Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.

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Supreme Court, U.S.

rin € D

no ZOGZ JUN 1 9 1998

OFFIGE-Or—tHe

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1997

Ernest A. Oliver

Petitioner

Vv.

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.;

Golden Gallon, Inc.;

Guy Moose; Bill Foxworth;

ALC Incorporated, et al.,

Respondents

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ernest A. Oliver

Plaintiff/Appellant, Pro SE

58 Bohr Drive

Chattanooga, Tennessee 37415

(423) 877-8723

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

i Whether Tennessee Senior Federal District

Court Judge James H. Jarvis violated

Plaintiff/Appellant's due process rights by

stripping him of his counsel, forcing him to

proceed Pro Se, and filing a fraudulent Opinion

protecting 82 companies, while at the same

time, covering up the poisoning of the

countries of Russia, Canada, and Mexico?

Ze Whether the United States Supreme Court

will allow the Sixth Circuit Court Of Appeals

to turn a blind eye to the overwhelming

evidence placed before it in the 823 pages of

joint appendix filed in this matter?

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioners:

Ernest A. Oliver, Plaintiff/Appellant, Pro Se

Respondents:

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.;

Golden Gallon, Inc;

Guy Moose; .

Bill Foxworth;

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED....---eeeeerecrercercs I

LIST OF PARTIES... ..ccccccccesccsececccens ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS....--eeeceeeercccccccers iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....-22eeeeeeeeeeeres iv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ...-++-+++-- 1

OPINION BELOW....-cccccccccccreesseccccres 1

SURISDICTION. .cccccesceececscesesessesenes 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED....---- 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...--+eeeeeeeerrrreers 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION......---- 11

RT Cee ee ee eet Ghee cea re een aera renee App.1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

City of New York v Exxon Corp.,

466 FiSape. TT? CD. LOSES a ok es ae & ie be fC

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,

€33 0.8. 20,22, i420 B.CEs 304,

S075. 2Rr Ecc aol ASO eR ek ak sees 13,24

ague v. Cj F

930 2c. wees: 12O- Cans. Beek Cehsicen ne 13,14

MARTIN v. SAS ) ANTS »

32 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1944 (D. Kan.

Fenruary 19, L9Sh) cvs ancaces a ate rer a kde a

Statutes

Rule 60, Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure..... 5, i9

Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure..5

40 C.F.R. 261.21 ("Ignitability")......... 7.46

ESE Rebs Re LS g ews ocscwreaeseenvaernssevnsecs 23

APPENDIX

ORDER OF THE U.S.COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT (MARCH 23, 1998)..----- App. 1

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE U.S.

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE (AUGUST 10,

AFFIVADIT OF RANDALL BLEVINS

CONCERNING THE ILLEGAL DUMPING

OF HAZARDOUS WASTES BY HYDRO-VAC

SERVICES, INC. (SEPT. 11, 1991) ..---ees App. 26

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’ S BRIEF TO

THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT (June il,

ee er en te FG Mk So a reais ty App. 33

LETTER FROM SHUMACKER & THOMPSON,

ATTORNEYS FOR HYDRO-VAC SERVICES,

INC., CONCERNING THE JUDGMENT

OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

THE PAYMENT OF $25,018.00(MAY 4,

SORES dc koe RAO EOS TOT EE EEE SOE E ESTES EN App. 68

LETTER OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT’ S

ATTORNEY RICHARD P. JAHN, SR.,

CONCERNING THE PERJURY OF GUY MOOSE

WHICH WAS REFERRED TO BY THE U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

IN THEIR ORDER OF MARCH 23,

1998. (MAY 9, 1996)...-seeeeereeeeeeees App. 70

App. ii

REGISTERED LETTER OF PLAINTIFF/

APPELLANT TO JUDGE JAMES H. JARVIS

Ct SUAS 20, = SOF i ink dock 4 cces cece App. 73

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Ernest A. Oliver, on behalf of

himself, respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The Order of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that gave rise to

this petition was not recommended for full text

publication by the Court. It is reprinted in

the Appendix hereto at App. :

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit entered an ORDER on March 23,

1998. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1, the

present petition is timely, having been filed

within 90 days after the entry of the ORDER.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Amendment XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause)

No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

SUPREME COURT RULE 10 (a).

