Appendix — Kelley v. Crosby

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APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit, dated July 23,

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APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, dated

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APPENDIX C

Order of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, dated

January 8, 2003 ...........ccrrccccoccscccccsecesecssessoess 108a

APPENDIX D

Opinion of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, dated

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APPENDIX E

Opinion of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida, dated

September 19, 2002 ...........sccssesssrssresseeeecoees 119a

APPENDIX F

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida,

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APPENDIX G

Opinion of the Supreme of Florida, dated

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APPENDIX H

Order of the Supreme Court of the United

States, dated October 6, 1986 ..................00 l6la

APPENDIX I

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida,

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APPENDIX J

Order on Petition for Rehearing and Petition

for Rehearing En Banc to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit, dated October 6, 2004 ..................... 179a

APPENDIX K

Joint Pretrial Stipulation of Facts in the United

States District Court for the Southern

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APPENDIX L

Letter Granting an Extension of Time Until

March 4, 2005 for the Filing of Petition

for Certiorari Before the Supreme Court

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APPENDIX A - la

APPENDIX A

WILLIAM H. KELLEY, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, Secretary Florida Department of

Corrections, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 03-10513

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

July 23, 2004, Decided

July 23, 2004, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C.

Docket No. 92-14246-CV-NCR. Kelley v. Singletary, 238 F.

Supp. 2d 1325, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26211 (S.D. Fla.,

2002)

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

COUNSEL: For Secretary for the Department of

Corrections, Appellant: Dittmar, Carol M., Office of Atty.

Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tampa, FL.

Kelley, William H., Appellee: Lohman, James Charles,

Attorney at Law, Austin, TX.

JUDGES: Before TJOFLAT,’ ANDERSON and

WILSON, Circuit Judges.

APPENDIX A - 2a

OPINIONBY: TJOFLAT

OPINION: TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

The petitioner, William H. Kelley, is a Florida prisoner on

death row, having been convicted of first degree murder. The

district court granted a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his

conviction and sentence.' We reverse.

This case--from the time of the murder to the present--has

spanned nearly thirty-eight years. Understandably, its history

is quite complicated. For the readers’ convenience, therefore,

we preface the opinion with the following table of contents:

I. Factual Background

A. The Maxcy Murder

B. John Sweet's Trial

C. Kelley's State Legal Proceedings

1. Kelley's Arrest

2. Kelley's Two Trials

3. Kelley's Direct Appeal

4. Kelley's Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal

' The district court granted the writ on two grounds: (1) that

the prosecutor denied the petitioner due process of law by

withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of the rule laid down

in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d

215 (1963); and (2) that petitioner's attorneys denied him of his

right to effective assistance of counsel at trial.

APPENDIX A - 3a

5. Kelley's Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief

from the Florida Supreme Court

Il. Federal Procedural History

A. Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition

B. Kelley's Federal Evidentiary Hearing

C. Disposition of Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition and

Subsequent Developments

III. Federal Evidentiary Hearing

A. Legal Standard for Permitting Federal Evidentiary

Hearings

B. Application of the Legal Standard to Kelley's Case

1. The District Court's Failure to Ascertain

the Appropriate Legal Standard

2. The District Court's Failure to Apply Any

Legal Standard

IV. Rulings on Habeas Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

1. The Exhaustion Requirement

2. Application of the Exhaustion

Requirement to Kelley's Case

3. Kelley's Lack of Prejudice from

Ineffective Assistance

APPENDIX A - 4a

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

1. The Brady rule

2. Application of the Brady Rule to Kelley's

Case

a. The Massachusetts Immunity Order and

the Joe Mitchell Report

b. Transcript of John Sweet's First Trial

| c. Roma Trulock Report

: d. Fingerprint Report

3. Conclusion Regarding Brady Claims

V. Conclusion

I.

Factual Background

A. The Maxcy Murder

This sordid tale begins with an illicit love affair between

John Sweet, a real estate broker with shadowy ties to Boston's

criminal underworld, and Irene Maxcy, who was married to

Charles von Maxcy ("Maxcy"), a wealthy citrus grower. It

culminates in Maxcy's assassination at the hands of two hit

men. The investigation and legal proceedings following the

murder have spanned almost four decades and have involved

some of the best known lawyers in the country.

The district court described the circumstances leading up

to and surrounding Maxcy's murder as follows:

APPENDIX A - 5a

Irene Maxcy and John Sweet were lovers,

and they planned to kill Irene's husband, Charles

von Maxcy, a wealthy citrus grover [sic] and

rancher from Sebring, Florida. Sweet and Irene

talked for months about the murder, after which

they planned to live together on Maxcy's large

estate. Sweet contacted an acquaintance, William

Bennett of Boston, Massachusetts. Arrangements

were made, and a price was set: $ 5000 up front,

and $ 15,000 after the murder.

On October 1, 1966, Sweet went to Daytona,

Florida to meet Andrew von Etter. Von Etter was

to do the killing, along with a partner. The next

day von Etter called Sweet to tell him the partner,

"William Kelley", had arrived. On October 3rd,

Sweet drove von Etter and "Kelley" to the estate.

The alleged killers showed Sweet the weapons

they would use, knives and a revolver, which

they kept in a satchel. Sweet drove back to

Sebring. Charles von Maxcy was murdered that

day. A couple weeks later, Sweet went to Boston

to pay the $ 15,000 balance due for the murder.

Unfortunately, the murder did not signal the

beginning of a blissful life on the estate for Irene

Maxcy and John Sweet. Sweet wanted more

money, purportedly to pay off the murder

balance, and he began to harass and threaten

Irene and her five-year-old daughter daily.

Terrified, Irene Maxcy went to the authorities. In

exchange for immunity, she implicated Sweet in

the murder-for-hire scheme.

APPENDIX A - 6a

Kelley v. Singletary, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1358 (S.D.

Fla. 2002) (order granting habeas relief on claim (1)). Before

Irene Maxcy came forward, a comprehensive investigation

was underway. Special Agent Roma Trulock of the Florida

Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") headed that

investigation and interviewed potential eye witnesses. In

particular he spoke with Kaye Carter, who met Kelley and

Von Etter around the time of the murder at the Daytona Inn

Motel, where the prosecution says the hit men lodged before

they drove to Sebring to kill Maxcy.

B. John Sweet's Trial

Sweet was tried in the Circuit Court of Polk County,

Florida. As the district court explained,

Sweet was arrested in 1967, charged with

first degree murder. It became known in the

course of the investigation for Sweet's trial that

the "triggermen” in the murder were named von

Etter and "Kelley". These men were not charged

at this time, however, as prosecutors felt they had

insufficient evidence against them.

Irene Maxcy was the star witness for the

prosecution in Sweet's first trial. Her testimony

was erratic and difficult as she denied, even

under the protection of immunity, that she

wanted to kill her husband. She testified it was

entirely Sweet's idea. She claimed to have

witnessed many of the phone calls Sweet had

made in arranging the murder, and she related

many of the details about which Sweet had kept

her informed, including the murder itself. She

further testified that she gave Sweet more than $

35,000 to help pay for the murder, and that Sweet

had wanted another $ 75,000. Sweet, testifying

APPENDIX A - 7a

on his own behalf, denied any involvement in the

crime.

Id. at 1359. Sweet also launched a vitriolic character

assault on Irene Maxcy, accusing her of partaking in a host of

deviant sex acts. The trial ended in a hung jury

In 1986, Sweet was tried a second time. Irene Maxcy

testified against him again, and, again, Sweet denied any

involvement in the murder. This time, however, Sweet was

convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in

prison.

Unfortunately, the second trial proceedings were tainted

by an evidentiary irregularity. Sweet's defense team repeated

their earlier attacks on the credibility of both Irene Maxcy and

another important witness against Sweet: Roma Trulock, the

primary investigator for Maxcy's murder. Sweet v. State, 235

So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Defense counsel

believed that Irene Maxcy and Trulock were engaged in a

romantic relationship and, therefore, that Trulock had an

interest in seeing Sweet incarcerated. To determine whether

Irene Maxcy and Trulock would admit to the affair, the court

permitted defense counsel to examine them outside the

presence of the jury. Trulock denied the allegation

vehemently, but Irene Maxcy did not. Irene Maxcy testified,

among other things, that she and Trulock had engaged in

sexual intercourse and that Trulock had expressed a desire to

get Sweet convicted so that she and Trulock could take a trip

to "the Islands." Id. at 41-42. The court excluded such

testimony, sustaining the State's objection. Following his

conviction, Sweet challenged the court's ruling on appeal. Id.

at 40-41. In a two-to-one decision, the district court of appeal

reversed Sweet's conviction and awarded a new trial. Id. at

42. In the court's view, "the proffered. cross-examination in

question went directly to undermine the very foundation of

the State's case, i.e., the credibility of Irene Maxcy and C. R.

mm «

Sn

APPENDIX A - 8a

Trulock. Its exclusion was a substantial frustration of

[Sweet's] nght to effective cross-examination . .. ." Id.

After this ruling, Sweet's defense, citing Florida's speedy

tral rules, filed a motion to discharge Sweet from

prosecution. The state conceded that it could not proceed

against Sweet again because key witnesses had become

unavailable. On November 16, 1971, the circuit judge who

had presided over Sweet's case found that he had "no course

other than to grant the motion." Commending the efforts of

the prosecution, the judge--in his own words--"reluctantly"

ordered that Sweet "stand[s] discharged from further

prosecution... ."

In April of 1976, the state attorney petitioned the circuit

court to enter an order authorizing the clerk of the court to

destroy certain physical evidence held for Sweet's

prosecution. The court granted that petition, and several

articles of evidence, including a bullet, a bloody bed sheet,

and a shred from the victim's shirt, were destroyed.

Sweet had gotten away with murder, but his role in the

prosecutor's pursuit of the-matter had not ended. As the

district court observed, after his conviction was reversed,

John Sweet wasted little time in

matriculating back into the underworld. By 1981,

Sweet was facing charges in Massachusetts of

prostitution, narcotics distribution, arson, bribery,

counterfeiting, loan sharking, and _ hijacking,

among other things. With authorities closing in

on him, Sweet went to them first. His plan was to

win immunity in exchange for information he

had on the murder of Charles von Maxcy.

William Kelley was the target, as Sweet

implicated him as one of the murderers. The

Massachusetts authorities brought Sweet to

Florida where Sweet gave authorities there his

APPENDIX A - 9a

confession. The next day Sweet was awarded

immunity in Massachusetts.

Kelley v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., No. 92-14246 at 4

(S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2000) (order denying habeas claims (4)-

(6)). On December 16, 1981, a Highlands County grand jury

indicted the petitioner, William H. Kelley, for first degree

murder.

C. Kelley's Arrest and Prosecution

1. Kelley's Arrest

William H. Kelley was arrested on June 16, 1983, roughly

seventeen years after Maxcy's murder. By that time, Walter

Bennett, who was Sweet's contact for the murder contract,

and Andrew von Etter, who was Kelley's supposed partner in

the killing, were both dead. Irene Maxcy, of course, had

immunity for her role in the murder.

Three special agents of the FBI apprehended Kelley at a

motel in Tampa, Florida. They had received a tip that a guest

of the motel met Kelley's description. One of the agents, Ross

Davis, testified at Kelley's trial that the FBI sought and

arrested Kelley for "[uJnlawful flight to avoid prosecution” in

North Carolina. The agents did not realize that Kelley was

wanted for murder in Florida until they took him back to their

Tampa office and conducted a background check. When

Davis finally informed Kelley of his indictment for the

Maxcy murder, Kelley made statements indicating knowledge

of the crime and suggested that the State would never be able

to obtain a conviction. These statements eventually became a

subject of dispute at Kelley’s trial.

2. Kelley's Two Trials

Xelley enlisted the assistance of several attorneys in

preparing his case for trial. He was represented initially by

APPENDIX A - 10a

Robert E. Dinsmore of Boston and Ronald K. Cacciatore of

Tampa. On October 20, 1983, however, Kelley, acting pro se,

filed a document entitled "Discharge of Attorneys," which

stated that Dinsmore and Cacciatore were no _ longer

authorized to act on Kelley's behalf and that new counsel

would begin representing him immediately. Kelley explained

that this decision was in his best interest and was made

without coercion or pressure from Dinsmore and Cacciatore.

The same day, Nicholas G. Schommer, a lawyer practicing in

Sebring,’ moved the court to permit Dinsmore and Cacciatore

to withdraw as Kelley's counsel. The court granted the

motion.

On December 7, Schommer filed a notice of appearance,

stating that he would act as Kelley's local counsel and that

Kunstler and Mason, 2 New York law firm, would serve as

Kelley's primary counsel. William Kunstler and Mark

Gombiner, partners of the firm, moved the court on December

8 for leave to appear pro hac vice. The court granted their

motion on December 20.

Sometime between December 20, 1983 and January 12,

1984, Jack Edmund of Bartow, Florida, joined Kunstler and

Gombiner as part of Kelley's defense team.’ Kunstler testified

later* that he first met Edmund and, in fact, first learned of

Edmund's role in the defense on January 12, 1984, when

Kunstler came to Sebring to argue pretrial motions.

Prior to trial, Kelley's defense team also included a

paralegal named Harvey Brower. Brower was formerly a

Massachusetts lawyer, but as the district court explained,

* Sebring is the county seat of Highlands County, Florida.

> Edmund did not file his notice of appearance as Kelley's co-

counsel, however, until January 23, 1984.

* On July 18, 1988, Kunstler testified at the evidentiary

hearing the circuit court held on Kelley's motion to vacate his

conviction and sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.850.

APPENDIX A - Ila

Brower was disbarred from the practice of

law in Massachusetts in August, 1979, for

defrauding one of his clients. In re: Harvey

Brower, No. 79-14BD (Mass. Aug. 16, 1979).

Earlier in his Massachusetts legal career, Brower

was censured by its Supreme Judicial Court for

fraudulent conduct in negligence cases. In re

Harvey Brower, No. 29871 Law (Mass. Feb. 23,

1973). Brower also was convicted in the Western

District of Louisiana for unlawfully conspiring to

aid and abet the crime of bail jumping. United

States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 78 (Sth Cir. 1980).

Kelley v. Singletary, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 (S.D.

Fla. 2002) (order denying habeas claim (3) but granting relief

on claim (2)) (footnote omitted). The district court further

noted that Brower's law office had also been involved in a

counterfeit bond sale conspiracy. Brower's conduct in the

course of Kelley's defense eventually played a critical role in

the district court's conclusion that Kelley suffered ineffective

assistance of counsel. It is not entirely clear how or when

Brower became involved in the case. The record permits the

inference that Brower arrived on the scene around the time

Kelley decided to discharge Dinsmore and Cacciatore as his

counsel. It is equally plausible, however, that Brower's

services were first employed at Kelley's request even before

Dinsmore was hired.

At the hearing the circuit court held in July 1988 on

Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion to vacate conviction and sentence,

Kunstler testified that Brower was the one who first contacted

him about participating in Kelley's defense. In fact, Kunstler

never met Kelley until he went to Sebring on January 12,

1984 for a motions hearing. Kunstler was under the

A aaa

APPENDIX A - 12a

impression that Brower had represented Kelley on other

matters in the past and that Brower would be preparing the

-case and virtually all of the pretrial motions. Kunstler

expected that his own role would be confined to trial counsel

alone, and he was not initially concerned with the amount of

responsibility that would be entrusted to Brower. Kunstler

expressed a great deal of confidence in Brower's ability

despite the disbarment, and he regarded Brower as both an

"excellent" lawyer and investigator. In fact, when Kunstler

missed a hearing on pretrial motions, he recommended that

the nonlicensed Brower argue the motions in his stead.”

