Croes nPetition — Miller v. Federal Communications Commission (No. 95-1361)
Supreme Court brief1995
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
IN THE a.”
Supreme Court of the United States ~ <<.
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
ZELL MILLER, ET AL.,
Cross-Petitioners,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, CROSS-RESPONDENTS (NO. 95-1200), and
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, et al.,
CROSS-RESPONDENTS (No. 95-1197),
Cross-Respondents,
On Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ALBERT G. NORMAN, JR.*
GORDON D. GIFFIN
BARBARA A. MCINTYRE
L. CRAIG DOWDY
LONG, ALDRIDGE & NORMAN
303 Peachtree Street
Suite 5300
Atlanta, GA 30308
(404) 527-4000
*Counsel of Record
February 26, 1996
ROY E. BARNES
MICHAEL JABLONSKI
ROBERT S. KAHN
BARNES, BROWNING,
TANKSLEY & CASURELLA
166 Anderson Street
Suite 225
Marietta, GA 30308
(770) 424-1500
ROGER S. MORROW
MORROW, ROMINE &
PEARSON
122 South Hall Street
Montgomery, AL 36104
(334) 262-7707
Counsel for Cross-Petitioners
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Section 315(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 pro-
vides that during certain periods the charges made for use of any
broadcasting station by political candidates shall net exceed the
lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount
of time for the same period. The Federal Communications Com-
mission (“FCC”) issued an order (the “Declaratory Ruling’)
purporting to preempt all state causes of action dependent on
any determination of the lowest unit charge under Sec-
tion 315(b), or of any other duty arising under that subsection,
and purporting to constitute the FCC as the sole forum for
adjudicating such matters. The questions conditionally presented
by the Cross-Petitioners are:
(1) whether the Cross-Petitioners presented a justiciable
case or controversy to the court of appeals; and
(2) assuming that this Court rules both that a justiciable
case or controversy was presented and that the FCC had author-
ity to issue the Declaratory Ruling, (a) if this Court determines
that the FCC had authority to interpret the intent of Congress,
whether Congyess intended the preemption effected by the
Declaratory Ruling, and (b) if this Court determines that the
FCC’s authority was plenary, whether the FCC’s exercise of that
authority in this proceeding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise unlawful.
a
eee
et em
a
‘3
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE COURT BELOW
The petitioners in the court of appeals were Zell Miller;
Zell Miller For Governor; Pierre Howard; Georgians For How-
ard ’90; Johnny Isakson; Johnny Isakson For Governor; Andrew
Young; Young Working For Georgia; Lauren McDonald;
Lauren McDonald For Governor; Roy Barnes; Roy Barnes For
Governor; Tim Ryles; Tim Ryles For Insurance Commissioner;
Warren Evans; Warren Evans Election Committee; William L.
Dickinson, Second District Campaign Committee; William J.
Cabaniss; Friends of Bill Cabaniss Committee; Spencer T.
Bachus, III; Bachus For Attorney General Committee; John
Teague; James E. Folsom, Jr.; Jim Folsom, Jr. For Lieutenant
Governor Committee; Fob James; Fob James For Governor
Committee; Kenneth D. Wallis; Alabamians For Ken Wallis
Committee; George D.H. McMillan, Jr.; The McMillan Com-
mittee; George Wallace, Jr.; Wallace For Treasurer Committee;
Charles A. Graddick; Graddick For Governor Committee; Wil-
liam J. Baxley; Friends Of Bill Baxley; Paul Hubbert; Richard
Shelby; Don Siegelman; Jimmy Sullivan; Scnany Hornsby;
Friends of E.C. Sonny Hornsby; Mark Kennedy; Judge Mark
Kennedy For Supreme Court; and Friends Of Judge Mark Ken-
nedy (collectively, the “Candidates”). The Candidates are the
Cross-Petitioners and Respondents in this Court, and have filed,
simultaneously herewith, a consolidated Brief In Opposition to
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari in Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200.
