Reply Brief for Respondent — Powers-Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OcTOBER TERM, 1930

No. 3

POWERS-KENNEDY CONTRACTING CORPORA- °

TION and ANTHONY G. FLECK

Defendants-Petitioners

Vv.

CONCRETE MIXING AND CONVEYING COMPANY

Plaintiff-Respondent

Respondent’s Reply to Supplemental Brief for

Petitioners on Reargument

’ STEPHEN J. Cox

¥ Lynn A. WILLIAMS

Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent

APPEAL PRINTING CO., 82 THAMES ST., NEW YORK CITY

SUBJECT INDEX.

PAGE

Alleged prior use in this case rejected on conflicting

WORE sa necncccusvvessssccene TTT IP TTT ite 2

Alleged prior use in Storrie case sustained on single

uncorroborated deposition only ............66. 2

Kespondent’s position that decision on prior use not

conclusive correct under authorities ............ 2

Decision in Storrie case contrary to “reasonabie

Ce OE cece veccesesnscéushesicseseadasse. 3

No corroboration or substantiation of Leake ceposi-

FOOD nv 0.0.6.6: 060.05 0:0 00.00560060056.590900006000008 1

Three documents referred to by Ninth C, C. A. do not

MUIIIIIID 5 0 0:00 60500006 606600600000080005860 1

Leake ex parte preliminary statement not evidence .. 1

Leake’s attorneys’ ex parte statement not evidence .. 1

Leake’s assignment to MeMichael’s attorney after

interference indicates MceMichael’s priority ..... 5

Leake admits no nozzle at outlet in 1905 experimental

UU hoc hnccen kee 6auncess buevettardhedecees 6

Leake not reluctant to testify against plaintiff ...... _ 7

Infringement. No question of fact before lower courts

GROG GS tO GHOTOUOR 6g cccccesvsececcevecuses 8

Construction of accused apparatus admitted both

CRRGD ccccccccccveccveseccccerecececeseveseees 8

Structure only involved in Storrie case ............. 8

Slug theory not relevant ............e.eeeees 9, 24, 25, 26

Merely an explanation of remarkable result ........ (id.)

Lower courts in Storrie case read into claims, elements

neither expressed nor implied .............. 9, 10, 26

Infringement in Storrie case question of law ........ 11

Alleged infringing structures in both cases substan-

Se We GUS ova ce dcciscnsipesdcesseeecneses 11,13

Patent for pioneer invention .........cccceseeveses 13

No prior device involved its principle .......... 14, 15, 22

ee a

Deering v. Winona Works, 155 U. S. 286, 300 ........

ii INDEX

PAGE

Went into universal use and supplanted all other

SOURED 6 6 6 6b eeec cde Nec ieesestesucuseceuseees 5

Ninth C. C. A. failed to appreciate true nature and im-

DOUGRMSS GE TUVOUNEEER co cccccccccvescvecsecsves 15

Prior devices all lacked vital feature of McMichael . 16

meg British 1875 and 1885 patents ........... 16, 17

UTE Bic. DUPED cree ccccrccccccevseecees 18, 19

Kolsche German EE EE Sdcccecevcesesseuevers 19)

Ge NED bcc ccedcccccodcssceceessceveseceess 2)

POE MES n-b.v 0-00 de sievecccceceucesescecseceees 2)

WED TEE: hho rebcc eve dccecedécbeceseoccencees 21

Sickels and Butler patents ..............05005. ccc Om

Canniff and Mellvrid patents .................. ccc

McCormick recollection testimony after thirty years

SED chaWibhedihdedesbadadeecenedesseveerts 21

Difference between McMichael and all prior devices.

SEE veceuurecedeasewsswavaccersaneséeess 22

Invention of patent has always been the same ...... 2:3

Patentee has right to enlarge specification and claims

while application is pending .................. 2:

MeMichael patent based on original application ..... 21

Supplemental oath removes all question ........... 2!

No attempt to vary meaning of patent .............. 21

No variation necessary to cover accused devices fully 26

Solid stream delivery in both infringing devices .. .25, 26

“Nose of wax” decision no application here ........ 27

FPPC Pee OL TUTTI TTT TT Tri eT 27

Velocity nozzle the most vital element .............. 28

Velocity nozzle fully described in specification ...... 28

INDEX oF CASES.

Adamson »v. Gilliland, 242 U. S, 350; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep.

PUES BOE. bxcveancvcdeuncece sees ctcebesesixeeess 2

Cleveland Foundry Co. v. Detroit (C. C. A. 6th), 131

Oe 8 Tee ee eee Peer err 2"

Davis v. Schwartz, 156 U. S. 631; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. 2

— ee

INDEX ' iil

PAGE

Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220

ie ee GP We hea cab nus see eedcectcsecestechus 23

Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,

Be ie Ob OP See ciunnesceensnasanepsaescedetess 3

General Electric Co, v. O. R. Mallory Co. (C. C. A.

MUG, Ge TOG, BE GED cccicccccccvccccscccces 6

Overland v. Packard, 274 U. S. 417; L. Ed. 1131 .... 23

Permutit Co. v. Harvey Laundry Co. (C. C. A. 9th),

UI I a as a ais lg a oe a aot a 18

Permutit Co. v. Wadham (C. C. A. 6th), 13 Fed. (2d)

See Ge wieuséweciesectenséeeedilendewecienuaes 18

Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U. S.; 74 L.

Ed. (Advance Opinions Nov. 1, 1929, Decided

es SUE bls Danked 000s Cécuntseccaciknass 3, 10

Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516 ..............05. 18

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Herman Cramer, 192 U. S. 265, 275;

de bb MERUTETETOTEL EET OCT T ET PET eee 3,11

T. H. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings

ly Se re. a NG nde diaavhbc ceecccceiecst 3

Western v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471; 73 C. C. A. 587.. 3

Westinghouse v. Metropolitan (C. C. A. 2nd), 290

RE a ee eye ad 23

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

POWERS-KENNEDY CONTRACTING CORPORA-

TION and ANTHONY G. FLECK,

Defendants-Petitioners, No. 3.

v. OCTOBER TERM,

1930.

