Appendix — Kelley v. Crosby
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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, dated July 23,
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APPENDIX B
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, dated
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APPENDIX C
Order of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, dated
January 8, 2003 ...........ccrrccccoccscccccsecesecssessoess 108a
APPENDIX D
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, dated
IY EE SEE 0 snsccapensuacecssnssacsssnnsevaness 109a
APPENDIX E
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, dated
September 19, 2002 ...........sccssesssrssresseeeecoees 119a
APPENDIX F
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida,
PIE MIIIEE BE, IUD. wnscccessnsevessscssccosensseesces 138a
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APPENDIX G
Opinion of the Supreme of Florida, dated
OE 6 TO cccsanisncitenstnasenniassainizntinncani 145a
APPENDIX H
Order of the Supreme Court of the United
States, dated October 6, 1986 ..................00 l6la
APPENDIX I
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida,
GRE FTE TR, TID eeccssecessseccsntesiccenssicnnsisnns 163a
APPENDIX J
Order on Petition for Rehearing and Petition
for Rehearing En Banc to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, dated October 6, 2004 ..................... 179a
APPENDIX K
Joint Pretrial Stipulation of Facts in the United
States District Court for the Southern
Rr PIII cicicos cad pusccnuniclaconnavensanaiaadion 18la
APPENDIX L
Letter Granting an Extension of Time Until
March 4, 2005 for the Filing of Petition
for Certiorari Before the Supreme Court
OE TG EE I vevitctiicscineccioniciinavintantcisiiitan 207a
APPENDIX A - la
APPENDIX A
WILLIAM H. KELLEY, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, Secretary Florida Department of
Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 03-10513
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 23, 2004, Decided
July 23, 2004, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C.
Docket No. 92-14246-CV-NCR. Kelley v. Singletary, 238 F.
Supp. 2d 1325, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26211 (S.D. Fla.,
2002)
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
COUNSEL: For Secretary for the Department of
Corrections, Appellant: Dittmar, Carol M., Office of Atty.
Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tampa, FL.
Kelley, William H., Appellee: Lohman, James Charles,
Attorney at Law, Austin, TX.
JUDGES: Before TJOFLAT,’ ANDERSON and
WILSON, Circuit Judges.
APPENDIX A - 2a
OPINIONBY: TJOFLAT
OPINION: TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
The petitioner, William H. Kelley, is a Florida prisoner on
death row, having been convicted of first degree murder. The
district court granted a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his
conviction and sentence.' We reverse.
This case--from the time of the murder to the present--has
spanned nearly thirty-eight years. Understandably, its history
is quite complicated. For the readers’ convenience, therefore,
we preface the opinion with the following table of contents:
I. Factual Background
A. The Maxcy Murder
B. John Sweet's Trial
C. Kelley's State Legal Proceedings
1. Kelley's Arrest
2. Kelley's Two Trials
3. Kelley's Direct Appeal
4. Kelley's Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal
' The district court granted the writ on two grounds: (1) that
the prosecutor denied the petitioner due process of law by
withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of the rule laid down
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963); and (2) that petitioner's attorneys denied him of his
right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.
APPENDIX A - 3a
5. Kelley's Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief
from the Florida Supreme Court
Il. Federal Procedural History
A. Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition
B. Kelley's Federal Evidentiary Hearing
C. Disposition of Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition and
Subsequent Developments
III. Federal Evidentiary Hearing
A. Legal Standard for Permitting Federal Evidentiary
Hearings
B. Application of the Legal Standard to Kelley's Case
1. The District Court's Failure to Ascertain
the Appropriate Legal Standard
2. The District Court's Failure to Apply Any
Legal Standard
IV. Rulings on Habeas Claims
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. The Exhaustion Requirement
2. Application of the Exhaustion
Requirement to Kelley's Case
3. Kelley's Lack of Prejudice from
Ineffective Assistance
APPENDIX A - 4a
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
1. The Brady rule
2. Application of the Brady Rule to Kelley's
Case
a. The Massachusetts Immunity Order and
the Joe Mitchell Report
b. Transcript of John Sweet's First Trial
| c. Roma Trulock Report
: d. Fingerprint Report
3. Conclusion Regarding Brady Claims
V. Conclusion
I.
Factual Background
A. The Maxcy Murder
This sordid tale begins with an illicit love affair between
John Sweet, a real estate broker with shadowy ties to Boston's
criminal underworld, and Irene Maxcy, who was married to
Charles von Maxcy ("Maxcy"), a wealthy citrus grower. It
culminates in Maxcy's assassination at the hands of two hit
men. The investigation and legal proceedings following the
murder have spanned almost four decades and have involved
some of the best known lawyers in the country.
The district court described the circumstances leading up
to and surrounding Maxcy's murder as follows:
APPENDIX A - 5a
Irene Maxcy and John Sweet were lovers,
and they planned to kill Irene's husband, Charles
von Maxcy, a wealthy citrus grover [sic] and
rancher from Sebring, Florida. Sweet and Irene
talked for months about the murder, after which
they planned to live together on Maxcy's large
estate. Sweet contacted an acquaintance, William
Bennett of Boston, Massachusetts. Arrangements
were made, and a price was set: $ 5000 up front,
and $ 15,000 after the murder.
On October 1, 1966, Sweet went to Daytona,
Florida to meet Andrew von Etter. Von Etter was
to do the killing, along with a partner. The next
day von Etter called Sweet to tell him the partner,
"William Kelley", had arrived. On October 3rd,
Sweet drove von Etter and "Kelley" to the estate.
The alleged killers showed Sweet the weapons
they would use, knives and a revolver, which
they kept in a satchel. Sweet drove back to
Sebring. Charles von Maxcy was murdered that
day. A couple weeks later, Sweet went to Boston
to pay the $ 15,000 balance due for the murder.
Unfortunately, the murder did not signal the
beginning of a blissful life on the estate for Irene
Maxcy and John Sweet. Sweet wanted more
money, purportedly to pay off the murder
balance, and he began to harass and threaten
Irene and her five-year-old daughter daily.
Terrified, Irene Maxcy went to the authorities. In
exchange for immunity, she implicated Sweet in
the murder-for-hire scheme.
APPENDIX A - 6a
Kelley v. Singletary, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1358 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) (order granting habeas relief on claim (1)). Before
Irene Maxcy came forward, a comprehensive investigation
was underway. Special Agent Roma Trulock of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") headed that
investigation and interviewed potential eye witnesses. In
particular he spoke with Kaye Carter, who met Kelley and
Von Etter around the time of the murder at the Daytona Inn
Motel, where the prosecution says the hit men lodged before
they drove to Sebring to kill Maxcy.
B. John Sweet's Trial
Sweet was tried in the Circuit Court of Polk County,
Florida. As the district court explained,
Sweet was arrested in 1967, charged with
first degree murder. It became known in the
course of the investigation for Sweet's trial that
the "triggermen” in the murder were named von
Etter and "Kelley". These men were not charged
at this time, however, as prosecutors felt they had
insufficient evidence against them.
Irene Maxcy was the star witness for the
prosecution in Sweet's first trial. Her testimony
was erratic and difficult as she denied, even
under the protection of immunity, that she
wanted to kill her husband. She testified it was
entirely Sweet's idea. She claimed to have
witnessed many of the phone calls Sweet had
made in arranging the murder, and she related
many of the details about which Sweet had kept
her informed, including the murder itself. She
further testified that she gave Sweet more than $
35,000 to help pay for the murder, and that Sweet
had wanted another $ 75,000. Sweet, testifying
APPENDIX A - 7a
on his own behalf, denied any involvement in the
crime.
Id. at 1359. Sweet also launched a vitriolic character
assault on Irene Maxcy, accusing her of partaking in a host of
deviant sex acts. The trial ended in a hung jury
In 1986, Sweet was tried a second time. Irene Maxcy
testified against him again, and, again, Sweet denied any
involvement in the murder. This time, however, Sweet was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison.
Unfortunately, the second trial proceedings were tainted
by an evidentiary irregularity. Sweet's defense team repeated
their earlier attacks on the credibility of both Irene Maxcy and
another important witness against Sweet: Roma Trulock, the
primary investigator for Maxcy's murder. Sweet v. State, 235
So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Defense counsel
believed that Irene Maxcy and Trulock were engaged in a
romantic relationship and, therefore, that Trulock had an
interest in seeing Sweet incarcerated. To determine whether
Irene Maxcy and Trulock would admit to the affair, the court
permitted defense counsel to examine them outside the
presence of the jury. Trulock denied the allegation
vehemently, but Irene Maxcy did not. Irene Maxcy testified,
among other things, that she and Trulock had engaged in
sexual intercourse and that Trulock had expressed a desire to
get Sweet convicted so that she and Trulock could take a trip
to "the Islands." Id. at 41-42. The court excluded such
testimony, sustaining the State's objection. Following his
conviction, Sweet challenged the court's ruling on appeal. Id.
at 40-41. In a two-to-one decision, the district court of appeal
reversed Sweet's conviction and awarded a new trial. Id. at
42. In the court's view, "the proffered. cross-examination in
question went directly to undermine the very foundation of
the State's case, i.e., the credibility of Irene Maxcy and C. R.
mm «
Sn
APPENDIX A - 8a
Trulock. Its exclusion was a substantial frustration of
[Sweet's] nght to effective cross-examination . .. ." Id.
After this ruling, Sweet's defense, citing Florida's speedy
tral rules, filed a motion to discharge Sweet from
prosecution. The state conceded that it could not proceed
against Sweet again because key witnesses had become
unavailable. On November 16, 1971, the circuit judge who
had presided over Sweet's case found that he had "no course
other than to grant the motion." Commending the efforts of
the prosecution, the judge--in his own words--"reluctantly"
ordered that Sweet "stand[s] discharged from further
prosecution... ."
In April of 1976, the state attorney petitioned the circuit
court to enter an order authorizing the clerk of the court to
destroy certain physical evidence held for Sweet's
prosecution. The court granted that petition, and several
articles of evidence, including a bullet, a bloody bed sheet,
and a shred from the victim's shirt, were destroyed.
Sweet had gotten away with murder, but his role in the
prosecutor's pursuit of the-matter had not ended. As the
district court observed, after his conviction was reversed,
John Sweet wasted little time in
matriculating back into the underworld. By 1981,
Sweet was facing charges in Massachusetts of
prostitution, narcotics distribution, arson, bribery,
counterfeiting, loan sharking, and _ hijacking,
among other things. With authorities closing in
on him, Sweet went to them first. His plan was to
win immunity in exchange for information he
had on the murder of Charles von Maxcy.
William Kelley was the target, as Sweet
implicated him as one of the murderers. The
Massachusetts authorities brought Sweet to
Florida where Sweet gave authorities there his
APPENDIX A - 9a
confession. The next day Sweet was awarded
immunity in Massachusetts.
Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., No. 92-14246 at 4
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2000) (order denying habeas claims (4)-
(6)). On December 16, 1981, a Highlands County grand jury
indicted the petitioner, William H. Kelley, for first degree
murder.
C. Kelley's Arrest and Prosecution
1. Kelley's Arrest
William H. Kelley was arrested on June 16, 1983, roughly
seventeen years after Maxcy's murder. By that time, Walter
Bennett, who was Sweet's contact for the murder contract,
and Andrew von Etter, who was Kelley's supposed partner in
the killing, were both dead. Irene Maxcy, of course, had
immunity for her role in the murder.
Three special agents of the FBI apprehended Kelley at a
motel in Tampa, Florida. They had received a tip that a guest
of the motel met Kelley's description. One of the agents, Ross
Davis, testified at Kelley's trial that the FBI sought and
arrested Kelley for "[uJnlawful flight to avoid prosecution” in
North Carolina. The agents did not realize that Kelley was
wanted for murder in Florida until they took him back to their
Tampa office and conducted a background check. When
Davis finally informed Kelley of his indictment for the
Maxcy murder, Kelley made statements indicating knowledge
of the crime and suggested that the State would never be able
to obtain a conviction. These statements eventually became a
subject of dispute at Kelley’s trial.
2. Kelley's Two Trials
Xelley enlisted the assistance of several attorneys in
preparing his case for trial. He was represented initially by
APPENDIX A - 10a
Robert E. Dinsmore of Boston and Ronald K. Cacciatore of
Tampa. On October 20, 1983, however, Kelley, acting pro se,
filed a document entitled "Discharge of Attorneys," which
stated that Dinsmore and Cacciatore were no _ longer
authorized to act on Kelley's behalf and that new counsel
would begin representing him immediately. Kelley explained
that this decision was in his best interest and was made
without coercion or pressure from Dinsmore and Cacciatore.
The same day, Nicholas G. Schommer, a lawyer practicing in
Sebring,’ moved the court to permit Dinsmore and Cacciatore
to withdraw as Kelley's counsel. The court granted the
motion.
On December 7, Schommer filed a notice of appearance,
stating that he would act as Kelley's local counsel and that
Kunstler and Mason, 2 New York law firm, would serve as
Kelley's primary counsel. William Kunstler and Mark
Gombiner, partners of the firm, moved the court on December
8 for leave to appear pro hac vice. The court granted their
motion on December 20.
Sometime between December 20, 1983 and January 12,
1984, Jack Edmund of Bartow, Florida, joined Kunstler and
Gombiner as part of Kelley's defense team.’ Kunstler testified
later* that he first met Edmund and, in fact, first learned of
Edmund's role in the defense on January 12, 1984, when
Kunstler came to Sebring to argue pretrial motions.
Prior to trial, Kelley's defense team also included a
paralegal named Harvey Brower. Brower was formerly a
Massachusetts lawyer, but as the district court explained,
* Sebring is the county seat of Highlands County, Florida.
> Edmund did not file his notice of appearance as Kelley's co-
counsel, however, until January 23, 1984.
* On July 18, 1988, Kunstler testified at the evidentiary
hearing the circuit court held on Kelley's motion to vacate his
conviction and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.
APPENDIX A - Ila
Brower was disbarred from the practice of
law in Massachusetts in August, 1979, for
defrauding one of his clients. In re: Harvey
Brower, No. 79-14BD (Mass. Aug. 16, 1979).
Earlier in his Massachusetts legal career, Brower
was censured by its Supreme Judicial Court for
fraudulent conduct in negligence cases. In re
Harvey Brower, No. 29871 Law (Mass. Feb. 23,
1973). Brower also was convicted in the Western
District of Louisiana for unlawfully conspiring to
aid and abet the crime of bail jumping. United
States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 78 (Sth Cir. 1980).
Kelley v. Singletary, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) (order denying habeas claim (3) but granting relief
on claim (2)) (footnote omitted). The district court further
noted that Brower's law office had also been involved in a
counterfeit bond sale conspiracy. Brower's conduct in the
course of Kelley's defense eventually played a critical role in
the district court's conclusion that Kelley suffered ineffective
assistance of counsel. It is not entirely clear how or when
Brower became involved in the case. The record permits the
inference that Brower arrived on the scene around the time
Kelley decided to discharge Dinsmore and Cacciatore as his
counsel. It is equally plausible, however, that Brower's
services were first employed at Kelley's request even before
Dinsmore was hired.
