Opinion — Silver v. Silver

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 24.—Ocroser Term, 1929.

Mae Silver, Appellant, Appeal from the Supreme

vs. Court of the State of Con-

Benjamin Silver. necticut.

[November 25, 1929.]

Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal under § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended

by Act of February 13, 1925, from a judgment of the Supreme

Court of Connecticut upholding the constitutionality of a state

statute. Chapter 308 of the Public Acts of Connecticut of 1927

(printed in the margin!) provides that no person carried gratui-

tously as a guest in an automobile may recover from the owner or

operator for injuries caused by its negligent operation. The ap-

pellant brought suit in the Superior Court of New Haven County

against appellee, her husband, for injuries so sustained. Judg-

ment for the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Both

courts ruled that the statute barred appellant, a guest carried

gratuitously, from recovery for injuries caused by ordinary negli-

gence in the operation of the car, and the Supreme Court, by

1Chapter 308. An Act releasing owners of motor vehicles from responsibility

for injuries to passengers therein.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General As-

sembly convened :

Section 1. No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor

vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause

of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss,

in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the

part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless

disregard of the rights of others.

See. 2. This act shall not relieve a public carrier or any owner or operator

of a motor vehicle while the same is being demonstrated to a prospective pur-

chaser of responsibility for ary injuries sustained by a passenger being trans-

ported by such public carrier or by such owner or operator.

2 Silver vs. Silver.

divided bench, held that the statute did not deny to appellant the

equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend.

ment.

As the record does not disclose the constitutional grounds on

which the appellant challenged the validity of the statute, our re.

view will be limited to the single question arising under the Fed-

eral Constitution which was considered in the opinion of the court

below. Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260. We need not,

therefore, elaborate the rule that the Constitution does not for-

bid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recog.

nized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object.

See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112, 116; New

York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Mountain Tim-

ber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219; Wilmington Mining Co. v.

Fulion, 205 U. S. 60, 74.

The use of the automobile as an instrument of transportation is

peculiarly the subject of regulation. We cannot assume that there

are no evils to be corrected or permissible social objects to be

gained by the present statute. We are not unaware of the in-

creasing frequency of litigation in which passengers carried gra-

tuitously in automobiles, often casual guests or licensees, have

sought the recovery of large sums for injuries alleged to have been

due to negligent operation. In some jurisdictions it has been judi-

cially determined that a lower standard of care should be exacted

where the carriage in any type of vehicle is gratuitous. See Mass-

aletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487; Marcienowski v. Sanders, 252

Mass. 65; Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399. Whether there has

been a serious increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in this

class of cases, where the carriage is by automobile, is for legislative

determination and, if found, may well be the basis of legislative

action further restricting the liability. Its wisdom is not the con-

cern of courts.

It is said that the vice in the statute is not that it distinguishes

between passengers who pay and those who do not, but between

gratuitous passengers in automobiles and those in other classes of

vehicles. But it is not so evident that no grounds exist for the dis-

tinction that we can say d priori that the classification is one for-

bidden as without basis, and arbitrary. See Clarke v. Deckebach,

274 U. S. 392, 397.

Silver vs. Silver. 3

_ Granted that the liability to be imposed upon those who operate

any kind of vehicle for the benefit of a mere guest or licensee ie an

appropriate subject of legislative restriction, there is no constitu-

tional requirement that a regulation, in other respects perr=‘s-

sible, must reach every class to which it might be applied that the

legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or

none. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 188, 144; Miller v. Wil-

son, 236 U. S. 373, 382, 384; International Harvester Co. v. Mis-

sours, 234 U. S. 200, 215; Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26, 29

(1913). In this day of almost universal highway transportation

by motor car, we cannot say that abuses originating in the multi-

plicity of suits growing out of the gratuitous carriage of passengers

in automobiles do not present so conspicuous an example of what

the legislature may regard as an evil, as to justify legislation aimed

at it, even though some abuses may not be hit. Carroll v. Green-

wich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401, 411; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278

U. S. 63, 73. It is enough that the present statute strikes at the

evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases where it most fre-

quently occurs.

Affirmed.

A true copy.

Test:

Clerk, Supreme Court, U. 8.