Respondents Brief — Minerals Separation North American Corp. v. Magma Copper Co.

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TTITLES ELMORE §

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1929.

No. 71.

~~

<—_or

MINERALS SEPARATION NORTH AMERICAN

CORPORATION,

Petitioner-Plaintif,,

VS.

MAGMA COPPER COMPANY,

Respondent-Defendant.

eer ane

———.

On Writ or CERTIORARI TO THE Unitep States Circuit

Court oF APPEALS FOR THE First Circuit.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT.

WILLIAM H. DAVIS,

MERTON W. SAGE,

Counsel for Respondent-Defendant.

GALLO & ACKERMAN, Inc., 142 Liberty Street, ‘Phones—Rector 7257-8

wh

a LESLIE SLO IE BEM TE IO ETRE ILE TER TEES TS AOE IES ORE NCE SN:

INDEX.

Jurisdiction of the Court

Brief Statement of the Case ne on

Defenses

Plaintiff’s Statement of the Case is Erroneous...

Argument

Point 1. The subject matter claimed in patent 962,-

678 is the use of a ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing

agent in the agitation froth process of plaintiff’s

earlier patent 835,120. There is no other differ-

ence between them

Point 2. It is shown by the evidence and found as a

matter of fact by the Court of Appeals of the

First Circuit in the instant case that the ‘‘solu-

ble’’ mineral-frothing agents named and claimed

in patent 962,678 are among the ‘‘oils, fatty

acids, or other substances which have a preferen-

tial affinity for metalliferous matter over

gangue’’ referred to in patent 835,120

The Kinds of ‘Oils’? Disclosed in Patent

835,120

Point 3. Since the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing

agents of patent 962,678 are substances already

known to be included within the ‘‘oils, fatty

acids, or other substances,’’ ete., of patent 835,-

120, the disclosure of patent 962,678 (which is no

more than an instruction to use these substances

as flotation agents in the process of patent 835,-

120) contains no novelty and is not the basis of

a valid patent

ore wo =

10

11

12

23

ii

The Kinds of ‘‘Oils’’ Disclosed in the New

Zealand Agitation Froth Patent (Corresponding

to Patent 835,120)

The Prior Art Disclosures of Other Soluble

Mineral-Frothing Agents Than Phenol and Cre-

sol

Amy] Acetate and Other Esters

Benzoic Acid

Valerianic Acid

The Error of Fact that Misled the Courts of

the Third Circuit

The District Court’s Decision in the Instant

Case

Point 4. Plaintiff’s counsel seek to escape this con-

clusion by arbitrarily differentiating among the

‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances which have

a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter

over gangue’’ referred to in patent 835,120.

They say that the disclosure of patent 835,120 is

limited to INSOLUBLE oils, fatty acids or

other substances which have a preferential affin-

ity for metalliferous matter over gangue.

Neither the word ‘‘insoluble’’ nor any similar

word is found in patent 835,120. Plaintiff’s

counsel seek to bridge this gap by pointing out

that patent 835,120 speaks of coating the min-

eral particles and coupling this with the assertion

that only insoluble substances can coat the min-

eral particles. But that assertion is irrelevant,

and besides, is not true

Plaintiff’s Primary Erroneous Assertion.........

Plaintiff’s Secondary Assertion

Mr. Higgins’ Demonstrations, and His Erro-

neous Deductions Therefrom

—

PAGE

The Fantastic Assertions to Which Plaintiff’s Coun-

sel Are Led in Their Attempt to Deny the Plain

Disclosure of the Agitation Froth Patent

Plaintiff’s Contention That This Court in the

Butte Case Passed Upon the Question Whether

All Substances Having Preferential Affinity for

Metalliferous Matter Necessarily Coat the Min-

eral Particles

Plaintiff’s counsel assert that the test for oily

substances in the agitation froth patent disclos-

ure is whether or not they coat the mineral parti-

eles. The real test stated in the patent is

whether or not, when added to the pulp in a quan-

tity less than one per cent. on the weight of the

ore, they will produce a mineral-bearing froth... 47

The Contention of Plaintiff’s Counsel that the

Disclosure of the Kinds of Oils and Oily Sub-

stances Available For Use in the Agitation Froth

Process of Patent 835,120 is Restricted to Oleic

Acid 49

The Attempt of Plaintiff’s Counsel to Avoid

the Disclosure of the Cattermole Patents and the

Cattermole, Sulman & Picard Patents on the

Ground that Their Processes Are Different .......... 55

45

ban

Counsel’s Misquotation to Support the Asser-

tion that the References in Patent 835,120 to

Patent 777,274 are ‘‘Specifically Confined to the

Disclosure of Oleic Acid Therein’’ 55

Plaintiff’s Assertion that the Disclosure of the

New Zealand Patent is ‘‘A Mere Juxtaposition”’

of the Three United States Patents 57

— 48° REALL RENEE HST EINE NO CLE? INE SS eM RI

iv

PAGE

The Summary Statement of Plaintiff’s posi-

tion, at the end of the brief, discloses its fallacy.. 57

Note: The remainder of this brief is devoted to

the discussion of the other defenses not con-

sidered in the opinion of the Court of Appeals

of the First Circuit.

Second Defense. The patent is invalid because of the

prior invention and patenting by Sulman, United

States patent 955,012, of the use of the soluble

mineral-frothing agent, alcohol, in solution in the

pulp in the froth flotation process of patent

835,120 59

Third Defense. The patentees, Sulman, Greenway

and Higgins, were not the joint inventors of the

subject matter of the patent in suit. On the con-

trary, two of the patentees, Sulman and Higgins,

7 knew,prior to any date available as a basis for

the patent here in suit, that the froth flotation

3 process of patent 835,120 could be practiced with

phenol, with cresol, and with certain alcohols

that were so soluble that they wholly dissolved in

the pulp 63

Fourth Defense. Claims 1 and 2 of the patent in

suit to which the complaint is limited are void

because they attempt to claim more than the pat-

entees had discovered or disclosed in the specifi-

cation. These claims attempt to cover the carry-

ing on of the process in any or all pulps ( acids,

alkaline or neutral) although the patentees had

not discovered how to carry on the process except

in an acidified pulp and the disclosure of the

specification is that acid is a necessary, not

merely a preferred, element of the process ......... 69

Fifth Defense. The claims are uot infringed because

all claims based upon the supposed invention

disclosed in the specification must be limited to

the carrying on of the process in an acidified

pulp; and defendant’s pulp is not acidified

Defendant’s Practice

Plaintiff’s Reply to the Fourth and Fifth

Defenses

Sixth Defense. The claims are not infringed by de-

fendant’s process because the claims were de-

liberately limited by the patentees to a process

in which the froth is formed by agitation, and

defendant uses the pneumatic bubble column flo-

tation process in which the froth is not formed

by agitation

Appendix

PAGE

69

79

81

91

vi

TABLE OF CASES.

PAGES

Alexander Milburn Co. vs. Davis-Bournonville Co.,

270 U.S., 390 61, 63

Bannerman vs. Sanford, 99 Fed., 294 C. C. A. 2... 68

Barrett vs. Hall, Federal Cases, 1047 68

Bracewell vs. Passaic Print Works, 107 Fed., 467.......... 24

DeLaval Separator Co. vs. Vermont Farm Mach. Co.,

126 Fed., 536 67

DeLaval Separator Co. vs. Vermont, 135 Fed., 772..... 68

Federal Yeast Corp. vs. Fleischmann Co., 13 F. (2),

570, C. C. A., 4 §2

Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. vs. Mellon, 104 U. S.,

112 83

Magma Copper Co. vs. Minerals Separation, 30 F.

(2d), 67, C.C. A. 1 mend, 6, 7, 24, 27, 30, 46, 53

McClain vs. Ortmayer, 141 U. S., 419 83

Merrill vs. Yeomans, 94 U. S., 568 83

Minerals Separation vs. Butte & Superior, 250 U. S.,

336 ........2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 18, 34, 38, 44, 45, 46, 50, 53, 77, 83

Minerals Separation vs. Hyde, 242 U. S., 261.2, 4, 14, 17,

37, 44, 46, 50, 81, 87

Minerals Separation vs. Hyde, 207 Fed., 956 D. C.

Mont. 39

Minerals Separation vs. Magma Copper Co., 23 F.

(2d), 931, D. C. Maine 33, 40, 73, 78

Minerals Separation vs. Miami Copper Co., 237 Fed.,

609, D. C. Del. 31, 51

Minerals Separation vs. Miami Copper Co., 244 Fed.,

752, C. C, A., 3 2, 4, 5, 6, 31, 32, 86, 87

Snow vs. Lake Shore, etc., Railway Co., 121 U. S.,

617 78

Stewart vs. Tenk, 32 Fed., 665 68

Thropp & Sons vs. DeLaski, 218 Fed., 458: affirmed

226 Fed., 941 68

vii

PAGES

Wellsbach Light Co. vs. Cosmopolitan incandescent

Light Co., 104 Fed., 83 68

Westinghouse vs. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co., 290

Fed., 661 80

White vs. Dunbar, 119 U. S., 47 83

Statutes.

U.S. C., Tit. 35, See. 69 (R. S. See. 4920) cnn wo ae

U.S. C., Tit. 35, See. 32 (RB. S. See. 4887) nn enmmmnnen . 61

U.S. C., Tit. 35, See. 72 (R. S. Sec. 4923) nnn . 64

U.S. C., Tit. 35, See. 33 (R. S. Sec. 4888) oommmnnnn 81

Present Case in the Courts Below.

Minerals Separation North American Corporation vs.

Magma Copper Company, D. C., 23 F. (2d), 931, R.,

Vol. I, page 617.

Magma Copper Company vs. Minerals Separation North

American Corporation C. C. A., 1st, 30 F. (2d), 67,

R., Vol. I, page 639.

Be . 4 — ~ ee ee at ee ess aaa

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1929.

No. 71.

<t

<_or

Mrnerats Separation NortH AMERICAN CoRPORATION,

Petitioner-Plaintiff,

vs.

Macma Copper Company,

Respondent-Defendant.

é>—

co}

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

(Defendant Below).

Jurisdiction of the Court.

This case comes from the Circuit Court of Appeals of

the First Circuit to this Court on a writ of certiorari

granted May 20, 1929, on petition of plaintiff* below

because of conflict as to anticipation of patent 962,678

(claims 1 and 2) by plaintiff’s earlier patent 835,120;

between the Circuit Court of Appeals of the First Cir-

euit which, on January 10, 1929, held the patent invalid

*In this brief petitioner will be referred to as plaintiff, and respondent

as defendant, as in the courts below. Emphasis is supplied by counsel

unless otherwise stated.

na

2

(Opinion, R., I, 639, 30 Fed. [2d], 67), and the Cirenit

Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit which, on May

24, 1917,* held the claims valid (244 Fed., 752).

Brief Statement of the Case.

The complaint, filed January 9, 1920, asserted infringe-

ment of plaintiff’s patents 835,120** (the so-called agita-

tion froth patent) and 962,678 (the so-called soluble froth-

ing agent patent). By stipulated order of court filed

September 28, 1922, the complaint was dismissed as to

patent 835,120 and an amended bill filed limiting the

charge of infringement to patent 962,678. At the trial

the charge of infringement was restricted to claims 1

and 2 of patent 962,678.

The defenses presented at the trial are invalidity and

non-infringement.

The patent is asserted to be invalid:

(1) Because its disclosure is anticipated in the agi-

tation froth patent 835,120.

This is the defense as to which conflict has arisen.

The other defenses were not presented to the Court

of Appeals of the Third Circuit and they were not

passed on by the Court of Appeals of the First

Circuit, which sustained the first defense but did

not consider the other defenses.

*That was before the decision of this Court in Minerals Separation, Ltd.,

vs. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U. S., 336. The importance of this

sequence of decisions is pointed out hereinafter.

**This is the much litigated patent that has been before this Court twice.

It was sustained in Minerals Separation, Ltd., et al., vs. Hyde, decided

December 11, 1916, 242 U. S,, 261, and the scope of its disclosure and

claims was passed upon in Minerals Separation, Ltd., et al., vs. Butte &

Superior Mining Co., 250 U. S., 336 (June 2, 1919).

3

(2) Because there is prior invention and prior pat-

enting of the subject matter, in the United States pat-

ent to Sulman 955,012 (R., II, 1058, et seq., and post, p.

59).

(3) Because the patentees Sulman, Greenway and

Higgins were not joint inventors, the alleged invention

having been made by Higgins and subsequently com-

municated by him to Sulman and Greenway (post, p.

63).

(4) Because the claims sued on (claims 1 and 2) em-

brace the use of soluble mineral-frothing agents in any

kind of pulp, whether acid, neutral or alkaline; whereas

the patentees’ alleged discovery, and the disclosure of

the specification, is limited to the use of soluble mineral-

frothing agents in an acid pulp (post, p. 69).

On the issue of infringement the defenses are:

(1) Defendant does not use the acidified pulp to which

the alleged discovery and the disclosure are limited, and

to which claims 1 and 2 must be limited to save them

from invalidity (post, p. 69).

(2) Defendant does not use a process in which the

froth is formed by agitation, to which claims 1 and 2 are

expressly limited (post, p. 81).

Plaintiff’s statement of the case is erroneous,

1. The assertion of plaintiff’s counsel (brief, p. 1) that

in reaching the conclusion that claims 1 and 2 of patent

962,678 are not anticipated by patent 835,120:

‘The Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-

cuit in the said Miami case had followed this Court

in this Court’s elucidation in Minerals Sevaration,

—

4

Ltd., vs. Hyde, 242 U. S., 261, of the invention of

plaintiff’s earlier patent aforesaid No. 835,120 (an

elucidation later confirmed by this Court in Minerals

Separation, Ltd., vs. Butte & Superior Mining Co.,

250 U. S., 336),

is not true.

The Miami Case was decided May 24, 1917, after the

decision by this Court of the Hyde Case and before the

decision by this Court of the Butte Case. The decisions

of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in the

Third Circuit in the Miami Case, sustaining patent 962,-

678, were expressly based on the belief (disproved in the

instant case) that the soluble mineral-frothing agents of

patent 962,678, are not oils or oily substances, and were

not, therefore, embraced within the oils, fatty acids or

other substances having a preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter over gangue referred to in patent 835,120.

On that question the decision of this Court in the Hyde

Case had no bearing. Patent 962,678 was not involved in

the Hyde Case, nor mentioned therein. And the scope of

the disclosure of patent 835,120 was not there in issue, as

this Court subsequently pointed out in the Butte Case.*

In the Butte Case, which was not decided by this Court

until after the decision of the Court of Appeals of the

Third Circuit in the Miami Case, the ‘‘nature and extent

of the disclosures’’ of patent 835,120 ‘‘with respect to

the kinds and quantities of oil which may be used in the

process’’ was for the first time in issue,** and this Court

found (250 U. S., 349)

*“While in the former case this Court was not called upon and in its

opinion did not attempt, to define the scope of the claims, but was con-

sidering the patent only from the point of view of the invention and use-

fulness of the claimed discovery,” etc. (Butte Case, 250 U. S., 341).

**“With the state of the prior art in mind, we come to consider the

nature and extent of the disclosures of the patent in suit, but only with

respect to the kinds and quantities of oil which may be used in the

process” (250 U. S., 346).

5

‘*that the only disclosure as to the kind and amount

of oil which the patentees made to the public as nec-

essary to the practicing of their process is that it

must be an oil or oily substance, or oily liquid having

a ‘preferential affinity for metalliferous matter,’ and

that it shall be limited in amount ‘to a fraction of

one per cent. on the ore’.”’

If the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in the

Miami Case had known what is conclusively proved in

the instant case, that the soluble mineral-frothing agents

named in the patent in suit are in fact oils, fatty acids,

or other substances already known at the date of patent

835,120 to possess this preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter, it could not have differentiated the

disclosure of patent 962,678 from the disclosure of patent

835,120. The differentiation between ‘‘insoluble’’ oils

and ‘‘soluble’’ oils, upon which plaintiff’s whole argu-

ment rests in the instant case, is just as much a viola-

tion of the disclosure of patent 835,120 as was plaintiff’s

attempted differentiation between ‘‘frothing’’ oils and

‘‘non-frothing’’ oils in the Butte Case, where this Court

said (250 U. S., 348):

‘*From this consideration of the terms of the

patent as written, it is apparent that it makes no

differentiation whatever, either in the claims or in

the specification, among the oils having a preferen-

tial affinity for metalliferous matter, and that its

disclosure, to which the petitioners must be limited,

is, that when a fraction of one per cent. on the ore of

any such oil is used in the manner prescribed, there

will be produced a metal-bearing froth, the result of

the process’’

and (p. 350):

‘“‘Thus when to our former conclusion that the

respondent used an efficient oil of the patent, we

a

6

add the further conclusion, derived from a study of

its terms, that the patentees failed to differentiate

among the oils described in the patent, we must con-

clude that it is impossible for the courts to distin.

guish among them, as more or less efficient in the

process, without amending the claims of the patent,

and this they are powerless to do.’’

