Croes nPetition — Miller v. Federal Communications Commission (No. 95-1361)

Supreme Court brief1995

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

IN THE a.”

Supreme Court of the United States ~ <<.

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

ZELL MILLER, ET AL.,

Cross-Petitioners,

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, CROSS-RESPONDENTS (NO. 95-1200), and

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, et al.,

CROSS-RESPONDENTS (No. 95-1197),

Cross-Respondents,

On Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ALBERT G. NORMAN, JR.*

GORDON D. GIFFIN

BARBARA A. MCINTYRE

L. CRAIG DOWDY

LONG, ALDRIDGE & NORMAN

303 Peachtree Street

Suite 5300

Atlanta, GA 30308

(404) 527-4000

*Counsel of Record

February 26, 1996

ROY E. BARNES

MICHAEL JABLONSKI

ROBERT S. KAHN

BARNES, BROWNING,

TANKSLEY & CASURELLA

166 Anderson Street

Suite 225

Marietta, GA 30308

(770) 424-1500

ROGER S. MORROW

MORROW, ROMINE &

PEARSON

122 South Hall Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

(334) 262-7707

Counsel for Cross-Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Section 315(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 pro-

vides that during certain periods the charges made for use of any

broadcasting station by political candidates shall net exceed the

lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount

of time for the same period. The Federal Communications Com-

mission (“FCC”) issued an order (the “Declaratory Ruling’)

purporting to preempt all state causes of action dependent on

any determination of the lowest unit charge under Sec-

tion 315(b), or of any other duty arising under that subsection,

and purporting to constitute the FCC as the sole forum for

adjudicating such matters. The questions conditionally presented

by the Cross-Petitioners are:

(1) whether the Cross-Petitioners presented a justiciable

case or controversy to the court of appeals; and

(2) assuming that this Court rules both that a justiciable

case or controversy was presented and that the FCC had author-

ity to issue the Declaratory Ruling, (a) if this Court determines

that the FCC had authority to interpret the intent of Congress,

whether Congyess intended the preemption effected by the

Declaratory Ruling, and (b) if this Court determines that the

FCC’s authority was plenary, whether the FCC’s exercise of that

authority in this proceeding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise unlawful.

a

eee

et em

a

‘3

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

IN THE COURT BELOW

The petitioners in the court of appeals were Zell Miller;

Zell Miller For Governor; Pierre Howard; Georgians For How-

ard ’90; Johnny Isakson; Johnny Isakson For Governor; Andrew

Young; Young Working For Georgia; Lauren McDonald;

Lauren McDonald For Governor; Roy Barnes; Roy Barnes For

Governor; Tim Ryles; Tim Ryles For Insurance Commissioner;

Warren Evans; Warren Evans Election Committee; William L.

Dickinson, Second District Campaign Committee; William J.

Cabaniss; Friends of Bill Cabaniss Committee; Spencer T.

Bachus, III; Bachus For Attorney General Committee; John

Teague; James E. Folsom, Jr.; Jim Folsom, Jr. For Lieutenant

Governor Committee; Fob James; Fob James For Governor

Committee; Kenneth D. Wallis; Alabamians For Ken Wallis

Committee; George D.H. McMillan, Jr.; The McMillan Com-

mittee; George Wallace, Jr.; Wallace For Treasurer Committee;

Charles A. Graddick; Graddick For Governor Committee; Wil-

liam J. Baxley; Friends Of Bill Baxley; Paul Hubbert; Richard

Shelby; Don Siegelman; Jimmy Sullivan; Scnany Hornsby;

Friends of E.C. Sonny Hornsby; Mark Kennedy; Judge Mark

Kennedy For Supreme Court; and Friends Of Judge Mark Ken-

nedy (collectively, the “Candidates”). The Candidates are the

Cross-Petitioners and Respondents in this Court, and have filed,

simultaneously herewith, a consolidated Brief In Opposition to

Petitions for Writs of Certiorari in Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200.

The United States and the Federal Communications Com-

mission were respondents in the court of appeals. The United

States and the Federal Communications Commission are the

Petitioners and Cross-Respondents in No. 95-1200.

