Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rodriguez v. Vander Jagt

CF, ae U2.

04 867 DEC > 7 298

No. OFFICE OF THe Cy,

IN THE |

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.,

Petitioner,

v.

Guy Vander Jagt, Esq., Harrison Pledger, Esq., Law

Offices of Pledger & Feord, LP; HFP INC.; IOTA Part-

ners; Jack Harbeston; Edris E. Harbeston; Jerome

Barron; and Murdock & Co.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ of Certiorari

- To the Supreme Court of Virginia and The Fairfax

County Circuit Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioner

THE LAW OFFICES OF RODRIGUEZ, SIBLEY, &

MENDOZA, L.L.P.

2304 Farrington Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22303-1520

(703)960-0225

In 1988 Petitioner Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. —

(“Rodriguez”) was specifically retained as an active

Virginia attorney to provide pro hoc vice legal services

to Respondent SSA Entities’ $10 Billion contract claim

against the Republic 'of Colombia, described by Con-

gressmen Dan Burton and Phil M. Crane, “as the largest

private claim by American citizens against a foreign

state pending in the world.” In 1998-SSA Entities’

Lobbyist Respondent Guy Vander Jagt surreptitiously

negotiated a settlement involving the lobbying for Plan

Colombia to include $300 million of “soft money,”

simultaneous with SSA Entities dissolving and fraudu-

lently transferring their claims. Therefore based on

Virginia State Bar Ethics Opinion issued under VA Code

§ 54.1-3910, to Rodriguez confirming that though his

pro hoc vice practice was outside of Virginia the VSB’s

jurisdiction, and his right to sue SSA Entities for fraud,

this Complaint was filed to enforce his perfected VA

Code § 54.1-3932 attorney’s lien, and to protect this

lien from the VA Code § 18.2-500 business conspiracy.

But the Courts of Virginia in discriminatory unpub-

lished summary orders dismissed the action and

denied him of the rights granted by special legislation

of the General Assembly to all other Virginia Attorneys.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMUNITY

CLAUSE ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THE U. S. CONSTITU-

TION WAS VIOLATED BY THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA

DISCRIMINATORY REFUSAL TO ENFORCE AND

PROTECT FROM THE FRAUD OF SSA ENTITIES,

VANDER JAGT AND PLEDGER, RODRIGUEZ’S STAT-

(i)

UTORY RIGHTS UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3932 AND §

18.2-500, GRANTED TO ALL OTHER VIRGINIA AT-

TORNEYS LOCATED IN VIRGINIA, BECAUSE HIS PRO

HOC VICES PRACTICE IS OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA

THOUGH UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE VIR-

GINIA STATE BAR?

2. WHETHER THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA

VIOLATED RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S.

CONSTITUTION BY THEIR DISCRIMINATORY REFUS-

ING TO ENFORCE AND PROTECT HIS STATUTORY

PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER VA CODE § 54.1-3932

AND § 18.2-500 BECAUSE HE IS A VIRGINIA ATTOR-

NEY PROVIDING PRO HOC VICES SERVICES OUTSIDE

OF VIRGINIA?

3. WHETHER THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA

VIOLATED RODRIGUEZ’S RIGHTS UNDER THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITU-

TION TO EQUAL PROTECTION BY THEIR DISCRIMI-

NATORY REFUSAL TO PROTECT AND ENFORCE HIS

PERFECTED VIRGINIA ATTORNEY’S LIEN UNDER VA

CODE § 54.1-3932 AND § 18.2-500 BY NOT GRANT-

ING HIS DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL AS REQUIRED

BY THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND VA CODE §

8.01-336, AND NOT COMPLYING WITH THEIR OWN

STARE DECISIS ON ENFORCEMENT OF SPECIAL

LEGISLATION?

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......-- (i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......--eeeeeeeees (iii)

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ........---- (v)

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW .......----- 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......----++-- 1

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4(c) ...-- 2

U.S. and VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONS, AND VIRGINIA

STATUTES INVOLVED ........-..----- 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......----++++e> 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........-------- 9

I. THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE IN

VIOLATION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMU-

NITY CLAUSE ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THEU.S. -

CONSTITUTION AND SHERMAN ANTITRUST

ACT THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DENIED

RODRIGUEZ AS A VIRGINIA ATTORNEY OF

HIS RIGHT TO A PRO HOC VICE PRACTICE

OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA UNDER THE JURISDIC-

TION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR BY

DISCRIMINATORY DENYING HIM OF HIS

STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS .....--- 9

(iii)

A. Privilege and Immunity ............ 12

B. Sherman Anti Trust and Privilege and Immu-

Set 4a-¢0'0s on 6 O46 a ae ae eee eae 17

Il. THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE

COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-

TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ OF DUE PROCESS

IN NOT ENFORCING AND PROTECTING HIS

STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS GIVEN TO

ALL VIRGINIA ATTORNEY LOCATED IN

VIRGINIA BECAUSE HIS PRO HOC VICE

PRACTICE IS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE BUT

UNDER THE VSB’S JURISDICTION. ..... 19

Ill. | THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE

COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-

TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ EQUAL PROTEC-

TION OF THE LAWS BY NOT PROVIDING THE

DEMANDED JURY TRIAL AND NOT FOLLOW-

SOUUs EPRI DG, in ca cccccccucede 21

A. Bosal Protection .... 1... cc ccc ccccs 21

B. Demand for Jury Trail ............. 22

C. The Court of Virginia ignored

ES C06 oho ets ae 25

RAGE 6 Ohh 54 ake KES Ok eek 29

Appendix A--Orders, Relevant Portions of Transcript

Below, and Virginia ‘ate Bar Ethics Opinion.

Appendix B--U.S. and Virginia Constitution, and

Virginia Statutes.

‘ (iv)

onc es

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Cases:

English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 39 (4 Cir.

WOOD ocak cecesdenneseenean 14, 16, 20, 26, 27

Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) .. 14

Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) ..... 15

Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (CA7 1984)

- so case cd eekeahicesesed ea eras wee wae eure 23

Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 103-04 (4th

Cir.), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 182 (1993) ....... 19

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,

33 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1972) ......c2eccceeeee 12, 19

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ..... 23

Brown v. Sparks, 262 Va. 567, 554 S.E.2d 449 (2001)

Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 212, 24 S.E. 830,

B33 (1G9G) onc cncdcnaccadidegetsneveeees 24

Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 52

L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 498 (1907)

lanatneaseecdsnnasss4e464100.0052—00— 22

(v)

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98

S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978) ........... 18

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa.

i: DPPPrrrrTrrrrrr Tet 12, 13

Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 347, 415 S.E.2d 436,

GST CESSES oc éntkecdaeeu oe cece eeeeeees 24

EPLUS Technology, Inc. v. Patricia Aboud et al, 155

F.Supp2d 692 (E.D. VA 2001) ............ 12,17

Etheridge [v. Medical Center Hospitals, 237 Va. 87, 376

S.£.26 SEB GOUGP) 0 ccstvcascacccouseuas 10, 24

Fary v. Aquino, 218 Va. 889, 241 S.E. 2d 799 (1978)

0000000ctéeeweeeeeb bs bbe eee eee 27

Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) ......... 15

Garcia v. San Antonio MTA, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 44 L.Ed.

2d 572, 95 S.Ct 2004, reh. den 423 U.S. 886 (1975)

PITTS TTT eee ee 17

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) ........ 14

Hinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958 at

064, 234 $2.26 Bee CISTI) cxcscsnnsseunens 27

(vi)

ee ee

at Cer ee wey =

Hughes v. Cole, 251 Va. 3, 465 S.E.2d 820(1996).

cde veesekewnckoe Oa benen ae eeeeneee 11, 26, 27

In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 14 S.Ct. 1082, 38 L.Ed.

GEO CIDE) 2c cccscccccccoscccssccosessen 21

Katopodis v. Liberian S/T Olympic Sun, 282 F.Supp. 369

(E.D. Va. 1968) .......cccccccccccsccccess 27

Knoingsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77

S.Ct. 722 1 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1957) ...........-- 22

M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473,

117 S. Ct. 555-107 (1996) ........------es 23

Mandel v. Allen, 81 F.3d 478, 481 (4th Cir. 1996)

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) . 19

Montavon v. United States, 864 F.Supp. 519 (E.D. Va.

BOE. ov ciccnneynsennsccecsnsdscensevaes 27

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109

S. Cz. 2765, m. 6 C19BD) 2. ccccccccccccceces 23

New York. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)

ee Sey er re reer re ee 19

Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S.Ct. 1363, 10 L.

Ed. 2d. 456 (1963) ......ccccccccccccceces 21

(vii)

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539,

og eS i. re 23

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 93 U.S. 2694, 33

Eo eo ba coo ak od awe eens 12

Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, 257 Va. 1, 509

De CE kana cbeceecdeses Secee 10°24

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)

Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d. 170 (4" Cir. 1933) ... 27

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77

SAX. 7T5a, 1 LAGSAESIO C1957) 2 cee cdccsdess 21

Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th

ahs SE ia) Sos each dn ow le Ge ee a eee 19

Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 355 S.E.2d

—¢) 8 is POPP EP ERE EPT CLT TET TEC Terre 28

Supinger +. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 203, 495 S.E.2d 813

PE +c tdscecnrwkepk canes bee nates 24

SEED 62d kb capaho ca Wkwees ee ene vedas 15, 26

SRO 04 4460 tower Senos wankeceeeeeee 14, 15

(viii)

ee eS ee °

Swekel v. River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (CA6 1997)

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L.

