Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals

| Suprame Court U.S.

(1) | FILED

QO41472 MAY 3 - 2005

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

04 -

SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

JOHN STANTON

Petitioner

Vv

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JOHN STANTON

2101 New Hampshire Avenue NW

Washington DC 20009

202-232-5369

Stanton_John@msn.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does respondent’s conduct in twice arguing for

abstention and then refusing to consider the

constitutional claims dismissed by the district court

in deference to respondent’s argument present

“extraordinary circumstances” making the second

abstention inappropriate?

y 2 In such circumstances is the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (DC

Circuit) correct in summarily affirming the second

abstention?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented

Table of Authorities

Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Statement of the Case:

Background, First Abstention

Second Abstention, Summary

Affirmance

Argument Summary......... srecesoesenneseneinennennenssensnesssehe

Petitioner’s Claims Remain

To be Considered

Respondent’s Conduct is

Extraordinary

Abstention as an Abhorrent

Forfeiture

Conclusion

Page

10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix:

Text of District Court

Memorandum Opinion

Text of 17 November 2004

DC Circuit Order

Text of 11 March 2005

DC Circuit Order

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Carroll v City of Mount Clemens,

945 Fsupp 1071 (EDMI 1996) aff'd

139 F3d 1072 (CA6 1998)

Deakins v Monaghan, 484 US 193,

108 SCt 523 (1988) ............0000

Hirsch v Justices of the Supreme Court

Of California, 67 F3d 708 (CA9 1995)

Page

1A

SA

7A

Page(s)

10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Juidice v Vail, 430 US 327, 97 SCt 1211 (1977) .......

Kugler v Helfant, 421 US 117, 95 SCt 1524 (1975) .......

Middlesex County Ethics Committee v

Garden State Bar Assiation et al,

457 US 423, 102 SCt 2515 (1982)

Moore v Sims, 442 US 415, 99 SCt 2371 (1979) ......0.

Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC

404, 127 F3d 72 (1997), cert denied 519 US 1142,

117 SCt 1018 (1997) mandamus denied

§25 US 808, 119 SCt 282 (1998) cert denied

120 SCt 2007 (2000)

In re Stanton, 757 A2d 87 (DC 2000) ........cccseseeoeeee

In re Stanton, 860 A2d 369 (DC 2004) petition

for cert filed 12 April 2005 (US 04-1355)

Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 91 SCt 746 (1971) ......

JURISDICTION

This petition under United States (US) Code Section

28-1254 is for review of the 17 November 2004 DC Circuit

order in CADC 04-7065 summarily affirming the abstention

dismissal in US District Court 02-574 made final by the 11

March 2005 order denying rehearing. Copies of both DC

Circuit orders and the district court memorandum opinion

are appended.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

US Constitution, Amendment I

“[There] shall [be] no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech.”

US Constitution, Amendment V

“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property without

due process of law.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents the question whether the DC

Circuit’s summary affirmance of the district’s court’s

dismissal (based on abstention) of constitutional claims

against respondent’s DC Bar disciplinary system was

correct following respondent’s deliberate failure (for the

second time) to consider such claims after arguing for

abstention.

Background, First Abstention

The history of what the DC Circuit has called the

“serial dispute”’ between the parties over the lawlessness of

respondent’s BPR and respondent’s deference to the BPR in

interpreting the DC Bar disciplinary rules to require

advocacy for guilty pleas by counsel for the accused in

criminal prosecutions is stated at pages 1-17 of the petition

' Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC 404, 405, 127 F3d 72,

73 (1997) cert denied 519 US 1142, 117 SCt 1018 (1997) mandamus

denied 525 US 808, 119 SCt 282 (1998) cert denied 529 US 1130, 120

SCt 2007 (2000). The dispute is over petitioner’s “view of a lawyer’s

proper role in assisting clients with guilty pleas,” In re Stanton, 757

A2d 87, 88 (DC 2000) cert denied 532 US 943, 121 SCt 1406 (2001), for

which he was suspended from practice by respondent, and his

“personal disagreement,” bid, with respondent's interpretation of the

disciplinary rules to require advocacy for guilty pleas. Although

petitioner pledges “to comply with the unconstitutional requirement

by constitutional means,” Jd at 89, respondent says his reinstatement

must be denied “due to doubt about his willingness to conform his

conduct to the disciplinary rules as interpreted,” Jd at 88, In re

Stanton, 860 A2d 369, 370 (DC 2004). Respondent says that to have

any chance at reinstatement petitioner must explain “how his position

has changed,” In re Stanton, 757 Ald at 89, on respondent’s

interpretation of its disciplinary rules.