2. The assertion of plaintiff’s counsel (brief, p. 2) that

the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the instant

case ‘‘refused to accept and follow the said decisions of

this Court as to the nature of the invention of the earlier

patent No. 835,120 and disregarded and overrode those

decisions’’ is not true. On the contrary, the Court of

Appeals of the First Cireuit accepted and followed the

decision of this Court in the Butte Case and regarded

that decision (Opinion, R., I, 648) as a refutation of

plaintiff’s contention that the disclosure of patent

835,120 is limited to insoludle mineral-frothing oils, fatty

acids, ete.; and as an affirmation of defendant’s conten-

tion that, the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances which

have a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter over

gangue’’ of patent 835,120 include soluble oils, fatty

acids and other kinds of substances specified in patent

967,678, and therefore anticipate that patent.

3. It is not true, as asserted by plaintiff’s counsel

(brief, p. 2) that the proofs as to the prior art are sub-

stantially the same in the two cases (the Miami Case

and the instant case). It is true that patent 835,120 was

put forward in the Miami Case as an anticipation of

patent 962,678. But the opinions of the District Court

and the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit show that

it was not there proved (or if proved was not brought

to the attention of the court) that the ‘‘oils, fatty acids,

_—

7

or other substances which have a preferential affinity’’ of

patent 835,120 include the solwble oils, fatty acids and

other substances of patent 962,678.

Argument.

Summary As to Anticipation of Patent

962,678 by the Disclosure of Patent 825,120.

Whether the disclosure of patent 835,120 does or does

not anticipate the subject-matter claimed in patent

962,678 is a simple matter of fact. No question of law

is involved, nor is the sometimes difficult question of

invention, as distinguished from mechanical skill, pre-

sented. If the facts are as the Court of Appeals for the

First Cireuit found them to be, direct anticipation is

established.

Summarily stated, the facts and the necessary con-

clusions from them are as follows:

Point 1.

The subject-matter claimed in patent 962,678 is the

use of a ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agent in the agi-

tation froth process of plaintiff’s earlier patent 835,120.

There is no other difference between them. The ‘‘solu-

ble’? mineral frothing agents named in patent 962,678

are ‘‘amy] acetate and other esters; phenol and its homo-

logues; benzoic, valerianic and lactie acids; acetones and

other ketones such as camphor”’ (R., II, 664, pat., p. 1,

lines 33-36).

Point 2.

It is shown by the evidence and found as a matter

of fact by the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit in

] | i,

the instant case that these ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing

agents named and claimed in patent 9€2,678 are among

the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances which have

a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter over

gangue’’ referred to in patent 835,120.

4

4

Point 3.

Since the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agents of patent

962,678 are substances already known to be included with-

in the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances,’’ etc., of

patent 835,120, the disclosure of patent 962,678 (which is

no more than an instruction to use these substances as

flotation agents in the process of patent 835,120) con-

: tains no novelty and is not the basis of a valid patent.

: Point 4.

Plaintiff’s counsel seek to escape this conclusion

by arbitrarily differentiating among the ‘‘oils, fatty

: acids, or other substances which have a preferential

affinity for metalliferous matter over gangue’’ referred

to in patent 835,120. They say that the disclosure of

patent 835,120 is limited to insoluble ‘‘ oils, fatty acids, or

other substances which have a preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter over gangue’’. Neither the word

‘‘insoluble’’ nor any similar word is found in patent

835,120. Plaintiff’s counsel seek to bridge this gap by

pointing out that patent 835,120 speaks of coating the

mineral particles and coupling this with the assertion

that only insoluble substances can coat the mineral

particles.

ae

As to this question, whether or not soluble flotation

agents coat the mineral particles, thus introduced into

the discussion by plaintiff’s counsel and therefore neces-

9

sary to be proved by plaintiff to support its contention

that the disclosure of patent 835,120 is limited to insol-

uble substances, defendant’s counsel reply:

(a) That if that fact were true, it would not make the

disclosure of patent 835,120 any less an anticipation of

patent 962,678. That patent 835,120 made to the man

skilled in the art the general disclosure that ‘‘oils, fatty

acids, or other substances’’ possessing this preferential

affinity would produce the mineral-bearing froth if used

in quantity less than one per cent. on the weight of the

ore and subjected to agitation. It was wholly unneces-

sary for the man skilled in the art to know, and it made

no practical difference in the availability of the process

for different ores, whether the oils, fatty acids and other

substances which display this preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter over gangue are soluble or insol-

uble in the water of the pulp in the minute proportions

specified in patent 835,120.

(b) That the evidence proves the fact to be that the

oils, fatty acids, ete., referred to in patent 835,120, in-

clude the soluble oils, fatty acids, ete., named in patent

962,678; and that all these mineral-frothing agents

whether soluble or insoluble, coat the mineral particles.

(c) That this attempt by plaintiff to prolong its mon-

opoly by a limiting differentiation, excluding soluble sub-

stances from the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances’’

referred to in patent 835,120, is closely analogous to

plaintiff’s attempt in the Butte Case to enlarge its mon-

opoly by a limiting differentiation excluding non-frothing

oils from the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances’’ of

patent 835,120. That attempt was disapproyed by this

Court in the Butte Case and by a parity of reasoning, the

like attempt now made should be disapproved in this

case.

10

POINT 1.

The subject matter claimed in patent 962,678 is the

use of a ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agent in the agita-

tion froth process of plaintiff’s earlier patent 835,120.

There is no other difference between them.

Plaintiff’s counsel say in their brief (p. 39):

‘Generally comparing the process of the patent

in suit with that of the first patent, No. 835,120, it

is a fact that the only essential change in the things

that are put into the pulp in the process of the pat-

ent in suit is that the agent is one which will go

into solution in the water of the pulp instead of re-

maining undissolved therein.”’

and all the differences that they argumentatively assert

between the two processes are attributed by them to the

‘‘change in the things that are put into the pulp.’’

This sole difference between the disclosure of patent

835,120 and the disclosure of patent 962,678 is expressed

in the definitive words ‘‘in solution’’ of claims 1 and 2

of the patent in suit. These are words of exclusion in-

tended to differentiate the claimed process from the

process of patent 835,120.

These words give rise immediately to the inquiry

whether, among substances already known to be avail-

able for use in the agitation froth process of patent

835,120, there were substances soluble in the propor-

tions used in the process of that patent—i. e., ‘‘a frac-

tion of one per cent. on the ore.’’ If such soluble sub-

stances are embraced within the disclosure of patent

835,120, there is nothing added to the knolwedge of the

art by the disclosure of patent 962,678, and the claimed

monopoly of mineral-frothing agents ‘‘in solution’’ is

unjustified.

11

In order to make this inquiry concrete, we note that

the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agents named in patent

962,678 are ‘‘amyl acetate and other esters; phenol and

its homologues; benzoic, valerianic and lactic acids; ace-

tones and other ketones such as camphor’’ (R., II, 664,

patent, p. 1, lines 33-36). If we find those soluble min-

eral-frothing agents, or any of them, among the “‘oils,

fatty acids, or other substances which have a preferen-

tial affinity for metalliferous matter over gangue’’ of

patent 835,120, then the answer to our inquiry must be

an affirmative one and patent 962,678 must be invalid.

POINT 2.

It is shown by the evidence and found as a matter of

fact by the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit in the

instant case that the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agents

named and claimed in patent 962,678 are among the

‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances which have a

preferential affinity for metalliferous matter over

gangue’’ referred to in patent 835,120.

For instance, phenol, one of the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-

frothing agents named in patent 962,678, the Court of

Appeals of the First Cireuit finds to be ‘‘specifically

named in the prior art patent of Cattermole 777,274 and

* * © among the oils or oily liquids of patent No. 835,120”

(Opinion, R., I, 649). The Court said:

‘‘Phenol being among the oils or oily liquids of

patent No. 835,120 and that patent having disclosed

that by reducing the quantity used to a fraction of

one per cent. on the weight of the ore and by vigor-

ously agitating the pulp, the agent would effect the

process of that patent, it is apparent that a clear dis-

closure anticipating the patent in suit is shown, for

eee en Tee

12

phenol in the quantity used in the process of that

patent is wholly dissolved in water.’’

In like manner it was shown by the evidence in the in-

stant case that amyl acetate and amy] alcohol are well

known oils of commerce having preferential affinity for

metalliferous. matter and ‘‘undoubtedly oils of the prior

art’’ (Opinion, R., I, 649); that valerianic acid “‘is a

fatty acid of the prior art patents Nos. 835,120 and

777,274’’ (same page); and that ‘‘benzoic acid * * * is

among the resin acids of Cattermole 777,274’’ (same

page).

The question here presented is decisive of the case.

Patent 962,678 is without novelty and cannot be sustained

if this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals of the

First Circuit that the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other sub-

stances which have a preferential affinity for metalli-

ferous matter over gangue,’’ known and available to the

art at the date of patent 835,120 included the substances

specifically named as examples of the soluble mineral-

frothing agents in the specification of patent 962,678.

The Kinds of ‘‘Oils’’ Disclosed in Patent 835,120.

The place to begin the inquiry as to what is disclosed

in patent 835,120 is in the specification of that patent

(R., II, 1002-1007). That patent says (R., II, 1004, pat.,

p. 1, lines 9-15):

‘‘This invention relates to improvements in the

concentration of ores, the object being to separate

metalliferous matter, graphite, and the like from

gangue by means of oils, fatty acids, or other sub-

stances which have a preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter over gangue.’’

13

What are these ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other sub-

stances which have a preferential affinity for metallif-

erous matter over gangue’’? The patent does not identify

them any further, except that it names oleic acid as one

example (pat., p. 1, line 80). Yet the patentees say (p.

1, lines 61, et seq.):

“‘The proportion of mineral which floats in the

form of froth varies considerably with different

ores and with different oily substances, and before

utilizing the facts above mentioned in the concen-

tration of any particular ore a simple preliminary

test is necessary to determine which oily substance

yields the proportion of froth or scum desired.’?

Clearly the words ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other sub-

stances,’’ ete., refer to substances already known in this

art to possess this ‘‘preferential affinity.’’ They import

into the disclosure of the patent all oils, fatty acids and

other substances then known to possess that preferential

affinity. There was no other source from which the man

skilled in the art could select the ‘‘different oily sub-

stances’’ for the stated test. with ‘‘different ores.’’

When we turn to this prior knowledge of the art thus

imported into the disclosure of patent 835,120, we find

that this preferential affinity for metalliferous matter

over gangue was known to be possessed by a tremendous

number of substances. So much so that such preferential

affinity may almost be said to be a property, in greater

or less degree, of all oils and oily substances, of all

fatty acids, and of a great many other substances be-

sides.*

*The knowledge of the art in this respect is discussed by defendant’s

expert, Professor Taggart (R., I, 180-200). In that testimony he lists the

oils, fatty acids, and other substances which in prior patents and publi-

cations had been shown to have this preferential affinity for metalliferous

matter over gangue. For the convenience of the Court, we have extracted

from that testimony, with reference to the patents and publications them-

selves, a list of these substances and have printed it in an appendix

to this brief.

14

But to find complete anticipation of patent 962,678 it is

not necessary to go beyond the prior patents and pub-

lications referred to by this Court in the Hyde Case, nor

indeed to go beyond the prior patents specifically re-

ferred to in the specification of patent 835,120.

Discussing patent 835,120 in the Hyde Case, this Court

said (242 U. S., 264):

‘It is clear that in the prior art, as it is developed

in this record, it was well known that oil and oily

substances had a selective affinity or attraction for,

and would unite mechanically with, the minute parti-

cles of metal and metallic compounds found in

crushed or powdered ores, but would not so unite

with the quartz, or rocky non-metallic material, called

‘gangue.’ Haynes British patent (1860), and United

States patents, Everson (1886), Robson (1897) and

Elmore (1901). It was also well known this selee-

tive property of oils and oily substances was in-

creased when applied to some ores by the addition of

a small amount of acid to the ore and water used in

process of concentration. United States patents,

Everson (1886), Elmore (1901), and Cattermole

(1904).’’

In the Haynes British patent (R., IT, 925), the ‘“‘agent”’

disclosed ‘‘for obtaining minerals from ores”? is (p. 925,

lines 8-11):

‘bituminous matter (coal tar from gasworks, and

such like, for instance), gums or gummy matter

(amongst others, gutta percha, india-rubber, for in-

stance), and fatty or oleaginous matter.’’

In the Everson patent, which first introduced the idea

of increasing the preferential affinity by adding a small

—

15

amount of acid to the ore and water (R., ITI, 935), the

agents are (p. 935, line 12) ‘‘fats or oils’’ and (lines

17-21)

‘*a fat or an oil, either animal, mineral, or vegetable,

or a fatty constituent or acid of an animal or vegeta-

ble fat or oil, or any constituent of a mineral oil’’

and more specifically (lines 82-87) :

“‘T have used petroleum and one of its several

constituents—namely, paraffine oils—also tallow

(melted), lard, lard-oil, red-oil (impure oleic acid),

cotton-seed oil, castor-oil, sperm-oil, and linseed oil,

and some combination of these with each other.’’

In Robson’s patent (R., II, 949) the preferentially se-

lective agent used is (line 35) ‘‘an oily liquid,’’ and more

specifically (lines 43-46) :

‘mixing a liquid hydrocarbon, such, for example, as

turpentine, petroleum, paraffin, or the like, with a

fatty oil such as colza-oil.’’

Elmore’s patent (R., II, 953) says (lines 10-20) :

‘*This invention relates to apparatus for effecting

the separation of minerals by the selective action of

oils and like substances * * *.

‘*In what follows I shall use the word ‘oil’ to mean

either oil or any other substance that can exert a

selective action on minerals such as oil exerts.’’

Cattermole’s patent 763,259 (R., II, 966) says (lines

9-16) :

‘The present invention relates to the classification

of the metalliferous constituents of ores which have

. ns st ial

aide PR TER OREN A

16

been separated from gangue by oil or similar matter,

such as certain wood or coal tar products, hereinafter

referred to as ‘oil,’ in which term I also include the

emulsifying agent when an emulsifying agent is

present with the oil.’’

Cattermole’s patent 763,260 (R., II, 970) says (p. 1,

lines 12-18) :

‘‘The present invention relates to improvements

in the separation of the metalliferous constituents of

ores and the like from gangue by means of the selec-

tive action of oils and certain tar products or similar

compounds (all hereinafter referred to as ‘oil’) on

metallic or metalliferous matter.’

And (p. 971, lines 89-94) :

‘‘The oil used may be animal, vegetable, or mineral

oil, or mixtures of these, or such coal or wood tar

products or other substances which exercise, like oils,

& preferential physical affinity for metallic mineral

matter as distinguished from gangue.’’

The same language is repeated in Cattermole patent

777,273 (R., II, 974, 975).

In the British patent to Cattermole, Sulman &

Picard* (R., II, 978) and in the corresponding United

States patent 777,274 (R., II, 982) the patentees say (R.,

II, 982, lines 10-19) :

‘‘Our process has for its object the separation of

minerals from the silicious, or earthy matters of

ores by means of soaps or similar compounds, and

is dependent upon the superior physical attraction

*It will be noted that Sulman & Picard are the patentees of patent

835,120, and that Sulman is one of the patentees of patent 962,678 in suit.

17

exhibited by minerals for fatty or resin acids, or for

certain other aromatic derivatives (such as cresols,

phenols, etc.) which form soluble salts or compounds

with alkaline hydrates as compared with earthy or

silicious substances.’’

It is clear from these disclosures (and particularly from

the practically identical phraseology used in the Sulman,

Picard and Ballot patent 835,120, in the Cattermole pat-

ent and in the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent), that

when the patentees of patent 835,120 used the words

‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances which have a pref-

erential affinity for metalliferous matter over gangue’”’

they referred to and embraced all these substances that

had already been shown to have this preferential

affinity.

It is easy to tmagine what plaintiff’s counsel would

have said, during the litigation on patent 835,120, if any

one using any of these substances in the agitation-froth

process of patent 835,120 had attempted to assert that

any one of these known oils, fatty acids, etc., was not

embraced im the disclosure of patent 835,120.

This Court, in the Hyde Case, after thus finding that it

was well known that oils and oily substances had this

selective affinity for metalliferous matter, went on to dis-

cuss (242 U. S., 264) the prior art processes for making

use of that property in the separation of minerals from

their ores; referring particularly to the surface flotation

process in which the oil was used in sufficient quantity to

float the mineral particles to the surface, and to the Cat-

termole metal sinking process in which the oil was used

in very much lesser amount to agglomerate the oil-coated

mineral particles into granules heavier than water, so

that the granules would sink to the bottom of the contain-

ing vessel, permitting the gangue to be carried away by an

Srey

18

upward flowing stream of water. And this Court pointed

out that the process of patent 835,120 differed from

those prior processes in using a critically small amount

of oil—amounting to a fraction of one per cent. on the

ore—in conjunction with agitation that impregnated the

mass of ore and water with air bubbles which rose to the

surface asa mineral-bearing froth.

And in the Butte Case, this Court said (250 U. S., 346):

‘Here is the essence of the discovery and it is

announced in these terms:

‘We have found that if the proportion of oily

substance be considerably reduced—say to a frac-

tion of one per cent. on the ore—granulation ceases

to take place, and after vigorous agitation there is

a tendency for a part of the oil-coated metalliferous

matter to rise to the surface of the pulp in the

form of a froth or scum.’’

It was thus made clear that the discovery of patent

835,120 was a process discovery, depending upon the

amount of the oily substance used and the character of

agitation employed, and not depending upon the choice of

the particular oil, fatty acid or other substance having

the preferential affinity for metalliferous matter. As to

all those substances, the new process was said to be, and

was in fact, generally applicable. It was from these

substances generally that the user of the new process was

directed to choose the ‘‘different oily substances”’ for

‘different ores,’’ in making the practical test set forth

in the patent (R., II, 1004, lines 61-69).