CONCRETE MIXING AND CONVEYING

CoMPANY,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

RESPONDENT’S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS ON

REARGUMENT.

The issues before the court are fully discussed in re-

spondent’s main brief herein (formerly No. 501, Oct.

Term, 1928), to which the court is referred for a full pres-

entation of respondent’s case. This supplemental brief

is limited to the questions presented in petitioners’ sup-

plemental brief, filed October, 1930.

The petitioners, evidently feeling that the facts in their

case are not adequately presented in their main brief, and

that these facts are not sufficient to support their conten-

tions, have filed a supplemental brief setting forth new

arguments presenting facts chiefly found in the record

of the companion case (No. 4, formerly No. 528, Oct. Term,

1928). The following is therefore a reply thereto.

ctyppeere fs >

2

I.

The alleged prior use in this case was rejected by

the trial court on conflicting oral evidence introduced

in open court.

The alleged prior use in the companion or

““Storrie” case was accepted by the trial court on a

single uncorroborated and unsubstantiated deposi-

tion only, taken before the trial out of court, and this

deposition concedes that the alleged prior use lacked

the vital and essential jet at the outlet of the patent

in suit.

The decision of the trial courtin the present case, who

saw the witnesseQ&and judged their character and credi-

bility, is therefor@conclusive.

The decision of the trial court in the companion case,

who did not see the witness and had no opportunity to

judge his character or credibility, and overlooked the

vital defect in that deposition, is inconclusive and should

be reversed.

This court is as well able to judge the weight and sufli-

ciency of that deposition as was the trial court.

There is, therefore, no inconsistency in respondent’s

position that as to the alleged prior use in the present

case, the finding of the trial court is conclusive, whereas

the finding of the trial court in the other case is not

conclusive, byt on the contrary may clearly be found

erroneous.

Both positions are fully supported by the authorities.

Thus the respondent’s position in this case is supported

by such decisions as—

Adamson y. Gilliland, 242 U. S. 350; 37 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 169, 171;

Davis v. Schwartz, 156 U. S. 631; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.

237,

and other authorities.

3

And the respondent’s (Petitioners there) position in the

other case is supported by such authorities as—

Eibel Process Co. y. Minnesota & Ontario Paper

io. 20 U.S. 4:

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Herman Cramer, 192 U. S. 265,

275; 24 Sup. Ct. 291;

Western v. Robertson, 142 Fed. 471; 73 C..C. A.

587;

Sanitary Refrigerator Co. vy. Winters, 280 U. S.

; 74 L. Ed. (Advance Opinions, Nov. 1,

1929, Decided Oct. 14, 1929).

I (a).

Furthermore, the finding of the trial court in the

other (Storrie) case was contrary to the rule in this

court that a prior use to invalidate an issued patent

must be proved “by evidence so cogent as to leave

no reasonable doubt.”

Derring v. Winona Works, 155 U. S. 286, 300;

T. H. Symington Co. y. National Malleable Cast-

ings Co., 250 U. S. 383, 386;

Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper

Co., 261 U. S. 45, 60.

The single deposition in the present case was not only

purely recollection of the witness who gave it—after a

lapse of more than twenty-two years—and unsubstan-

tiated by any contemporaneous record or other tangible

thing, but contains a frank admission by that witness (R.

998, Slorrie case) that the experimental apparatus had no

“air on the bottom,” the vital and essential feature of the

patent in suit and its claims.

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i (b).

There was no corroboration or substantiation of

the Leake prior use deposition.

The three documents referred to by the courts in the

Ninth Circuit (see Op., Storrie R. 669) all originated years

after Leake’s alleged prior use and more than a year afler

McMichael had made a full and complete reduction to

practice of his invention by filing his application for the

patent in suit (Jan. 14, 1907), which was approximately

nine months before Leake filed his application (Oct. 7,

1907, Id., Exbt. Bk., 454 and 332). |

These documents and the reasons for their utter lack

of value are as follows:

1. Leake’s preliminary statement in the «interference

with one Darley (/d. 582) involving his application which

was also in interference with McMichael.

This was an ex parte statement made in 1909, more

than fwo years after McMichael’s application for the pat-

ent, and nearly four years after the alleged prior use, and

was never substantiated in the interference, which was

decided against Leake and in favor of McMichael as the

true and prior inventor (Jan. 29, 1910, Jd. 405). The de-

cision was accepted by Leake, who thereupon cancelled

the claims which were in the interference—and all claim

to the present invention (/d. 409-10)—and thereafter con-

tented himself with claiming certain relatively unimpor-

tant details of his apparatus which were additions to or

alleged refinements of the basic apparatus of the patent

in suit (see Leake pat. Jd. 455).

2. An ex parte statement by Leake’s attorneys made

during the prosecution of his application, and in 1908,

that Leake had “successfully moved concrete” by “air

pressure” and had “actually constructed several plants”

where it was done by the apparatus of his application

(/d. 368, 378).

This laudatory, unverified ex parte— and probably hear-

say—statement was made by Leake’s attorneys more than

a year after McMichael’s application and after Leake pre-

sumably had every opportunity to learn all about Me-

Michael’s invention. The statement does not say when

Leake did this, and even if true and supported by proof

would not even tend to show that Leake made anything

prior to McMichael’s application.

Leake himself admits that the apparatus made by him

for practical use was made after McMichael’s reduction

of the invention to practice in his application—*some-

time in 1907, or so” or in “07 or 08” (Storrie R. 997, 603-

4)—also that it was different from this earlier thing which

was “nothing but a crude machine” (/d. 586); had “noth-

ing automatic,” and differed from his later machine in

that the latter “takes air in on the bottom and top both”

(id. 598).

3. The assignment by Leake to McMichael’s attorney

of his appgation.

_ This was made December 2, 1910 (Storrie R. Exbt. Bk.

179), more than nine months after he lost the interfer-

ence to McMichael and actually relinquished all claims

to the present invention, conceding McMichael to be en-

titled to it as the prior inventor (/d. 109-10).