The United States and the Federal Communications Com-
mission were respondents in the court of appeals. The United
States and the Federal Communications Commission are the
Petitioners and Cross-Respondents in No. 95-1200.
Respondents-intervenors in the court of appeals were Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, Inc.; Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.; The Times Mir-
ror Company; American Family Broadcast Group, Inc.;
Allbritton Communications Company; CBS, Inc.; Chronicle
OE ——————<—-
Publishing Co.; Fox Television Stations, Inc.; Gillett Broadcast-
ing of California, Inc.; Gillett Communications of San
Diego, Inc.; Great American Television and Radio Com-
pany, Inc.; Kelly Broadcasting Company; Kelly Television Com-
pany; Lin Television Company; McCraw-Hill Broadcasting
Company, Inc.; Midwest Television, Inc.; National Broadcasting
Company, Inc.; The New York Times Company; Post-Newsweek
Stations, Inc.; The Providence Journal Company; The Spartan
Broadcasting Company; Tribune Broadcasting Company; West-
inghouse Broadcasting Company, Inc.; WKRG-TV, Inc.;
WTVT, Inc.; Meredith Corporation; A.H. Belo Corporation;
Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation; Cox Enterprises, Inc.; and
the National Association of Broadcasters (collectively, the
“Broadcasters’’).The Broadcasters are the Petitioners and Cross-
Respondents in No. 95-1197.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BOE Ng eR tS a re a
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT
all ig SE os Oe ar ae a ee Bar
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND
ORDINANCES INVOLVED ....... cc ccceeeves
DEPLERAOEMEENE JE DEAE GAM ces ccesecepetesees
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE CROSS-
PRESET 6 ECE Vo VCC ae CORE OVER e ewe eas
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d
See Tee SE bs cet es eke EL Kod OY
Beverly v. Observer Pub. Co., 88 Ga. App. 490, 77
Dae Oe RS CAO o dah del de 2 NS ODED
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .............
California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
CN iss aks na ou PN oe oe
Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove Assocs.,
S35 R2d 1359 (ith Cir. 1968)... cccnccccus
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502
EE 5 Ls eee kee e ee was ee eae ene
Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick
& Tie Co, SG US Bil FGI) oo. i nee
City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) ......
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. American Air Transport, Inc.,
De Rae ERD 6 Nahe ees hoe ee see tes
Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S.
Ek aie ies 05a Oe Ee AT KS
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
Wis REED 6-30-00 #uc bd 60 eV ERE WE COs ee
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)... .
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458
see Fee ere pre error Te ee
Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers Local
foe tt ee ge. re
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)
vi
CASES:
Hernstadt v. FCC, 677 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ...
Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir.
SN in. 6k nie aaee Cae ¥ carne Mawes
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
746 F.2d 1492 (D.C, Gir. 1984)... scr cewcens
New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
742 F.2d 1 (ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
ae Fo: | eee ee Ore ree eee er eae
New York State Comm’n or Cable Television v. FCC,
CGD Tae ae Uae Ge. TORS Ci ce cc eeneree sees
New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC,
TAD BAG B06 CONC. Ge. FOO) a knee a ek beens
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Ca, SE UB. Sire soe thease 6eeCeaensees
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421 (10th
he MR ae vs ikon ee eee
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) ............
