Reply Brief for Respondent — Powers-Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OcTOBER TERM, 1930
No. 3
POWERS-KENNEDY CONTRACTING CORPORA- °
TION and ANTHONY G. FLECK
Defendants-Petitioners
Vv.
CONCRETE MIXING AND CONVEYING COMPANY
Plaintiff-Respondent
Respondent’s Reply to Supplemental Brief for
Petitioners on Reargument
’ STEPHEN J. Cox
¥ Lynn A. WILLIAMS
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
APPEAL PRINTING CO., 82 THAMES ST., NEW YORK CITY
SUBJECT INDEX.
PAGE
Alleged prior use in this case rejected on conflicting
WORE sa necncccusvvessssccene TTT IP TTT ite 2
Alleged prior use in Storrie case sustained on single
uncorroborated deposition only ............66. 2
Kespondent’s position that decision on prior use not
conclusive correct under authorities ............ 2
Decision in Storrie case contrary to “reasonabie
Ce OE cece veccesesnscéushesicseseadasse. 3
No corroboration or substantiation of Leake ceposi-
FOOD nv 0.0.6.6: 060.05 0:0 00.00560060056.590900006000008 1
Three documents referred to by Ninth C, C. A. do not
MUIIIIIID 5 0 0:00 60500006 606600600000080005860 1
Leake ex parte preliminary statement not evidence .. 1
Leake’s attorneys’ ex parte statement not evidence .. 1
Leake’s assignment to MeMichael’s attorney after
interference indicates MceMichael’s priority ..... 5
Leake admits no nozzle at outlet in 1905 experimental
UU hoc hnccen kee 6auncess buevettardhedecees 6
Leake not reluctant to testify against plaintiff ...... _ 7
Infringement. No question of fact before lower courts
GROG GS tO GHOTOUOR 6g cccccesvsececcevecuses 8
Construction of accused apparatus admitted both
CRRGD ccccccccccveccveseccccerecececeseveseees 8
Structure only involved in Storrie case ............. 8
Slug theory not relevant ............e.eeeees 9, 24, 25, 26
Merely an explanation of remarkable result ........ (id.)
Lower courts in Storrie case read into claims, elements
neither expressed nor implied .............. 9, 10, 26
Infringement in Storrie case question of law ........ 11
Alleged infringing structures in both cases substan-
Se We GUS ova ce dcciscnsipesdcesseeecneses 11,13
Patent for pioneer invention .........cccceseeveses 13
No prior device involved its principle .......... 14, 15, 22
ee a
Deering v. Winona Works, 155 U. S. 286, 300 ........
ii INDEX
PAGE
Went into universal use and supplanted all other
SOURED 6 6 6 6b eeec cde Nec ieesestesucuseceuseees 5
Ninth C. C. A. failed to appreciate true nature and im-
DOUGRMSS GE TUVOUNEEER co cccccccccvescvecsecsves 15
Prior devices all lacked vital feature of McMichael . 16
meg British 1875 and 1885 patents ........... 16, 17
UTE Bic. DUPED cree ccccrccccccevseecees 18, 19
Kolsche German EE EE Sdcccecevcesesseuevers 19)
Ge NED bcc ccedcccccodcssceceessceveseceess 2)
POE MES n-b.v 0-00 de sievecccceceucesescecseceees 2)
WED TEE: hho rebcc eve dccecedécbeceseoccencees 21
Sickels and Butler patents ..............05005. ccc Om
Canniff and Mellvrid patents .................. ccc
McCormick recollection testimony after thirty years
SED chaWibhedihdedesbadadeecenedesseveerts 21
Difference between McMichael and all prior devices.
SEE veceuurecedeasewsswavaccersaneséeess 22
Invention of patent has always been the same ...... 2:3
Patentee has right to enlarge specification and claims
while application is pending .................. 2:
MeMichael patent based on original application ..... 21
Supplemental oath removes all question ........... 2!
No attempt to vary meaning of patent .............. 21
No variation necessary to cover accused devices fully 26
Solid stream delivery in both infringing devices .. .25, 26
“Nose of wax” decision no application here ........ 27
FPPC Pee OL TUTTI TTT TT Tri eT 27
Velocity nozzle the most vital element .............. 28
Velocity nozzle fully described in specification ...... 28
INDEX oF CASES.
Adamson »v. Gilliland, 242 U. S, 350; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep.
PUES BOE. bxcveancvcdeuncece sees ctcebesesixeeess 2
Cleveland Foundry Co. v. Detroit (C. C. A. 6th), 131
Oe 8 Tee ee eee Peer err 2"
Davis v. Schwartz, 156 U. S. 631; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. 2
— ee
INDEX ' iil
PAGE
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220
ie ee GP We hea cab nus see eedcectcsecestechus 23
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
Be ie Ob OP See ciunnesceensnasanepsaescedetess 3
General Electric Co, v. O. R. Mallory Co. (C. C. A.
MUG, Ge TOG, BE GED cccicccccccvccccscccces 6
Overland v. Packard, 274 U. S. 417; L. Ed. 1131 .... 23
Permutit Co. v. Harvey Laundry Co. (C. C. A. 9th),
UI I a as a ais lg a oe a aot a 18
Permutit Co. v. Wadham (C. C. A. 6th), 13 Fed. (2d)
See Ge wieuséweciesectenséeeedilendewecienuaes 18
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U. S.; 74 L.
Ed. (Advance Opinions Nov. 1, 1929, Decided
es SUE bls Danked 000s Cécuntseccaciknass 3, 10
Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516 ..............05. 18
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Herman Cramer, 192 U. S. 265, 275;
de bb MERUTETETOTEL EET OCT T ET PET eee 3,11
T. H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings
ly Se re. a NG nde diaavhbc ceecccceiecst 3
Western v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471; 73 C. C. A. 587.. 3
Westinghouse v. Metropolitan (C. C. A. 2nd), 290
RE a ee eye ad 23
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
POWERS-KENNEDY CONTRACTING CORPORA-
TION and ANTHONY G. FLECK,
Defendants-Petitioners, No. 3.
v. OCTOBER TERM,
1930.