There was no understanding or agreement leading up

la this, and the reason for the purchase was obviously

that Leake showed in his applicationsome later additions

or “improvements” which could be used in connection

with the McMichael invention, including duplex charging

hoppers, and agitators.

And at the time of the assignment there was no claim

in the Leake application—nor has there ever been since

Which conflicted with MeMichael’s claims to the invention

here involved.

This document, instead of being “strongly suggestive of

the inference that McMichael recognized the priority of

pce >

1 Sts PAPO RATER ITI MO 50 —

Leake’s invention,” supports an inference to the contrary.

It indicates that McMichael’s interests were in control of

both applications, and in position to issue a patent with

broad claims to the invention on either application to

themselves. The fact that they chose to issue the broad

patent on MecMichael’s application, tndicales that they

Anew McMichael to be the prior tnventor.

McMichael died prior to 1925 (Ulen R., Kirkland dep.,

Exbt. D, QU6, p. 56); and to sustain an attempt to destroy

his adjudged prior inventorship by such documents as

these, after a lapse of twenty-two years, is, we submit

with respect, repugnant “to every Anglo-American legal

concept” of evidence.

General Electric Co. vy. P. R. Mallory Co. (C. C. A.

2nd), 298 Fed. 579, 585.

As the court also said in that case, in similar circum-

stances, such a thing is not only “repugnant” “to every

Anglo-American legal concept,” but something so unfair

that anything more unfair cannot be imagined (p. 586).

I (c).

But, as we have seen, Leake himself in his depo-

sition admitted frankly and freely (R. 598, etc.), that

his “crude,” experimental thing, which he dismantled

after he had made a test with it (R. 586), had no

“air on the bottom” (R. 598), and that it therefore

lacked the vital and indispensable feature of the

present invention.

Comparing it with the machine made by him after Me-

Michael had occupied the field, he says, referring to this

later machine, that it was not the same in principle. And

answering a very improper question by which it was at-

tempted to lead him into saying that it was, he says:

“Oh, no. This (the second Leake machine made

long after McMichael’s filing date) takes air on the

bottom and top both,”

and further that with the earlier apparatus:

“All I did was push the air right out through.”

The sketch made by Leake to illustrate his early experi-

mental apparatus also shows no nozzle at the outlet. See

Defendant’s Chicago Exhibit 127 (Exbt. Bk., p. 694).

But had Leake attempted to say that the apparatus

tested by him in September, 1905 (R. 583), embodied the

invention of the patent in suit, it would have been com-

pletely overcome by Leake’s oath made more than two

years later, in 1907, and forming a part of his application

for patent (R., Exbt. Bk. 335), that it had not been pub-

licly used more than two years prior to his application.

But Leake expressly admits that the crude thing tried

by him in 1905 at New Orleans and represented by his

sketch (Exbt. 127) was used “only as an experiment”

(R. 602), and was a “little temporary” affair (R. 604)

which he tore down after he had used (R. 586).

Nor was Mr. Leake at all reluctant to testify against the

present owners of his patent, to whose assignor he as-

signed many years ago. He shows a willingness to testify

fully to the facts, as he recalls them, after a lapse of

twenty-two years, but cannot be induced to make state-

ments which he knows to be untrue, or testify to facts

which are beyond his recollection,

Leake does not even know who owns his patent

(R. 599).

And it is more reasonable to suppose that he was in-

clined to favor such a powerful interest as the defendant

in the other suit, the Great Western Power Company,

for whom he first made a deposition (R. 590) than the

unknown present owners of his application.

Pen

Fo Ree |

Sart feat oe

I (d).

On the matter of infringement there was no

question of fact before the lower courts in either

case, except as to the operation of the defendants’

apparatus.

In both cases the construction of the accused apparat cs

was admitted by the defendants (Powers-Kennedy, R.

292, 3, 4; Storrie R., Exbt. Bk. 78, 83-8, 683-4).

The illustration on page 78 of the Storrie case Exhibit

book is that of the patent granted to the maker of de-

fendants’ machine, Hackley, and is substantially the same

as his original drawing forming part of Exhibit 12 (p. 83)

which Hackley says shows the defendants’ apparatus

(R. 73-6). All these illustrations show the air inlets—17,

28", etc.—at the back of the vessel, and behind the mass

of concrete therein, and the air jets—14, 25*, etc.—at the

outlet of the vessel.

It is admitted that this Hackley patent does “illustrate

and describe” the defendants’ “Hackley” machine (Re-

spondents’ brief, Storrie case, p. 8).

Even the drawing submitted by defendants-respondents’

counsel on page 2 of his brief shows these same air inlets

—t and 1—at the back of the vessel and at the front

outlet, respectively, and the District Court in the Ninth

Circuit finds these elements present (Op., KR. 614).

In the Second Circuit the courts held, on conflicting

evidence, that the defendants’ apparatus was operated by

them in such a manner as to practice the method or proc-

ess specified in certain claims of the patent. They also

held that the admitted structure infringed the structural

claims; and as to.this there can be no question since the

defendants’ structure corresponds to every feature of the

machine showry in the patent itself.

In the Ninth Circuit only the structural claims were

involved. The controversy as to the particular way in

_—_

9

which the patented device and the accused device

operated, was therefore somewhat beside the mark. It

arose out of the plaintiff's evidence tending to show that

the result accomplished was due to a peculiar action

inside the apparatus, known as the slug movement, which

evidence was controverted by the defendants. But as the

court in the Second Circuit noted this is not material

(Opinion, Powers-Kennedy R. 346-7), saying further:

“To us the dispute seems irrelevant. The patent

says nothing which commits the patentee to the slug

method of operation.”

Therefore, the holding of non-infringement in the Ninth

Circuit was due to the fact that the court held the patent

limited to something not described, shown or claimed

therein, and which the court in the Second Circuit holds—

and rightly—is irrelevant, because the patent is in no way

limited thereto.

The court in the Ninth Circuit, therefore, held, that the

admitted apparatus did not infringe the claims for that

apparatus because it did not produce the irrelevant slug

action. This was a decision of law. It was an interpreta-

tion of the patent as a matter of law.