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59
a Ramee aon Gare Maines ECR Eos:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
Vad GA, 200. TR, SB ois x's on nice 0p eed eee
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
SHSC 396 . oes ik LO eee
SURC. 6 Dass reacSicivkss thee
WUE WED. Eee
NUS. 600 SS
WUSL 6 WA os oo ckicccceeee
11
Vii
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et
SE Stee ears tne Sa O06 Oe ws Sek oO 9,13
CE obo unas 6 ys oh 60656 wads 9
NAL niu dpa: e ke 6 s0.6. Kw a 69.08 ek Ae 9
Ge A airs a Want @ ies asaeie 4.0.4.0 be os 9
ook oe oy 6 6 oe ee Od wales eee 9, 13
hia a Soles wd s wiace-aik 8 Whale we passim
EEE Shake Oa ara Ok ace WW hae a eee 12
ee bk a Kb ate 4 6 oe Oe fe passim
a a Fk a ees ec & oes 3-4, 10
I eae et Be tas TC ds 6 ¢ 6 58 4,6
I ere cere ie es 9, 13
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ......... 8, 10, 15
opt Frere ee er eee 9
ee Se ere ee ie 9
A ge | SE ee eae Che ee eee 9
OTHER MATERIALS:
PT VSN. Se sWobeeVesveeeseuees 2
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930)........ 15
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, Title I, § 103(a)(1), 86 Stat. 4 (1971).. 8
ae ee
Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200
| IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
ZELL MILLER, et al.,
| y Cross-Petitioners,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CROSS-RESPONDENTS
(No. 95-1200), AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS, ET AL., CROSS-RESPONDENTS (NO. 95-1197),
|
Cross-Respondents,
|
'
On Conditional Cross-Petition for
A Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
| for the Eleventh Circuit
CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Cross-Petitioners are legally qualified candidates for public
office (the “Candidates”) who filed a petition in the court below
for review of a declaratory ruling issued by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (the “FCC”). Cross-Petitioners respect-
fully urge that if the Court grants either the Petition For a Writ of
Certiorari filed by the FCC (No. 95-1200) or the Petition For a
| Writ of Certiorari filed by the National Association of Broad-
casters et al. (the “Broadcasters”) (No. 95-1197), that it also
grant this Cross-Petition to enable the Court to address fully the
relevant issues in this proceeding.
a
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 66 F3d
1140. The Declaratory Ruling of the FCC is reported at 6 FC.C.
Red 7511. The FCC’s order on reconsideration is reported at 7
F.C.C. Red 4123. The FCC’s notice of its intention to issue the
Declaratory Ruling is reported at 6 FC.C. Red 5954. Each of
these opinions below is reproduced in full in the Appendix (here-
inafter the “FCC App.”’) to the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari
filed in No. 95-1200 by the FCC (hereinafter the “FCC
Petition’’).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on Sep-
tember 29, 1995. On December 21, 1995, Justice Kennedy
entered an order extending the time within which to file a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari to and including January 26, 1996.
The FCC and the Broadcasters each filed separate Petitions for a
Writ of Certiorari on January 26, 1996. The Broadcasters’ Peti-
tion was docketed in this Court as No. 95-1197 on January 26,
1996. The FCC’s Petition was docketed in this Court as
No. 95-1200 on January 29, 1996. Pursuant to this Court’s
Rule 12.5, this consolidated Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, filed in Nos. 95-1197 and 95-1200, is timely filed on Febru-
ary 26, 1996, within 30 days after the Broadcasters’ Petition was
first docketed in this Court on January 26, 1996 in No. 95-1197.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES INVOLVED
1. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,
which provides, in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
3
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; to Controver-
sies . . . between Citizens of different States . . ..
2. Section 315 of Title 47, United States Code, which pro-
vides in part:
(b) Broadcast media rates
The charges made for the use of any broadcasting
station by any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office in connection with his cam-
paign for nomination for election, or election to such
office shall not exceed —
(1) during the forty-five days preceding
the date of a primary or primary runoff elec-
tion and during the sixty days preceding the
date of a general or special election in which
such person is a candidate, the lowest unit
charge of the station for the same class and
amount of time for the same period; and
(2) at any other time, the charges made for
comparable use of such station by other users
thereof.
~ x ” *
(d) Rules and regulations
The Commission shall prescribe appropriate
rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
section.
3. Section 401(b) of Title 47, United States Code, which
provides:
If any person fails or neglects to obey any order of
- the Commission other than for the payment of money,
while the same is in effect, the Commission or any party
injured thereby, or the United States, by its Attorney
4
General, may apply to the appropriate district court of
the United States for the enforcement of such order. If,
after hearing, the court determines that the order was
regularly made and duly served, and that the person is
in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce
obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or other
proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain
such person or the officers, agents, or representatives
of such person, from further disobedience of such
order, or to enjoin upon ‘t or them obedience to the
same.