Respondents-intervenors in the court of appeals were Capi-

tal Cities/ABC, Inc.; Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.; The Times Mir-

ror Company; American Family Broadcast Group, Inc.;

Allbritton Communications Company; CBS, Inc.; Chronicle

OE ——————<—-

Publishing Co.; Fox Television Stations, Inc.; Gillett Broadcast-

ing of California, Inc.; Gillett Communications of San

Diego, Inc.; Great American Television and Radio Com-

pany, Inc.; Kelly Broadcasting Company; Kelly Television Com-

pany; Lin Television Company; McCraw-Hill Broadcasting

Company, Inc.; Midwest Television, Inc.; National Broadcasting

Company, Inc.; The New York Times Company; Post-Newsweek

Stations, Inc.; The Providence Journal Company; The Spartan

Broadcasting Company; Tribune Broadcasting Company; West-

inghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc.; WKRG-TV, Inc.;

WTVT, Inc.; Meredith Corporation; A.H. Belo Corporation;

Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation; Cox Enterprises, Inc.; and

the National Association of Broadcasters (collectively, the

“Broadcasters’’).The Broadcasters are the Petitioners and Cross-

Respondents in No. 95-1197.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BOE Ng eR tS a re a

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT

all ig SE os Oe ar ae a ee Bar

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND

ORDINANCES INVOLVED ....... cc ccceeeves

DEPLERAOEMEENE JE DEAE GAM ces ccesecepetesees

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-

PRESET 6 ECE Vo VCC ae CORE OVER e ewe eas

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d

See Tee SE bs cet es eke EL Kod OY

Beverly v. Observer Pub. Co., 88 Ga. App. 490, 77

Dae Oe RS CAO o dah del de 2 NS ODED

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .............

California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691

CN iss aks na ou PN oe oe

Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove Assocs.,

S35 R2d 1359 (ith Cir. 1968)... cccnccccus

Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502

EE 5 Ls eee kee e ee was ee eae ene

Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick

& Tie Co, SG US Bil FGI) oo. i nee

City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) ......

Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. American Air Transport, Inc.,

De Rae ERD 6 Nahe ees hoe ee see tes

Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S.

Ek aie ies 05a Oe Ee AT KS

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478

Wis REED 6-30-00 #uc bd 60 eV ERE WE COs ee

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)... .

Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458

see Fee ere pre error Te ee

Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers Local

foe tt ee ge. re

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)

vi

CASES:

Hernstadt v. FCC, 677 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ...

Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.

SN in. 6k nie aaee Cae ¥ carne Mawes

National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,

746 F.2d 1492 (D.C, Gir. 1984)... scr cewcens

New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,

742 F.2d 1 (ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S.

ae Fo: | eee ee Ore ree eee er eae

New York State Comm’n or Cable Television v. FCC,

CGD Tae ae Uae Ge. TORS Ci ce cc eeneree sees

New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC,

TAD BAG B06 CONC. Ge. FOO) a knee a ek beens

Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line

Ca, SE UB. Sire soe thease 6eeCeaensees

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).

State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421 (10th

he MR ae vs ikon ee eee

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............

United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59

a Ramee aon Gare Maines ECR Eos:

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

Vad GA, 200. TR, SB ois x's on nice 0p eed eee

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:

SHSC 396 . oes ik LO eee

SURC. 6 Dass reacSicivkss thee

WUE WED. Eee

NUS. 600 SS

WUSL 6 WA os oo ckicccceeee

11

Vii

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et

SE Stee ears tne Sa O06 Oe ws Sek oO 9,13

CE obo unas 6 ys oh 60656 wads 9

NAL niu dpa: e ke 6 s0.6. Kw a 69.08 ek Ae 9

Ge A airs a Want @ ies asaeie 4.0.4.0 be os 9

ook oe oy 6 6 oe ee Od wales eee 9, 13

hia a Soles wd s wiace-aik 8 Whale we passim

EEE Shake Oa ara Ok ace WW hae a eee 12

ee bk a Kb ate 4 6 oe Oe fe passim

a a Fk a ees ec & oes 3-4, 10

I eae et Be tas TC ds 6 ¢ 6 58 4,6

I ere cere ie es 9, 13

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ......... 8, 10, 15

opt Frere ee er eee 9

ee Se ere ee ie 9

A ge | SE ee eae Che ee eee 9

OTHER MATERIALS:

PT VSN. Se sWobeeVesveeeseuees 2

K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930)........ 15

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.