A United States court of appeals has

entered a decision in conflict with the

decision of another United States court of

appeals on the same important matter; has

decided an important federal question in a way

that conflicts with a decision by a state court

of last resort; or has so far departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by

a lower court, as to call for an exercise of

this Court’s supervisory power.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction

This action was commenced by the

Plaintiff/Appellant in August of 1991 against

the Appellees and approximately (80) other

Defendants, charging that Defendants engaged in

an illegal hazardous waste dumping operation in

the City of Chattanooga and a conspiracy to

wrongfully terminate Plaintiff/Appellant from

his employment with Defendant/Appellee Hydro-

Vac Services, Inc., and to deprive him of

constitutionally protected rights, in violation

af 42. 0.8.0. 6 i383 6 1985. When the

investigation of Plaintiff/Appellant's

allegations revealed that Defendant/Appellee

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. and its owner William

Foxworth had been illegally commingling the

wastes of over 80 companies and had

contaminated the unlined Chattanooga Summit

Landfill with at least 13 hazardous wastes in

huge amounts, the conspiracy to cover-up the

problem began. Foxworth had been operating

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. for over 18 months in

direct violation of orders from the Air

Pollution Board, and in direct violation of

regulations of the City of Chattanooga, and the

State and Federal environmental protection

agencies, when the violations were discovered.

Defendant/Appellee, State Solid Waste

Manager Guy M. Moose, conspired with attorneys

William Colvin, Frederick Hitchcock, and James

W. Gentry representing the Appellees herein, to

cover-up the facts in this case and to defraud

the Courts and the American Public as to the

damage to the Landfill and the threat to the

health and welfare of the general public both

national and international.

When the case came before State Circuit

Court Judge Samuel H. Payne, Plaintiff/

Appellant tape recorded a conversation with

Judge Payne in order to prove the overwhelming

conspiracy and abuse of the justice system in

Tennessee. This tape recording and transcript

was placed before the Sixth Circuit in

Plaintiff/Appellant's Petition For Writ Of

“

Prohibition, Court of Appeals Case No. 97-5611.

Judge Payne states he's not concerned about the

hazardous waste dumping operation going on in

his own district, and that he and other Judges

in Chattanooga are not public protectors.

When the case came before Federal District

Judge James H. Jarvis and revelations of the

political damage and the embarrassment that

could occur to the State of Tennessee and over

80 companies, Judge Jarvis joined the

conspiracy as well. Judge Jarvis did not

foresee that his protection of the dumping

would have the potential to destroy the

wholesome image of North America's largest

private snack food company, Mckee Foods

Corporation, manufacturers of Little Debbie®

products, whose baking plants are located

adjacent to the Landfill. Judge Jarvis not

only threw out the case rendering an opinion

based on fraud, but he issued an injunction

against Plaintiff/Appellant preventing him from

ever refiling the case even though the dumping

operation is still going on. The conspiracy

has continued from 1990 through the present

time and has resulted not only in the loss of

Plaintiff/Appellant's chemistry teaching

position at Chattanooga State Technical

Community College (herein "CSTCC"), but alSo in

slander and libel against Plaintiff/Appellant's

scientific abilities and expertise. A right to

sue letter was issued by the EEOC against CSTCC

on May Re 1996 resulting in the

Plaintiff/Appellant's Federal lawsuit at Case

No. 1:96-Cv-380 against CSTCC before the

Honorable Thomas G. Hull. Judge Hull dismissed

Plaintiff/Appellant's Count II alleging

aia sr oa ee eat

conspiracy between CSTCC, Defendant/Appellees

and their attorneys, and others, for conspiracy

to violate Plaintiff/Appellant's civil rights.

Judge Hull stated Plaintiff/Appellant’s Count

II was a collateral attack on Judge Jarvis's

previous order enjoining Plaintiff/Appellant

from:

m filing any further pleadings

in this case and any further

pleadings in the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee arising out of

the facts set forth in this

lawsuit..."

However, Honorable Thomas G. Hull also

made the following statement in his order of

December 18, 1996 with respect to the case

before Judge Jarvis:

there is a suggestion in the

record that Judge Jarvis may have

relied upon a false affidavi in

dismissing the previous lawsuit..."

Plaintiff/Appellant then filed a Motion to

Set Aside Orders on January 17, 1997 which was

denied by Judge Jarvis by his Final Order of

January 31, 1997. This Final Order was

appealed by Plaintiff/Appellant within 10 days

under Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate

On May 19, 1997, Plaintiff/Appellant filed

a Petition For Writ Of Prohibition against

Judge Jarvis as Court of Appeals Case No. 97-

5611, which was denied by the Sixth Circuit.