4. Section 402(a) of Title 47, United States Code, which
provides:
Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or sus-
pend any order of the Commission under this chapter
(except those appealable under subsection (b) of this
section) shall be brought as provided by and in the
manner prescribed in chapter 158 of Title 28.
5. Section 2342 of Title 28, United States Code, which pro-
vides in part:
The court of appeals (other than the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in
part) or to determine the validity of (1) all final orders
of the Federal Communications Commission made
reviewable by Section 402(a) of title 47 . . ..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Cross-Petitioners filed a petition in the court of
appeals to review a declaratory ruling (the “Declaratory Rul-
ing”) issued by the FCC. The Cross-Respondents are the United
States of America and the FCC (No. 95-1200), and the Broad-
casters (No. 95-1197). Cross-Petitioners incorporate herein by
reference the Statement of the Case set forth in their Brief in
5
Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari filed simultane-
ously herewith in these proceedings.
In addition, the Candidates submit the following facts. The
Declaratory Ruling was issued by the FCC on its own motion.
FCC App. at 17a. According to the FCC, the FCC’s conclusions
were based upon its review of the comments and its own inde-
pendent legal analysis. FCC App. at 18a. In the Public Notice
inviting comments, the FCC cited litigation in several states
where candidates for elective office had sued broadcast stations
for charging rates allegedly in excess of those permitted by Sec-
tion 315(b), and the inconsistent rulings with regard to jurisdic-
tion that had been issued in such cases. FCC App. at 87a-94a.
Except fo the comments and petitions for reconsideration,
there were no further filings in the proceeding and no evidence
was taken.
REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE CROSS-PETITION
This proceeding involves the most recent in a series of
orders issued by the FCC pursuant to which the FCC has under-
taken to preempt, by “declaratory ruling,” a wide range of state
laws and regulations relating to interstate and foreign radio and
wire communications. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S.
57 (1988)(preemption of signal-quality regulation of cable televi-
sion); State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1986)
(preemption of state utility commission’s altering of sampling
periods used by local telephone companies to allocate equip-
ment costs); New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC,
749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (preemption of state and local
entry regulation of SMATV systems); National Ass’n of Regula-
tory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pre-
emption of state restrictions on the resale and sharing of all
interstate WATS service used exclusively in interstate com-
merce); New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982) (preemption of New York cable television
6
statute which prohibited receipt of federally authorized pay pro-
gramming on MATYV systems).
This proceeding is unique because, for the first time, the
FCC purports to have the authority to determine the constitu-
tional question of whether a state law cause of action is pre-
empted by federal law, the authority to oust the state courts (and
the federal district courts in diversity cases) from jurisdiction to
make any determinations under Section 315(b) of the Communi-
cations Act, to constitute itself as the sole forum for adjudicating
such matters, and to enact procedures for such adjudications.
If this Court chooses to grant either of the Petitions for a
Writ of Certiorari, and chooses to rule on the validity of the
Declaratory Ruling, as requested in each of the Petitions,’ the
Court should also grant this Cross-Petition to address the unique
issues raised by the Candidates in the court of appeals.
A. This Court Should Clarify the Circumstances Under
Which a Declaratory Ruling of the FCC is Subject to
Judicial Review.
The Candidates filed their petition for review in the court
of appeals pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(1). The court of appeals, after concluding that the FCC
had no authority to issue a ruling preempting state causes of
action, or ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, declined to
rule on the issue of whether Congress itself intended to preempt
any such state causes of action. The court of appeals held that
notwithstanding the Declaratory Ruling the courts were free to
decide such constitutional issues in any judicial action filed by
the Candidates, and that the court of appeals would decline to
1 As the Candidates set forth more fully in their Brief In Opposition to
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, it does not appear that this Court can or
should reach the validity of the Declaratory Ruling, since the court of
appeals itself did not. “This Court does not normally review orders of
administrative agencies in the first instance . . ..” Civil Azronautics Bd. v.