2

for certiorari filed 12 April 2005 in a related case, Stanton v

DC Court of Appeals, US 04-1355. While his third

reinstatement action was pending before respondent

petitioner “filed suit in federal court posing constitutional

challenges both to the substantive provisions of the DC

Rules of Professional Conduct . . . and to the procedures

governing reinstatement.” “The district court dismissed . .

- On grounds of abstention . . . because of the pending

proceeding in the DC judicial system” and petitioner

appealed from the dismissal to the DC Circuit.

For many months the DC Circuit did nothing on

petitioner’s appeal even after respondent again denied his

reinstatement without any consideration of his constitutional

challenges until he petitioned for a writ of certiorari before

judgment. Then the DC Circuit proceeded to “reverse the

judgment regarding [petitioner’s] procedural claims and

remand the case for further proceedings.“ On further

proceedings, however, the district court stayed all discovery,

refused to make findings on petitioner’s claims, and

dismissed them for the second time. On appeal from the

second dismissal the DC Circuit took judicial notice of

unspecified mysterious “facts of public record” to affirm

summarily by converting the dismissal into a summary

judgment. ,

* Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC at 405-406, 127 F3d at

73-74.

* Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC at 406, 127 F3d at 74.

The suit alleged that the constitutional challenges posed had been

presented to respondent but that respondent would not consider them.

* Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC at 412, 127 F3d at 80.

The DC Circuit expressly found that respondent “hald] not

considered,” Id at 409, 127 F3d at 77, the constitutional claims or

challenges it had asked the district court to dismiss “on grounds of

abstention.”

* Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, CADC 99-7093 (20 October 1999) cert

denied 529 US 1130, 120 SCt 2007 (2000).

3

Second Abstention, Summary Affirmance

During the proceedings before the district court

and the DC Circuit after the remand from the first

abstention petitioner pursued his fourth reinstatement

action before respondent. Again denying reinstatement,

respondent said (1) “If petitioner’s understanding of his

ethical duty is exactly the same . . . he will not be

heard,” (2) “the lawyer is expected to give voice in court

to the client’s decision to plead guilty,”’ (3) “Our

consideration of [BPR] findings and recommendations is

similar to our review of administrative agency decisions,”®

(4) “In reaching our decision we rely solely on the

assertions contained in the petition,” and (5) “the doctrine

of ex post facto application of law, to the extent that

petitioner relies on it, by itself does not pertain to attorney

discipline.””*

* In re Stanton, 757 A2d at 89, adding that, “as the [BPR] noted in the

penultimate paragraph of it’s dismissal order, petitioner has not yet

come to grips with the substance of his misconduct which led to his

suspension and to the repeated rejection by [respondent] and the

[BPR] of his efforts to gain reinstatement,” Jbid. The BPR order had

demanded “straightforward acceptance” of the requirement of

advocacy for guilty pleas.

” In re Stanton, 757 A2d at 90. Respondent said the obligations to the

client under the DC Bar disciplinary rules “override the lawyer’s First

Amendment interests,” bid.

* In re Stanton, 757 A2d at 91, such similar consideration to be

accorded even though “{BPR] proceedings do not offer the same

| procedural protections,” bid, and “the [BPR] does not follow the same

procedures as District administrative agencies,” Ibid.

* In re Stanton, 757 A2d at 89, disregarding “views as expressed at oral

argument,” /bid, and in briefs contesting the BPR dismissal order.

'© In re Stanton, 757 A2d at 90, indicating that the ex post facto

doctrine would not de deemed to pertain to respondent’s

reinstatement factors of the nature and circumstances of the

misconduct for which petitioner has been suspended or of his

recognition of the seriousness of his misconduct.