CONCRETE MIXING AND CONVEYING
CoMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
RESPONDENT’S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ON
REARGUMENT.
The issues before the court are fully discussed in re-
spondent’s main brief herein (formerly No. 501, Oct.
Term, 1928), to which the court is referred for a full pres-
entation of respondent’s case. This supplemental brief
is limited to the questions presented in petitioners’ sup-
plemental brief, filed October, 1930.
The petitioners, evidently feeling that the facts in their
case are not adequately presented in their main brief, and
that these facts are not sufficient to support their conten-
tions, have filed a supplemental brief setting forth new
arguments presenting facts chiefly found in the record
of the companion case (No. 4, formerly No. 528, Oct. Term,
1928). The following is therefore a reply thereto.
ctyppeere fs >
2
I.
The alleged prior use in this case was rejected by
the trial court on conflicting oral evidence introduced
in open court.
The alleged prior use in the companion or
““Storrie” case was accepted by the trial court on a
single uncorroborated and unsubstantiated deposi-
tion only, taken before the trial out of court, and this
deposition concedes that the alleged prior use lacked
the vital and essential jet at the outlet of the patent
in suit.
The decision of the trial courtin the present case, who
saw the witnesseQ&and judged their character and credi-
bility, is therefor@conclusive.
The decision of the trial court in the companion case,
who did not see the witness and had no opportunity to
judge his character or credibility, and overlooked the
vital defect in that deposition, is inconclusive and should
be reversed.
This court is as well able to judge the weight and sufli-
ciency of that deposition as was the trial court.
There is, therefore, no inconsistency in respondent’s
position that as to the alleged prior use in the present
case, the finding of the trial court is conclusive, whereas
the finding of the trial court in the other case is not
conclusive, byt on the contrary may clearly be found
erroneous.
Both positions are fully supported by the authorities.
Thus the respondent’s position in this case is supported
by such decisions as—
Adamson y. Gilliland, 242 U. S. 350; 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 169, 171;
Davis v. Schwartz, 156 U. S. 631; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
237,
and other authorities.
3
And the respondent’s (Petitioners there) position in the
other case is supported by such authorities as—
Eibel Process Co. y. Minnesota & Ontario Paper
io. 20 U.S. 4:
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Herman Cramer, 192 U. S. 265,
275; 24 Sup. Ct. 291;
Western v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471; 73 C..C. A.
587;
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. vy. Winters, 280 U. S.
; 74 L. Ed. (Advance Opinions, Nov. 1,
1929, Decided Oct. 14, 1929).
I (a).
Furthermore, the finding of the trial court in the
other (Storrie) case was contrary to the rule in this
court that a prior use to invalidate an issued patent
must be proved “by evidence so cogent as to leave
no reasonable doubt.”
Derring v. Winona Works, 155 U. S. 286, 300;
T. H. Symington Co. y. National Malleable Cast-
ings Co., 250 U. S. 383, 386;
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper
Co., 261 U. S. 45, 60.
The single deposition in the present case was not only
purely recollection of the witness who gave it—after a
lapse of more than twenty-two years—and unsubstan-
tiated by any contemporaneous record or other tangible
thing, but contains a frank admission by that witness (R.
998, Slorrie case) that the experimental apparatus had no
“air on the bottom,” the vital and essential feature of the
patent in suit and its claims.
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Te =
PNT SE me iS NR BRS He
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ba
i (b).
There was no corroboration or substantiation of
the Leake prior use deposition.
The three documents referred to by the courts in the
Ninth Circuit (see Op., Storrie R. 669) all originated years
after Leake’s alleged prior use and more than a year afler
McMichael had made a full and complete reduction to
practice of his invention by filing his application for the
patent in suit (Jan. 14, 1907), which was approximately
nine months before Leake filed his application (Oct. 7,
1907, Id., Exbt. Bk., 454 and 332). |
These documents and the reasons for their utter lack
of value are as follows:
1. Leake’s preliminary statement in the «interference
with one Darley (/d. 582) involving his application which
was also in interference with McMichael.
This was an ex parte statement made in 1909, more
than fwo years after McMichael’s application for the pat-
ent, and nearly four years after the alleged prior use, and
was never substantiated in the interference, which was
decided against Leake and in favor of McMichael as the
true and prior inventor (Jan. 29, 1910, Jd. 405). The de-
cision was accepted by Leake, who thereupon cancelled
the claims which were in the interference—and all claim
to the present invention (/d. 409-10)—and thereafter con-
tented himself with claiming certain relatively unimpor-
tant details of his apparatus which were additions to or
alleged refinements of the basic apparatus of the patent
in suit (see Leake pat. Jd. 455).
2. An ex parte statement by Leake’s attorneys made
during the prosecution of his application, and in 1908,
that Leake had “successfully moved concrete” by “air
pressure” and had “actually constructed several plants”
where it was done by the apparatus of his application
(/d. 368, 378).
This laudatory, unverified ex parte— and probably hear-
say—statement was made by Leake’s attorneys more than
a year after McMichael’s application and after Leake pre-
sumably had every opportunity to learn all about Me-
Michael’s invention. The statement does not say when
Leake did this, and even if true and supported by proof
would not even tend to show that Leake made anything
prior to McMichael’s application.
Leake himself admits that the apparatus made by him
for practical use was made after McMichael’s reduction
of the invention to practice in his application—*some-
time in 1907, or so” or in “07 or 08” (Storrie R. 997, 603-
4)—also that it was different from this earlier thing which
was “nothing but a crude machine” (/d. 586); had “noth-
ing automatic,” and differed from his later machine in
that the latter “takes air in on the bottom and top both”
(id. 598).
3. The assignment by Leake to McMichael’s attorney
of his appgation.
_ This was made December 2, 1910 (Storrie R. Exbt. Bk.
179), more than nine months after he lost the interfer-
ence to McMichael and actually relinquished all claims
to the present invention, conceding McMichael to be en-
titled to it as the prior inventor (/d. 109-10).