Ed. 1460 (1948) ......cccccccccsecccccces 17

Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 422 S.E.2d 765 (1992)

Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State, et AL,

Petitioners V. Jennifer K. Harbury, 2002 U.S. LEXIS

4647, 536 U.S. 403; 122 S. Ct. 2179; 153 L. Ed. 2d

iy Ce 1 a ree Pre ee eee 22

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94

S. Ct. 2963, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 336 (1974) ....... 23

Constitution, Treaty, Statutes, and Regulations:

Art. I, Section 8, cl. 3, United States Constitution 17

Article IV, sec 2 of the U.S. Constitution . 12, 16, 22

5" Amendment to the Constitution ........ 19, 23

14 Amendment to the Constitution . 14, 16, 20, 26,

a7

15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, Sherman Antitrust Act ....... 17

28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) and (bD) .......---- +e eee 2

(ix)

Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia . 24, 27

Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia . 11, 26

Article IV, § 14 of the Constitutien of Virginia ... 10,

26, 27

VA Code § 18.2-499 and § 500 settee teen e ees 12

VA Code $18.2-500 ......0cceees 14, 16, 20, 25

VA Code § $4.1-S910 . wc cc cccccccccesn 5, 17, 20

VA Code § 54.1-3932 ..ccccccsccsace 10, 11, 17

WA COORG COL SIS cicccccecscensnesas 24, 25

Miscellaneous Material:

1992 Va. AG 155 ...... ke aes 14, 16, 20, 26, 27

1996 Va. AG 23 ....... PT Te ee Tee TT Ore 11

(x)

aa

CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The unpublished orders of the Supreme Court of

Virginia whose review is sought are reproduced in the

Appendix at A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5. The unpub-

lished bench and written summary orders of the Fairfax

County Circuit Court (“Circuit Court”) whose review is

sought are reproduced in the Appendix at A-6, A-10, A-

11, and A-16."

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Virginia denied motions

for a stay of the mandate on November 5, 2004 (A-1

and A-2). As to Respondents HFP Inc.; IOTA Partners;

Jack Harbeston; Edris E. Harbeston; Jerome Barron;

and Murdock & Company (“SSA Entities”),” the panel

la.” references are to pages in the first section of the

attached Appendix. :

2SSA Entities are a joint venture that assumed Sea Search-

Armada and Armada Company’s claim to 15 treasure troves targets

sunk in the territorial/international waters off the coast of

Colombia valued at $10 Billion (“Treasure Trove”): (i) Respondent

IOTA Partners LP, is an Idaho limited partnership organized by

Respondent Jack Harbeston in 1988, for the sole purpose of the

“salvage of treasure trove in or about Colombia,” which is owned

by Sea Search-Armada and Armada Company; (ii) Respondent

Murdock & Co., and James Barron are the main investor in IOTA

Partners; (iii) Respondent HFP, Inc., is owned by Harbeston and

incorporated in the State of Washington, to serve as the General

Partner of IOTA Partners LP. Because Sea Search-Armada and

Armada Company fraudulently dissolved in 2002 and their assets

were secretly transferred to SSA Entities, they are not parties.

1

of the Supreme Court of Virginia entered an order on

October 12, 2004 (A-3), refusing the appeal of the

summary bench order of the Circuit Court dated

February 27, 2004(A-9 and A-10). As to SSA Entities

Chief Lobbyist Respondents Guy Vander Jagt (“Vander

Jagt”), and their attorney Harrison Pledger and the

Law Firm of Pledger & Feord LP (“Pledger”), on Octo-

ber 1, 2004 the Supreme Court of Virginia denied a

Petition for Rehearing (A-4). The panel of the Su-

preme Court of Virginia entered an order on August 13,

2004 (A-5), denying appeal of the summary bench

order of the Circuit Court dated January 23, 2004 (A-

15 and A-16). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257(a), Article IV, Sec. 2, of the

U.S. Constitution, and the V and XIV Amendments.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 29.4( c )

The Court is informed that 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)

may apply and this Petition has been served upon the

Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Neither the Supreme Court of Virginia nor the Circuit

Court certified to the Attorney General that pursuant to

Article of IV, sec. 2, the 5“ and 14 Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution the constitutionality of their rules of

procedure is called into question as depriving Rodri-

guez of the privileges and immunities of the laws of

Virginia as a Virginia attorney providing pro hoc vice

services outside of Virginia under the jurisdiction of the

Virginia State Bar, Virginia Code. § 54.1-3910, due

process and equal protection of his perfected Virginia

Attorney’s Lien for pro hoc vice legal services pursuant

to VA Code § 54.1-3932 and VA Code § 18.2-500.

ys

SAE Wa I RR gh Ae de eta baw idk

aaa neler hacsd esas

PRN Ne le a Me

U.S. and VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONS, AND

VIRGINIA STATUTES INVOLVED*

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, Art. IV,2 ..... B-1

AMENDMENT V .....----eeeeeeteeterret? B-1

AMENDMENT VII ....------eeeeetrrrteee? B-1

AMENDMENT XIV....------+eeesteereere? B-1

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, SECTION 11 ... B-1

Virginia Code § 54.1-3932. Lien ee B-2

Virginia Code § 18.2-499, Business Conspiracy . . B-2

Virginia Code § 18.2-500, Business Conspiracy . . B-3

Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1. Virginia’s Long-Arm

CN 8 pee ees ee esses essecese doses B-3

Virginia Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and govern-

ment of Virginia State Bar ....----+-++++++0> B-4

Virginia Code § 8.01-336. Jury trial of right; waiver of

Hp tad oo cece cece ce ccceecevces B-4

“B.” references are to pages in the second section of the

attached Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 2, 1988 when SSA Entities Chief

Lobbyist Vander Jagt was a Member of the U.S. House

of Representatives, he protested in the Congressional

Record (E-1806), the attempted “expropriation” of SSA

Entities contract claims to the Treasure Trove by Colom-

bia. Shortly thereafter in September 1988, Respondent

Jack Harbeston (“Harbeston”); on behalf of SSA

Entities retained Rodriguez as a Virginia Attorney

providing pro hoc vice fiduciary and legal management

services as their Legal Representative responsible for

the contract litigation against Colombia.*

Two years after the filing of the contract litiga-

tion against Colombia, due to SSA Entities failure to

pay invoices for services under their contract Rodriguez

filed for and obtained on February 27, 1990, Virginia

Bar Legal Ethics Opinion #1325 (A-18)(“VA Ethics

Opinion”), which stated,

. . . [Rodriguez being] admitted to practice in

Virginia is subject to the Virginia Code of Profes

“<nder the Colombian Code to establish jurisdictional

standing to sue Colombia, Rodriguez as the “Legal Representative”

of SSA Entities must be given the total corporate authority of the

Board of Directors. Thus SSA Entities need to have Rodriguez’s

fiduciary duty supervised by the Virginia Sate Bar, who although

domiciled and a voting resident in Virginia since 1979, resided in

‘Colombia between 1989 and 1999, in compliance with his pro hoc

vice fiduciary duty to SSA Entities. See Master Isidoro Rodriguez-

Hazbun v. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, S. Ct.

Docket No. 04-724, and other related Petitions.

4

sional Responsibility although engaged in

practice elsewhere ... when [he] assumes the

responsibility of acting as a fiduciary . . . As

such Rodriguez’s suit for Attorney fees is per-

missible ... to prevent fraud or gross imposi-

tion.

Upon receipt of notice of the VA Ethics Opinion,

SSA Entities knowing negotiated and entered into a

new verbal 10% contingency fee agreement with

Rodriguez in December 1990, so to continue availing

themselves of the protection of VA Code § 54.1-3910,

which assured Rodriguez’s fidelities as a Virginia

Attorney providing pro hoc vice services in Colombia.”

On June 16, 1998, Rodriguez submitted through

his Agent the initial response of SSA Entities to Colom-

bia’s settlement offer as a “total accord on the claims

[to the 15 Treasure Trove targets], and the consequent

identification and recovery of the treasures or ship-

wrecked antiquities claimed,” in the “areas defined by

the contract.” But in response to Rodriguez's request

for a status report of Vander Jagt as SSA Entities chief

negotiator, on April 6, 2000, Harbeston sent from the

State of Washington a letter into State of Virginia

terminating without Board Authorization Rodriguez as

5VA Code § 54.1-3910, states “[a]ll advisory opinions . . .

shall be incorporated into the Code of Virginia .... ” This includes

the VA Legal Ethics Opinion issued in the instant action that stated

that to “prevent fraud or gross imposition” Rodriguez, has the

right to sue for his fee.

\

ee

SSA Entities Legal Representative, and advising that

Rodriguez was to look to his Agent for fees.

In response upon returning to reside in Northern

Virginia, Rodriguez perfected his statutory charging

Virginia Attorney’s Lien pursuant to VA Code § 54.1-

3932, by sending notice to all the Board of Directors of

SSA Entities and Vander Jagt, as their Chief Lobbyist.

Since October 2000, Pledger has represented

SSA Entities and has repeatedly made misstatements of

fact and law in response to Rodriguez efforts to enforce

his Virginia Attorney’s Lien under VA Code VA Code §

54.1-3932, and protect his lien from a VA Code § 18.2-

500 business conspiracy by SSA Entities fraud. How-

ever, for some unknown reason the federal courts have

ignored the statutory gravamen of the Complaint based

on Rodriguez’s rights as a Virginia Attorney providing

pro hoc vice services, to dismiss the action for lack of

personal jurisdiction based on the theory of at-will-

contracts (A-7 and A-8).

. ie ee eae

i il at te eel Di eT et

In June/July 2002, SSA Entities dissolved and

secretly transferred its interest in their 15 Treasure

Trove targets, after allegedly Vander Jagt surrepti-

tiously negotiated a settlement based on the U.S.

enacting Plan Colombia, providing for more than $300

million of “soft money.”