4

As a result of these rulings in his fourth

reinstatement action when he filed his fifth reinstatement

action petitioner complained to the district court of

constitutional deprivations in respondent’s disciplinary

system: (1) deprivation of freedom of expression by the

demand for uncritical “straightforward acceptance” of

respondent’s interpretation of the DC Bar disciplinary rules

to require advocacy for guilty pleas by counsel for the

accused in criminal prosecutions, (2) deprivation of freedom

of expression by the interpretation on the DC Bar

disciplinary rules to require counsel for the accused in

criminal prosecutions to announce or give voice to decisions

to plead guilty even when the accused are ready, willing, and

able to announce such decisions personally, (3) deprivation

of due process of law by respondent’s undue deference to the

findings and recommendations reported by the lawless BPR,

(4) deprivation of due process of law by respondent’s

practice of considering only the allegations of reinstatement

petitions and of disregarding arguments made in

explanation and defense of the allegations against BPR

attack, and (5) deprivation of due process of law by

’ respondent’s demand for an admission of misconduct as a

condition for reinstatement with abrogation of the

prohibition against ex post facto application of the

disciplinary rules. Petitioner asked the district court to

declare unconstitutional as alleged in his complaint

respondent’s interpretations of the DC Bar disciplinary

rules and as well as the challenged practices and provisions

of the DC Bar disciplinary process.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint,

arguing that petitioner would have an adequate

opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in his

pending reinstatement action. Petitioner opposed the

motion, arguing that the history of respondent’s bad faith

default following the first abstention overcame any

presumption of honesty and integrity and made a second

abstention out of the question. While the district court

5

entertained this motion petitioner conducted discovery and

moved for summary judgment based on indisputable facts

established by respondent’s discovery responses and

published opinions.

While respondent’s motion to dismiss and

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment were pending

the BPR reported its findings and recommendation to

respondent on petitioner’s fifth reinstatement action.

Petitioner then filed a civil statement informing the district

court of the BPR report and attaching a copy of it. In the

statement petitioner pointed out the fact that the BPR had

reported no findings on petitioner’s constitutional claims but

had ducked and disregarded them as “a diatribe against the

disciplinary system”’' “disrespect for the disciplinary

system,”’* or “a broad-based and irrational assault on the

disciplinary system.””

Unaffected by this information, the district court

decided that it would “abstain from exercising jurisdiction

under Younger abstention doctrine”’* and so petitioner

appealed to the DC Circuit from this second abstention from

the “serial dispute” between the parties. Both parties moved

for summary disposition of the appeal Petitioner argued

that there was no reason to doubt but every reason to expect

that respondent intended to repeat the pattern of arguing

for abstention and then deliberately failing to consider the

claims or challenges dismissed by the district court “on

grounds of abstention” respondent had argued.

For several months nothing happened on _ the

summary disposition motions but when respondent denied

petitioner’s reinstatement “for the reasons set forth in the

"! In re Stanton, 860 A2d at 372.

'2 In re Stanton, 860 A2d at 381.

3 In re Stanton, 860 A2d at 381.

'* District court memorandum opinion at 2-3, Appendix at 4A,

referring to Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 91 SCt 746 (1971).

6

[BPR] report and recommendation””> the DC Circuit

summarily affirmed the district court abstention, stating in

the summary affirmance order that “although [petitioner]

argues that he does not have an adequate opportunity to

present his constitutional claims during the reinstatement

proceedings . . . [respondent’s] published opinions denying

reinstatement show otherwise”’’ and that “[petitioner’s]

allegations of bad faith are unsupported by the record.”””

Petitioner requested rehearing. He argued that

respondent’s latest published opinion considered none of his

five claims for relief from (1) respondent’s demand for

uncritical acceptance of advocacy for guilty pleas, (2)

respondent’s demand that counsel for the accused give voice

to decisions of the accused to plead guilty, (3) respondent’s

refusal to consider views as expressed in briefs and oral

arguments, (4) respondent’s undue deference to the lawless

BPR, and (5) respondent’s abrogation of the prohibition

against ex post facto application of the disciplinary rules. He

reminded the DC Circuit that in such circumstances it

“would ordinarily vacate the district court’s abstention and

remand the case.”"® He asked for another remand to the

district court for findings on his claims but the DC Circuit

refused any rehearing so then came this petition.