There was no understanding or agreement leading up
la this, and the reason for the purchase was obviously
that Leake showed in his applicationsome later additions
or “improvements” which could be used in connection
with the McMichael invention, including duplex charging
hoppers, and agitators.
And at the time of the assignment there was no claim
in the Leake application—nor has there ever been since
Which conflicted with MeMichael’s claims to the invention
here involved.
This document, instead of being “strongly suggestive of
the inference that McMichael recognized the priority of
pce >
1 Sts PAPO RATER ITI MO 50 —
Leake’s invention,” supports an inference to the contrary.
It indicates that McMichael’s interests were in control of
both applications, and in position to issue a patent with
broad claims to the invention on either application to
themselves. The fact that they chose to issue the broad
patent on MecMichael’s application, tndicales that they
Anew McMichael to be the prior tnventor.
McMichael died prior to 1925 (Ulen R., Kirkland dep.,
Exbt. D, QU6, p. 56); and to sustain an attempt to destroy
his adjudged prior inventorship by such documents as
these, after a lapse of twenty-two years, is, we submit
with respect, repugnant “to every Anglo-American legal
concept” of evidence.
General Electric Co. vy. P. R. Mallory Co. (C. C. A.
2nd), 298 Fed. 579, 585.
As the court also said in that case, in similar circum-
stances, such a thing is not only “repugnant” “to every
Anglo-American legal concept,” but something so unfair
that anything more unfair cannot be imagined (p. 586).
I (c).
But, as we have seen, Leake himself in his depo-
sition admitted frankly and freely (R. 598, etc.), that
his “crude,” experimental thing, which he dismantled
after he had made a test with it (R. 586), had no
“air on the bottom” (R. 598), and that it therefore
lacked the vital and indispensable feature of the
present invention.
Comparing it with the machine made by him after Me-
Michael had occupied the field, he says, referring to this
later machine, that it was not the same in principle. And
answering a very improper question by which it was at-
tempted to lead him into saying that it was, he says:
“Oh, no. This (the second Leake machine made
long after McMichael’s filing date) takes air on the
bottom and top both,”
and further that with the earlier apparatus:
“All I did was push the air right out through.”
The sketch made by Leake to illustrate his early experi-
mental apparatus also shows no nozzle at the outlet. See
Defendant’s Chicago Exhibit 127 (Exbt. Bk., p. 694).
But had Leake attempted to say that the apparatus
tested by him in September, 1905 (R. 583), embodied the
invention of the patent in suit, it would have been com-
pletely overcome by Leake’s oath made more than two
years later, in 1907, and forming a part of his application
for patent (R., Exbt. Bk. 335), that it had not been pub-
licly used more than two years prior to his application.
But Leake expressly admits that the crude thing tried
by him in 1905 at New Orleans and represented by his
sketch (Exbt. 127) was used “only as an experiment”
(R. 602), and was a “little temporary” affair (R. 604)
which he tore down after he had used (R. 586).
Nor was Mr. Leake at all reluctant to testify against the
present owners of his patent, to whose assignor he as-
signed many years ago. He shows a willingness to testify
fully to the facts, as he recalls them, after a lapse of
twenty-two years, but cannot be induced to make state-
ments which he knows to be untrue, or testify to facts
which are beyond his recollection,
Leake does not even know who owns his patent
(R. 599).
And it is more reasonable to suppose that he was in-
clined to favor such a powerful interest as the defendant
in the other suit, the Great Western Power Company,
for whom he first made a deposition (R. 590) than the
unknown present owners of his application.
Pen
Fo Ree |
Sart feat oe
I (d).
On the matter of infringement there was no
question of fact before the lower courts in either
case, except as to the operation of the defendants’
apparatus.
In both cases the construction of the accused apparat cs
was admitted by the defendants (Powers-Kennedy, R.
292, 3, 4; Storrie R., Exbt. Bk. 78, 83-8, 683-4).
The illustration on page 78 of the Storrie case Exhibit
book is that of the patent granted to the maker of de-
fendants’ machine, Hackley, and is substantially the same
as his original drawing forming part of Exhibit 12 (p. 83)
which Hackley says shows the defendants’ apparatus
(R. 73-6). All these illustrations show the air inlets—17,
28", etc.—at the back of the vessel, and behind the mass
of concrete therein, and the air jets—14, 25*, etc.—at the
outlet of the vessel.
It is admitted that this Hackley patent does “illustrate
and describe” the defendants’ “Hackley” machine (Re-
spondents’ brief, Storrie case, p. 8).
Even the drawing submitted by defendants-respondents’
counsel on page 2 of his brief shows these same air inlets
—t and 1—at the back of the vessel and at the front
outlet, respectively, and the District Court in the Ninth
Circuit finds these elements present (Op., KR. 614).
In the Second Circuit the courts held, on conflicting
evidence, that the defendants’ apparatus was operated by
them in such a manner as to practice the method or proc-
ess specified in certain claims of the patent. They also
held that the admitted structure infringed the structural
claims; and as to.this there can be no question since the
defendants’ structure corresponds to every feature of the
machine showry in the patent itself.
In the Ninth Circuit only the structural claims were
involved. The controversy as to the particular way in
_—_
9
which the patented device and the accused device
operated, was therefore somewhat beside the mark. It
arose out of the plaintiff's evidence tending to show that
the result accomplished was due to a peculiar action
inside the apparatus, known as the slug movement, which
evidence was controverted by the defendants. But as the
court in the Second Circuit noted this is not material
(Opinion, Powers-Kennedy R. 346-7), saying further:
“To us the dispute seems irrelevant. The patent
says nothing which commits the patentee to the slug
method of operation.”
Therefore, the holding of non-infringement in the Ninth
Circuit was due to the fact that the court held the patent
limited to something not described, shown or claimed
therein, and which the court in the Second Circuit holds—
and rightly—is irrelevant, because the patent is in no way
limited thereto.
The court in the Ninth Circuit, therefore, held, that the
admitted apparatus did not infringe the claims for that
apparatus because it did not produce the irrelevant slug
action. This was a decision of law. It was an interpreta-
tion of the patent as a matter of law.