Indeed the specification of patent 835,120 refers

directly to the Cattermole patent 777,273 and to the Cat-

termole, Sulman & Picard patent 777,274, and differen-

tiates the new process from the old Cattermole agglom-

erating process, not in respect of the kind of oils, fatty

19

acids or other substances employed as mineral-frothing

agents, but wholly in respect of the quantity of oil, fatty

acid or other substance employed and the kind and

degree of agitation. The patentees said (pat. 835,120,

R., II, 1004, lines 28 et seq.) :

‘“We have found that if the proportion of oily sub-

stance be considerably reduced—say to a fraction of

one per cent. on the ore—granulation ceases to take

place, and after vigorous agitation there isa tendency

for a part of the oil-coated metalliferous matter to

rise to the surface of the pulp in the form of a froth

or scum’’

If, therefore, the reader of patent 835,120 found that

oleic acid (the only substance specifically mentioned in

the patent) was not suitable for the particular ore from

which he was trying to separate the metalliferous matter,

his next step would be to look at the Cattermole patent

and the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent to find ‘dif-

ferent oily substances’’ for his tests.

The Cattermole Patent 777,273 (R., II, 974) says the

invention relates

‘“* * * to improvements in the separation of the

metalliferous constituents of ores and the like from

gangue by means of the selective action of oils and

certain tar products or similar compounds (all

hereinafter referred to as ‘oil’) on metallic or metal-

liferous matter’’ (p. 1, lines 9-15).

*“‘The ‘oil’ used may be animal, vegetable, or

mineral oil or mixtures of these or such coal or wood

tar products or other substances which exercise, like

oils, a preferential physical affinity for metallic min-

eral matter as distinguished from gangue’’ ( p. 2,

lines 89-94),

20

From this disclosure of the Cattermole granulation

process the seeker for information as to what substances

might be used in the process of patent 835,120 is directed

somewhat more specifically than in patent 835,120 to

animal, vegetable and mineral oils, in general, and par-

ticularly to coal tar and wood tar compounds, which are

the substances that have had the widest use in industrial

flotation of minerals.

Turning from the Cattermole patent to the Catter-

mole, Sulman & Picard patent 777,274 for further specific

identification of the oils, fatty acids and other sub-

stances having a preferential affinity for metalliferous

matter referred to in patent 835,120, the man skilled in

the art would find that the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard

patent 777,274 discloses unmistakably many of the very

substances named in the patent here in suit. The pat-

entees of that patent say (R., II, 982, lines 10-19):

‘*Our process has for its object the separation of

minerals from the silicious or earthy matters of ores

by means of soaps or similar compounds, and is de-

pendent upon the superior physical attraction ex-

hibited by minerals for fatty or resin acids or for

certain other aromatic derivatives (such as cresols,

phenols, etc.) which form soluble salts or com-

pounds with alkaline hydrates as compared with

earthy or silicious substances.’’

The patented improvement of that patent was a

method of thoroughly dispersing the fatty or resin acid

or cresol or phenol throughout the pulp so that it could

effectively exercise its selective function. To that end a

soap compound of the fatty or resin acid or other aro-

matic derivative, such as cresol, phenol, etc., was substi-

tuted for the agent of the Cattermole patent 777,273.

The soap compound, which was readily soluble in the

21

pulp, quickly disseminated the agent through the body

of the pulp. Thereupon, by action of acid in the pulp

on the soap compound, this compound was broken down,

“liberating in a state of chemical subdivision the fatty

or resin acid or other compound, such as cresol, etce.,

in intimate contact with the suspended ore particles’’

(R., IT, 982; p. 1, lines 39 to 42).

Thus the man skilled in the art. looking to the disclo-

sure of these Cattermole and Cattermole, Sulman &

Picard patents to find substances other than oleic acid

which have a preferential affinity for metalliferous mat-

ter over gangue, would find in this patent 777,274 not

only the fatty acids, broadly mentioned in patent 835,120,

but also resin acids, and more specifically, cresol and

phenol, which are among the very substances named in

the patent here in suit.*

Being thus told by the Cattermole patents that among

the substances having preferential affinity for metallifer-

ous matter over gangue are animal, vegetable and min-

eral oils, particularly coal tar and wood tar products ;

and fatty acids, resin acids. phenol and cresol, the

mill man would, following the instructions of patent

835,120 (p. 1, line 61, et seq.), proceed to make the

‘simple preliminary test’’ on his ore with these agents.

He would make that test with each of the selected. sub-

stances. He would carry out the process described in

that patent, using the ore he was trying to float and

the several flotation agents in succession.

When among these agents he came to use in the process

phenol or cresol in the specified quantities and with the

apparatus and the degree of agitation disclosed in pat-

ent 835,120, he would produce a mineral-bearing froth

and would find himself practicing the process of the pat-

ent in suit.

*The patent in suit says (p. 1, line 34) “phenol and its homologues.”

Cresol is a homologue of phenol.

——

22

ce |

Plaintiff does not deny this. In fact that is the very

disclosure of patent 962,678 when it says to use ‘‘phenol

and its homologues’’ in the process described in patent

835,120.

That the man skilled in the art would thus determine

the availability of the then known oils, fatty acids and

other substances having preferential affinity for metalli-

ferous matter over gangue to which patent 835,120 directs

his attention and which were then known to possess that

property, by the simple, practical test outlined in the

patent; and that in so doing he would practice the proc-

ess of the patent here in suit, is quite fully admitted by

plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Higgins, who said:

(R., I, 495, XQ486.) ‘‘It has always been my

i opinion that the test of the suitability of an oil or

j mineral-frothing agent for use in the air froth flota-

3 tion process, is the application of the process itself.’’

(501, XQ519.) ‘‘There was nothing known at the

i date of that patent, was there, to prohibit or impede

| a man making such an investigation, to use the oils

: that Bessel had told him to use? A. No. * * *”’

:

4

prperahe

(502: XQ525.) ‘‘A. My answer is as before, that

a metallurgist would be justified in taking those

; which were oily in nature, such as resin oil.’’

(XQ526.) ‘*Well, if he did that, he would find

some of them that were very substantially soluble

| in those proportions, would he not? A. Yes. * * *’’

| (XQ527.) ‘** * * I asked you whether, if he took

; less than 1 per cent. upon the weight of the ore of

one of these resin compounds indicated by this lan-

guage from Bessel, and proceeded to put it in the

; Gabbett mixer with the pulp, and carried out the

} operation as you carried it out in Boston (the opera-

; tion of patent No. 835,120), I say that he would

iz _

23

have gotten a mineral-bearing froth, would he not?

A. With some of them, yes.’’

(XQ528.) ‘‘And he would have had present a

mineral frothing agent in solution, would he not?

A. He could have chosen one that would have given

him that condition.’’

(XQ529.) ‘*And if that process were carried out

before you now with that particular substance, you

would say that it was the practice of the process of

the patent here in suit, would you not? A. No, I

do not think so (and then after some discussion) I

misunderstood your question, Mr. Davis. The an-

swer there should have been ‘Yes.’ ”’

POINT 3.

We submit that this ends the matter. It leads neces-

sarily to the conclusion, expressed in Point 3 (ante,

p. 8) that since some of the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-froth-

ing agents of patent 962,678 are substances already

known to be included within the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or

other substances,’’ etc., of patent 835,120, the disclosure

of patent 962,678 (which is no more than an instruction

to use these substances as flotation agents in the process

of patent 835,120) contains no novelty and is not ‘the’

basis of a valid patent.

We must be right in saying that the instruction of

patent 835,120 is to use in that process the already known

oils, fatty acids and other substances having a prefer-

ential affinity for metalliferous matter over gangue;

because there is no other instruction in the patent as to

where the man skilled in the art is to find the ‘‘different

oily substances’’ for ‘‘different ores.’’ We cannot be

wrong in saying that the proper test of other oily sub-

JP Sr NRG

mama

24

stances with other ores is the practical test of use, because

that and no other is the test that patent 835,120 pre-

scribes. Plaintjff’s expert, Mr. Higgins, admits that it

is “‘the test of, suitability of an oil or mineral-frothing

agent for use in the air froth flotation process’; and

patents are addressed to practical men and not to the-

orists and rhetoricians.*

If we are right in these things, then we arrive, by imme-

diate reference from patent 835,120 to the Cattermole pat-

ent and the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent, at a

disclosure which completely anticipates the patent in suit.

That is the conclusion arrived at by the Court of

1 Appeals of the First Circuit and expressed in that part

of its opinion quoted ante, pages 11-12.

The Kinds of ‘‘Oils’’ Disclosed in the

New Zealand Agitation Froth Patent

(Corresponding to Patent 835,120).

‘eee aE ats on 5: am alia oA

Although we do not believe that any reasonable person

can doubt that the instruction of patent 835,120 was to

use in the new agitation froth process of that patent any

and all known substances having a preferential affinity

for metalliferous matter over gangue and particularly the

\ oils, fatty acids and other substances of the Cattermole

+ and Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent; yet we proceed

_ to direct the attention of this Court to the fact that in

the Sulman, Greenway & Ballot New Zealand patent (R.,

II, 1011), which corresponds to the United States pat-

| ent 835,120, the disclosure specifically instructs the man

| skilled in the art to use phenol and cresol as flotation

_ agents in a proportion less than one per cent. on the ore

_ in the agitation froth process.

The New Zealand patent, on pages 1, 2, 3 and 4, fol-

lows almost exactly the specification of the United States

*“The patent is not addressed to rhetoricians or verbalists, but to the

workers in the art.” Bracewell vs. Passaic Print Works, 107 Fed., 467-470.

25

patent 835,120 from the beginning of page 1 through line

45 of page 2. The difference between the two patents

is that whereas the use of the oils and oily substances

of the Cattermole patent 777,273 and of the Cattermole,

Sulman & Picard patent 777,274 are imported into the

United States patent by reference; the New Zealand

patent verbally and explicitly discloses the use of less

than one per cent. (on the weight of the ore) of the fatty

and resin acids and phenol and cresol in the agitation

froth process.

The New Zealand patent says (R., IT, 1015):

‘“‘Another feature of this invention consists in a

method of producing and utilizing the fatty or resin

acids or certain other aromatic derivatives (such as

cresols, phenols, ete.) * * *.”

‘‘In carrying out this part of our invention, the

suitably crushed ore is suspended in water and to

the mixture an addition of a small quantity of soap

solution is made. A small amount of mineral acid

is then added which decomposes the soluble soap or

other similar compound by uniting with the alka-

line base thereof, thus liberating in a state of chem-

ical sub-division the fatty or resin acid or other com-

pound such as cresol, ete., in intimate contact with

the suspended ore particles. It is found that lib-

erated fatty acids, which may even be solid in cer-

tain cases, are precipitated and under these condi-

tions adhere to the sulpheretted minerals, or to sul-

phur, graphite, or free metals present in the ore,

leaving the gangue or earthy particles preferentially

wetted by water, and free from adhesions of fatty

acid and the like.’’

The New Zealand patent then says (p. 1016):

“If the proportion of fatty acid produced in the

mixture be about 1% to 4% of the ore and if the

ie

26

mixture be thoroughly agitated, the coated metallif-

erous particles will adhere together and form gran-

ules or small agglomerate masses which, partly by

reason of gravity and partly on account of their

bulk, as compared with the individual grains of

gangue, may be readily separated in up-currents or

by other suitable classification apparatus.’’

That is the Cattermole granulation process.

The New Zealand patent then goes on to say:

“*If, however, the proportion of fatty acid be less

than 1% of the ore a greater or less proportion of

the coated metalliferous matter will form into a

froth as described at the beginning of this speci-

fication.’’

That is the agitation froth process.

It is clear from the context that the words ‘‘fatty

acid’’ in both the above statements refer back to the

group of substances ‘‘fatty or resin acids or certain

other aromatic derivatives (such as cresols, phenols,

etc.)’’ with which the discussion of this feature of the

invention opens and which group, in the disclosure of

this feature (pp. 1015-1016), is variously referred to as

‘‘fatty or resin acid or other compound such as cresol,

etc.,’’ ‘‘fatty or resin acids,’’ ‘‘fatty acids and the like’’

and ‘‘fatty acids.’’*

*Note, for example, that in the paragraph immediately preceding, the

patentees speak of “liberating in a state of chemical subdivision, the fatty

or resin acid or other compound such as cresol, etc.”; then at the beginning

of the next sentence say that “liberated fatty acids” are preciptated; and

at the end of the same sentence speak of the gangue particles as “free

from adhesions of fatty acid, and the like.”

27

The Court of Appeals of the First Circuit said, in the

instant case (R., I, 649):

“‘This construction of patent No. 835,120 is con-

firmed by the disclosure in the New Zealand patent

No. 19,633 of October 27, 1905, which corresponds

to the United States patent No. 835,120, and was

granted to the same persons for the same invention.’’

And (p. 650):

‘The words fatty acids as used in that paragraph

refer back to the group of fatty acids and their de-

rivatives creso] and phenol previously mentioned and

plainly disclose that phenol is one of the frothing

agents described in and made a part of patent No.

835,120; and if used in the fraction of one per cent.

on the ore, the critical amount of the patent, the

metalliferous matter will be coated and the froth

formed.’’

The Prior Art Disclosures of

Other Soluble Mineral-Frothing

Agents Than Phenol and Cresol.

But even if the words ‘‘fatty acid’’ here meant only

fatty acids and nothing else, that would not make this

statement in the New Zealand patent of 1905 any less a

complete disclosure of the process of the patent here in

suit; because among the fatty acids is valerianic acid,

one of the ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing agents named

in the patent in suit (post, p. 30).

We have emphasized the explicit disclosure of the use

of phenol and cresol in the agitation froth process of

patent 835,120 and of the corresponding New Zealand

| a

28

patent because phenol and cresol are explicitly named in

patent 962,678 in suit.*

Plaintiff cannot monopolize what was already known;

either the use specifically of phenol and cresol as min-

eral-frothing agents, or, generically, the use of a mineral-

frothing agent wholly in solution.

Since defendant is not using any one of the mineral-

frothing agents specifically mentioned in the patent in

suit** we are not really concerned to inquire whether any

residue of patentable novelty is left in the other agents

specifically mentioned—amyl acetate and other esters,

: benzoic, valerianic and lactic acids, acetones and other

ketones such as camphor.

It is only the broad monoply claimed—the monopoly

of every organic mineral-frothing agent in solution—

that defendant is charged with transgressing. That

_ _ broad monopoly being untenable, the defendant must be

_ discharged.

It is not, however, to be supposed that phenol and

cresol are the only soluble flotation agents mentioned in

the patent in suit that were included among the oils, fatty

acids and other substances that patent 835,120 (and the

* corresponding New Zealand patent) directed the man

skilled in the art to use. The ‘‘soluble’’ mineral-frothing

agents, other than phenol and its homologue cresol, named

in patent 962,678 are ‘‘amyl acetate and other esters;

benzoic, valerianic and lactic acids; acetones and other

ketones such as camphor”? (pat., p. 1, lines 34-37).

Amyl Acetate and Other Esters.—The only sub-

stance for which the patent claims a specific monopoly—

as distinguished from the broader monoply of all min-

eral-frothing agents in solution, within which the specific

*“phenol and its homologues” (pat., p. 1, line 34). Cresol is one of the

: homologues of phenol.

j **The mineral-frothing agent used by defendant is alpha naphthylamine,

5 commonly known as X-cake (post, p. 79).

; f gts

i... 2 spies Yor ‘ . :

29

monopoly is included—is ‘‘an organic amyl compound”’

(claim 9).

The disclosure of the specification upon which this

claim is based is the statement that the patentees ‘‘have

found suitable for use as mineral-frothing agents with

certain ores * * * amyl acetate and other esters.”’

Amy! acetate is described by Professor Taggart on

pages 228 and 229 of the Record, Vol. I. It isa colorless,

oily liquid commonly known as banana oil; a well known

oil of commerce. When used in the proportions specified

in Patent 835,120 it forms a mineral-bearing froth,

thereby displaying its preferential affinity for metalli-

ferous matter over gangue. It is clearly one of the oils

or oily substances included within the broader expres-

sion of Patent 835,120.

Amy] alcohol is ‘‘an organic amyl compound”? closely

related, chemically, to amyl acetate. It is commonly

known as ‘‘fusel oil’? and is specifically mentioned as a

flotation agent in the two Bessel German patents No. 42

of 1877 and No. 39,369 of 1887 (R., Vol. II, 928-934;

Taggart, R., I, 186, Q6, and 242, Qs115-117). It is an-

other wholly soluble organic mineral-frothing agent

specifically mentioned in the prior art as one of the

oily substances having a preferential affinity for metalli-

ferous matter over gangue, suitable for use in these

flotation processes. In fact, the second Bessel patent

(R., II, 934) selects fusel oils as of special importance

to be included among the preferred substances in the

patent claim, saying ‘‘especially hydrocarbons in solid

and liquid state, fusel oils, ete.’?

Amy] alcohol was also patented in the United States

patent to Sulman 955,012 which is pleaded as a prior

patent invalidating the patent here in suit and which is

the hasis of the second defense (R., II, 1060 and post,

p. 59).