'S In re Stanton, 860 A2d at 371.

© DC Circuit summary affirmance order at 1-2, Appendix at 6A, with

not a word about what respondent’s latest published opinion otherwise

shows.

‘7 DC Circuit summary affirmance order at 2, Appendix at 6A, adding

that petitioner’s allegations “do not rise to the level of ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ which would warrant federal intervention,” Jbid, citing

as examples cases where “bad faith” meant “that a prosecution has

been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid

conviction,” Kugler v Helfant, 421 US 117, 126, 95 SCt 1524, 1531

(1975), cases decided before abstention was extended to bar

disciplinary proceedings in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v

Garden State Bar Association et al, 457 US 423, 102 SCt 2515 (1982).

18 Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC at 406, 127 F3d at 74.

ARGUMENT

As if weaving transparent new clothes to conceal the

lawlessness of an evil empire, the DC Circuit says

respondent’s latest published opinion shows that petitioner

has “an adequate opportunity to present his constitutional

claims during the _ reinstatement proceedings” and

respondent’s conduct in twice arguing for abstention and

then deliberately failing to consider petitioner’s claims in the

DC Bar _ reinstatement proceedings presents no

“extraordinary circumstances” warranting further federal

proceedings.

Petitioner’s Claims Remain to be Considered

- Petitioner provided the district court with a copy of

the BPR report adopted by respondent as its latest published

opinion in the disciplinary campaign against him. The DC

Circuit took notice of respondent’s published opinions

denying reinstatement and knows that the adopted BPR

report contains no consideration of any of the due process or

freedom of expression deprivation claims dismissed by the

district court. How the DC Circuit can say in these

circumstances that petitioner has a legally adequate

opportunity to present constitutional challenges to

respondent’s disciplinary system is inexplicable unless, as

respondent perceives a need to “protect the disciplinary

system”? from petitioner’s claims or cliallenges, the DC

Circuit feels impelled to protect respondent from them as

well. If so respondent’s bad faith may be contagious.

1? In re Stanton, 860 A2d at 371.

8

Respondent’s Conduct is Extraordinary

The DC Circuit says respondent’s conduct does not

present “extraordinary circumstances’ that would

warrant federal intervention in the [DC] court

proceedings.”” But the DC court proceedings have been

concluded and because there would be no _ such

intervention if the district court at this point made findings

of fact on petitioner’s unconsidered claims the DC Circuit

“would ordinarily vacate the district court’s abstention

and remand the case””’ for further proceedings on them.

Even if further proceedings in the district court

might amount to intervention the DC Circuit’s view of

“extraordinary circumstances” constituting “bad faith” is

unduly restrictive and anachronistic. An _ attorney

suspended from practice indefinitely by the machinations of

a lawless bar disciplinary regime cannot reasonably be

expected to show that a criminal prosecution “brought

without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid

conviction”” accounts for the “bad faith” of the regime in

arbitrary treatment of his reinstatement petitions and

refusal to consider his constitutional challenges to its

20 DC Circuit summary affirmance order at 2, Appendix at 6A.

21 Stanton v DC Court of Appeals, 326 USAppDC at 406, 127 F3d at 74.

The district court seems to have anticipated this course of events when

it suggested that petitioner “may raise his constitutional claims when

the claims are reinstated,” district court memorandum opinion at 3,

Appendix at 3A.

22 Kugler v Helfant, 421 US at 126, 95 SCt at 1531. Helfant alleged

“bad faith” in “seek[ing] a permanent injunction against the further

prosecution,” Id at 123, 95 SCt at 1530, of the state criminal charges

against him. When abstention was extended to bar disciplinary

proceedings the reference to “bad faith, harassment, or other

exceptional circumstances,” Middlesex County Ethics Committee v

Garden State Bar Association et al, 457 US at 437, 102 SCt 2524,

probably did not include such prosecutions in the context of

reinstatement actions.

9

lawlessness after twice arguing for abstention so that it could

consider them in his reinstatement proceedings.