Judge Jarvis was given the opportunity by the

Sixth Circuit to respond to the charges in said

petition. On Friday, June 6, 1997, Plaintiff/

Appellant was informed by the Clerk of the

Court that Judge Jarvis had returned the

certified docket as requested by the Court but

had submitted no cover letter and no response.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On August 27, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellant

Ernest A. Oliver ("Oliver") was fired from his

position of Lab Director at Hydro-Vac Services,

SG «, a Chattanooga, Tennessee based

nonhazardous waste water treatment facility

("Hydro-Vac"). Oliver was fired for blowing

the whistle on illegal activities regarding the

improper disposal of both hazardous and

nonhazardous wastes. Oliver requested an

investigation by the U.s. Department of Labor

which resulted in a hearing before ALJ

Honorable Ralph Musgrove on January 22 and

January 23, 1991. Judge Musgrove died

immediately following the hearing and Oliver

appealed the replacement ALJ's decision which

had been based on Moose's perjury. on November

a, 2936, U.8. Secretary of Labor, Dr. Robert

Reich, reversed the replacement ALJ's decision

and ordered Hydro-Vac to reinstate Oliver

stating Hydro-Vac had illegally fired Oliver

from his lab direttor position. On February 19,

1997, Honorable Daniel A. Sarno, Jr. ordered

Hydro-Vac to pay Oliver $43,000.00 in back pay

and front pay plus interest for illegally

firing Oliver.

a aa rarer

APN arg Peer eg ear nay ese Seen eee em ene

During Oliver's employment at Hydro-Vac

and after his termination, he gathered

significant evidence in the form cf documents,

pictures, tape recordings, and video tape to

prove not only his allegations of illegal

disposal of hazardous wastes, but moreover,

that a conspiracy which began in 1990 is still

continuing, and has today become so large as to

infect the Tennessee State and Federal Court

systems, the FBI, the Department of Justice and

Offices of U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno,

Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr., and the

Clinton Administration.

Defendant/Appellee, Guy M. Moose

("Moose"), is Director of the Southeast

Regional Office, Division of Solid Waste

Management for the State of Tennessee, located

in Chattanooga. During the period of August

1990 through January 1991, Moose and his office

investigated Oliver's allegations of illegal

dumping of hazardous wastes by Hydro-Vac and

found that Hydro-Vac had violated the Tennessee

Hazardous Waste Management Act and the

Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act. Moose

cited Hydro-Vac on at least three (3) different

occasions, which included allowing wastes

containing 40 C.F.R Subpart C hazardous wastes

to migrate into the Chattanooga Creek. Moose

withheld all of this information from Oliver at

the labor hearing before ALJ Musgrove and he

testified under oath at the Federal Labor

Hearing on January 23, 1991 that no hazardous

wastes were present at Hydro-Vac.

Attorney Frederick L. Hitchcock

("Hitchcock"), who represented Golden Gallon,

Inc. in the case, had provided clear proof to

Judge Jarvis in his affidavit of September 23,

1992, that Hitchcock was fully aware that his

client Golden Gallon's gasoline contaminated

dirt had become hazardous by Federal standards,

as more specifically defined in City of New

York v Exxon Corp., 766 F.Supp. 177 (S8S.D.N.Y.

1991). Hitchcock admits at paragraph 3(c) of

his affidavit that:

",...the petroleum-Contaminated Soil

was mixed with some waste other than

petroleum from an underground

storage tank installation..."

Hitchcock also admits at paragraph 3(b)

that:

"Contaminated soil from underground

Storage tank installations and other

materials such as absorbent pads

used to clean up petroleum spills

are not subject to regulation as

hazardous waste, even though the

petroleum in the soil or other

materials contains chemical

substances, such as benzene and

toluene, that would separately

subject to regulation as hazardous

waste. 40 C.F.R. 261.4(b) (10) and

TDEC Rules 1200-1-11.02(1) (d) (wii)

Hitchcock further states that he hired a

geologic and environmental consulting firm to

examine the petroleum-contaminated soil, and

that it was determined that other constituents

were present other than contamination from

petroleum underground storage tanks. Hitchcock

states that the Golden Gallon contaminated soil

was then placed in "roll-off boxes” on Hydro-

Vac's premises and that he had shared the

information from the consulting firm with the

Tennessee Department of Environment an

Conservation (i.e., Moose).

It is a fact that the City of Chattanooga

has identified hazardous wastes benzene and

dichloroethylene- and three metals- mercury,

cadmium and barium in monitoring wells at the

Summit Landfill.

It is a fact that Moose and the Tennessee

Department of Environment and Conservation

identified benzene, mercury, cadmium, and

barium at Hydro-Vac in wastes being prepared to

be land filled at the Summit Landfill.

It is a fact that on September 21, 1990,

Jim Templeton with the City of Chattanooga

Summit Landfill, advised Hydro-Vac that it

would no longer accept any waste unless

specifically authorized by the Division of

Solid Waste Management in writing. This

information in an inter-office memo of Moose,

was also withheld by Moose from Oliver at the

Federal Labor hearing held before ALJ Musgrove

on January 23-24, 1991.

It is a fact that Mr. Rick Brown, Solid

Waste Manager for the Tennessee Department of

Environment and Conservation in Knoxville, in

his letter to Hydro-Vac general manager Tom

Cochran on March 6, 1991, admonishes Hydro-Vac

for receiving hazardous wastes on at least two

(2) occasions and states:

'...your facility is not authorized

to receive and treat hazardous

wastes generated by others...”