In November 2003, Rodriguez filed this action

in the Circuit Court to enforce his perfected charging

Virginia Attorney’s Lien VA Code § 54.1.3932, for $4.6

million based on quantum merit for the more than

6

twelve years of pro hoc vice fiduciary and legal manage-

ment services to Respondents SSA Entities which at all

times was under the jurisdiction of the Virginia State

Bar, VA Ethics Opinion (A-18), and Virginia Code §

54.1-3910 (B-4). Thus personal jurisdiction in the

Commonwealth of Virginia over SSA Entities as nonres-

ident is based on VA Code § 8.01-328.1 (1), because

SSA Entities transacted business in the State by con-

tracting for and agreeing to the protection of the laws

of Virginia over Rodriguez’s pro hoc vice services.

In addition this action was filed to protect

Rodriguez’s property rights in his Virginia statutory lien

from a common law and Business Conspiracy to

commit fraud by SSA Entities, Vander Jagt, and

Pledger (both residents of the Commonwealth of

Virginia) to commit fraud and thereby injure Rodri-

guez’s business and profession in violation of VA Code

§ 18.2-500. As to this count jurisdiction is based in

the State under VA Code § 8.01-328.1 (3) and (4).

In response to Vander Jagt and Pledger’s mo-

tions to demurrer, which disputed the facts stated in

the Complaint, Rodriguez demanded a jury trial again

pursuant Article I Sec. 11 of the Constitution and VA

Code § 8.01-336(a).

On January 15, 2004, prior to the hearing

before the Circuit Court set for January 23, 2004,

Rodriguez filed a copy with the Court of SSA Entities et

al., Virginia Bar Complaint, VSB Docket No. 04-052-

0794,° where they surreally confessed that Harbeston

violated Rodriguez’s Power of Attorney as Legal Repre-

sentative given by the Board of Directors by interfering

with said powers; Harbeston admitted that he and

Rodriguez’s Agent have disregarded their respective

fiduciary and legal duty to Rodriguez as Legal Repre-

sentative of SSA Entities, violated Colombian Criminal

Law and the laws of Virginia, and Harbeston made

false statements to discredit and damage Rodriguez

reputation as a lawyer.

On January 23, 2004, without providing the

demanded jury trial, which at no time was waived, the

Circuit Court without explanation summarily granted

Vander Jagt and Pledger demurrers and dismissed the

action “with prejudice,” (A-15 and A-16). In its

summary bench and written order the Circuit Court

disregarded any consideration of the special legislation

mandating the enforcement and protection of Rodri-

guez’s perfected charging Virginia Attorney’s Lien

based on pro hoc vice service under the jurisdiction of

the Virginia State Bar, but instead accepted the

territorial jurisdiction argument of Vander Jagt and

Pledger (A-11), which had nothing to do with the

gravamen of the complaint and relevant facts support

"To date after nearly 12 months the Alexandria Bar

Counsel and Bar Committee are still conducting an intensive

background investigation of Rodriguez, to which Rodriguez has

both responded and supplied supplemental information, and met

with the VSB investigator in October 2004.

8

ing the allegation of business conspiracy fraud in

violation of VA Code § 18.2-500.’

One month later on February 27, 2004, again

without providing the repeatedly demanded jury trial

the Circuit Court summarily dismissed the action as to

SSA Entities (A-10), and specifically refused the

request to provide the legal basis for its decision (A-9).

On appeal Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed

the Circuit Court in unpublished orders (A-1 to A-5).

REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI

a THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE

IN VIOLATION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND IMMU-

NITY CLAUSE ARTICLE IV, SEC. 2 OF THE U.S.

CONSTITUTION AND SHERMAN ANTITRUST

ACT THE COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DENIED

RODRIGUEZ AS A VIRGINIA ATTORNEY OF

7As circumstantial confirmation of the on going skulldug-

gery of SSA Entities, a motion was filed with the Circuit Court for

judicial notice of the AP news article dated February 13, 2004,

regarding the ruling of the Supreme Court of the Republic of

Colombia denying SSA Entities claim to the 1707 Spanish Galleon

San Jose. The claimed rights to the other 14 Treasure Trove

targets, were not addressed, and allegedly were fraudulent

transfer when Sea Search-Armada and Armada Company

dissolved. It is important to note in total disregard of Vander Jagt

1988 concerns regarding the preventing of the “expropriation of

the vested rights of Sea Search Armada,” no protests were issued

by either SSA Entities, U.S. Congress or U.S. Executive Branch.

9

HIS RIGHT TO A PRO HOC VICE PRACTICE

OUTSIDE OF VIRGINIA UNDER THE JURISDIC-

TION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR BY

DISCRIMINATORY DENYING HIM OF HIS

STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS.

Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution of Virginia

provides that “(t]he General Assembly shall not enact

any local, special, or private law . . . (18) [g]ranting to

any private corporation, association, or individual any

special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity."

However, regarding rights under “special legislation”

passed by the Virginia Legislature, the Supreme Court

of Virginia in Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, 257

Va. 1, 15, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999), stated in no uncer-

tain terms that,

In Etheridge, we noted that we had previously

held that laws may be made to apply to a class

only, even though the class may be small,

provided the classification is reasonable, not

arbitrary, and the law is made to apply to all

persons in the class without distinction. 237

Va. at 102, 376 S.E.2d at 533. We also noted

that if the classification bears a reasonable and

substantial relation to the object sought to be

accomplished, it will survive a special-laws

constitutional challenge. Id. (Emphasis added).

Regarding the enforcement of a perfected VA

Attorney’s Lien, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held

that the language of VA Code § 54.1-3932, provides,

10

... “any attorney [employed] to prosecute [a

claim sounding in tort or in contract) shall have

a lien upon the cause of action as security for

his fees for any services rendered in relations to

the cause or claim.’ (Emphasis in the opinion).

This language is broad and permits no inter-

pretation limiting the benefits of the statute to

Virginia lawyers. . . .”(Emphasis added). Hughes

v. Cole, 251 Va. 3 at 27, 465 S.E.2d 820(1996).

Regarding the protection of the above statutory

property right Article I, § 11, of the Constitution of

Virginia provide that “"{t]hat no person shall be de-

prived of his . . . property without due process of law;

Consequently, as special legislation protecting

all other members of the Virginia Bar practicing locally,

VA Code § 54.1-3932, the rules of the Courts’ of

Virginia must provide the same equal protection to

Rodriguez’s statutory property rights in his interna-

tional pro hoc vice practice which is under the supervi-

sion of the Virginia State Bar (A-18).° Otherwise as

repeatedly argued below the failure to enforce a

Virginia attorney's property right because it relates to

a pro hoc vice practice vis-a-vis the same property right

*In the Commonwealth of Virginia Attorney General

Opinion 1996 Va. AG 23, it was confirmed that the General

Assembly may limit rule-making authority of Supreme Court and

is not encroachment on powers of either branch to perform their

constitutionally assigned functions and is not violation of separa-

tion of powers doctrine. See 1992 Va. AG 155.

11

iii iia ae

based on a local practice would fail to survive constitu-

tional challenge (A-8 and A-12). ° |

Logically this includes the statutory right to

protect his reputation, business, profession and per-

fected statutory charging Virginia Attorney’s Lien from

the malicious common law torts and on going Business

Conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of VA Code §

18.2-499 and § 500, see EPLUS Technology, Inc. v.

Patricia Aboud et al, 155 F.Supp2d 692 (E.D. VA 2001).

ay enn ee ee ee

si hia bisciaachil Sai

A. Privilege and Immunity

The classical judicial exposition of the meaning

of this phrase is that of Justice Washington in Corfield

v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (CCED Pa. 1823).

There the question at issue was the validity of a New

Jersey statute which prohibited “any person who is

not, at the time, an actual inhabitant and resident in

this State” from raking or gathering “clams, oysters or

, south ste iter sialeiS Re eee es

‘Similarly this Court has recognized state-created interests

called "entitlements, "see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92

S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1972). Such entitlements are

privileges extended to a well-defined section of society. To foster

a claim to such an entitlement, the claimant must demonstrate

both his inclusion in the group expecting the entitlement and that

such entitlement is present in "rules and understandings, promul-

gated and fostered by state officials." Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.

593, 93 U.S. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Consequently, since

Rodriguez meets both of these requirements as a Virginia attorney

receiving Legal Ethics Opinion (A-18) and perfecting his Attorney’s

Lien, Rodriguez does have a constitutionally protected property

right which has been violated by the Courts of Virginia.

12

shells” in any of the waters of the State, on board any

vessel “not wholly owned by some person, inhabitant

of and actually residing in this State. ... (Emphasis

added). The inquiry is,” wrote Justice Washington,

“what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in

the several States? We feel'no hesitation in confining

these expressions to those privileges and immunities

which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,

of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and

which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens

of the several States which compose this Union, . . .”

He specified the following rights as answering this

description: “Protection by the Government; the

enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire

and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and

obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to

such restraints as the Government must justly prescribe

for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen

of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other

State, for purposes of . . . professional pursuits .. . ; to

institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts

of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property,

either real or personal; and an exemption from higher

taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens

of the State; ... .” Id., 551-552.

Thus Justice Washington's opinion in Coryell

afforded the Court the standard; while recognizing that

the opinion relied on notions of natural rights, the

Court thought he used the term ** fundamental" in the

modern sense as well. This Court held whether an

activity in which a nonresident wishes to engage is

13

within the protection of the clause, the activity must

be fundamental, such that the interference with which

would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the

United States. Thus the right to practice law is to be

considered fundamental activity, and protected against

unreasonable burdening, Supreme Court of New Hamp-

shire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).