No. 92-225, Title I, § 103(a)(1), 86 Stat. 4 (1971).. 8

ae ee

Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200

| IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

ZELL MILLER, et al.,

| y Cross-Petitioners,

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CROSS-RESPONDENTS

(No. 95-1200), AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BROADCASTERS, ET AL., CROSS-RESPONDENTS (NO. 95-1197),

|

Cross-Respondents,

|

'

On Conditional Cross-Petition for

A Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

| for the Eleventh Circuit

CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Cross-Petitioners are legally qualified candidates for public

office (the “Candidates”) who filed a petition in the court below

for review of a declaratory ruling issued by the Federal Commu-

nications Commission (the “FCC”). Cross-Petitioners respect-

fully urge that if the Court grants either the Petition For a Writ of

Certiorari filed by the FCC (No. 95-1200) or the Petition For a

| Writ of Certiorari filed by the National Association of Broad-

casters et al. (the “Broadcasters”) (No. 95-1197), that it also

grant this Cross-Petition to enable the Court to address fully the

relevant issues in this proceeding.

a

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 66 F3d

1140. The Declaratory Ruling of the FCC is reported at 6 FC.C.

Red 7511. The FCC’s order on reconsideration is reported at 7

F.C.C. Red 4123. The FCC’s notice of its intention to issue the

Declaratory Ruling is reported at 6 FC.C. Red 5954. Each of

these opinions below is reproduced in full in the Appendix (here-

inafter the “FCC App.”’) to the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari

filed in No. 95-1200 by the FCC (hereinafter the “FCC

Petition’’).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on Sep-

tember 29, 1995. On December 21, 1995, Justice Kennedy

entered an order extending the time within which to file a peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari to and including January 26, 1996.

The FCC and the Broadcasters each filed separate Petitions for a

Writ of Certiorari on January 26, 1996. The Broadcasters’ Peti-

tion was docketed in this Court as No. 95-1197 on January 26,

1996. The FCC’s Petition was docketed in this Court as

No. 95-1200 on January 29, 1996. Pursuant to this Court’s

Rule 12.5, this consolidated Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certio-

rari, filed in Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200, is timely filed on Febru-

ary 26, 1996, within 30 days after the Broadcasters’ Petition was

first docketed in this Court on January 26, 1996 in No. 95-1197.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES AND ORDINANCES INVOLVED

1. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,

which provides, in relevant part:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law

and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of

3

the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies to

which the United States shall be a Party; to Controver-

sies . . . between Citizens of different States . . ..

2. Section 315 of Title 47, United States Code, which pro-

vides in part:

(b) Broadcast media rates

The charges made for the use of any broadcasting

station by any person who is a legally qualified candi-

date for any public office in connection with his cam-

paign for nomination for election, or election to such

office shall not exceed —

(1) during the forty-five days preceding

the date of a primary or primary runoff elec-

tion and during the sixty days preceding the

date of a general or special election in which

such person is a candidate, the lowest unit

charge of the station for the same class and

amount of time for the same period; and

(2) at any other time, the charges made for

comparable use of such station by other users

thereof.

~ x ” *

(d) Rules and regulations

The Commission shall prescribe appropriate

rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this

section.

3. Section 401(b) of Title 47, United States Code, which

provides:

If any person fails or neglects to obey any order of

- the Commission other than for the payment of money,

while the same is in effect, the Commission or any party

injured thereby, or the United States, by its Attorney

4

General, may apply to the appropriate district court of

the United States for the enforcement of such order. If,

after hearing, the court determines that the order was

regularly made and duly served, and that the person is

in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce

obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or other

proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain

such person or the officers, agents, or representatives

of such person, from further disobedience of such

order, or to enjoin upon ‘t or them obedience to the

same.