The court in the Ninth Circuit notes that Hackley him-

self found the operation of the two machines the same.

They say:

“He testified to having had experience in using

appellant's combination and that in so using ** the

concrete issued in a continuous stream and that in

the use of his own device the concrete came out in

a continuous stream mixed with air * * *”

(Opinion).

They further say, at the end of the Opinion:

“We think that the slug theory, when all is said,

has no bearing upon the merits of the present con-

troversy, for whether or not the appellant's appa-

Perv? foe

£' 2 oreo

10

ratus operated to deliver concrete in slugs or sec-

tions, it is very clear that the Hackley apparatus op-

erates in delivering a constant stream of concrete,

interrupted only so far as it is interfered with by

the air which accompanies it through the dis-

charge pipe.”

But, on what ground they found non-infringement by

the apparatus of the apparatus claims which clearly read

upon it, they do not say. They merely atlirm the decision

of the lower court (R. 621) which found non-infringement

because the defendants’ apparatus did not have the fol-

lowing four unspecified elements:

1. “Upright cylindrical hopper bottomed container,”

2. “The U bend,”

3. “Upper air save some incidental back pressure,”

i

“Discharge slug fashion as claimed is the inven-

tion of McMichael,”.

None of these elements is found in the claims of the

patent, and none of them is essential to the embodiment

of the invention.

The patent does not even call for “upper air.” The

method or process claims do call for “air behind the mass

of material” (Claim 1); but this may be upper or rear or

in any other place, so long as it is behind the mass. How-

ever, these method or process claims were not involved in

the Storrie suit. But the “incidental back pressure” fs and

must be a pressure behind the mass.

It is evident, therefore, that the courts in the Ninth

Circuit held non-infringement, not because of any ques-

tior of involving features of the patented invention, but

because of an error of law in interpreting that invention

to include something not included and not intended to

be included even in the method claims.

This brings the present case clearly under the language

of the decision of this court in

Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters (supra),

11

in which it was said:

“Furthermore, pon the undisputed evidence the

question of infringement resolves itself in each case

into one of law, depending upon a comparison be-

tween the structure disclosed on the face of the pat-

ent and the device shown in the Dent latch, and the

correct application thereto of the rule of equival-

ency, Compare Singer Mfg. Co. v, Cramer, 192

U. S. 265, 275, 48 L. Ed. 437, 443, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep.

291.”

I (e).

That the two alleged infringing structures are sub-

stantially the same, and both substantially the same

as that of the patent, will be apparent from a mere

comparison of them.

The illustrative embodiment shown in the patent is an

upright or vertical chamber or vessel, and the embodi-

ment of the defendants in the Storrie case is a horizontal

chamber or vessel, like the infringing device in the Ulen

suit (12 Fed. {2nd} 929-931), while the defendant’s em-

bodiment in the Powers-Kennedy case is a vertical or up-

right vessel.

(See sheet of drawings, p. 76, Petitioner's Storrie

case, brief.)

It will be apparent, however, that if the device of the

patent is laid on its side, or the Storrie (Hackley) appa-

ratus placed in upright position with its outlet at the bot-

tom, the two are substantially identical in all essentials.

The only difference in the operation due to the change

of position is that when the chamber is horizontal some

means must be provided for moving the mass of materials

toward the outlet, this being done by gravity when the

chamber is upright. In the Ulen infringing apparatus,

this was done by means of a plunger which pushed the

SONG ST SA eae

12

material forward toward the outlet. In the Storrie appa-

ratus, it is done by air pipes in the bottom of the vessel

located between the rear end and the outlet. In the hori-

zontal machine made by the licensee (fhe Ransome Com-

pany) under the patent, this is done by a screw conveyor

(Storrie R., Exbt. Bk. 102-105).

But whether the vessel is upright or horizontal, the

construction and arrangement of the air pressure devices

and the vessel, and the result, are the same.

Thus, in the patent, air pressure behind the mass is sup-

plied by the upper air pipe (8) near the head of the ves-

sel, and the velocity nozzle at the outlet (10) is the pipe

extending into the neck of the vessel. In the Storrie de-

vice the air pressure behind the mass is supplied by the

pipe entering through the head at its lower part, and the

velocity nozzle is the pipe extending into the neck of the

vessel. The air pipes in the bottom of the vessel will also

supply air pressure behind the mass, but would not alone

and without the air pipe in the head or back end move all

the concrete forward to the outlet. |

In the Powers-Kennedy apparatus, pressure behind the

mass was first supplied by the pipes at the top of the ves-

sel, and, later, by air exploding upward from the outlet

nozzle and being trapped in the top, and the velocity

nozzle at the outlet is the pipe entering the neck of the

vessel where it Joins the conveying conduit.

Only a part of the patent’s claims are limited to any

location of the air inlet for supplying air behind the mass.

The sealed chamber will always trap compressed air be-

hind this mass, no matter where the air inlet is located,

and the velocity nozzle at the outlet will supply this, if it

is not supplied by a separate pipe.

Accordingly, the courts in the Second Circuit found that

the defendants infringed all the claims when they used the

top inlet and only a part of them when they used the

:

13

nozzle at the outlet only (Opinion, R. 328, and [D. C.] R.

327). It was admitted that there was pressure behind the

mass in the Powers-Kennedy device when only the nozzle

at the outlet was used, and the court so held (ld. R. 347—

bottom).

In all of the claims which are involved in both suits

the “chamber for containing concrete forming materials”

with an outlet and a “compressed air inlet pipe leading

through the chamber wall and terminating” “near the

opening into the conduit,” or their equivalents (Claim 2)

with means for supplying compressed air “back of [or

“behind” ] the mass of materials” (Claims 4 and 17) or its

equivalent, are essentials. These essentials are found in

the apparatus of both defendants. Therefore no different

interpretation of the claims is necessary to bring these

two devices within their proper and intended scope and

meaning.