Kelley's trial began in January of 1984. By that time,

Brower had disappeared. As the federal district court later

observed, "Kunstler characterized Brower as a thief who

‘absconded' with fees without ever performing his

investigatory duties." Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328

(S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2002). Kunstler and Edmund were the

dominant players in Kelley's defense.° Kunstler took primary

responsibility for many of the most important trial tasks,

including the cross-examination of the state's star witness,

John Sweet. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and on

January 30, the court declared a mistrial.

The state decided to prosecute Kelley again. With Brower

gone, the defense enlisted the assistance of a investigator in

* Of course, the court did not permit Brower to appear as an

attorney. The court first requested that Schommer argue the

motions. Schommer indicated that he was only local counsel and

was not prepared to argue. Consequently, the court required

Schommer to argue only the motions he could handle and then

recessed the hearing until the following day, when Kunstler would

be available, to consider the remaining motions.

® The record does not reveal the extent of Gombiner's

participation, if any.

APPENDIX A - 13a

Edmund's office to do some additional work in preparation

for the retrial.’

Kelley's second trial commenced on March 27. Again,

Kunstler and Edmund shared the major responsibilities for

Kelley's defense, but Edmund played a more significant role

in the second proceeding. In particular, the task of cross-

examining John Sweet now fell to Edmund. This important

responsibility included impeaching Sweet's testimony about a

conversation he had with Kelley years after the murder, in

which Kelley allegedly told Sweet, "I stabbed [Maxcy] three

or four times and he kept coming after us, so I had to shoot

him in the head." Kelley v. State, 486 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla.

1986). One of the State's other key witnesses was Abe Namia,

a private investigator hired by Sweet's defense team when

. Sweet was being prosecuted. Namia's testimony corroborated

Sweet's and was admitted to rebut the inference that Sweet

recently fabricated his version of the story. Id.

At the conclusion of the State's case, the defense moved

for judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion. The

defense then rested without introducing any evidence. This

decision entitled the defense to make the first and last closing

arguments to the jury.’ When asked at the evidentiary hearing

on Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion whether he considered the

defense's decision to rest without putting on a case "to be a

matter of trial strategy," Edmund responded, "Of course." He

characterized the decision as a no-brainer in Kelley's case,

’ The investigator, Richard Mars, was a lawyer licensed to

practice in Florida.

* At the time of Kelley's trial, Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.250 provided

that "a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except

his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the

jury." Customary practice under this rule is to have three

arguments; the defendant opens and closes, and the prosecution is

sandwiched in the middle.

APPENDIX A - 14a

and he suggested that any good defense lawyer would have

adopted the same approach.

On March 30, the jury found Kelley guilty of first degree

murder. At the end of the sentencing phase of the trial, a

majority of the jury recommended that he receive the death

penalty. On April 2, consistent with the jury's

recommendation, the court sentenced Kelley to death.

3. Kelley's Direct Appeal

Kelley appealed his cenviction and sentence to the Florida

Supreme Court. Kunstler and Edmund appeared on Kelley's

initial bref, which challenged several of the trial court's

rulings. Specifically, Kelley contended that:

(1) The court should have dismissed his

indictment because the destruction of physical

evidence after Sweet's second trial violated

Kelley's due process rights.

(2) The court should have excluded Abe

Namia's testimony regarding a conversation

between Namia and Sweet in 1967.

(3) The court erred by refusing to answer a

question posed the jury during its deliberations.

In particular, the jury asked "if John J. Sweet

received immunity in Florida for Ist Degree

murder and perjury before he gave information

on the Maxcy trial and if he had anything to gain

by his testimony[.]"

(4) The court erred in allowing the jurors to

take notes.

APPENDIX A - 15a

(5) The court erred in admitting statements

Kelley made to the FBI agents who apprehended

him indicating Kelley's knowledge about the

Maxcy murder at the time of his arrest.

(6) Florida's’ statute governing the

proceedings for issuing death sentences is

facially unconstitutional and, in any event, was

improperly applied by the court.

In addition to the brief Kunstler and Edmund filed, the

supreme court allowed Kelley to file a supplemental brief

prepared by Barry Haight, a Massachusetts lawyer, and

Donald Ferguson, a Florida lawyer.’ Beyond the arguments

_advanced by Kunstler and Edmund, the. supplemental brief

asserted that the court gave improper, nonstandard jury

instructions--in particular, an Allen charge’? --which might

have coerced the jury to overcome an impasse. Significantly,

the supplemental brief also claimed that Kunstler and

Edmund were ineffective and, therefore, deprived Kelley of

his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

Amendment. In support of this claim, the supplemental brief

cited (1) counsels’ failure to prepare pretrial motions properly;

(2) counsels' failure to move the court to dismiss the

indictment due to the State's destruction of evidence after

Sweet's second trial; (3) Kunstler's failure to appear in

Sebring on January 11 at the hearing the court had scheduled

for Kelley's pretrial motions and his ostensible willingness to

allow Brower to argue those motions; (4) counsels’ failure to

object to the court's Allen charge; and (5) counsels’ failure to

object to the court's refusal to answer the jury question

described above.

® From all we can tell, this was Haight and Ferguson's first

appearance in the case.

'° See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41

L. Ed. 528 (1896).

+ ee ome

APPENDIX A - 16a

The supreme court rejected all of Kelley's arguments.

Kelley, 486 So. 2d at 586. It also explained that Kelley's

ineffective assistance claim could not be resolved on "the

record as it stands." Id. at 585. That claim could be raised,

however, in a collateral motion for postconviction relief. Id.

With the assistance of Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law

School professor, Kelley petitioned the United States

Supreme Court for a wnt of certiorari. The Court denied the

writ on October 6, 1986. Kelley v. Florida, 479 U.S. 871, 107

S. Ct. 244, 93 L. Ed. 2d 169.

4. Kelley's Rule 3.850 Motion and Appeal

In 1987, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of

Criminal Procedure,'’ Kelley moved the trial court (the "Rule

3.850 court") to vacate his conviction and sentence. At this

stage, Kelley was represented by Barry Wilson, a Boston

lawyer, and James Green, who practiced in West Palm Beach.

The motion alleged that the State had denied Kelley due

process of law for the following reasons: (1) the State

destroyed certain tangible exhibits introduced into evidence

during Sweet's prosecution; (2) due to the destruction of these

'' The version of Rule 3.850 in effect during the collateral

proceedings in this case provided, in relevant part:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court estabiished

by the laws of Florida claiming the right to be released upon

the ground that the judgment was entered or that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the

United States, or of the State of Florida, or that the court was

without jurisdiction to enter such judgment or to impose such

sentence or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or that his plea was given involuntarily, or

the judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral

attack, may move the court which entered the judgment or

imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the

judgment or sentence.

APPENDIX A - 17a

exhibits, defense counsel could not effectively cross-examine

the State's expert witness who testified about. them; (3) the

prosecution illegally suppressed numerous items of

exculpatory evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly

interfered with defense counsel's cross-examination of Abe

Namia; (5) the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury

contained intentional misstatements of fact; and (6) Kunstler

and Edmund deprived Kelley of effective assistance of

counsel.’

The Rule 3.850 court held an evidentiary hearing on two

issues: "1) whether the prosecution suppressed evidence

favorable to the defendant [claim (3)], and 2) whether the

defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel [claim

(6)]." After receiving the parties' evidence, the court made

written findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied

Kelley's motion. The Florida Supreme Court, largely adopting

those findings and conclusions, affirmed. Kelley v. State, 569

So. 2d 754, 762 (Fla. 1990). Responding to claim (1), the

court found that "[t]he state was not at fault in the destruction

of the evidence" and therefore did not deny Kelley of due

process of law. Id. at 756. The court found that claims (4) and

(5) were barred because they were not cognizable in a Rule

3.850 proceeding.” Id. Although the supreme court did not

'2 This sixth claim is described in considerable detail in Part

IV.A.2, infra, where we address the district court's issuance of the

writ on a claim Kelley did not present to the Rule 3.850 court, to

wit: that Kunstler and Edmund denied Kelley his Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel when they relied on Brower

to conduct the pretrial investigation.

'> The bases for claims (4) and (5) were contained in the

record of the proceedings in Kelley's criminal prosecution;

therefore, those claims should have been raised on direct appeal.

Rule 3.850 permits collateral attack on a sentence and conviction. It

is not a vehicle for relitigating claims that were cognizable on

direct appeal--whether or not those claims were actually raised and

decided on direct appeal.

APPENDIX A - 18a

say so in its opinion, the Rule 3.850 court correctly found

claim (2) barred for a similar reason: "The admission of

evidence and testimony at trial is clearly a matter which could

have been raised on appeal."

In rejecting claims (3) and (6), the supreme court quoted

the lower court's reasoning. Turning to claim (3), the court

addressed all of the items the State had withheld from the

defense and concluded that each was either legally immaterial

or sufficiently available to defense counsel.

The court distilled Kelley's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, claim (6), into seven discreet instances. The court

responded to each, finding that every alleged instance of

ineffective assistance was the result of trial strategy, .was

legally immaterial, or otherwise was not supported by the

evidence presented at the Rule 3.850 hearing. The court

concluded that both Kunstler and Edmund were "capable and

effective" in their defense of Kelley. Id. at 761.

5. Kelleys' Motion for Habeas Corpus Relief from the

Florida Supreme Court

Kelley's final attempt to seek relief in the state court

system was a petition to the Florida Supreme Court for a writ

of habeas corpus. In that petition, Kelley raised three claims:

"(1) his appellate counsel [were] ineffective; (2) the

application of the death penalty statute to this crime is ex post

facto; and (3) the aggravating factors [supporting his death

sentence] of pecuniary gain and cold calculated, and

premeditated are overbroad." Kelley v. Dugger, 597 So. 2d

262, 263 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added). On March 12, 1992,

the court rejected each of these claims and denied Kelley's

petition. Id. at 265.

II.

Federal Procedural History

APPENDIX A - 19a

A. Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition

On October 9, 1992, Kelley, represented by Laurence

Tribe, a Harvard Law School professor, and Barry Wilson,

petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. The petition, nearly 300 pages in length (not counting

attached exhibits), asserted six bases for relief:

(1) prosecutorial misconduct, including

deliberate misstatements to the jury and the

suppression of exculpatory evidence;

(2) ineffective assistance of: trial counsel,

including "failure to investigate, to depose

. Witnesses, to presenta case in defense, and to

perform other basic defense functions";

(3) deprivation of Kelley's Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights through the

destruction of evidence following John Sweet's

second trial;

(4) improper admission at trial of Abe

Namia's testimony;

(5) improper admission at trial of statements

Kelley made to FBI Special Agent Ross Davis at

the time of his arrest; and

(6) unconstitutional imposition of the death

sentence.

Kelley's petition contained a demand for an evidentiary

hearing.

APPENDIX A - 20a

On August 31, 2000, the court issued an order denying

claims (4), (5), and (6). The court concluded that those claims

could be decided on the basis of the record of the proceedings

in the trial stage of Kelley's prosecution. In the same order,

the court deferred its decision on claims (1), (2), and (3) until

it decided whether an evidentiary hearing on those claims was

necessary. Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31,

2000). On November 22, 2000, over eight years after Kelley

filed his petition, the district court granted him an evidentiary

hearing on the remaining claims over the State's repeated

objections.

B. Kelley's Federal Evidentiary Hearing

The district court decided to hold an evidentiary hearing

before it resolved three claims: (1) that the prosecution

deprived Kelley of due process by suppressing exculpatory

evidence; (2) that Kelley was prejudiced by ineffective

assistance of counsel; and (3) that the destruction of evidence

following Sweet's second trial deprived Kelley of due process

of law. The hearing commenced on Apmil 24, 2001. Attorneys

James C. Lohman“ of Tallahassee, Florida and Joseph Oteri

of Boston, Massachusetts appeared on Kelley's behalf. Carol

Dittmar appeared for the State. In total, Kelley's attorneys

called eleven witnesses; the State called two.

'* Lohman came to represent Kelley after another series of

attorney substitutions. On March 30, 1993, Barry Wilson filed a

motion to withdraw from Kelley's case. The court entered an order

substituting Donald Ferguson for Wilson on June 5. Unfortunately,

Ferguson did not stay with Kelley throughout the habeas

proceedings either. He filed his motion to withdraw on August 8,

1995. On August 29, the court granted that motion “to the extent

that Mr. James C. Lohman will be substituted as counsel of record

for Mr. Donald L. Ferguson."

APPENDIX A - 21a

The first two days of the hearing were held in Boston.

Kelley presented the testimony of eight witnesses,’ one of

whom was co-counsel Joseph Oteri.'® The third day of the

'* One of the witnesses testified via videotape.

'° Oteri_ testified concerning a material issue: whether Harvey

Brower's conduct operated to deny Kelley effective assistance of

counsel. Oteri testified, in part, as follows:

I wouldn't have entrusted Harvey [Brower] with 10 cents. He

was totally incompetent as far as paying attention to details.

He did absolutely nothing--he did the minimal amount of

work he could do. And in this particular case, for Bill

Kunstler, whom I had knew and had worked with, to entrust

Harvey [Brower] with the preparation of a capital case is a

mortal sin as well as incompetence.

After testifying to an issue on which the district court

eventually granted habeas relief, Oteri participated in the

evidentiary hearing as Kelley's co-counsel. Rule 3.7(a) of the

Model Rule of Professional Conduct provides that

A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the

lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal

services rendered in the case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial

hardship on the client.

The record is silent as to whether Oteri, opposing counsel, or

the district court were aware of this ethical provision. What we do

know is that after testifying, Oteri did not withdraw from active

participation in the habeas proceeding.

APPENDIX A - 22a

hearing was held on July 9 in Ft. Pierce, Florida. At that time,

Kelley called three additional witnesses. The same day, the

State called both of its witnesses, one being Edmund. Twelve

of the thirteen individuals who testified at the evidentiary

hearing had not testified at the Rule 3.850 hearing in state

court. Only Edmund testified at both hearings.

C. Disposition of Kelley's Federal Habeas Petition and

Subsequent Developments

On September 19, 2002, the court issued an order granting

Kelley relief on claim (1). Based in part on testimony

adduced at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that

Kelley was entitled to a new trial because the State had

withheld material exculpatory evidence in derogation of the

rule laid down in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct.

1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357

(S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2002). Having granted Kelly relief on this

claim, the court apparently thought it unnecessary to rule on

Kelley's two remaining claims, (2) and (3). Acting pursuant to

the September 19 order, the clerk entered a final judgment

and closed the case the same day.

On September 30, 2002, the State filed a motion to alter

or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.'’ The State supported its motion

'” In relevant part, Rule 59 provides,

(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the

parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action tried

without a jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings

have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts

of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action

tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one

has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings

of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and

conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. ...

APPENDIX A - 23a

with two arguments. First, citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d

925 (11th Cir. 1992), the State argued that the district court

should have ruled on claims (2) and (3) as well as claim (1).

Second, the State argued that the court should revise its

disposition of claim (1) to correct clear error and prevent

manifest injustice. In the State's view, the court reached its

decision only by disregarding important testimony and failing

to give due deference to the findings of the state courts.

The district court disposed of the State's motion in an

order issued on December 30, 2002. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d

1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Answering the State's second argument

first, the court declined to alter or amend its judgment on

claim (1). The court agreed with the State; however, that it

should have ruled on the two undecided claims.