American Air Transport, Inc., 344 U.S. 4,5 (1952).
7
issue an advisory opinion on the issue of Congressional intent.
FCC App. at 15a.
Given that the court of appeals had concluded that the FCC
had no authority to issue the Declaratory Ruling, the court of
appeals properly declined to give an advisory opinion on the
issue of Congressional intent. The court of appeals’ concern with
issuing an “advisory opinion,” however, should not have applied
to the issue of the FCC’s authority. In the event that this Court
grants certiorari, the Candidates submit that the court of appeals
should have entertained (rather than dismissed) the Candidates’
petition for review, and set aside the Declaratory Ruling, for lack
of authority. The putative preemptive effect of the Declaratory
Ruling created a sufficient case or controversy. See, e.g., New
England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 742 F.2d 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986):
If it [the potential petitioner] had to wait until the
regulations were enforced to secure judicial review of
their validity, it might have to wait forever, . . . for [it]
intended to obey the regulations, to [its] detriment.
Thus, to interpret “order” in section 402 to apply only
to the outcome of an adjudicatory enforcement pro-
ceeding would deprive those who might be seriously
injured by . . . obedience to an FCC rule of any
opportunity to challenge the rule’s legal validity.
B. This Court Should Grant the Cross-Petition To Consider
the Impact of the Declaratory Ruling on the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.
As set forth in more detail in the Candidates’ Brief in
Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, it is the Candi-
dates’ position that the court of appeals correctly concluded that
the FCC had no authority, either as a plenary matter, or by
construing the intent of Congress, to preempt any state law
causes of action or to oust the jurisdiction of any court. For this
reason, the Candidates believe that this Court should not reach
the validity of the conclusions reached in, or the procedures
8
adopted by, the Declaratory Ruling. If this Court chooses, how-
ever, to review the validity of the Declaratory Ruling, in the
manner requested by each of the Petitioners, the Court should
also consider the additional arguments raised by the Candidates
in support of their petition for review which were not addressed
by the court of appeals.
In concluding that Congress itself intended the preemptive
effect set forth in the Declaratory Ruling, the FCC relied, almost
exclusively, upon the Communications Act. Section 315(b), how-
ever, was enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 (FECA). See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, Title I, § 103(a)(1), 86 Stat. 4, 7 (1971).
FECA is a comprehensive reform measure designed to increase
fairness in the political process by reducing campaign costs. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). As stated in the preamble to
FECA, its purpose was “to promote fair practices in the conduct
of election campaigns for Federal political offices . . ..” See also
Hernstadt v. FCC, 677 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
The purpose of FECA was to control spiraling campaign
costs. Section 315(b) established a ceiling on the cost of political
advertising during the two most important campaign periods.
The rights provided by Section 315(b) are meaningless, however,
unless there are practical remedies to redress violations. The
Declaratory Ruling deprives candidates from across the nation
of the opportunity to resort to the relatively inexpensive and
expeditious remedies that may be available in the state courts.
The cost of a round-trip airline flight to the District of Columbia
may be considerably more than the amount of the claim of a
candidate for sheriff in New Mexico. An understanding of the
workings of the FCC and the skills of the specialized bar who
practice before that agency, it is clear, may be beyond the com-
pass of many candidates for public office, and their attorneys.
Thus, only the largest claims by the most persistent suitors can be
expected to result in filings with the FCC. These considerations,
of course, do not apply to the Broadcasters, who are already
regulated by the FCC and make regular appearances there.
BARBRA,
9
In contrast to the FCC’s ruling in this case, before a court
would conclude that a cause of action is implicitly preempted by
federal law, it would first determine that an enforceable federal
administrative remedy exists to replace the preempted cause of
action. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove
Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988). The FCC did not
even purport to provide a replacement remedy for some of the
causes of action covered by the Declaratory Ruling. For example,
a state law collection suit filed by a broadcaster against a candi-
date might require a determination of the lowest unit charge, if
the candidate refused to pay due to an alleged overcharge. No
provision is made in the Declaratory Ruling for the FCC to
adjudicate such claims, but all such claims are preempted by the
Declaratory Ruling.