Ail of the documents referred to above were

presented to the Sixth Circuit in the three

volume, 823 page joint appendix.

In 1992, Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr.

at the United Nations 1992 Earth Summit in Rio

de Janeiro, told the whole international

community that Chattanooga is the

"Environmental City” of the future. In a

speech he stated: "...I believe Chattanooga

does rightfully serve as an example this

country can hold up to the rest of the world."

The fact that 82 companies were involved in

illegal hazardous waste dumping in the so-

called "Environmental City”, suddenly became a

serious problem. However, the fact that the

health and welfare of persons not only in North

America, but also in the countries of Russia,

Canada, and Mexico, has been placed at risk by

“Dirty” Little Debbie® products baked in the

Chattanooga area, has caused this issue now to

become a REGIONAL COVER-UP!

It is a fact that lawyers for McKee Foods

corporation admit on tape recorded

conversation, that they are aware of the

contamination of the water at the Summit

Landfill but did not know that it was in the

air too, and that Plaintiff/Appellant has

dropped a "BOMB SHELL" on McKee Foods

Se OS RCE ETC eT CT Ter ee eT

Corporation. Furthermore, McKee Attorney Gary

Lander has stated in certified Air Pollution

Records that Oliver is attempting to get McKee

Foods Corporation to sue him for libel and

slander so he can win his case on the merits in

a counterclaim.

It is a fact that instead of fixing the

problem of the hazardous wastes contaminating

their Little Debbie® products, McKee Foods

Corporation has relied on the conspiracy and

protection of powerful judges and politicians

to cover-up the danger to the health and

welfare of their customers, and have recently

built a third baking plant in the center of the

hazardous pollution and have for the past two

years been shipping their “Dirty” Little

Debbie® products to Russia, Canada, and Mexico.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

JUDGE JARVIS VIOLATED PETIONEER'S DUE

PROCESS RIGHTS AND FILED A FRAUDULENT OPINION,

KNOWING IT TO BE FRAUDULENT, FOR THE SOLE

PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THE IMAGE AND ORGANIZED

CRIME OF 82 COMPANIES, THE IMAGE AND CRIMINAL

NEGLIGENCE OF MCKEE FOODS CORPORATION AND ITS

LAWYERS, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY OF CHATTANOOGA

AND THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, AND THE IMAGE

OF ENVIRONMENTAL VICE-PRESIDENT FROM TENNESSEE,

ALBERT GORE, Jr.

It is a fact that Judge Jarvis issued a

fraudulent Memorandum Opinion on August 109,

1992, App. 5, stating on page 13 that:

"...-Moose concludes that all of Mr. Oliver's

allegations were "groundless"..." (emphasis

added). Nowhere in the record of this case is

there any evidence, whatsoever, to even

remotely support such a statement. In order for

Judge Jarvis to be able to Support his

injunction preventing Plaintiff/Appellant from

refiling his lawsuit, Judge Jarvis had to

create a myth which would suggest that

Plaintiff/Appellant was absolutely wrong in

his actions of filing a citizen's suit against

82 companies. Judge Jarvis had to show that not

even one allegation made by Plaintiff/Appellant

was true. To do so, Judge Jarvis had to enter

into a conspiracy with defense Attorneys

William Colvin, Frederick Hitchcock, James

Gentry, and State Solid Waste Manager Guy

Moose, to ignore the overwhelming facts and

documents signed by Moose and his office, which

Plaintiff/Appellant submitted as evidence PRIOR

TO Judge Jarvis’s Memorandum Opinion on Augus

10, 1992, App.5, and again in

Plaintiff/Appellant’s__Motion To Set Aside

Orders which Judge Jarvis denied on January

17, 1997. All four (4) men and Judge Jarvis

were fully aware that Judge Jarvis's statement:

"...Moose concludes that all of Mr. Oliver's

allegations were “groundless”. ..." (emphasis

added) was and is A BLATANT MISSTATEMENT OF THE

TRUTH!

Judge Jarvis intimidated Plaintiff/

Appellant's Michigan lawyer, Mark Light, into

abandoning his client and refusing to appeal

the Memorandum Opinion filed by Judge Jarvis on

Eg COL SOLO eNO

ie a ee

August 10, 1992, App.5. Judge Jarvis approved

attorney Light's request to withdraw without

any notice whatsoever to Plaintiff/Appellant

Oliver.

Judge Jarvis incorrectly applied

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493. 0.8.