Turning to claim (2), the court found that Kelley was

entitled to habeas relief because his trial counsel was

ineffective. The court reasoned that Kelley's defense counsel

had "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigation

unnecessary[,]" but had met neither obligation. Id. at 1329

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). In the court's view,

Harvey Brower, who was_ responsible for pretrial

investigation, was incompetent, and Kelley's primary defense

counsel, Kunstler and Edmund, did not know that Brower had

failed them. As the court stated in its order,

Kelley's trial counsel was deficient in having

a disbarred attorney, lazy to a fault, resolve

whether or not to conduct a pretrial investigation.

(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Any motion to alter

or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry

of the judgment.

APPENDIX A - 24a

... [T]rial counsel in the present case acted under

the mistaken belief that Brower would perform a

dutiful investigation or decide not to investigate

after thoughtful consideration.

Id. at 1329. After finding that counsel's performance fell

short of the Sixth Amendment's standard for effective

assistance of counsel, the court neglected to say how, if at all,

counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced Kelley. The court also

failed to mention the other instances of ineffective assistance

of counsel that Kelley asserted in his petition.

The court found no merit in claim (3) because Kelley

failed to show that the State had acted in bad faith when it

destroyed the exhibits introduced into evidence during

Sweet's prosecution.

On January 28, 2003, the State initiated the appeal now

before us. The appeal calls into question the correctness of the

orders the district court entered on September 19, 2002

(granting habeas relief on claim (1)) and December 30, 2002

(granting relief on claim (2)).'* Kelley does not cross-appeal

the district court's denial of claims (3), (4), (5), and (6) or its

partial denial of claim (2).

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

If.

Federal Evidentiary Hearing

Before proceeding to the merits of the district court's

rulings, we first address the question of whether the court

abused its discretion in granting Kelley an evidentiary hearing

so that he could present evidence to it that was not presented

to the state courts. We review a district court's decision to

'® The State did not appeal the district court's partial denial of

its Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend its September 19 judgment.

APPENDIX A - 25a

grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.

See Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 690 (11th Cir. 2002); cf.

Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493, 1497 (llth Cir. 1992)

(vacating grant of habeas relief and remanding for cause-and-

prejudice hearing where the district court, without identifying

its authority to do so and despite respondent's objections,

permitted petitioner to develop evidence never presented to

the state court). A district court abuses its discretion if it

misapplies the law or makes findings of fact that are clearly

erroneous. Ambrosia Coal and Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368

F.3d 1320, 1332, 95 Fed. Appx. 1320 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted).

A. Legal Standard for Permitting a Federa’ Evidentiary

Hearings

The legal standard for determining the scope of a district

court's discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas

corpus case deyends on whether the case is subject to the

Antiterrorism ad Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of

1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Where

AEDPA applies, the standard is articulated in 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2). In pre-AEDPA cases, the standard was first set

forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L.

Ed. 2d 770 (1963), and clarified in subsequent decisions,

including most prominently Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d. 318 (1992).

Beginning with pre-AEDPA cases, the Supreme Court

held in Townsend that district courts are required to grant

evidentiary hearings to state prisoners when any of the

following six circumstances applies:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not

resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual

APPENDIX A - 26a

determination is not fairly supported by the

record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure

employed by the state court was not adequate to

afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a

substantial allegation of newly discovered

evidence; (5) the material facts were not

adequately developed at the state-court hearing;

or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier

of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full

and fair fact hearing.

372 U.S. at 313, 83 S. Ct. at 757. The Court emphasized

that these six circumstances merely enumerated the cases in

which an_ evidentiary hearings is mandatory. The

circumstances in which an evidentiary hearing is authorized

were considerably broader. Indeed, the Court indicated that

district judges have "discretion" to hold evidentiary hearings

in "all" cases, even where the petitioner "was afforded a full

and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable

findings . . . ." Id. at 318, 83 S. Ct. at 760. The Court

elaborated,

In every case [the district judge] has the

power, constrained only by his sound discretion,

to receive evidence bearing up the applicant's

constitutional claim. There is every reason to be

confident that federal district judges, mindful of

their delicate role in the maintenance of proper

federal-state relations, will not abuse that

discretion.

Id.

Three years after the Townsend decision came down,

Congress amended the habeas statute. Among these

APPENDIX A - 27a

amendments, Congress established a statutory presumption

according deference to state-court factfindings except under

eight enumerated exceptions, which roughly paralleled

Townsend's tests for determining when district courts must

grant an evidentiary hearing.’"? Where none of these

'? The relevant statute, which has since been comprehensively

amended, then provided as follows:

In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination

after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a

State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which

the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent

thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written

opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall

be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish

or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit--

(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in

the State court hearing;

(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State ccurt

was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;

(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at

the State court hearing;

rc

(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject

matter or over the person of the appellant in the State court

proceeding;

(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in

deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint

counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;

APPENDIX A - 28a

exceptions applied, the amended statute increased the burden

petitioners had to meet to override state factfindings. Where

state factfindings were presumed correct, the petitioner had to

establish the state court's error by "convincing evidence";

where state factfindings were not presumed correct (because

one of the statute's exceptions applied), the petitioner had to

(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate

hearing in the State court proceeding; or

(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of

law in the State court proceeding;

(8) cr unless that part of the record of the State court

proceeding in which the determination of sucii factual issue

was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of

the evidence to support such factual determination, is

produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court

on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole

concludes that such factual determination is not fairly

supported by the record:

And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the

Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination

has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the

circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered

(1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise

appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court

concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered

(8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered

as a whole, does not fairly support such factual

determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to

establish by convincing evidence that the factual

determination by the State court was erroneous.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), subsequently amended by Antiterrorism

and Effect Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

APPENDIX A - 29a

establish the facts necessary to support his claim by only a

preponderance of the evidence. Keeney, 504 U.S. at 20, 112

S. Ct. at 1726 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Sumner v.

Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551, 101 S. Ct. 764, 771, 66 L. Ed. 2d

722 (1981)). Thus, although district courts still could, within

the limits of their "sound discretion," Townsend, 372 U.S. at

318, 83 S.Ct. at 760, grant evidentiary hearings when

Townsend's tests were not met, they could not overlook the

elevated deference accorded state factfindings unless an

exception to the revised statute applied.

In 1992, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of federal

evidentiary hearings and overruled Townsend in part. In

Keeney, the Court reconsidered the fifth circumstance in

which Townsend entitled a petitioner to an evidentiary

hearing, namely, when material facts were not adequately

developed in the state courts. The Court held that a habeas

petitioner is "entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he can show

cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-court

proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure."

Keeney, 504 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 1721 (emphasis added).

Alternatively, the petitioner is permitted to develop additional

facts at the federal level if he could "show that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a

federal evidentiary hearing." Id. at 12, 112 S. Ct. at 1721. The

Supreme Court explained that this rule limiting the

availability of federal evidentiary hearings was motivated not

only by considerations of judicial economy, but also by those

of comity to state courts, accuracy and finality of state court

judgments, and consistency in habeas corpus jurisprudence.

Id. at 8-9, 112 S. Ct. at 1719-20.

A majority of the Court did not specify whether Keeney's

revision of the law defined the conditions in which federal

evidentiary hearings were mandatory or, rather, the outer

boundaries of when they were permissible. But see id. at 23,

112 S. Ct. at 1727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he district

courts . . . still possess the discretion, which has not been

APPENDIX A - 30a

removed by today's opinion, to hold [evidentiary] hearings

even where they are not mandatory."). We confronted that

- issue, however, in Mathis v. Zant, 975 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.

1992). There, "the district court, on its own initiative,

permitted [the] petitioner to introduce additional evidence to

bolster his claim of ineffective assistance of counse! at

sentencing by developing and submitting evidence never

presented to the state court that first addressed this claim.” Id.

at 1497. After considering the newly developed evidence, the

court granted relief on the ineffective assistance ground.” Id.

We observed that, despite the respondent's numerous

objections, the district court never identified its authority for

holding an evidentiary hearing on its own initiative. Id.

Consequently, we vacated the district court's judgment and

remanded, instructing the court

(1) to articulate its ground or grounds for

circumventing the presumption of correctness

accorded a state court's factual findings under

[pre-AEDPA] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by sua sponte

permitting petitioner to submit additional

evidence on his claim of ineffective assista:. <¢ of

counsel at sentencing, [and] (2) to determine

whether petitioner can demonstrate cause and

prejudice for failing to present to the state courts

the supplemental evidence submitted to the

district court....

Id. (citing Keeney, 504 U.S. 1, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318, 112 S.

Ct. 1715).

*° It also granted relief on other grounds, but they are of no

consequence here.

APPENDIX A - 31a

Arguably, this holding could be narrowly read to require

satisfaction of Keeney's cause-and-prejudice test only where a

district court elects to hold an evidentiary hearing absent

motion of the petitioner. But we later resolved any doubt as to

the necessity of applying Keeney’s test to all cases in Weeks

v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1043 (11th Cir. 1994). There we held

unequivocally, "Without a cause and prejudice showing for

evidence not submitted to the state court, a habeas petitioner

is procedurally barred on federal habeas review just as he is

from presenting new claims not previously before the state

court." Id. at 1043; see also Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571,

577 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that under pre-AEDPA law "a

district court abuses its discretion by ordering [an evidentiary]

hearing without first requiring the petitioner to make the

requisite showing [of cause and prejudice]"). But see Seidel v.

Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that

Keeney did not limit the discretion of a district court to hold

an evidentiary hearing that is not required by Townsend);

Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 1997)

("Keeney . . . addresses only the circumstances under which

an evidentiary hearing is required."); Pagan v. Keane, 984

F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that, after Keeney, district

courts retain the power to hold evidentiary hearings even

though one is not required). Thus, it was settled in this circuit

that, after Keeney and before AEDPA, district courts lacked

discretion to grant evidentiary hearings to develop facts that a

habeas petitioner had failed to develop in state court, unless

the petitioner established cause and prejudice or a miscarriage

of justice,

The test AEDPA established in 1996 is even more

deferential to state courts than the earlier standard:

If the applicant has failed to develop the

factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an

APPENDIX A - 32a

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

or

(11) a factual predicate that could not have

been previously discovered through the exercise

of due diligence; and

-

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the

applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). Note that, like

the Keeney test, the current § 2254(e)(2) is specific to those

situations in which an evidentiary hearing is requested to

develop facts that the petitioner failed to develop in state

court. Note further that AEDPA expressly limits the extent to

\vhich hearings are permissible, not merely the extent to

which they are required.

B. Application of the Legal Standard to Kelley's Case

Kelley requested an evidentiary hearing in his petition for

habeas corpus relief and renewed his request several times

thereafter. For example, after AEDPA's enactment in 1996,

the court asked the parties to file memoranda briefing

AEDPA's effects on the ongoing proceeding. Kelley's

memorandum argued that AEDPA's amendments to § 2254,

APPENDIX A - 33a

and § 2254(e) in particular, do not apply to this case, and it

urged the court to honor Kelley's previous demand for a

hearing. The State took the opposite position and specifically

noted that the amended § 2254(e) limits the availability

federal evidentiary hearings.

On April 23, 1997, Kelley, acting under the impression

that the court had ordered an evidentiary hearing "for some

time during the period of May 12 to May 23, 1997," moved

the court for leave to issue subpoenas requiring several

witnesses to appear at the federal government's expense to

testify in support of his claims.”' The State filed a response on

*" Kelley styled his motion as a Motion for Issuance of

Witness Subpoenas and Award of Witness Fees and Expenses

Without Cost to Petitioner. As authority for his motion, he cited

Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)-(b), "Computing and Extending Time," and

21 U.S.C. § 848(q), "Appeal in capital cases; counsel for

financially unable defendants." Section 848 was plainly

inapplicable. The section applies to cases in which the death

penalty is imposed under § 848; Kelley's was imposed under

Florida law. Because the rule of criminal procedure he cited was

also inapplicable, we assume that Kelley meant to cite Rule

4S(c)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "Protection of

Persons Subject to Subpoenas." That section states:

If a subpoena . . . requires a person who is not a party or an

officer of a party to incur substantial expense to travel more

than 100 miles to attend trial . . . the court may, to protect a

person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or

modify the subpoena or, if the party in whose behalf the

subpoena is issued shows a substantial need for the testimony

. .. that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship and

assures that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed

wiil be reasonably compensated, the court may order

appearance .. . only upon specified conditions.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).

APPENDIX A - 34a

April 30, contending that a hearing should not be held.” The

State protested that Kelley had not shown "(1) cause for, and

prejudice from, the failure to develop such facts, or (2) that a

federal evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a

fundamental miscarriage of justice."

On May 27, 1997, Kelley filed a pretrial memorandum

outlining several avenues along which he hoped to develop

additional facts to support his claims. Ultimately, the

memorandum asked the court to convene a hearing to receive

Kelley's new evidence. In the alternative, Kelley asked for a

hearing to argue that the court could receive that evidence

because he had cause for his failure to present it to the state

courts and resulting prejudice.

On August 26, 1997, the court heard argument of counsel

on the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. At

a status conference held on December 15, 1998, the court

indicated its inclination to hold an evidentiary hearing in both

Ft. Pierce and Boston, where it could receive the testimony of

witnesses located in that vicinity and alleviate concerns about

the cost of transporting many of Kelley's witnesses. The State

protested again:

The State objected to Kelley's motion because the motion

neither demonstrated “a substantial need for the testimony" of the

witnesses sought to be subpoenaed nor represented that the

witnesses would "be reasonably compensated.” As noted in the text,

the State also objected on the ground that an evidentiary hearing

was no” permitted

* Kelley amended his Motion for Issuance of Witness

Subpoenas and Award of Witness Fees and Expenses Without Cost

to Petitioner on September 14, 1998, and the State responded with

the same challenges.

APPENDIX A - 35a

MS. DITTMAR:” [Y]our Honor, I feel like I

need to reiterate the respondent's position that

there just is no reason--

THE COURT: I know what your position is;

that you don't think it necessary.

MS. DITTMAR: That is correct, your

Honor.

THE COURT: I feel under all of the

circumstances that the better course is to have the

hearing.

MS. DITTMAR: Your Honor, I am not sure

what circumstances those are. I am not aware of

any capital case in Florida where there has been a

federal evidentiary hearing after there has been a

full and fair hearing in State Court. And I just

don't understand the legal basis for having any of

these witnesses give testimony at this point.

THE COURT: Well, that is not the kind of

new ground I would like to break. And I promise

you I will review it one more time before I take

any, set the wheels in motion with the

Administrative Office.”

** Carol M. Dittmar appeared on behalf of the State. This

transcript excerpt has been edited to correct the spelling of her

surname.

* The court apparently felt it necessary to obtain the approval

of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to hold an

evidentiary hearing in Boston at government expense.

APPENDIX A - 36a

The court deferred its final ruling on the evidentiary

hearing issue until November 22, 2000, when in a telephone

conference with counsel, it resolved to hold a hearing on

Kelley's remaining habeas claims. The State emphasized that

it had "a continuing objection to holding the hearing at all."

Over that objection, the court decided that the hearing would

begin the next spring in Boston.

The State persisted in its opposition to the hearing. On

December 11, 2000, for instance, the State once again

objected to having a hearing; alternatively, it moved the court

to limit the scope of the hearing, contending that it should be

limited only to Kelley's claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel during the penalty phase of Kelley's trial.

On December 29, 2000, the court entered an order

scheduling the evidentiary hearing to commence in Boston on

April 24, 2001.

On March 21, 2001, the state filed written objections to

Kelley's list of proposed witnesses. Once again, it reiterated

its opposition to the course the court was taking:

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any

cause or prejudice for his failure to present these

witnesses at his state court postconviction

evidentiary hearing. Absent such cause and

prejudice, this additional evidence should not be

presented. . . . Since the Petitioner has not offered

any justification for his failure to present this

evidence when he was granted the opportunity to

do so in state court, he is precluded from offering

it at his federal evidentiary hearing.