Even with respect to refund claims asserted by candidates,
for which the Declaratory Ruling does purport to provide a
remedy, no enforceable remedy is provided. In issuing the
Declaratory Ruling, the FCC overlooked that Congress had not
granted the FCC authority to order refunds of overcharges. Sec-
tions 204(a)(1), 206, 207, 208 and 407 of the Communications
Act, relating to refunds, apply only to common carriers, not to
broadcasters.
The procedures established by the FCC do not comply with
the Administrative Procedure Act, conflict with other FCC rules,
and are not adequate to enforce Section 315(b) claims. For
example, the prescriptions for the form and content of pleadings
set forth in the Declaratory Ruling (see FCC App. at 27a) conflict
with the explicit rules governing these matters in 47 C.F.R. § 1.41
et seq. The provisions relating to filing periods and service (see
FCC App. at 27a) conflict with 47 C.ER. § 1.45 et seq. The
extremely limited discovery periods, which apply only to the
broadcasters’ records related to rates, terms and conditions for
advertising during the relevant periods (FCC App. at 28a), con-
flict with the broader discovery provisions of 47 CER. § 1.315 et
seq., and applicable state civil practice acts. These abbreviated
procedures also conflict with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556
10
and 559 relating to the conduct of hearings, and requirements or
privileges relating to evidence.
The Declaratory Ruling does not confide the Sec-
tion 315(b) claims to a “specially constituted tribunal” or pre-
scribe a “particular procedure for investigation, complaint and
notice, and lkearing and decision” as would be required even if
Congress itself had established these procedures. See Garner v.
Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers Local Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490
(1953). Instead, the FCC’s “Mass Media Bureau” is permitted to
consider these claims, without any time limits imposed on the
decision. See FCC App. at 27a-28a. This Court struck down
similar rules enacted by the FSLIC for this very reason. See Coit
Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 586 (1989)
(Petitioners’ “claim has essentially been relegated to a ‘black
hole’ from which it may not emerge before the statute of limita-
tions on [petitioner’s] state law claims has run.’’)
Even if the FCC issues an order for the payment of a
refund, Section 401(b) of the Communications Act specifically
excludes orders for the payment of money from the scope of the
orders which may be enforced by the courts. Thus, any refund
order could not be enforced by any candidate, and the Declara-
tory Ruling seriously undermines and thwarts the statutory pur-
pose of FECA to reduce campaign costs.
C. This Court Should Grant the Cross-Petition to Clarify
the Circumstances Under Which An Executive Agency
May Interpret the Intent of Congress, and the Binding
Effect of Any Such Interpretation.
As set forth in the Candidates’ Brief in Opposition to Peti-
tions for Writs of Certiorari, it is the Candidates’ position that
the FCC has no authority to issue an opinion, which is binding on
the courts, interpreting Congressional intent on constitutional
issues such as the preemption of state law causes of action. If the
Court grants either of the Petitions, however, and reaches the
correctness of the FCC’s “opinion” on these issues, the Court
11
should grant the Cross-Petition to consider the unique issues
raised by the Candidates on these issues in the court of appeals.
Assuming that the FCC could issue a declaratory ruling of
this type, there is no reasonable basis for the FCC’s conclusion
that Congress, by implication, intended to preempt state law
causes of action involving the lowest unit charge provision. The
regulations governing Section 315(b) are explicit and reasonably
detailed, the power to prescribe and revise regulations under this
section remains in the FCC, and all judicial interpretations of
Section 315(b) are subject to review. Permitting the state courts
to have concurrent jurisdiction over Section 315(b) claims “cre-
ates no significant danger of inconsistent application of fed-
eral . . . law” because “[s]tate court judgments misinterpreting
federal . . . law would, of course, also be subject to direct
review by this Court.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990).
In the absence of Congressional action, primary jurisdiction, not
implied exclusive federal jurisdiction, is the concept, if any,
which is responsive to the FCC’s uniformity concerns. See United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956) (where the
doctrine applies, “the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.”’).