Once finding a fundamental interest protected

under the clause, in the particular case the right to

pursue Rodriguez’s international pro hoc vice practice

and receive the same rights as a Virginia attorney

practicing locally, the Court must employ its two-

pronged analysis to determine whether the Courts of

Virginia's distinction between a Virginia attorney’s local

practice and a nonresident Virginia attorney’s pro hoc

vice practice are justified.’° Thus, the Courts of Virginia

was compelled to show that nonresident Virginia

attorneys constituted a peculiar source of the evil at

which their procedural rules which disregarded VA

Code § 54.1-3932 and § 18.2-500, were aimed and

that the discrimination bore a substantial relationship

to the particular “evil” they are said to represent, e.g.,

‘Although the clause specifically refers to “citizens,” the

Court treats the terms “citizens” and “residents” as “essentially

interchangeable.” Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.

8 (1975); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n. 8 (1978). Thus

although Rodriguez is a resident of Virginia, he is a “nonresident”

for purposes of seeking to protect his right to be paid for his pro

hoc vice practice VA Code § 54.1-3932, and protect his property

right from a business conspiracy under VA Code § 18.2-500, just

as a Virginia attorney with a local practice.

14

d

,

7

q

3

:

that it is “closely tailored” to meet the actual problem.

See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989); Su-

preme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59

(1988). Since they could not they issued summary

unpublished orders in the instant action.

Specifically on point is Supreme Court of New

Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), where Justice

Powell, who delivered the opinion for the Supreme

Court, and by chance was another Virginia attorney,

stated that "[o]nly with respect to those ‘privileges’

and ‘immunities' bearing on the vitality of the Nation

as a single entity" that a State must accord residents

and nonresidents equal treatment. Even Chief Justice

Rehnquist who in his dissent viewed the practice of law

“fundamentally different from those other occupations

that are practiced across state lines without significant

deviation from State to State,” confirmed that it was up

to the State legislature to decide how to treat the rights

of resident and nonresident attorneys, not the State

Courts.

Therefore, Rodriguez relies on this Court's

decisions invalidating discriminatory residency require-

ments on an attorney to challenge the rules of proce-

dure of the Courts of Virginia that authorizes granting

a demurrer. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546

(1989); Supreme Court v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59

(1988); Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987);

Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). In each

of those cases which involved a residency requirement

that discriminated against out-of-state residents, this

Court held that such requirements were invalid under

15

either the Privileges and Immunities lause or the

Court's supervisory power over federal courts.

Here, there is exactly the type of prohibited

discrimination because the Courts of Virginia using

their rules of court have refused to enforce the protec-

tion against client fraud which it grated to all other

Virginia attorney practicing locally. Here Rodriguez

who as a Virginia Attorney has passed the state's bar

examination and has been an active member in good

standing of the bar since 1982, and has an interna-

tional pro hoc vice practice specialized in litigating on

behalf of individual against government abuse, is being

deprived of his statutory property right by the Supreme

Court of Virginia and the Circuit Court through their

rules of practice granting SSA Entities motion to

dismiss and Vander Jagt Pledgers motion to demurrer,

in clear violation of Article IV, sec 2 of the U.S. Consti-

tution, the Constitution of Virginia, and the clear

protection granted to all Virginia Attorney’s under VA

Code § 54.1.3932 (B-2) and § 18.2-500 (B-3).""

“The surreal nature of this petition is that while Rodriguez

has been deprived of his right to enforce and protect his statutory

property rights in his Virginia Attorney’s Lien from a business

conspiracy to fraudulently damage his profession, SSA Entities’

Virginia State Bar Complaint against Rodriguez for his allegedly

filing “frivolous law suits in federal and state courts against them

and/or the entities they represent,” has been ongoing for over

twelve months to the present, VSB Docket No 04-052-1044.

Related to this petition is Rodriguez’s Son’s action to enforce a

Treaty, Master Isidoro Rodriguez-Hazbun v. National Center for

Missing and Exploited Children, et al., Supreme Court Docket Nos.

16

B. Sherman Anti Trust and Privilege and Immunity.

Given that both the Federal and State Courts

provide protection under both the VA Code and even

under general contract theory provide for a Virginia

attorney with a local practice in the State to enforce an

action for his fees, English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d

36, 39 (4% Cir. 1990) (and logically protect fees from

a business conspiracy to commit fraud, see EPLUS

Technology, Inc. v. Patricia Aboud et al, 155 F.Supp2d

692 (E.D. VA 2001), the refusal to provide the same

protection to Rodriguez as a Virginia Attorney provid-

ing pro hoc vice service under the supervision of the

Virginia State Bar is not only discriminatory, arbitrary,

and a violation of Constitutional rights, but too, is an

illegal restraint on interstate trade under 15 U.S.C. Sec.

1, Sherman Antitrust Act.’

04-454 and 04-724, where too the Virginia State Bar has been

investigating a Bar Complaint for over 14 months filed by the

NCMEC based on the same ground, VSB Docket No 04-052-0794.

Thus Rodriguez and his Son are being subject to VSB investigation

for exercising their right to access to the courts to redress a

grievance against the government.

12aJso as noted to the Courts of Virginia, to not enforce

Rodriguez’s right in his VA Attorney’s Lien for his pro hoc vice

fiduciary services would be an impermissible burden on interstate

commerce, and an unlawful usurpation of the power granted only

Congress to regulate Commerce, pursuant to Art. I, Section 8, cl.

3, United States Constitution. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,

68 S.Ct. 1156, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948).

17

At the outset, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421

U.S. 773, 44 L.Ed. 2d 572, 95 S.Ct 2004, reh. den 423

U.S. 886 (1975), has done away with the "learned

profession exception" to Section One of the Sherman

Act. Consequently pursuant to City of Philadelphia v.

New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d

475 (1978), the territorial restraints which the rules of

the Courts of Virginia have created in discriminating

against Rodriguez’s statutory property right in his

Virginia Attorney’s Lien for pro hoc vice services outside

of Virginia vis-a-vis a Virginia attorney with a local

practice, deny him the benefits and protection of the

Virginia Code and cause a burden on interstate com-

merce constituting an antitrust violation.

By denying the same statutory property rights

and protection from client fraud granted to all other

Virginia Attorneys residing and practicing locally in

Virginia, the Courts of Virginia impede the formation of

an international law practice. The rules of the Courts

of Virginia are particularly unreasonable given that the

Virginia State Bar in the Legal Ethics Opinion autho-

rized litigation to prevent fraud, confirmed that it

supervised the professional standards of Rodriguez

irrespective of where his practice is located, and for the

past 14 months to the present has conducted a detailed

investigation of Rodriguez based on the VSB Complaint

filed by SSA Entities. Thus Virginia Court’s interest

based on: (a) its responsibility of maintaining profes-

sional competence; and (b) the economic protection of

the Virginia State Bar members is not present.

18

II. THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE

COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-

TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ OF DUE PROCESS

IN NOT ENFORCING AND PROTECTING HIS

STATUTORY PROPERTY RIGHTS GIVEN TO

ALL VIRGINIA ATTORNEY LOCATED IN

VIRGINIA BECAUSE HIS PRO HOC VICE

PRACTICE IS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE BUT

UNDER THE VSB’S JURISDICTION

DUE PROCESS - is best defined in one word--

fairness. The 5" Amendment to the Constitution (B-1),

guarantees that the government cannot take away a

person's right to property, without due process of law.

The 14° Amendment to the Constitution (B-1), prohib-

its the deprivation of property without due process of

law.

In order to state a due process claim, Rodriguez

"must first demonstrate that [he] possess[es] a “ cogni-

zable property interest, rooted in state law’ in the lost

benefit." Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 103-04

(4th Cir.), cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 182 (1993) (quoting

Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th

Cir. 1983)). "A property interest requires more than a

“unilateral expectation’ . . . [I]nstead, there must be a

“legitimate claim of entitlement.” Id. at 104 (quoting

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972),

Mandel v. Allen, 81 F.3d 478, 481 (4th Cir. 1996).

When a person is treated unfairly by the government,

including the Courts of Virginia, he is said to have been

deprived of or denied due process. See. New York.

Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

19

This Court stated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 335 (1976), a case regarding termination of

Social Security benefits, that “due process, unlike some

legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed

content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.

Due process is flexible and calls for such procedure

protections as the particular situation demands.”

Thus a review of the record establishes that the

following elements of the adversary process were

denied Rodriguez and were required as part of the "due

process" before the courts can be permitted to deny

him of to a statutory property right include an opportu-

nity to discovery and present evidence or witnesses to

the decision-maker; a chance to confront and cross-

examine opposing witnesses or evidence; the Virginia

Constitution and VA Code § 8.01-336 right to a jury

trial on the various disputes of fact below; and a

judicial decision based on the record with a statement

of fact and law as to the reasons for the decision.

Not only was this last element denied in the

summary unpublished orders (A-5, A-9, and A-16), but

too, the gravamen of the entire action that is based on

Rodriguez’s statutory property right under VA Code §

54.1-3932, that gives all Virginia Attorneys a "legiti-

mate claim of entitlement" was never even discussed.

Thus the Courts of Virginia issuance of summary

unpublished orders deprived Rodriguez to due process

under VA Code § 54.1-3932, Virginia Bar Legal Ethics

Opinion (A-18), and VA Code § 54.1-3910 (B-4), and

20

his right to protect his lien from a fraudulent business

conspiracy in violation of VA Code § 18.2-500.

Ill. ©THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE

COURTS OF VIRGINIA HAVE DISCRIMINA-

TORY DENIED RODRIGUEZ EQUAL PROTEC-

TION OF THE LAWS BY NOT PROVIDING THE

DEMANDED JURY TRIAL AND NOT FOLLOW-

ING STARE DECISIS.