The vital and essential element in all the claims com-

mon to both suits, is the nozzle at the outlet cooperating

with the pressure behind the mass. This is fully em-

bodied in the apparatus of both defendants, and is not

found in the prior art. Therefore, both defendants have

appropriated the essence of the invention and the features

which distinguish it from all prior devices, and have

enabled it to convey concrete pneumatically, which these

prior devices were unable to do.

II.

The patent is for a pioneer invention.

No prior device ever conveyed concrete by compressed

air in any manner (Opinion, 2nd C. C. A., R. 344).

No prior device ever employed (‘static’) pressure

behind a mass of concrete in a chamber with (“velocity”)

pressure directed into the mass at the outlet of the

chamber.

ONS te OTe ee 7 RNA en MARE —

14

It was this combination of static and velocity pressure

that made the conveyance of concrete by air pressure

possible.

Apparently no prior inventor thought that the mass of

rocks filled in with mortar which constitutes concrete

(see Pat., p. 2, lines 100, et seq.) could be conveyed by air

pressure. The desirability of such a thing was realized

for at least thirty-five years before McMichael’s invention,

when Smith, in 1872, proposed to convey “concrete” tn

water, as a flutd (Smith Pats., Storrie R. 481-485), which,

of course, would have destroyed the concrete.

This mass of rocks intimately mixed with sand and

cement could not be blown by a blast of air, like sand,

grain and other finely divided substances, because it could

not be carried in an air current at any obtainable press-

ure, and would simply jam and plug the conduit after

the light fine material had been blown out of it, and if

this could have been done it would have unmixed the

concrete (Opinion D. C., Powers-Kennedy, R. 327).

Nor could this mass of rocks be forced through a con-

duit like a liquid, because it is, and must be, at least

90 per cent. solids and 55 per cent. rocks (Robinson,

Storrie R. 351; Powers-Kennedy Spec., R. 296; Kennedy

R. 206), and rocks wul not flow. aS

If any prior inventor ever thought of using a velocity

jet at the outlet of the vessel to cause this rocky mass to

shoot through the conveying conduit under the air press-

ure behind it (it would otherwise do nothing bet make

it jam and plug the pipe) he apparently did not think it

worth trying out. Even after McMichael did it engineers

would not believe it (Ulen R. 45).

It remained for McMichael to discover that this heavy,

rocky mass could be conveyed through a conduit by air

pressure by placing a velocity jet at the outlet of the ves-

sel to break up the mass and make it shoot through the

conveying conduit and to great distances and elevations

15

(see Respondents’ Main Brief, pp. 15-32, and Storrie R.

105-7).

His invention has accomplished a great work, has gone

into universal use, has made possible great enterprises

attended by the greatest difficulties, and under the most

adverse conditions (/d. pp. 32-36; Ulen Op., D. C., 12 Fed.

[2nd] 929, 931), and has supplanted all other methods

of tunnel lining (Storrie R. 101-3).

It is seldom that a patent has come-before this court

with such a record of accomplishment, preceded by such

an utter failure of accomplishment.

The courts in the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate this

record, and apparently failed to grasp the true nature of

the invention. They appear to have overlooked the very

essence of the invention, which resides in the duofold

pressure behind the mass and at the front of the mass.

At any rate, in comparing the patent with the prior art,

they ignored the critical character of the velocity nozzle

at the front of the mass and held the invention substan-

tialiy anticipated by apparatus in which this element was

entirely lacking.

Thus the court says in its opinion, referring to the Smith

machine, that it contained all the features of appellants’

patent “except the nozzle for admission of air near the

point of exit,” and in comparing it with the Duckham

patent, which also lacked this element or any suggestion

of it, that one of his pipes for the admission of compressed

air in the tank (nowhere near the outlet) was “localable

at the exit.”

As well might one say that Shakespeare’s play of Ham-

let was anticipated by an earlier play which had all the

characters “except the Prince of Denmark,” or that an

earlier play anticipated it because it could have portrayed

such a character as Shakespeare portrayed it. As well

might it be said that one who has located an oil well in

a widely extended territory, where others were drilling

cone ls

16

without success, is not entitled to the reward of his dis-

covery, because the drill holes of the others were “lo-

catable” in the same spot.

II (a).

That all the prior patents and practices lack this

vital and essential jet at the outlet of the pressure

chamber is sufficiently shown by the following brief

summary.

The Duckham British patents 4,400 of 1875 and 15,348

of 1885 (Storrie Exbt. Bk. 598, 603 and 611) propose to

discharge water and mud from the huge barge tank of a

dredge by putting air pressure on the tank and thus de-

positing it on the shore. No other means for discharging

is shown or described in the 1875 patent, but the sugges-

tion is made (/d. 601) that

“I prefer to inject compressed air (with or with-

out an admixture of water) supplied by force pump

or other means through a number of nozzles at the

bottom of the tank, said nozzles being pointed

towards the outlet.” ~~

But where located and how many feet from the outlet

is not stated. He says:

“By this means the particles are prevented from

settling, and are kept in suspension until the whole

is expelled from the tank. Compressed air may

moreover be admitted into the discharge pipe with

the same object.”

The 1885 patent, referring to the 1875 apparatus, says

that the discharge was

“assisted by compressed air and water injected at

the bottom of the tank for the purpose of agitating

the mud and preventing thick deposit” (/d. 608).

(All Italics in quotations ours.)

17

The purpose of the nozzles, therefore, was to agitate the

mud and prevent it from settling on the bottom. They

had no other function. If located at the outlet from the

tank into the discharge pipe in the form of nozzles, they

would have interfered with the discharge by blowing

through and breaking up the column of liquid, “escaping

through the discharge pipe and ‘arrying with it all the

liquid” (see Opinion, 9th C. C. A., 1887 article) mixed with

mud, leaving the heavier portions of the mixture behind.

The article referred to by the court in the Ninth Circuit

says, that blowing through clay or stiff mud by the pipes

in the bottom of the tank “was easily rectified by re-ar-

ranging and increasing the size of the large injection

nozzles.” This means that they were not velocity nozzles

at all, but compressed air inlets delivering a large volume

of air which would spread out and bubble up through the

mud,

That no such location or function as that of the patent

in suit was ever thought of, is shown by Duckham’s state-

ment (/d. 599, 601):

“To prevent the choking of the pipes a screen or

grating is provided through which the mud or spoil

passes before it enters the outlet pipe.”