The FCC relied on four types of cases in concluding that
Congress intended to preempt all state law causes of action
dependent on a determination under Section 315(b). None of
these categories of cases, however, provides any support for the
Declaratory Ruling.
(i) Implied Federal Cause of Action. The FCC first postu-
lated that there is no implied federal cause of action for damages
under Section 315(b). This postulation was the FCC’s premise
for its own conclusion that Congress intended to preempt all
state law causes of action requiring a determination of the lowest
unit charge. As an initial matter, the FCC’s reasoning process
was flawed because “preemption and implied private cause of
action analyses are distinct modes cf divining Congressional
intent.” Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 2d 1552, 1555-56 (11th
Cir. 1983).
12
It was particularly inappropriate in any event for the FCC
to bootstrap its argument for preemption of state causes of
action upon its own determination, rather than a court’s determi-
nation, of whether there is a private federal cause of action for
violation of Section 315(b). As set forth in the Candidates’ Brief
in Opposition, this is an issue peculiarly reserved for determina-
tion by the courts.”
In concluding that there is no private federal cause of
action for violations of Section 315(b), the FCC’s principal and
repeated reliance was upon Belluso v. Turner Communications
Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (Sth Cir. 1980), which held that no private
federal cause of action will be implied under Section 315(a) of
the Act. Mr. Belluso was a gubernatorial candidate who believed
that he had the power to hypnotize voters through his television
advertisements. After Turner Communications refused to air his
advertisements, and after the voters had elected one of his oppo-
nents, Mr. Belluso brought an action alleging breach of an
implied federal cause of action for damages, to his candidacy and
his reputation, based, in part, upon Section 315(a) of the Act
(the “equal time rule”). The Candidates submit that the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Belluso has no bearing on whether a court
would imply a cause of action under Section 315(b) of the Act.
Belluso represents nothing more than a recognition of the long-
standing principle that “[s]pecial damages for the loss of a public
? Although the Declaratory Ruling on its face purported to preempt
only state law causes of action, the FCC further purported to constitute
itself the sole forum for adjudicating all matters requiring any determina-
tion under Section 315(b), presumably including any implied federal cause
of action pursuant to Section 315(b). If the Declaratory Ruling were con-
strued to oust federal court jurisdiction, such a construction would raise
further serious questions of constitutionality under Article III. See Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 838-39 (1986);
Norther Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 582
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
13
office in an election for that office are too remote and specula-
tive to be recoverable.” Beverly v. Observer Pub. Co., 88 Ga. App.
490, 490, 77 S.E.2d 80, 81 (1953).
Even assuming that the existence of an implied federal
cause of action under Section 315(b) was relevant to the issues
the FCC purported to decide, the FCC ignored the fundamental
concept applied by the courts in deciding these issues, that an
administrative remedy must first exist if a private cause of action
is to be denied. The FCC has no authority to order refunds to be
paid by broadcasters; the FCC’s refund authority applies only to
common carriers. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)(1), 208, and 407.
“Precedent indicates that the Supreme Court is more likely to
allow a private remedy where Congress provides a benefit but
does not provide access to any type of administrative process.”
Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral’s Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d
1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988).
(ii) Exclusive Federal Remedies. The second category of
cases relied upon by the FCC consists of cases interpreting Con-
gress’ intent with respect to whether administrative remedies
under various federal statutes are exclusive. These cases, all of
which were decided by courts, not agencies, would not support
the Declaratory Ruling because in adopting Section 315(b), Con-
gress merely laid down a substantive rule of law. Congress did
not prescribe administrative remedies for violations of Sec-
tion 315(b). Before exclusive jurisdiction will be implied, a court
must inquire whether, among other things, the scheme of federal
regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it . . ..”