4. Section 402(a) of Title 47, United States Code, which

provides:

Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or sus-

pend any order of the Commission under this chapter

(except those appealable under subsection (b) of this

section) shall be brought as provided by and in the

manner prescribed in chapter 158 of Title 28.

5. Section 2342 of Title 28, United States Code, which pro-

vides in part:

The court of appeals (other than the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive

jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in

part) or to determine the validity of (1) all final orders

of the Federal Communications Commission made

reviewable by Section 402(a) of title 47 . . ..

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Cross-Petitioners filed a petition in the court of

appeals to review a declaratory ruling (the “Declaratory Rul-

ing”) issued by the FCC. The Cross-Respondents are the United

States of America and the FCC (No. 95-1200), and the Broad-

casters (No. 95-1197). Cross-Petitioners incorporate herein by

reference the Statement of the Case set forth in their Brief in

5

Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari filed simultane-

ously herewith in these proceedings.

In addition, the Candidates submit the following facts. The

Declaratory Ruling was issued by the FCC on its own motion.

FCC App. at 17a. According to the FCC, the FCC’s conclusions

were based upon its review of the comments and its own inde-

pendent legal analysis. FCC App. at 18a. In the Public Notice

inviting comments, the FCC cited litigation in several states

where candidates for elective office had sued broadcast stations

for charging rates allegedly in excess of those permitted by Sec-

tion 315(b), and the inconsistent rulings with regard to jurisdic-

tion that had been issued in such cases. FCC App. at 87a-94a.

Except fo the comments and petitions for reconsideration,

there were no further filings in the proceeding and no evidence

was taken.

REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE CROSS-PETITION

This proceeding involves the most recent in a series of

orders issued by the FCC pursuant to which the FCC has under-

taken to preempt, by “declaratory ruling,” a wide range of state

laws and regulations relating to interstate and foreign radio and

wire communications. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S.

57 (1988)(preemption of signal-quality regulation of cable televi-

sion); State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1986)

(preemption of state utility commission’s altering of sampling

periods used by local telephone companies to allocate equip-

ment costs); New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC,

749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (preemption of state and local

entry regulation of SMATV systems); National Ass’n of Regula-

tory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pre-

emption of state restrictions on the resale and sharing of all

interstate WATS service used exclusively in interstate com-

merce); New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669

F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982) (preemption of New York cable television

6

statute which prohibited receipt of federally authorized pay pro-

gramming on MATYV systems).

This proceeding is unique because, for the first time, the

FCC purports to have the authority to determine the constitu-

tional question of whether a state law cause of action is pre-

empted by federal law, the authority to oust the state courts (and

the federal district courts in diversity cases) from jurisdiction to

make any determinations under Section 315(b) of the Communi-

cations Act, to constitute itself as the sole forum for adjudicating

such matters, and to enact procedures for such adjudications.

If this Court chooses to grant either of the Petitions for a

Writ of Certiorari, and chooses to rule on the validity of the

Declaratory Ruling, as requested in each of the Petitions,’ the

Court should also grant this Cross-Petition to address the unique

issues raised by the Candidates in the court of appeals.

A. This Court Should Clarify the Circumstances Under

Which a Declaratory Ruling of the FCC is Subject to

Judicial Review.

The Candidates filed their petition for review in the court

of appeals pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2342(1). The court of appeals, after concluding that the FCC

had no authority to issue a ruling preempting state causes of

action, or ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, declined to

rule on the issue of whether Congress itself intended to preempt

any such state causes of action. The court of appeals held that

notwithstanding the Declaratory Ruling the courts were free to

decide such constitutional issues in any judicial action filed by

the Candidates, and that the court of appeals would decline to

1 As the Candidates set forth more fully in their Brief In Opposition to

Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, it does not appear that this Court can or

should reach the validity of the Declaratory Ruling, since the court of

appeals itself did not. “This Court does not normally review orders of

administrative agencies in the first instance . . ..” Civil Azronautics Bd. v.