The court did not address the State's December 11, 2000

motion to limit the scope of the evidentiary hearing until

March 18, 2002. Because the hearing had already been held at

that point and, indeed, had concluded almost a year earlier,

the court denied the State's motion as moot.

APPENDIX A - 37a

In our-view, the district court abused its discretion in

granting the evidentiary hearing. First, the court failed to

determine the appropriate legal standard for measuring its

discretion to grant the hearing. Second, despite the State's

continuous objections to the hearing, the court failed to

acknowledge and apply any legal constraint on its discretion

at all. We elaborate on these points below.

1. The District Court's Failure to Ascertain the

Appropriate Legal Standard

Determining the test to be applied in this case--AEDPA's

or the pre-AEDPA standard--is a difficult question that cannot

be resolved on this record. The district court and the litigants

uncritically agreed that the pre-AEDPA cause-and-prejudice

test applied. Although it is true that Kelley filed his habeas

petition prior to AEDPA's enactment, the possibility of

retroactive application complicates our analysis.

The Supreme Court addressed the extent of AEDPA's

retroactive application in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997). The Court noted that

AEDPA amended portions of Title 28, Chapter 153 of the

United States Code, which involves habeas corpus

proceedings generally. Section 2254(e)(2), which contains the

updated limitations on federal evidentiary hearings, was

among the amended provisions in that chapter.” AEDPA also

*° As the Court explained, AEDPA eliminated what was

formerly § 2254(d) and moved what was once subsection (e) to

subsection (f). Lindh, 521 U.S. at 332, 117 S. Ct. 2066.

[I]n place of the old (d), it inserted a new (d) followed by a

new (e), the two of them dealing with, among other things,

the adequacy of state factual determinations as bearing on a

right to federal relief, and the presumption of correctness to

be given such state determination.

Id.

APPENDIX A - 38a

"creates an entirely new chapter 154, with special rules

favorable to the state party, but applicable only if the State

-meets certain conditions, including provision for appointment

of postconviction counsel in state proceedings." Id. at 327,

117 S. Ct. at 2063. AEDPA specifically provided that chapter

154, which pertains only to capital cases, "shall apply to cases

pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act."

AEDPA § 107(c), 110 Stat. at 1221 (codified as note to 28

U.S.C. § 2261). Because the statute contained no similar

indication about the reach of the amendments to chapter 153,

the Supreme Court concluded that AEDPA's text fairly

implies "that the new provisions of chapter 153 generally

apply only to cases filed after the Act became effective."

Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336, 117 S. Ct. at 2068.

Although AEDPA's pertinent provision, § 2254(e)(2), is

contained in nonretroactive chapter 153, its restrictions might

still apply to Kelley through chapter 154, which is retroactive

and at least potentially applicable. Importantly, chapter 154

incorporates parts of chapter 153 by reference; it expressly

provides, for instance, that district courts must rule on the

claims before them "subject to subsections (a), (d), and (e) of

section 2254[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (emphasis added). The

Supreme Court noted that where retroactive chapter 154

applies and incorporates parts of chapter 153 by reference, it

renders those portions of AEDPA retroactive for its limited

purposes. As the Court explained, "[W]hen a pending case is

also an expedited capital case subject to chapter 154, the new

provisions of § § 2254(d) and (e) will apply to that case[,]"

even though those sections are nonretroactive without the

help of chapter 154. Lindh, 521 U.S. at 335, 117 S. Ct. at

2067; see also id. at 326, 117 S. Ct. at 2063 ("The statute

reveals Congress's intent to apply the amendments to chapter

153 only to such cases as were filed after the statute's

enactment (except where chapter 154 otherwise makes select

provisions of chapter 153 applicable to pending cases)

(emphasis added)).

APPENDIX A - 39a

Kelley's habeas petition was pending when AEDPA

became effective; thus, AEDPA's restrictions on federal

evidentiary hearings probably extend to his case if chapter

154 applies and makes them retroactive. This conclusion,. of

course, begs another challenging question: Is chapter 154

applicable? At the broadest level, the chapter, entitled

"Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital Cases," applies

only to "cases arising under section 2254, brought by.

prisoners in State custody who are subject to a capital

sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2261(a). Without question, Kelley,

unlike the petitioner in the Lindh case, is subject to a capital

sentence. More particularly, chapter 154 only applies if the

state that sentenced the petitioner meets the criteria of § §

2261(b) and (c), which involve the appointment and

compensation of competent postconviction counsel for the

petitioner. At this time, it is not clear whether the state of

Florida had satisfied those criteria.”°

Here, the district court naively assumed that pre-AEDPA

law applied. The court reasoned, "[E]xcept for select

provisions that Congress explicitly made retroactive,

?° We addressed this issue once in Hill v. Butterworth, 133

F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated by 147 F.3d 1333, 1334 (11th

Cir. 1998). The district court in that case determined that Florida

did not satisfy all of the requirements necessary to invoke chapter

154. Id. at 784-85 (quoting Hill v. Butterworth, 170 F.R.D. 509,

524 (N.D. Fla. 1997)). Noting that, since the case left the district

court, Florida's laws changed in ways that might have affected the

applicability of chapter 154, we remanded the case for further

proceedings. Id. at 786. Soon thereafter, though, the Supreme Court

decided Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 118 S. Ct. 1694, 140 L.

Ed. 2d 970 (1998), which demonstrated that the Butterworth case

was nonjusticiable and rendered chapter 154's applicability moot.

Consequently, on the State's petition for rehearing, we vacated our

previous decision and remanded the case to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the case. 147 F.3d 1333, 1334 (11th Cir.

1998). To the best of our knowledge, the issue of chapter 154's

applicability to Florida cases remains unresolved.

APPENDIX A - 40a

[AEDPA's] amendments apply only to cases filed after the

effective date of the amended statute." Kelley, 222 F. Supp.

2d 1357, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2002). It concluded, "As Kelley's

petition was filed in 1992, and does concern the select

retroactive provisions, this court must apply the law as it was

prior to the 1996 amendmenis." Id. The court did not explain

why the retroactive provisions of chapter 154 did not concern

Kelley's petition. Indeed, it is apparent that the court never

considered the possibility that chapter 154 made AEDPA's

other provisions retroactive such that they might control the

standard for granting an evidentiary hearing in this case.

This issue was not briefed to us, however, and the record

lends no insight sufficient to permit us to decide whether

chapter 154 extends to Florida such that AEDPA's restrictions

on evidentiary hearings should have applied in this case.

2. The District Court's Failure to Apply Any Legal

Standard

In any event, the district court clearly abused its discretion

by authorizing the hearing. The court compounded its failure

to determine the applicable legal standard by neglecting to

apply any standard at all.

If AEDPA applied, the court could not have afforded

Kelley an evidentiary hearing. The record was, and is, devoid

of any indication that Kelley's claims rely either on "new rule

of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral .

review" or on "a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence . .

. ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). Although it is the nature of

Brady claims that the prosecution precludes the defense from

obtaining important evidence before trial, we observe no

indication that Rule 3.850 counsel were precluded from

developing the factual basis for any of Kelley's collateral

claims through the exercise of due diligence during the Rule

APPENDIX A - 4la

3.850. proceedings.” Nor do we perceive the remo

possibility that the facts supporting the three claims for whic

the evidentiary hearing was granted "would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have

found [Kelley] guilty of [murder].". 28 US.C. §

2254(e)(2)(B).

Even if the district court were correct in its hasty

assumption that pre-AEDPA law governed its decision, the

court abused its discretion by neglecting to apply the pre-

AEDPA test properly.

Kelley, who also assumed that pre-AEDPA law applied,

advanced, as he does here, several explanations for why he

was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Townsend. None

have merit. He argues that the Rule 3.850 court's factual

determinations cannot be presumed correct because the court

failed to address "crucial allegations and matter in dispute"

and because it made "findings that were clearly unsupported

by the record." We cannot agree. In the Rule 3.850 court,

Kelley's attorneys placed twenty-six exhibits in evidence and

presented the testimony of ten witnesses in support of the

Kelley's claims for relief. The court systematically analyzed

each of Kelley's claims in a thorough opinion that was

ultimately given great deference by the Florida Supreme

Court. After reviewing the record of the Rule 3.850

proceedings, we conclude that the court's findings are fairly

supported.

Thus, Kelley's only basis for obtaining a federal

evidentiary hearing must be that he failed to develop material

facts adequately in the Rule 3.850 court. As explained above,

the district court had discretion to allow a hearing before

*” By the time of the Rule 3.850 proceedings, Kelley had

obtained ali of the items upon which the Brady claims in his

federal habeas petition are based.

APPENDIX A - 42a

AEDPA took effect only if Kelley could satisfy Keeney's test

of cause and prejudice or miscarriage of justice. The court

_ erroneously neglected to apply this standard. Indeed, although

the court voiced its view that the hearing was necessary, the

record is barren of any indication as to why it concluded that

a hearing was permissible.

Because it failed properly to apply Keeney and our

subsequent precedent, the district court has deprived us of a

record basis for deciding whether Kelley established cause

and resulting prejudice for his failure to develop the factual

bases for his claims in the Rule 3.850 court. In oral argument

in this appeal, Kelley's attorney agreed that the district court

failed to make findings of cause and prejudice. In fact, he

contended that this court could not make a cause-and-

prejudice determination on the record as its stands, and that if

we conclude that the district court erred in granting Kelley an

evidentiary hearing, we should remand the case to the district

court to permit Kelley to show the cause and prejudice that

warranted the district court's decision to hold an evidentiary

hearing.

Even so, we observe from what is before us that Kelley

would have faced great difficulties in satisfying Keeney's test.

To show cause, Kelley had to prove that some impediment

external to the decisions of his Rule 3.850 counsel prevented

him from first presenting to the state court the evidence he

introduced in the hearing in the district court. See Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L. Ed.

2d 397 (1986). Three of the eleven witnesses Kelley called to

the stand before the district court testified to events that

occurred in Kelley's presence. If Kelley now hangs his

"cause" hat on Brower's insufficient pretrial investigation, we

are baffled as to why Kelley required an investigator at all to

discover these witnesses. Furthermore, the record reveals no

hint that Kelley was incapable of fully developing his

collateral claims in the Rule 3.850 court. Kelley's failure to

present evidence to that court must not be confused with his

APPENDIX A - 43a

inability to develop certain evidence at the second trial. For

example, although prosecutorial misconduct might have

created cause for defense counsel's failure to present certain

evidence at trial, the record before us yields no indication that

similar misconduct impeded counsel from presenting to the

Rule 3.850 court the evidence they introduced (for the first

time) at the federal hearing. By the same token, although trial

records rarely reflect a complete account of an attorney's

ineffectiveness, there is no apparent reason why Kelley

should not have known the extent of trial counsel's

shortcomings by the time he filed his Rule 3.850 motion for

collateral relief.

Kelley would also be hard-pressed to demonstrate any

prejudice for failing to develop the new evidence that was not

properly presented to the state court. If Kelley was prejudiced

by such failure, it must be because he either (1) would have

prevailed on_a claim he asserted had he introduced the new

evidence with it, or (2) would have prevailed on a claim he

never asserted at all.

Kelley cannot establish the latter circumstance. To raise

an unexhausted claim for the first time in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding, the petitioner must first establish cause

and prejudice or miscarriage of justice for failing to exhaust

the claim in state court. See, e.g., Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d

1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This is a one-

time requirement. If the petitioner meets it successfully, he

can go forward and develop the claim's factual basis; if he

does not, the claim is barred and the issue of factual

development is moot. As we explain below, the district court

improperly granted Kelley relief on an unexhausted instance

of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See supra Part

IV.A. Because that instance of Kelley's claim was not

presented to the state courts, its was procedurally defaulted.

Kelley obviously could not have been prejudiced in the

district court by his failure to develop evidence in the Rule

3.850 court for a claim he can no longer raise.

APPENDIX A - 44a

Kelley would also have difficulty establishing prejudice

from Rule 3.850 counsel's failure to present the new evidence

supporting the claims he did exhaust. The district court

correctly denied claims (4), (5), and (6) as a legal matter.

Kelley, No. 92-14246 at 29 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2000).

Additional evidence could not have enhanced these claims.

The court rejected claim (3) on the ground that the State did

not deny Kelley due process by destroying certain evidence

after Sweet's second trial because the State had not done so in

bad faith. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).

Kelley's new evidence had nothing whatsoever to do with the

State's intentions surrounding the destruction of the evidence.

Thus, that evidence could not have enhanced that claim.

Furthermore, for reasons we discuss below, see infra Part

IV.B, Kelley's Brady claims fail for lack of legal materiality.

No amount of additional evidence can revive a claim that is

legally insufficient.

That leaves us with Kelley's ineffective assistance claims.

The evidence Kelley presented to the district court shed little

light on the instances of his ineffective assistance claim that

had been exhausted and, therefore, were preserved for federal

review. Most of the new evidence appears relevant primarily

to the procedurally barred claim that Kelley's conviction

might not have resulted had defense counsel not relied on

Brower to conduct the pretrial investigation. Even if the claim

were not barred, we have serious doubt that new evidence of

Brower's incompetence justified the granting of habeas

relief.** After all, Kelley's counsel had well over a month after

Brower's disappearance to conduct further research for

Kelley's second trial if such research were necessary.

Furthermore, Kelley's counsel testified that their decision to

** Indeed, that Kelley told the district court that he needed an

evidentiary hearing to develop this instance of his ineffective

assistance claim underscores the fact that he did not raise the claim

in his Rule 3.850 proceeding.

APPENDIX A - 45a

rest without putting on a defense was a matter of calculated

trial strategy. See infra note 34.

All of this said, we need not remand the case, as we did in

‘Mathis, 975 F.2d at 1497, to enable the petitioner to show

cause and resulting prejudice for his failure to present his new

evidence to the Rule 3.850 court. As we explain in Part IV,

Kelley would not qualify for habeas relief as a matter of law

even if the additional evidence were admitted and properly

weighed.

IV.

Rulings on Habeas Claims

Having decided that the district court abused its discretion

by granuug the evidentiary hearing without applying the

proper legal standard, we turn to the relief it granted. The

court granted habeas relief on claim (1) for five Brady

violations, and claim (2) for ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. We address these rulings in reverse order. As

indicated supra, neither claim has merit with or without the

evidence Kelley presented to the district court.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The district court granted Kelley habeas relief for

ineffective assistance on the ground that "Kelley's trial

counsel was deficient in having a disbarred attorney, lazy to a

fault, resolve whether or not to conduct a pretrial

investigation." Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla.

2002). Kelley defaulted this claim by failing to present it to

the Rule 3.850 court. Therefore, the district court should have

dismissed it. Even if the claim were preserved, however, it

should have failed.

1. The Exhaustion Requirement

Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal

court that were not first exhausted in state court. See, e.g.,

APPENDIX A - 46a

Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998).

To properly exhaust a claim, "the petitioner must afford the

State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the

claim on the merits." Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. at

1720. It is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas

petitioner has been through the state courts, Picard v. Connor,

404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S. Ct. 509, 512, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438

(1971), nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary to

support the claim were before the state courts or that a

somewhat similar state-law claim was made, Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277, 74 L. Ed. 2d 3

(1982) (citations omitted). The petitioner must present his

claims to the state courts such that they are permitted the

“opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts

bearing upon (his) constitutional claim." Picard, 404 U.S. at

277, 112 S. Ct. at 513 (alteration in original).