The court in the Ninth Circuit notes that Hackley him-
self found the operation of the two machines the same.
They say:
“He testified to having had experience in using
appellant's combination and that in so using ** the
concrete issued in a continuous stream and that in
the use of his own device the concrete came out in
a continuous stream mixed with air * * *”
(Opinion).
They further say, at the end of the Opinion:
“We think that the slug theory, when all is said,
has no bearing upon the merits of the present con-
troversy, for whether or not the appellant's appa-
Perv? foe
£' 2 oreo
10
ratus operated to deliver concrete in slugs or sec-
tions, it is very clear that the Hackley apparatus op-
erates in delivering a constant stream of concrete,
interrupted only so far as it is interfered with by
the air which accompanies it through the dis-
charge pipe.”
But, on what ground they found non-infringement by
the apparatus of the apparatus claims which clearly read
upon it, they do not say. They merely atlirm the decision
of the lower court (R. 621) which found non-infringement
because the defendants’ apparatus did not have the fol-
lowing four unspecified elements:
1. “Upright cylindrical hopper bottomed container,”
2. “The U bend,”
3. “Upper air save some incidental back pressure,”
i
“Discharge slug fashion as claimed is the inven-
tion of McMichael,”.
None of these elements is found in the claims of the
patent, and none of them is essential to the embodiment
of the invention.
The patent does not even call for “upper air.” The
method or process claims do call for “air behind the mass
of material” (Claim 1); but this may be upper or rear or
in any other place, so long as it is behind the mass. How-
ever, these method or process claims were not involved in
the Storrie suit. But the “incidental back pressure” fs and
must be a pressure behind the mass.
It is evident, therefore, that the courts in the Ninth
Circuit held non-infringement, not because of any ques-
tior of involving features of the patented invention, but
because of an error of law in interpreting that invention
to include something not included and not intended to
be included even in the method claims.
This brings the present case clearly under the language
of the decision of this court in
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters (supra),
11
in which it was said:
“Furthermore, pon the undisputed evidence the
question of infringement resolves itself in each case
into one of law, depending upon a comparison be-
tween the structure disclosed on the face of the pat-
ent and the device shown in the Dent latch, and the
correct application thereto of the rule of equival-
ency, Compare Singer Mfg. Co. v, Cramer, 192
U. S. 265, 275, 48 L. Ed. 437, 443, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep.
291.”
I (e).
That the two alleged infringing structures are sub-
stantially the same, and both substantially the same
as that of the patent, will be apparent from a mere
comparison of them.
The illustrative embodiment shown in the patent is an
upright or vertical chamber or vessel, and the embodi-
ment of the defendants in the Storrie case is a horizontal
chamber or vessel, like the infringing device in the Ulen
suit (12 Fed. {2nd} 929-931), while the defendant’s em-
bodiment in the Powers-Kennedy case is a vertical or up-
right vessel.
(See sheet of drawings, p. 76, Petitioner's Storrie
case, brief.)
It will be apparent, however, that if the device of the
patent is laid on its side, or the Storrie (Hackley) appa-
ratus placed in upright position with its outlet at the bot-
tom, the two are substantially identical in all essentials.
The only difference in the operation due to the change
of position is that when the chamber is horizontal some
means must be provided for moving the mass of materials
toward the outlet, this being done by gravity when the
chamber is upright. In the Ulen infringing apparatus,
this was done by means of a plunger which pushed the
SONG ST SA eae
12
material forward toward the outlet. In the Storrie appa-
ratus, it is done by air pipes in the bottom of the vessel
located between the rear end and the outlet. In the hori-
zontal machine made by the licensee (fhe Ransome Com-
pany) under the patent, this is done by a screw conveyor
(Storrie R., Exbt. Bk. 102-105).
But whether the vessel is upright or horizontal, the
construction and arrangement of the air pressure devices
and the vessel, and the result, are the same.
Thus, in the patent, air pressure behind the mass is sup-
plied by the upper air pipe (8) near the head of the ves-
sel, and the velocity nozzle at the outlet (10) is the pipe
extending into the neck of the vessel. In the Storrie de-
vice the air pressure behind the mass is supplied by the
pipe entering through the head at its lower part, and the
velocity nozzle is the pipe extending into the neck of the
vessel. The air pipes in the bottom of the vessel will also
supply air pressure behind the mass, but would not alone
and without the air pipe in the head or back end move all
the concrete forward to the outlet. |
In the Powers-Kennedy apparatus, pressure behind the
mass was first supplied by the pipes at the top of the ves-
sel, and, later, by air exploding upward from the outlet
nozzle and being trapped in the top, and the velocity
nozzle at the outlet is the pipe entering the neck of the
vessel where it Joins the conveying conduit.
Only a part of the patent’s claims are limited to any
location of the air inlet for supplying air behind the mass.
The sealed chamber will always trap compressed air be-
hind this mass, no matter where the air inlet is located,
and the velocity nozzle at the outlet will supply this, if it
is not supplied by a separate pipe.
Accordingly, the courts in the Second Circuit found that
the defendants infringed all the claims when they used the
top inlet and only a part of them when they used the
:
13
nozzle at the outlet only (Opinion, R. 328, and [D. C.] R.
327). It was admitted that there was pressure behind the
mass in the Powers-Kennedy device when only the nozzle
at the outlet was used, and the court so held (ld. R. 347—
bottom).
In all of the claims which are involved in both suits
the “chamber for containing concrete forming materials”
with an outlet and a “compressed air inlet pipe leading
through the chamber wall and terminating” “near the
opening into the conduit,” or their equivalents (Claim 2)
with means for supplying compressed air “back of [or
“behind” ] the mass of materials” (Claims 4 and 17) or its
equivalent, are essentials. These essentials are found in
the apparatus of both defendants. Therefore no different
interpretation of the claims is necessary to bring these
two devices within their proper and intended scope and
meaning.