A better, sounder, equitable view is simply that,

“Generally the establishment of bad faith requires a showin

that there is an absence of fair [DC] judicial proceedings”

and that where a federal plaintiff alleges “bad faith” the

district court should not dismiss but “stay [the] federal

lawsuit to protect against the possibility that [the plaintiff]

could be deprived of the opportunity to present the merits of

[the] claims in [the DC] court. If the [DC] court should

dispose of [the] federal claims on grounds that do not reach

the merits [the] federal action would still be pending.”

For the second time respondent has argued for

abstention and then disposed of federal constitutional claims

on grounds (the BPR report) that do not reach their merits.

This “absence of fair DC judicial proceedings” presents

“extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant federal

intervention or at least a pending federal action as a forum

for fair consideration of claims.

Abstention as an Abhorrent Forfeiture

If abstention is “founded on the basic doctrine of

equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ...

when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and

* Carroll v City of Mount Clemens, 945 FSupp 1071, 1075 (EDMI

1996), aff'd 139 F3d 1072 (CA6 1998), citing Juidice v Vail, 430 US 327,

97 SCt 1211 (1977).

4 Carroll v City of Mount Clemens, 139 F3d at 1075-1076, citing

Deakins v Monaghan, 484 US 193, 108 SCt 523 (1988). The DC Circuit

seems to be determined to prevent any federal action from reaching

the merits of petitioner’s claims even though respondent has

demonstrated for the second time that in practice its disciplinary

system “clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims,”

Moore v Sims, 442 US 415, 426, 99 SCt 2371, 2379 (1979), petitioner

has made against it. The DC Circuit now goes beyond delay of justice

to outright denial.

10

will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief”

action is indicated where there have been two abstentions

with no remedy at law for the deprivations petitioner has

alleged.

CONCLUSION

The DC Circuit summary affirmance order should

be vacated and petitioner’s action should be remanded to

the district court for findings on the factual merits of

petitioner’s claims of due process and freedom of expression

deprivations in respondent’s DC Bar disciplinary system.

JOHN STANTON

2101 New Hampshire Ave NW

Washington DC 20009

202-232-5369

Stanton_John@msn.com

25 Kugler v Helfant, 421 US at 123, 95 SCt at 1530. There is in fact no

legal remedy for petitioner’s injury in the unfairly prolonged

deprivation of his right to practice his profession. Even if respondent

were not immune from “claims for monetary relief,” Hirsch v Justices

of Supreme Court of California, 67 F3d 708, 715 (CA9 1995), a remedy

for petitioner’s injury would not be calculable monetarily .

1A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN STANTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.02-0574 (JGP)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COURT OF APPEALS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is defendant District of Columbia Court of

Appeals’ ("DCCA ") Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for

Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment. Plaintiff John Stanton alleges violations of his right to

freedom of expression and three counts of violation of his due

process rights. Count I, Stanton alleges that defendant violated his

First Amendment right to free expression because of the District of

Columbia Bar's requirement that members accept the disciplinary

rules which require counsel for the accused to advocate during

guilty pleas. Count II alleges that the DC Bar rule requiring counsel

to "announce or give voice" to client's decision to plead guilty is a

2A

\

violation of the plaintiffs First Amendment right to free expression.

Count III, alleges that the defendant "highly and excessively

deferential review” of the Board of Professional Responsibilities

("Board") finding and recommendations deprives plaintiff of due

process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Count IV, also alleges a

Fifth Amendment violation when the defendant "disregarded [the]

brief and oral arguments” of the plaintiff, filed in response to the

Board's report and recommendation. Finally, Count V, alleges a

Fifth Amendment violation for the defendant’ s requirement that

plaintiff admit all misconduct. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court grants to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Mr. Stanton is once again before this Court. In 1983,

defendant was suspended from practicing law. Def.'s Mtn. at 1.

Subsequently, plaintiff has filed four petitions for reinstatement, all

of which have been rejected by the DCCA. On March 8, 2002,

plaintiff filed a fifth petition for reinstatement with the Board of

Professional Responsibility’. Def.'s Mtn. at 9. This matter is still

pending before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

3A

The defendant court is responsible for reviewing the Board

of Professional Responsibility’s recommendation, which is a judicial

proceeding. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983). This Court has no jurisdiction to

review the DCCA. /d. Furthermore, the DCCA plays a critical role

in regulating attorney conduct in the District of Columbia. While

the Circuit Court has yet to decide whether Younger applies”, this

Court has determined that the Younger abstention is appropriate in

this context. Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

No.95-1952 (D.D.C. filed January 23,1996) (JR).