At the hearing the circuit court held in July 1988 on
Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion to vacate conviction and sentence,
Kunstler testified that Brower was the one who first contacted
him about participating in Kelley's defense. In fact, Kunstler
never met Kelley until he went to Sebring on January 12,
1984 for a motions hearing. Kunstler was under the
A aaa
APPENDIX A - 12a
impression that Brower had represented Kelley on other
matters in the past and that Brower would be preparing the
-case and virtually all of the pretrial motions. Kunstler
expected that his own role would be confined to trial counsel
alone, and he was not initially concerned with the amount of
responsibility that would be entrusted to Brower. Kunstler
expressed a great deal of confidence in Brower's ability
despite the disbarment, and he regarded Brower as both an
"excellent" lawyer and investigator. In fact, when Kunstler
missed a hearing on pretrial motions, he recommended that
the nonlicensed Brower argue the motions in his stead.”
Kelley's trial began in January of 1984. By that time,
Brower had disappeared. As the federal district court later
observed, "Kunstler characterized Brower as a thief who
‘absconded' with fees without ever performing his
investigatory duties." Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2002). Kunstler and Edmund were the
dominant players in Kelley's defense.° Kunstler took primary
responsibility for many of the most important trial tasks,
including the cross-examination of the state's star witness,
John Sweet. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and on
January 30, the court declared a mistrial.
The state decided to prosecute Kelley again. With Brower
gone, the defense enlisted the assistance of a investigator in
* Of course, the court did not permit Brower to appear as an
attorney. The court first requested that Schommer argue the
motions. Schommer indicated that he was only local counsel and
was not prepared to argue. Consequently, the court required
Schommer to argue only the motions he could handle and then
recessed the hearing until the following day, when Kunstler would
be available, to consider the remaining motions.
® The record does not reveal the extent of Gombiner's
participation, if any.
APPENDIX A - 13a
Edmund's office to do some additional work in preparation
for the retrial.’
Kelley's second trial commenced on March 27. Again,
Kunstler and Edmund shared the major responsibilities for
Kelley's defense, but Edmund played a more significant role
in the second proceeding. In particular, the task of cross-
examining John Sweet now fell to Edmund. This important
responsibility included impeaching Sweet's testimony about a
conversation he had with Kelley years after the murder, in
which Kelley allegedly told Sweet, "I stabbed [Maxcy] three
or four times and he kept coming after us, so I had to shoot
him in the head." Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla.
1986). One of the State's other key witnesses was Abe Namia,
a private investigator hired by Sweet's defense team when
. Sweet was being prosecuted. Namia's testimony corroborated
Sweet's and was admitted to rebut the inference that Sweet
recently fabricated his version of the story. Id.
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defense moved
for judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion. The
defense then rested without introducing any evidence. This
decision entitled the defense to make the first and last closing
arguments to the jury.’ When asked at the evidentiary hearing
on Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion whether he considered the
defense's decision to rest without putting on a case "to be a
matter of trial strategy," Edmund responded, "Of course." He
characterized the decision as a no-brainer in Kelley's case,
’ The investigator, Richard Mars, was a lawyer licensed to
practice in Florida.
* At the time of Kelley's trial, Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.250 provided
that "a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except
his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the
jury." Customary practice under this rule is to have three
arguments; the defendant opens and closes, and the prosecution is
sandwiched in the middle.
APPENDIX A - 14a
and he suggested that any good defense lawyer would have
adopted the same approach.
On March 30, the jury found Kelley guilty of first degree
murder. At the end of the sentencing phase of the trial, a
majority of the jury recommended that he receive the death
penalty. On April 2, consistent with the jury's
recommendation, the court sentenced Kelley to death.
3. Kelley's Direct Appeal
Kelley appealed his cenviction and sentence to the Florida
Supreme Court. Kunstler and Edmund appeared on Kelley's
initial bref, which challenged several of the trial court's
rulings. Specifically, Kelley contended that:
(1) The court should have dismissed his
indictment because the destruction of physical
evidence after Sweet's second trial violated
Kelley's due process rights.
(2) The court should have excluded Abe
Namia's testimony regarding a conversation
between Namia and Sweet in 1967.
(3) The court erred by refusing to answer a
question posed the jury during its deliberations.
In particular, the jury asked "if John J. Sweet
received immunity in Florida for Ist Degree
murder and perjury before he gave information
on the Maxcy trial and if he had anything to gain
by his testimony[.]"
(4) The court erred in allowing the jurors to
take notes.
APPENDIX A - 15a
(5) The court erred in admitting statements
Kelley made to the FBI agents who apprehended
him indicating Kelley's knowledge about the
Maxcy murder at the time of his arrest.
(6) Florida's’ statute governing the
proceedings for issuing death sentences is
facially unconstitutional and, in any event, was
improperly applied by the court.
In addition to the brief Kunstler and Edmund filed, the
supreme court allowed Kelley to file a supplemental brief
prepared by Barry Haight, a Massachusetts lawyer, and
Donald Ferguson, a Florida lawyer.’ Beyond the arguments
_advanced by Kunstler and Edmund, the. supplemental brief
asserted that the court gave improper, nonstandard jury
instructions--in particular, an Allen charge’? --which might
have coerced the jury to overcome an impasse. Significantly,
the supplemental brief also claimed that Kunstler and
Edmund were ineffective and, therefore, deprived Kelley of
his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. In support of this claim, the supplemental brief
cited (1) counsels’ failure to prepare pretrial motions properly;
(2) counsels' failure to move the court to dismiss the
indictment due to the State's destruction of evidence after
Sweet's second trial; (3) Kunstler's failure to appear in
Sebring on January 11 at the hearing the court had scheduled
for Kelley's pretrial motions and his ostensible willingness to
allow Brower to argue those motions; (4) counsels’ failure to
object to the court's Allen charge; and (5) counsels’ failure to
object to the court's refusal to answer the jury question
described above.
® From all we can tell, this was Haight and Ferguson's first
appearance in the case.
'° See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41
L. Ed. 528 (1896).
+ ee ome
APPENDIX A - 16a
The supreme court rejected all of Kelley's arguments.
Kelley, 486 So. 2d at 586. It also explained that Kelley's
ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved on "the
record as it stands." Id. at 585. That claim could be raised,
however, in a collateral motion for postconviction relief. Id.
With the assistance of Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law
School professor, Kelley petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a wnt of certiorari. The Court denied the
writ on October 6, 1986. Kelley v. Florida, 479 U.S. 871, 107
S. Ct. 244, 93 L. Ed. 2d 169.
4. Kelley's Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal
In 1987, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure,'’ Kelley moved the trial court (the "Rule
3.850 court") to vacate his conviction and sentence. At this
stage, Kelley was represented by Barry Wilson, a Boston
lawyer, and James Green, who practiced in West Palm Beach.
The motion alleged that the State had denied Kelley due
process of law for the following reasons: (1) the State
destroyed certain tangible exhibits introduced into evidence
during Sweet's prosecution; (2) due to the destruction of these
'' The version of Rule 3.850 in effect during the collateral
proceedings in this case provided, in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court estabiished
by the laws of Florida claiming the right to be released upon
the ground that the judgment was entered or that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the
United States, or of the State of Florida, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to enter such judgment or to impose such
sentence or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or that his plea was given involuntarily, or
the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which entered the judgment or
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
judgment or sentence.
APPENDIX A - 17a
exhibits, defense counsel could not effectively cross-examine
the State's expert witness who testified about. them; (3) the
prosecution illegally suppressed numerous items of
exculpatory evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly
interfered with defense counsel's cross-examination of Abe
Namia; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury
contained intentional misstatements of fact; and (6) Kunstler
and Edmund deprived Kelley of effective assistance of
counsel.’
The Rule 3.850 court held an evidentiary hearing on two
issues: "1) whether the prosecution suppressed evidence
favorable to the defendant [claim (3)], and 2) whether the
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel [claim
(6)]." After receiving the parties' evidence, the court made
written findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied
Kelley's motion. The Florida Supreme Court, largely adopting
those findings and conclusions, affirmed. Kelley v. State, 569
So. 2d 754, 762 (Fla. 1990). Responding to claim (1), the
court found that "[t]he state was not at fault in the destruction
of the evidence" and therefore did not deny Kelley of due
process of law. Id. at 756. The court found that claims (4) and
(5) were barred because they were not cognizable in a Rule
3.850 proceeding.” Id. Although the supreme court did not
'2 This sixth claim is described in considerable detail in Part
IV.A.2, infra, where we address the district court's issuance of the
writ on a claim Kelley did not present to the Rule 3.850 court, to
wit: that Kunstler and Edmund denied Kelley his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel when they relied on Brower
to conduct the pretrial investigation.
'> The bases for claims (4) and (5) were contained in the
record of the proceedings in Kelley's criminal prosecution;
therefore, those claims should have been raised on direct appeal.
Rule 3.850 permits collateral attack on a sentence and conviction. It
is not a vehicle for relitigating claims that were cognizable on
direct appeal--whether or not those claims were actually raised and
decided on direct appeal.
APPENDIX A - 18a
say so in its opinion, the Rule 3.850 court correctly found
claim (2) barred for a similar reason: "The admission of
evidence and testimony at trial is clearly a matter which could
have been raised on appeal."
In rejecting claims (3) and (6), the supreme court quoted
the lower court's reasoning. Turning to claim (3), the court
addressed all of the items the State had withheld from the
defense and concluded that each was either legally immaterial
or sufficiently available to defense counsel.
The court distilled Kelley's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, claim (6), into seven discreet instances. The court
responded to each, finding that every alleged instance of
ineffective assistance was the result of trial strategy, .was
legally immaterial, or otherwise was not supported by the
evidence presented at the Rule 3.850 hearing. The court
concluded that both Kunstler and Edmund were "capable and
effective" in their defense of Kelley. Id. at 761.
5. Kelleys' Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief from the
Florida Supreme Court
Kelley's final attempt to seek relief in the state court
system was a petition to the Florida Supreme Court for a writ
of habeas corpus. In that petition, Kelley raised three claims:
"(1) his appellate counsel [were] ineffective; (2) the
application of the death penalty statute to this crime is ex post
facto; and (3) the aggravating factors [supporting his death
sentence] of pecuniary gain and cold calculated, and
premeditated are overbroad." Kelley v. Dugger, 597 So. 2d
262, 263 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added). On March 12, 1992,
the court rejected each of these claims and denied Kelley's
petition. Id. at 265.
II.
Federal Procedural History
APPENDIX A - 19a
A. Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition
On October 9, 1992, Kelley, represented by Laurence
Tribe, a Harvard Law School professor, and Barry Wilson,
petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The petition, nearly 300 pages in length (not counting
attached exhibits), asserted six bases for relief:
(1) prosecutorial misconduct, including
deliberate misstatements to the jury and the
suppression of exculpatory evidence;
(2) ineffective assistance of: trial counsel,
including "failure to investigate, to depose
. Witnesses, to presenta case in defense, and to
perform other basic defense functions";
(3) deprivation of Kelley's Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights through the
destruction of evidence following John Sweet's
second trial;
(4) improper admission at trial of Abe
Namia's testimony;
(5) improper admission at trial of statements
Kelley made to FBI Special Agent Ross Davis at
the time of his arrest; and
(6) unconstitutional imposition of the death
sentence.
Kelley's petition contained a demand for an evidentiary
hearing.
APPENDIX A - 20a
On August 31, 2000, the court issued an order denying
claims (4), (5), and (6). The court concluded that those claims
could be decided on the basis of the record of the proceedings
in the trial stage of Kelley's prosecution. In the same order,
the court deferred its decision on claims (1), (2), and (3) until
it decided whether an evidentiary hearing on those claims was
necessary. Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31,
2000). On November 22, 2000, over eight years after Kelley
filed his petition, the district court granted him an evidentiary
hearing on the remaining claims over the State's repeated
objections.
B. Kelley's Federal Evidentiary Hearing
The district court decided to hold an evidentiary hearing
before it resolved three claims: (1) that the prosecution
deprived Kelley of due process by suppressing exculpatory
evidence; (2) that Kelley was prejudiced by ineffective
assistance of counsel; and (3) that the destruction of evidence
following Sweet's second trial deprived Kelley of due process
of law. The hearing commenced on Apmil 24, 2001. Attorneys
James C. Lohman“ of Tallahassee, Florida and Joseph Oteri
of Boston, Massachusetts appeared on Kelley's behalf. Carol
Dittmar appeared for the State. In total, Kelley's attorneys
called eleven witnesses; the State called two.
'* Lohman came to represent Kelley after another series of
attorney substitutions. On March 30, 1993, Barry Wilson filed a
motion to withdraw from Kelley's case. The court entered an order
substituting Donald Ferguson for Wilson on June 5. Unfortunately,
Ferguson did not stay with Kelley throughout the habeas
proceedings either. He filed his motion to withdraw on August 8,
1995. On August 29, the court granted that motion “to the extent
that Mr. James C. Lohman will be substituted as counsel of record
for Mr. Donald L. Ferguson."
APPENDIX A - 21a
The first two days of the hearing were held in Boston.
Kelley presented the testimony of eight witnesses,’ one of
whom was co-counsel Joseph Oteri.'® The third day of the
'* One of the witnesses testified via videotape.
'° Oteri_ testified concerning a material issue: whether Harvey
Brower's conduct operated to deny Kelley effective assistance of
counsel. Oteri testified, in part, as follows:
I wouldn't have entrusted Harvey [Brower] with 10 cents. He
was totally incompetent as far as paying attention to details.
He did absolutely nothing--he did the minimal amount of
work he could do. And in this particular case, for Bill
Kunstler, whom I had knew and had worked with, to entrust
Harvey [Brower] with the preparation of a capital case is a
mortal sin as well as incompetence.
After testifying to an issue on which the district court
eventually granted habeas relief, Oteri participated in the
evidentiary hearing as Kelley's co-counsel. Rule 3.7(a) of the
Model Rule of Professional Conduct provides that
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
The record is silent as to whether Oteri, opposing counsel, or
the district court were aware of this ethical provision. What we do
know is that after testifying, Oteri did not withdraw from active
participation in the habeas proceeding.
APPENDIX A - 22a
hearing was held on July 9 in Ft. Pierce, Florida. At that time,
Kelley called three additional witnesses. The same day, the
State called both of its witnesses, one being Edmund. Twelve
of the thirteen individuals who testified at the evidentiary
hearing had not testified at the Rule 3.850 hearing in state
court. Only Edmund testified at both hearings.
C. Disposition of Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition and
Subsequent Developments
On September 19, 2002, the court issued an order granting
Kelley relief on claim (1). Based in part on testimony
adduced at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that
Kelley was entitled to a new trial because the State had
withheld material exculpatory evidence in derogation of the
rule laid down in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.
1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2002). Having granted Kelly relief on this
claim, the court apparently thought it unnecessary to rule on
Kelley's two remaining claims, (2) and (3). Acting pursuant to
the September 19 order, the clerk entered a final judgment
and closed the case the same day.
On September 30, 2002, the State filed a motion to alter
or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'’ The State supported its motion
'” In relevant part, Rule 59 provides,
(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action tried
without a jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings
have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts
of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one
has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings
of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. ...
APPENDIX A - 23a
with two arguments. First, citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d
925 (11th Cir. 1992), the State argued that the district court
should have ruled on claims (2) and (3) as well as claim (1).
Second, the State argued that the court should revise its
disposition of claim (1) to correct clear error and prevent
manifest injustice. In the State's view, the court reached its
decision only by disregarding important testimony and failing
to give due deference to the findings of the state courts.