20,232,130: 8.€8.: FOas:.. Wel. 267 see: a

(1989), as the standard by which he bases his

opinion, and his justification for sanctions

and dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that Hallstrom

specifically indicates it does not apply under

42 U.S.C. 6972(b) (1) (A) (111) when “subchapter

III violations" or ae RCRA Subpart C

violations) are occurring. In Dague v. City

of Burlinaton, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),

and in Martin v. Kansas Board of Regents, 32

Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1944 (D. Kan. Feb. 19,

1991), the courts held that no 60- day notice

was necessary when "RCRA Subpart C violations"

have occurred.

At pages 19 and 20 of Judge Jarvis's

Memorandum Opinion at App.5, Judge Jarvis shows

that he is not only capable of outright lying

in his opinion, but is also capable of ignoring

the most important part of Guy Moose's

affidavit found at Court Docket #25, in regard

to Plaintiff's rights. Judge Jarvis quotes

paragraphs 2 , 3, and 15 of Moose's affidavit

to support his outrageous statement that:

",...Moose concludes that all of Mr.

Oliver's allegations were

“groundless”. ..."(emphasis added)

Not only did Moose Say nothing of the

kind, but Judge Jarvis conveniently leaves out

paragraph 14 of Moose's affidavit where Moose

admits to citing Hydro-vac for:

-The relief sought by Mr. Oliver

in ‘his prayer under Count I was, in

fact, invoked by me and the State of

Tennessee through a "permit by rule"

procedure in the Fall of 1990,

without any request from Mr. Oliver

for such an action and not because

Mr. Oliver had been lee stg by

HVSI at an earlier time.

Here Moose is referring to his citing of

Hydro-Vac on January 22, 1991 for allowing oil

from UST contaminated soil to migrate into the

Chattanooga Creek. This citation is part of the

Record Of Appeal and can be found in the joint

appendix at page JA258. Judge Jarvis ignores

the fact this oil migrating into the

Chattanooga Creek from gasoline-contaminated

dirt (UST Soil), contained "RCRA Subpart Cc"

hazardous wastes benzine and toluene. The fact

that these compounds are listed as hazardous

wastes is further confirmed by Golden Gallon's

attorney Hitchcock in his affidavit of

September 23, 1992, found in the joint appendix

at JA300 and previously introduced above under

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Therefore, because "RCRA Subpart C

violations" were occurring at Hydro-Vac,

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County cited by Judge

Jarvis does not apply. The correct law should

have been the standard cases Dague vy. City of

Burlington Supra, and Martin v. Kansas Board

of Regents Supra, where the courts held that no

60-day notice was necessary when "RCRA Subpart

C violations" had occurred.

ANYONE WITH ANY COMMON SENSE AT ALL WOULD

REALIZE THAT ALLOWING THE NAVIGABLE WATERS AND

THE GROUNDWATER OF A CITY LIKE CHATTANOOGA TO

BE POLLUTED WITH THE CANCER-CAUSING HAZARDOUS

WASTES BENZINE AND MERCURY FOR 60 DAYS BEFORE

ANY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN, WOULD BE CRIMINAL!

Plaintiff/Appellant specifically brought

this to the attention of Judge Jarvis on

September 16, 1992 at Docket #70, found in the

joint appendix at page JA229. Judge Jarvis

confirms that he is aware of this information

when he states in his Memorandum Opinion of

December 28, 1992 at Docket #98 on doc. Nos. 70

and 83 that:

" . However, apparently unwilling to

acknowledge this fact, plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, has continued to

file pleadings arguing that Count I

is meritorious and that, therefore,

the complaint was not frivolous and

should not have been dismissed [see

Docs.No. 70 and 83]."

On September 16, 1992 at Docket #70,

Oliver filed his Motion to Deny Defendant's

Motion For Sanctions with exhibits 1-1’.

Exhibit #9 is the Notice of Violation under the

Solid Waste Management Act filed by Moose which

charges Hydro-Vac with allowing oil from UST

contaminated soil (roll-off boxes) to migrate

into the Chattanooga Creek. Exhibit #10 is the

on)

Notice of Violation under the Tennessee

Hazardous Waste Management Act which was filed

against Hydro-Vac by Moose's office on December

S, 1991 and charges Hydro-Vac with processing

wastes that are hazardous for "Ignitability”.

Both of the above cited violations were for

compounds that were hazardous for the

characteristic of "ignitability”.

In City of New York v Exxon Corp., 766

F.Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) at page 184, the

Court establishes that under the RCRA

regulations two(2) separate and independent

Standards exist for determining whether a

substance is a hazardous waste. Subpart C of

RCRA regulations provides that a waste is

hazardous if it exhibits any of the

characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity,

reactivity, or EP toxicity. (See 40 C.F.R.§§

261.20-261.24). Subpart D, on the other hand,

is a list of both specific wastes and general

waste categories which are considered RCRA

hazardous wastes. (See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-

261.33). Under CERCLA'S definition of

"hazardous substance", a hazardous substance

includes any waste which falls under any of the

various definitions and listings of hazardous

wastes under other statues including RCRA and

CWA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).