This would, of course, break up the i-aterial and de-

stroy any jet action. Furthermore, a grating could not be

used with concrete, as it would cause the rocks to form

a complete dam, if they ever got that far.

The Duckham patents

1. Are for handling liquid in a column,

2. Contain no suggestion that concrete or sim-

ilar material can be handled in any manner by air

pressure.

3. Give no suggestion of a velocity nozzle located

at the outlet of the chamber into the conveying con-

duit, for any purpose.

SSP et eI Les ee ~ mr

18

4. Disclose a structure which differs greatly from

that of McMichael, and could not be used for

handling concrete at all.

5. Are old foreign patents without definite de-

scription of anything relating to the present inven-

tion, and are therefore irrelevant.

Permutit Co. vy. Harvey Laundry Co, (C. C. A. 9th),

279 Fed. 713, 718,

citing,

Seymour vy. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, and other au-

thorities.

Permulit Co. v. Wadham (C, GC. A. 6th), 138 Fed.

(2d) 454, 457.

The Smith U. S. patents of 1872 (Exbt. Bk., pp. 481 and

484) propose to use “a quantity of water equal to about

three-fifths of the entire mass of materials” (R. 481, Col.

2), or at least 37'% per cent. of water, so that “a liquid or

semi-liquid mass results which can be flowed through

pipes” (/d.), and to then force this liquid through a dis-

charge pipe by simple air pressure behind it. No velocity

nozzle or other nozzle located anywhere is suggested.

These Smith patents

.

1. Would so dilute the cement in the concrete

mixture as to render it worthless, since the maxi-

mum amount of liquid permissible is about 10 per

cent, (R. 591); and Smith proposed to use nearly

four times that amount.

2. Gave no hint or suggestion of the vital and in-

dispensable nozzle at the outlet from the chamber

into the conveying conduit, which has made the

patented invention a success, where all prior de-

vices were useless for conveying concrete or the

like.

3. Merely show that thirty-five years before Mc-

Michael the desirability of conveying concrete by

19

compressed air was realized, and that at that early

date it was proposed to ruin the concrete mixture

in order to do it.

4. Were mere paper patents which never con-

tributed anything to the public good.

5. Were for a liquid column apparatus not

usable for concrete, which is at least 90 per cent.

solids, and principally a mass of rocks.

‘The maker of the defendants’ (Storrie) apparatus,

Hackley, who knew all about the patented machines (R.

72, 91), after making a test with an alleged Smith appar-

atus and admitting that it failed to properly discharge the

rock (R. 434) finally concedes that it is not satisfactory,

because it does not have the jet at the outlet, and that he

uses the jet at the outlet for the reason that it gives

“a different and better action” (R. 435-6).

And this is the best that the biased witnesses could do,

in camera, with the Smith machine, at the instance of the

Pacific Gas & Electric Company, another alleged in-

fringer of the patent in suit (R. 468-4170).

It is obvious that the defendants are not using the

Smith apparatus, but are using the apparatus of the

patent in suit, and contesting this litigation, because the

present apparatus is operative and perfectly efficient,

whereas the Smith apparatus is worthless.

The Kolsche German patent of 1882 (Exbt. Bk. 182-b)

is for nothing but a kinetic air flotation device for “con-

veying slack (coal dust) sandy or granular material by

means of a current of air.” The material is dropped from

the bottom of the vessel in a thin stream into a large blast

of air rushing through a large conduit, and is carried

along in suspension. It has no nozzle or anything of the

sort at or near the outlet of the chamber, or anywhere

else, and could not be used for concrete or any similar

material in any way.

BAPTA we oe 0 : Sa TR ee ee ee] "Me ay

20)

It is an old foreign patent disclosing nothing relevant

to the present invention.

The Goldie patent 707,840 of 1902 (Storrie Exbt. Bk.

514) is for nothing but a crude impracticable apparatus

for blowing dry cement, or cement and sand, under rail-

road ties, by means of a jet of steam. The dry material

must first gravitale from a hopper down through a long

narrow pipe to the nozzle, and if the nozzle met with any

resistance, it would blow up through the top of the hopper

which is not sealed and has no air pressure in it.

The Goldie patents 576,128 and 9 (/d. 498 and ))

are crude predecessors of the later Goldie patent above

mentioned, and are for substantially the same impossible

scheme. In both of them, the dry material is contained

in-an open hopper, gravitates down into the small pipe

and is supposed to be blown under the railroad ties by

pressure supplied to this pipe by a small hand pump.

The Farnham patent 747,396 of 1903 (Ulen R. 3!7)

shows only a “sand-blast” apparatus, for producing a

blast of sand carried in a current of air, for cleaning and

other purposes. This is fully discussed in our main bricf

at pages 53-55,

The Farnham patent shows:

1. No jet or nozzle at the outlet but a suction

jet (11) at the bottom of a long, narrow pipe ex-

tending from the flat bottom of the vessel, and ob)-

structing the mouth of that pipe so as to project air

“across the mouth of the discharge-pipe 2” (Sjec.,

p. 1, lines 100, et seq.).

2. No cooperation between the pressure in the

tank and the suction jet or nozzle, since the sand

flows “by gravity” (/d. line 18) in a small stream

from the tank down to the point where it is acted

upon by the suction and blast of the nozzle and

blown through the small pipe leading to the work,

suspended in the air.

3. No nozzle of any description at or near the

outlet of the vessel.

21

4. And would have to be rearranged and re-

designed to convey concrete or the like, and with

the teachings of the McMichael patent in suit in

view,

The Warren patent 671,303 (/d. 650) is for a “mixer

for sand-blast apparatus,” and shows a hopper with a

small bottom discharge pipe through which materials

(loose sand, etc.) pass in a small stream from the hopper

to a chamber in a pipe through which a current of air

passes, where it is caught up by the air, “with which it

mingles and by which it is carried through the chamber

into the flexible tube M and discharged through the nozzle

QO” (Spec., p. 1, lines 63-71). It shows nothing not shown

in the Farnham patent. It does not even show a suction

nozzle, nor a nozzle of any kind.