‘@

; 30

; The Court of Appeals in the inztant case said (R., I,

3 649) :

“‘Amyl acetate known in commerce as banana oil,

and amyl alcohol commonly known as fusel oil, both

of which are specifically mentioned as mineral-froth-

ing agents in the patent in suit [No. 962,678], have

a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter and

are undoubtedly oils of the prior art.’’

Benzoic Acid.—Benzoiz acid is a crystalline solid sol-

uble in the proportion of .34 parts per 100 parts of water

‘ at 25° C. (Taggart, p. 231, Qs89-90). It is a resin acid

and as such it is included in the flotation agents indi-

eated in patent 835,120 by reference to patent 777,274

and by the direct statement in the New Zealand agitation

froth patent 19,633: ‘‘fatty or resin acids or certain

other aromatic derivatives (such as cresols, phenols,

etc.)’’ (R., Vol. II, 1015). It is also indicated in the

Bessel German patent—‘‘ All resins of the vegetable and

mineral kingdom, their solutions, and the oils obtainable

from them by dry (destructive) distillation’’ (Vol. II,

929).

The Court of Appeals said (R., I, 649):

(BBE Pe ie:

Aap hi aR Rie OA I iad in Teatiiae ai

‘*Benzoic acid is also one of the soluble mineral.

frothing agents specifically mentioned in the patent

in suit. It has a preferential affinity for metallif-

erous matter over gangue and is therefore included

within the terms referred to in patent 835,120 as

: ‘other substances’ and is also included among the

i resin acids of Cattermole 777,274.’’

Valerianic Acid.—Valerianic acid is a fatty acid com-

pletely soluble in water in the proportions used in flota-

tion. It is a colorless, oily liquid (Taggart, p. 232,

Q92). Being a well known fatty acid, it is directly

included in the disclosure of patent 835,120. It is also

31

included in the disclosure of the Bessel patent 42 of

1877—‘‘ All fatty oils and solid fats of the animal and

vegetable kingdom, and the fatty acids obtainable there-

from.’’

The other substances specifically named as soluble min-

eral-frothing agents in the patent in suit (lactic acid ;

acetones and other ketones such as camphor) are not

mentioned in the prior art disclosures of substances hav-

ing this preferential affinity. None of them has ever had

any practical application in flotation (Taggart, R., I,

232-3, Qs94-96).

In the face of this complete anticipation, it is a natural

question to ask how the patent was ever sustained by

the courts of the Third Circuit in the Miami Case and

by the District Court of Maine in the instant case.

The Error of Fact that Misled the

Courts of the Third Circuit.

The answer to that question, so far as the courts of

the Third Circuit are concerned, is that they decided the

issue on a different state of facts. Those courts sup-

posed, as their opinions clearly state, that the soluble

agents of patent 962,678 (referred to by them as the

second patent) are not oils, fatty acids or oily sub-

stances. Whether that error of fact was due to lack

of proof, or to the tremendous absorption of the Judges

in the difficult question of infringement of patent 835,120

(as to which Judge Buffington dissented from the major-

ity of the Court), we do not know. But that those

courts made that error of fact is clear from their

opinions.

In the District Court, Judge Bradford said (Minerals

Separation vs. Miami Copper Co., 237 Fed., 609, at pp.

635-6) :

32

‘In the process of the second patent in suit,* no

oil, fatty acid, or oily substance is introduced into

the mixture.’’

‘*The novelty of this invention is to be found * * *

in the fact that a mineral-frothing agent as the means

of separating the metallic particles from the gangue

is substituted for the oil, fatty acid or other oily

substance essential to the process of the first patent

in suit.’’

In the instant ease it is, on the contrary, proved that

the soluble mineral-frothing agents named in patent

962,678 include in fact ‘‘oil, fatty acid or other oily sub-

stance’’; and that they are not substituted for, but are

chosen from among, the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other sub-

stances which have a preferential affinity for metallifer-

ous matter over gangue’’ of patent 835,120.

The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in the Miami

Case said, in the majority opinion (244 Fed., 773):

‘The difference between the two patents may be

shortly stated to be this: The first process rests upon

the use in very small quantity of an oily substance

that does not dissolve in water, coupled with agita-

tion of the pulp, and this succeeds in producing a

special froth that is remarkably effective in recove:-

ing the minute particles of ore. The second process

does not employ oil, or an undissolvable substance;

on the contrary, the ‘mineral-frothing agent’ must

be in solution, and ex vi termini must therefore be

dissolvable. The specification disclaims the use of

*Three patents were involved in the Miami Case—(1) the agitation

froth patent 835,120; (2) the patent here sued on, 962,678; and (3) the

Greenway patent 1,099,699,

33

so large a quantity that part of it remains undis-

solved.’’

But in the instant case it is proved, and the Court

found, that among the oily substances of the first patent

835,120 are many that do dissolve in the pulp water; that

the substances named in the second patent 962,678 in-

clude oils and oily substances already known to be avail-

able for use in the process of the first patent, and that the

supposed difference between the two patents does not,

as a matter of fact, exist.

The District Court’s Decision in the Instant Case.

So far as Juage Peters’ decision in the instant case

is concerned, it seems to us that the only encouraging

thing that can be said about the specious and hair-split-

ting arguments advanced by plaintiff’s counsel—resting

on assertion, not on proof—is that they should ever have

been able to persuade Judge Peters to accept them. And,

reading Judge Peters’ opinion, written more than four

years after the case was submitted to him, we may be

permitted to doubt that he would ever have reached

that conclusion if he had allowed his mind to absorb the

facts proved in the instant case, instead of resting on

the erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals of the

Third Cireuit in the Miami Case.

The simple fact of the matter is that the disclosure of

these agitation froth patents (835,120 and the corre-

sponding New Zealand patent) is not restricted to insol-

uble oils, fatty acids and other substances having prefer-

ential affinity for metalliferous matter, but embraces all

oils, fatty acids and other substances having that prop-

erty. That fact is made so unmistakably plain by the

language of the patent that discussion can only obscure

it. When plaintiff tries to deny it in this Court, it is

et eat ee atte

T | _——_

4 34

; again asking the Court to do what the Court refused to

: do in the Butte Case. Under these circumstances it is

really unimportant to know, and only adds confusion

to the discussion to inquire, how plaintiff’s counsel pro-

pose to support their assertion that these disclosures of

the agitation froth process are limited to insoluble sub-

stances. But, inasmuch as plaintiff’s brief is wholly

built upon that assertion, we feel obliged to discuss what |

counsel say about it.

} POINT 4.

Plaintiff’s counsel seek to escape this conclusion by

arbitrarily differentiating among the ‘‘oils, fatty acids,

or other substances which have a preferential affinity

for metalliferous matter over gangue’’ referred to in

patent 835,120. They say that the disclosure of patent

835,120 is limited to INSOLUBLE oils, fatty acids or

other substances which have a preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter over gangue. Neither the word ‘‘in-

soluble’’ nor any similar word is found in patent 835,120.

Plaintiff's counsel seek to bridge this gap by pointing

out that patent 835,120 speaks of coating the mineral par-

_ ticles and coupling this with the assertion that only in-

_ soluble substances can coat the mineral particles. But

_ that assertion is irrelevant, and besides, is not true.

Se Ee a ee tae eee eee eT

| Plaintiff’s Primary Erroneous Assertion.

The first step in plaintiff’s argument is the assertion

that the disclosure of the agitation froth patent 835,120,

and of the corresponding New Zealand patent, is re-

stricted to insoluble oils, fatty acids or other substances

having a preferential affinity for metalliferous matter

35

over gangue. Upon that assertion plaintiff’s whole case

depends.*

The word ‘‘insoluble’’ does not occur either in the

specification or in the claims of patent 835,120. Nor is

there any equivalent word therein, nor any reason for

the practical man skilled in the art who reads it to

suppose that when he goes about looking for ‘‘different

oily substances’’ than oleic acid to test on ‘‘different

ores’’ he has first to find out whether that oily sub-

stance is or is not soluble in the water of the pulp, when

used in the proportions specified in patent 835,120.

The specification of the corresponding New Zealand

agitation-froth patent 19,633 of June 27, 1905 (R., II,

1011-1033) not only fails to restrict the oils, fatty acids,

and other substances to insoluble oils, fatty acids and

other substances, but it verbally and explicitly includes

(as patent 835,120 includes by reference) resin acids

and aromatic derivatives, such as cresol, phenol, etc.,

among the oils, fatty acids and other substances that

display this preferential affinity.**

The metallurgist, instructed by these simple and ex-

plicit statements, had only to test these ‘‘different oily

substances’’ on the ‘‘different ores.’’ Phenol and its

homologue cresol are brought to the metallurgist’s atten-

tion by name. He certainly would not fail to try them

by the test of the agitation froth patent (R., II, 1004, and

*The assertion is made over and over and over again in plaintiff's brief,

substantially in the words (p. 3) “A mineral frothing agent that dissolves

in the water of the pulp does not and cannot coat the mineral particles.”

We have noted the same assertion on pages 9, 11, 12, 18, 27, 28, 29, 40,

77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83 and 109. But plaintiff has not proved that it does

not, and counsel do not expiain why it cannot. The evidence is that it

can and does.

**“Our process * * * is dependent upon the superior physical attraction

exhibited by minerals for fatty or resin acids or for certain other aromatic

derivatives (such as cresols, phenols, etc.)”—Cattermole, et al., 777,274

(R., II, 982, lines 10-20).

ari.

ea ee

—

post, pp. 37, 47). When he did try them by that test, he

would find that when phenol or cresol is added to the

pulp in an amount less than one per cent. on the weight of

the ore and subjected to agitation, there will be produced,

(as the disclosureg of the agitation-froth process says

there will be), a metal-bearing froth that rises to the

surface. He would find that the disclosed agitation-froth

process is in fact effective with these different oily sub-

stances (including phenol and cresol) and he would

neither know nor care whether the oily substances were

dissolved or undissolved; or whether or not they coated

the mineral particles.

There would not come into the mind of such a man

any theoretical considerations as to the scientific mode

of operation of the substances in the flotation process

to deter him from making practical application of them

in his mineral concentration plat.

Plaintiff’s Secondary Assertion.

The second step in plaintiff’s argument involves the

further assertion, unimportant if true but contradicted by

the evidence, that because patent 835,120 says that the

flotation agents coat the mineral particles, it follows that

the agents referred to must have been insoluble.

We call particular attention to the fact that the burden

of proof on this subject is wholly on the plaintiff. It

is the bridge by which they seek to span the gap between

the actual disclosure of patent 835,120 (and of the cor-

responding New Zealand patent) and their primary as-

sertion that these disclosures are restricted to insoluble

substances.

(a) Even if plaintiff had succeeded in proving this

second assertion, it would not make the disclosure of

patent 835,120 any less an anticipation of patent 962,678.

37

The Cattermole patent and the Cattermole, Sulman &

Picard patent had disclosed that these particular oils,

fatty acids and other substances, including phenol and

cresol, possess this preferential affinity for metalliferous

matter over gangue. Patent 835,120 said that if you use

any substance possessing that property in a quantity

less than one per cent. on the weight of the ore with agi-

tation, the metal-bearing froth will result. That is true

—it will result with any of those substances. That is all

the metallurgists needed to know in order to make prac-

tical application of these substances to the separation

of mineral in the process of patent 835,120. When that

result is produced by the use of the fatty acid, valerianic

acid, or the resin acid, benzoic acid, or the aromatic de-

rivatives phenol or cresol, the process of patent 962,678

is practiced. No theory can affect this practical result.

What difference could it make to the practical man

skilled in the art whether the substances effect the pref-

erential selection by coating the mineral particles or by

modifying the character of the bubbles or in some other

way not yet understood? How can the availability of

these known substances in the process of patent 835,120

be affected by any scientific explanation, or lack of ex-

planation, as to the physical principles and mode of op-

eration involved in this process?

The specification of patent 835,120 (and of the cor-

responding New Zealand patent) supplies to the man

skilled in the art an infallible test to determine whether

a particular oil, fatty acid or other substance has the

desired preferential affinity and will therefore effect the

desired separation of the particular ore he is trying to

treat. It is set forth in patent 835,120 at page 1, lines

61-69 (R., II, 1004). It was discussed and found to be

sufficient for its purpose by this Court in the Hyde Case

where this Court said (242 U. S., 270-271) :

a a a oat ols NOSTRA DRL SVS TENS PPI ET

Le

38

‘*Equally untenable is the claim that the patent is

invalid for the reason that the evidence shows that

when different ores are treated preliminary tests

must be made to determine the amount of oil and

the extent of agitation necessary in order to obtain

the best results. Such variation of treatment must

be within the scope of the claims, and the certainty

which the law requires in patents is not greater than

is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter,

The composition of ores varies infinitely, each one

presenting its special problem, and it is obviously im-

possible to specify in a patent the precise treatment

which would be most successful and economical in

each case. The process is one for dealing with a

; large class of substances and the range of treat-

ment within the terms of the claims, while leaving

; something to the skill of persons applying the inven-

tion, is clearly sufficiently definite to guide those

skilled in the art to its successful application, as the

evidence abundantly shows.’’

Among the things left ‘‘to the skill of persons apply-

ing the invention”’ is the selection of ‘different oily sub-

stances’’ for ‘‘different ores.’’ The only oily substance

named in the patent is oleic acid. From what oily sub-

stances, then, is the selection to be made? Clearly the

answer is—from oils, fatty acids and other substances

already known to possess this preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter over gangue,—including the oils,

fatty acids and other substances mentioned in the Catter-

mole patent and the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent

referred to in the specification of patent 835,120.

This test was again discussed and approved by this

Court in the Butte Case (250 U. S., 340-1) and it there

formed the basis of the holding of this Court that patent

835,120 ‘‘makes no differentiation whatever, either in the

claims or in the specification, among the oils having a

PIT AAT 5 FADER PE ON I” I Bion, Som ET Ne POLE EP eT Oe a i _—

39

preferential affinity for metalliferous matter, and that its

disclosure, to which the petitioner must be limited, is,

that,when a fraction of one per cent. on the ore of any such

oil is used in the manner prescribed, there will be pro-

duced a metal-bearing froth, the result of the process. ’’

This test is indeed stated and approved by plaintiff’s

counsel in their brief at pages 34-35; and is there char-

acterized by counsel as ‘‘the necessary and usual pro-

cedure of metallurgists.’’

Indeed the fact is that no practical man can determine

or satisfy himself that an agent used in the small quan-

tities prescribed in patent 835,120 does or does not coat

the mineral particles. The ore pulp is a freely-flowing,

muddy-looking liquor consisting of about four parts of

water to one part of ore crushed almost to an impalpable

powder. Using two pounds of oil per ton of ore (0.1%

on the ore), this two pounds of oil will be dispersed

throughout an ore pulp mass of 10,000 pounds (8,000

pounds of water plus 2,000 pounds of finely divided ore) ;

such a relatively small proportion of oil as to be visibly

undiscernible in the ore pulp.* As a matter of fact, the

specification of patent 835,120 negatives the suggestion

that the practical man could determine for himself

whether an agent did coat the mineral particles, and

specifically prescribes trial in the process itself as the

proper means for determining the availability in the

process of any particular agent.

(b) But quite aside from the fact that the practice of

the process of patent 835,120 does not require the prac-

tical man to know, and in fact the practical man cannot

*A quantity characterized by this Court as “necessarily an infinitesimal

amount” (Hyde Case, 242 U. S., 267) and by Lord Atkinson in the decision

of the British House of Lords (Hyde Case, 242 U. S., 269) as “relatively

infinitesivial quantities”; and by Judge Bourquin in the Hyde Case (207

Fed., 959) as “so little oil it disappears, is not sensible to sight or touch

upon the concentrates, but only to analysis.”

eshte: ot Lake ee |

‘

q

{

i

:

Re ee

40

know, whether the flotation agent employed coats the

mineral particles or not; we go on to point out that plain.

tiff could prevail only if the evidence proved that, in

point of fact, soluble oils do not coat the mineral par-

ticles. And the evidence proves the fact to be that sol-

uble oils do coat the mineral particles by adsorption from

solution.

The District Court, in the instant case, remarked (R.,

I, 619) that

‘‘This is a region of disputation where experts

and scientists occupy the field alone.’’

If that is true, it militates against the plaintiff, not

against defendant, as the District Court concluded. The

question involved is brought into the case by plaintiff

to bridge the gap between the actual disclosure of patent

835,120 and plaintiff’s interpretation of that disclosure.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof. It cannot take even

the first step in its argumentative departure from the

real disclosure of patent 835,120 without first satisfying

the Court that soluble substances do not coat the min-

eral particles.

The assertion is explicitly denied in defendant’s

proofs. Defendant’s experts, Professor Taggart of the

Columbia School of Mines and Dr. Bacon of the Mellon

Institute, testified that the soluble mineral-frothing

agents, notwithstanding the fact that they are in solution

in the pulp, coat the mineral particles by adsorption from

the solution onto the surface of the particles.* The

phenomenon of adsorption from solution is a very well

known one and underlies the silk-dyeing industry and

other dyeing processes, as well as other industrial proc-

esses such as the decolorizing of oil and the removal of

fusel oil from whisky (Taggart, R., I, 255, Q150).

*See Taggart, R., I, 254-256, Qs149-150; 306, XQ369; 312-313,

RDQs425-426; 583, 0449; and Bacon, 345, Q21.