A. Equal Protection

The Fourteenth Amendment (A-1), provides that

the Courts of Virginia cannot "deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Thus the equal protection clause guarantees that the

Courts of Virginia may not be arbitrary, capricious or

discriminatory in the application of its laws. See Norvell

v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 83 S.Ct. 1363, 10 L. Ed. 2d.

456 (1963). Although generally the right to practice

law is not a privilege or immunity under the Four-

teenth Amendment, In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 14

S.Ct. 1082, 38 L.Ed. 929 (1894), the constitutional

right of equal protection standards is invoked as here

when an entitlement exists (i.e., Virginia Statutory

Attorney's Lien), or where there is arbitrary action (i.e.,

refusal to explain the denial of a property right and of

the protection of a Virginia Attorney's Lien from client's

fraud), or invidious discrimination by the Courts of

Virginia which excludes an individual from a pro hoc

vice practice by denying him of his property right under

the Virginia Code in his Virginia Statutory Attorney's

Lien and to protect the same against a Business Con-

21

spiracy, see Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353

U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 l.ed2d 810 (1957) (involving

a law school's graduate's application to sit for the bar

exam), and Knoingsberg v. State Bar of California, 353

U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722 1 L.Ed. 2d 8:10

(1957) (concerning an application by an out-of-state

attorney for permanent admission). In both decisions

the Court held that state are free,to determine the right.

of the practice of law as long as it is not exercised in an

arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

Obviously, in the instant action by refusing to

comply with the Virginia Code's protection given to all

Virginia attorney in their statutory attorney's lien

because the Virginia attorney is providing pro hoc vice

services, is both arbitrary and discriminatory, and a

violation of equal protection. Here both the Circuit

Court and the Supreme Court of Virginia had abused

their respective discretion in disregarding totally the

statutory right of a Virginia Attorney's property right in

his statutory attorney's lien-this is particularly true in

the instant action when the Legal Ethics Opinion (A-

18) specifically stated that he could sue to prevent

fraud, and that since January 2004, Rodriguez has

been the subject of a vigorous investigating of the

Virginia Bar Complaint filed SSA Entities against

Rodriguez for his attempt to enforce his lien

B. Demand for Jury Trail

In Warren Christopher, Former Secretary of State,

et Al., Petitioners V. Jennifer K. Harbury, 2002 U.S.

LEXIS 4647, 536 U.S. 403; 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2198; 153

22

L. Ed. 2d 413 (2002), this court held that decisions of

this Court have grounded the right of access to courts

in Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, Cham-

bers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148, 52

L. Ed. 143, 28 S. Ct. 34, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 498 (1907), the

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Murray v.

Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct.

2765, n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion), and the Four-

teenth Amendment Equal Protection, Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 107 S. Ct.

1990 (1987), and Due Process Clauses, Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S.

Ct. 2963, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 336 (1974); Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-381 (1971).

In Christopher supra, the Court discussed two

types of denial of access to the Court, the first based on

claims that systemic official action to frustrate a

plaintiff in preparing and filing suits. Thus, denial of

access to the court was found in M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519

U.S. 102, 106, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct. 555-107

(1996) (record fee in parental-rights termination

action); the second, category covers a specific case that

cannot now be tried (or tried with all material evi-

dence), no matter what official action may be in the

future, e.g., Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261

(CA7 1984) ("The cover-up and resistance of the

investigating police officers rendered hollow [the

plaintiff's] right to seek redress"), the loss of an oppor-

tunity to sue, e.g., Swekel v. River Rouge, 119 F.3d

1259, 1261 (CA6 1997) (police cover-up extended

throughout "time to file suit . . . under . . . statute of

23

limitations"), or the loss of an opportunity to seek some

particular order of relief.

Thus based on the clear mandate of the Virginia

legislature and the Virginia Constitution the Courts of

Virginia cannot grant in summary fashion SSA Entities,

Vander Jagt and Pledger’s because Article I, § 11 of the

Constitution of Virginia states, “{t]hat no person shall

be deprived of his . . . property without due process of

law; .... That in controversies respecting property, .

.. , trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to

be held sacred. .. .”

In interpreting this mandate the Supreme Court

stated in Supinger v. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 203, 495

S.E.2d 813 (1998), that “[i]n Virginia, the right to trial

by jury extends to civil litigants . . . ,” and they are

entitled to a fair and impartial jury trial. Edlow v.

Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 347, 415 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1992);

see VA Code § 8.01-336 (B-4). "Trial by jury is a

sacred right, and should be sedulously guarded."

Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200, 212, 24 S.E. 830,

833 (1896).”(Emphasis added).

In Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services, 257 Va.

1, 10, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999), involving as here a case

dealing with “special legislation,” this Court explained

that,

at the time the Constitution was adopted, the

jury's sole function was to resolve disputed

facts, that this continues to be a jury's sole

function [citations omitted],and that the jury's

24

fact-finding function extends to the assessment

of damages. [Etheridge [ v. Medical Center Hospi-

tals, 237 Va. 87, 95-96, 376 S.E.2d 529

(1989)}.

Rodriguez repeatedly requested a trial by jury,

and never waived this right under the Constitution of

Virginia and VA Code § 8.01-336(b) (B-4), of this

action regarding special legislation enacted to enforce

and protect his perfected charging Attorney’s Lien for

pro hoc vice services. Thus it was a denial of equal

protection to issue a summary dismissal of this action

under special legislation. This particularly true given

the admissions in SSA Entities Virginia Bar Complaint

of an ongoing Business Conspiracy in violation of VA

Code § 18.2-499 and § 500.”

GC. The Court of Virginia ignored Stare Decisis

Rodriguez is an active member in good standing

of the Virginia Bar since 1982, providing pro hoc vice

services. In its Legal Ethics Opinion the Virginia State

Bar confirmed that they supervised Rodriguez’s profes

'3Summary judgment is available to a litigant only when

no material facts are in dispute. Turner v. Lotts, 244 Va. 554, 556,

422 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1992). Here SSA Entities disputed the

material conflict in the evidence regarding the nature of Rodri-

guez’s agreement, and his right to protect his perfected charging

Virginia Attorney’s Lien from common law torts and business

conspiracy. Disputes of material facts should be submitted to the

finder of fact and not resolved in a summary fashion. Brown v.

Sparks, 262 Va. 567, 571, 554 S.E.2d 449 (2001).

25

sional conduct irrespective of where he practices and

he could sue against SSA Entities fraud (A-18). There-

fore, as noted above under the special legislation

requirement under Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution

of Virginia, any disparate treatment by the Court of

Virginia of Rodriguez statutory protected contract

rights under the special legislation of VA Code § 54.1-

3932, would also be a violation of his right to due

process and equal protection of the laws under Article

I, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, unless they

Courts can show the reasonableness of their rules of

procedure. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman,

487 U.S. 59, 108 S.Ct. 2260 (1988).

Thus the Courts of Virginia cannot issue sum-

mary unpublished orders granting SSA Entities, Vander

Jagt and Pledger motions without overruling the stare

decisis in Hughes v. Cole, 251 Va. 3 at 27, 465 S.E.2d

820(1996), regarding the enforcement and protection

of the special legislation protecting a perfected charg-

ing Virginia Attorney’s Lien.

Here the Circuit Court specifically refused to

explain either the facts or law which permitted it to

disregard the special legislation design to enforce

Rodriguez’s perfected charging Virginia Attorney’s Lien,

and logically his right to protect a perfected charging

lien from the common law torts (A-9).

However this Court has held that, "property

interests . . . are created and their dimensions are

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem

from an independent source such as state law,"

26

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990

(1984). Thus to deny Rodriguez’s his right to enforce

his perfected charging Attorney’s Lien based on pro hoc

vice service outside of Virginia and his right to protect

his statutory property rights is a clear denial of due

process and equal protection of the laws pursuant to

Article I, § 11, and Article IV, § 14 of the Virginia

Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution by overruling

through judicial fiat the stare decisis of Hughes v. Cole,

251 Va. 3 at 27, 465 S.E.2d 820(1996); Heinzman v.

Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 234 S.E.2d 282

(1977); and Fary v. Aquino, 218 Va. 889, 241 S.E. 2d

799 (1978) (as well as developed in the Fourth Circuit;

Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d. 170 (4 Cir. 1933); Tignor v.

Parkison, 729 F.2d. 977 (4™ Cir. 1984); Katopodis v.

Liberian S/T Olympic Sun, 282 F.Supp. 369 (E.D. Va.

1968) [Rodriguez’s rights as a party in interest in the

contract litigation against Colombia for the 14 Treasure

Trove based on his perfected charging VA Attorney’s

Liens]; Montavon v. United States, 864 F.Supp. 519

(E.D. Va. 1994) [Rodriguez’s right in this charging lien

remaining inchoate until the favorable judgement is

confirmed]; and, Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum & F ine,

217Va. 958, 234 S.E.2d 282 (1977)[Rodriguez is

entitled to a fee based on quantum merit for his pro hoc

vice services].'* Here the Virginia General Assembly, as

14The law is clear that ‘when .. . an attorney employed

under a contingent fee contract is discharged without just cause .

.. the discharged attorney is entitled to a fee based upon quantum

merit for services rendered prior to discharge and, as security for

such fees, to the lien granted by [VA Code § 54.1-3932]. (citation

27

confirmed in the above decisions determined that a

property interest exists for Virginia attorneys, but there

has been a deprivation of property by the Courts of

Virginia procedures regarding enforcement of Attor-

ney’s Lien].