American Air Transport, Inc., 344 U.S. 4,5 (1952).

7

issue an advisory opinion on the issue of Congressional intent.

FCC App. at 15a.

Given that the court of appeals had concluded that the FCC

had no authority to issue the Declaratory Ruling, the court of

appeals properly declined to give an advisory opinion on the

issue of Congressional intent. The court of appeals’ concern with

issuing an “advisory opinion,” however, should not have applied

to the issue of the FCC’s authority. In the event that this Court

grants certiorari, the Candidates submit that the court of appeals

should have entertained (rather than dismissed) the Candidates’

petition for review, and set aside the Declaratory Ruling, for lack

of authority. The putative preemptive effect of the Declaratory

Ruling created a sufficient case or controversy. See, e.g., New

England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 742 F.2d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986):

If it [the potential petitioner] had to wait until the

regulations were enforced to secure judicial review of

their validity, it might have to wait forever, . . . for [it]

intended to obey the regulations, to [its] detriment.

Thus, to interpret “order” in section 402 to apply only

to the outcome of an adjudicatory enforcement pro-

ceeding would deprive those who might be seriously

injured by . . . obedience to an FCC rule of any

opportunity to challenge the rule’s legal validity.

B. This Court Should Grant the Cross-Petition To Consider

the Impact of the Declaratory Ruling on the Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971.

As set forth in more detail in the Candidates’ Brief in

Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, it is the Candi-

dates’ position that the court of appeals correctly concluded that

the FCC had no authority, either as a plenary matter, or by

construing the intent of Congress, to preempt any state law

causes of action or to oust the jurisdiction of any court. For this

reason, the Candidates believe that this Court should not reach

the validity of the conclusions reached in, or the procedures

8

adopted by, the Declaratory Ruling. If this Court chooses, how-

ever, to review the validity of the Declaratory Ruling, in the

manner requested by each of the Petitioners, the Court should

also consider the additional arguments raised by the Candidates

in support of their petition for review which were not addressed

by the court of appeals.

In concluding that Congress itself intended the preemptive

effect set forth in the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC relied, almost

exclusively, upon the Communications Act. Section 315(b), how-

ever, was enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act

of 1971 (FECA). See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,

Pub. L. No. 92-225, Title I, § 103(a)(1), 86 Stat. 4, 7 (1971).

FECA is a comprehensive reform measure designed to increase

fairness in the political process by reducing campaign costs. See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). As stated in the preamble to

FECA, its purpose was “to promote fair practices in the conduct

of election campaigns for Federal political offices . . ..” See also

Hernstadt v. FCC, 677 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The purpose of FECA was to control spiraling campaign

costs. Section 315(b) established a ceiling on the cost of political

advertising during the two most important campaign periods.

The rights provided by Section 315(b) are meaningless, however,

unless there are practical remedies to redress violations. The

Declaratory Ruling deprives candidates from across the nation

of the opportunity to resort to the relatively inexpensive and

expeditious remedies that may be available in the state courts.

The cost of a round-trip airline flight to the District of Columbia

may be considerably more than the amount of the claim of a

candidate for sheriff in New Mexico. An understanding of the

workings of the FCC and the skills of the specialized bar who

practice before that agency, it is clear, may be beyond the com-

pass of many candidates for public office, and their attorneys.

Thus, only the largest claims by the most persistent suitors can be

expected to result in filings with the FCC. These considerations,

of course, do not apply to the Broadcasters, who are already

regulated by the FCC and make regular appearances there.

BARBRA,

9

In contrast to the FCC’s ruling in this case, before a court

would conclude that a cause of action is implicitly preempted by

federal law, it would first determine that an enforceable federal

administrative remedy exists to replace the preempted cause of

action. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove

Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988). The FCC did not

even purport to provide a replacement remedy for some of the

causes of action covered by the Declaratory Ruling. For example,

a state law collection suit filed by a broadcaster against a candi-

date might require a determination of the lowest unit charge, if

the candidate refused to pay due to an alleged overcharge. No

provision is made in the Declaratory Ruling for the FCC to

adjudicate such claims, but all such claims are preempted by the

Declaratory Ruling.