In City of New York v Exxon Corp., 766

F.Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) it is absolutely

clear that CERCLA liability is established in

a multigenerator, multihazardous’ substance

case, such as the immediate case, if the

Plaintiff can establish that the defendant (1)

disposed of its hazardous substances, (2) ata

ee es Cen ws ae

facility which now contains hazardous

substances of the sort disposed of by the

generator, (3) if there is a release of that or

some other type of hazardous substance, (4)

which causes the incurrence of response costs.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that there is

absolute proof that Hydro-Vac received and

commingled gasoline-contaminated soil with

hazardous “used oil" and also "waste oil”

along with wastes from over 80 companies. This

waste was land filled in the Chattanooga Summit

Landfill over a period of 18 months until

Plaintiff/Appellant blew the whistle in August

of 1990.

The fact that Moose cited Hydro-Vac for

having allowed this waste in "roll-off" boxes

to migrate into the Chattanooga Creek is a

second "RELEASE" in addition to the first

"RELEASE" into the Chattanooga Summit Landfill.

The fact that the City of Chattanooga has

identified the same hazardous wastes in wells

located at the Summit Landfill as_ these

hazardous wastes that Moose and the Department

Of Environment and Conservation had identified

at Hydro-Vac during their inspections of Hydro-

Vac in 1990, satisfies all the requirements

under CERCLA to require all 82 companies listed

in Plaintiff/Appellants complaint in the

immediate case to clean up the Landfill.

The Affidavit of Hydro-Vac employee,

Randall Blevins, App.26, and also found in the

joint appendix at JA271, establishes the mixing

of different wastes, and the land filling of

said wastes at the Summit Landfill. Also, Mr.

Blevins establishes just how outrageous and

illegal the operation was at Hydro-Vac.

II.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

WILL ALLOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO THE OVERWHELMING

EVIDENCE PLACED BEFORE IT IN THE THREE VOLUMES

AND 823 PAGES OF JOINT APPENDIX FILED IN THIS

MATTER?

On March 23, 1998, Sixth Circuit Judges

Boggs,Norris, and Moore entered their Order

App.1, denying Plaintiff/Appellant’s request

and in doing so listed a series of inaccurate

statements regarding the facts in this case.

The Order states:

“In his timely appeal from the

denial of his Rule 60(b) motion,

Oliver argues that the statue of

limitations for Rule 60(b) should be

tolled due to a continuing

conspiracy, that the Attorney

General should not have been

permitted to represent the State of

Tennessee without recording his

appearance, that the filing

injunction has allowed the

defendants to defame him, and that

the district court erred by not

allowing him to speak at the

sanctions hearing. He also requests

Oral argument.”

Das a aces

ee ee ee ee ee

The court then makes the exradionary statement

citing Foster v. Barilow, 6F.3d 405, 407(6th

Cir. 1993), that because Oliver did not raise

the issues in the above quote, the Court will

not address an issue not first raised in the

district court.

Plaintiff/Appellant charges here that his due

process rights have been violated. The above

quote is a perfect example to support these

allegations.

None of the issues stated by the court in the

above quote had occurred at the time for

Plaintiff/Appellant to raise them. If the sixth

Circuit judges had taken the time to read

Plaintiff/Appellant’s timely filed brief,

App.33, they would have realized that only

during the next four years did the

defemination occur, or that Plaintiff/Appellant

learned that Attorney James Gentry representing

Guy Moose, was also representing the State of

Tennessee. Furthermore, Plaintiff/Appellant has

never been allowed to speak in any court, State

or Federal, and State Circuit Court Judge

Samuel Payne is on tape recording stating that

he also did not read anything filed before him

by Plaintiff/Appellant in this matter.

On January 20, 1997, three days after

Judge Jarvis denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s

Motion To Set Aside Orders, Plaintiff/Appellant

sent his Registered Letter, #R 838 493 627,

App. 73, to Judge Jarvis describing in detail

the facts regarding the contanimation of the

Summit Land Fill and MOREOVER, the damage to

McKee Foods Corporation, and the threat to the

health and welfare of the NATIONAL and

INTERNATIONAL communities. Judge Jarvis and

other high ranking public officials have

decided to ignore the facts.

If a Court of law makes up the facts as it

goes, as did Judge Jarvis in this matter, and

the Sixth Circuit not only allows this to occur

but also makes up the facts as it goes,

Plaintiff/Appellant submits his Constitutional

Rights to Due Process have been violated.

What proof does Petitioner have that both the

District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court

knowingly filed statements that were contrary

to Known Facts before them?

Judge Jarvis stated in his August 10, 1992

Memorandum Opinion, App.5, that “...Moose

concludes that all of mr. Oliver’s allegations

were “groundless”...”