The Sickels and Butler patents 99,360 and 660,946

(Storrie, Exbt. Bk. 514 and 654) are even less relevant

than the foregoing kinetic or air flotation patents.

The Canniff patent 873,345 and Mcllvrid patent

958,421 (It. 318 and 323) are merely for machines which

mix and discharge grout, a thin liquid composed of sand,

cement and water, which is forced in a liquid column

through pipes, like any other liquid. They also lack the

nozzle at the outlet of the chamber (they have no nozzle

at all) which is an indispensable element of the patent in

suit.

The wholly uncorroborated oral testimony of Mr, Me-

Cormick to the effect that he used air in an apparatus like

that of the Canniff patent to assist the discharge of the

liquid grout (Storrie R, 403-420), nearly thirty years be-

fore he testified, based as it is upon pure unaided recol-

lection, is unbelievable. The courts in the Ninth Circuit

evidently gave it no credence. Furthermore, it has been

sufliciently shown that the use of air at the outlet would

break up the column of liquid (McCormick never used

anything but grout) and make it ineffective for grouting.

RR >

22

McCormick's recollection as to date and the particular

character of the apparatus used by him with his “paint-

like grout” (/d. 415) has evidently been reconstructed

with the exigencies of the present situation in view,

From the foregoing it will be seen that all the prior

patents relied on by the defendants—except pump pat-

ents, which are entirely irrelevant-—belong to one of two

classes, viz.:

1. Patents for kinetic or air flotation devices

for handling light or finely divisible materials by

conveying them in suspension in a current of air,

and

2. Patents for apparatus for moving a column

of liquid by means of air pressure behind it;

And that neither of these could be used to convey con-

crete which is composed almost wholly of heavy cohesive

solids irtimately mixed and proportioned and the bulk

of which is broken rock or stones; and further,

That McMichael’s apparatus belongs to a third and

new class, which has no precedent in any art, the char-

acteristics of which are (1) a chamber in which solids

are maintained under pressure forcing them to the

contracted outlet of the chamber, and (2) a velocity

nozzle at the outlet of the chamber to the conduit directed

into the materials and into the outlet to shoot them

through the outlet and through the conduit in a mass or

masses to the point of application.

No pneumatic apparatus for conveying coarse, heavy

solids was known before McMichael’s invention.

aa

23

The invention of the patent is and always has

been the same from the filing of the application in

1907 up to the present date.

The criticism based on the alleged enlargement of the

invention has been overruled by the courts in the Second

Circuit no less than four times, viz:

by the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the

Ulen suit and by both courts again in this present suit.

It has no merit in fact or in law, and may be briefly an-

swered by the following summary:

1. The drawing of the patent is the drawing originally

filed in the application; not a line nor a letter has been

changed,

2. The original specification described that apparatus

and its method of operation with ample clearness and de-

tail to enable any one skilled in the art to make and use

them fully, and, in all their advantages, which is all that

the Patent Statute (U.S. R. S. 4888) requires.

4. The Patent Statute does not even require a full de-

scription in the application, but only in the patent as

linally issued.

1. A patentee has the absolute right to amplify the de-

scription of his invention while his application is pend-

ing, so long as it is fairly based upon his original discto-

sure, in the drawings or in the specification, or both.

Westinghouse vy. Metropolitan (C. C. A. 2nd), 290

Fed. 661;

Diamond Rubber Co. vy. Consolidated Tire Co.,

220 U. S. 428, 435;

Cleveland Foundry Co. vy. Detroit (C. C. A. 6th),

131 Fed, 853, 857;

Overland vy, Packard, 274 U. S. 417; 71 L. Ed.

1131.

weer

‘ .eerteo

21

» If the patentee wishes to depart from the original

disclosure of his application, while his application is

pending, he may do so, provided only that he files a

supplemental oath to the elfect that the invention was Put

published or used, ete., two years prior to his original

application, and this merely to satisfy the Patent Office

on that point, under Section 1892, of the Patent Statute.

This McMichael did (Ulen R. 251; Storrie R. 278), although

it was nol necessary, because the additional claims and

description were clearly based on the original disclosure.

6. Some of the claims in the patent are of substantially

the same scope as claim 3 of the original application, and

claim 3 of the application is substantially tdentical with

claim 2 of the patent. (See original claim 2, Storrie R.

201, Ulen BR. 202.) This claim is in both suits.

It is therefore apparent that the patent as issued is

for the original invention, supy orted by the original and

supplemental oath, and that the description and claims

added during the pendency of the application are prop-

erly in the patent.

(See also discussion this subject, pp. 36-47. Re-

spondent’s Brief, and decisions quoted.)

IV.

No attempt has been made to alter the patent or

change its meaning in any way since the patent was

granted and became a public document.

The slug theory of operation is not, and never was, a

part of the patent or any of its claims, but is an explana-

tion of the astonishing fact that the invention makes it

possible for a jet of air acting under the pressure behind

the mass and located at the critical point, to shoot tons

of rocks carefully mixed with sand, cement and a little

water, at express speed, thousands of feet and up to high

elevations, without disturbing the mixture of these

heterogeneous elements.

* It was hard in the beginning to make engineers believe

thet this could be done (Ulen R. 44), and the plaintil?,

therefore, thouglii that the court should be given its own

best explanation of the reasons for this remarkable per-

formance, This was appreciated by the District Judge,

in the Second Circuit, in the Ulen case, who referred to it

in his opinion (12 Fed. (2nd) 929), and whose decision

was endorsed by the Court of Appeals (Ud. 931).

The action is not kinetic or air flotation action, nor

liquid column action, such as prior devices employed for

finely divisible solids, such as sand, grain, etc., or liquids

such as mud, cement _as grout), etc., carried in water.