Thus, the prohibition against raising nonexhausted claims

in federal court extends not only to broad legal theories of

relief, but also to the specific assertions of fact that might

support relief. For example, habeas petitioners may not

present particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel in their federal petitions that were not first presented

to the state courts. Footman v. Singletary, 978 F.2d 1207,

1211 (11th Cir. 1992). As we explained,

allowing a habeas petitioner to allege a

single instance of ineffective assistance in his

state post-conviction proceedings and_ then

proceed to federal court to allege additional

instances would be contrary to the state's "full

and fair opportunity to address the claim on the

merits." The state would never have the benefit

of evaluating the claim using a fully developed

set of facts. This would not be the "serious and

APPENDIX A - 47a

meaningful" exhaustion of claims that Congress

intended.

Id.; see also Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th

Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that, where the habeas

petitioner properly raised only one ineffective assistance

claim on collateral! attack in state court, he could seek federal

relief based on that specific claim, but not based on other

alleged attorney defects that were not presented to the state

courts); Maynard v. Lockhart, 981 F.2d 981, 984-85 & n.1

(8th Cir. 1992) ("To preserve an allegation of ineffective

assistance for federal habeas review, a petitioner must present

that specific allegation to a state court."). Furthermore, habeas

petitioners cannot preserve otherwise unexhausted, specific

claims of ineffective assistance merely by arguing that their

lawyers were ineffective in a general and unspecified way.

See Weeks, 26 F.3d at 1044-46 (rejecting petitioner's

argument that "the general claim of ineffective assistance in

state court preserves for federal review all alleged instances

of ineffectiveness, regardless of whether evidence of a

particular act was presented to the state court"). In sum, to

preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for

federal review, the habeas petitioner must assert this theory of

relief and transparently present the state courts with the

specific acts or omissions of his lawyers that resulted in

prejudice.

Federal habeas petitioners are undoubtedly on their

strongest footing with regard to the exhaustion requirement

when their federal claims are carbon copies of the claims they

presented to the state courts. Such reproduction leaves no

question that the claims presented to the federal court are the

same as those that were presented to the state court. But we

do not demand exact replicas. We recognize that habeas

petitioners are permitted to clarify the arguments presented to

APPENDIX A - 48a

the state courts on federal collateral :eview provided that

those arguments remain unchanged in substance.

We are not so draconian or formalistic as to require

petitioners to give a separate federal law heading to each of

the claims they raise in state court to ensure exhaustion for

federal review. We simply require that petitioners present

their claims to the state courts such that the reasonable reader

would understand each claim's particular legal basis and

specific factual foundation. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 112

S Ct. at 513. As the First Circuit observed,

{T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas

applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift

needles in the haystack of the state court record.

The ground relied upon must be presented face-

up and squarely; the federal question must be

plainly defined. Oblique references which hint

that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork

will not turn the trick.

Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1988).

To ensure exhaustion, petitioners must present their

claims in this manner of clarity throughout "one complete

round of the State's established appellate review process."

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728,

1732, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999). As long as state supreme court

review of a prisoner's claims is part of a state's ordinary

appellate review procedure, prisoners of that state must

present their claims to the state supreme court to preserve

those claims for federal review, even if review by that court is

discretionary. See id. at 848-49, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.

The habeas petitioner can escape the exhaustion

requirement only by showing cause for the default and actual

prejudice resulting therefrom, or by _ establishing a

:

APPENDIX A - 49a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Bailey, 172 F.3d at 1306

(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639,

91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-

27, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995)). Absent the

applicability of these exceptions, nonexhausted claims cannot

be raised in federal habeas corpus petitions.

We review a district court's determination as to whether a

habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from raising a claim

in federal court de novo. Lusk v. Singletary, 112 F.3d 1103,

1105 (11th Cir. 1997).

2. Application of the Exhaustion Requirement to Kelley's

Case

Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion cited seven specific instances

of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the motion

contended that Kelley's trial counsel, Kunstler and Edmund,

were ineffective because "they failed to thoroughly review"

certain materials obtained by Rule 3.850 counsel that could

have been used "to determine the full extent of the evidence

destroyed in 1976," after John Sweet's second trial.

Second, the motion argued that Kunstler and Edmund

were ineffective because they failed to object to the expert

testimony of three of the State's expert witnesses and

stipulated to the testimony of a fourth expert. These witnesses

testified about the destroyed evidence, and Kelley's Rule

3.850 counsel reasoned that they could not be cross-examined

effectively because that evidence was not in existence at the

time of Kelley's trial.

Kelley's third theory of ineffective assistance contained a

hodgepodge of grievances, all of which fell under the banner

of "Failure to Develop Defense Theories." The gravamen of

this claim was that Kunstler and Edmund made a series of

missteps that undermined the defense's two key theories: first,

that the person who registered at the Daytona Inn Motel

around the time of the murder, although using Kelley's name,

was not actually defendant William Kelley; and second, that

APPENDIX A - 50a

John Sweet executed the murder himself without the

assistance of hired assassins. Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel

argued that his trial counsel should have more adroitly

resisted the State's effort to link Kelley to the motel. Along

these lines, the Rule 3.850 motion specifically faulted

Kelley's trial counsel for failing "to adduce evidence that the

handwriting on the motel's registration record was not the

defendant William Kelley's handwriting, a fact that the

defendant had made known to defense counsel." It faults trial

counsel for stipulating that the car registered at the motel

belonged to Jennie Adams, who had been seen with Kelley

from time to time and was his girlfriend. Additionally, the

motion contended that trial counsel should have attempted to

show that descriptions of the women who accompanied the

man registered under Kelley's name at the motel did not

match the appearance of Jennie Adams.

In this sarne section, the motion asserts that Edmund

performed deficiently in his cross-examination of Kaye

Carter, the daughter of a clerk at the motel. In the first place,

Edmund failed to differentiate between Kelley and the

supposed imposter who used Kelley's name at the motel. This

blunder, Rule 3.850 counsel insisted, reinforced the State's

devastating contention that the men were one in the same.

Secondly, Edmund did not use cross-examination to suggest

that the man registered under Kelley's name could have

actually been Steve "the Greek" Busias, a person from

Kelley's neighborhood who allegedly matched physical

characteristics of the man at the motel, as described by Carter.

The motion stressed that Edmund even stated at one point that

Kelley, rather than the theoretical imposter Kelley, registered

the car matching Jennie Adams's license plate at the Daytona

Inn.

The Rule 3.850 motion also posited other specific

deficiencies related to Kelley's third ineffective assistance

claim: the broad "Failure to Develop Defense Theories." It

contended, for instance, that defense counsel should have

APPENDIX A - 51a

more carefully researched the weather and daylight conditions

at the time of the murder. Carter testified that the man

registered as Kelley arrived at the motel before 8:30 P.M. on

the night of the murder. One of the victim's neighbors,

however, testified that she saw two people leaving the

victim's home, driving the victim's car with the lights on.

Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel theorized that the late time of

sunset on the day of the murder would have made it

improbable that the killers drove from the victim's house in

Sebring after twilight and reached the motel in Daytona

before 8:30 P.M. Yet another line of argument involves

comments Kelley made to FBI Agent Ross Davis at the time

of arrest, which tended indicate Kelley's knowledge of the

murder. On this subject, the motion faulted Kelley's trial

counsel for failing to present copies of a 1981 news story

about the murder during Davis's cross-examination.

Most significantly, this same third ineffective assistance

claim asserted that "defense [counsel] failed to develop facts

and interview witnesses to support its ‘wrong William Kelley’

defense." Purportedly, many witnesses would have been

available to testify that Kelley's appearance at the time of the

murder differed from that of the man Sweet described as a

triggerman.

The remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are less important for purposes of this appeal. The fourth

instance cited by the motion involved comments Edmund

made during the jury-selection voir dire alluding to Kelley's

prior criminal conduct. The fifth instance faulted defense

counsel for failing to object to the Allen charge given to the

jury. The sixth instance complained that Kelley's defense was

ineffective in impeaching John Sweet's credibility and found

specific fault with counsel's failure to object when the court

declined to answer a question the jury submitted during

deliberations about whether Sweet received immunity in

Florida for his testimony against Kelley. Finally, the Rule

3.850 motion cited as a seventh instance of ineffective

APPENDIX A - 52a

assistance Kunstler and Edmund's failure to request a change

of venue.

Kelley's brief to the Florida Supreme Court appealing the

denial of Rule 3.850 relief cast Kelley's ineffective assistance

of counsel claims in substantially similar terms.”

By the time he sought federal habeas relief, however,

many of Kelley's ineffective assistance claims had assumed a

strikingly different hue. At the broadest level, Kelley's federal

petition asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for "failure

to investigate, to depose witnesses, to present a case in

defense, and to perform other basic defense functions." The

district court ably distilled Kelley's claims down to the

following distinct instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel:

(1) the unreasonable failure to investigate

and to present evidence on behalf of Kelley; (2)

the failure to take pretrial depositions and to seek

a more fair trial venue; (3) the failure to impeach,

confront, and rebut the state's case; (4) the failure

to make an effective closing argument and to

object to improper closing argument by the state;

and (5) the failure to provide reasonably effective

*? Kelley's brief to the court brief differs from his Rule 3.850

motion only insofar as it adds the claim that the Rule 3.850 court

erred in failing to admit into evidence an affidavit drafted for, but

never signed by, Edmund. Kelley argues that this affidavit was

relevant because it accurately reflected Edmund's view of his

effectiveness as trial counsel even though Edmund eventually

drafted a different affidavit, rather than signing the one at issue.

This argument clearly amounts to an appeal of an evidentiary

ruling; therefore, it works no material change or supplement to

Kelley's ineffective assistance claims.

APPENDIX A - 53a

assistance with regard to the submission of

proposed jury instructions.

Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2002)

As noted above, the district court granted Kelley relief for

the first of these instances ineffective assistance of counsel:

defense counsel's failure to investigate. This decision rested

almost exclusively on defense counsel's reliance on disbarred

Harvey Brower for handling the pretrial investigation. On the

basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984), the district court reasoned that Kelley's counsel were

ineffective unless they either conducted a reasonable

investigation or made a reasonable decision not to investigate.

Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 ("[C]ounsel has a duty to make

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary.") Applying

this test, the court found that

neither Kunstler nor Edmund made the

decision not to investigate. They mistakenly

assumed that Brower, the — disbarred

attorney/investigation, would conduct his

investigation in a conscientious manner.

Ultimately, however, Brower failed to perform an

investigation, and his failure to present the

findings of a pretrial investigation or to file any

pretrial motions” effectively provided Kelley

*° We pause to note the oddity of the district court's criticism

regarding Brower's failure to file pretrial motions. Brower was not

licensed to practice law in Florida. In fact, at the time of Kelley's

trial, Brower was disbarred in Massachusetts. It is abundantly clear,

then, that Brower could not file pretrial motions. Insofar as the

APPENDIX A - 54a

with ineffective counsel. Therefore, Kelley's trial

counsel was deficient in have a disbarred

attorney, lazy to a fault, resolve whether or not to

conduct a pretrial investigation. qe

Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2002).

Although it identified them, the district court remarked no

further on the remaining instances of ineffective assistance

Kelley raised in his petition.”

district court's statement implies that Kelley's counsel (because of

Brower or for other reasons) neglected to file pretrial motions in

Kelley's case, the statement is plainly wrong. Kelley's counsel

argued no fewer than thirteen motions prior to Kelley's first trial.

They argued a motion to dismiss the indictment on the eve of

Kelley's second tnal.

*! As explained above, the district court identified each of the

five instances of Kelley's ineffective assistance claim but grounded

its ruling only on the instance concerning counsel's failure to

investigate. When it issued this order, the district court was

responding to the State's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. That

motion asked the court to amend its September 19, 2002 judgment

granting relief based on Kelley's Brady claims and to address the

remaining claims asserted in Kelley's petition. Although the district

court refused to alter its decision regarding the Brady claims, it

agreed with the State's contention that it "must settle all claims in a

petition for writ of habeas corpus" to avoid piecemeal litigation and

improve the quality of the judicial product. Kelley, 238 F. Supp. 2d

1325, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925,

936 (11th Cir. 1992). The court then proceeded to treat Kelley's

petition comprehensively. Because it noted all five instances of

Kelley's ineffective assistance claim, id. at 1325, but only identified

one as meriting relief, namely counsel's failure to investigate, we

infer that the district court determined that the remaining instances

of ineffective assistance are unavailing. Because Kelley did not

APPENDIX A - 55a

We conclude that the district court should have dismissed

Kelley's ineffective assistance claim based on counsels’

failure to investigate. After careful analysis of the record, we

are confident that Kelley has presented no claim to the Rule

3.850 court that fairly notified the State that he intended to

challenge his conviction on the ground that his attorneys were

constitutionally deficient in their duty to investigate or

because they relied on Harvey Brower for this chore. This

ineffective assistance claim was not merely a clarified

rendition of an exhausted claim, but a new claim altogether.

Kelley's broad Rule 3.850 claim concerning the "Failure

to Develop Defense Theories" is the most similar, by far, to

the ineffective assistance claim upon which the district court

granted relief. Yet the two claims are clearly distinct, in form

and in substance. The former, exhausted claim assailed

Kelley's trial counsel for failing to develop and even

undermining its core theories that Sweet performed the

murder unassisted or that the defendant was not the person

who registered at the Daytona Inn Motel under Kelley's name.

In its brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Kelley's counsel

summarized the claim (as also set out in the supplemental

brief Kelley filed in appealing his conviction to the Florida

- Supreme Court) as follows:

Mr. Kelley's trial attorneys’ lack of

effectiveness was so plain that appellate counsel

sought to present the claim on direct appeal.

They failed to investigate, develop, or present

readily available evidence that would have

supported their own defense theories while

presenting the jury with incomprehensible

comments which gutted their own theory and

which can be supported by no reasonable tactic.

cross-appeal the district court's order denying those features of the

claim, these decisions are not before us.

APPENDIX A - 56a

This claim most closely approached the distinct,

unexhausted claim that prevailed in the district court when

Kelley argued to the Florida Supreme Court,

[Bly virtue of defense counsel's

incompetence, the jury was presented with only

one version [of the facts]: the defendant William

Kelley had been registered at the Daytona Inn on

the days surrounding the murder of Maxcy, just

as John Sweet had testified. This version,

however, was far from accurate, and counsel had

the tools with which they could have shown the

jury the inaccuracy. Without a reason, they

simply failed to investigate and thus failed to

develop or use the tools that they had.

The Rule 3.850 court and, eventually the Florida

Supreme Court, carefully distilled Kelley's broad "failure to

develop defense theories" claim into seven specific

grievances:

1. Counsel failed to adduce evidence that the

handwriting on the motel registration record was

not the defendant's. . . .

2. Counsel stipulated to the State's evidence

linking the Mr. and Mrs. William Kelley

registered at the Daytona Inn Motel to the motor

vehicle owned by Jennie Adams. ...

3. Counsel failed to point out the distinctions

between the man at the Daytona Inn Motel, as

described by Kaye Carter, and the defendant... .

APPENDIX A - 57a

4. Counsel failed to investigate and utilize

the inconsistencies in the time periods on the

evening of the murder. . . .

5. Counsel failed to interview and call

witnesses to testify regarding the defendant's

physical characteristics in 1966... .

6. Counsel failed to obtain and present

evidence (newspaper articles) which would

explain the defendant's knowledge of the Maxcy

killing when he was arrested. . . .

7. Counsel failed to obtain affidavits and

present testimony from three attorneys that the

defendant contacted them to determine if there

was a warrant for the defendant's arrest.

Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 759-60. Clearly, the Florida courts

comprehended in these arguments no intimation that Kelley's

‘defense counsel flouted their general duty to investigate or,

alternatively, decide not to investigate by relying on Brower

for this aspect of the trial preparation. The State did not divine

this argument either, and, consequently, its own brief to the

Florida Supreme Court articulated no rebuttal to the novel

claim that prevailed in the district court.