Docket # 70 Pltf.’s Motion to deny defts.’

motions for Sanctions, w/exhibits 1-17 before

Judge Jarvis, clearly show that Moose had cited

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. For everything

Plaintiff/Appellant had alleged and much more.

Furthermore, at pages JA223-229 of the 823

page, three volume joint appendix before the

Sixth Circuit, the same evidence can be found.

The most extradionary evidence of the violation

of Plaintiff/Appellant’s DUE PROCESS RIGHTS is

the statement by the Sixth Circuit Judges in

their Order, App.1, that:

OE EE

“Although he refers to a 1996 letter

from his attorney alleging that

defendant [Moose] committed perjury,

he provides no evidence to support

the allegation of perjury”

Again, the Sixth Circuit Court Judges Boogs,

Norris, and Moore either lied outright about

pages 223-299 of the joint appendix, or they

didn’t read Plaintiff/Appellant’s brief,

App.33. They further state:

“Oliver has not provided evidence of

conduct by any officer of the court

that was intentionally false,

wilfully blind to the truth, or in

reckless disregard of the

truth.”...”Instead, he primarily

made frivolous allegations as to

post-judgment events.”

On May 4, 1998, Respondent Hydro-Vac Services,

Inc. Paid Plaintiff/Appellant $25018.00 as the

final order of the Secretary of Labor. The

letter from Shumacker & Thompson, Attorneys for

Respondent Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. confirming

this payment, is found at App.68.

Judge Jarvis states in the footnote at

page 2 of his Memorandum Opinion of August 10,

1992, at App. 5, that:

“Plaintiff has filed two other

actions as a result of his being

fired by HVSI. On September 24,

1990, Plaintiff commenced an action

before the United States Department

of Labor claiming retaliatory,

discriminatory discharge under

various employee protection

Provisions of numerous federal

environmental statutes. The first

stage review by the Department of

Labor resulted in a finding that

there had been no retaliatory,

discriminatory discharge by HVSI.

Plaintiff then filed an appeal with

the chief administrative law judge

and was afforded a de novo hearing

in January, 1991, which was heard

over a two-day period. The record in

that case is closed and a

recommended decision and order from

the administrative law judge was

issued January 21, 1992. [See

Doc.14, Exh 4.] The administrative

law judge, Robert M. Glennon, found

that HVSI “had legitimate and non-

discriminatory reasons to discharge

[Plaintiff] ...because he “performed

poorly at his job and...disrupted

the organization” [See id.].

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that Judge

Jarvis was made fully aware at the time of his

Memorandum Opinion on August 10,1992, App.5,

that the decision of judge Robert M. Glennon

had been appealed and was based on Guy Moose’s

perjury. MOREOVER, Judge Jarvis was made fully

aware that Secretary of Labor, Dr. Robert

Riech had on November 1, 1995, REVERSED JUDGE

GLENNON’ S ORDER and ordered Hydro-Vac Services

TLE TT RT

a ys ss

to reinstate Plaintiff and pay back pay! The

Secretary of Labor’s opinion confirmed the

violations of Federal Environmental Laws by

HVSI.

Again, Judge Jarvis was fully aware of the

truth and complete facts regarding this matter

from the letter sent to him by

Plaintiff/Appellant on January 20, 1997

Registered Mail #R 838 493 627, App.73.

The Sixth Circuit Court in it’s order of

March 23, 1998, App. 1,states that “perjured

testimony alone does not constitute a fraud

upon the court. Judges Boggs, Norris, and Moore

also state that Plaintiff/Appellant “Oliver

failed to cite to any authority suggesting that

Rule 60(b) statue of limitations can be tolled

by a continuing conspiracy.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that this

statement is patently false and absolutely

provable! The Annotation of the American Law

Review, 97 A.L. R. 137, is listed at page ii of

Plaintiff/Appellant’s brief at App.33. It is

also found at page ZA455 of the 823 three

volume joint appendix filed before Judges

Boggs, Norris and Moore, Furthermore, at page

17 of said brief before judges Boogs, Norris,

and Moore, at App. 58, question V. “What

specific issues do you wish to raise on

appeal?” Plaintiff/Appellant states that:

a) “Plaintiff/Appellant wishes to

bring to the attention that

according to the authority of the

Annotation of the American Law

Review, 97 A.L.R. 137, all matters

in this case that could be

Challenged as untimely due to the

Statue of Limitations, should be

tolled due to the continuing

conspiracy that began in 1990 and is

continuing today.”

The statement by Judges Boggs, Norris, and

Moore that “Oliver failed to cite to any

authority suggesting that Rule 60(b) statue of

limitations can be tolled by a continuing

conspiracy” is just as outrageous as Judge

Jarvis statement “Moose concludes that all of

Mr. Oliver’s allegations are “groundless” .”