In effect all of these statutory property rights as

a Virginia attorney are lost to Rodriguez by the Courts

of Virginia not following the Virginia Code and stare

decisis. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed it

well in Garcia v. San Antonio MTA, 469 U.S. 528, 530

(1985) when he stated: "any departure from the

doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.

... The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect

for the authority of this Court, are not served by the

precipitous overruling of multiple precedents."’”

omitted).” Hughes v. Cole 251 Va. at 23. Also Rodriguez’s rights

as a Virginia statutory creditor of SSA Entities cause SSA Entities

director’s, and their lobbyist, and attorneys, primary duty to shift

to Rodriguez as a creditor, upon the dissolving of Sea Search-

Armada and Armada Company. I.T. Sales, Inc. v. Dry, 222 Va. 6,

278 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1981).

“Even the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that,

“In Virginia, the doctrine of stare decisis is more than a

mere cliche. That doctrine plays a significant role in the orderly

administration of justice by assuring consistent, predictable, and

balanced application of legal principles. And when a court of last

resort has established a precedent, after full deliberation upon the

issue by the court, the precedent will not be treated lightly or

ignored, in the absence of flagrant error or mistake.” Selected

Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581

(1987).

28

Based on the undisputed fact SSA Entities

knowingly entered into a contingency fee agreement

with Rodriguez subsequent to the VA Bar Ethics

Opinion (A-18), SSA Entities, Vander Jagt, and Pledger

could expect to be sued in Virginia to enforce and

protect the perfected charging Virginia Attorney’s Lien.

This is logical, fair and in‘accordance with due process

requirements because SSA Entities transacted business

in Virginia by gaining the protection of Virginia laws

for 12 years of Rodriguez’s fiduciary services as a

Virginia attorney, which were under the control of the

Virginia State Bar. To do otherwise would be unjust

and discriminatory since Virginia has the undisputed

interest in protecting Rodriguez’s rights under its

special legislation-there is no contrary interest to

suggest that Virginia’s public policies should not

control.

CONCLUSION

Paradoxically as the practice of law has become

more national and international since this Courts

holding in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,

470 U.S. 274 (1985) and the advent of electronic

communications, the courts have sought to limit the

practice of law, thus Courts of Virginia summary ruling

have demonstrate an impermissible discriminatory

attitude to Rodriguez as a Virginia attorney with an

international pro hoc vice practice which at all times

has been under supervision of the Virginia State Bar

(A-18), by denying to him the right to enforce his

property rights in his perfected attorney’s lien VA Code

§ 54.1-3932, and protect said lien from a fraudulent

29

business conspiracy by SSA Entities, VanderJagt and

Pledger in violation of VA Code § 18.2-500. For the

above reasons the petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ov: lax one: ball

Isidoro Rodriguez, Eeq.

Attorney of Record for Petitioner

Admission to the Bar of

The United States Supreme Court 1992

THE LAW OFFICES OF RODRIGUEZ, SIBLEY &

MENDOZA, LLP

2304 Farrington Avenue

Alexandria, Virginia 22303-1520

30

TIE aaa

APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENT

Appendix A, Orders and 1990 VA Bar Ethics Opinion:

November 5, 2004 Unpublished Order of the

Supreme Court of Virginia denying motion to defer

issuance of mandate in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. HFP,

Inc. Et al., Record No. 040942 ............... A-1

November 5, 2004 Unpublished Orde: of the

Supreme Court of Virginia denying motion to defer

issuance of mandate in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Guy

Vanderjagt, Esq. Et al., Record No. 040941 ..... A-2

October 12, 2004 Unpublished Order of the Supreme

Court of Virginia refusing the Petition for Appeal in

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. HFP, Inc., et al., Record No.

| Pe ea ror ran eer ea ee A-3

October 1, 2004 Unpublished Order of the Supreme

Court of Virginia denying Petition for Rehearing in

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Guy Vanderjagt, Esq. Et al.,

PN FUR GUE ov cee wks acess beanane es A-4

August 13, 2004 Unpublished Order of the Supreme

Court of Virginia refusing the Petition for appeal in

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Guy Vanderjagt, Esq. Et al.,

eg errr rrr errr Tyee res A-5

February 27, 2004 part of hearing transcript before

THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR..,

Fairfax County Circuit Court in Isidoro Rodriguez,

Esq. v. HFP, Inc., et al., At Law No 215327 ..... A-6

February 27, 2004 Order of THE HONORABLE

ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR. ............ A-10

January 23, 2004 part of hearing transcript before

THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR..,

in Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq. v. Guy Vanderjagt, Esq. et

Gh, PET TG BEGGARS 6 oss n dis ecrddvncase A-11

January 23, 2004 Order of THE HONORABLE

ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR. ............ A-16

Virginia Bar Legal Ethics Opinion #1325, February

Be re VEN ewe eh a EA He REA OAD A-18

SECTIONS OF U.S. AND VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION,

AND VIRGINIA STATUTES INVOLVED

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, Art. IV,2 ..... B-1

PDRENIREINE Vino nck cbse sds ceded ste es B-1

pot ty | ere ree ee ee ee B-1

PIMEINDIIREIGE AY oc ence encased neseeens B-1

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, SECTION 11 ... B-1

Virginia Code § 54.1-3932. Lien for fees ....... B-2

Virgie Code $ 1B.2-4G9 onsen cecccsscs B-2

Virginia Code § 18.2-500 ..............008. B-2

Virginie CoGe § GO1-S2G.1 2.6 wc ca ens B-3

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 5th day of November, 2004.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

V. Record No. 040942

Circuit Court No. L215327

HFP, Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

From the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

On October 15, 2004 came Isidoro Rodriguez,

Esquire and filed a motion to defer issuance of the

mandate in this case. Upon consideration whereof,

the Court denies the motion.

A copy,

Teste:

S

Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 5th day of November, 2004.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

v. Record No. 040941

Circuit Court No. L215327

Guy Vanderjagt, Esq., et al.,

Appellees.

From the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

On October 5, 2004 came Isidoro Rodriguez,

Esquire and filed a motion to defer issuance of the

mandate in this case. Upon consideration whereof,

the Court denies the motion.

A copy,

Teste:

S

Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 12th day of October, 2004.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

V. Record No. 040942

Circuit Court No. L215327

HFP, Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

From the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

Upon review of the record in this case and

consideration of the argument submitted in support

of the granting of the appeal, the Court is of the

opinion there is no reversible error in judgement

complained of. Accordingly, the Court refuses the

petition for appeal.

Upon further consideration whereof,

appellant's motion for judicial notice is denied.

A copy,

Teste:

S

Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 1* day of October, 2004.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

v. Record No. 040941

Circuit Court No. L215327

Guy Vanderjagt, Esq., et al.,

Appellees.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing

On consideration of the petition of the appellant

to set aside the judgement rendered herein on the 13th

of August, 2004 and grant a rehearing thereof, the

prayer of the said petition is denied.

A copy,

Teste:

S

Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 13" day of August, 2004.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq.

Appellant,

v. Record No. 040941

Circuit Court No. L215327

Guy Vanderjagt, Esq., et al.,

Appellees.

From the Circuit Court of Fairfax County

Upon review of the record in this case and

consideration of the argument submitted in support

and in opposition to the granting of the appeal, the

Court is of the opinion there is no reversible error in

judgement complained of. Accordingly, the Court

refuses the petition for appeal.

A copy,

Teste:

S

Clerk

A-5

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, ESQ..,

Plaintiff,

At Law No.

vs. 215327

GUY VANDERJAGT, ESQ., et al.,

Respondent.

* * * * *

Fairfax Virginia

Friday, February 27, 2004

The proceedings commenced at 10:12 a.m.

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR.

* * * * *

MR. PLEDGER (Page 2, line 8): . . . The issue is

not whether Mr. Rodriguez has an attorney's lien or

does not have an attorney's lien. The issue is whether

this Court has jurisdiction over these nonresidents and

whether service under the Long Arm Statute of Virginia

is appropriate.

MR PLEDGER (line 3, line 6): You know this has

been ruled on by other judges in Virginia. It has been

ruled on by appellate courts based on the ruling in the

District Court, and it has been the subject of petitions

for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United

A-6

States. ...

THE COURT (Page 3, line 14): The rulings in

the Federal District court or courts, did they follow an

evidentiary hearing or not?

MR. PLEDGER (Page 3, Line 17): There was no

evidentiary hearing. There was just a hearing on the

motions. Judge Cachceris held a hearing and Judge

Lee in the second case held a hearing. Both involving

basically the same issue; that is, does Virginia long arm

jurisdiction apply in this particular case... ..

THE COURT (Page 4, line 11): I don’t have any

questions. Thank you.

MR. RODRIGUEZ (Page 4, Line 17): To take off

where my opposing counsel left off, the federal courts,

both Judge Cachceris and Judge Lee never dealt with

the Virginia statutory issues. . . . (Page 5, line 12)

[NJone of these decisions, neither in the District Court

nor in the federal [appeals] court ever dealt the with

the issue of Virginia statutory rights, either in the

Virginia statutory lien or under the _ business

conspiracy statute. They dealt with it on simple

contract terms.

MR. RODRIGUEZ (Page 8, Line 20): They being

Sea Search Armada entities was all managed by Mr.

Harbeston. And based on the[ir] Virginia Bar

complaint, which I provided the Court a copy of, which

is essentially a surreal confession of all that I have

alleged. ...

(Page 9, Line 19) The Key to this thing is two

issues: Hugh v. Cole, dealing with the Virginia

attorney's need for enforcement of the attorney's lien,

and the [Virginia] Supreme Court has said there is not

limitations; that here, after the [1991] Virginia Bar

A-7

complaint was filed , these parties entered int a new

contingent fee contract [with me], and that as

consideration of that , the removal of the hourly fee

contract. ...