Even with respect to refund claims asserted by candidates,

for which the Declaratory Ruling does purport to provide a

remedy, no enforceable remedy is provided. In issuing the

Declaratory Ruling, the FCC overlooked that Congress had not

granted the FCC authority to order refunds of overcharges. Sec-

tions 204(a)(1), 206, 207, 208 and 407 of the Communications

Act, relating to refunds, apply only to common carriers, not to

broadcasters.

The procedures established by the FCC do not comply with

the Administrative Procedure Act, conflict with other FCC rules,

and are not adequate to enforce Section 315(b) claims. For

example, the prescriptions for the form and content of pleadings

set forth in the Declaratory Ruling (see FCC App. at 27a) conflict

with the explicit rules governing these matters in 47 C.F.R. § 1.41

et seq. The provisions relating to filing periods and service (see

FCC App. at 27a) conflict with 47 C.ER. § 1.45 et seq. The

extremely limited discovery periods, which apply only to the

broadcasters’ records related to rates, terms and conditions for

advertising during the relevant periods (FCC App. at 28a), con-

flict with the broader discovery provisions of 47 CER. § 1.315 et

seq., and applicable state civil practice acts. These abbreviated

procedures also conflict with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556

10

and 559 relating to the conduct of hearings, and requirements or

privileges relating to evidence.

The Declaratory Ruling does not confide the Sec-

tion 315(b) claims to a “specially constituted tribunal” or pre-

scribe a “particular procedure for investigation, complaint and

notice, and lkearing and decision” as would be required even if

Congress itself had established these procedures. See Garner v.

Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490

(1953). Instead, the FCC’s “Mass Media Bureau” is permitted to

consider these claims, without any time limits imposed on the

decision. See FCC App. at 27a-28a. This Court struck down

similar rules enacted by the FSLIC for this very reason. See Coit

Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 586 (1989)

(Petitioners’ “claim has essentially been relegated to a ‘black

hole’ from which it may not emerge before the statute of limita-

tions on [petitioner’s] state law claims has run.’’)

Even if the FCC issues an order for the payment of a

refund, Section 401(b) of the Communications Act specifically

excludes orders for the payment of money from the scope of the

orders which may be enforced by the courts. Thus, any refund

order could not be enforced by any candidate, and the Declara-

tory Ruling seriously undermines and thwarts the statutory pur-

pose of FECA to reduce campaign costs.

C. This Court Should Grant the Cross-Petition to Clarify

the Circumstances Under Which An Executive Agency

May Interpret the Intent of Congress, and the Binding

Effect of Any Such Interpretation.

As set forth in the Candidates’ Brief in Opposition to Peti-

tions for Writs of Certiorari, it is the Candidates’ position that

the FCC has no authority to issue an opinion, which is binding on

the courts, interpreting Congressional intent on constitutional

issues such as the preemption of state law causes of action. If the

Court grants either of the Petitions, however, and reaches the

correctness of the FCC’s “opinion” on these issues, the Court

11

should grant the Cross-Petition to consider the unique issues

raised by the Candidates on these issues in the court of appeals.

Assuming that the FCC could issue a declaratory ruling of

this type, there is no reasonable basis for the FCC’s conclusion

that Congress, by implication, intended to preempt state law

causes of action involving the lowest unit charge provision. The

regulations governing Section 315(b) are explicit and reasonably

detailed, the power to prescribe and revise regulations under this

section remains in the FCC, and all judicial interpretations of

Section 315(b) are subject to review. Permitting the state courts

to have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 315(b) claims “cre-

ates no significant danger of inconsistent application of fed-

eral . . . law” because “[s]tate court judgments misinterpreting

federal . . . law would, of course, also be subject to direct

review by this Court.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990).

In the absence of Congressional action, primary jurisdiction, not

implied exclusive federal jurisdiction, is the concept, if any,

which is responsive to the FCC’s uniformity concerns. See United

States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (where the

doctrine applies, “the judicial process is suspended pending

referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.”’).