41

Mr. Higgins’ Demonstrations, and His

Erroneous Deductions Therefrom.

To this testimony plaintiffs oppose the deductions

drawn by its expert, Mr. Higgins, from two experiments

performed by him at a demonstration in Boston during

the trial.

Mr. Higgins took a quantity of zine ore, divided it into

two parts. The first part he subjected to the agitation-

froth process using oleic acid as the mineral-frothing

agent. The second part he subjected to the same agita-

tion-froth process using phenol. He then took the

mineral-bearing froth from the oleic acid treatment and

put it on a filter letting the water run through the

filter. And he did the same thing on another filter

with the mineral-bearing froth of the phenol treatment.

He then introduced the substance that remained on the

filter from the oleic acid treatment into a fresh body of

water in an agitation froth machine, agitated it and pro-

duced a second mineral-bearing froth. He then took the

material remaining on the filter from the phenol treat-

ment, introduced it into a fresh body of water in an agi-

tation froth machine, agitated it, and found that it would

not produce a froth.

From that he deduced that the mineral particles were

not coated in the phenol treatment. That was an errone-

ous deduction. The experiment showed nothing about

whether the mineral particles were coated or not. All

it showed was that much of the oleic acid remained un-

dissolved, while the phenol was dissolved, in the water

of the pulp. When he put the mineral-bearing froth from

the oleic acid treatment on the filter, the undissolved

oleic acid was caught by the filter and remained with

the filtered concentrates. Then when he put these con-

centrates of the oleic acid treatment into the fresh body

of water for a fresh agitation, the undissolved oleic acid

42

pa tetaicies ica cont

that had been entrapped with the concentrates became at

once effective to form a new froth. But the phenol, on

) _ the other hand, being in solution in the water of the pulp,

_ drained through the filter with the water. When he put

the drained phenol concentrates back into clean water

and renewed agitation, he did not get a froth because he

had no frothing agent present. The dissolved phenol had

gone off with the water.

The mineral particles were coated with phenol, to be

sure, but the coating produced by adsorption from the

solution is of such a character that it will not wash off*—

just as when, in the dye industry, a substance is dyed by

) adsorption from solution, the dye coating will not subse-

| quently wash off—and even as oleic acid when it has once

coated the mineral particles will not wash off and, if it

| is to be recovered at all, must be recovered in some such

way as by the treatment of the oil-covered concentrate

with alkali, as explained in the Cattermole, Sulman &

Picard patent 777,274 (R., II, 983, lines 78, et seq., and

plaintiff’s brief, bottom p. 20).

Mr. Higgins should have seen this true explanation of

the experiment (that in the oleic acid treatment substan-

tially all the frothing agent remained with the mineral

on the filter, while in the case of the phenol treatment

all of the frothing agent went through the filter with the

+ pulp water) from the fact, emphasized by plaintiff’s

q counsel, that in the oleic acid treatment the water of the

pulp that is left behind, if agitated anew with fresh ore,

will not produce a froth (brief, p. 10); while in the

phenol treatment, the water of the pulp that is left be-

hind, if agitated anew with fresh ore, will produce a froth

(brief, p. 10).

In addition to Professor Taggart’s testimony already

referred to, the fact that phenol, which is a tar acid, does

coat the mineral particles is further proved by the ex-

*See Professor Taggart’s testimony, R., I, 583, 0449,

PRR OT PARSE eS . y :

43

tract from his article which plaintiff introduced on cross-

examination (XQ414, R., I, 309), as follows:

‘“‘After adsorbing a tar acid onto two 500-gm. lots

of galena, in the one case below 200 mesh, in the

other between 200 and 100, the solid was drained

by suction filtration and then placed in a Janney

laboratory flotation machine with about 1,500 cc. of

water and agitated at 2,200 r. p.m. No froth at all

was produced. Yet the amount of adsorbed oil pres-

ent produced an appreciable froth when added anew

even without a solid material to enhance the vis-

cosity.”’

Other than these experiments of Mr. Higgins, which

do not touch at all the question whether the soluble min-

eral-frothing agents coat the mineral particles, plaintiff

produces no evidence to substantiate the assertion—neces-

sary to plaintiff’s argument—that only insoluble sub-

stances can coat the mineral particles. On the other

hand, although the burden of proof was on plaintiff, not

defendant, defendant has produced two men highly

trained in the art (Professor Taggart and Dr. Bacon),

both of whom testified affirmatively that the soluble sub-

stances do coat the mineral particles, and back up that

testimony by the statement of qualitative and quantita-

tive results.*

(c) The attempt by plaintiff to prolong its monopoly

by a limiting differentiation, excluding soluble substances

from the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances’’ referred

to in patent 835,120, is closely analogous to plaintiff’s

attempt in the Butte Case to enlarge its monopoly by

a limiting differentiation excluding non-frothing oils from

the ‘‘oils, fatty acids, or other substances’’ of patent

*See footnote, ante, page 40.

Pe MERA AT ARR

44

835,120. That attempt was disapproved by this Court in

the Butte Case and the like attempt should be disap.

proved in this case.

The Butte Case (250 U. S., 336) came to this Court

after the Court had held in the Hyde Case (224 U.S,

271) that patent 835,120 was ‘‘confined to the results

obtained by the use of oil within the proportions * * *

amounting to a fraction of one per cent. on the ore.”

Defendant, in the Butte Case, was using a mixture of oils

in quantity greater than one per cent. of the weight of

the ore. Plaintiff contended that defendant nevertheless

infringed, asserting that the mixture of oils was made up

partly of frothing oils which were oils of the patent, and

partly of non-frothing oils which were not oils of the

patent. To this the defendant replied that all of the oils

of the mixture were oils having a preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter over gangue and were, therefore,

among the oils, fatty acids or other substances of patent

835,120.

The decision of this Court rejected plaintiff’s at-

tempted differentiation among the oils of the patent,

holding that patent 835,120 makes no differentiation

whatever, either in the claims or in the specification,

among the oils having preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter, but includes any such oil; and that

where the patent does not differentiate it is impossible

for the Courts to differentiate (250 U. S., 348-350).

We submit that the same simple reason makes it im-

possible for the Courts now to differentiate between in-

soluble oils and soluble oils; and compels the conclusion

that the disclosure of patent 835,120 made available to

the man skilled in the art the agitation froth process

using any oil, fatty acid or other substances (soluble or

insoluble) having a preferential affinity for metalliferous

matter over gangue.

LT

45

The Fantastic Assertions to Which Plaintiff’s Counsel

Are Led in Their Attempt to Deny the Plain Dis-

closure of the Agitation-Froth Patent.

We shall not attempt to expose every erroneous deduc-

tion that plaintiff’s counsel derive from their erroneous

premises. But we shall point to some of the final conclu-

sions which seem to us, in their fantastic character, to

demonstrate doubly the falseness of plaintiff’s position.

It is usually the case that when, in an argument, one

error is admitted to mar the simple truth, it demands

other and still other errors to feed upon, and in turn

propagates further errors to perpetuate itself.

Plaintiff’s Contention That This Court in the Butte Case

Passed Upon the Question Whether All Substances

Having Preferential Affinity for Metalliferous Mat-

ter Necessarily Coat the Mineral Particles.

Plaintiff’s counsel are profoundly embarrassed by the

fact that their attempt here to differentiate between in-

soluble oils and soluble oils is precisely like their unsuc-

cessful attempt in the Butte Case to differentiate between

frothing oils and non-frothing oils.

To ease that embarrassment, they assert that this

Conrt in the Butte Case held that the “oils, fatty acids,

or other substances having preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter’’ of patent 835,120 are restricted to sub-

stances that coat the mineral particles.

At the bottom of page 7 and top of page 8 of their

brief counsel (in stating what this Court has decided as

to the ‘‘kind of oil,’’ that patent 835,120 discloses) quote

the finding of this Court that the oil or oily substance or

oily liquid must have preferential affinity for metallif-

erous matter, and then counsel insert their own addition

(p. 7) ‘‘to the end that it may preferentially coat that

metalliferous matter’’ (emphasis theirs). On page 9 they

——EO—— ee

46

refer to the conclusion of the Cireuit Court of Appeals

for the First Cirenit as ‘‘the opposite conclusion.’’** On

page 11 they say that

“‘what this Court speaks of as the preferential affin-

ity * * * is the power of the agent to preferentially

coat those mineral particles * * *. Whatever has not

that power of preferential coating is not the agent of

patent No. 835,120. This is * * * the definition * * *

given by this Court.’’

On page 78 they say that this Court recognized in its prior

decisions that the use of the term ‘‘preferential affinity ”’

in patent No. 835,120 ‘‘necessarily implied oil undissolved

in water,’’ and (p. 80) that this Court ‘‘clearly held that

it did require the presence in the ore pulp of undissolved

; substances’’ and that there was expressed in the decisions

of this Court in the Hyde Case and in the Butte Case

“the limitation * * * as a necessary consequence of that

preferential affinity, that it should coat the metalliferous

mineral matter in the ore pulp.’’

And (p. 83) they say that the decision of this Court

holding kerosene oil and fuel oil to be oils of the patent

; “‘obviously * * * assumed that the process disclosed in

patent No. 835,120 required the presence in the pulp of

an undissolved oily agent.’’

We do not think this Court in the Hyde Case or in the

Butte Case put any restriction at all upon the oils, fatty

acids and other substances having preferential affinity for

metalliferous matter. The Court, as we read the opinion,

was only concerned to know whether or not the particular

*On page 12 this matter of coating is made the test of the patent.

On pages 18, 27, 28, 29, 40, 77, 79 and 109 they repeat the assertion that

only substances that coat metalliferous matter are included within the

disclosure and couple it with the assertion that only undissolved sub-

stances can coat the metalliferous matter or display preferential affinity

therefor.

prraenennnnetrieeerem aan, wwanys wy aoe

47

oils there in question would display preferential affinity

for the metalliferous matter by the practical test of

bringing the metalliferous matter to the surface of the

pulp ii the agitation-froth process.

We do not think this Court was there concerned to

know, and there was certainly no evidence by which it

might determine, whether or not this preferential af-

finity would be displayed by substances that went wholly

into solution in the pulp. It was urged by plaintiff, and

agreed to by the Court, that pine oil, which is very

largely dissolved in the pulp, is among the oils having

preferential affinity for metalliferous matter. It was

held, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, that petroleum

oils, which are very little dissolved in the pulp, are

also oils having this preferential affinity. But the Court

cid not inquire whether or not the preferential affinity

was dependent upon solubility.

In fact, the argumentative assertions of plaintiff’s

counsel lead them so far as to expose them to a compari-

son by parallel columns showing self-contradiction. Thus

their statement on page 80 that this Court

‘‘clearly held that it did require the presence in the

ore pulp of undissolved substances”?

is directly contradicted by their statement on page 81:

‘No question of solubility entered into the subject

matter this Court was considering. * * * That ques-

tion [‘whether or not these petroleum products were

insoluble (immiscible) or soluble (miscible)’] was

not under consideration.’

Plaintiff’s counsel assert that the test for oily substances

in the agitation froth patent disclosure is whether or not

they coat the mineral particles. The real test stated in

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48

the patent is whether or not, when added to the pulp in

a quantity less than one per cent. on the weight of the

ore, they will produce a mineral-bearing froth.

Plaintiff’s counsel (brief, pp. 11-12) say that—

‘*The fallacy of the conclusion of the Cireuit Court

of Appeals in the instant case, as to anticipation by

patent No. 835,120, is that it ignores the test by which

the user of the process of patent No. 835,120, skilled

in the art, would select any agent to be used in place

of oleic acid.’’

And they go on to ask, with some emphasis (p. 11):

‘*What is that test?”’

And reply (p. 12):

‘‘It is written all over the patent and is woven

all through the Hyde and the Butte & Superior de-

cisions of this Court as stated.

‘‘That test is whether the agent in the small quan-

tity prescribed will, as oleic acid does, preferentially

coat the mineral particles * * *.’’

And in the footnote they say that ‘‘The test is stated or

adverted to at the following places in patent No. 835,120’’

and list many references to the specification of the patent,

at no one of which is the word ‘‘test,’’ or any equivalent

word, employed. On the other hand, they entirely omit

from the list—and we would call the Court’s particular

attention to the significance of this omission—any refer-

ence to the plain and straightforward statement of pat-

ent 835,120 that ‘‘a simple preliminary test is necessary

to determine which oily substance yields the proportion

of froth or scum desired’’ (R., II, 1004, lines 66-69).

49

This is the only place that patent 835,120 says anything

about a test.

The Contention of Plaintiff’s Counsel that the Disclosure

of the Kinds of Oils and Oily Substances Available

“or Use in the Agitation-Froth Process of Patent

835,120 Are Restricted to Oleic Acid.

This idea is introduced into plaintiff’s brief first on

page 3. It is followed by the assertion (pp. 16, 19, 21 and

86) that the reference in patent 835,120 to the Cattermole

patent 777,273 and to the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard

patent 777,274 did not import ‘‘into the disclosure of that

patent No. 835,120 agents specified in those prior art pat-

ents’’ (p. 16). That is followed by the assertion ( pp. 13,

23-24,* 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 52 and 122) that only oleie acid

was available for use in that process until after the dis-

covery of patent 962,678; and that it was the discovery

of patent 962,678 that advanced the art beyond the use

of oleic acid to the solution of the problem of floating

other ores and particularly the great body of porphyry

copper ores in America (pp. 43, 45, 47, 50, 52 and 122).

It seems to us absurd to say that the reference to the

Cattermole patent and to the Cattermole, Sulman &

Picard patent did not import into the disclosure of patent

835,120 the oils, fatty acids and other substances having

the preferential affinity for metalliferous matter men-

tioned in those patents. We think plaintiff’s contention

is completely answered by the question—Where, other

than from the knowledge of the man skilled in the art

(and particularly from the disclosures of these patents

*At page 23 “Oleic acid was the only oily substance that was actually

used in practice” prior to the invention of the patent here in suit.” And

page 24: “The use of mineral-froth flotation was limited to these

Australian zinc-lead ores and was not extended to other ores until after

the inventiog in issue was made.”

PER NET OWT HE SANSA AETHER I

50

referred to in patent 835,120), was the metallurgist, read-

ing patent 835,120, to find the ‘‘different oily substances’’

to use in his simple preliminary tests of ‘‘different ores’’?

Furthermore, we have seen that the New Zealand agita-

tion froth patent specifically directs the use of fatty and

resin acids and other aromatic derivatives, such as phenol

and cresol, in quantity less than one per cent. on the

weiglit of the ore, in the agitation froth process.

Still further, this Court, in the Hyde Case, sustaining

what was then plaintiff’s contention and supporting

thereby its holding that invention was involved in patent

835,120, said (242 U. S., 270):

‘The record shows not only that the process in

suit was promptly considered by the patentees as an

original and important discovery, but that it was

immediately generally accepted * * * it promptly

came into extensive use for the concentration of ores

in most, if not all, of the principal mining countries

of the world, notably in the United States, Australia,

Sweden, Chile and Cuba, and that, because of its

economy and simplicity, it has largely replaced all

earlier processes. ’’

Again this Court said, in the Butte Case (250 U. S.,

343) :

**In each of the four claims of the ‘Complete Speci-

fication’ of the British patent, filed by the same per-

sons who were patentees of the patent in suit, on

June 3, 1905, ‘petrol’ is given as an equivalent of

oleic acid in the process. * * * ‘Petrol’ is the name

used in England for gasoline.’’

Still further there appears in this record (Defendant’s

Exhibit 120, R., II, 1185-1206) a report made by Messrs.

Sulman & Picard to Minerals Separation, Ltd., in which

51

those engineers say, under date of May 3, 1905 (R., IT,

1200) :

‘*We may here conveniently note that other oils

besides Oleic acid may be employed in this modified

recovery process, but so far as Broken Hill is con-

cerned Oleic acid gives by far the best results.’’

The date of this report is twenty-six days before the

fili:g of the United States application on which patent

835,120 was issued; and almost exactly four years before

the filing of the application for the patent in suit.

Thus when plaintiff’s counsel now assert that the fail-

ure to use, in the agitation-froth process, substances other

than oleic acid in treating the Australian ores was due to

a lack of knowledge subsequently disclosed in the patent

here in suit, they are directly contradicted by the reports

of plaintiff’s own engineers made many years before this

controversy arose and four years before the so-called

discovery of patent 962,678.

Still further plaintiff’s contention here that the por-

phyry ores had been floated by the process of the patent

here in suit and not by the process of patent 835,120 is

directly contrary to its assertion in the Miami Case and

to the decision of the Courts of the Third Circuit in that

ease. In the District Court’s decision in the Miami Case,

Judge Bradford said (237 Fed., 618):

‘*A great advance in the art of ore concentration

has resulted from the process of the first patent in

suit in the efficient recovery of slimes. With the use

of that process ore may be so finely ground as to

insure the thorough separation of the metallic parti-

cles and gangue, and great savings effected. The

profit so saved in a single year from the output of

the principle porphyry copper mines, including the

defendant’s, has been estimated by one of the expert

witnesses as more than $17,000,000.”’’

eee en ee Re i oe La DESMO LD a MEG LAA PERE MELTL ITSO LAS SI

os ra oe

52

It is plain enough that these present extraordinary

assertions by plaintiff’s counsel, so contradictory of the

plain facts and of what the same counsel urged upon this

Court and the other courts in the litigation on patent

835,120, are made here in an attempt to bring to the

support of the patent now in suit the same great com-

mercial success that counsel formerly, and correctly,

attributed to patent 835,120. In this way counsel seek

to escape the troublesome fact, proved in this record,

that the soluble mineral-frothing agents named in patent

962,678 have never had any commercial use (see Taggart,

R., I, 232, Qs94 and 233, Q97).