The district court disposed of the State's motion in an
order issued on December 30, 2002. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Answering the State's second argument
first, the court declined to alter or amend its judgment on
claim (1). The court agreed with the State; however, that it
should have ruled on the two undecided claims.
Turning to claim (2), the court found that Kelley was
entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel was
ineffective. The court reasoned that Kelley's defense counsel
had "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigation
unnecessary[,]" but had met neither obligation. Id. at 1329
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). In the court's view,
Harvey Brower, who was_ responsible for pretrial
investigation, was incompetent, and Kelley's primary defense
counsel, Kunstler and Edmund, did not know that Brower had
failed them. As the court stated in its order,
Kelley's trial counsel was deficient in having
a disbarred attorney, lazy to a fault, resolve
whether or not to conduct a pretrial investigation.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Any motion to alter
or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry
of the judgment.
APPENDIX A - 24a
... [T]rial counsel in the present case acted under
the mistaken belief that Brower would perform a
dutiful investigation or decide not to investigate
after thoughtful consideration.
Id. at 1329. After finding that counsel's performance fell
short of the Sixth Amendment's standard for effective
assistance of counsel, the court neglected to say how, if at all,
counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced Kelley. The court also
failed to mention the other instances of ineffective assistance
of counsel that Kelley asserted in his petition.
The court found no merit in claim (3) because Kelley
failed to show that the State had acted in bad faith when it
destroyed the exhibits introduced into evidence during
Sweet's prosecution.
On January 28, 2003, the State initiated the appeal now
before us. The appeal calls into question the correctness of the
orders the district court entered on September 19, 2002
(granting habeas relief on claim (1)) and December 30, 2002
(granting relief on claim (2)).'* Kelley does not cross-appeal
the district court's denial of claims (3), (4), (5), and (6) or its
partial denial of claim (2).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
If.
Federal Evidentiary Hearing
Before proceeding to the merits of the district court's
rulings, we first address the question of whether the court
abused its discretion in granting Kelley an evidentiary hearing
so that he could present evidence to it that was not presented
to the state courts. We review a district court's decision to
'® The State did not appeal the district court's partial denial of
its Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend its September 19 judgment.
APPENDIX A - 25a
grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.
See Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 690 (11th Cir. 2002); cf.
Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493, 1497 (llth Cir. 1992)
(vacating grant of habeas relief and remanding for cause-and-
prejudice hearing where the district court, without identifying
its authority to do so and despite respondent's objections,
permitted petitioner to develop evidence never presented to
the state court). A district court abuses its discretion if it
misapplies the law or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous. Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368
F.3d 1320, 1332, 95 Fed. Appx. 1320 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
A. Legal Standard for Permitting a Federa’ Evidentiary
Hearings
The legal standard for determining the scope of a district
court's discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas
corpus case deyends on whether the case is subject to the
Antiterrorism ad Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Where
AEDPA applies, the standard is articulated in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2). In pre-AEDPA cases, the standard was first set
forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 770 (1963), and clarified in subsequent decisions,
including most prominently Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d. 318 (1992).
Beginning with pre-AEDPA cases, the Supreme Court
held in Townsend that district courts are required to grant
evidentiary hearings to state prisoners when any of the
following six circumstances applies:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not
resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual
APPENDIX A - 26a
determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state-court hearing;
or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier
of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full
and fair fact hearing.
372 U.S. at 313, 83 S. Ct. at 757. The Court emphasized
that these six circumstances merely enumerated the cases in
which an_ evidentiary hearings is mandatory. The
circumstances in which an evidentiary hearing is authorized
were considerably broader. Indeed, the Court indicated that
district judges have "discretion" to hold evidentiary hearings
in "all" cases, even where the petitioner "was afforded a full
and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable
findings . . . ." Id. at 318, 83 S. Ct. at 760. The Court
elaborated,
In every case [the district judge] has the
power, constrained only by his sound discretion,
to receive evidence bearing up the applicant's
constitutional claim. There is every reason to be
confident that federal district judges, mindful of
their delicate role in the maintenance of proper
federal-state relations, will not abuse that
discretion.
Id.
Three years after the Townsend decision came down,
Congress amended the habeas statute. Among these
APPENDIX A - 27a
amendments, Congress established a statutory presumption
according deference to state-court factfindings except under
eight enumerated exceptions, which roughly paralleled
Townsend's tests for determining when district courts must
grant an evidentiary hearing.’"? Where none of these
'? The relevant statute, which has since been comprehensively
amended, then provided as follows:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a
State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which
the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent
thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written
opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall
be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish
or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit--
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State ccurt
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at
the State court hearing;
rc
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter or over the person of the appellant in the State court
proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint
counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
APPENDIX A - 28a
exceptions applied, the amended statute increased the burden
petitioners had to meet to override state factfindings. Where
state factfindings were presumed correct, the petitioner had to
establish the state court's error by "convincing evidence";
where state factfindings were not presumed correct (because
one of the statute's exceptions applied), the petitioner had to
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of
law in the State court proceeding;
(8) cr unless that part of the record of the State court
proceeding in which the determination of sucii factual issue
was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support such factual determination, is
produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court
on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole
concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the
Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination
has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the
circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered
(1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise
appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court
concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered
(8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered
as a whole, does not fairly support such factual
determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to
establish by convincing evidence that the factual
determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), subsequently amended by Antiterrorism
and Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
APPENDIX A - 29a
establish the facts necessary to support his claim by only a
preponderance of the evidence. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 20, 112
S. Ct. at 1726 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551, 101 S. Ct. 764, 771, 66 L. Ed. 2d
722 (1981)). Thus, although district courts still could, within
the limits of their "sound discretion," Townsend, 372 U.S. at
318, 83 S.Ct. at 760, grant evidentiary hearings when
Townsend's tests were not met, they could not overlook the
elevated deference accorded state factfindings unless an
exception to the revised statute applied.
In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of federal
evidentiary hearings and overruled Townsend in part. In
Keeney, the Court reconsidered the fifth circumstance in
which Townsend entitled a petitioner to an evidentiary
hearing, namely, when material facts were not adequately
developed in the state courts. The Court held that a habeas
petitioner is "entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he can show
cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-court
proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure."
Keeney, 504 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1721 (emphasis added).
Alternatively, the petitioner is permitted to develop additional
facts at the federal level if he could "show that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a
federal evidentiary hearing." Id. at 12, 112 S. Ct. at 1721. The
Supreme Court explained that this rule limiting the
availability of federal evidentiary hearings was motivated not
only by considerations of judicial economy, but also by those
of comity to state courts, accuracy and finality of state court
judgments, and consistency in habeas corpus jurisprudence.
Id. at 8-9, 112 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
A majority of the Court did not specify whether Keeney's
revision of the law defined the conditions in which federal
evidentiary hearings were mandatory or, rather, the outer
boundaries of when they were permissible. But see id. at 23,
112 S. Ct. at 1727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he district
courts . . . still possess the discretion, which has not been
APPENDIX A - 30a
removed by today's opinion, to hold [evidentiary] hearings
even where they are not mandatory."). We confronted that
- issue, however, in Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.
1992). There, "the district court, on its own initiative,
permitted [the] petitioner to introduce additional evidence to
bolster his claim of ineffective assistance of counse! at
sentencing by developing and submitting evidence never
presented to the state court that first addressed this claim.” Id.
at 1497. After considering the newly developed evidence, the
court granted relief on the ineffective assistance ground.” Id.
We observed that, despite the respondent's numerous
objections, the district court never identified its authority for
holding an evidentiary hearing on its own initiative. Id.
Consequently, we vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded, instructing the court
(1) to articulate its ground or grounds for
circumventing the presumption of correctness
accorded a state court's factual findings under
[pre-AEDPA] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by sua sponte
permitting petitioner to submit additional
evidence on his claim of ineffective assista:. <¢ of
counsel at sentencing, [and] (2) to determine
whether petitioner can demonstrate cause and
prejudice for failing to present to the state courts
the supplemental evidence submitted to the
district court....
Id. (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. 1, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318, 112 S.
Ct. 1715).
*° It also granted relief on other grounds, but they are of no
consequence here.
APPENDIX A - 31a
Arguably, this holding could be narrowly read to require
satisfaction of Keeney's cause-and-prejudice test only where a
district court elects to hold an evidentiary hearing absent
motion of the petitioner. But we later resolved any doubt as to
the necessity of applying Keeney’s test to all cases in Weeks
v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1043 (11th Cir. 1994). There we held
unequivocally, "Without a cause and prejudice showing for
evidence not submitted to the state court, a habeas petitioner
is procedurally barred on federal habeas review just as he is
from presenting new claims not previously before the state
court." Id. at 1043; see also Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571,
577 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that under pre-AEDPA law "a
district court abuses its discretion by ordering [an evidentiary]
hearing without first requiring the petitioner to make the
requisite showing [of cause and prejudice]"). But see Seidel v.
Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
Keeney did not limit the discretion of a district court to hold
an evidentiary hearing that is not required by Townsend);
Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 1997)
("Keeney . . . addresses only the circumstances under which
an evidentiary hearing is required."); Pagan v. Keane, 984
F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that, after Keeney, district
courts retain the power to hold evidentiary hearings even
though one is not required). Thus, it was settled in this circuit
that, after Keeney and before AEDPA, district courts lacked
discretion to grant evidentiary hearings to develop facts that a
habeas petitioner had failed to develop in state court, unless
the petitioner established cause and prejudice or a miscarriage
of justice,
The test AEDPA established in 1996 is even more
deferential to state courts than the earlier standard:
If the applicant has failed to develop the
factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an
APPENDIX A - 32a
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that--
(A) the claim relies on--
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or
(11) a factual predicate that could not have
been previously discovered through the exercise
of due diligence; and
-
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). Note that, like
the Keeney test, the current § 2254(e)(2) is specific to those
situations in which an evidentiary hearing is requested to
develop facts that the petitioner failed to develop in state
court. Note further that AEDPA expressly limits the extent to
\vhich hearings are permissible, not merely the extent to
which they are required.
B. Application of the Legal Standard to Kelley's Case
Kelley requested an evidentiary hearing in his petition for
habeas corpus relief and renewed his request several times
thereafter. For example, after AEDPA's enactment in 1996,
the court asked the parties to file memoranda briefing
AEDPA's effects on the ongoing proceeding. Kelley's
memorandum argued that AEDPA's amendments to § 2254,
APPENDIX A - 33a
and § 2254(e) in particular, do not apply to this case, and it
urged the court to honor Kelley's previous demand for a
hearing. The State took the opposite position and specifically
noted that the amended § 2254(e) limits the availability
federal evidentiary hearings.
On April 23, 1997, Kelley, acting under the impression
that the court had ordered an evidentiary hearing "for some
time during the period of May 12 to May 23, 1997," moved
the court for leave to issue subpoenas requiring several
witnesses to appear at the federal government's expense to
testify in support of his claims.”' The State filed a response on
*" Kelley styled his motion as a Motion for Issuance of
Witness Subpoenas and Award of Witness Fees and Expenses
Without Cost to Petitioner. As authority for his motion, he cited
Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)-(b), "Computing and Extending Time," and
21 U.S.C. § 848(q), "Appeal in capital cases; counsel for
financially unable defendants." Section 848 was plainly
inapplicable. The section applies to cases in which the death
penalty is imposed under § 848; Kelley's was imposed under
Florida law. Because the rule of criminal procedure he cited was
also inapplicable, we assume that Kelley meant to cite Rule
4S(c)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "Protection of
Persons Subject to Subpoenas." That section states:
If a subpoena . . . requires a person who is not a party or an
officer of a party to incur substantial expense to travel more
than 100 miles to attend trial . . . the court may, to protect a
person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or
modify the subpoena or, if the party in whose behalf the
subpoena is issued shows a substantial need for the testimony
. .. that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship and
assures that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed
wiil be reasonably compensated, the court may order
appearance .. . only upon specified conditions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).
APPENDIX A - 34a
April 30, contending that a hearing should not be held.” The
State protested that Kelley had not shown "(1) cause for, and
prejudice from, the failure to develop such facts, or (2) that a
federal evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a
fundamental miscarriage of justice."
On May 27, 1997, Kelley filed a pretrial memorandum
outlining several avenues along which he hoped to develop
additional facts to support his claims. Ultimately, the
memorandum asked the court to convene a hearing to receive
Kelley's new evidence. In the alternative, Kelley asked for a
hearing to argue that the court could receive that evidence
because he had cause for his failure to present it to the state
courts and resulting prejudice.
On August 26, 1997, the court heard argument of counsel
on the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. At
a status conference held on December 15, 1998, the court
indicated its inclination to hold an evidentiary hearing in both
Ft. Pierce and Boston, where it could receive the testimony of
witnesses located in that vicinity and alleviate concerns about
the cost of transporting many of Kelley's witnesses. The State
protested again:
The State objected to Kelley's motion because the motion
neither demonstrated “a substantial need for the testimony" of the
witnesses sought to be subpoenaed nor represented that the
witnesses would "be reasonably compensated.” As noted in the text,
the State also objected on the ground that an evidentiary hearing
was no” permitted
* Kelley amended his Motion for Issuance of Witness
Subpoenas and Award of Witness Fees and Expenses Without Cost
to Petitioner on September 14, 1998, and the State responded with
the same challenges.
APPENDIX A - 35a
MS. DITTMAR:” [Y]our Honor, I feel like I
need to reiterate the respondent's position that
there just is no reason--
THE COURT: I know what your position is;
that you don't think it necessary.
MS. DITTMAR: That is correct, your
Honor.
THE COURT: I feel under all of the
circumstances that the better course is to have the
hearing.
MS. DITTMAR: Your Honor, I am not sure
what circumstances those are. I am not aware of
any capital case in Florida where there has been a
federal evidentiary hearing after there has been a
full and fair hearing in State Court. And I just
don't understand the legal basis for having any of
these witnesses give testimony at this point.
THE COURT: Well, that is not the kind of
new ground I would like to break. And I promise
you I will review it one more time before I take
any, set the wheels in motion with the
Administrative Office.”
** Carol M. Dittmar appeared on behalf of the State. This
transcript excerpt has been edited to correct the spelling of her
surname.
* The court apparently felt it necessary to obtain the approval
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to hold an
evidentiary hearing in Boston at government expense.
APPENDIX A - 36a
The court deferred its final ruling on the evidentiary
hearing issue until November 22, 2000, when in a telephone
conference with counsel, it resolved to hold a hearing on
Kelley's remaining habeas claims. The State emphasized that
it had "a continuing objection to holding the hearing at all."
Over that objection, the court decided that the hearing would
begin the next spring in Boston.
The State persisted in its opposition to the hearing. On
December 11, 2000, for instance, the State once again
objected to having a hearing; alternatively, it moved the court
to limit the scope of the hearing, contending that it should be
limited only to Kelley's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel during the penalty phase of Kelley's trial.
On December 29, 2000, the court entered an order
scheduling the evidentiary hearing to commence in Boston on
April 24, 2001.
On March 21, 2001, the state filed written objections to
Kelley's list of proposed witnesses. Once again, it reiterated
its opposition to the course the court was taking:
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any
cause or prejudice for his failure to present these
witnesses at his state court postconviction
evidentiary hearing. Absent such cause and
prejudice, this additional evidence should not be
presented. . . . Since the Petitioner has not offered
any justification for his failure to present this
evidence when he was granted the opportunity to
do so in state court, he is precluded from offering
it at his federal evidentiary hearing.