(Page 10, line 5)The second part is a business

conspiracy. Subsequent to the negotiation[s with

Colombia in 1998], I believe, that is when they [say]

and if you read the[ir] Virginia Bar complaint, they

essentially say that for the last 112 years, I was a

translator to my agent. And that I was supposed to be

paid by my agent.

Now, that, if nothing else, gives a prima facie

case there is some type of conspiracy confession

{which must go to a jury]. And that’s the second part

of this lawsuit.

Now, the second part, the business conspiracy

statue issue, was never de’ It with by Judge Lee, either

under contract - -or judge Cachceris. So jurisdiction

exists both under § 8.01-328-1[1], because there was

transacted business subsequent to the entering of the

contingency fee contract, continuously, in order to

maintain the law suit in Colombia. And second, for

business conspiracy under the same statute, [3] and

[4], dealing with tortious acts in and out of Virginia to

damage my reputation, my business and my profession.

THE COURT (Page 13, Line 9); All right, sir.

Thank you. The motion for defendants to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction is granted.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: May I respectfully request a

reason as to why?

> THE COURT: Because I believe the motion is well

taken. That's the only reason I'm going to give you.

i: = 2 2 "

(At 10:37 a.m. proceeding concluded)

Joy R. Dawson, Registered Merit Reporter

A-9

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

RODRIGUEZ

Plaintiff/Complaint

V. Law No. 215327

Vander Jagt et al.,

Defendant/Respondent,

ORDER

This case came to be heard on the 27" day of

February, 2004, on the Defendants motion to dismiss.

Upon the matters presented to the Court at the

Hearing it is, ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED

as follows: that the motion of the defendants HFP, Inc.,

IOTA Partners LP; Murdock & Company; Jerome

Baron, Jack Harbeston and Edris S. Harbeston to

dismiss is granted. Further Ordered that these

defendants motion for sanctions is denied.

Entered, this 27" day of February, 2004.

/S/

Robert W. Wooldridge, Circuit Court Judge

Objection based on issues raised in Response

Brief, and as noted in argument.

/S/ ae

Isidoro Rodriguez R. Harrison Pledger, Jr.

Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant

A-10

VIRGINIA: | |

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.,

Plaintiff,

At Law No.

vs. 215327

GUY VANDERJAGT, ESQ., et al.,

Respondent.

* * = * *

The above-entitled matter came for motion

hearing on Friday, January 23, 2004, commencing at

11:50 a.m., at 4110 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax,

Virginia, before Deborah Rinaldo, Notary Public,

M.A.R. Reporting Group, Professional Court Reporters,

www.mar-reporting.com, (703)534-1225

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. WOOLDRIDGE, JR.

* * * * *

MR. MCDONOUGH (Page 6, line 12):.... I represent

the attorney who was hired by SSA and its various

entities and general partners in defense of the lawsuit

by Mr. Rodriguez to try to collect his claimed attorney's

fees that he earned representing that entity.

It's our position that this is --really what Mr.

Rodriguez is trying to do is to prosecute that core case

against his former client and he wants to do it in

A-11

Virginia. He's been rejected twice by the Eastern

District of Virginia, and those were affirmed on appeal.

The petition to the U.S. Supreme court was

denied and now the second federal case has gone

through Eastern District of Virginia, Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals, and now that’s on petition to the

Supreme Court. I suspect that will be rejected as well.

Mr. Rodriguez wants to have those claims heard

in Virginia. In order to do that he has added Mr.

Pledger and his law firm and Mr. Vander Jagt as

individual defendants of the claim solely to try to get

jurisdiction in Virginia to his claims.

He doesn’t want to go where the federal court

told him to go. The federal Court told him, you don’t

have proper jurisdiction in Virginia. You may have

claims. Go to them in the right court.

That's our position there today. It's the same

thing again. If he wants to pursue his attorney's lien,

he needs to go against his former client, SSA in a

proper jurisdiction following the federal court's

instructions on that regard. ...

MR. RODRIGUEZ (Page 9, line 15):. . . .This case

essentially involves statutory rights on the attorney's

lien as well as a business conspiracy statute. And the

benchmark, as stated by Supreme Court in dealing with

statutory construction, is Abby v. Willey, W-I-L-L-E-Y, at

497 southeast 526-253 Virginia 88, 1997.

And I quote, "Where the legislature has used

words of a plain and definite import, the court cannot

put upon them a construction which amounts to

holding the legislature did not mean what it has

actually expressed."

With regard to those two statute, there were two

A-12

2

4

sf

clear public expressions of policy that the Virginia

legislature intended. One was the payment of ar

attorney for his fees if he was dismissed prior to the

termination of litigation of contracts; and two, if there

was an attempt to deprive him and damage him of his

business convention to have a cause of action.

Now, the [interpretation of ] Virginia statute of

attorney's lien from the Virginia Supreme Court in

Hague v. Cole says it very emphatically. And I quote,

"Virginia Code 54-392 is broad and permits no

interpretation limits to the benefits of [the] statute to

a Virginia lawyer."

The business conspiracy _ statute says,

"Conspiracy is an agreement between two individuals

or more who by concert in action seek to commit an

offense." . . . That's in Bowman v. Commonwealth, 11

Virginia Appeals 259 (1990).

Again, the Virginia Court of Appeals stated in

Brown v,. Commonwealth at 10 Virginia Appeals 73

(1990), "Proof of an explicit agreement is not required.

The agreement may be proved by circumstantial

evidence. |

What we have here is a lobbyist/negotiator/

attorney by the name of Guy Vander Jagt, former

congressman, who form 1988 to the present or to

sometime - - unspecified time was the negotiator of a

contract litigation against the Republic of Colombia.

At the same time that I was legal representative

for the entities that was litigating and forced to be in

Colombia, when the negotiations began and I began to

inquire [in 1998], then shut me out. I cam forward to

Virginia to find out what occurred.

A-13

THE COURT: I have read your motion for

judgement and I’ve read the amended motion for

judgement. We are really dealing now with the issues

that are raised on the demurrer.

MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Page 12, line 20) The issue is whether or not giving

12 years of participation as a chief lobbyist/negotiator

[by] Mr. Vander Jagt, all of a sudden the entities that

I had been litigating [for can be permitted to ] simply

disappear.

They negotiated some type of settlement in the

Republic of Colombia and dissolved ....

Now, Mr. Pledger, during the period that I was

attempting to exercise my rights [as a Virginia

Attorney] under the Virginia code, and Mr. Vander ~

Jagt, as well as in the federal district court in the

District of Columbia, raised the issue as if it was [only

a simple] contract suit.

They used whatever influence they had. Ans as

I pointed out int the [U.S. Supreme Court petition,

unless there is an exception--The Rodriguez exception

to the Virginia statute that permits the federal [and

state] courts to ignore the statutory language and

simply decide the case on contracts, there is a prima

facie case that has to go to a jury....

(page 13, line 13) .... [the demurrer] as the

Court knows, in effect accepts as true, for purposes of

he demurrer, all of my allegations in the first amended

complaint.

The only question before this Court is a legal

one, whether the statute that gave me the attorney's

lien. . . deserves the protection of the statute against a

business conspiracy.

A-14

(Page 14, line 18). . . . there is not one citation

to the statutory issue which was the basis of the

gravamen of the entire complaint. . . .

Because of that fact that the case was never

dealt with, the gravamen of the complaint [regarding

rights under Virginia Statute], they dealt with the case

[as if it were] a contract, the twin doctrines of

collateral estoppel or res judicata are not germane.

And I fact, the business conspiracy statute was never

even discussed.

The Court (page 16, line 3) The defendants'

demurrers are sustained without leave to amend, and

I dismiss these defendants as parties in this case. I

dismiss the claims against them.

The defendant’s motion for sanctions is denied.

The plaintiffs motion are moot. give me an order

please before you all leave.

A-15

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

Isidoro Rodriguez, Esq..,

Plaintiff/Complaint,

v. Law No. 215327

Guy Vander Jagt et al.,

Defendant/Respondent,

ORDER

This case came to be heard on the 23 day of

January, 2004, on the Defendants motion to Strike,

Demurrer and Sanctions filed by Pledger and by

Vander Jagt. ,

Upon the matters presented to the Court at the

Hearing it is, ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED

as follows: Pledger’s motion to Strike and Motion for

Sanctions is denied and Vander Jagt’s motion to strike

and Motion for Sanctions is Denied. Pledger’s

Demutrrer is Sustained and all claims against Pledger

individually and Pledger & Feord are dismissed with

prejudice. Vander Jagt’s Demurrer is sustained and all

claims against Vander Jagt are dismissed with

prejudice.

_Entered, this 23rd day of January, 2004.

/S/

Robert W. Wooldridge, Circuit Court Judge

A-16

Objection to dismissal of

Vander Jagt and Pledger.

Objection to dismissal

with prejudice.

/S/ /S/

Isidoro Rodriguez Counsel for

Counsel for Plaintiff Defendant Vander Jagt

/S/

Counsel for

Defendant Pledger

A-17

[SEAL]

50 Years Public Service

Virginia State Bar

1938-1988

VIRGINIA STATE BAR

Tenth Floor, Ross Building, 301 East Main Street

Richmond, Virginia 2319 (804)786-2061

(804)736-5966 (Voice/TDD)

STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS

February 27; 1990

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Isidoro Rodriguez C., Esquire

Calle 84 No. 56-51

Piso 2, Oficina 4

Barranquilla, Colombia S.A.

Re: Legal Ethics Opinion # 1325

Dear Mr. Rodriguez:

I am writing in response to your letter dated January

3, 1990, requesting an informal advisory opinion

from the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on

the Legal ethics (“committee”).