There is no evidence that any one of them ever got

beyond experimental use, excepting possibly cresol, and

it was immediately found that cresol, as such—that is

pure cresol which would go wholly into solution in the

pulp—was not a good flotation agent; or at least not

good enough for commercial use (Chapman, R., I, 556,

Qs125-6).

In this same connection, plaintiff’s counsel assert that

the use of pine oil in the agitation froth process (p. 31)

and the use of wood tar in that process (p. 47) did not

become possible until after the disclosure of the patent in

suit.*

*On page 87, plaintiff's counsel say:

“No one ever used these tar products in carrying on the Catter-

mole process. No one used these tar products in carrying on the

Process of patent No. 835,120, no one used these tar products for

jointly carrying on the process of patent No. 835,120 and the process

of the patent in suit, until long after the discovery and invention of

the process in suit.”

But there is not a scrap of evidence to support these assertions. They

are such assertions as counsel sometimes permit themselves to make

thoughtlessly in the heat of argument. The evidence does not go at all

to what substances were actually used in the Cattermole process. These tar

products are admittedly foremost among the flotation agents in the process

of patent 835,120. Whether these tar products were among the “other oils”

that Messrs. Sulman & Picard had found to be available prior to May 3,

(Footnote continued on next page.)

BPP LEP IIL IP MA TAT UREN Fy LEER IN Ny menace eee

53

The absurdity of this is manifest. It was plaintiff’s

contention in the Butte Case that pine oil was the only

one of the three oils there used that was an oil of patent

835,120. This Court held that not only pine oil but also

kerosene and fuel oils were oils of patent 835,120.

Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals of the First

Circuit pointed out (R., I, 643, 652) the patent in suit

expressly disclaims (pat., p. 2, lines 68-77) the use of

substances (like pine oil and the coal and wood tar prod-

ucts) that are not wholly soluble in the pulp water,

saying:

‘‘We disclaim any such use of these substances

and only claim them in such amount as will enable

them to dissolve in the acidified water.”’

Of all oils and oily substances that anyone could pick

out as characteristic oils of patent 835,120, the products

of wood tar and coal tar are the most prominent and

most frequently referred to in the prior art.

Professor Taggart’s testimony (R., I, 180-200, and

appendix to this brief) shows that these products of coal

tar and wood tar are mentioned in nearly every one of

the earlier patents in this art of separating minerals

from gangue by use of the preferential affinity of oils

and oily substances for metalliferous matter.*

1905, does not appear one way or the other. But if anyone could have

proved that these tarry substances were not among them, it would have

been plaintiff.

*See Haynes British patent of 1860, R., I, 181, “coal tar from gas

works”; Bessel German patent of 1877, same page, “tar from brown coal,

anthracite coal, wood and peat, and also the oily products of the distillation

of these tars”; the Bessel German patent of 1886, page 186, “mineral tar”;

the Cattermole U. S. patent 763,260 of 1904, page 189, “such coal or wood

tar products or other substances which exercise, like oils, a preferential

physical affinity for metallic mineral matter as distinguished from gangue” ;

Elmore U. S. patent 826,411 of 1906, page 199, in which process the art

actually used, see page 200, “a large variety of oils and similar substances

(Footnote continued on next page.)

PLIERS AES EINE ONES LIN NE ISS LON NAN A REGIE SY AIOE 8 BE NONE LD il ETI on SRB” TEE ets

54

The fact that these coal tar and wood tar oils are

within the disclosure of the prior art necessarily cancels

all that plaintiff’s counsel say as to the great utility of

the alleged invention of the patent in suit. Coal-tar

and wood-tar oils have been, since the very inception of

the art in the Haynes British patent to the present day,

typical flotation agents.

When plaintiff’s counsel say that the use of such a

coal tar or wood tar oil is at once the practice of the

process of patent 835,120 and the practice of the process

of the patent in suit, they merely assert that the process

of the patent in suit was disclosed in patent 835,120.

That is obviously true because, even if we should accept

plaintiff’s contention, above referred to, that coating the

mineral particles is the test of the patent, these sub-

stances (pine oil and coal tar and wood tar products) cer-

tainly respond to that test. By that very test that plain-

tiff’s counsel themselves supply, the man skilled in the

art would include pine oil and these coal tar and wood

tar products among the oils of patent 835,120. When he

used them, he would get the characteristic froth of the

agitation froth process and if, as plaintiff contends, their

use is a practice of the process of 962,678, that process

would be completely anticipated by such use.

In fact plaintiff’s contention, if we should adopt it,

would lead to the conclusion that not even oleic acid is

an oil of patent 835,120 because the evidence is that oleic

acid is itself partially soluble in the proportions used in

agitation froth flotation, and that it is upon that partial

solubility that the froth-forming power of oleic acid

depends.®*

* * * such, for instance, as * * * tars, blast furnace oils,” which is coal tar

creosote; and Cattermole’s U. S. patent 777,273, R., II, 975, line 91, “coal

or wood tar products.”

*See Professor Taggart’s testimony (R., I, 213-214, Qs46-49); the

article by Mr. Sulman published in 1919 and quoted from by Professor

Taggart, R., I, 214; Professor Taggart (R., I, 217-218, Q54); and De-

(Footnote continued on next page.)

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ENE ERG LLNS GOA TESTER! BOY Sa iLO he LESTE SES TD 9

55

The Attempt of Plaintiff’s Counsel to Avoid the Disclos-

ure of the Cattermole Patents and the Cattermole,

Sulman & Picard Patents on the Ground that Their

Processes Are Different.

Plaintiff’s counsel say (Brief, p. 85) of the disclosure

in the Cattermole patents with respect to the use of cer-

tain oily substances, that:

‘*Obvionsly the use of these products in this proc-

ess where the recovery of concentrates was by sink-

ing would not in any manner have informed the art

of any possible use of these wood or coal tar products

in processes where the recovery of concentrates was

by flotation.’’

And by this same argument, based on the disclosure of

the particular processes of these prior art patents, plain

tiff’s counsel seek to exclude from éonsideration all of

the oily substances mentioned therein (pp. 87-93).

But that attempt evades the very point of the disclosure

of patent 835,120 which was that (p. 1, lines 28, et seq.) :

‘“We have found that if the proportion of oily

substance be considerably reduced—say to a fraction

of one per cent. on the ore—granulation ceases to

take place,’’

referring, of course, to the oily substances and the granu-

lation of the Cattermole process.

Counsel’s Misquotation to Support the Assertion That

the References in Patent 835,120 to Patent 777,274

Are ‘‘Specifically Confined to the Disclosure of

Oleic Acid Therein.”’

The attention of this Court is specifically directed to

the quotation from patent 835,120 on page 21 of plain-

fendant’s Exhibit 95 (R., II, 1099) and Taggart’s testimony about it (R.,

I, 237-239) ; and the finding of the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit

(R,, I, 61).

a RE NUIYS FERNS TU

56

tiff’s brief, and to what counsel say about it. In the

patent itself, the words immediately following the two .

sentences quoted on page 21 of plaintiff’s brief are ‘‘The

oleic acid or other fatty acid,’’ etc.

Yet plaintiff’s counsel, omitting these words, here ask

the Court to ‘‘particularly’’ note that ‘‘these references

in patent No. 835,120 to the process disclosed in patent

No. 777,274 are limited to oleic acid,’”’ and on page 91,

they say again:

**the two references to this patent were carefully

confined to the disclosure of oleic acid therein.’’

In addition to this misquotation from patent 835,120,

counsel seek to evade the reference in that patent to

the Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent 777,274, by

saying (brief, p. 8§) that the Cattermole patent 777,273

is ‘‘the principal patent for the Cattermole metal

sinking process’’ and is the disclosure referred to in pat-

ent 835,120 to describe the advance which the agitation

froth process made over the Cattermole agglomeration

process. The truth is that the Cattermole agglomeration

process is described in patent 777,274, as well as in patent

777,273, and the reference of patent 835,120 is to both of

them. But if the reference were only to patent 777,273,

that would not help plaintiff. In fact, it would absolutely

contradict plaintiff’s contention that the oily substances,

referred to on page 1, line 29 of patent 835,120, are

limited to oleic acid. Because, in the Cattermole patent,

777,273, the words ‘‘oleic acid’’ are not found. The oils

disclosed there (R., II, 975, lines 90, et seq.) are:

‘*Animal, vegetable, or mineral oil or mixtures of

these or such coal or wood tar products or other sub-

stances' which exercise, like oils, a preferential physi-

cal affinity for metallic mineral matter as distin-

guished from gangue.’’

‘

. HARIRI re ch ER NN RET EAR IEAM SEIS NASI TOS DOB 9 AI eke ya Sea pp emt —

57.

Plaintiff’s Assertion that the Disclosure of the New Zeal-

and Patent is ‘‘A Mere Juxtaposition’’ of the Three

United States Patents.

It is plaintiff’s assertion that the New Zealand patent

is a mere juxtaposition for the sake of economy of the

disclosure of U. S. Patents 835,120 and ‘‘two prior Cat-

termole patents’’* (brief, pp. 16 and 93-99). We do not

know how that could lessen its disclosure if it were true.

The New Zealand patent may be a juxtaposition of the

explicit disclosure of three United States patents, but it

is more than a ‘‘mere’’ juxtaposition of the explicit dis-

closure of the United States patents because it makes

explicit, what the United States patent 835,120 disclosed

by reference, that the fatty and resin acids and other

aromatic derivatives such as phenol and cresol of the

Cattermole, Sulman & Picard patent 777,274 are to be

used in the agitation-froth process in a quantity less than

one per cent. on the weight of the ore, and when so used

will produce the characteristic mineral-bearing froth.

Finally, we submit that counsel’s summary statement

of plaintiff’s position, at the end of their brief, discloses

its fallacy.

Counsel say (p. 124):

‘Nobody skilled in the art derived at the time of

its issue, or afterward, from patent No. 835,120

knowledge sufficient to enable him to understand the

nature and operation of the invention of the patent

in suit No. 962,678 and to carry the process of the

patent in suit into practical use.’’

We think it is true, as plaintiff's counsel repeatedly

assert (pp. 42, 43, 44 and’ 45) that the ‘‘nature and opera-

tion’’ of the phenomena involved in the agitation-froth

process cannot even now be explained. At any rate there

*Plaintiff’s brief does not identify them. We assume counsel mean

777,273 and 777,274.

58

is not yet any explanation that has been generally ac-

cepted. That is true whether the agents used are soluble or

insoluble. The fact is known that all of these substances

which display preferential affinity for metalliferous mat-

ter over gangue coat the mineral particles, either by

mechanically smearing them in the case of undissolved

agents, or by adsorption from solution in the case of

dissolved agents. The fact is also known that all sub-

stances which produce froth contain a soluble constituent.

The modern theory is that the froth formation is de-

pendent upon the modification of the water by the soluble

constituent, and that the selection of the mineral particles,

in preference to the gangue, results from the fact that

they are coated with a film of the flotation agent.

But it is the practical aspect, not the theoretical aspect,

that is important to the mill man. He does not have to

know what the theory is if he knows how to proceed in the

mill. He was immediately able, upon reading patent 835,-

120, ‘‘to carry the process * * “into practical use’’ by the

simple expedient of adding to the pulp less than one per

cent. of any oil, fatty acid or other substance that had, in

the prior art, displayed a preferential affinity for metal-

liferous matter over gangue, and then subjecting the pulp

to agitation to produce the mineral-bearing froth.

We submit, therefore, that the Court of Appeals of the

First Circuit was right in finding that the patent in suit

is completely anticipated by patent 835,120; and that this

affirmed.

The remainder of this brief is devoted to the other

defenses. It need not be considered by this Court unless

this Court is prepared to reverse the Court of Appeals

of the First Circuit and is then disposed to consider

the other defenses rather than to refer the case back to

the Court of Appeals of the First Cireuit for farther

consideration. 2

. — ee LIAM AM ERG Fe ; tie

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PEI, t ¥ L

59

Second Defense.

The patent is invalid because of the prior invention.

and patenting by Sulman, United States patent 955,012,

of the use of the soluble mineral-frothing agent, alcohol,

in solution in the pulp in the froth flotation process of

patent 835,120.*

This defense is pleaded in the answer under para-

graph 9(a) (1) (R., I, 37), and in the amendment to

the answer under paragraph 9-G (R., I, 95). It is the

fourth defense of U.S. C., Tit. 39, See. 69 (R.S., Sec. 4920)

which provides, among the defenses to a suit for infringe-

ment, that the patentee ‘‘was not the original and first

inventor or discoverer of any material and substantial

part of the thing patented.”’

The question here involved is wholly a question of the

dates available to the two patentees; whether the Sulman

patent 955,012 is entitled to an earlier date of invention

than the patent here in suit. The subject matter claimed

in claims 1 and 2 of the patent here in suit is unques-

tionably disclosed in the Sulman patent.

We say this despite the fact that plaintiff in the court

below insisted that the disclosure of the Sulman patent

was not a disclosure of the same invention patented in

claims 1 and 2 of the patent in suit.

To our minds that contention is simply fantastic. The

subject matter patented in the patent in suit is the ‘‘proc-

ess of concentrating ores which consists in mixing the

powdered ore with water containing in solution a small

quantity of a mineral-frothing agent, agitating the mix-

ture to form a froth and separating the froth’’ (Pat.

claim 1). The truth and sincerity of plaintiff’s counsel’s

contention that this invention is not disclosed in the Sul-

*Defendant’s Exhibits Nos. 70, 71 and 72, Vol. II, pages 1054, 1058

and 1063.

—_— ATLL PIII IIS AB Daa

6 ee Oe Te TT

60

man patent can, we believe, be tested at any time by ask-

ing them the direct question whether or not the process

disclosed in the Sulman patent is a process of concentrat-

ing ores which consists in mixing the powdered ore with

water containing in solution a small quantity of a mineral-

frothing agent, agitating the mixture to form a froth and

separating the froth.

Plaintiff cannot answer that question otherwise than

affirmatively.

Sulman in his patent says (R., II, 1060) :

‘‘According to this invention the crushed ore is

introduced into water containing a very small per-

centage of certain alcohols such as amyl-alcohol and

containing also a small percentage of a suitable acid

such as sulphuric acid, and the mixture is thoroughly

agitated. The ore particles are caused to come into

contact with a gas such as air; and the result is that

metallic sulphid particles float and they can there-

after be separated by any well-known means.’’

In the examples given (R., II, 1060, lines 34, 57 and 83)

it is explained that the mineral frothing agents used are

in solution in the pulp; and the specification of the Sul-

man patent contains this statement (lines 78, et seq.) :

‘*According to this invention the mineral-froth-

ing agent or agents which enables metallic sulphids

to float under the condition specified, consists of an

alcohol such as amyl-aleohol contained in solution in

the acidified water.’’

which is to be compared with the statement in the patent

in suit (p. 2, lines 62, et seq.) :

‘* According to this invention the mineral-frothing

agent consists of an organic compound contained in

solution in the acidified water.’’

61

It is apparent, therefore, that the patent in suit is in-

validated by the Sulman patent 955,012 if the effective

date of that patent is earlier than the effective date of the

patent in suit.

The respective dates of the Sulman Patent 955,012 and

of the patent in suit, and of the corresponding United

States and British applications are as follows:

Patented in Filed in Filed in

United States United States England

Sulman 955,012 April 12, 1910 Nov. 22, 1909 Dec. 24, 1908

Sulman, Greenway &

Higgins, 962,678 June 28, 1910 Apr. 30, 1909 Feb. 1, 1909

This Court has held (Alexander Milburn Co. vs. Davis-

Bournonville Co., 270 U. S., 390) that a description in a

patent issued prior to the patent sued on, and based on

an application filed before the filing date of the patent

sued on, is prior knowledge of the invention and invali-

dates the patent sued on under the fourth defense of R. S.,

Sec. 4920.

Applying the law of that case to the facts here, the

patent here in suit will be invalid if the Sulman patent

is entitled to an application filing date earlier than the

filing date of the patent here in suit. The filing date to

which the two patents are respectfully entitled is deter-

mined by the provisions of U. 8. C., Tit. 35, Sec. 32 (R. S.,

Sec. 4887), since both the patent in suit and the anticipat-

ing Sulman patent were granted on applications filed by

foreign inventors.

Section 4887 of the Revised Statutes provides that:

‘An application for patent for an invention or

discovery or for a design filed in this country by

any person who has previously regularly filed an

application for a patent for the same invention, dis-

covery, or design in a foreign country which, by

treaty, convention, or law, affords similar privileges

oo

to citizens of the United States shall have the same

force and effect as the same application would have

if filed in this country on the date on which the

application for patent for the same invention, dis-

covery, or design was first filed in such foreign

country.’’

Under this statute, the effective date of the patent in

suit is the British filing date, February 1, 1909,* and the

effective date of the Sulman U. S. patent 955,012 is

the British filing date, December 24, 1908. Sulman is,

therefore, the prior inventor.