The vital and essential element in all the claims com-
mon to both suits, is the nozzle at the outlet cooperating
with the pressure behind the mass. This is fully em-
bodied in the apparatus of both defendants, and is not
found in the prior art. Therefore, both defendants have
appropriated the essence of the invention and the features
which distinguish it from all prior devices, and have
enabled it to convey concrete pneumatically, which these
prior devices were unable to do.
II.
The patent is for a pioneer invention.
No prior device ever conveyed concrete by compressed
air in any manner (Opinion, 2nd C. C. A., R. 344).
No prior device ever employed (‘static’) pressure
behind a mass of concrete in a chamber with (“velocity”)
pressure directed into the mass at the outlet of the
chamber.
ONS te OTe ee 7 RNA en MARE —
14
It was this combination of static and velocity pressure
that made the conveyance of concrete by air pressure
possible.
Apparently no prior inventor thought that the mass of
rocks filled in with mortar which constitutes concrete
(see Pat., p. 2, lines 100, et seq.) could be conveyed by air
pressure. The desirability of such a thing was realized
for at least thirty-five years before McMichael’s invention,
when Smith, in 1872, proposed to convey “concrete” tn
water, as a flutd (Smith Pats., Storrie R. 481-485), which,
of course, would have destroyed the concrete.
This mass of rocks intimately mixed with sand and
cement could not be blown by a blast of air, like sand,
grain and other finely divided substances, because it could
not be carried in an air current at any obtainable press-
ure, and would simply jam and plug the conduit after
the light fine material had been blown out of it, and if
this could have been done it would have unmixed the
concrete (Opinion D. C., Powers-Kennedy, R. 327).
Nor could this mass of rocks be forced through a con-
duit like a liquid, because it is, and must be, at least
90 per cent. solids and 55 per cent. rocks (Robinson,
Storrie R. 351; Powers-Kennedy Spec., R. 296; Kennedy
R. 206), and rocks wul not flow. aS
If any prior inventor ever thought of using a velocity
jet at the outlet of the vessel to cause this rocky mass to
shoot through the conveying conduit under the air press-
ure behind it (it would otherwise do nothing bet make
it jam and plug the pipe) he apparently did not think it
worth trying out. Even after McMichael did it engineers
would not believe it (Ulen R. 45).
It remained for McMichael to discover that this heavy,
rocky mass could be conveyed through a conduit by air
pressure by placing a velocity jet at the outlet of the ves-
sel to break up the mass and make it shoot through the
conveying conduit and to great distances and elevations
15
(see Respondents’ Main Brief, pp. 15-32, and Storrie R.
105-7).
His invention has accomplished a great work, has gone
into universal use, has made possible great enterprises
attended by the greatest difficulties, and under the most
adverse conditions (/d. pp. 32-36; Ulen Op., D. C., 12 Fed.
[2nd] 929, 931), and has supplanted all other methods
of tunnel lining (Storrie R. 101-3).
It is seldom that a patent has come-before this court
with such a record of accomplishment, preceded by such
an utter failure of accomplishment.
The courts in the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate this
record, and apparently failed to grasp the true nature of
the invention. They appear to have overlooked the very
essence of the invention, which resides in the duofold
pressure behind the mass and at the front of the mass.
At any rate, in comparing the patent with the prior art,
they ignored the critical character of the velocity nozzle
at the front of the mass and held the invention substan-
tialiy anticipated by apparatus in which this element was
entirely lacking.
Thus the court says in its opinion, referring to the Smith
machine, that it contained all the features of appellants’
patent “except the nozzle for admission of air near the
point of exit,” and in comparing it with the Duckham
patent, which also lacked this element or any suggestion
of it, that one of his pipes for the admission of compressed
air in the tank (nowhere near the outlet) was “localable
at the exit.”
As well might one say that Shakespeare’s play of Ham-
let was anticipated by an earlier play which had all the
characters “except the Prince of Denmark,” or that an
earlier play anticipated it because it could have portrayed
such a character as Shakespeare portrayed it. As well
might it be said that one who has located an oil well in
a widely extended territory, where others were drilling
cone ls
16
without success, is not entitled to the reward of his dis-
covery, because the drill holes of the others were “lo-
catable” in the same spot.
II (a).
That all the prior patents and practices lack this
vital and essential jet at the outlet of the pressure
chamber is sufficiently shown by the following brief
summary.
The Duckham British patents 4,400 of 1875 and 15,348
of 1885 (Storrie Exbt. Bk. 598, 603 and 611) propose to
discharge water and mud from the huge barge tank of a
dredge by putting air pressure on the tank and thus de-
positing it on the shore. No other means for discharging
is shown or described in the 1875 patent, but the sugges-
tion is made (/d. 601) that
“I prefer to inject compressed air (with or with-
out an admixture of water) supplied by force pump
or other means through a number of nozzles at the
bottom of the tank, said nozzles being pointed
towards the outlet.” ~~
But where located and how many feet from the outlet
is not stated. He says:
“By this means the particles are prevented from
settling, and are kept in suspension until the whole
is expelled from the tank. Compressed air may
moreover be admitted into the discharge pipe with
the same object.”
The 1885 patent, referring to the 1875 apparatus, says
that the discharge was
“assisted by compressed air and water injected at
the bottom of the tank for the purpose of agitating
the mud and preventing thick deposit” (/d. 608).
(All Italics in quotations ours.)
17
The purpose of the nozzles, therefore, was to agitate the
mud and prevent it from settling on the bottom. They
had no other function. If located at the outlet from the
tank into the discharge pipe in the form of nozzles, they
would have interfered with the discharge by blowing
through and breaking up the column of liquid, “escaping
through the discharge pipe and ‘arrying with it all the
liquid” (see Opinion, 9th C. C. A., 1887 article) mixed with
mud, leaving the heavier portions of the mixture behind.