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)(quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Even then,
however, all detailed regulatory schemes are not exclusive. The
Courts look for “special features warranting preemption.” Jd. at
87. The FCC did not demonstrate any special features warrant-
ing preemption in this case.
ee ee
14
(iii) Immunity Based Upon Federal Defenses. The third
category of cases relied upon by the FCC consists of cases inter-
preting Congress’ intent with respect to whether compliance
with standards set forth in a federal rule affords an immunity
from, or a defense to, an otherwise applicable state cause of
action. See, e.g., Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981)(ICC’s approval of aban-
donment of railroad service preempts state causes of action for
abandonment). These judicial decisions are not relevant here
because the state causes of action preempted by the Declaratory
Ruling would never involve actions sanctioned by Sec-
tion 315(b); they would generally involve alleged violations of
Section 315(b). Moreover, this Court specifically reserved the
issue in Kalo Brick of whether “a damages action can never be
brought for an illegal abandonment, or if such an action can be
brought, whether Congress might have intended that state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.” Jd. at 323 n.10.
(iv) Preemptive Effect of Federal Regulations. The fourth,
and final, category of cases relied upon by the FCC in purporting
to interpret Congressional intent consists solely of judicial deter-
minations of the preemptive effect of federal regulations. These
cases are not relevant here because they all involved preemption
of state regulations, not the preemption of state causes of action,
and not the ouster of state court jurisdiction or federal court
jurisdiction in diversity cases. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)(preemption of state prohibition of
retransmission by cable television systems of alcoholic beverage
advertisements); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982)(preemptive effect of Federal Home Loan
Bank Board regulation permitting federally chartered savings
and loan association to exercise due on sale clause inconsistent
with state law).
Even if this Court believes that “[t]he Commission makes a
persuasive case in support of its policy objective, . . . that case
must be made to Congress and not to this court.” California v.
FCC, 798 F.2d 1515, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1986). If the Declaratory
—
che Ae Ra Tin mal ll Ra bow
15
Ruling’s uniformity justification were taken to its logical conclu-
sion, there would be nothing to prevent the FCC from preempt-
ing all state law causes of action that require an interpretation of
any FCC statutory or regulatory provision. However, even if, as
the FCC speculates, court enforcement of FCC lowest unit
charge claims could result in inconsistent interpretations, “this
not necessarily unhealthy prospect is no more than the usual
consequence of the historic acceptance of concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction . . ..” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368
U.S. 502, 514 (1962).
Until Congress acts, the present jurisdiction of the courts
should not be disturbed. Otherwise, the inclusion of Sec-
tion 315(b) as a part of the adoption of FECA in 1971 will have
failed in its essential purpose to reduce campaign costs. At a bare
minimum, the effectuation of Congress’ intent in adopting Sec-
tion 315(b) requires that lowest unit charge disputes be settled by
some tribunal. “It is important that they be settled right. But let
me insist upon a thing too often overlooked. It is more important
still that they be settled.” K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush at
135 (1930).
16
CONCLUSION
The Court has before it the Petition of the FCC and the
Petition of the Broadcasters which, in addition to presenting the
issues ruled upon by the court of appeals, present to this Court
the issue of the validity of the conclusions reached in the Declar-
atory Ruling. If this Court accepts either of the Petitions and,
rather than remanding this proceeding to the court of appeals,
decides to rule on all of the issues presented by the Petitioners,
this Court should also grant this Cross-Petition to consider, in
addition to the issues presented by the Petitioners, the unique
issues presented by the Candidates.
Respectfully submitted,
ALBERT G. NORMAN, JR.* Roy E. BARNES
GORDON D. GIFFIN MICHAEL JABLONSKI
BARBARA A. MCINTYRE ROBERT S. KAHN
L. CRAIG DOWDY BARNES, BROWNING,
LONG, ALDRIDGE & TANKSLEY & CASURELLA
NORMAN 166 Anderson Street
303 Peachtree Street Suite 225
Suite 5300 Marietta, GA 30308
Atlanta, GA 30308 (770) 424-1500
(404) 527-4000 ROGER S. MORROW
*Counsel of Record MORROW, ROMINE &
PEARSON
122 South Hall Street
Montgomery, AL 36104
(334) 262-7707
Counsel for Cross-Petitioners
February 26, 1996
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.