A situation on all fours with that here presented was

considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit in Federal Yeast Corporation vs. Fleisch-

mann Co., 13 F. [2d], 570. In that case, the Court held

that a patent of Hayduck No. 1,449,103, issued on March

20, 1923, upon an application filed in the United States

Patent Office on October 30, 1920, was entitled to a filing

date of March 15, 1915** (the date of filing of a German

patent for the same invention), and that the Hayduck

patent, therefore, anticipated a patent in suit of Nilsson

and Harrison No. 1,449,103, issued March 20, 1923, upon

an application filed in the United States Patent Office

on January 7, 1919.

*It is referred to in plaintiff’s brief (p. 46) as “February 1, 1909, the

record date of the invention in issue.”

**The Court said (13 F. [2d], 571):

“In our Patent Office, their [Nilsson and Harrison] application

preceded that of Hayduck by almost two years. Nevertheless he

was entitled to priority over them because as early as March 15,

1915, he had asked for a German patent for the same invention,

and his American application by virtue of section 4887 of the

Revised Statutes (Comp. St., 9431), and of the Act of March 3,

1921, 41 Stat. 1313 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp., 1923, 943la-9431h),

commonly called the Nolan Act, is to be treated as if it had been

then made.”

DORSET EO IE Pm =

eo |

—

There is, we submit, no answer to this proposition.

Under the law as stated by this Court in the Milburn

Case and Section 4887 of the Revised Statutes, the pat-

ent in suit is invalid in view of the Sulman patent No.

955,012.

63

We, therefore, submit that the patent in suit is invalid

because of the prior invention and prior patenting by

Sulman, in U. 8. Patent 955,012, of the use in froth flo-

tation of alcohol—a wholly soluble mineral-frothing

agent.

Third Defense.

The patentees, Sulman, Greenway and Higgins, were

not the joint inventors of the subject matter of the patent

in suit. On the contrary, two of the patentees, Sulman

and Higgins, knew, prior to any date available as a basis

for the patent here in suit, that the froth flotation process

of patent 835,120 could be practiced with phenol, with

cresol, and with certain alcohols that were so soluble

that they wholly dissolved in the pulp.

The third defense, that the patentees Sulman, Green-

way and Higgins were not the joint inventors of the

subject matter of the patent in suit is supported by proof

that, quite aside from the just above discussed Sulman

United States patent 955.012, and the British applica-

tion of December 24, 1908, upon which the application

for that United States patent was based, both Sulman

individually and Higgins individually, prior to Febru-

ary 1, 1909, the earliest date available to the plaintiff

as the date of alleged joint invention of the patent in

suit, had full knowledge of the process patented in the

patent in suit, i. e., the process of concentrating ores

which consists in mixing the powdered ore with water

containing in solution a small quantity of a mineral-

G4

frothing agent, agitating the mixture to form a froth,

and separating the froth.

That being so, neither Sulman nor Higgins could have

believed that the alleged invention of the patent in suit

was the joint invention of Sulman, Higgins and Green-

way.

U. S. C., Tit. 35, See. 72 (R. S., Sec. 4923), provides:

‘¢Whenever it appears that a patentee, at the time

of making his application for the patent, believed

himself to be the original and first inventor or dis-

coverer of the thing patented, the same shall not be

held to be void on account of the invention or dis-

covery, or any part thereof, having been known or

used in a foreign country, before his invention or

discovery thereof, if it had not been patented or

described in a printed publication.’’

From this statute it follows, of course, that the patent

will be held to be void if the patentees had knowledge

of the prior work (whether done abroad or at home), and

consequently did not believe themselves to be the original

and first inventors of the thing patented.

The defense is pleaded as follows:

Answer, paragraph 9, section ¢ (Vol. 1, p. 40):

‘‘That the patentees Sulman, Greenway and Hig-

gins were not joint inventors of the subject-matter

alleged to be patented by said Letters Patent No.

962,678 or any substantial or material part thereof.’’

Amendment to Answer, paragraph 9, section F (Vol.

I, p. 95):

‘‘That the patentees Sulman, Greenway and Hig-

gins falsely made oath that they believed themselves

to be the inventors of the subject-matter of the said

letters patent, or of so much thereof as the defend-

ant'is charged with infringing, when in fact at'the

date of filing the application on which the said letters

patent in suit were granted, they, or some, or all of

them, knew that the said subject-matter was already

known individually to the said Higgins and the said

Sulman, each of whom had previously individually

filed applications for letters patent therefor in Great

Britain.”’’

That Sulman, at least as early as December 24; 1908;

knew how to practice a process of concentrating ores

which consists in mixing the powdered ore with water

containing in solution a small quantity of a mineral-

frothing agent, agitating the mixture to form a froth

and separating the froth, has been shown in our preced-

ing discussion of the second defense. Having that knowl-

edge, which he professed was of his own discovery or in-

vention, as early as December 24, 1908, he could not have

been a joint inventor of that subject matter with Higgins

and Greenway on February Ist, 1909.

Similarly, the record here shows that Mr. Higgins

knew, and took steps to patent in England, that phenol

and cresol and other related substances would act as

mineral-frothing agents in solution in.such a process.

That fact is proved by the Provisional Specification of

the Higgins British patent of December 10, 1908 (R., IT,

1051), the subject matter of which was communicated _to

Minerals Separation, Ltd., by Mr. Higgins. In that

specification, it is said (R., II, p. 1051, lines 6, et seq.) :

‘‘According to this invention the ernshed ore is

introduced into water containing in solution, a very

small percentage of aromatic hydroxy-compounds

such as phenol, cresol, salicylic acid or salicylates, .

66

hydroquinone, picric acid, pyrogallic acid and also

a small percentage of a mineral acid such as sulfuric

acid, and the mixture is thoroughly agitated. The

ore particles are caused to come into contact with

a gas such as air; the result is to cause metallic

sulphides to float and they can therefore be sepa-

rated by any well known means.”’

The only subject matter that could have been the joint

invention (assuming that there might have been inven-

tion) of Sulman, Higgins & Greenway, on February 1,

1909, is the use of the specific agents mentioned in the

patent in suit and not mentioned in the earlier applica-

tions, namely, amyl acetate and other esters, benzoic,

valerianic and lactic acids, acetones and other ketones

such as camphor.

If plaintiff had been able to prove that Sulman, Hig-

gins and Greenway jointly did some work that ante-

dated the development by Higgins of the use of phenol

and cresol in the froth-flotation process, and the develop-

ment by Sulman of the use of alcohols in that process,

then the patent might have been sustained, since a pat-

entee in the United States is entitled, where originality

of invention is in issue, to carry his date back to the

earliest work he did abroad.*

But in answer to this defense, plaintiff offered no evi-

dence of any kind, and contented itself with the sugges-

tion that the defense is a technical one not favored by

the courts. That we admit, in the sense that it is a

*On this aspect of the case—joint inventorship of Sulman, Greenway

and Higgins—the Court should bear in mind that Higgins was continu-

ously absent from England (being in fact in Australia) from August,

1908, until March, 1909 (R., I, 600), while Sulman and Greenway were

each in England during this period (R., I, 600-601). It is impossible for

us to conceive of these three gentlemen making a joint invention while

so separated. The facts, as shown by the proofs in this case, are that

there was no joint invention or discovery of mineral-frothing agents in

solution.

PRIN Pees RE NT, REGO ELT SERVER AMPS PIE keg RY th ertows aon vere ie Pe MOT NTPC E SA

67

statutory defense that may have the effect to destroy

an otherwise meritorious patent. It is nevertheless a

complete defense fully supported by the facts. Under the

law of this country, a patent, to be valid, must be granted

to the original or true inventor or inventors and if it

appears that it was not so granted, nothing can save it.

In DeLaval Separator Co. vs. Vermont Farm Mach.

Co., 126 Fed., 536, the patent in suit was granted to Jules

Melotte of Belgium and Wilhelm Reuther of Germany.

Melotte under compulsion testified that he alone was the

sole inventor. Judge Wheeler said (p. 537):

‘‘This [defense] is technical, but, as patents are

founded solely upon statutes, they are not valid

unless they comply substantially with all the terms

and provisions of the statute.’’

He held the patent invalid, citing Bannerman vs. San-

ford, 99 Fed., 294 C. C. A., 2nd Cir.

On appeal (135 Fed., 772), the Court of Appeals of the

Second Circuit said:

‘“‘The Court below adjudged the patent invalid

upon the ground that the defense that Melotte and

Reuther were not the joint inventors was satisfac-

torily established. With this conclusion we are con-

strained to agree, though we do so with regret, he-

cause the defense is purely technical, and destroys

a meritorious patent, purchased by the complainant

in ignorance of its infirmity, and at a very consid-

erable price.’’

It is useless to review all the cases on the subject be-

cause the law is not disputed. If the proofs show that

the invention was not a joint invention, the patent is

invalid. In this case, the effective dates of the Higgins

provisional specification and of the Sulman, Picard and

ASAE gS 8 REN a RPE CERT AREA OR AMD TO fra CREMATED Ty ABCA URE FENRIS RAE BM IIR GRC pes

68

Ballot provisional specification are admitted and these

provisional specifications leave no room for doubt that

Higgins and Sulman, prior to the date of the alleged

joint invention, knew how to use organic mineral-froth-

ing agents—specifically ‘‘aromatic hydroxy compounds,

such as phenol, cresol, salicylic acid or salicylates, hydro-

quinone, picrie acid, pyrogallic acid’’ and “alohols, such

as amyl-alcohol’’—in solution in the agitation-froth flota-

tion process.

Attention is called, however, to:

Barrett vs. Hall, Federal Cases, 1047;

Stewart vs. Tenk, 32 Fed., 665;

Wellsbach Light Co. vs. Cosmopolitan Incandes-

cent Light Co., 104 Fed., 83;

DeLaval Separator Co. vs. Vermont, 135 Fed.,

772;

Thropp & Sons vs. DeLaski, 218 Fed., 458;

affirmed 226 Fed., 941,

and the cases cited in those opinions.

We respectfully submit that the evidence in this case

conclusively establishes the fact that Sulman and Hig-

gins, long prior to the alleged joint invention of the pat-

ent in suit, knew the very thing the patent purports to

cover as the joint invention of Higgins, Sulman and

Greenway, i. e., that the agitation froth process could

be practiced with mineral frothing agents (particularly

phenol, cresol, and certain alcohols) which existed in the

pulp wholly in solution, and that, on this ground alone,

the patent in suit must be held invalid.

We further submit that plaintiff has failed to present

any sound reply to this defense because the defense is

without flaw and unanswerable.

$ AONE LG TONY AC OE ORE OBE VU ay tory

69

Fourth Defense.

Claims 1 and 2 of the patent in suit to which the com-

plaint is limited are void because they attempt to claim

more than the patentees had discovered or disclosed in

the specification. These claims attempt to cover the

carrying on of the process in any or all pulps (acid,

alkaline or neutral) although the patentees had not dis-

covered how to carry on the process except in an acidified

pulp and the disclosure of the specification is that acid

is @ necessary, not merely a preferred, element of the

process.

Fifth Defense.

The claims are not infringed because all claims based

upon the supposed invention disclosed in the specification

must be limited to the carrying on of the process in an

acidified pulp; and defendant’s pulp is not acidified.

These defenses are based upon lack of consideration

for the monopoly claimed. The specification of the pat-

ent instructs that the agents be used in an acidified pulp;

and nowhere suggests that they can be used in a neutral

or alkaline pulp. The patentees say:

(Pat., p. 1, lines 15-22:)

‘‘According to this invention the crushed ore is

mixed with water containing in solution a small per-

centage of a mineral-frothing agent * * * and con-

taining also a small percentage of a suitable acid

such as sulfuric acid.’’

(P. 1, lines 39-41 :)

‘‘The above mentioned mineral-frothing agents

are all more or less effective in the presence of an

acid such as sulfuric acid * * *,’’

70

(P. 1, lines 55-59 :)

‘‘Water containing a small percentage of sulfuric

acid in solution, say from .2% to 0.5%, and contain-

ing in solution a small quantity, say 0.1% of one of

the foregoing organic substances (say amyl acte-

tate) ** o 99

(P. 2, lines 61-64:)

‘‘ According to this invention the mineral-frothing

agent consists of an organic compound contained in

solution in the acidified water.’’

(P. 2, lines 74-77 :)

‘‘We disclaim any such use of these substances

and only claim them in such amount as will enable

them to dissolve in the acidified water.’’

The evidence shows affirmatively that the patentees

did not know how to produce a mineral-bearing froth

with any of these agents, except in an acidified pulp.

This is shown by the laboratory records of Mr. Stevens.

He was employed in the laboratory of Sulman and Picard

in London in the latter part of 1908 and the first part of

1909, and when so employed conducted a series of experi-

ments upon the effects of a large number of substances

as frothing agents in the agitation froth process, acting

under instructions from his superiors. The results of

these tests are shown in his contemporaneous notes and

reports (R., I, p. 375, and Defendant’s Exhibit No. 115,

R., II, pp. 1107-1184).

The first report is dated December 11, 1908, and the

last is dated June 7, 1909.

He started out experimenting with phenol, and in each

case used acid in measured amounts. His report sheets

(see for example R., II, 1107-9) show

71

‘Circuit before test—0.7% acid,

Cireuit after test—0.55% acid.”’

On December 30, 1908 (p. 1120), he reported tests on

various other reagents experimented with ‘‘according

to instructions received from Mr. Greenway.’’ The data

sheets show that he used a 0.6% solution of acid in each

case.

The lists of substances experimented with included

amy] alcohol, and in his report he says (p. 1122):

‘*None of these reagents gave satisfactory results

unless acid was present.’’

On January 2, 1909 (p. 1123), he says:

“*T regret to say that with all the substances tried,

no satisfactory result has been obtained, it appear-

ing impossible to obtain a good clean-up of the min-

eral especially if large quantities of slimes are pres-

ent unless acid is added.’’

On January 9th he reported (p. 1131) a further series

of tests with amyl alcohol and amyl acetate using an acid

circuit in every test (pp. 1132-1134) and on the same day,

in a second report, he said (p. 1135) :

‘**T beg to report results of series of tests carried

out according to instructions received from Mr. H. L.

Sulman, with the object of obviating the addition of

either acid or oil to the pulps. No satisfactory result

was obtained unless acid was added except in the

ease of Aniline Sulphate. * * * This material is dis-

tinctly acid to litmus, and may possibly contain some

free Sulphuric Acid which accounts for this result.’’

On January 16, 1909 (p. 1141), he reported the results

with various substances, including cresylic acid and cre-

sol, and says:

72

‘In trying these reagents without the addition of

sulphuric acid, the results were very poor.’’

On January 24, 1909 (p. 1146), he reported the result

of tests to determine the minimum quantity of acid which

could be used with amy] aicohol solution:

‘(From the tests it appears that less acid is neces-

sary to procure the desired effect than when Oleic

Acid is the selective agent, and when the pulp is

slightly warmed the cleaning up action is obtained

with less acid than required in the cold. I am of

the opinion that in the cold 15-20 lbs. of acid per

ton would be necessary, whereas if warmed to about

35 C. good results should be obtained with 15.0 Ibs.

as a mMaximum.’’

In no ease did he succeed in getting flotation without

acid. His final conclusion, expressed in a report of June

7, 1909 (pp. 1183-4), was that amyl acetate

‘sig the best we have found amongst the many sub-

stances tried in the place of oil, * * *.’’

‘‘The concentrates produced are very clean, and

I feel confident in asserting that much less acid will

be found necessary in conjunction with this reagent,

in fact a very fair clean-up can be obtained when

using sulfarous acid in the place of sulfuric acid.’’

Of course, this is language which would not have been

used in a communication to Sulman & Picard if it had

been known that the substances could be used without

acid—that is, in a neutral or alkaline pulp.

On this evidence, the District Court found that the

patentees of the patent in suit disclosed only an acid

RNR RSs INR ETN ar eenR MEAT ah CRN aCe YMRS

whe et Os dat ana at hd

73

pulp and did not know that the process could be used

otherwise. The Court said (R., I, 623) :

‘It is apparently true that the inventors disclosed

an acid pulp and did not know that the process could

be used otherwise.’’

The Court added:

“Tt was widely understood at that time that noth-

ing but an acid process would work in their concen-

tration process, and it was the general custom to use

an acidified pulp.’’

But that cannot be so because in the specification of

patent 835,120 the Minerals Separation engineers had

explained that in that process generally the acidification

of the water was only a preferable step, not a necessary

one.

The difference between that disclosure and the dis-

closure of the patent in suit was a deliberate difference

and arose out of the fact that after prolonged attempts

to operate in a non-acid pulp with the particular agents

specified in the patent in suit the patentees had not been

able to find any that would operate, except in an acid

pulp.

In saying this, we are only saying what the plaintiff

said to the Patent Office in prosecuting the Greenway

flotation patent 1,099,699 of June 9, 1914 (R., II, 1248,

et seq.), the so-called third patent of the Miami litiga-

tion. In the specification filed with the application

for that patent, the alleged invention was said to be a

modification of the invention described in the patent here

in suit (962,678). The patentees saying (R., II, pp. 1291,

lines 21-36) :

‘‘The process therein described is applicable gen-

erally to the recovery of metallic sulfids and like

74

floatable metalliferous matter and in the case of lead

and zine sulfides to which the process has been largely

applied it is necessary for efficient working that the

pulp should be slightly acidified, and in most cases

in practice the pulp is heated. It is now found that

with copper ore such as an ore containing copper

pyrites effective separation is obtained in the cold

without the use of acid by employing as mineral-

frothing agents, aromatic hydroxy compounds such

as phenol, cresol, or mixtures containing the same.’’

