668,

Respondent is alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R.

§56.14101(a)(1) which provides:

(1) Self-propelled mobile equipment shall be

equipped with a service brake system capable of

stopping and holding the equipment with its

typical load on the maximum grade it travels.

This regulation was violated. The front-end loaders must

be equipped with functioning brakes that make it possible

for the operator to stop a loaded vehicle on a ramp within a

reasonable distance. This regulation seems such an obvious

mandatory safety standard that the Respondent must be

presumed to have been aware of the requirement. Because

of the setting in which operations occurred, the gravity of

the violation is moderate. Because of the Respondent’s size,

I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be

excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration

of all the statutory criteria, to be $1,000.00 for the three

Citations.

24a

Appendix C

In Citations 7741666, and 7724560, Respondent is

alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14130(g), which

provides:

(zg) Seat belts shall be worn by the equipment

operator except that when operating graders from

a standing position, the grader operator shall wear

safety lines and a harness in place of a seat belt.

This regulation was violated. The operators, including

the owner and supervisor, regularly failed to wear seat belts

in the front-end loader. This regulation was known to the

supervisor and operators. Because of the low speeds involved

in the setting in which operations occurred, the gravity of

the violation is minimal. Because of the Respondent’s size,

I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be

excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration

of all the statutory criteria, to be $200.00 for the two

Citations.

(2) Hand Rails

In Citation 7724567, Respondent is alleged to have

violated 30 C.F.R. §56.11002, which provides:

Crossovers, elevated walkways, elevated

ramps, and stairways shall be of substantial

censtruction, provided with handrails, and

maintained in good condition.

This regulation was violated. The catwalk was not

provided with a substantial handrail in place of a designating

25a

Appendix C

rope. There is a reasonable dispute as to Respondent’s

knowledge of this requirement, and the gravity of the

violation is minimal. Because of the Respondent’s size,

I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be

excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration

of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

(3) Electric Faults

In Citation 7723568, Respondent is alleged to have

violated 30 C.F.R. §56.12001, which provides:

Circuits shall be protected against excessive

overload by fuses or circuit breakers of the correct

type and capacity.

This regulation was violated. The motor circuits did not

include protection against overload in the form or either fuses

or circuit breakers. Respondent claimed to have relied upon

a qualified electrician in the creation of the circuits.

Mr. Scheer claimed, on the other hand, to be knowledgeable

on the subject of electrical circuits. The need for overload

protection seems so clear as to make it impossible to claim

ignorance of the requirement. Mr. Scheer did not claim

ignorance but, rather, claimed the equivalent safety factor

was provided by other means. His explanation of the other

means was unpersuasive. Because of the Respondent’s size,

I consider the penalties proposed by the Secretary to be

excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after consideration

of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

26a

Appendix C

In Citation 7724570, Respondent is alleged to have

violated 30 C.F.R. §56.12028, which provides:

Continuity and resistance of grounding

systems shail be tested immediately after

installation, repair and modification; and

annually thereafter. A record of the resistance

measured during the most recent tests shall be

made available on a request by the Secretary or

his duly authorized representative.

This regulation was violated. Respondent was quite

candid in testifying that the testing was not performed so a

record could not be maintained. Mr. Scheer testified as to

various theories of electric circuits under which such

information would not be required. His testimony on this

subject was unpersuasive. No electrical injuries have been

sustained in the Respondent’s business. Because of the

Respondent’s size, I consider the penalties proposed by the

Secretary to be excessive. I find the appropriate penalty, after

consideration of all the statutory criteria, to be $50.00.

(4) Guards

In Citations 7741670 and 7741671, Respondent is

alleged to have violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14107, which

provides:

(a) Moving machine parts shall be guarded

to protect persons from contacting gears,

sprockets, chains, drive, head, tail, and takeup

pulleys, flywheels, coupling, shafts, fan blades and

similar moving parts that can cause injury.

27a

Appendix C

This regulation was violated in both instances.