The article referred to by the court in the Ninth Circuit
says, that blowing through clay or stiff mud by the pipes
in the bottom of the tank “was easily rectified by re-ar-
ranging and increasing the size of the large injection
nozzles.” This means that they were not velocity nozzles
at all, but compressed air inlets delivering a large volume
of air which would spread out and bubble up through the
mud,
That no such location or function as that of the patent
in suit was ever thought of, is shown by Duckham’s state-
ment (/d. 599, 601):
“To prevent the choking of the pipes a screen or
grating is provided through which the mud or spoil
passes before it enters the outlet pipe.”
This would, of course, break up the i-aterial and de-
stroy any jet action. Furthermore, a grating could not be
used with concrete, as it would cause the rocks to form
a complete dam, if they ever got that far.
The Duckham patents
1. Are for handling liquid in a column,
2. Contain no suggestion that concrete or sim-
ilar material can be handled in any manner by air
pressure.
3. Give no suggestion of a velocity nozzle located
at the outlet of the chamber into the conveying con-
duit, for any purpose.
SSP et eI Les ee ~ mr
18
4. Disclose a structure which differs greatly from
that of McMichael, and could not be used for
handling concrete at all.
5. Are old foreign patents without definite de-
scription of anything relating to the present inven-
tion, and are therefore irrelevant.
Permutit Co. vy. Harvey Laundry Co, (C. C. A. 9th),
279 Fed. 713, 718,
citing,
Seymour vy. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, and other au-
thorities.
Permulit Co. v. Wadham (C, GC. A. 6th), 138 Fed.
(2d) 454, 457.
The Smith U. S. patents of 1872 (Exbt. Bk., pp. 481 and
484) propose to use “a quantity of water equal to about
three-fifths of the entire mass of materials” (R. 481, Col.
2), or at least 37'% per cent. of water, so that “a liquid or
semi-liquid mass results which can be flowed through
pipes” (/d.), and to then force this liquid through a dis-
charge pipe by simple air pressure behind it. No velocity
nozzle or other nozzle located anywhere is suggested.
These Smith patents
.
1. Would so dilute the cement in the concrete
mixture as to render it worthless, since the maxi-
mum amount of liquid permissible is about 10 per
cent, (R. 591); and Smith proposed to use nearly
four times that amount.
2. Gave no hint or suggestion of the vital and in-
dispensable nozzle at the outlet from the chamber
into the conveying conduit, which has made the
patented invention a success, where all prior de-
vices were useless for conveying concrete or the
like.
3. Merely show that thirty-five years before Mc-
Michael the desirability of conveying concrete by
19
compressed air was realized, and that at that early
date it was proposed to ruin the concrete mixture
in order to do it.
4. Were mere paper patents which never con-
tributed anything to the public good.
5. Were for a liquid column apparatus not
usable for concrete, which is at least 90 per cent.
solids, and principally a mass of rocks.
‘The maker of the defendants’ (Storrie) apparatus,
Hackley, who knew all about the patented machines (R.
72, 91), after making a test with an alleged Smith appar-
atus and admitting that it failed to properly discharge the
rock (R. 434) finally concedes that it is not satisfactory,
because it does not have the jet at the outlet, and that he
uses the jet at the outlet for the reason that it gives
“a different and better action” (R. 435-6).
And this is the best that the biased witnesses could do,
in camera, with the Smith machine, at the instance of the
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, another alleged in-
fringer of the patent in suit (R. 468-4170).
It is obvious that the defendants are not using the
Smith apparatus, but are using the apparatus of the
patent in suit, and contesting this litigation, because the
present apparatus is operative and perfectly efficient,
whereas the Smith apparatus is worthless.
The Kolsche German patent of 1882 (Exbt. Bk. 182-b)
is for nothing but a kinetic air flotation device for “con-
veying slack (coal dust) sandy or granular material by
means of a current of air.” The material is dropped from
the bottom of the vessel in a thin stream into a large blast
of air rushing through a large conduit, and is carried
along in suspension. It has no nozzle or anything of the
sort at or near the outlet of the chamber, or anywhere
else, and could not be used for concrete or any similar
material in any way.
BAPTA we oe 0 : Sa TR ee ee ee] "Me ay
20)
It is an old foreign patent disclosing nothing relevant
to the present invention.
The Goldie patent 707,840 of 1902 (Storrie Exbt. Bk.
514) is for nothing but a crude impracticable apparatus
for blowing dry cement, or cement and sand, under rail-
road ties, by means of a jet of steam. The dry material
must first gravitale from a hopper down through a long
narrow pipe to the nozzle, and if the nozzle met with any
resistance, it would blow up through the top of the hopper
which is not sealed and has no air pressure in it.
The Goldie patents 576,128 and 9 (/d. 498 and ))
are crude predecessors of the later Goldie patent above
mentioned, and are for substantially the same impossible
scheme. In both of them, the dry material is contained
in-an open hopper, gravitates down into the small pipe
and is supposed to be blown under the railroad ties by
pressure supplied to this pipe by a small hand pump.
The Farnham patent 747,396 of 1903 (Ulen R. 3!7)
shows only a “sand-blast” apparatus, for producing a
blast of sand carried in a current of air, for cleaning and
other purposes. This is fully discussed in our main bricf
at pages 53-55,
The Farnham patent shows:
1. No jet or nozzle at the outlet but a suction
jet (11) at the bottom of a long, narrow pipe ex-
tending from the flat bottom of the vessel, and ob)-
structing the mouth of that pipe so as to project air
“across the mouth of the discharge-pipe 2” (Sjec.,
p. 1, lines 100, et seq.).
2. No cooperation between the pressure in the
tank and the suction jet or nozzle, since the sand
flows “by gravity” (/d. line 18) in a small stream
from the tank down to the point where it is acted
upon by the suction and blast of the nozzle and
blown through the small pipe leading to the work,
suspended in the air.
3. No nozzle of any description at or near the
outlet of the vessel.