In the second Patent Office Action (p. 1261) the claims

of this application were rejected upon reference to the

patent here in suit 962,678. To that Office action the

applicant’s attorney, Mr. Henry D. Williams, said (p.

1267):

‘‘The present applicant participated in the inven-

tion disclosed in this patent [962,678] and the pres-

ent invention is an important improvement upon that

patent. That patent discloses the employment of

soluble frothing agents in an acid solution. Phenol

and its homologues are mentioned as such frothing

agents, and it is said:

‘The above mentioned mineral frothing agents are

all more or less effective in the presence of an acid

such as sulfuric acid’ (Spec., p. 1, lines 30-42).’’

‘‘Since the making of the Solution invention, it

has been discovered as the result of careful research

and investigation, and quite contrary to the expecta-

tions of the metallurgists of Minerals Separation,

Limited, that, if copper ores are treated in neutral

water and with a minute quantity of an aromatic

hydroxy compound or a material containing such a

Rr.

75

compound, such as wood-tar oil, and submitted to

the vigorous agitation characteristic of the agitation-

froth process, a remarkable concentration may be

attained.’’

(Page 1268:)

“It could not have been predicted from the pat-

ents cited, or, indeed, from any patents dealing with

the problem of concentrating ores, that the remark-

able results attainable by this new process were pos-

sible of attainment by the procedure covered in the

present claims.”’

The Examiner was not satisfied and repeated his rejec-

tion (p. 1269).

To this further rejection Mr. Williams replied by filing

affidavits of Mr. John Ballot and Mr. Greenway (one of

the patentees of the patent in suit and also the patentee

of Patent 1,099,699) and a further argument reviewing

at some length the Minerals Separation’s inventions and

differentiating them from one another. He restates the

substance of the Greenway affidavit, which relates to cir-

cumstances under which the supposed inventien was

made, and says (p. 1275):

‘‘Uultimately the question appears to be whether

or not, before he made the present invention, he dis-

closed it in these prior patents. He certainly did

not do so in the Solution patent, since the most that

may be said of that disclosure is that it suggests the

use of a phenol in an acidified solution, without heat.

It must be remembered that great ore-concentrating

enterprises were being carried on in Australia with

which Mr. Greenway was in direct contact, wherein

a very considerable item of expense was the sulphuric

acid essential in those processes. Indeed, it is char-

76

acteristic. of all the Australian sulphide ores that

they contain a considerable quantity of calcite and

that necessarily considerable sulphuric acid is wasted

in useless chemical reaction in the decomposition

of this calcite, and therefore the acid consumption

for all Australian ores was very high. It was, there-

fore, highly desirable to save this item of expense,

and yet that saving was deemed to be impossible.

Another important factor was that a great litigation

was pending wherein the owners of the Elmore pat-

ents were asserting that their Australian patent,

corresponding to United States Patent No. 689,070,

was a master patent for the use of sulphuric acid in

any process wherein oils were employed in the con-

centration of ore. Had the Elmores prevailed in this

: suit, enormous sums in damages would have been col-

lected and a great industry would have been held in

subjection.

There was, therefore, during the entire period

from the Solution invention to the diseovery of the

present invention the strongest possible incentive to

the omission of acid.’’

He then proceeded to make the argument that if the

possibility of omitting acid had been known to the pat-

entees of the patent in suit or discoverable by men

skilled in the art from the disclosure of the patent in

suit, the acid would have been omitted and all of these

expenses saved.

His remarks make plain the purpose of Mr. Stevens’

investigation and confirm the fact that it resulted in a

failure to float ore with any of the substances named in

the patent in suit, except in an acidified pulp.

ee ee

77

The Greenway affidavit (pp. 1282-8) asserts of the

Solution patent here in suit that

‘** * * the important discovery there set forth is

that the agitation-froth process may be carried on

in an acidified pulp containing in solution a mineral-

frothing agent as distinguished from the disclosures

of the original agitation froth process patent No.

835,120.”’

‘‘The present invention was made by me subse-

quent to my participation in the Solution and in the

Essential Oils inventions above referred to. It was

not suggested to me by those inventions. It was, in

fact, a discovery unexpected and surprising.’’

Plaintiff through its counsel then represented that

after the disclosure of the patent in suit it still required

invention to use these frothing agents (phenol and cresol

and the other substances mentioned in the patent in

suit) in the flotation of copper ores without acid; yet

now plaintiff contends that anyone would know, upon

reading the disclosure of the patent in suit, that these

substances could be used as well in a neutral or alkaline

pulp.

As this Court said in the Butte Case (250 U. S., 344-

345):

‘*Much of this evidence is especially impressive

because the papers from which it is derived were

written and the witnesses testified before the ques-

tion * * * , now made in this case, was raised or

diseussed.’’

ETT ET EE EY MOTTE IE RW, RP PN RE RR rae

78

The District Court, in its opinion, said on this ques-

tion (R., I, 624):

‘‘Even if the patentees did not know that the

process described by them could be carried on with

an alkaline pulp they did not limit themselves in that

respect and it is sufficient if the real novelty of

their invention is broad enough to support the claims,

as it appears to be.”’

But that seems to us a strange way to judge the quid

pro quo that must be delivered by a patentee to the pub-

lic as compensation for the granted monopoly. What the

patentee has really added to the sum of human knowl-

edge in the sense of its practical availability in the arts,

he is entitled to monopolize by a patent. Here, leaving

aside the question of anticipation hereinabove discussed,

what the patentees stated to the men skilled in the art

was that if they used these soluble substances in an acid-

ified pulp, those substances would go wholly into solu-

tion in the pulp and would produce a mineral-bearing

froth. Beyond that the disclosure did not go; and we

do not see how the monopoly can be extended beyond

the disclosure.

In sharp contrast with the disclosure of patent No.

835,120, the patent here in suit sets forth the use of acid,

not as a recommendation of preference, but as a neces-

sary element of the process. In Snow vs. Lake Shore,

eic., Railway Co. (121 U. S., 617, at p. 630) this Court

said, expressing a well-established rule:

**It is not admissible to adopt the argument made

on behalf of the appellants, that this language is to

be taken as a mere recommendation by the patentee

of the manner in which he prefers to arrange these

parts of his machine. There is nothing in the con-

ns sclionieiaratseinniias tied dacetede es ictaih oa ie eae eae ee meher —

—

79

text to indicate that the patentee contemplated any

alternative for the arrangement of the piston and

piston rod. The arrangement of the valves, as shown

in the drawings, he declared not to be essential, and

explained how they might be otherwise adjusted, and

the comparative advantage and disadvantage of

those plans; but no such language is used in refer-

ence to the connection between the piston and its

rod.’’

This being so, claims 1 and 2 of the patent in suit,

which are not limited to an acidified pulp, attempt to

claim more than the patentees had discovered or dis-

closed, and are therefore invalid.

Defendant’s Practice.

In defendant’s practice there is added to the ore pulp

a small quantity of a mineral-frothing agent which goes

wholly into solution in the pulp. But that mineral-

frothing agent is not any of the substances mentioned

or suggested in plaintiff’s paten& or anything that was

known at the time of plaintiff’s patent to have preferen-

tial affinity for metalliferous matter. The agent used

by defendant is alpha naphthylamine, commonly known

as X-cake. It is a flotation agent discovered and pat-

ented by plaintiff’s licensor, Metals Recovery Company

(Patent No. 1,228,183, of May 29, 1917, R., II, 1222; and

see Stipulation, R., I, 105, and License Agreement, R.,

II, 1238).

The substances mentioned in plaintiff’s patent have not

had any considerable place in the industrial use of the

flotation process. Industrially the art has used prin-

cipally wood-tar and coal-tar oils. The only mireral-

frothing agent going wholly into solution in the pulp that

has had any extended industrial use is alpha naph-

thylamine, developed by defendant’s licensor.

EE IE ETE T OR I EE EI A SS ETN. ee NN: I GP CRIT BIS AUR To TU RE SRNR HBA L IAT ae

LAER MO yn TCS NU DPS ee SIS

80

Defendant’s pulp is not acidified. On the contrary, it

is made alkaline by the addition of lime. Defendant’s

use of an alkaline pulp is not, in any sense, a practice

adopted for the purpose of avoiding the claims of the

patent in suit. The testimony of Mr. Nichols (R., I, 373-

374) shows that the defendant’s mill is operated on an

alkaline pulp because satisfactory recovery of the min-

erals cannot be effected on its ore with its process unless

the pulp is alkaline.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that defend-

ant does not infringe claims 1 and 2 of the patent in suit,

since these claims are of necessity limited to an acidified

pulp, both by the disclosure of the patent itself and by’

the state of knowledge of the patentees as established by

the evidence.

Plaintiff’s Repiy to the Fourth and Fifth Defenses.

In replying to these defenses, plaintiff cited in the

Court below, many cases to the effect that broad claims

in a patent are not to be restricted to specific details set

forth in the specification. With this we agree. If the

specification discloses one or more specific ways of doing

the thing, the claims may be broad enough to cover all

of those ways of doing it and their equivalents, but where

the specification does not disclose, and the patentees did

not know, how to use a soluble frothing agent in a non-

acidified pulp, they cannot cover that by any claim lan-

guage. Claims covering, in broad phraseology, the dis-

closure of the specification are not to be limited to the

specific means disclosed. On the other hand, the monop-

oly cannot be extended by broad claim language to cover

something not disclosed in the specification.

It was said by Judge Hough, speaking for the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Westing-

house vs. Metropolitan Electric Mfg. Co., 290 Fed., 661,

May 7, 1923, page 664:

81

‘What any patentee has invented is theoretically

what he discloses, and the disclosure is the specifica-

tion. A claim is a definition of that which has been

described in the specification. A disclosure tells how

to do that of which the claim attempts definition.

* * * A claim not supported by the specification is

a bad claim.’’

The doctrine is, in fact, well enough illustrated in the

opinion of this Court in the Hyde Case on patent No.

835,120. Claims 9, 10 and 11 of that patent were broadly

for the use of a ‘‘small quantity’’ of mineral-frothing

agent. The other claims were limited to “a fraction of

one per cent.’’ Claims 9, 10 and 11 were, therefore,

broader than the other claims and plaintiff urged there,

as it does here, that to restrict claims 9, 10 and 11 toa

fraction of one per cent. would be to give them the same

meaning as the other narrower claims. This Court de-

clared the broader claims invalid, thereby applying and

illustrating the rule that a patent can never be broader

than the invention—a rule that may be thought of as the

fundamental rule of the patent law, the whole purpose

of which is to secure to inventors a monopoly of what

they invent, and not of something else.

Sixth Defense,

The claims are not infringed by defendant’s process

because the claims were deliberately limited by the pat-

entees to a process in which the froth is formed by agita-

tion, and defendant uses the pneumatic bubble column

flotation process in which the froth is not formed by agi-

tation,

This defense is based upon the statutory requirement

(U. S. C., Tit. 35, See. 33; R. S., See. 4888) that the pat-

DE ORIEL IO IOP SA AR

Vv

82

entee ‘‘shall particularly point out and distinctly claim

the part, improvement, or combination which he claims

as his invention or discovery.’’

Defendant’s position is that the words ‘‘agitating the

mixture to form a froth’’ in the claims of the patent

define and are limited to such a process of froth flotation

as is described in patent 835,120, wherein by agitation

air is introduced into the pulp to form the froth. The

patentees of the patent in suit, engineers of Minerals

Separation, Ltd., knew all about the agitation-froth

process of patent 835,120 and all about the several

other known froth flotation processes in which the froth-

forming gas was not introduced into the pulp by agitation,

but was otherwise ‘‘liberated in, generated in, or effec-

tively introduced into the mixture.’’ The patentees

of the patent in suit deliberately chose the expression

‘‘agitating the mixture to form a froth”’ to differentiate

it from these earlier processes. And defendant does

not infringe because it uses a subsequently invented proc-

ess in which air is not introduced into the pulp by

agitation but is gently released therein under light pres-

sure through the porous bottom of the pneumatic flota-

tion cell.

It does not answer this proposition to say that plain-

tiff might have demanded and received a patent for the

use of mineral-frothing agents in solution in every froth

flotation process, no matter how the gas might be intro-

duced into the pulp. The rule of the patent law is that

the claims as granted measure the extent of the monopoly.

From the earliest days, although the purpose of the

law to fully reward the inventor has always been kept in

mind, this Court has held that the public interest must

also be considered and that, even though the language of

the claim is narrower than the true invention, the pat-

entee will, nevertheless, be limited to the scope of the

monopoly claimed ; since to do otherwise would be unfair

EI ERNE eT BTA ErT Ie

83

to the public and would give rise to hidden liens and

unknown liabilities which would more than offset the

hardship to inventors which may arise out of the appli-

cation of the rule.*

That being the law, the facts are, defendant contends,

that the words ‘‘agitating the mixture to form a froth’’

of the claims here in issue were words of recog-

nized significance to the man skilled in the art, inelud-

ing the patentees of the patent here in suit; that those

words meant the agitation froth process—the process of “= —

patent 835.120, or its equivalent—and excluded other

froth flotation processes: and that the patentees of the

patent here in suit deliberately chose them for that

purpose.

These are the very words which the same patentees

used in the broadest claims (9. 10 and 11) of their pat-

ent 835,120, and they have the same meaning as the

words used in the other claims of that patent—‘‘agitat-

ing the mixture until the oil-coated mineral matter forms

into a froth.”’

The record shows that these men knew all about (1)

the boiling process (Sulman U. 8S. Patent 835,143), in

which the bubbles of air and water vapor were gener-

ated in the body of the pulp by boiling; (2) the chemical]

generation process (Froment British Patent 12,778 of

1902, for example, and the Potter and Delprat process

of U. S. Patents 735,071, 768,035 and 776,145), in which

the bubbles of gas were generated in the pulp by chem-

ical reaction; (3) the Elmore vacuum process (Patent

826,411), in which bubbles of air were liberated in the

body of pulp by a vacuum; (4) the plus-pressure process

*White vs. Dunbar, 119 U. S., 47, at page 51; Lehigh Valley Railroad

Co. vs. Mellon, 104 U. S., 112, at page 118; McClain vs. Ortmayer, 141

U. S., 419, at page 423: Merrill vs. Yeomans, 94 U. S., 568, at page 573;

and Minerals Separation, Ltd., vs. Bute, etc., Mining Co., 250 U. S., 336, at

page 347.

Re 8 et A ARTE NEY CEEOL all I AE eA, OR LOI A ENTIRE CAE EMRE DILL AMEE Wel

84

(Plaintiff’s U. S. Patents 835,120 and 835,479), in which

additional air was dissolved in the pulp by a preliminary

compressing operation and was then released to form

the flotation bubbles by relieving the pressure; and (5)

the agitation-froth process of Patent 835,120.

All of these processes are included within the generic

expression ‘‘a gas is liberated in, generated in, or effec-

tively introduced into the mixture.’’ But the specific

expression ‘‘agitating the mixture to form a froth’’ de-

fines only the agitation froth process of patent 835,120.

In the specification of the patent in suit, the patentees,

with their intimate knowledge of these prior processes

and just how the gas was introduced in each, said that

in their process of the patent in suit (R., II, 664, lines

23-25)

i ‘*the mixture is thoroughly agitated; a gas is lib-

; erated in, generated in, or effectively introduced into

the mixture.’’

That expression, as it stood, without more, might have

been interpreted to mean either ‘‘the mixture is thor-

oughly agitated (and thereby) a gas is liberated in, gen-

erated in, or effectively introduced into the mixture,”’

or it might be interpreted that for the purpose of form-

ing the froth ‘‘the mixture is thoroughly agitated (or

in lieu of agitation) a gas is liberated in, generated in,

or effectively introduced into the mixture.”’

But when it came to claiming their invention, the pat-

entees deliberately chose between these two possible

things and expressly limited their claims to ‘‘agitating

the mixture to form a froth.’’ Having the definition

clearly in mind, they deliberately chose to limit their

claims to the agitation froth process in which the

agitation introduced air into the pulp and formed the

froth. No doubt they then believed that process to be

of controlling importance in the industry (the Pneu-

a a Sa tM ala Miah a RR AR eee a seen ue yp ecpeate nae RE

85

matic-Flotation process used by defendant had not then

been invented) and preferred to limit their claims to

that; thereby adding to the claims whatever strength

inheres in the more specific basis for the monopoly. We

submit that the choice made then cannot now be de-

parted from.

Plaintiff’s counsel said, in argument in the Court be-

low, that he could think of no broader way of stating

the invention than in the words ‘‘agitating the mixture

to form a froth,’’ but it is obvious that the patentees

knew how to state it more broadly. If it had been their

purpose to claim broadly the use of mineral-frothing

agents in solution in any and all of the then-known

frothing processes, the proper language lay right on

their tongues. All they had to do was use the unqualified

expression ‘‘effectively introducing a gas into the mix-

ture to form a froth.’’ Having chosen not to make that

claim during the prosecution in the Patent Office, they

cannot make it now.

In the process of flotation claimed in the patent in

suit air is sucked and beaten into the pulp and the

mineral-bearing froth is formed in the pulp by agitation.

In the pneumatic flotation process the pulp is aerated by

a multitude of minute bubbles forced thro

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