Even the testimony for both defendants in these cases

proves that. Their witnesses state that the concrete and

air come out in “a solid stream” (Powers-Kennedy R. 22,

Qs189-191), and although a considerable volume of air

necessarily discharges with the concrete, there are no

bubbles or entrained air mixed with the concrete (/d.).

This was also the finding of the court in the Storrie

case based on the testimony of the defendants’ witnesses

(see Wilkins, Storrie R. 446). The court said (Storrie R.

618):

“* * * that the concrete discharges in a con-

tinuous aerated or mixed stream of concrete and

air and not at all in any slug formation.”

(See also Opinion, 9th C. C. A., last page.)

The question, however, was not how the concrete was

discharged at the distant outlet of the conveying conduit,

but how it was charged from the chamber into the other

end of the conduit.

The slug theory is adhered to, in spite of the fact that

the courts in the Ninth Circuit have found against it, as

the only satisfactory explanation, of how a mass of solids,

* ERP ES PO Ee eer ann,

OR OTTERS FT IN ah EEO Rap we

EEE, lo

ows eres ee

26

principally rocks, can be conveyed by compressed air

through a pipe to distances up to approximately a mile,

smoothly, without disintegration, and without the inevi-

table plugging of the pipe at every step and on each new

discharge, which would otherwise be the ruinous result.

But, after all, the slug theory is merely a theory, and

has nothing to do with the interpretation of the patent

and its claims, which are not limited in any way or de-

pendent upon the correctness of that theory.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit,

after the decision of the District Court in the Ninth Cir-

cuit, said (Powers-Kennedy R. 344):

+o. *

nobody before McMichael had used a

pneumatic apparatus to transport concrete,”

and (Id. 346):

“To us the dispute seems irrelevant. The patent

says nothing which commits the patentee to the slug

method of operation.”

And again (/d. 347):

“But whether the concrete goes forward as we im-

agine, or in some other manner, there is no sulli-

cient reason to suppose that defendants’ machine

does not operate in the same manner as plaintiff's,

whatever that manner may be.”

The slug theory is therefore not an attempt to change

the patent or read anything into it, but merely a satisfy-

ing explanation of its remarkable performance.

Nor is any theory of operation necessary to apply the

claims to defendants’ device, which has all the elements

of these claims, and produces precisely the same result.

The courts in the Ninth Circuit have not found to the

contrary, but, as we have seen, have without warrant read

a

27

into them the slug theory, and unimportant structural de-

tails, in order to find non-infringement.

(lor further discussion of these questions see Re-

spondent’s Main Brief, pp. 97-101, and, on in-

fringement, pp. 63-96.)

The “nose of wax’’ decision (White vy. Dunbar, 119 U.S.

47) involved a reissue patent in which the language of

the claims had actually been changed to change the nature

of the original invention. It has no application here.

The Kirkland Article, written by a person who was

not connected with the owners of the patent, but merely

with a licensee at that time, is wholly irrelevant and in-

competent, and was ignored by the court, after proper

objection (Powers-Kennedy R. 104). The statement that

Mr. Kirkland was then Chief Engineer for the patentee or

was connected with the patentee, is erroneous (Id.).

This article was published more than three years after

the patent was granted (/d. 103), and more than six years

before the commencement of this suit. Furthermore, it

was repudiated by the author, in this suit and the earlier

Ulen suit, as incorrect, after actual tests (/d. 105-6). It is

also shown to be erroneous by the statement of the pat-

entee, made to the Patent Office through his attorney dur-

ing the prosecution of the application (Jd. 106, Ulen R.

267; Storrie Exbt. Bk. 296).

All that Kirkland’s article could indicate, if it were

admissible, is that the operation of the patented appar-

atus is so obscure and almost inexplicable that even an

engineer familiar with the apparatus could misinterpret

its internal modus operandi.

(For further discussion of this matter see Appel-

lee’s Main Brief, pp. 108-9.)

eae

SO RE Rees coe

Pre eee

SPE FE PO PE OR rr Te oe tee >

a et i mer

bl tebe. vee,

28

V.

The velocity nozzle at the outlet is and always has

been the most vital element of the patented combina-

tion, and essential to the method of the patent.

It was shown in the drawings, described and claimed in

the original application (see Spee. p. 1, lines 60-64, and

p. 2, lines 21-21, which correspond with the original speci-

fication). To answer the unfounded contention of the de-

fendants that the velocity nozzle has been introduced or

magnified since the patent was granted, it is only neces-

sary to quote briefly from the description in the specifica-

tion, which says, inter alia (p. 2, lines 50, et seq.):

“The lower pipe 10, however, serves to direct a

jet of air moving at a considerable velocity directly

against portions of the mass as they move toward

and into the discharge duct. The two pipes thus

act in very different ways, the upper pipe supplying

air which acts by pressure and the lower pipe sup-

plying air which acts by velocity.”

(See also p. 2, lines 21-50 and 68-93.)

It is a'so distinctly specified in the claims of which

claim 2 serves as an illustration, saying

“* * * and another compressed air inlet pipe

leading through the chamber wail and terminating

within the chamber near the opening into the

conduit in a nozzle directed toward said opening.”

And it was this velocity nozzle, located at and directed

toward the outlet of the chamber into the conveying

conduit which at once made the McMichael invention

what it is and distinguished it both in genus and species

from all previous devices.

It is not a suction nozzle, limited to a pressure of less

than the atmospheric pressure of fifteen pounds, created

Pe 8 NE SOAR 8 ee redo ee He ESOS. a Be

29

behind it, nor an agitating or stirring nozzle for loose or

floatable materials, but a cutting, driving jet located at the

critical point where the rocky concrete mass would jam,

arch or plug, and acting by its velocity on the obstinate

mass of solids to break the jam—or rather prevent it—

and shoot these solids intact to great distances and great

elevations.

For a further discussion of all of the foregoing matters,

the court is referred to this respondents’ main brief.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN J. Cox,

Lynn A, WILLIAMS,

Counsel for Respondents.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Reply Brief for Respondent — Powers-Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co. · 282 U.S. 175 | Frix