21
4. And would have to be rearranged and re-
designed to convey concrete or the like, and with
the teachings of the McMichael patent in suit in
view,
The Warren patent 671,303 (/d. 650) is for a “mixer
for sand-blast apparatus,” and shows a hopper with a
small bottom discharge pipe through which materials
(loose sand, etc.) pass in a small stream from the hopper
to a chamber in a pipe through which a current of air
passes, where it is caught up by the air, “with which it
mingles and by which it is carried through the chamber
into the flexible tube M and discharged through the nozzle
QO” (Spec., p. 1, lines 63-71). It shows nothing not shown
in the Farnham patent. It does not even show a suction
nozzle, nor a nozzle of any kind.
The Sickels and Butler patents 99,360 and 660,946
(Storrie, Exbt. Bk. 514 and 654) are even less relevant
than the foregoing kinetic or air flotation patents.
The Canniff patent 873,345 and Mcllvrid patent
958,421 (It. 318 and 323) are merely for machines which
mix and discharge grout, a thin liquid composed of sand,
cement and water, which is forced in a liquid column
through pipes, like any other liquid. They also lack the
nozzle at the outlet of the chamber (they have no nozzle
at all) which is an indispensable element of the patent in
suit.
The wholly uncorroborated oral testimony of Mr, Me-
Cormick to the effect that he used air in an apparatus like
that of the Canniff patent to assist the discharge of the
liquid grout (Storrie R, 403-420), nearly thirty years be-
fore he testified, based as it is upon pure unaided recol-
lection, is unbelievable. The courts in the Ninth Circuit
evidently gave it no credence. Furthermore, it has been
sufliciently shown that the use of air at the outlet would
break up the column of liquid (McCormick never used
anything but grout) and make it ineffective for grouting.
RR >
22
McCormick's recollection as to date and the particular
character of the apparatus used by him with his “paint-
like grout” (/d. 415) has evidently been reconstructed
with the exigencies of the present situation in view,
From the foregoing it will be seen that all the prior
patents relied on by the defendants—except pump pat-
ents, which are entirely irrelevant-—belong to one of two
classes, viz.:
1. Patents for kinetic or air flotation devices
for handling light or finely divisible materials by
conveying them in suspension in a current of air,
and
2. Patents for apparatus for moving a column
of liquid by means of air pressure behind it;
And that neither of these could be used to convey con-
crete which is composed almost wholly of heavy cohesive
solids irtimately mixed and proportioned and the bulk
of which is broken rock or stones; and further,
That McMichael’s apparatus belongs to a third and
new class, which has no precedent in any art, the char-
acteristics of which are (1) a chamber in which solids
are maintained under pressure forcing them to the
contracted outlet of the chamber, and (2) a velocity
nozzle at the outlet of the chamber to the conduit directed
into the materials and into the outlet to shoot them
through the outlet and through the conduit in a mass or
masses to the point of application.
No pneumatic apparatus for conveying coarse, heavy
solids was known before McMichael’s invention.
aa
23
The invention of the patent is and always has
been the same from the filing of the application in
1907 up to the present date.
The criticism based on the alleged enlargement of the
invention has been overruled by the courts in the Second
Circuit no less than four times, viz:
by the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the
Ulen suit and by both courts again in this present suit.
It has no merit in fact or in law, and may be briefly an-
swered by the following summary:
1. The drawing of the patent is the drawing originally
filed in the application; not a line nor a letter has been
changed,
2. The original specification described that apparatus
and its method of operation with ample clearness and de-
tail to enable any one skilled in the art to make and use
them fully, and, in all their advantages, which is all that
the Patent Statute (U.S. R. S. 4888) requires.
4. The Patent Statute does not even require a full de-
scription in the application, but only in the patent as
linally issued.
1. A patentee has the absolute right to amplify the de-
scription of his invention while his application is pend-
ing, so long as it is fairly based upon his original discto-
sure, in the drawings or in the specification, or both.
Westinghouse vy. Metropolitan (C. C. A. 2nd), 290
Fed. 661;
Diamond Rubber Co. vy. Consolidated Tire Co.,
220 U. S. 428, 435;
Cleveland Foundry Co. vy. Detroit (C. C. A. 6th),
131 Fed, 853, 857;
Overland vy, Packard, 274 U. S. 417; 71 L. Ed.
1131.
weer
‘ .eerteo
21
» If the patentee wishes to depart from the original
disclosure of his application, while his application is
pending, he may do so, provided only that he files a
supplemental oath to the elfect that the invention was Put
published or used, ete., two years prior to his original
application, and this merely to satisfy the Patent Office
on that point, under Section 1892, of the Patent Statute.
This McMichael did (Ulen R. 251; Storrie R. 278), although
it was nol necessary, because the additional claims and
description were clearly based on the original disclosure.
6. Some of the claims in the patent are of substantially
the same scope as claim 3 of the original application, and
claim 3 of the application is substantially tdentical with
claim 2 of the patent. (See original claim 2, Storrie R.
201, Ulen BR. 202.) This claim is in both suits.
It is therefore apparent that the patent as issued is
for the original invention, supy orted by the original and
supplemental oath, and that the description and claims
added during the pendency of the application are prop-
erly in the patent.
(See also discussion this subject, pp. 36-47. Re-
spondent’s Brief, and decisions quoted.)
IV.
No attempt has been made to alter the patent or
change its meaning in any way since the patent was
granted and became a public document.
The slug theory of operation is not, and never was, a
part of the patent or any of its claims, but is an explana-
tion of the astonishing fact that the invention makes it
possible for a jet of air acting under the pressure behind
the mass and located at the critical point, to shoot tons
of rocks carefully mixed with sand, cement and a little
water, at express speed, thousands of feet and up to high
elevations, without disturbing the mixture of these
heterogeneous elements.
* It was hard in the beginning to make engineers believe
thet this could be done (Ulen R. 44), and the plaintil?,
therefore, thouglii that the court should be given its own
best explanation of the reasons for this remarkable per-
formance, This was appreciated by the District Judge,
in the Second Circuit, in the Ulen case, who referred to it
in his opinion (12 Fed. (2nd) 929), and whose decision
was endorsed by the Court of Appeals (Ud. 931).
The action is not kinetic or air flotation action, nor
liquid column action, such as prior devices employed for
finely divisible solids, such as sand, grain, etc., or liquids
such as mud, cement _as grout), etc., carried in water.