The court did not address the State's December 11, 2000
motion to limit the scope of the evidentiary hearing until
March 18, 2002. Because the hearing had already been held at
that point and, indeed, had concluded almost a year earlier,
the court denied the State's motion as moot.
APPENDIX A - 37a
In our-view, the district court abused its discretion in
granting the evidentiary hearing. First, the court failed to
determine the appropriate legal standard for measuring its
discretion to grant the hearing. Second, despite the State's
continuous objections to the hearing, the court failed to
acknowledge and apply any legal constraint on its discretion
at all. We elaborate on these points below.
1. The District Court's Failure to Ascertain the
Appropriate Legal Standard
Determining the test to be applied in this case--AEDPA's
or the pre-AEDPA standard--is a difficult question that cannot
be resolved on this record. The district court and the litigants
uncritically agreed that the pre-AEDPA cause-and-prejudice
test applied. Although it is true that Kelley filed his habeas
petition prior to AEDPA's enactment, the possibility of
retroactive application complicates our analysis.
The Supreme Court addressed the extent of AEDPA's
retroactive application in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117
S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). The Court noted that
AEDPA amended portions of Title 28, Chapter 153 of the
United States Code, which involves habeas corpus
proceedings generally. Section 2254(e)(2), which contains the
updated limitations on federal evidentiary hearings, was
among the amended provisions in that chapter.” AEDPA also
*° As the Court explained, AEDPA eliminated what was
formerly § 2254(d) and moved what was once subsection (e) to
subsection (f). Lindh, 521 U.S. at 332, 117 S. Ct. 2066.
[I]n place of the old (d), it inserted a new (d) followed by a
new (e), the two of them dealing with, among other things,
the adequacy of state factual determinations as bearing on a
right to federal relief, and the presumption of correctness to
be given such state determination.
Id.
APPENDIX A - 38a
"creates an entirely new chapter 154, with special rules
favorable to the state party, but applicable only if the State
-meets certain conditions, including provision for appointment
of postconviction counsel in state proceedings." Id. at 327,
117 S. Ct. at 2063. AEDPA specifically provided that chapter
154, which pertains only to capital cases, "shall apply to cases
pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act."
AEDPA § 107(c), 110 Stat. at 1221 (codified as note to 28
U.S.C. § 2261). Because the statute contained no similar
indication about the reach of the amendments to chapter 153,
the Supreme Court concluded that AEDPA's text fairly
implies "that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally
apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective."
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336, 117 S. Ct. at 2068.
Although AEDPA's pertinent provision, § 2254(e)(2), is
contained in nonretroactive chapter 153, its restrictions might
still apply to Kelley through chapter 154, which is retroactive
and at least potentially applicable. Importantly, chapter 154
incorporates parts of chapter 153 by reference; it expressly
provides, for instance, that district courts must rule on the
claims before them "subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of
section 2254[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court noted that where retroactive chapter 154
applies and incorporates parts of chapter 153 by reference, it
renders those portions of AEDPA retroactive for its limited
purposes. As the Court explained, "[W]hen a pending case is
also an expedited capital case subject to chapter 154, the new
provisions of § § 2254(d) and (e) will apply to that case[,]"
even though those sections are nonretroactive without the
help of chapter 154. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 335, 117 S. Ct. at
2067; see also id. at 326, 117 S. Ct. at 2063 ("The statute
reveals Congress's intent to apply the amendments to chapter
153 only to such cases as were filed after the statute's
enactment (except where chapter 154 otherwise makes select
provisions of chapter 153 applicable to pending cases)
(emphasis added)).
APPENDIX A - 39a
Kelley's habeas petition was pending when AEDPA
became effective; thus, AEDPA's restrictions on federal
evidentiary hearings probably extend to his case if chapter
154 applies and makes them retroactive. This conclusion,. of
course, begs another challenging question: Is chapter 154
applicable? At the broadest level, the chapter, entitled
"Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases," applies
only to "cases arising under section 2254, brought by.
prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital
sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a). Without question, Kelley,
unlike the petitioner in the Lindh case, is subject to a capital
sentence. More particularly, chapter 154 only applies if the
state that sentenced the petitioner meets the criteria of § §
2261(b) and (c), which involve the appointment and
compensation of competent postconviction counsel for the
petitioner. At this time, it is not clear whether the state of
Florida had satisfied those criteria.”°
Here, the district court naively assumed that pre-AEDPA
law applied. The court reasoned, "[E]xcept for select
provisions that Congress explicitly made retroactive,
?° We addressed this issue once in Hill v. Butterworth, 133
F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated by 147 F.3d 1333, 1334 (11th
Cir. 1998). The district court in that case determined that Florida
did not satisfy all of the requirements necessary to invoke chapter
154. Id. at 784-85 (quoting Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509,
524 (N.D. Fla. 1997)). Noting that, since the case left the district
court, Florida's laws changed in ways that might have affected the
applicability of chapter 154, we remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 786. Soon thereafter, though, the Supreme Court
decided Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 118 S. Ct. 1694, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 970 (1998), which demonstrated that the Butterworth case
was nonjusticiable and rendered chapter 154's applicability moot.
Consequently, on the State's petition for rehearing, we vacated our
previous decision and remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the case. 147 F.3d 1333, 1334 (11th Cir.
1998). To the best of our knowledge, the issue of chapter 154's
applicability to Florida cases remains unresolved.
APPENDIX A - 40a
[AEDPA's] amendments apply only to cases filed after the
effective date of the amended statute." Kelley, 222 F. Supp.
2d 1357, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002). It concluded, "As Kelley's
petition was filed in 1992, and does concern the select
retroactive provisions, this court must apply the law as it was
prior to the 1996 amendmenis." Id. The court did not explain
why the retroactive provisions of chapter 154 did not concern
Kelley's petition. Indeed, it is apparent that the court never
considered the possibility that chapter 154 made AEDPA's
other provisions retroactive such that they might control the
standard for granting an evidentiary hearing in this case.
This issue was not briefed to us, however, and the record
lends no insight sufficient to permit us to decide whether
chapter 154 extends to Florida such that AEDPA's restrictions
on evidentiary hearings should have applied in this case.
2. The District Court's Failure to Apply Any Legal
Standard
In any event, the district court clearly abused its discretion
by authorizing the hearing. The court compounded its failure
to determine the applicable legal standard by neglecting to
apply any standard at all.
If AEDPA applied, the court could not have afforded
Kelley an evidentiary hearing. The record was, and is, devoid
of any indication that Kelley's claims rely either on "new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral .
review" or on "a factual predicate that could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence . .
. ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Although it is the nature of
Brady claims that the prosecution precludes the defense from
obtaining important evidence before trial, we observe no
indication that Rule 3.850 counsel were precluded from
developing the factual basis for any of Kelley's collateral
claims through the exercise of due diligence during the Rule
APPENDIX A - 4la
3.850. proceedings.” Nor do we perceive the remo
possibility that the facts supporting the three claims for whic
the evidentiary hearing was granted "would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found [Kelley] guilty of [murder].". 28 US.C. §
2254(e)(2)(B).
Even if the district court were correct in its hasty
assumption that pre-AEDPA law governed its decision, the
court abused its discretion by neglecting to apply the pre-
AEDPA test properly.
Kelley, who also assumed that pre-AEDPA law applied,
advanced, as he does here, several explanations for why he
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Townsend. None
have merit. He argues that the Rule 3.850 court's factual
determinations cannot be presumed correct because the court
failed to address "crucial allegations and matter in dispute"
and because it made "findings that were clearly unsupported
by the record." We cannot agree. In the Rule 3.850 court,
Kelley's attorneys placed twenty-six exhibits in evidence and
presented the testimony of ten witnesses in support of the
Kelley's claims for relief. The court systematically analyzed
each of Kelley's claims in a thorough opinion that was
ultimately given great deference by the Florida Supreme
Court. After reviewing the record of the Rule 3.850
proceedings, we conclude that the court's findings are fairly
supported.
Thus, Kelley's only basis for obtaining a federal
evidentiary hearing must be that he failed to develop material
facts adequately in the Rule 3.850 court. As explained above,
the district court had discretion to allow a hearing before
*” By the time of the Rule 3.850 proceedings, Kelley had
obtained ali of the items upon which the Brady claims in his
federal habeas petition are based.
APPENDIX A - 42a
AEDPA took effect only if Kelley could satisfy Keeney's test
of cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice. The court
_ erroneously neglected to apply this standard. Indeed, although
the court voiced its view that the hearing was necessary, the
record is barren of any indication as to why it concluded that
a hearing was permissible.
Because it failed properly to apply Keeney and our
subsequent precedent, the district court has deprived us of a
record basis for deciding whether Kelley established cause
and resulting prejudice for his failure to develop the factual
bases for his claims in the Rule 3.850 court. In oral argument
in this appeal, Kelley's attorney agreed that the district court
failed to make findings of cause and prejudice. In fact, he
contended that this court could not make a cause-and-
prejudice determination on the record as its stands, and that if
we conclude that the district court erred in granting Kelley an
evidentiary hearing, we should remand the case to the district
court to permit Kelley to show the cause and prejudice that
warranted the district court's decision to hold an evidentiary
hearing.
Even so, we observe from what is before us that Kelley
would have faced great difficulties in satisfying Keeney's test.
To show cause, Kelley had to prove that some impediment
external to the decisions of his Rule 3.850 counsel prevented
him from first presenting to the state court the evidence he
introduced in the hearing in the district court. See Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed.
2d 397 (1986). Three of the eleven witnesses Kelley called to
the stand before the district court testified to events that
occurred in Kelley's presence. If Kelley now hangs his
"cause" hat on Brower's insufficient pretrial investigation, we
are baffled as to why Kelley required an investigator at all to
discover these witnesses. Furthermore, the record reveals no
hint that Kelley was incapable of fully developing his
collateral claims in the Rule 3.850 court. Kelley's failure to
present evidence to that court must not be confused with his
APPENDIX A - 43a
inability to develop certain evidence at the second trial. For
example, although prosecutorial misconduct might have
created cause for defense counsel's failure to present certain
evidence at trial, the record before us yields no indication that
similar misconduct impeded counsel from presenting to the
Rule 3.850 court the evidence they introduced (for the first
time) at the federal hearing. By the same token, although trial
records rarely reflect a complete account of an attorney's
ineffectiveness, there is no apparent reason why Kelley
should not have known the extent of trial counsel's
shortcomings by the time he filed his Rule 3.850 motion for
collateral relief.
Kelley would also be hard-pressed to demonstrate any
prejudice for failing to develop the new evidence that was not
properly presented to the state court. If Kelley was prejudiced
by such failure, it must be because he either (1) would have
prevailed on_a claim he asserted had he introduced the new
evidence with it, or (2) would have prevailed on a claim he
never asserted at all.
Kelley cannot establish the latter circumstance. To raise
an unexhausted claim for the first time in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, the petitioner must first establish cause
and prejudice or miscarriage of justice for failing to exhaust
the claim in state court. See, e.g., Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d
1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This is a one-
time requirement. If the petitioner meets it successfully, he
can go forward and develop the claim's factual basis; if he
does not, the claim is barred and the issue of factual
development is moot. As we explain below, the district court
improperly granted Kelley relief on an unexhausted instance
of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See supra Part
IV.A. Because that instance of Kelley's claim was not
presented to the state courts, its was procedurally defaulted.
Kelley obviously could not have been prejudiced in the
district court by his failure to develop evidence in the Rule
3.850 court for a claim he can no longer raise.
APPENDIX A - 44a
Kelley would also have difficulty establishing prejudice
from Rule 3.850 counsel's failure to present the new evidence
supporting the claims he did exhaust. The district court
correctly denied claims (4), (5), and (6) as a legal matter.
Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2000).
Additional evidence could not have enhanced these claims.
The court rejected claim (3) on the ground that the State did
not deny Kelley due process by destroying certain evidence
after Sweet's second trial because the State had not done so in
bad faith. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
Kelley's new evidence had nothing whatsoever to do with the
State's intentions surrounding the destruction of the evidence.
Thus, that evidence could not have enhanced that claim.
Furthermore, for reasons we discuss below, see infra Part
IV.B, Kelley's Brady claims fail for lack of legal materiality.
No amount of additional evidence can revive a claim that is
legally insufficient.
That leaves us with Kelley's ineffective assistance claims.
The evidence Kelley presented to the district court shed little
light on the instances of his ineffective assistance claim that
had been exhausted and, therefore, were preserved for federal
review. Most of the new evidence appears relevant primarily
to the procedurally barred claim that Kelley's conviction
might not have resulted had defense counsel not relied on
Brower to conduct the pretrial investigation. Even if the claim
were not barred, we have serious doubt that new evidence of
Brower's incompetence justified the granting of habeas
relief.** After all, Kelley's counsel had well over a month after
Brower's disappearance to conduct further research for
Kelley's second trial if such research were necessary.
Furthermore, Kelley's counsel testified that their decision to
** Indeed, that Kelley told the district court that he needed an
evidentiary hearing to develop this instance of his ineffective
assistance claim underscores the fact that he did not raise the claim
in his Rule 3.850 proceeding.
APPENDIX A - 45a
rest without putting on a defense was a matter of calculated
trial strategy. See infra note 34.
All of this said, we need not remand the case, as we did in
‘Mathis, 975 F.2d at 1497, to enable the petitioner to show
cause and resulting prejudice for his failure to present his new
evidence to the Rule 3.850 court. As we explain in Part IV,
Kelley would not qualify for habeas relief as a matter of law
even if the additional evidence were admitted and properly
weighed.
IV.
Rulings on Habeas Claims
Having decided that the district court abused its discretion
by granuug the evidentiary hearing without applying the
proper legal standard, we turn to the relief it granted. The
court granted habeas relief on claim (1) for five Brady
violations, and claim (2) for ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. We address these rulings in reverse order. As
indicated supra, neither claim has merit with or without the
evidence Kelley presented to the district court.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The district court granted Kelley habeas relief for
ineffective assistance on the ground that "Kelley's trial
counsel was deficient in having a disbarred attorney, lazy to a
fault, resolve whether or not to conduct a pretrial
investigation." Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla.
2002). Kelley defaulted this claim by failing to present it to
the Rule 3.850 court. Therefore, the district court should have
dismissed it. Even if the claim were preserved, however, it
should have failed.
1. The Exhaustion Requirement
Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal
court that were not first exhausted in state court. See, e.g.,
APPENDIX A - 46a
Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998).
To properly exhaust a claim, "the petitioner must afford the
State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the
claim on the merits." Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. at
1720. It is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas
petitioner has been through the state courts, Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438
(1971), nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary to
support the claim were before the state courts or that a
somewhat similar state-law claim was made, Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277, 74 L. Ed. 2d 3
(1982) (citations omitted). The petitioner must present his
claims to the state courts such that they are permitted the
“opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon (his) constitutional claim." Picard, 404 U.S. at
277, 112 S. Ct. at 513 (alteration in original).
Thus, the prohibition against raising nonexhausted claims
in federal court extends not only to broad legal theories of
relief, but also to the specific assertions of fact that might
support relief. For example, habeas petitioners may not
present particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel in their federal petitions that were not first presented
to the state courts. Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207,
1211 (11th Cir. 1992). As we explained,
allowing a habeas petitioner to allege a
single instance of ineffective assistance in his
state post-conviction proceedings and_ then
proceed to federal court to allege additional
instances would be contrary to the state's "full
and fair opportunity to address the claim on the
merits." The state would never have the benefit
of evaluating the claim using a fully developed
set of facts. This would not be the "serious and
APPENDIX A - 47a
meaningful" exhaustion of claims that Congress
intended.