Because this matter is pending before the defendant court,

' For a full history see the following cases: In re Stanton, 470

A.2d 272 (D.C. 1983); In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C. 1983); 532 A.2d

95 (D.C. 1987); In re Stanton 589 A.2d 425 (D.C. 1991); In re Stanton, 682

A.2d 655 (D.C. 1996); In re Stanton, 757 A.2d 87 (2000); Stanton v.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, No.84-1619 (D.D.C. filed June 25,

1984) (JGP); Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, No.95-

1952 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23,1996 and April28, 1999) (JR); Stanton v.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 326 U.S.App.D.C. 404,127 F.3d 72

(1997).

? LaShawn v. Kelly, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 49, 52, 990 F.2d

1319,1322 (1993) ("This Court has never decided whether the District of

Columbia is a state for Younger abstention purposes. Instead, every time

the question has arisen, we have assumed that the doctrine applies to the

District and nonetheless determined, in light of the facts of each particular

case, that Younger abstention has not been appropriate.").

4A

this court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Younger

abstention doctrine. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1970).

Plaintiff may raise his constitutional claims when the claims are

reinstated. For these reasons, this Court will dismiss the Complaint.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: August 8, 2003 JOHN GARRETT PENN

United States District Judge

5A

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 04-7065 September Term, 2004

02cv00574

Filed On: November 17, 2004

[860185]

John Stanton,

Appellant

District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

Appellee

BEFORE: Sentelle, Henderson, and Tatel, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance

and the opposition thereto; and the motion for summary reversal, the

opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be

granted and the motion for summary reversal be denied. The merits

of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action.

See Taxpayers Watchdog. Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court properly dismissed

appellant's complaint under the abstention doctrine of Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in light of the ongoing proceedings in

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA) concerning

appellant's fifth petition for reinstatement to the District of

Columbia Bar. See JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia 378 F.3d

6A

1117,1125 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the District of Columbia is

a state for purposes of Younger abstention).

The three requirements for proper invocation of Younger

abstention are: 1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding; 2) the

implication of an important state interest in the proceeding; and 3)

an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional questions in the

proceeding. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State

Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Reinstatement

proceedings are clearly judicial in nature. See Stanton v. DCCA,

127 F.3d 72,75 (D.C. Cir 1997) ("That Stanton's now-completed

third reinstatement proceeding was judicial in nature is clear and

undisputed.”). The regulation of the practice of law and the

enforcement of disciplinary rules governing members of the D.C.

Bar is an important "state" interest. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 434

(noting that the State of New Jersey "has an extremely important

interest in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the

attorneys it licenses"). And, although appellant argues that he does

not have an adequate opportunity to present his constitutional claims

during the reinstatement proceedings, the full history of appellant's

quest for reinstatement, including the DCCA's published opinions

denying reinstatement, show otherwise.

Finally, appellant's allegations of bad faith are unsupported

by the record and do not rise to the level of "extraordinary

circumstances” which would warrant federal intervention in the

state court proceedings. See. e.g.. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117,

126 n.6 (1975); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,85 (1971).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be

published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate

herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for

rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41

(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam

7A

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 04-7065 September Term, 2004

02cv00574

Filed On: March 11, 2005 [883272]

John Stanton,

Appellant

District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

Appellee

BEFORE: Sentelle, Henderson, and Tatel, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing

filed December 16, 2004, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam x

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

j

|

;

|

8A

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 04-7065 September Term, 2004

02cv00574

Filed On: March 11, 2005 [883271]

District of Columbia Court of Appeals,

Appellee

BEFORE: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, and Edwards, Sentelle, Hender-

son, Randolph, Rogers,* Tatel, Garland, and Roberts, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellant's petition for rehearing en

banc, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a

vote, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

* Circuit Judge Rogers did not participate in this matter.