The FCC relied on four types of cases in concluding that

Congress intended to preempt all state law causes of action

dependent on a determination under Section 315(b). None of

these categories of cases, however, provides any support for the

Declaratory Ruling.

(i) Implied Federal Cause of Action. The FCC first postu-

lated that there is no implied federal cause of action for damages

under Section 315(b). This postulation was the FCC’s premise

for its own conclusion that Congress intended to preempt all

state law causes of action requiring a determination of the lowest

unit charge. As an initial matter, the FCC’s reasoning process

was flawed because “preemption and implied private cause of

action analyses are distinct modes cf divining Congressional

intent.” Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 2d 1552, 1555-56 (11th

Cir. 1983).

12

It was particularly inappropriate in any event for the FCC

to bootstrap its argument for preemption of state causes of

action upon its own determination, rather than a court’s determi-

nation, of whether there is a private federal cause of action for

violation of Section 315(b). As set forth in the Candidates’ Brief

in Opposition, this is an issue peculiarly reserved for determina-

tion by the courts.”

In concluding that there is no private federal cause of

action for violations of Section 315(b), the FCC’s principal and

repeated reliance was upon Belluso v. Turner Communications

Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (Sth Cir. 1980), which held that no private

federal cause of action will be implied under Section 315(a) of

the Act. Mr. Belluso was a gubernatorial candidate who believed

that he had the power to hypnotize voters through his television

advertisements. After Turner Communications refused to air his

advertisements, and after the voters had elected one of his oppo-

nents, Mr. Belluso brought an action alleging breach of an

implied federal cause of action for damages, to his candidacy and

his reputation, based, in part, upon Section 315(a) of the Act

(the “equal time rule”). The Candidates submit that the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Belluso has no bearing on whether a court

would imply a cause of action under Section 315(b) of the Act.

Belluso represents nothing more than a recognition of the long-

standing principle that “[s]pecial damages for the loss of a public

? Although the Declaratory Ruling on its face purported to preempt

only state law causes of action, the FCC further purported to constitute

itself the sole forum for adjudicating all matters requiring any determina-

tion under Section 315(b), presumably including any implied federal cause

of action pursuant to Section 315(b). If the Declaratory Ruling were con-

strued to oust federal court jurisdiction, such a construction would raise

further serious questions of constitutionality under Article III. See Com-

modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 838-39 (1986);

Norther Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 582

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).

13

office in an election for that office are too remote and specula-

tive to be recoverable.” Beverly v. Observer Pub. Co., 88 Ga. App.

490, 490, 77 S.E.2d 80, 81 (1953).

Even assuming that the existence of an implied federal

cause of action under Section 315(b) was relevant to the issues

the FCC purported to decide, the FCC ignored the fundamental

concept applied by the courts in deciding these issues, that an

administrative remedy must first exist if a private cause of action

is to be denied. The FCC has no authority to order refunds to be

paid by broadcasters; the FCC’s refund authority applies only to

common carriers. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)(1), 208, and 407.

“Precedent indicates that the Supreme Court is more likely to

allow a private remedy where Congress provides a benefit but

does not provide access to any type of administrative process.”

Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d

1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988).

(ii) Exclusive Federal Remedies. The second category of

cases relied upon by the FCC consists of cases interpreting Con-

gress’ intent with respect to whether administrative remedies

under various federal statutes are exclusive. These cases, all of

which were decided by courts, not agencies, would not support

the Declaratory Ruling because in adopting Section 315(b), Con-

gress merely laid down a substantive rule of law. Congress did

not prescribe administrative remedies for violations of Sec-

tion 315(b). Before exclusive jurisdiction will be implied, a court

must inquire whether, among other things, the scheme of federal

regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference

that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it . . ..”