Id.; see also Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th
Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that, where the habeas
petitioner properly raised only one ineffective assistance
claim on collateral! attack in state court, he could seek federal
relief based on that specific claim, but not based on other
alleged attorney defects that were not presented to the state
courts); Maynard v. Lockhart, 981 F.2d 981, 984-85 & n.1
(8th Cir. 1992) ("To preserve an allegation of ineffective
assistance for federal habeas review, a petitioner must present
that specific allegation to a state court."). Furthermore, habeas
petitioners cannot preserve otherwise unexhausted, specific
claims of ineffective assistance merely by arguing that their
lawyers were ineffective in a general and unspecified way.
See Weeks, 26 F.3d at 1044-46 (rejecting petitioner's
argument that "the general claim of ineffective assistance in
state court preserves for federal review all alleged instances
of ineffectiveness, regardless of whether evidence of a
particular act was presented to the state court"). In sum, to
preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
federal review, the habeas petitioner must assert this theory of
relief and transparently present the state courts with the
specific acts or omissions of his lawyers that resulted in
prejudice.
Federal habeas petitioners are undoubtedly on their
strongest footing with regard to the exhaustion requirement
when their federal claims are carbon copies of the claims they
presented to the state courts. Such reproduction leaves no
question that the claims presented to the federal court are the
same as those that were presented to the state court. But we
do not demand exact replicas. We recognize that habeas
petitioners are permitted to clarify the arguments presented to
APPENDIX A - 48a
the state courts on federal collateral :eview provided that
those arguments remain unchanged in substance.
We are not so draconian or formalistic as to require
petitioners to give a separate federal law heading to each of
the claims they raise in state court to ensure exhaustion for
federal review. We simply require that petitioners present
their claims to the state courts such that the reasonable reader
would understand each claim's particular legal basis and
specific factual foundation. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 112
S Ct. at 513. As the First Circuit observed,
{T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas
applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift
needles in the haystack of the state court record.
The ground relied upon must be presented face-
up and squarely; the federal question must be
plainly defined. Oblique references which hint
that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork
will not turn the trick.
Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1988).
To ensure exhaustion, petitioners must present their
claims in this manner of clarity throughout "one complete
round of the State's established appellate review process."
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728,
1732, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). As long as state supreme court
review of a prisoner's claims is part of a state's ordinary
appellate review procedure, prisoners of that state must
present their claims to the state supreme court to preserve
those claims for federal review, even if review by that court is
discretionary. See id. at 848-49, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.
The habeas petitioner can escape the exhaustion
requirement only by showing cause for the default and actual
prejudice resulting therefrom, or by _ establishing a
:
APPENDIX A - 49a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Bailey, 172 F.3d at 1306
(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639,
91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-
27, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995)). Absent the
applicability of these exceptions, nonexhausted claims cannot
be raised in federal habeas corpus petitions.
We review a district court's determination as to whether a
habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from raising a claim
in federal court de novo. Lusk v. Singletary, 112 F.3d 1103,
1105 (11th Cir. 1997).
2. Application of the Exhaustion Requirement to Kelley's
Case
Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion cited seven specific instances
of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the motion
contended that Kelley's trial counsel, Kunstler and Edmund,
were ineffective because "they failed to thoroughly review"
certain materials obtained by Rule 3.850 counsel that could
have been used "to determine the full extent of the evidence
destroyed in 1976," after John Sweet's second trial.
Second, the motion argued that Kunstler and Edmund
were ineffective because they failed to object to the expert
testimony of three of the State's expert witnesses and
stipulated to the testimony of a fourth expert. These witnesses
testified about the destroyed evidence, and Kelley's Rule
3.850 counsel reasoned that they could not be cross-examined
effectively because that evidence was not in existence at the
time of Kelley's trial.
Kelley's third theory of ineffective assistance contained a
hodgepodge of grievances, all of which fell under the banner
of "Failure to Develop Defense Theories." The gravamen of
this claim was that Kunstler and Edmund made a series of
missteps that undermined the defense's two key theories: first,
that the person who registered at the Daytona Inn Motel
around the time of the murder, although using Kelley's name,
was not actually defendant William Kelley; and second, that
APPENDIX A - 50a
John Sweet executed the murder himself without the
assistance of hired assassins. Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel
argued that his trial counsel should have more adroitly
resisted the State's effort to link Kelley to the motel. Along
these lines, the Rule 3.850 motion specifically faulted
Kelley's trial counsel for failing "to adduce evidence that the
handwriting on the motel's registration record was not the
defendant William Kelley's handwriting, a fact that the
defendant had made known to defense counsel." It faults trial
counsel for stipulating that the car registered at the motel
belonged to Jennie Adams, who had been seen with Kelley
from time to time and was his girlfriend. Additionally, the
motion contended that trial counsel should have attempted to
show that descriptions of the women who accompanied the
man registered under Kelley's name at the motel did not
match the appearance of Jennie Adams.
In this sarne section, the motion asserts that Edmund
performed deficiently in his cross-examination of Kaye
Carter, the daughter of a clerk at the motel. In the first place,
Edmund failed to differentiate between Kelley and the
supposed imposter who used Kelley's name at the motel. This
blunder, Rule 3.850 counsel insisted, reinforced the State's
devastating contention that the men were one in the same.
Secondly, Edmund did not use cross-examination to suggest
that the man registered under Kelley's name could have
actually been Steve "the Greek" Busias, a person from
Kelley's neighborhood who allegedly matched physical
characteristics of the man at the motel, as described by Carter.
The motion stressed that Edmund even stated at one point that
Kelley, rather than the theoretical imposter Kelley, registered
the car matching Jennie Adams's license plate at the Daytona
Inn.
The Rule 3.850 motion also posited other specific
deficiencies related to Kelley's third ineffective assistance
claim: the broad "Failure to Develop Defense Theories." It
contended, for instance, that defense counsel should have
APPENDIX A - 51a
more carefully researched the weather and daylight conditions
at the time of the murder. Carter testified that the man
registered as Kelley arrived at the motel before 8:30 P.M. on
the night of the murder. One of the victim's neighbors,
however, testified that she saw two people leaving the
victim's home, driving the victim's car with the lights on.
Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel theorized that the late time of
sunset on the day of the murder would have made it
improbable that the killers drove from the victim's house in
Sebring after twilight and reached the motel in Daytona
before 8:30 P.M. Yet another line of argument involves
comments Kelley made to FBI Agent Ross Davis at the time
of arrest, which tended indicate Kelley's knowledge of the
murder. On this subject, the motion faulted Kelley's trial
counsel for failing to present copies of a 1981 news story
about the murder during Davis's cross-examination.
Most significantly, this same third ineffective assistance
claim asserted that "defense [counsel] failed to develop facts
and interview witnesses to support its ‘wrong William Kelley’
defense." Purportedly, many witnesses would have been
available to testify that Kelley's appearance at the time of the
murder differed from that of the man Sweet described as a
triggerman.
The remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are less important for purposes of this appeal. The fourth
instance cited by the motion involved comments Edmund
made during the jury-selection voir dire alluding to Kelley's
prior criminal conduct. The fifth instance faulted defense
counsel for failing to object to the Allen charge given to the
jury. The sixth instance complained that Kelley's defense was
ineffective in impeaching John Sweet's credibility and found
specific fault with counsel's failure to object when the court
declined to answer a question the jury submitted during
deliberations about whether Sweet received immunity in
Florida for his testimony against Kelley. Finally, the Rule
3.850 motion cited as a seventh instance of ineffective
APPENDIX A - 52a
assistance Kunstler and Edmund's failure to request a change
of venue.
Kelley's brief to the Florida Supreme Court appealing the
denial of Rule 3.850 relief cast Kelley's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in substantially similar terms.”
By the time he sought federal habeas relief, however,
many of Kelley's ineffective assistance claims had assumed a
strikingly different hue. At the broadest level, Kelley's federal
petition asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for "failure
to investigate, to depose witnesses, to present a case in
defense, and to perform other basic defense functions." The
district court ably distilled Kelley's claims down to the
following distinct instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel:
(1) the unreasonable failure to investigate
and to present evidence on behalf of Kelley; (2)
the failure to take pretrial depositions and to seek
a more fair trial venue; (3) the failure to impeach,
confront, and rebut the state's case; (4) the failure
to make an effective closing argument and to
object to improper closing argument by the state;
and (5) the failure to provide reasonably effective
*? Kelley's brief to the court brief differs from his Rule 3.850
motion only insofar as it adds the claim that the Rule 3.850 court
erred in failing to admit into evidence an affidavit drafted for, but
never signed by, Edmund. Kelley argues that this affidavit was
relevant because it accurately reflected Edmund's view of his
effectiveness as trial counsel even though Edmund eventually
drafted a different affidavit, rather than signing the one at issue.
This argument clearly amounts to an appeal of an evidentiary
ruling; therefore, it works no material change or supplement to
Kelley's ineffective assistance claims.
APPENDIX A - 53a
assistance with regard to the submission of
proposed jury instructions.
Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
As noted above, the district court granted Kelley relief for
the first of these instances ineffective assistance of counsel:
defense counsel's failure to investigate. This decision rested
almost exclusively on defense counsel's reliance on disbarred
Harvey Brower for handling the pretrial investigation. On the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984), the district court reasoned that Kelley's counsel were
ineffective unless they either conducted a reasonable
investigation or made a reasonable decision not to investigate.
Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 ("[C]ounsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary.") Applying
this test, the court found that
neither Kunstler nor Edmund made the
decision not to investigate. They mistakenly
assumed that Brower, the — disbarred
attorney/investigation, would conduct his
investigation in a conscientious manner.
Ultimately, however, Brower failed to perform an
investigation, and his failure to present the
findings of a pretrial investigation or to file any
pretrial motions” effectively provided Kelley
*° We pause to note the oddity of the district court's criticism
regarding Brower's failure to file pretrial motions. Brower was not
licensed to practice law in Florida. In fact, at the time of Kelley's
trial, Brower was disbarred in Massachusetts. It is abundantly clear,
then, that Brower could not file pretrial motions. Insofar as the
APPENDIX A - 54a
with ineffective counsel. Therefore, Kelley's trial
counsel was deficient in have a disbarred
attorney, lazy to a fault, resolve whether or not to
conduct a pretrial investigation. qe
Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
Although it identified them, the district court remarked no
further on the remaining instances of ineffective assistance
Kelley raised in his petition.”
district court's statement implies that Kelley's counsel (because of
Brower or for other reasons) neglected to file pretrial motions in
Kelley's case, the statement is plainly wrong. Kelley's counsel
argued no fewer than thirteen motions prior to Kelley's first trial.
They argued a motion to dismiss the indictment on the eve of
Kelley's second tnal.
*! As explained above, the district court identified each of the
five instances of Kelley's ineffective assistance claim but grounded
its ruling only on the instance concerning counsel's failure to
investigate. When it issued this order, the district court was
responding to the State's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. That
motion asked the court to amend its September 19, 2002 judgment
granting relief based on Kelley's Brady claims and to address the
remaining claims asserted in Kelley's petition. Although the district
court refused to alter its decision regarding the Brady claims, it
agreed with the State's contention that it "must settle all claims in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus" to avoid piecemeal litigation and
improve the quality of the judicial product. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d
1325, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925,
936 (11th Cir. 1992). The court then proceeded to treat Kelley's
petition comprehensively. Because it noted all five instances of
Kelley's ineffective assistance claim, id. at 1325, but only identified
one as meriting relief, namely counsel's failure to investigate, we
infer that the district court determined that the remaining instances
of ineffective assistance are unavailing. Because Kelley did not
APPENDIX A - 55a
We conclude that the district court should have dismissed
Kelley's ineffective assistance claim based on counsels’
failure to investigate. After careful analysis of the record, we
are confident that Kelley has presented no claim to the Rule
3.850 court that fairly notified the State that he intended to
challenge his conviction on the ground that his attorneys were
constitutionally deficient in their duty to investigate or
because they relied on Harvey Brower for this chore. This
ineffective assistance claim was not merely a clarified
rendition of an exhausted claim, but a new claim altogether.
Kelley's broad Rule 3.850 claim concerning the "Failure
to Develop Defense Theories" is the most similar, by far, to
the ineffective assistance claim upon which the district court
granted relief. Yet the two claims are clearly distinct, in form
and in substance. The former, exhausted claim assailed
Kelley's trial counsel for failing to develop and even
undermining its core theories that Sweet performed the
murder unassisted or that the defendant was not the person
who registered at the Daytona Inn Motel under Kelley's name.
In its brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Kelley's counsel
summarized the claim (as also set out in the supplemental
brief Kelley filed in appealing his conviction to the Florida
- Supreme Court) as follows:
Mr. Kelley's trial attorneys’ lack of
effectiveness was so plain that appellate counsel
sought to present the claim on direct appeal.
They failed to investigate, develop, or present
readily available evidence that would have
supported their own defense theories while
presenting the jury with incomprehensible
comments which gutted their own theory and
which can be supported by no reasonable tactic.
cross-appeal the district court's order denying those features of the
claim, these decisions are not before us.
APPENDIX A - 56a
This claim most closely approached the distinct,
unexhausted claim that prevailed in the district court when
Kelley argued to the Florida Supreme Court,
[Bly virtue of defense counsel's
incompetence, the jury was presented with only
one version [of the facts]: the defendant William
Kelley had been registered at the Daytona Inn on
the days surrounding the murder of Maxcy, just
as John Sweet had testified. This version,
however, was far from accurate, and counsel had
the tools with which they could have shown the
jury the inaccuracy. Without a reason, they
simply failed to investigate and thus failed to
develop or use the tools that they had.
The Rule 3.850 court and, eventually the Florida
Supreme Court, carefully distilled Kelley's broad "failure to
develop defense theories" claim into seven specific
grievances:
1. Counsel failed to adduce evidence that the
handwriting on the motel registration record was
not the defendant's. . . .
2. Counsel stipulated to the State's evidence
linking the Mr. and Mrs. William Kelley
registered at the Daytona Inn Motel to the motor
vehicle owned by Jennie Adams. ...
3. Counsel failed to point out the distinctions
between the man at the Daytona Inn Motel, as
described by Kaye Carter, and the defendant... .
APPENDIX A - 57a
4. Counsel failed to investigate and utilize
the inconsistencies in the time periods on the
evening of the murder. . . .
5. Counsel failed to interview and call
witnesses to testify regarding the defendant's
physical characteristics in 1966... .
6. Counsel failed to obtain and present
evidence (newspaper articles) which would
explain the defendant's knowledge of the Maxcy
killing when he was arrested. . . .
7. Counsel failed to obtain affidavits and
present testimony from three attorneys that the
defendant contacted them to determine if there
was a warrant for the defendant's arrest.
Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 759-60. Clearly, the Florida courts
comprehended in these arguments no intimation that Kelley's
‘defense counsel flouted their general duty to investigate or,
alternatively, decide not to investigate by relying on Brower
for this aspect of the trial preparation. The State did not divine
this argument either, and, consequently, its own brief to the
Florida Supreme Court articulated no rebuttal to the novel
claim that prevailed in the district court.