Even the testimony for both defendants in these cases
proves that. Their witnesses state that the concrete and
air come out in “a solid stream” (Powers-Kennedy R. 22,
Qs189-191), and although a considerable volume of air
necessarily discharges with the concrete, there are no
bubbles or entrained air mixed with the concrete (/d.).
This was also the finding of the court in the Storrie
case based on the testimony of the defendants’ witnesses
(see Wilkins, Storrie R. 446). The court said (Storrie R.
618):
“* * * that the concrete discharges in a con-
tinuous aerated or mixed stream of concrete and
air and not at all in any slug formation.”
(See also Opinion, 9th C. C. A., last page.)
The question, however, was not how the concrete was
discharged at the distant outlet of the conveying conduit,
but how it was charged from the chamber into the other
end of the conduit.
The slug theory is adhered to, in spite of the fact that
the courts in the Ninth Circuit have found against it, as
the only satisfactory explanation, of how a mass of solids,
* ERP ES PO Ee eer ann,
OR OTTERS FT IN ah EEO Rap we
EEE, lo
ows eres ee
26
principally rocks, can be conveyed by compressed air
through a pipe to distances up to approximately a mile,
smoothly, without disintegration, and without the inevi-
table plugging of the pipe at every step and on each new
discharge, which would otherwise be the ruinous result.
But, after all, the slug theory is merely a theory, and
has nothing to do with the interpretation of the patent
and its claims, which are not limited in any way or de-
pendent upon the correctness of that theory.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit,
after the decision of the District Court in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, said (Powers-Kennedy R. 344):
+o. *
nobody before McMichael had used a
pneumatic apparatus to transport concrete,”
and (Id. 346):
“To us the dispute seems irrelevant. The patent
says nothing which commits the patentee to the slug
method of operation.”
And again (/d. 347):
“But whether the concrete goes forward as we im-
agine, or in some other manner, there is no sulli-
cient reason to suppose that defendants’ machine
does not operate in the same manner as plaintiff's,
whatever that manner may be.”
The slug theory is therefore not an attempt to change
the patent or read anything into it, but merely a satisfy-
ing explanation of its remarkable performance.
Nor is any theory of operation necessary to apply the
claims to defendants’ device, which has all the elements
of these claims, and produces precisely the same result.
The courts in the Ninth Circuit have not found to the
contrary, but, as we have seen, have without warrant read
a
27
into them the slug theory, and unimportant structural de-
tails, in order to find non-infringement.
(lor further discussion of these questions see Re-
spondent’s Main Brief, pp. 97-101, and, on in-
fringement, pp. 63-96.)
The “nose of wax’’ decision (White vy. Dunbar, 119 U.S.
47) involved a reissue patent in which the language of
the claims had actually been changed to change the nature
of the original invention. It has no application here.
The Kirkland Article, written by a person who was
not connected with the owners of the patent, but merely
with a licensee at that time, is wholly irrelevant and in-
competent, and was ignored by the court, after proper
objection (Powers-Kennedy R. 104). The statement that
Mr. Kirkland was then Chief Engineer for the patentee or
was connected with the patentee, is erroneous (Id.).
This article was published more than three years after
the patent was granted (/d. 103), and more than six years
before the commencement of this suit. Furthermore, it
was repudiated by the author, in this suit and the earlier
Ulen suit, as incorrect, after actual tests (/d. 105-6). It is
also shown to be erroneous by the statement of the pat-
entee, made to the Patent Office through his attorney dur-
ing the prosecution of the application (Jd. 106, Ulen R.
267; Storrie Exbt. Bk. 296).
All that Kirkland’s article could indicate, if it were
admissible, is that the operation of the patented appar-
atus is so obscure and almost inexplicable that even an
engineer familiar with the apparatus could misinterpret
its internal modus operandi.
(For further discussion of this matter see Appel-
lee’s Main Brief, pp. 108-9.)
eae
SO RE Rees coe
Pre eee
SPE FE PO PE OR rr Te oe tee >
a et i mer
bl tebe. vee,
28
V.
The velocity nozzle at the outlet is and always has
been the most vital element of the patented combina-
tion, and essential to the method of the patent.
It was shown in the drawings, described and claimed in
the original application (see Spee. p. 1, lines 60-64, and
p. 2, lines 21-21, which correspond with the original speci-
fication). To answer the unfounded contention of the de-
fendants that the velocity nozzle has been introduced or
magnified since the patent was granted, it is only neces-
sary to quote briefly from the description in the specifica-
tion, which says, inter alia (p. 2, lines 50, et seq.):
“The lower pipe 10, however, serves to direct a
jet of air moving at a considerable velocity directly
against portions of the mass as they move toward
and into the discharge duct. The two pipes thus
act in very different ways, the upper pipe supplying
air which acts by pressure and the lower pipe sup-
plying air which acts by velocity.”
(See also p. 2, lines 21-50 and 68-93.)
It is a'so distinctly specified in the claims of which
claim 2 serves as an illustration, saying
“* * * and another compressed air inlet pipe
leading through the chamber wail and terminating
within the chamber near the opening into the
conduit in a nozzle directed toward said opening.”
And it was this velocity nozzle, located at and directed
toward the outlet of the chamber into the conveying
conduit which at once made the McMichael invention
what it is and distinguished it both in genus and species
from all previous devices.
It is not a suction nozzle, limited to a pressure of less
than the atmospheric pressure of fifteen pounds, created
Pe 8 NE SOAR 8 ee redo ee He ESOS. a Be
29
behind it, nor an agitating or stirring nozzle for loose or
floatable materials, but a cutting, driving jet located at the
critical point where the rocky concrete mass would jam,
arch or plug, and acting by its velocity on the obstinate
mass of solids to break the jam—or rather prevent it—
and shoot these solids intact to great distances and great
elevations.
For a further discussion of all of the foregoing matters,
the court is referred to this respondents’ main brief.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHEN J. Cox,
Lynn A, WILLIAMS,
Counsel for Respondents.
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