The conveyer belt pulleys contain pinch points that can cause

injury to people moving in the area. Respondent made no

claim the pulleys were guarded, but merely attempted to

minimize the risk because of the small number of people

exposed to the unguarded machinery. I find the appropriate

penalty, after consideration if all the statutory criteria, to be

$250.00.

(5) Record Keeping

In Citation 7741672, Respondent is alleged to have

violated 30 C.F.R. §56.14100(d), which provides:

(d) Defects on self-propelled mobile

equipment affecting safety, which are not

corrected immediately, shall be reported to and

recorded by the mine operator The records shall

be kept at the mine or nearest mine office from

the date the defects are recorded until the defects

are corrected. Such records shall be made

available for inspection by an authorized

representative of the Secretary.

This regulation was violated. The testimony indicates

records were not kept of either brake or back-up alarm

malfunctions, and this failure was the reason why records

were not produced at the request of the MSHA inspector. |

find the appropriate penalty, after consideration of all the

statutory criteria, to be $200.00.

Fe ee

28a

Appendix C

Summary

It is my conclusion that the Respondent has violated a

variety of mine safety regulations, perhaps in part motivated

by his strongly held conviction as to his legal position, with

serious consequences for the health and safety of his

employees and customers. The total Civil Penalty appropriate

to redress these violations is $2,400.00.

ORDER

The Respondent is directed to pay a Civil Penalty of

$2,400.00 within 40 days of the date of this Order. The parties

are to bear their own costs.

s/ Irwin Schroeder

Irwin Schroeder

Administrative Law Judge

29a

APPENDIX D — ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DATED AND FILED OCTOBER 15, 2004

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse

40 Foley Square

New York 10007

Roseann B. MacKechnie

Clerk

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 15th day of October two thousand four.

D.A.S. SAND & GRAVEL, INC.,

Petitioner,

¥.

ELAINE L. CHAO, United States Secretary of Labor,

MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

A petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc

having been filed herein by the petitioner DAS Sand &

Gravel, Inc.

30a

Appendix D

Upon consideration by the panel that decided the appeal,

it is Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is further noted that the petition for rehearing en banc has

been transmitted to the judges for the court in regular active

service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that

no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

For the Court,

Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk

By: [illegible]

Motion Staff Attorney

31a

APPENDIX E — STATUTES INVOLVED

30 USCS § 801. Congressional findings and declaration

of purpose

Congress declares that—

(a) the first priority and concern of all in the coal

or other mining industry must be the health and

safety of its most precious resource—the miner;

(b) deaths and serious injuries from unsafe and

unhealthful conditions and practices in the coal

or other mines cause grief and suffering to the

miners and to their families;

(c) there is an urgent need to provide more

effective means and measures for improving the

working conditions and practices in the Nation’s

coal or other mines in order to prevent death and

serious physical harm, and in order to prevent

occupational diseases originating in such mines;

(d) the existence of unsafe and unhealthful

conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or

other mines is a serious impediment to the future

growth of the coal or other mining industry and

cannot be tolerated;

(e) the operators of such mines with the assistance

of the miners have the primary responsibility to

prevent the existence of such conditions and

practices in such mines;

32a

Appendix E

(f) the disruption of production and the loss of

income to operators and miners as a result of coal

or other mine accidents or occupationally caused

diseases unduly impedes and burdens commerce;

and

(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) to establish

interim mandatory health and safety standards and

to direct the Secretary of Health and Human

Services and the Secretary of Labor to develop

and promulgate improved mandatory health or

safety standards to protect the health and safety

of the Nation’s coal or other miners; (2) to require

that each operator of a coal or other mine and

every miner in such mine comply with such

standards; (3) to cooperate with, and provide

assistance to, the States in the development and

enforcement of effective State coal or other mine

health and safety programs; and (4) to improve

and expand, in cooperation with the States and

the coal or other mining industry, research and

development and training programs aimed at

preventing coal or other mine accidents and

occupationally caused diseases in the industry.

30 USCS § 803. Mines subject to coverage

Each coal or other mine, the products of which

enter commerce, or the operations or products of

which affect commerce, and each operator of such

mine, and every miner in such mine shall be

subject to the provisions of this Act.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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