The silence of the supreme court and the State in this
regard is unsurprising. Nowhere in the portion of Kelley's
brief asserting ineffectiveness for the failure of his counsel to
develop defense theories did Kelley mention Harvey Brower.
Indeed, in all 101 pages of Kelley's brief to the state supreme
court, Brower's name appears only twice, both times in a
single paragraph:
APPENDIX A - 58a
Other noteworthy and telling matters came
to light at the [Rule] 3.850 hearing. Harvey
Brower, a disbarred attorney, did much of the
investigation and preliminary legal work prior to
Mr. Kelley's first trial. Apparently, Mr. Brower
supplied a list of names and addresses of
potential witnesses to the defense, and the
defense learned that the addresses listed were
incorrect--they did not represent actual addresses.
This paragraph--unique in its mention of Brower--
appears not in a discussion of trial counsel's investigatory
dereliction, but rather in the course of Kelley's separate
evidentiary argument that the Rule 3.850 court erred by
excluding from evidence an unsigned affidavit regarding
Edmund's effectiveness.”
In stark contrast to his brief to the Florida Supreme
Court, Kelley's federal habeas petition expends almost
seventeen pages arguing that his trial counsel were ineffective
for their "unreasonable failure to investigate." Each of these
pages is devoted almost exclusively to criticizing counsel for
their reliance on Brower. Indeed, the very first sentence of the
section reads,
Virtually all pretrial matters were delegated
to the incompetent hands of one Harvey Brower,
a Massachusetts former lawyer and federal felon
* This section of Kelley's brief is entitled, "The Judge Should
Have Granted Mr. Kelley's Offer to Admit Into Evidence Jack
Edmund's Unsigned Affidavit." By way of background, Kelley's
- Rule 3.850 counsel drafted an affidavit regarding Edmund's
performance at trial and asked him to sign it. Edmund refused to
sign this particular document and eventually drafted and signed a
different affidavit on this subject and provided it to the defense. See
supra note 29.
APPENDIX A - 59a
who was disbarred in 1979 for defrauding a
former nun out of $ 11,400 in phony stock shares
and a ioan to a non-existent third party.
Throughout this extensive argument, Kelley cites
repeatedly to four appended materials: two Massachusetts
judgments, one in which Brower was censured and another in
which he was disbarred; and two affidavits of Massachusetts
attorneys who attested to Brower's incompetence or
irresponsibility. Tellingly, these exhibits were never presented
to the state courts. We conclude that this earlier omission was
no oversight; the appended materials appear for the first time
before the district court because the federal proceeding
marked the first appearance of Kelley's claim that his defense
counsel denied him a constitutional right by relying on
Brower to conduct their pretrial investigation.
Our concerns for comity, judicial efficiency, and fairness
to the respondent preclude us from finding that the ineffective
assistance claim that prevailed in the district court was
properly exhausted. Recharacterizing the claim Kelley
presented to the Rule 3.850 court at this -late hour as a
challenge to the counsel's reliance on Brower for pretrial
investigation would "fundamentally alter the legal claim{s]
already considered by the state courts" such that we could not
consider the restated claim as exhausted. Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 260, 106 S. Ct. 617, 622, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598
(1986). And what we cannot achieve by such
recharacterization, neither can we achieve by sewing
disjointed factual snippets scattered throughout the Rule
3.850 record into a patchwork federal claim. At the very
most, Kelley's singular reference to Brower in his brief to the
Florida Supreme Court brief amounts to a "needle[{] in the
haystack of the state court record." Martens, 836 F.2d at 717.
Kelley's other Rule 3.850 claims and other instances of
ineffective assistance come nowhere near shouting distance of
the issue upon which the district court granted relief.
APPENDIX A - 60a
Our finding of procedural default is in no way disturbed
by the fact that Brower's antics were discussed to some degree
on the record during the Rule 3.850 hearing. This discussion
was not sufficient to "afford the State a full and fair
opportunity to address and resolve the claim on the merits."
Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. at 1720." By the time of
the hearing, the State could not have prepared for or presented
evidence to rebut the argument that defense counsel were
deficient in relying on Brower. Morever, even if the evidence
Kelley put on at the Rule 3.850 hearing would have supported
a finding of ineffective assistance on this then-unasserted
instance of that claim, Kelley would not have satisfied the
exhaustion requirement. "It is not enough that all the facts
necessary to support the federal claim were before the state
courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made."
Harless, 459 U.S. at 6, 103 S. Ct. at 277 (citations omitted).
To exhaust the claim sufficiently, Kelley must have presented
the state court with this particular legal basis for relief in
addition to the facts supporting it.
Our conclusion also withstands Kelley's unpersuasive
argument that the State waived the requirement of exhaustion.
Although prior to AEDPA's enactment, this court held that
"the State may waive exhaustion either expressly or
impliedly," we explained that such waiver occurs "[w]hen the
State has not raised lack of exhaustion in the district court or
on appeal. . . . " Atkins v. Attorney General of State of Ala.,
932 F.2d 1430, 1431 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).” In
this case, the State pled lack of exhaustion in the district court
and in its brief to us. Accordingly, exhaustion remains very
much a viable issue.
3 Where AEDPA applies, states will not be deemed to have
waived the exhaustion requirement unless they indicate their
intention to waive the requirement expressly. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(3). In fact, the Tenth Circuit has noted that states are now
free to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See Hale v.
Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1327 n.12 (10th Cir. 2000).
APPENDIX A - 6la
Because Kelley's petition contains both exhausted and
nonexhausted claims, it is a classic "mixed petition."
Ordinarily, "a district court must dismiss such ‘mixed
petitions,’ leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to
state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or
resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted
claims to the district court." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
510, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1199, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). Rose
informed petitioners that they could no longer withhold
collateral claims from their state court petitions in the hope
that the district court would entertain them on the merits.
Dismissing a mixed petition is of little utility, however,
when the claims raised for the first time at the federal level
can no longer be litigated on the merits in state court because
they are procedurally barred. In such a case, requiring the
petitioner to return to state court only to make a futile
application for relief simply delays the federal courts’
adjudication of his petition. As we observed in Snowden v.
Singletary, 135 F.3d at 736 (citations and footnotes omitted),
when it is obvious that the unexhausted
claims would be procedurally barred in state
court due to a state-law procedural default, we
can forego the needless "judicial ping-pong" and
just treat those claims now barred by state law as
no basis for federal habeas relief. . . . [W]here all
the unexhausted claims are procedurally barred
from being considered in Florida courts, it would
serve no purpose to dismiss the petition for
further exhaustion because review of those
claims is unavailable in state courts.
Without question, the Florida courts will no longer
entertain on the merits of the claims Kelley has asserted for
the first time in the instant petition. See, e.g., Aldridge v.
APPENDIX A - 62a
State, 503 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a state
prisoner is procedurally barred from raising on a second
motion for postconviction relief "somewhat different facts to
support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim"). Clearly,
Kelley could demonstrate no cause for not having raised the
Brower-related instance of ineffective assistance of counsel in
the Rule 3.850 proceeding. There was no conceivable
impediment to raising it. Consequently, we can address
Kelley's remaining claims, rather than remanding the case to
the district court with the instruction that it dismiss Kelley's
petition.
3. Kelley's Lack of Prejudice from Ineffective Assistance
Although Kelley's procedural default obviates any need to
reach the merits of his ineffective assistance claim, we pause
briefly to voice our serious skepticism that counsel's reliance
on Brower for pretrial investigation could have amounted to a
violation of Kelley's nghts.
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. More specifically, we have
held that
[t]o succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance, Petitioner must show both
incompetence and prejudice: (1) "[PJetitioner
must show that ‘counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
and (2) “{P]etitioner must show ‘that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”
APPENDIX A - 63a
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (11th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106
S. Ct. 2464, 2473, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986)) (alterations in
original).
Unfortunately, the district court did not find--explicitly or
implicitly--that Kelley suffered prejudice as a result of
counsel's performance. Recognizing this deficiency in the
district court's order, Kelley's attorneys moved the court for
clarification on this issue on January 6, 2003:
[I]jn an abundance of caution, Petitioner
respectfully suggests that further specificity
regarding the Strickland prejudice prong might
be warranted in order to minimize the risk that
the Court of Appeals might misunderstand this
Court's determination and either might (a) fail to
recognize that this Court had indeed made the
requisite finding under the ‘prejudice prong’ of
Strickland, or might (b) assume that the finding
had been made but harbor some uncertainty
regarding the basis on which it had been made.™*
** In support of their motion for clarification, counsel proffered
two recommended findings of prejudice. First, trial counsel's
shoddy pretrial investigation rendered them unable to call Hobart
Willis as a defense witness Willis testified by videotape at the
federal evidentiary hearing that Steven Busias claimed
responsibility to him for the Maxcy murder. Apparently, Willis
notified Brower that he would be available to testify in Kelley's
defense. Second, counsel were unable to utilize the testimony of
Joseph Whittington. Richard Mars, an attorney from Bartow,
Florida testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that he
interviewed Whittington before Kelley's second trial. Ostensibly,
Whittington implied that John Sweet had a motive for framing
Kelley.
APPENDIX A - 64a
The district court denied the motion for clarification in an
order entered on January 8, 2003.
This denial is not surprising. Prejudice would be difficult,
if not impossible, to find on this record. Kelley had two trials,
and Brower's services were employed only for the first.
Obviously, Kelley's conviction resulted from the second trial.
By the second trial, Kelley's defense team was well aware of
what the State's case would look like, since the State had
revealed its hand during the first trial, and the defense team
had a transcript of the testimonies of the State's witnesses.
Furthermore, the nearly two months that passed between the
aborted first trial and the commencement of the second tnal--
after Brower's inadequacy had been exposed--afforded
defense counsel ample time to locate potential defense
witnesses and conduct further investigation. According to
both of Kelley's trial lawyers, defense counsel did just that.
Edmund testified that he and Kunstler sent an attorney to New
England after the first trial to corroborate evidence of Sweet's
questionable character and to find favorable evidence about
Kelley's character. Kunstler's testimony is even more
illuminating. During Kelley's state Rule 3.850 hearing,
Kunstler was asked,
During the interim between the first trial and
the second trial, did you and Mr. Edmund sit
down and discuss: Well, this is how the first trial
it bears mention that this second asserted prejudice is rather
inconsistent with the notion that defense counsel failed to
investigate. Furthermore, Edmund did, as part of his calculated trial
strategy, argue that Sweet had such a motive. In fact, Edmund
testified that he was aware of Whittington and concluded that he
was not a valuable witness because Edmund intended to advance a
different frame-up motive than that to which Whittington would
speak.
APPENDIX A - 65a
went; now we knew what the evidence is, what
the witnesses are, let's do this or let's do that, let's
change some things for the second trial?
Kunstler answered, "We did. I don't know if we did it in
person. We had a lot of telephone calls. And since Brower
had vanished from the face of the earth, Jack [Edmund] had
his own investigator from his office. And he put his own
investigator to work." Finally, Kelley's attorneys repeatedly
testified that they decided against putting on evidence at trial
as a matter of strategy,” which afforded the defense both the
** For instance, at the Rule 3.850 hearing, the State called
Edmund to the stand:
Q: During the trial or during both trials actually, you and Mr.
Kunstler [Kelley's other trial lawyer] did not call any defense
witnesses. Mr. Kelley did not take the stand. Was that
something that you and Mr. Kunstler discussed or how was it
decided as to that aspect of the defense case what would be
done or not done as far as presenting witnesses?
A: I don't remember a specific discussion about not calling
witnesses. And I don't remember a specific discussion about
not calling Bill [Kelley]. But that was one of those decisions
that good trial lawyers familiar with the facts could make
without any- I mean that really didn't take a decision. It was a
matter that was going to be.
Q: Do consider that to be a matter of trial strategy?
A: Of course.
Confronted with a similar line of inquiry at the federal
evidentiary hearing, Edmund testified,
APPENDIX A - 66a
first and last closing arguments to the jury at the end of the
day. We must be highly deferential to such strategic decisions
of counsel. As the Supreme Court instructed, "a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S. Ct. at 2065 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1518-19 (11th Cir.
1995) (en banc) (observing that "[w]e cannot, and will not,
second guess" the "strategic decisions trial counsel are called
upon to make"). In sum, the mistrial gave defense counsel two
important benefits: (1) a transcript of the State's case, and (2)
an additional opportunity to conduct the investigation Brower
neglected. Because counsel made full use of these benefits
and because they would likely have declined as a matter of
trial strategy to give up the right to make the first and last
closing arguments so that they could call some of the
witnesses who testified at the federal evidentiary hearing, we
cannot agree that Brower's inadequate investigation
prejudiced Kelley's defense.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
I tried the case the way I thought the case should be tried
with the witnesses that I was cross examining. . . . [T]his is
not something that should override calling a witness who is a
critical witness, but in Florida if the defendant alone testifies
or doesn't testify and calls no witnesses the defense has beth
the opening [and] closing portions of the closing argument. In
a case with none or few witnesses I think it is to the
advantage of the defense to retain that if possible. Again that
was a decision that was, I am sure, jointly made... . It is a
tactic not to call any witnesses to further impeach Sweet than
he had already impeached himself.
APPENDIX A - 67a
1. The Brady Rule
The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). As the Supreme Court later clarified,
there are three components of a true Brady violation: (1) The
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have
ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct.
1936, 1948, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Evidence is material so
as to establish prejudice only "if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the ‘evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed.
2d 481 (1985).”° Of course, Brady and its progeny apply only
to evidence possessed by the prosecution team, which
includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.
United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989).
** Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in Bagley, but this
quotation is drawn from a portion of his opinion that was joined
only by Justice O'Connor. Although a majority of the Court did not
agree with this portion of the opinion in its entirety, Justice White
wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, agreeing with the materiality standard quoted
above. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (White, J., concurring). Since
Bagley, the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly
recognized that this standard governs determinations of materiality
for the purpose of deciding Brady claims. See, e.g., Strickler, 527
U.S. at 280, 119 S. Ct. at 1948; Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288,
1325 (11th Cir. 2002).
APPENDIX A - 68a
An alleged Brady violation presents a mixed question of
law and fact, which we review de novo. Wright v. Hopper,
169 F.3d 695, 701 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. Application of the Brady Rule to Kelley's Case
The Rule 3.850 court, and the Florida Supreme Court on
appeal, rejected Kelley's Brady claims on the merits. The
district court disagreed with the state courts’ rulings and
concluded that Kelley was entitled to relief on the claims he
had presented to the Rule 3.850 court. The district court,
relying on the evidence presented to the Rule 3.850 court and
at the federal evidentiary hearing, found that five items of
withheld evidence were exculpatory. It further found that the
State had maternally prejudiced Kelley's defense by
withholding those items. The five withheld items include
. (1) a Massachusetts immunity order,
indicating that Sweet received immunity from
that state on March 13, 1981;
(2) The Florida Department of Law
Enforcement Investigative Report authored by
Agent Joe Mitchell, dated February 21, 1981;
(3) the transcript of Sweet's first trial;
(4) the second of two police reports authored
by Special Agent Roma Trulock, reflecting
observations of witness Kaye Carter; and
(5) a fingerprint report, constructed from
prints at the victim's house and car, containing no
positive matches to Kelley's prints. Without
APPENDIX A - 69a
identifying particular prejudices, the district court
remarked in general terms,
Disclosure of the suppressed
evidence to competent counsel
would have made a different result
much more probable. The essence of
the State's case was the testimony of
Sweet. Disclosure of his immunity
and transcript from his first trial
would have resulted in a markedly
weaker case for the prosecution and
a markedly stronger one for the
defense.
Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
Whether the withheld items the court seized upon in
granting Kelley relief are considered individually or
collectively, we conclude that Kelley suffered no Brady
prejudice as a result of the withholding.
a. The Massachusetts Immunity Order and the Joe
Mitchell Report
On March 13, 1981, after being informed that Sweet had
invoked his right against self-incrimination before a
Massachusetts grand jury involving "offenses of larceny,
breaking and entering a building, violations of the narcotic
and harmful drug laws, and lending or money or thing of
value in violation of the General Laws [of Massachusetts],"
the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts
entered an order granting Sweet transactional immunity. Its
order stated, in relevant part:
John J. Sweet shall not be prosecuted or
subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
APPENDIX A - 70a
account of any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is so compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify or produce evidence, nor
shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence
in any criminal or civil proceeding against him in
any court of the Commonwealth, except in
prosecution for perjury or contempt while giving
testimony or producing evidence under
compulsion ....
On March 29, 1984, in his closing argument to the jury at
the end of Kelley's trial, Assistant State Attorney Hardy
Pickard stated that Sweet did not have to testify as a
prosecution witness against Kelley in Florida to obtain the
immunity the Massachusetts court granted him.*’ The district
court found, albeit implicitly, that had the State given defense
counsel copies of the immunity order and Joe Mitchell's
investigative report pnor to Kelley's tral, the prosecutor
would not have made the statement at all or, if he made it,
defense counsel--having tiie final closing argument to the
jury--would have convinced the jury that the prosecutor's
*” Specifically Pickard argued,
John Sweet did not have to give the police Kelley to get
immunity. John Sweet got immunity from Massachusetts on
a long list of things. It has nothing to do with the Maxcy case
or giving them Kelley on the Florida cases.
He already had his immunity from Massachusetts on loan
sharking, whatever that long list of things were. He didn't
have to give them Kelley to get immunity. That came up later
after he went to Massachusetts and thirty investigators or
however many he said were questioning him about all sorts
of crimes in Massachusetts.
(Emphasis added).
APPENDIX A - 7la
statement was a lie.* But for the lie, the district court
concluded, there was "a reasonable probability that . . . the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley,
473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383.
The district court found separate Brady violations in the
State's failure to disclose the immunity order and the Mitchell
report. The court also found a symbiotic relationship between
the two items, such that, when considered together, the items'
materiality was significantly enhanced and clearly established
a Brady violation. We consider these items separately and
then together.
Nothing in the immunity order states that the
Massachusetts court granted Sweet immunity on the condition
that he testify against Kelley in Florida.” To find that the
court imposed such a condition, we would first have to infer
that the court entered the order after obtaining Sweet's
commitment to testify against Kelley in Florida. Since the
order does not reveal such commitment, the commitment
would have to to have been made in a separate writing or
given orally. We would have to infer further that had Sweet
not made the commitment, the court would not have granted
him immunity. To draw that inference, we would have to
*8 An alternative implicit finding is that the court would have
instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement.
* As a threshold matter, the order cannot constitute Brady
material because there is no indication in the record that the State
possessed the order, nor is there any indication that the order was
more accessible to the State than it was to Kelley's defense team.
See Meros, 866 F.2d at 1309. Although the Massachusetts court
sealed the grand jury's application for Sweet's immunity and the
testimony he gave the grand jury about crimes in Massachusetts,
the immunity order itself was a public document and thus available
to Kelley's defense team. Although the State was not required to
obtain a copy of the immunity order and turn it over to the defense,
we demonstrate that the order lacked Brady materiality as a matter
of law.
APPENDIX A - 72a
infer that the court would have ignored the grand jury's
request, which was based on the need for Sweet's testimony
regarding several serious crimes. Put another way, we would
have to infer that the court was more interested in helping the
Florida authorities obtain Sweet's testimony than it was in
honoring the grand jury's request. The counter-inference is far
more likely: the court was so inclined to grant the grand jury's
request that it gave Sweet transactional immunity rather than
use immunity. In sum, the immunity order, standing alone,
does not permit the inference that the prosecutor lied when he
told the jury that the Massachusetts immunity order was not
conditioned on Sweet's promise to testify against Kelley in
Florida. Moreover, as will become clear from an examination
of the Mitchell report, there can be no doubt that court did not
grant Sweet immunity because he promised to testify for the
State at Kelley's tnal.
We turn now to the Mitchell report to see if it permits the
inference that the prosecutor lied in his closing argument to
the jury. The district court found that the State's "fail[ure] to
disclose to defense counsel Agent Joe Mitchell's Florida
Department of Law Enforcement Investigative Report dated
February 21, 1981" violated the Brady rule. Kelley, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The report generally
describes conferences that took place on February 21 and 23,
March 6 and 12, 1981 concerning Kelley's and Sweet's
criminal activities, including the Maxcy murder. Some of the
conferences were held telephonicially and some in person. All
involved law enforcement authorities; Sweet was physically
present on March 12.
According to Mitchell's report, on February 21, Rex
Amistead, Director of the Regional Organized Crime
“° Although Mitchell's report was dated February 21, the report
refers to events that occurred after that date. A notation appears at
the bottom of the report indicating that it was dictated on March 23
and typed on May 6, 1981.
APPENDIX A - 73a
Intelligence Center in Memphis, Tennessee, called Mitchell
with the following information: Major John Regan of the
Massachusetts State Police had informed him that the State
Police were "conducting a major multi jurisdictional [sic]
investigation involving organized crime activities in. . .
Massachusetts and a witness whom they had in protective
custody had provided information pertaining to [the Maxcy]
murder." The witness was John Sweet. The information was
that Maxcy had been killed in 1966 by William Kelley, "a...
hit man” Sweet had hired. "Armistead emphasized that Major
Regan . . . indicated that Sweet was willing to testify in behalf
of the State of Florida [in the prosecution of Kelley for
Maxcy’s murder], providing he could be granted immunity . . .
." Mitchell was aware of the "the homicide . . . Sweet had
been discussing with Major Regan" and told Director
Armistead that Sweet had been indicted for Maxcy's murder,
and that the victim's wife, Irene Maxcy, who testified at
Sweet's trial, had subsequently been charged with perjury and
found guilty. Mitchell also told Armistead that he was
unaware of the "disposition of Sweet's charges.”
According to . . . Armistead, Major Regan
was requesting assistance from the [FDLE] in
checking into the investigation of the homicide of
von Maxcy, and the possibilities of using
testimony by Sweet on charges against suspect
William Kelley of the Boston area. Further,
Major Regan advised that their department is
scheduled to indict and charge suspect Kelley
with a number of felonies . . . . It was felt that if
the State of Florida could prosecute Kelley in
thf{e] 1966 homicide the State of Florida could
make a stronger case against Kelley.
Mitchell advised Director Armistead that "Major Regan's
request would relayed to the Director of the Division of Law
APPENDIX A - 74a
Enforcement . . . to determine what action may be made by
the [FDLE] in the case."
On February 23, following Director Frank Tassone's
instructions, Mitchell informed the State Attorney of Major
Regan's request for investigative assistance and Sweet's
willingness to testify against Kelley in Florida provided that
he be granted immunity there with respect to the Maxcy
murder.
On March 6, several parties interested in Sweet's potential
testimony met in the State Attorney's Office in Bartow,
Florida. Attendants at the meeting included law enforcement
officers, representatives of the State Attorney's office, the
State Attorney who had prosecuted Sweet in 1967 (retired at
the time of the meeting), FDLE personnel (including the case
agent in the Maxcy investigation), a Massachusetts district
attorney, and Paul A. Cataldo (a Massachusetts lawyer who
was "representing Sweet in the immunity for the State of
Massachusetts cases"). "As a result of the meeting, it was
agreed . . . that representatives from the State Attorney's
Office . . . and the [FDLE] would proceed to Boston . . . and
interview John Sweet for the full details in connection[{] with
the ... Maxcy homicide... ."
On March 12, State Attorney Quillian Yancey, Assistant
State Attorney Hardy Pickard, and Mitchell interviewed
Sweet in the "Office of the District Attorney, New Bedford,
Massachusetts." At the request of Sweet's attorney, Steve
Rusconi, a young lawyer in Cataldo's office, the interviewers
neither placed Sweet under oath nor tape recorded what he
said. Mitchell's report summarizes what Sweet related, which
is essentially what he testified to at Kelley's trial. Mitchell's
summary of the information obtained from Sweet appears
verbatim in the margin.“
*' In relevant part, the report states:
APPENDIX A - 75a
[Sweet] admitted to his participation in the homicide of . . .
Maxcy. He advised that initially has was engaged in
conversation with the wife of . .. Maxcy, Irene Maxcy, who
mentioned to him that she was in fear that Maxcy had
intentions of divorcing her and cutting her out of any portion
of the estate. After that, Irene Maxcy, discussed with him
concerning doing away with . . . Maxcy, and she asked him to
contact his friends in Boston, Massachusetts, to discuss the
killing of her husband. Sweet further emphasized, based on
the request of Irene Maxcy, he proceeded through a close
associate of his, WALTER BENNETT, who hired VON
ETTER white/male, (NFI) and WILLIAM KELLEY, of the
Boston, MA, area, to do the killing. Sweet further indicated,
that Mrs. Maxcy, provided the finances to hire Walter
Bennett, and he delivered Bennett a $ 5,000 fee in advance
and later they traveled to Boston, Massachusetts, where he
delivered the balance of $ 15,000 dollars personally to Walter
Bennett, at a Howard Johnson's Motel parking lot, just south
of Boston, Massachusetts.
Sweet indicated that after Bennett was given the $ 5,000
down payment, he sent Von Etter down to review the
situation and Sweet met with him to show him the area and
after that, they set up a prearranged date which would be
suitable for the hit man to arrive and commit the murder.
Further, Sweet indicated that on the day of the murder, Mrs.
Maxcy left the doors unlocked to the house and Etter and
Kelley drove to a shopping center parking lot, Sebring,
Florida, where Sweet met them and drove them to the Maxcy
house and dropped them to await Maxcy's arrival. At the time
he dropped them at the house, they were in possession of a
bag containing several knives and pistol's [sic] and after they
were through with the assignment, they were scheduled to
drive the victim's vehicle back to the shopping center where
he had left their vehicle after he returned from the victim's
house.
APPENDIX A - 76a
The district court, in concluding that the Mitchell report
constituted exculpatory evidence, relied on the following
passage in the report regarding Director Armistead's
telephone conversation with Mitchell: “Mr. Armistead
emphasized that Major Regan had indicated that Sweet was
willing to testify in behalf of the State of Florida, providing
he could be granted immunity in the 1966 case." The district
After the killing, Mrs. Maxcy took the money out of a trust
account from an Orlando Bank to furnish to Sweet to be
delivered to Walter Bennett in Massachusetts to pay the
balance of the $ 20,000 payment.
A few months after the incident, Von Etter's body was found
in the trunk of a[n] automobile in the Boston, Massachusetts,
area, and also Sweet indicated that Walter Bennett and his
brother were also missing from the area, and all intelligence
revealed that they were both killed.
Sweet emphasized that he had known William Kelley a
number of years, but did not see him for 3 years after the
killing and advised that Kelley had been involved in the
rackets associated closely with organized crime associates in
the Boston, Massachusetts, area for many years. Sweet
further indicated, that Kelley had recapped the scene of
killing . . . Maxcy, and he advised that they had thrown a
sheet over Maxcy's head when he arrived in his house and
stabbed him four (4) times. The [sic] indicated Maxcy was a
powerful man and they had to shoot him. Further, Mr. Sweet
emphasized that Kelley had been continually involved in
criminal activities and was suspected [to be] involved in
several unsolved homicides, but had not been charged. Mr.
Sweet emphasized that he had voluntarily come forth to the
Massachusetts State Police and was agreeable to provide
information pertaining to Kelley's current activities and also
had agreed to testify against him. Sweet advised that he was
agreeable to testify for the State of Florida, in connection{}
with the . . . Maxcy homicide if the State proceeded with
charging William Kelley with the homicide.
APPENDIX A - 77a
court found this passage “vastly at odds with the state's
representation [to the jury in closing argument] at the trial."
Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2002). "During
the State's closing argument, Pickard argued to the jury that
Sweet did not have to give Kelley to the authorities in order to
get immunity. However, it is clear from the withheld report
that Sweet was willing to testify if he could be granted
immunity.” Id.
It is obvious to us that the district court was confusing the
immunity granted Sweet in Florida with the immunity granted
him in Massachusetts. The court also failed to realize that the
Mitchell report discloses what Sweet wanted for testifying
against Kelley, to-wit: Florida immunity. The report contains
not a word about Sweet obtaining immunity from a
Massachusetts court and what, if anything, he would have to
do to obtain that immunity. What the Mitchell report has to
say on the subject of immunity is that Sweet was willing to
testify in a case brought against Kelley in Florida if Florida
gave him immunity. No statement attributed to Major Regan
or anyone else in the Mitchell report yields a permissible
inference that Sweet was willing to testify in Florida only if
the Massachusetts court granted him transactional immunity
with respect to the crimes the Massachusetts grand jury was
investigating. Finally, nothing in the Mitchell report even
suggests, much less establishes circumstantially, that
Pickard's comment to the jury--that Sweet did not have to
agree to testify against Kelley in Florida to gain immunity in
Massachusetts--was a lie.“ To the contrary, the record at hand
leads inexorably to the fact that Pickard told the truth.
“ The Mitchell report indicates that the Massachusetts grand
jury was conducting a “major multi jurisdictional investigation
involving organized crime activities in the State of Massachusetts.”
The grand jury apparently considered both Sweet and Kelley as
suspects. Under the immunity the Massachusetts court granted
Sweet, he might be asked questions that would implicate Kelley. If
he refused, the court could hold him in civil contempt--whether or
APPENDIX A - 78a
We move then to the district court's finding that the
immunity order and the Mitchell report, if considered
together, contained exculpatory evidence. The district court
was led to this finding because the Massachusetts court
granted Sweet immunity on March 13, 1981, the day after the
Florida officials interviewed Sweet. The court's finding
necessarily implies that there was a connection between the
grant of immunity and the interview. In the district court's
mind, the connection was this: the Massachusetts court was
not going to grant Sweet immunity unless the Florida officials
reported that Sweet had given them what they needed. In
other words, the Massachusetts court was prepared to deprive
the grand jury of Sweet's testimony about widespread
criminal activity in Massachusetts unless Sweet agreed to
testify against Kelley in Florida if the Highlands County
grand jury indicted Kelley for the Maxcy murder (which it
eventually did occur on December 16, 1981). Such an
implication strains credulity. Sweet was in protective custody
because those he could incriminate wanted him silenced. The
grand jury needed his testimony and asked the court to grant
him immunity. The notion that the court granted Sweet
immunity because some Florida officials in effect gave the
court the go-ahead sign is preposterous.
The Rule 3.850 court and, later, the Florida Supreme
Court also examined the Mitchell report and the immunity
order. The supreme court explicitly found that there was "no
evidence to support the inference that Sweet's Massachusetts
immunity was contingent upon his testimony in the
defendant's Florida trial." Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 758. As we
have shown at length, this state-court factfinding is more than
"fairly supported by the record." As such, it is entitled to our
deference. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S. Ct.