The silence of the supreme court and the State in this

regard is unsurprising. Nowhere in the portion of Kelley's

brief asserting ineffectiveness for the failure of his counsel to

develop defense theories did Kelley mention Harvey Brower.

Indeed, in all 101 pages of Kelley's brief to the state supreme

court, Brower's name appears only twice, both times in a

single paragraph:

APPENDIX A - 58a

Other noteworthy and telling matters came

to light at the [Rule] 3.850 hearing. Harvey

Brower, a disbarred attorney, did much of the

investigation and preliminary legal work prior to

Mr. Kelley's first trial. Apparently, Mr. Brower

supplied a list of names and addresses of

potential witnesses to the defense, and the

defense learned that the addresses listed were

incorrect--they did not represent actual addresses.

This paragraph--unique in its mention of Brower--

appears not in a discussion of trial counsel's investigatory

dereliction, but rather in the course of Kelley's separate

evidentiary argument that the Rule 3.850 court erred by

excluding from evidence an unsigned affidavit regarding

Edmund's effectiveness.”

In stark contrast to his brief to the Florida Supreme

Court, Kelley's federal habeas petition expends almost

seventeen pages arguing that his trial counsel were ineffective

for their "unreasonable failure to investigate." Each of these

pages is devoted almost exclusively to criticizing counsel for

their reliance on Brower. Indeed, the very first sentence of the

section reads,

Virtually all pretrial matters were delegated

to the incompetent hands of one Harvey Brower,

a Massachusetts former lawyer and federal felon

* This section of Kelley's brief is entitled, "The Judge Should

Have Granted Mr. Kelley's Offer to Admit Into Evidence Jack

Edmund's Unsigned Affidavit." By way of background, Kelley's

- Rule 3.850 counsel drafted an affidavit regarding Edmund's

performance at trial and asked him to sign it. Edmund refused to

sign this particular document and eventually drafted and signed a

different affidavit on this subject and provided it to the defense. See

supra note 29.

APPENDIX A - 59a

who was disbarred in 1979 for defrauding a

former nun out of $ 11,400 in phony stock shares

and a ioan to a non-existent third party.

Throughout this extensive argument, Kelley cites

repeatedly to four appended materials: two Massachusetts

judgments, one in which Brower was censured and another in

which he was disbarred; and two affidavits of Massachusetts

attorneys who attested to Brower's incompetence or

irresponsibility. Tellingly, these exhibits were never presented

to the state courts. We conclude that this earlier omission was

no oversight; the appended materials appear for the first time

before the district court because the federal proceeding

marked the first appearance of Kelley's claim that his defense

counsel denied him a constitutional right by relying on

Brower to conduct their pretrial investigation.

Our concerns for comity, judicial efficiency, and fairness

to the respondent preclude us from finding that the ineffective

assistance claim that prevailed in the district court was

properly exhausted. Recharacterizing the claim Kelley

presented to the Rule 3.850 court at this -late hour as a

challenge to the counsel's reliance on Brower for pretrial

investigation would "fundamentally alter the legal claim{s]

already considered by the state courts" such that we could not

consider the restated claim as exhausted. Vasquez v. Hillery,

474 U.S. 254, 260, 106 S. Ct. 617, 622, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598

(1986). And what we cannot achieve by such

recharacterization, neither can we achieve by sewing

disjointed factual snippets scattered throughout the Rule

3.850 record into a patchwork federal claim. At the very

most, Kelley's singular reference to Brower in his brief to the

Florida Supreme Court brief amounts to a "needle[{] in the

haystack of the state court record." Martens, 836 F.2d at 717.

Kelley's other Rule 3.850 claims and other instances of

ineffective assistance come nowhere near shouting distance of

the issue upon which the district court granted relief.

APPENDIX A - 60a

Our finding of procedural default is in no way disturbed

by the fact that Brower's antics were discussed to some degree

on the record during the Rule 3.850 hearing. This discussion

was not sufficient to "afford the State a full and fair

opportunity to address and resolve the claim on the merits."

Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. at 1720." By the time of

the hearing, the State could not have prepared for or presented

evidence to rebut the argument that defense counsel were

deficient in relying on Brower. Morever, even if the evidence

Kelley put on at the Rule 3.850 hearing would have supported

a finding of ineffective assistance on this then-unasserted

instance of that claim, Kelley would not have satisfied the

exhaustion requirement. "It is not enough that all the facts

necessary to support the federal claim were before the state

courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made."

Harless, 459 U.S. at 6, 103 S. Ct. at 277 (citations omitted).

To exhaust the claim sufficiently, Kelley must have presented

the state court with this particular legal basis for relief in

addition to the facts supporting it.

Our conclusion also withstands Kelley's unpersuasive

argument that the State waived the requirement of exhaustion.

Although prior to AEDPA's enactment, this court held that

"the State may waive exhaustion either expressly or

impliedly," we explained that such waiver occurs "[w]hen the

State has not raised lack of exhaustion in the district court or

on appeal. . . . " Atkins v. Attorney General of State of Ala.,

932 F.2d 1430, 1431 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).” In

this case, the State pled lack of exhaustion in the district court

and in its brief to us. Accordingly, exhaustion remains very

much a viable issue.

3 Where AEDPA applies, states will not be deemed to have

waived the exhaustion requirement unless they indicate their

intention to waive the requirement expressly. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(3). In fact, the Tenth Circuit has noted that states are now

free to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See Hale v.

Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1327 n.12 (10th Cir. 2000).

APPENDIX A - 6la

Because Kelley's petition contains both exhausted and

nonexhausted claims, it is a classic "mixed petition."

Ordinarily, "a district court must dismiss such ‘mixed

petitions,’ leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to

state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or

resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted

claims to the district court." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

510, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1199, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982). Rose

informed petitioners that they could no longer withhold

collateral claims from their state court petitions in the hope

that the district court would entertain them on the merits.

Dismissing a mixed petition is of little utility, however,

when the claims raised for the first time at the federal level

can no longer be litigated on the merits in state court because

they are procedurally barred. In such a case, requiring the

petitioner to return to state court only to make a futile

application for relief simply delays the federal courts’

adjudication of his petition. As we observed in Snowden v.

Singletary, 135 F.3d at 736 (citations and footnotes omitted),

when it is obvious that the unexhausted

claims would be procedurally barred in state

court due to a state-law procedural default, we

can forego the needless "judicial ping-pong" and

just treat those claims now barred by state law as

no basis for federal habeas relief. . . . [W]here all

the unexhausted claims are procedurally barred

from being considered in Florida courts, it would

serve no purpose to dismiss the petition for

further exhaustion because review of those

claims is unavailable in state courts.

Without question, the Florida courts will no longer

entertain on the merits of the claims Kelley has asserted for

the first time in the instant petition. See, e.g., Aldridge v.

APPENDIX A - 62a

State, 503 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a state

prisoner is procedurally barred from raising on a second

motion for postconviction relief "somewhat different facts to

support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim"). Clearly,

Kelley could demonstrate no cause for not having raised the

Brower-related instance of ineffective assistance of counsel in

the Rule 3.850 proceeding. There was no conceivable

impediment to raising it. Consequently, we can address

Kelley's remaining claims, rather than remanding the case to

the district court with the instruction that it dismiss Kelley's

petition.

3. Kelley's Lack of Prejudice from Ineffective Assistance

Although Kelley's procedural default obviates any need to

reach the merits of his ineffective assistance claim, we pause

briefly to voice our serious skepticism that counsel's reliance

on Brower for pretrial investigation could have amounted to a

violation of Kelley's nghts.

"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness

must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 686, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. More specifically, we have

held that

[t]o succeed on a claim of ineffective

assistance, Petitioner must show both

incompetence and prejudice: (1) "[PJetitioner

must show that ‘counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,”

and (2) “{P]etitioner must show ‘that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.”

APPENDIX A - 63a

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1312-13 (11th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106

S. Ct. 2464, 2473, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1986)) (alterations in

original).

Unfortunately, the district court did not find--explicitly or

implicitly--that Kelley suffered prejudice as a result of

counsel's performance. Recognizing this deficiency in the

district court's order, Kelley's attorneys moved the court for

clarification on this issue on January 6, 2003:

[I]jn an abundance of caution, Petitioner

respectfully suggests that further specificity

regarding the Strickland prejudice prong might

be warranted in order to minimize the risk that

the Court of Appeals might misunderstand this

Court's determination and either might (a) fail to

recognize that this Court had indeed made the

requisite finding under the ‘prejudice prong’ of

Strickland, or might (b) assume that the finding

had been made but harbor some uncertainty

regarding the basis on which it had been made.™*

** In support of their motion for clarification, counsel proffered

two recommended findings of prejudice. First, trial counsel's

shoddy pretrial investigation rendered them unable to call Hobart

Willis as a defense witness Willis testified by videotape at the

federal evidentiary hearing that Steven Busias claimed

responsibility to him for the Maxcy murder. Apparently, Willis

notified Brower that he would be available to testify in Kelley's

defense. Second, counsel were unable to utilize the testimony of

Joseph Whittington. Richard Mars, an attorney from Bartow,

Florida testified at the federal evidentiary hearing that he

interviewed Whittington before Kelley's second trial. Ostensibly,

Whittington implied that John Sweet had a motive for framing

Kelley.

APPENDIX A - 64a

The district court denied the motion for clarification in an

order entered on January 8, 2003.

This denial is not surprising. Prejudice would be difficult,

if not impossible, to find on this record. Kelley had two trials,

and Brower's services were employed only for the first.

Obviously, Kelley's conviction resulted from the second trial.

By the second trial, Kelley's defense team was well aware of

what the State's case would look like, since the State had

revealed its hand during the first trial, and the defense team

had a transcript of the testimonies of the State's witnesses.

Furthermore, the nearly two months that passed between the

aborted first trial and the commencement of the second tnal--

after Brower's inadequacy had been exposed--afforded

defense counsel ample time to locate potential defense

witnesses and conduct further investigation. According to

both of Kelley's trial lawyers, defense counsel did just that.

Edmund testified that he and Kunstler sent an attorney to New

England after the first trial to corroborate evidence of Sweet's

questionable character and to find favorable evidence about

Kelley's character. Kunstler's testimony is even more

illuminating. During Kelley's state Rule 3.850 hearing,

Kunstler was asked,

During the interim between the first trial and

the second trial, did you and Mr. Edmund sit

down and discuss: Well, this is how the first trial

it bears mention that this second asserted prejudice is rather

inconsistent with the notion that defense counsel failed to

investigate. Furthermore, Edmund did, as part of his calculated trial

strategy, argue that Sweet had such a motive. In fact, Edmund

testified that he was aware of Whittington and concluded that he

was not a valuable witness because Edmund intended to advance a

different frame-up motive than that to which Whittington would

speak.

APPENDIX A - 65a

went; now we knew what the evidence is, what

the witnesses are, let's do this or let's do that, let's

change some things for the second trial?

Kunstler answered, "We did. I don't know if we did it in

person. We had a lot of telephone calls. And since Brower

had vanished from the face of the earth, Jack [Edmund] had

his own investigator from his office. And he put his own

investigator to work." Finally, Kelley's attorneys repeatedly

testified that they decided against putting on evidence at trial

as a matter of strategy,” which afforded the defense both the

** For instance, at the Rule 3.850 hearing, the State called

Edmund to the stand:

Q: During the trial or during both trials actually, you and Mr.

Kunstler [Kelley's other trial lawyer] did not call any defense

witnesses. Mr. Kelley did not take the stand. Was that

something that you and Mr. Kunstler discussed or how was it

decided as to that aspect of the defense case what would be

done or not done as far as presenting witnesses?

A: I don't remember a specific discussion about not calling

witnesses. And I don't remember a specific discussion about

not calling Bill [Kelley]. But that was one of those decisions

that good trial lawyers familiar with the facts could make

without any- I mean that really didn't take a decision. It was a

matter that was going to be.

Q: Do consider that to be a matter of trial strategy?

A: Of course.

Confronted with a similar line of inquiry at the federal

evidentiary hearing, Edmund testified,

APPENDIX A - 66a

first and last closing arguments to the jury at the end of the

day. We must be highly deferential to such strategic decisions

of counsel. As the Supreme Court instructed, "a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;

that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,

104 S. Ct. at 2065 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1518-19 (11th Cir.

1995) (en banc) (observing that "[w]e cannot, and will not,

second guess" the "strategic decisions trial counsel are called

upon to make"). In sum, the mistrial gave defense counsel two

important benefits: (1) a transcript of the State's case, and (2)

an additional opportunity to conduct the investigation Brower

neglected. Because counsel made full use of these benefits

and because they would likely have declined as a matter of

trial strategy to give up the right to make the first and last

closing arguments so that they could call some of the

witnesses who testified at the federal evidentiary hearing, we

cannot agree that Brower's inadequate investigation

prejudiced Kelley's defense.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

I tried the case the way I thought the case should be tried

with the witnesses that I was cross examining. . . . [T]his is

not something that should override calling a witness who is a

critical witness, but in Florida if the defendant alone testifies

or doesn't testify and calls no witnesses the defense has beth

the opening [and] closing portions of the closing argument. In

a case with none or few witnesses I think it is to the

advantage of the defense to retain that if possible. Again that

was a decision that was, I am sure, jointly made... . It is a

tactic not to call any witnesses to further impeach Sweet than

he had already impeached himself.

APPENDIX A - 67a

1. The Brady Rule

The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97,

10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). As the Supreme Court later clarified,

there are three components of a true Brady violation: (1) The

evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have

ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct.

1936, 1948, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Evidence is material so

as to establish prejudice only "if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the ‘evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed.

2d 481 (1985).”° Of course, Brady and its progeny apply only

to evidence possessed by the prosecution team, which

includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.

United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989).

** Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in Bagley, but this

quotation is drawn from a portion of his opinion that was joined

only by Justice O'Connor. Although a majority of the Court did not

agree with this portion of the opinion in its entirety, Justice White

wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and

Justice Rehnquist, agreeing with the materiality standard quoted

above. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (White, J., concurring). Since

Bagley, the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly

recognized that this standard governs determinations of materiality

for the purpose of deciding Brady claims. See, e.g., Strickler, 527

U.S. at 280, 119 S. Ct. at 1948; Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288,

1325 (11th Cir. 2002).

APPENDIX A - 68a

An alleged Brady violation presents a mixed question of

law and fact, which we review de novo. Wright v. Hopper,

169 F.3d 695, 701 (11th Cir. 1999).

2. Application of the Brady Rule to Kelley's Case

The Rule 3.850 court, and the Florida Supreme Court on

appeal, rejected Kelley's Brady claims on the merits. The

district court disagreed with the state courts’ rulings and

concluded that Kelley was entitled to relief on the claims he

had presented to the Rule 3.850 court. The district court,

relying on the evidence presented to the Rule 3.850 court and

at the federal evidentiary hearing, found that five items of

withheld evidence were exculpatory. It further found that the

State had maternally prejudiced Kelley's defense by

withholding those items. The five withheld items include

. (1) a Massachusetts immunity order,

indicating that Sweet received immunity from

that state on March 13, 1981;

(2) The Florida Department of Law

Enforcement Investigative Report authored by

Agent Joe Mitchell, dated February 21, 1981;

(3) the transcript of Sweet's first trial;

(4) the second of two police reports authored

by Special Agent Roma Trulock, reflecting

observations of witness Kaye Carter; and

(5) a fingerprint report, constructed from

prints at the victim's house and car, containing no

positive matches to Kelley's prints. Without

APPENDIX A - 69a

identifying particular prejudices, the district court

remarked in general terms,

Disclosure of the suppressed

evidence to competent counsel

would have made a different result

much more probable. The essence of

the State's case was the testimony of

Sweet. Disclosure of his immunity

and transcript from his first trial

would have resulted in a markedly

weaker case for the prosecution and

a markedly stronger one for the

defense.

Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2002).

Whether the withheld items the court seized upon in

granting Kelley relief are considered individually or

collectively, we conclude that Kelley suffered no Brady

prejudice as a result of the withholding.

a. The Massachusetts Immunity Order and the Joe

Mitchell Report

On March 13, 1981, after being informed that Sweet had

invoked his right against self-incrimination before a

Massachusetts grand jury involving "offenses of larceny,

breaking and entering a building, violations of the narcotic

and harmful drug laws, and lending or money or thing of

value in violation of the General Laws [of Massachusetts],"

the Supreme Judicial Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts

entered an order granting Sweet transactional immunity. Its

order stated, in relevant part:

John J. Sweet shall not be prosecuted or

subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on

APPENDIX A - 70a

account of any transaction, matter or thing

concerning which he is so compelled, after

having claimed his privilege against self-

incrimination to testify or produce evidence, nor

shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence

in any criminal or civil proceeding against him in

any court of the Commonwealth, except in

prosecution for perjury or contempt while giving

testimony or producing evidence under

compulsion ....

On March 29, 1984, in his closing argument to the jury at

the end of Kelley's trial, Assistant State Attorney Hardy

Pickard stated that Sweet did not have to testify as a

prosecution witness against Kelley in Florida to obtain the

immunity the Massachusetts court granted him.*’ The district

court found, albeit implicitly, that had the State given defense

counsel copies of the immunity order and Joe Mitchell's

investigative report pnor to Kelley's tral, the prosecutor

would not have made the statement at all or, if he made it,

defense counsel--having tiie final closing argument to the

jury--would have convinced the jury that the prosecutor's

*” Specifically Pickard argued,

John Sweet did not have to give the police Kelley to get

immunity. John Sweet got immunity from Massachusetts on

a long list of things. It has nothing to do with the Maxcy case

or giving them Kelley on the Florida cases.

He already had his immunity from Massachusetts on loan

sharking, whatever that long list of things were. He didn't

have to give them Kelley to get immunity. That came up later

after he went to Massachusetts and thirty investigators or

however many he said were questioning him about all sorts

of crimes in Massachusetts.

(Emphasis added).

APPENDIX A - 7la

statement was a lie.* But for the lie, the district court

concluded, there was "a reasonable probability that . . . the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley,

473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383.

The district court found separate Brady violations in the

State's failure to disclose the immunity order and the Mitchell

report. The court also found a symbiotic relationship between

the two items, such that, when considered together, the items'

materiality was significantly enhanced and clearly established

a Brady violation. We consider these items separately and

then together.

Nothing in the immunity order states that the

Massachusetts court granted Sweet immunity on the condition

that he testify against Kelley in Florida.” To find that the

court imposed such a condition, we would first have to infer

that the court entered the order after obtaining Sweet's

commitment to testify against Kelley in Florida. Since the

order does not reveal such commitment, the commitment

would have to to have been made in a separate writing or

given orally. We would have to infer further that had Sweet

not made the commitment, the court would not have granted

him immunity. To draw that inference, we would have to

*8 An alternative implicit finding is that the court would have

instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement.

* As a threshold matter, the order cannot constitute Brady

material because there is no indication in the record that the State

possessed the order, nor is there any indication that the order was

more accessible to the State than it was to Kelley's defense team.

See Meros, 866 F.2d at 1309. Although the Massachusetts court

sealed the grand jury's application for Sweet's immunity and the

testimony he gave the grand jury about crimes in Massachusetts,

the immunity order itself was a public document and thus available

to Kelley's defense team. Although the State was not required to

obtain a copy of the immunity order and turn it over to the defense,

we demonstrate that the order lacked Brady materiality as a matter

of law.

APPENDIX A - 72a

infer that the court would have ignored the grand jury's

request, which was based on the need for Sweet's testimony

regarding several serious crimes. Put another way, we would

have to infer that the court was more interested in helping the

Florida authorities obtain Sweet's testimony than it was in

honoring the grand jury's request. The counter-inference is far

more likely: the court was so inclined to grant the grand jury's

request that it gave Sweet transactional immunity rather than

use immunity. In sum, the immunity order, standing alone,

does not permit the inference that the prosecutor lied when he

told the jury that the Massachusetts immunity order was not

conditioned on Sweet's promise to testify against Kelley in

Florida. Moreover, as will become clear from an examination

of the Mitchell report, there can be no doubt that court did not

grant Sweet immunity because he promised to testify for the

State at Kelley's tnal.

We turn now to the Mitchell report to see if it permits the

inference that the prosecutor lied in his closing argument to

the jury. The district court found that the State's "fail[ure] to

disclose to defense counsel Agent Joe Mitchell's Florida

Department of Law Enforcement Investigative Report dated

February 21, 1981" violated the Brady rule. Kelley, 222 F.

Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The report generally

describes conferences that took place on February 21 and 23,

March 6 and 12, 1981 concerning Kelley's and Sweet's

criminal activities, including the Maxcy murder. Some of the

conferences were held telephonicially and some in person. All

involved law enforcement authorities; Sweet was physically

present on March 12.

According to Mitchell's report, on February 21, Rex

Amistead, Director of the Regional Organized Crime

“° Although Mitchell's report was dated February 21, the report

refers to events that occurred after that date. A notation appears at

the bottom of the report indicating that it was dictated on March 23

and typed on May 6, 1981.

APPENDIX A - 73a

Intelligence Center in Memphis, Tennessee, called Mitchell

with the following information: Major John Regan of the

Massachusetts State Police had informed him that the State

Police were "conducting a major multi jurisdictional [sic]

investigation involving organized crime activities in. . .

Massachusetts and a witness whom they had in protective

custody had provided information pertaining to [the Maxcy]

murder." The witness was John Sweet. The information was

that Maxcy had been killed in 1966 by William Kelley, "a...

hit man” Sweet had hired. "Armistead emphasized that Major

Regan . . . indicated that Sweet was willing to testify in behalf

of the State of Florida [in the prosecution of Kelley for

Maxcy’s murder], providing he could be granted immunity . . .

." Mitchell was aware of the "the homicide . . . Sweet had

been discussing with Major Regan" and told Director

Armistead that Sweet had been indicted for Maxcy's murder,

and that the victim's wife, Irene Maxcy, who testified at

Sweet's trial, had subsequently been charged with perjury and

found guilty. Mitchell also told Armistead that he was

unaware of the "disposition of Sweet's charges.”

According to . . . Armistead, Major Regan

was requesting assistance from the [FDLE] in

checking into the investigation of the homicide of

von Maxcy, and the possibilities of using

testimony by Sweet on charges against suspect

William Kelley of the Boston area. Further,

Major Regan advised that their department is

scheduled to indict and charge suspect Kelley

with a number of felonies . . . . It was felt that if

the State of Florida could prosecute Kelley in

thf{e] 1966 homicide the State of Florida could

make a stronger case against Kelley.

Mitchell advised Director Armistead that "Major Regan's

request would relayed to the Director of the Division of Law

APPENDIX A - 74a

Enforcement . . . to determine what action may be made by

the [FDLE] in the case."

On February 23, following Director Frank Tassone's

instructions, Mitchell informed the State Attorney of Major

Regan's request for investigative assistance and Sweet's

willingness to testify against Kelley in Florida provided that

he be granted immunity there with respect to the Maxcy

murder.

On March 6, several parties interested in Sweet's potential

testimony met in the State Attorney's Office in Bartow,

Florida. Attendants at the meeting included law enforcement

officers, representatives of the State Attorney's office, the

State Attorney who had prosecuted Sweet in 1967 (retired at

the time of the meeting), FDLE personnel (including the case

agent in the Maxcy investigation), a Massachusetts district

attorney, and Paul A. Cataldo (a Massachusetts lawyer who

was "representing Sweet in the immunity for the State of

Massachusetts cases"). "As a result of the meeting, it was

agreed . . . that representatives from the State Attorney's

Office . . . and the [FDLE] would proceed to Boston . . . and

interview John Sweet for the full details in connection[{] with

the ... Maxcy homicide... ."

On March 12, State Attorney Quillian Yancey, Assistant

State Attorney Hardy Pickard, and Mitchell interviewed

Sweet in the "Office of the District Attorney, New Bedford,

Massachusetts." At the request of Sweet's attorney, Steve

Rusconi, a young lawyer in Cataldo's office, the interviewers

neither placed Sweet under oath nor tape recorded what he

said. Mitchell's report summarizes what Sweet related, which

is essentially what he testified to at Kelley's trial. Mitchell's

summary of the information obtained from Sweet appears

verbatim in the margin.“

*' In relevant part, the report states:

APPENDIX A - 75a

[Sweet] admitted to his participation in the homicide of . . .

Maxcy. He advised that initially has was engaged in

conversation with the wife of . .. Maxcy, Irene Maxcy, who

mentioned to him that she was in fear that Maxcy had

intentions of divorcing her and cutting her out of any portion

of the estate. After that, Irene Maxcy, discussed with him

concerning doing away with . . . Maxcy, and she asked him to

contact his friends in Boston, Massachusetts, to discuss the

killing of her husband. Sweet further emphasized, based on

the request of Irene Maxcy, he proceeded through a close

associate of his, WALTER BENNETT, who hired VON

ETTER white/male, (NFI) and WILLIAM KELLEY, of the

Boston, MA, area, to do the killing. Sweet further indicated,

that Mrs. Maxcy, provided the finances to hire Walter

Bennett, and he delivered Bennett a $ 5,000 fee in advance

and later they traveled to Boston, Massachusetts, where he

delivered the balance of $ 15,000 dollars personally to Walter

Bennett, at a Howard Johnson's Motel parking lot, just south

of Boston, Massachusetts.

Sweet indicated that after Bennett was given the $ 5,000

down payment, he sent Von Etter down to review the

situation and Sweet met with him to show him the area and

after that, they set up a prearranged date which would be

suitable for the hit man to arrive and commit the murder.

Further, Sweet indicated that on the day of the murder, Mrs.

Maxcy left the doors unlocked to the house and Etter and

Kelley drove to a shopping center parking lot, Sebring,

Florida, where Sweet met them and drove them to the Maxcy

house and dropped them to await Maxcy's arrival. At the time

he dropped them at the house, they were in possession of a

bag containing several knives and pistol's [sic] and after they

were through with the assignment, they were scheduled to

drive the victim's vehicle back to the shopping center where

he had left their vehicle after he returned from the victim's

house.

APPENDIX A - 76a

The district court, in concluding that the Mitchell report

constituted exculpatory evidence, relied on the following

passage in the report regarding Director Armistead's

telephone conversation with Mitchell: “Mr. Armistead

emphasized that Major Regan had indicated that Sweet was

willing to testify in behalf of the State of Florida, providing

he could be granted immunity in the 1966 case." The district

After the killing, Mrs. Maxcy took the money out of a trust

account from an Orlando Bank to furnish to Sweet to be

delivered to Walter Bennett in Massachusetts to pay the

balance of the $ 20,000 payment.

A few months after the incident, Von Etter's body was found

in the trunk of a[n] automobile in the Boston, Massachusetts,

area, and also Sweet indicated that Walter Bennett and his

brother were also missing from the area, and all intelligence

revealed that they were both killed.

Sweet emphasized that he had known William Kelley a

number of years, but did not see him for 3 years after the

killing and advised that Kelley had been involved in the

rackets associated closely with organized crime associates in

the Boston, Massachusetts, area for many years. Sweet

further indicated, that Kelley had recapped the scene of

killing . . . Maxcy, and he advised that they had thrown a

sheet over Maxcy's head when he arrived in his house and

stabbed him four (4) times. The [sic] indicated Maxcy was a

powerful man and they had to shoot him. Further, Mr. Sweet

emphasized that Kelley had been continually involved in

criminal activities and was suspected [to be] involved in

several unsolved homicides, but had not been charged. Mr.

Sweet emphasized that he had voluntarily come forth to the

Massachusetts State Police and was agreeable to provide

information pertaining to Kelley's current activities and also

had agreed to testify against him. Sweet advised that he was

agreeable to testify for the State of Florida, in connection{}

with the . . . Maxcy homicide if the State proceeded with

charging William Kelley with the homicide.

APPENDIX A - 77a

court found this passage “vastly at odds with the state's

representation [to the jury in closing argument] at the trial."

Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2002). "During

the State's closing argument, Pickard argued to the jury that

Sweet did not have to give Kelley to the authorities in order to

get immunity. However, it is clear from the withheld report

that Sweet was willing to testify if he could be granted

immunity.” Id.

It is obvious to us that the district court was confusing the

immunity granted Sweet in Florida with the immunity granted

him in Massachusetts. The court also failed to realize that the

Mitchell report discloses what Sweet wanted for testifying

against Kelley, to-wit: Florida immunity. The report contains

not a word about Sweet obtaining immunity from a

Massachusetts court and what, if anything, he would have to

do to obtain that immunity. What the Mitchell report has to

say on the subject of immunity is that Sweet was willing to

testify in a case brought against Kelley in Florida if Florida

gave him immunity. No statement attributed to Major Regan

or anyone else in the Mitchell report yields a permissible

inference that Sweet was willing to testify in Florida only if

the Massachusetts court granted him transactional immunity

with respect to the crimes the Massachusetts grand jury was

investigating. Finally, nothing in the Mitchell report even

suggests, much less establishes circumstantially, that

Pickard's comment to the jury--that Sweet did not have to

agree to testify against Kelley in Florida to gain immunity in

Massachusetts--was a lie.“ To the contrary, the record at hand

leads inexorably to the fact that Pickard told the truth.

“ The Mitchell report indicates that the Massachusetts grand

jury was conducting a “major multi jurisdictional investigation

involving organized crime activities in the State of Massachusetts.”

The grand jury apparently considered both Sweet and Kelley as

suspects. Under the immunity the Massachusetts court granted

Sweet, he might be asked questions that would implicate Kelley. If

he refused, the court could hold him in civil contempt--whether or

APPENDIX A - 78a

We move then to the district court's finding that the

immunity order and the Mitchell report, if considered

together, contained exculpatory evidence. The district court

was led to this finding because the Massachusetts court

granted Sweet immunity on March 13, 1981, the day after the

Florida officials interviewed Sweet. The court's finding

necessarily implies that there was a connection between the

grant of immunity and the interview. In the district court's

mind, the connection was this: the Massachusetts court was

not going to grant Sweet immunity unless the Florida officials

reported that Sweet had given them what they needed. In

other words, the Massachusetts court was prepared to deprive

the grand jury of Sweet's testimony about widespread

criminal activity in Massachusetts unless Sweet agreed to

testify against Kelley in Florida if the Highlands County

grand jury indicted Kelley for the Maxcy murder (which it

eventually did occur on December 16, 1981). Such an

implication strains credulity. Sweet was in protective custody

because those he could incriminate wanted him silenced. The

grand jury needed his testimony and asked the court to grant

him immunity. The notion that the court granted Sweet

immunity because some Florida officials in effect gave the

court the go-ahead sign is preposterous.

The Rule 3.850 court and, later, the Florida Supreme

Court also examined the Mitchell report and the immunity

order. The supreme court explicitly found that there was "no

evidence to support the inference that Sweet's Massachusetts

immunity was contingent upon his testimony in the

defendant's Florida trial." Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 758. As we

have shown at length, this state-court factfinding is more than

"fairly supported by the record." As such, it is entitled to our

deference. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S. Ct.