You have advised that, although you are a member of

the Virginia State Bar, you reside and practice in a

South American country. You further indicate that

you entered into an agreement, which was executed

in Idaho, to represent a foreign corporation in the

negotiation, settlement, and/or litigation against a

foreign government resulting from the corporation’s

A-18

claim as finder of a shipwreck which contained an

estimated $3 billion in treasure. The agreement

provided for an hourly fee rate, costs, and monthly

detailed invoices and was affirmed by the

corporation’s Board of Directors which also named

you as Legal Representative for the corporation. You

have described for the committee that a Legal

Representative In the country in which you practice

is distinct from an attorney at law and is the

commercial. representative for the company in that

country with all of the corporate powers of the Board

of Directors and all, of the potential individual

liability. Furthermore, such a Legal Representative is

not required to be an attorney at law. Subsequent to

those corporate actions, you were authorized to bring

a legal action against the foreign government and

you authorized your then-law partner, which

partnership has subsequently been dissolved, to file

the suit as Attorney of Record. The facts you have

provided indicate that the suit was filed shortly after

you authorized your partner to do so.

You indicate that, although much time has been

expended on the case and the corporation repeatedly

expressed satisfaction with the work being performed

by your firm, the corporation has failed to comply

with its contractual agreement to pay invoices after

they were presented. Specifically, the corporation

agreed to pay $10,000 approximately two months

after suit was filed and an additional $50,000 within

30 days thereafter. The first payment ($10,000) was

made as scheduled, but no further payments have

been made by the corporation. Subsequent to that

A-19

first payment, the corporation requested a contingent

fee agreement be submitted for consideration; such a

contract was prepared and submitted, but the

corporation has not responded.

In addition to the failure to pay fees, you indicate

that the corporation, without your knowledge, sent a

defamatory letter against the foreign government

which then prepared an official protest to the United

States Embassy. You indicate that the letter accused

the government and unnamed officials of criminal

acts, subjecting you, as the corporation’s Legal

Representative, to civil liability and both you and

your former law partner to physical danger.

As a result of both issues, failure to pay fees and

costs owed and the defamatory latter, you requested

that the corporation retain a new Legal represen-

tative and a new attorney. You indicate that to date

you have not received any response from the corp-

oration’s Board of Directors.

Finally, you advise that under the law and profes-

sional norms of the foreign government, your former

lev partner has a right to unilaterally and voluntarily

withdraw from the litigation, without any

requirement to seek permission of the trial court. You

indicate that he may also file a civil suit against the

corporation for monies owed during or after litiga-

tion. Your former partner has not exercised those

rights pending your receipt of this informal

advisory opinion.

A-20

You have asked that the committee opine as to the

propriety of your renunciation of your fiduciary

appointment as Legal Representative to the

corporation in view of the non-payment of costs and

fees owed and of the defamatory letter sent by the

corporation to the foreign government. You have

further inquired as to the propriety of your instituting

suit against the corporation for their non-payment of

fees and costs owed.

The appropriate and controlling rules relative to your

questions are DR 1-102(A) (4) which prohibits a

lawyer from engaging “in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation which reflects adversely

on [the] lawyer’s fitness to practice law”; DR 2-

108(B)(2, 3, and 4) which proscribe the conditions

which permit a lawyer to withdraw from

representing a client; DR 2—108©) which directs

that counsel of record in a court proceeding may not

withdraw except by leave of court after notice to the

client of the timeand place of a motion for leave to

withdraw; and DR1-102(B) which instructs that a

lawyer admitted to practice in Virginia is subject to

the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility

although engaged In practice elsewhere, unless

disciplinary rules of the foreign jurisdiction permit

the activity [emphasis added].

The committee is of the opinion that the provisions

of DR 1-102(A)4) embrace far more than an

attorney's conduct in the context of an

attorney/client relationship. Thus, the committee

A-21

opines that when an attorney assumes the

responsibility of acting as a fiduciary and violates his

or her duty in a manner that would justify

disciplinary action had the relationship been that of

attorney/client, the attorney may be properly

disciplined pursuant to the Code of Professional

Responsibility. The committee thus specifically

adopts the conclusions reached in ABA Formal

Opinion 336. See also: State. v_Freeman, 229 Kan.

639, 629 P.2d 716 (1981); and Committee on

Professional Ethics v. Gross, 322 N.V2d 82 (Iowa

1982).

Virginia Disciplinary Rule 2-108(B), subsections (2),

(3), and (4), directs that a lawyer may withdraw

from representing a client if (2) the client persists in

a course of conduct involving the lawyer’s services

that the lawyer reasonably believes is illegal or

unjust; (3) the client fails to fulfill an obligation to

the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and such

failure continues after reasonable notice to the client;

or (4) the representation

will result in an unreasonable financial burden on

the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably

difficult by the client. The committee is of the

opinion that, under the facts you have provided, it

would nét be improper to move to withdraw as Legal

Representative for the corporation. See also LEO

#974. The committee understands, however, from

your recitation of the facts, that such permission of

the court is not required in the foreign country in

which you practice. Under those circumstances, the

committee directs your attention to

A-22

DR 1-102(B) which, as noted above, would control.

Therefore, if the professional norms in that country

permit unilateral and voluntary withdrawal from

representation without authorization by the court, it

would not be improper for you to act accordingly.

The committee has earlier opined that there is no

disciplinary rule ethically prohibiting an attorney

from bringing an action against his client for past-

due attorney’s fees end costs. See LEOs #974 and

995. Guidance I available under Ethical

Consideration 2-25 which urges that a lawyer should

not sue a [current] client for a fee unless necessary

to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.

See LEO 11117. But see LEOs #1230 and 1257.

This opinion is advisory only, based only on the facts

you presented and not binding on any court or

tribunal.

Very truly yours,

Kathleen O’Brien

Encl.

cc: C. Torrence Armstrong, Esquire

Willard M. Robinson, Jr., Esquire

Susan B. Spielberg, Esquire

A-23

U.S. CONSTITUTION, PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art IV, 2,

provides that the "Citizens of each State shall be

entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in

the several States."

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

provides in pertinent part, that no person shall “be

deprived of . . . property, without due process of

law.”

The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at

common law, .. . , the right of trial by jury shall be

preserved... .” |

The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the

Fourteenth Amendment provides that, “No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the iaws.”

VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND VIRGINIA

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, SECTION 11. DUE

PROCESS OF LAW; OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS;

. ..3 JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES.

That no person shail be deprived of his .. .

property without due process of law; that the

B-1

General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing j

the obligation of contracts, . .

That in controversies respecting property, and

in suits between man and man, trial by jury is prefer-

able to any other, and ought to be held sacred....

Virginia Code § 54.1-3932. Lien for fees.

Any person having or clajming a right of

action sounding in. . . contract, may contract with

any attorney to prosecute the same, and the attorney

shall have a lien upon the cause of action as security

for his fees for any services rendered in relation to

the cause of action or claim. ...

Title 18.2 Crimes and Offenses Generally , Chap. 12

Miscellaneous, §§ 493 - 510, Art. 2 Conspiracy to

Injure Another in Trade, Business or Profession, §§

499 - 501

Virginia Code § 18.2-499. Combination to injure

others in their reputation, trade, business or

profession: right of employees

(a) Any two or more persons who shall

combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or

concert together for the purpose of wilfully and

maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade,

business or profession by any means whatever, or for

the purpose of wilfully and maliciously compelling

another to do or perform any act against his will, or

preventing or hindering another form doing or

performing any lawful act, shall be jointly and

severally guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. Such

punishment shall be in addition to any civil relief

B-2

recoverable under § 18.2-500.

(b) Any person who attempts to procure the

participation, cooperation, agreement or other

assistance of any one or more persons to enter into

any combination, association, agreement, mutual

understanding or concert prohibited in subsection (a)

of this section shall be guilty of a violation of this

section and subject to the same penalties set out in

subsection (a) hereof.

Virginia Code § 18.2-500. Same; civil relief;

damages and counsel fees; injunctions. —

(a) Any person who shall be injured in his

reputation, trade, business or profession by reason of

a violation of § 18.2-499, may sue therefor and

recover three-fold the damages by him sustained,

and the costs of suit, including a reasonable fee to

plaintiff's counsel; and without limiting the

generality of the term, “damages” shall include loss

of profits. Such counsel shall in no case receive any

other, further or additional compensation except thai :

allowed by the court and any contract to the contrary

shall be null and void.

Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1.

When personal jurisdiction over person may

be exercised.

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction

over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to

._a cause of action arising from the person's:

1. Transacting any business in this

Commonwealth;...;

B-3

3. Causing tortious injury by an act or ))

omission in this Commonwealth;

4. Causing tortuous injury in this Common-

wealth by an act or omission outside this

Commonwealth if he regularly . . .engages in any

other persistent course of conduct, or derives

substantial revenue from . . . services rendered, in

this Commonwealth;. . . .

Virginia Code § 54.1-3910. Organization and

government of Virginia State Bar.

The Supreme Court may promulgate rules and

regulations organizing and governing the Virginia

State Bar. . . . All advisory opinions issued by the

Virginia State Bar's Standing Committees on Legal

Ethics . . . shall be incorporated into the Code of

Virginia....

Virginia Code § 8.01-336. Jury trial of right; waiver

of jury trial... .—

A. The right of trial by jury as declared in

Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia

and by statutes thereof shall be preserved inviolate to

the parties.

B. Waiver of jury trial. — In any action at law

in which the recovery sought is greater than $100,

exclusive of interest, unless one of the parties

demand that the case or any issue thereof be tried by

a jury, ..., the whole matter of law and fact may be

heard and judgment given by the court... .

B-4

pom eS