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)(quoting Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Even then,

however, all detailed regulatory schemes are not exclusive. The

Courts look for “special features warranting preemption.” Jd. at

87. The FCC did not demonstrate any special features warrant-

ing preemption in this case.

ee ee

14

(iii) Immunity Based Upon Federal Defenses. The third

category of cases relied upon by the FCC consists of cases inter-

preting Congress’ intent with respect to whether compliance

with standards set forth in a federal rule affords an immunity

from, or a defense to, an otherwise applicable state cause of

action. See, e.g., Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo

Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)(ICC’s approval of aban-

donment of railroad service preempts state causes of action for

abandonment). These judicial decisions are not relevant here

because the state causes of action preempted by the Declaratory

Ruling would never involve actions sanctioned by Sec-

tion 315(b); they would generally involve alleged violations of

Section 315(b). Moreover, this Court specifically reserved the

issue in Kalo Brick of whether “a damages action can never be

brought for an illegal abandonment, or if such an action can be

brought, whether Congress might have intended that state and

federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.” Jd. at 323 n.10.

(iv) Preemptive Effect of Federal Regulations. The fourth,

and final, category of cases relied upon by the FCC in purporting

to interpret Congressional intent consists solely of judicial deter-

minations of the preemptive effect of federal regulations. These

cases are not relevant here because they all involved preemption

of state regulations, not the preemption of state causes of action,

and not the ouster of state court jurisdiction or federal court

jurisdiction in diversity cases. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.

Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)(preemption of state prohibition of

retransmission by cable television systems of alcoholic beverage

advertisements); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,

458 U.S. 141 (1982)(preemptive effect of Federal Home Loan

Bank Board regulation permitting federally chartered savings

and loan association to exercise due on sale clause inconsistent

with state law).

Even if this Court believes that “[t]he Commission makes a

persuasive case in support of its policy objective, . . . that case

must be made to Congress and not to this court.” California v.

FCC, 798 F.2d 1515, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1986). If the Declaratory

—

che Ae Ra Tin mal ll Ra bow

15

Ruling’s uniformity justification were taken to its logical conclu-

sion, there would be nothing to prevent the FCC from preempt-

ing all state law causes of action that require an interpretation of

any FCC statutory or regulatory provision. However, even if, as

the FCC speculates, court enforcement of FCC lowest unit

charge claims could result in inconsistent interpretations, “this

not necessarily unhealthy prospect is no more than the usual

consequence of the historic acceptance of concurrent state and

federal jurisdiction . . ..” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368

U.S. 502, 514 (1962).

Until Congress acts, the present jurisdiction of the courts

should not be disturbed. Otherwise, the inclusion of Sec-

tion 315(b) as a part of the adoption of FECA in 1971 will have

failed in its essential purpose to reduce campaign costs. At a bare

minimum, the effectuation of Congress’ intent in adopting Sec-

tion 315(b) requires that lowest unit charge disputes be settled by

some tribunal. “It is important that they be settled right. But let

me insist upon a thing too often overlooked. It is more important

still that they be settled.” K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush at

135 (1930).

16

CONCLUSION

The Court has before it the Petition of the FCC and the

Petition of the Broadcasters which, in addition to presenting the

issues ruled upon by the court of appeals, present to this Court

the issue of the validity of the conclusions reached in the Declar-

atory Ruling. If this Court accepts either of the Petitions and,

rather than remanding this proceeding to the court of appeals,

decides to rule on all of the issues presented by the Petitioners,

this Court should also grant this Cross-Petition to consider, in

addition to the issues presented by the Petitioners, the unique

issues presented by the Candidates.

Respectfully submitted,

ALBERT G. NORMAN, JR.* Roy E. BARNES

GORDON D. GIFFIN MICHAEL JABLONSKI

BARBARA A. MCINTYRE ROBERT S. KAHN

L. CRAIG DOWDY BARNES, BROWNING,

LONG, ALDRIDGE & TANKSLEY & CASURELLA

NORMAN 166 Anderson Street

303 Peachtree Street Suite 225

Suite 5300 Marietta, GA 30308

Atlanta, GA 30308 (770) 424-1500

(404) 527-4000 ROGER S. MORROW

*Counsel of Record MORROW, ROMINE &

PEARSON

122 South Hall Street

Montgomery, AL 36104

(334) 262-7707

Counsel for Cross-Petitioners

February 26, 1996

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.