1769, 1771, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995) ("In habeas

not he had told the court, when it granted him immunity, that he

was willing to testify against Kelley.

APPENDIX A - 79a

proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state

courts are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside,

absent procedural error, only if they are 'not fairly supported

by the record.” (quoting pre-AEDPA 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(8))). Since the district court's implicit finding that

Sweet had to testify against Kelley in Florida to gain

immunity in Massachusetts cannot be squared with the

deference due to the state court's finding, we must reject it.

And as that finding crumbles, so too does the district court's

conclusion that Mitchell's report could have affected the result

of Kelley's trial.

Because the record cannot support the finding that Pickard

lied to the jury during the State's closing argument, it is clear

that information about Sweet's immunity was valuable only

for the purpose of impeaching Sweet's credibility as a witness.

It bears emphasis that Kelley's defense, despite its lack of the

immunity order and the Mitchell report, was neither deprived

of nor forwent any opportunities to discredit Sweet by

discussing the scope of his Massachusetts immunity. While

the application to the Massachusetts court for Sweet's

immunity and Sweet's resulting testimony were sealed,

Kelley's defense learned a great deal about Sweet's immunity

from the transcript of a Massachusetts criminal trial at which

Sweet testified at length. Jack Edmund used this transcript to

cross-examine Sweet thoroughly about his immunity in

Massachusetts. For example, Edmund succeeded in getting

Sweet to admit that he testified numerous times for Robert

Kane, an assistant district attorney for Bristol County. Sweet

went on to acknowledge that he received immunity for every

offense he discussed with Kane and other Massachusetts

prosecutors. Edmund then catalogued a litany of crimes for

which the Massachusetts court, in the order it entered on

March 13, 1981, had granted Sweet immunity. Among these,

Sweet admitted to receiving immunity for loan sharking,

hijacking, drug violations, larceny, arson, bribing a police

officer, participating as an intermediary in a bookkeeping

APPENDIX A - 80a

operation, making false reports to police officers, and

counterfeiting. Sweet also acknowledged that the state of

Massachusetts agreed not to prosecute him for his

involvement in "manag[ing]" prostitution, although he

quibbled as to whether a state court had given effect to the

understanding in a formal immunity order.

Edmund also cross-examined Sweet about his immunity

in Flonda:

Q: Mr. Sweet, you received immunity for

first degree murder in Florida, didn't you, sir?

That is the killing of Von Maxcy; nght? Is that a

fair statement?

A: Yes, sir.

Responding to subsequent questions, Sweet proceeded to

admit that he also received immunity for the perjury he

committed in both of his own Florida trials. The Mitchell

report's indication that Sweet wanted immunity in Florida in

exchange for testimony there could not have added to Sweet's

bald admissions regarding his Florida immunity.

Finally, despite the disadvantages Kelley's federal habeas

counsel claim Kelley suffered because the State failed to give

his trial attorneys copies of the immunity order and the

Mitchell report, his trial attorneys proved themselves readily

able to seize every opportunity to use information about

Sweet's immunity in Massachusetts and Florida in their first

and last closing arguments to the jury at the close of Kelley's

trial. In his opening argument, Kunstler lamented to the jury

that Sweet "comes down here and he gets immunity for

murder and perjury." Edmund, in his closing argument,

roughly paralleled Sweet's various immunities to

transgressions of the Ten Commandments:

APPENDIX A - 81a

[Sweet] has immunity for first degree

murder. Thou shalt not kill.

He has immunity for perjury in that first

degree murder trial. Thou shall not bear false

witness.

He has immunity for larceny. Thou shalt not

steal.

He wasn't prosecuted for adultery. Thou

shalt not commit adultery.

He won't be prosecuted for stealing Mrs.

Irene Maxcy away from her husband. Thou shalt

not covet thy neighbor's wife.

He will not be prosecuted for taking Von

Maxcy's estate money. Thou shalt not covet thy

neighbor's goods.

Nor will he be prosecuted for loan sharking.

Thou shalt not break thy neighbor's head.

He will not be prosecuted for breaking and

entering, nor shall he be prosecuted for the

prostitution, the narcotics, the bribery, the falsely

reporting a crime or counterfeiting.

Make your message to the State of Florida _

ring out loud and clear . . . prosecute him for

lying about that man [Kelley] and send [Sweet]

where he justly belongs.

APPENDIX A - 82a

At the end of the day, the defense counsel's purpose for

wanting to exploit Sweet's immunity arrangements was to

convince the jury that Sweet was a sullied witness. There can

be no doubt on this record that counsel succeeded without the

Massachusetts immunity order and the Mitchell report. If

introduced into evidence as part of Kelley's defense, these two

exhibits would have constituted, at best, cumulative evidence.

See Routley v. Singletary, 33 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.

_1994) (holding that no prejudice resulted from state's failure

to supply the defense with a witness's immunity agreement

and related documents where defense counsel alerted the jury

to the witness's immunity and potential bias through cross-

examination, rendering the disputed evidence no more than

"cumulative impeachment" of the witness). “At worst, the

exhibits--especially the Mitchell report--would have been

highly prejudicial to Kelley. Recall that the report revealed

that the Massachusetts grand jury was conducting a multi-

jurisdictional "investigation involving organized crime

activities in the State of Massachusetts," and that the State

Police wanted Kelley indicted for "a number of felonies."*

We do not hesitate to conclude that the State's withholding of

the immunity order and the Mitchell report did not violate the

Brady rule.

b. Transcript of John Sweet's First Tnal

The State Attorney in office at the time of Sweet's

prosecution, in 1967 and 1968, was Glenn Darty. The State

Attomey in office at the time of Kelley's prosecution in 1983,

— sixteen years later, was Quillian Yancey. Assistant State

|

*? We have not overlooked the possibility that defense counsel

would have chosen not to admit the Mitchell report into evidence,

electing instead to call Mitchell to the witness stand. Depending on

how far counsel opened the door on direct-examination, the State

might be able on cross to explore Kelley's criminal activities in

Massachusetts.

APPENDIX A - 83a

Attorney Harding Pickard handled Kelley's prosecution for

Yancey.

Prior to Kelley's first trial, defense counsel, recognizing

that Sweet would be the State's star witness, made a discovery

request that Pickard produce the transcripts of both of Sweet's

trials. Pickard turned over the transcript of Sweet's second

trial, the trial that resulted in Sweet's conviction. But he did

not produce the transcript of Sweet's first trial, which resulted

in a hung jury and a mistrial. He apparently thought that a

transcript had not been prepared.

In responding to Kelley's Rule 3.850 motion in January

1988, the Florida Attorney General's office, which represents

the State in Rule 3.850 proceedings in capital cases, produced

transcripts of portions of Sweet's first trial. The record does

not contain or even suggest the answer to the question of

whether State Attorney Yancey's office had the transcript of

Sweet's first trial in its possession at the time of Kelley's

discovery request. The answer, however, is not important.

The transcript is legally immaterial because Kelley's attorneys

had available to them during both of Kelley's trials the entire

transcript of Sweet's second trial, and that transcript contained

the essence of Sweet's testimony at his first trial.

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court

pointed to two pieces of information that were contained in

the first transcript but not the second. First, the undisclosed

transcript shows that Sweet testified about Irene Maxcy's

sexual deviance, including allegations that she engaged in

bestiality. Although Irene Maxcy did not testify at Kelley's

trial, Kelley's Rule 3.850 counsel posited--and federal habeas

counsel do so now--that this testimony about her would have

been valuable in impeaching Sweet. This _ testimony

demonstrates that Sweet was willing to testify to anything that

would further his interests.

What Sweet said about Irene Maxcy's sexual deviancy is

immaterial primarily because the Florida Supreme Court, in

APPENDIX A - 84a

reviewing the Rule 3.850 court's denial of relief, concluded

that evidence of her alleged deviancy would not have been

admissible at Kelley's trial. Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 757. Thus,

its unavailability could not have affected the result of the case

so as to create prejudice. A reasonable probability of a

different result is possible only if the suppressed information

is itself admissible evidence or would have led to admissible

evidence. Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1044 (1994).

Furthermore, the Rule 3.850 court explicitly found that

Kelley's. "deferise counsel wiere] aware of the allegations

concerning Mrs. Maxcy." Kelley, 569 So. 2d at 757. Again,

we must defer to this finding of fact because the record

supports it. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.“

Both of Kelley's defense attorney's indicated some knowledge

of these allegations at the Rule 3.850 hearing. Finally, this

highly inflammatory testimony about Irene Maxcy, who did

not testify at Kelley's trial, could not have been more useful to

show Sweet's willingness to lie at trial than Sweet's own,

unequivocal testimony that he committed perjury repeatedly

in both of his trials.** Armed with this admission, defense

““ Moreover, - nothing in the federal habeas proceeding

contradicts the finding.

** At Kelley's second trial, for example, Sweet testified as

follows on cross-examination:

Q: I am talking about the number of lies. Would they be in

the hundreds of lies that you have told under oath, Mr.

Sweet?

A: Well, it would be both trials. I'm sure it was--

Q: It was question after question after question in your first

trial that you lied about, wasn't there, sir?

-A: Yes, sir.

APPENDIX A - 85a

counsel had little to gain by exploiting the perverted

allegations in Sweet's first trial transcript.

Second, the undisclosed first-trial transcript reveals that

the jury heard recorded phone conversations between Sweet

and Irene Maxcy. During these conversations, Sweet stated

that he did not know anyone named "William Kelley." The

transcript also reveals that Sweet testified that he believed

Irene Maxcy's assurances that she was not tape recording their

conversations.

Sweet's denial of knowing Kelley might seem critical in a

vacuum, but the force of that denial is eroded almost entirely

by Sweet's admission that, after the murder, he routinely

denied any knowledge of or involvement with Kelley. For

instance, at Kelley's second trial, Edmund elicited the

following testimony from Sweet on cross-examination:

Q: During your first trial you denied

knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?

Q: And you were under oath?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you raised your hand to swear to God to tell the truth,

the whole truth, just like you did today?

A: Yes.

Q: And you lied?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You lied to save your life?

A: Yes, sir.

APPENDIX A - 86a

A: I did.

Q: When you were talking to the

investigators prior to your first trial, you denied

knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?

A: I did.

Q: During you second tral you denied

knowing Bill Kelley, didn't you?

A: I did.

Q: When Bill Kelley beat you up and you

went to the hospital, you even lied to the hospital

about how it happened, didn't you?

A: I did.

Q: Could you estimate for this Jury how

many lies you have told under oath, sir, over the

period of the last seventeen and a half or eighteen

years?

A: Well, since I have known Bill Kelley, any

involvement there, I have lied about knowing the

man.

APPENDIX A - 87a

Sweet's recorded conversations with Irene Maxcy

transpired after the murder, when Sweet, according to his own

testimony, had commenced lying about knowing Kelley. The

phone conversations simply corroborate Sweet's testimony

about this pattern of denial.

Even without a transcript of the testimony Sweet gave at

his first trial, defense counsel were able to take advantage of

Sweet's specific admission that he had denied knowing

Kelley. For example, in his opening argument to the jury,

Kunstler said,

[John Sweet] committed perjury twice down

here. He took the same oath. He is saying to you,

believe me now. I am being good now. I am

going to tell you all the truth. But he told two

other juries total lies. He told them he had

nothing to do with the murder, he knew nothing

about it, he didn't know Kelley.

Consequently, there can be no reasonable probability that

the availability of a transcript of Sweet's first-trial testimony

could have affected the outcome of Kelley's trial.

c. Roma Trulock Report

Kaye Carter lived at the Daytona Inn Motel at the time of

the murder; her parents were the motel's managers. The

prosecution theorized that both of triggermen, Kelley and

Von Etter, roomed at the Daytona Inn Motel before driving

down to Sebring to murder Maxcy. In fact, the motel's records

from that time reflect guests registered as "Mr. and Mrs.

William Kelley." Carter, who was only seventeen when the

murder occurred, testified that she met Von Etter, the man

registered as Kelley, and two females traveling with the men.

Carter claims she had dinner with Kelley and the others on

October 3, 1966, the very evening Maxcy was slain. Through

APPENDIX A - 88a

this association, Carter became familiar with Kelley's

appearance.

Special Agent Roma Trulock of the FDLE interviewed

Carter on March 17, 1967 and obtained a description of the

man Carter knew as Kelley at the motel. Trulock then

summarized Carter's one-time description of Kelley in two

different investigative reports: one dated March 17, 1967, the

second dated March 18, 1967. Although defense counsel

acquired Trulock's first report, the State never produced the

second the report.

The district court found that the "suppression of the

[second] report violated Kelley's constitution [sic] right and

prejudiced his defense. " Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1366

(S.D. Fla. 2002). In the court's view, distinctions in Trulock's

reports regarding Carter's description of Kelley rendered both

reports material to Kelley's defense. The court compared the

documents as follows: According to Trulock's first report,

which was dated March 17, 1967 and was disclosed to the

defense, Carter described the person she knew as Kelley "as

being about 40, 6' to 6' 2" tall, medium build, dark hair, (kind

of curly) with a deep husky voice"; according to Trulock's

second report, which was dated March 18, 1967 and was not

disclosed to the defense, Carter described Kelley "as being

about 40, 6' medium build, dark hair, kind of curly, husky

voice." Additionally, the second report, but not the first,

contains Trulock's following reflection about Carter's

identification: "This picture of William Harold Kelley looks

something like him although she is sure that he was older than

the 26 years on his description.” Id. at 1365.

The district court offered three reasons why the second

report was materially exculpatory, even though the defense

had the first report. First, it argued, the two-inch height

discrepancy between the reports was critical because Kelley,

in fact, stood at about 6' 5". Second, the notation that Carter

was "sure" that Kelley was older than twenty-six was material

because Kelley was only twenty-three on the night of the

APPENDIX A - 89a

murder. And third, the notation that Carter thought the picture

presented by Trulock looked "something like" Kelley

revealed her uncertainty and, perhaps, constituted a negative

identification.

To be sure, the defense was entitled to at least one of

these reports. Both reflect similar descriptions by Carter that

differ considerably from Kelley's actual appearance at the

time of the murder. Ostensibly, Kelley was twenty-three and

youthful in appearance. He had straight blond hair and stood

well over 6'. Both of Trulock's reports suggest that Carter

thought the man identified as Kelley at the motel was shorter,

much older, and had dark curly hair.

This conflicting description was important to Kelley's

defense, and counsel ensured that the jury knew that. As

noted above, defense counsel had the benefit of delivering the

first and last closing arguments to the jury because they

elected not to present a case. In the first argument, Kunstler

cast Carter as a truly objective witness, one who has

"absolutely nothing to gain or lose by this case." He

emphasized that the State never asked Carter to identify

Kelley at trial, and he argued that at least some aspects of

Kelley's appearance, such. as his height, should not have

changed so much over the years since the murder that Carter

should have been unable do so if the defendant Keiley and the

man Daytona Inn Motel were in fact one in the same. Defense

counsel underscored these troubling inconsistencies time and

again at Kelley's trial. "You have to decide whether the man

having the name William Kelley," Kunstler reasoned to the

jury, "Was a twenty-three year old .. . six foot six man with

blondish hair or a forty-year-old man with medium build and

dark curly hair and four inches shorter than Mr. Kelley is.

That testimony is very significant." In his closing argument,

Edmund poignantly directed Kelley to stand so that the jury

could observe him. "I'll ask him to stand up," Edmund

explained, "because the man who registered into the Daytona

Beach Inn over there was a man who has been described by

APPENDIX A

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Appendix — Kelley v. Crosby · 545 U.S. 1149 | Frix