1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995) ("In habeas
not he had told the court, when it granted him immunity, that he
was willing to testify against Kelley.
APPENDIX A - 79a
proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state
courts are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside,
absent procedural error, only if they are 'not fairly supported
by the record.” (quoting pre-AEDPA 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(8))). Since the district court's implicit finding that
Sweet had to testify against Kelley in Florida to gain
immunity in Massachusetts cannot be squared with the
deference due to the state court's finding, we must reject it.
And as that finding crumbles, so too does the district court's
conclusion that Mitchell's report could have affected the result
of Kelley's trial.
Because the record cannot support the finding that Pickard
lied to the jury during the State's closing argument, it is clear
that information about Sweet's immunity was valuable only
for the purpose of impeaching Sweet's credibility as a witness.
It bears emphasis that Kelley's defense, despite its lack of the
immunity order and the Mitchell report, was neither deprived
of nor forwent any opportunities to discredit Sweet by
discussing the scope of his Massachusetts immunity. While
the application to the Massachusetts court for Sweet's
immunity and Sweet's resulting testimony were sealed,
Kelley's defense learned a great deal about Sweet's immunity
from the transcript of a Massachusetts criminal trial at which
Sweet testified at length. Jack Edmund used this transcript to
cross-examine Sweet thoroughly about his immunity in
Massachusetts. For example, Edmund succeeded in getting
Sweet to admit that he testified numerous times for Robert
Kane, an assistant district attorney for Bristol County. Sweet
went on to acknowledge that he received immunity for every
offense he discussed with Kane and other Massachusetts
prosecutors. Edmund then catalogued a litany of crimes for
which the Massachusetts court, in the order it entered on
March 13, 1981, had granted Sweet immunity. Among these,
Sweet admitted to receiving immunity for loan sharking,
hijacking, drug violations, larceny, arson, bribing a police
officer, participating as an intermediary in a bookkeeping
APPENDIX A - 80a
operation, making false reports to police officers, and
counterfeiting. Sweet also acknowledged that the state of
Massachusetts agreed not to prosecute him for his
involvement in "manag[ing]" prostitution, although he
quibbled as to whether a state court had given effect to the
understanding in a formal immunity order.
Edmund also cross-examined Sweet about his immunity
in Flonda:
Q: Mr. Sweet, you received immunity for
first degree murder in Florida, didn't you, sir?
That is the killing of Von Maxcy; nght? Is that a
fair statement?
A: Yes, sir.
Responding to subsequent questions, Sweet proceeded to
admit that he also received immunity for the perjury he
committed in both of his own Florida trials. The Mitchell
report's indication that Sweet wanted immunity in Florida in
exchange for testimony there could not have added to Sweet's
bald admissions regarding his Florida immunity.
Finally, despite the disadvantages Kelley's federal habeas
counsel claim Kelley suffered because the State failed to give
his trial attorneys copies of the immunity order and the
Mitchell report, his trial attorneys proved themselves readily
able to seize every opportunity to use information about
Sweet's immunity in Massachusetts and Florida in their first
and last closing arguments to the jury at the close of Kelley's
trial. In his opening argument, Kunstler lamented to the jury
that Sweet "comes down here and he gets immunity for
murder and perjury." Edmund, in his closing argument,
roughly paralleled Sweet's various immunities to
transgressions of the Ten Commandments:
APPENDIX A - 81a
[Sweet] has immunity for first degree
murder. Thou shalt not kill.
He has immunity for perjury in that first
degree murder trial. Thou shall not bear false
witness.
He has immunity for larceny. Thou shalt not
steal.
He wasn't prosecuted for adultery. Thou
shalt not commit adultery.
He won't be prosecuted for stealing Mrs.
Irene Maxcy away from her husband. Thou shalt
not covet thy neighbor's wife.
He will not be prosecuted for taking Von
Maxcy's estate money. Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's goods.
Nor will he be prosecuted for loan sharking.
Thou shalt not break thy neighbor's head.
He will not be prosecuted for breaking and
entering, nor shall he be prosecuted for the
prostitution, the narcotics, the bribery, the falsely
reporting a crime or counterfeiting.
Make your message to the State of Florida _
ring out loud and clear . . . prosecute him for
lying about that man [Kelley] and send [Sweet]
where he justly belongs.
APPENDIX A - 82a
At the end of the day, the defense counsel's purpose for
wanting to exploit Sweet's immunity arrangements was to
convince the jury that Sweet was a sullied witness. There can
be no doubt on this record that counsel succeeded without the
Massachusetts immunity order and the Mitchell report. If
introduced into evidence as part of Kelley's defense, these two
exhibits would have constituted, at best, cumulative evidence.
See Routley v. Singletary, 33 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.
_1994) (holding that no prejudice resulted from state's failure
to supply the defense with a witness's immunity agreement
and related documents where defense counsel alerted the jury
to the witness's immunity and potential bias through cross-
examination, rendering the disputed evidence no more than
"cumulative impeachment" of the witness). “At worst, the
exhibits--especially the Mitchell report--would have been
highly prejudicial to Kelley. Recall that the report revealed
that the Massachusetts grand jury was conducting a multi-
jurisdictional "investigation involving organized crime
activities in the State of Massachusetts," and that the State
Police wanted Kelley indicted for "a number of felonies."*
We do not hesitate to conclude that the State's withholding of
the immunity order and the Mitchell report did not violate the
Brady rule.
b. Transcript of John Sweet's First Tnal
The State Attorney in office at the time of Sweet's
prosecution, in 1967 and 1968, was Glenn Darty. The State
Attomey in office at the time of Kelley's prosecution in 1983,
— sixteen years later, was Quillian Yancey. Assistant State
|
*? We have not overlooked the possibility that defense counsel
would have chosen not to admit the Mitchell report into evidence,
electing instead to call Mitchell to the witness stand. Depending on
how far counsel opened the door on direct-examination, the State
might be able on cross to explore Kelley's criminal activities in
Massachusetts.
APPENDIX A - 83a
Attorney Harding Pickard handled Kelley's prosecution for
Yancey.
Prior to Kelley's first trial, defense counsel, recognizing
that Sweet would be the State's star witness, made a discovery
request that Pickard produce the transcripts of both of Sweet's
trials. Pickard turned over the transcript of Sweet's second
trial, the trial that resulted in Sweet's conviction. But he did
not produce the transcript of Sweet's first trial, which resulted
in a hung jury and a mistrial. He apparently thought that a
transcript had not been prepared.
In responding to Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion in January
1988, the Florida Attorney General's office, which represents
the State in Rule 3.850 proceedings in capital cases, produced
transcripts of portions of Sweet's first trial. The record does
not contain or even suggest the answer to the question of
whether State Attorney Yancey's office had the transcript of
Sweet's first trial in its possession at the time of Kelley's
discovery request. The answer, however, is not important.
The transcript is legally immaterial because Kelley's attorneys
had available to them during both of Kelley's trials the entire
transcript of Sweet's second trial, and that transcript contained
the essence of Sweet's testimony at his first trial.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court
pointed to two pieces of information that were contained in
the first transcript but not the second. First, the undisclosed
transcript shows that Sweet testified about Irene Maxcy's
sexual deviance, including allegations that she engaged in
bestiality. Although Irene Maxcy did not testify at Kelley's
trial, Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel posited--and federal habeas
counsel do so now--that this testimony about her would have
been valuable in impeaching Sweet. This _ testimony
demonstrates that Sweet was willing to testify to anything that
would further his interests.
What Sweet said about Irene Maxcy's sexual deviancy is
immaterial primarily because the Florida Supreme Court, in
APPENDIX A - 84a
reviewing the Rule 3.850 court's denial of relief, concluded
that evidence of her alleged deviancy would not have been
admissible at Kelley's trial. Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 757. Thus,
its unavailability could not have affected the result of the case
so as to create prejudice. A reasonable probability of a
different result is possible only if the suppressed information
is itself admissible evidence or would have led to admissible
evidence. Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1044 (1994).
Furthermore, the Rule 3.850 court explicitly found that
Kelley's. "deferise counsel wiere] aware of the allegations
concerning Mrs. Maxcy." Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 757. Again,
we must defer to this finding of fact because the record
supports it. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.“
Both of Kelley's defense attorney's indicated some knowledge
of these allegations at the Rule 3.850 hearing. Finally, this
highly inflammatory testimony about Irene Maxcy, who did
not testify at Kelley's trial, could not have been more useful to
show Sweet's willingness to lie at trial than Sweet's own,
unequivocal testimony that he committed perjury repeatedly
in both of his trials.** Armed with this admission, defense
““ Moreover, - nothing in the federal habeas proceeding
contradicts the finding.
** At Kelley's second trial, for example, Sweet testified as
follows on cross-examination:
Q: I am talking about the number of lies. Would they be in
the hundreds of lies that you have told under oath, Mr.
Sweet?
A: Well, it would be both trials. I'm sure it was--
Q: It was question after question after question in your first
trial that you lied about, wasn't there, sir?
-A: Yes, sir.
APPENDIX A - 85a
counsel had little to gain by exploiting the perverted
allegations in Sweet's first trial transcript.
Second, the undisclosed first-trial transcript reveals that
the jury heard recorded phone conversations between Sweet
and Irene Maxcy. During these conversations, Sweet stated
that he did not know anyone named "William Kelley." The
transcript also reveals that Sweet testified that he believed
Irene Maxcy's assurances that she was not tape recording their
conversations.
Sweet's denial of knowing Kelley might seem critical in a
vacuum, but the force of that denial is eroded almost entirely
by Sweet's admission that, after the murder, he routinely
denied any knowledge of or involvement with Kelley. For
instance, at Kelley's second trial, Edmund elicited the
following testimony from Sweet on cross-examination:
Q: During your first trial you denied
knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?
Q: And you were under oath?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you raised your hand to swear to God to tell the truth,
the whole truth, just like you did today?
A: Yes.
Q: And you lied?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You lied to save your life?
A: Yes, sir.
APPENDIX A - 86a
A: I did.
Q: When you were talking to the
investigators prior to your first trial, you denied
knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?
A: I did.
Q: During you second tral you denied
knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?
A: I did.
Q: When Bill Kelley beat you up and you
went to the hospital, you even lied to the hospital
about how it happened, didn't you?
A: I did.
Q: Could you estimate for this Jury how
many lies you have told under oath, sir, over the
period of the last seventeen and a half or eighteen
years?
A: Well, since I have known Bill Kelley, any
involvement there, I have lied about knowing the
man.
APPENDIX A - 87a
Sweet's recorded conversations with Irene Maxcy
transpired after the murder, when Sweet, according to his own
testimony, had commenced lying about knowing Kelley. The
phone conversations simply corroborate Sweet's testimony
about this pattern of denial.
Even without a transcript of the testimony Sweet gave at
his first trial, defense counsel were able to take advantage of
Sweet's specific admission that he had denied knowing
Kelley. For example, in his opening argument to the jury,
Kunstler said,
[John Sweet] committed perjury twice down
here. He took the same oath. He is saying to you,
believe me now. I am being good now. I am
going to tell you all the truth. But he told two
other juries total lies. He told them he had
nothing to do with the murder, he knew nothing
about it, he didn't know Kelley.
Consequently, there can be no reasonable probability that
the availability of a transcript of Sweet's first-trial testimony
could have affected the outcome of Kelley's trial.
c. Roma Trulock Report
Kaye Carter lived at the Daytona Inn Motel at the time of
the murder; her parents were the motel's managers. The
prosecution theorized that both of triggermen, Kelley and
Von Etter, roomed at the Daytona Inn Motel before driving
down to Sebring to murder Maxcy. In fact, the motel's records
from that time reflect guests registered as "Mr. and Mrs.
William Kelley." Carter, who was only seventeen when the
murder occurred, testified that she met Von Etter, the man
registered as Kelley, and two females traveling with the men.
Carter claims she had dinner with Kelley and the others on
October 3, 1966, the very evening Maxcy was slain. Through
APPENDIX A - 88a
this association, Carter became familiar with Kelley's
appearance.
Special Agent Roma Trulock of the FDLE interviewed
Carter on March 17, 1967 and obtained a description of the
man Carter knew as Kelley at the motel. Trulock then
summarized Carter's one-time description of Kelley in two
different investigative reports: one dated March 17, 1967, the
second dated March 18, 1967. Although defense counsel
acquired Trulock's first report, the State never produced the
second the report.
The district court found that the "suppression of the
[second] report violated Kelley's constitution [sic] right and
prejudiced his defense. " Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1366
(S.D. Fla. 2002). In the court's view, distinctions in Trulock's
reports regarding Carter's description of Kelley rendered both
reports material to Kelley's defense. The court compared the
documents as follows: According to Trulock's first report,
which was dated March 17, 1967 and was disclosed to the
defense, Carter described the person she knew as Kelley "as
being about 40, 6' to 6' 2" tall, medium build, dark hair, (kind
of curly) with a deep husky voice"; according to Trulock's
second report, which was dated March 18, 1967 and was not
disclosed to the defense, Carter described Kelley "as being
about 40, 6' medium build, dark hair, kind of curly, husky
voice." Additionally, the second report, but not the first,
contains Trulock's following reflection about Carter's
identification: "This picture of William Harold Kelley looks
something like him although she is sure that he was older than
the 26 years on his description.” Id. at 1365.
The district court offered three reasons why the second
report was materially exculpatory, even though the defense
had the first report. First, it argued, the two-inch height
discrepancy between the reports was critical because Kelley,
in fact, stood at about 6' 5". Second, the notation that Carter
was "sure" that Kelley was older than twenty-six was material
because Kelley was only twenty-three on the night of the
APPENDIX A - 89a
murder. And third, the notation that Carter thought the picture
presented by Trulock looked "something like" Kelley
revealed her uncertainty and, perhaps, constituted a negative
identification.
To be sure, the defense was entitled to at least one of
these reports. Both reflect similar descriptions by Carter that
differ considerably from Kelley's actual appearance at the
time of the murder. Ostensibly, Kelley was twenty-three and
youthful in appearance. He had straight blond hair and stood
well over 6'. Both of Trulock's reports suggest that Carter
thought the man identified as Kelley at the motel was shorter,
much older, and had dark curly hair.
This conflicting description was important to Kelley's
defense, and counsel ensured that the jury knew that. As
noted above, defense counsel had the benefit of delivering the
first and last closing arguments to the jury because they
elected not to present a case. In the first argument, Kunstler
cast Carter as a truly objective witness, one who has
"absolutely nothing to gain or lose by this case." He
emphasized that the State never asked Carter to identify
Kelley at trial, and he argued that at least some aspects of
Kelley's appearance, such. as his height, should not have
changed so much over the years since the murder that Carter
should have been unable do so if the defendant Keiley and the
man Daytona Inn Motel were in fact one in the same. Defense
counsel underscored these troubling inconsistencies time and
again at Kelley's trial. "You have to decide whether the man
having the name William Kelley," Kunstler reasoned to the
jury, "Was a twenty-three year old .. . six foot six man with
blondish hair or a forty-year-old man with medium build and
dark curly hair and four inches shorter than Mr. Kelley is.
That testimony is very significant." In his closing argument,
Edmund poignantly directed Kelley to stand so that the jury
could observe him. "I'll ask him to stand up," Edmund
explained, "because the man who registered into the Daytona
Beach Inn over there was a man who has been described by
APPENDIX A
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