It is a violation of Plaintiff/Appellant’s due

process rights because the judges either did

not read the brief at App. 33, or, like Judge

Jarvis, lied outright about the facts in

Plaintiff/Appellant’s Appeal.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits the United

States Supreme Court has a duty to protect the

health and welfare of U.S. citizens and a moral

obligation to protect the International

Community as well. Furthermore, the United

States Supreme Court has a legal and moral duty

to supervise and correct the violation of the

constitutional rights of a U.S. Citizen who

tries to protect the health and welfare of the

general public both national and international

EVEN IF IT GOES AGAINST THE WISHES OF TENNESSEE

SENIOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGE JAMES H. JARVIS

AND ENVIRONMENTAL VICE-PRESIDENT AL GORE, Jr.

LL TOOT TT Tg

EE eee eT Sir Taree ee eM ON TC

Judge Jarvis actions in this matter which

have now been condoned by Sixth Circuit Court

Judges Boggs, Norris, and Moore cannot be

defended and cannot be denied when examined

against the 823 page three volume joint

appendix filed in this case.

IT IS PLAIN AND SIMPLY A BLATANT COVER-UP!

The fact that this cover-up is protecting

the contamination of food products that are

being consumed by Americans, Canadians,

Mexicans, Russians, and all the U.S. Military

Bases all over the world is HATEFUL and

REPREHENSIBLE !

IT MAY NOT BE A FRAUD AGAINST THE COURT,

BUT IT IS CERTAINLY A FRAUD AGAINST THE

COUNTRIES OF RUSSIA, CANADA, AND MEXICO!

There is a CANCER on the United States

Federal Court System in the presence of

Tennessee Senior Federal District Judge James

H. Jarvis. If the United States Supreme Court

does not exercise it’s supervisory duty in this

matter, the exposure of the truth herein to the

National and International Communities being

threatened by the contamination ot -"DiRss

LITTLE DEBBIE® products baked in the

Chattanooga area, will forever taint the Honor,

Integrity, and Credibility of the United States

Federal Court System.

As I stated in my brief to the Sixth Circuit

Court, App.33, As a member of the United States

Public Health Association, I have a duty to see

that the health and welfare of innocent persons

is not placed at risk by the Criminal

Negilence, Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, and

the Protection Of Organized Crime that has

become the Rule in the State of Tennessee.

The Sixth Circuit erred in upholding Judge

Jarvis’s Opinion and injunction, and should be

reversed.

Respectfully Submitted,

Ernest A. Oliver

Plaintiff/Appellant, Pro Se

58 Bohr Drive,

Chattanooga, TN 37415

(423) 877-8723

App. l

No. 97-5354

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ERNEST A. OLIVER

Plaintiff/Appellant

HYDRO-VAC SERVICES, INC.; GOLDEN

GALLON, INC.; GUY MOOSE; BILL

FOXWORTH; ALC INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants/Appellees.

Before: BOGGS, NORRIS, AND MOORE, Circuit

Judges.

Frnest A. Oliver, proceeding pro se,

appeals a district court order dismissing his

motion to set aside orders filed pursuant to

Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b). This case has been

referred to a panel of the court pursuant to

Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon

examination, this panel unanimously agrees that

oral argument is not needed Fed R. App P. 34

(a).

Seeking monetary and equitable relief,

Oliver sued eighty-seven defendants. He

App. 2

asserted that: 1) the defendants had violated

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of

1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.c. $$6901, et seq.; 2)the

defendants had “violated” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

3)the defendants conspired to illegally dump

waste in violation of State law. After

dismissing eighty-three defendants because

Oliver had failed to serve them, the district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the

remaining defendants (Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.,

Golden Gallon, Inc., Guy Moose, and Bill

Foxworth) in an order entered August 10, 1992.

Thereafter, in an Order entered December 28,

1992,the district court awarded sanctions in

favor of the defendants, enjoined Oliver’s

attorney from filing pleadings in the district

court for three years, and enjoined Oliver from

filing any other pleadings arising from the

same allegations. Oliver did not appeal the

Order of August 10, 1992, or the order of

December 28, 1992. Over four years later, on

January 22, 1997, Oliver filed a Rule 60 (b)

motion to set aside the Orders and reinstate

the second claim. The district court denied the

motion.

In his timely appeal from the denial of

his Rule 60(b) motion, Oliver argues tliat the

Statute of limitations for Rule 60(b) shcald be

tolled due to a continuing conspiracy, that the

Attorney General should not have been permitted

to represent the State of Tennessee without

recording his appearance, that the filing

injunction has allowed the defendants to defame

him, and that the district court erred by not

allowing him to speak at the Sanctions hearing.

Unless exceptional circumstances are present,

App. 3

this court will not address an issue not first

raised in the district court. Foster vy.

Barilow, 6 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1993). No

exceptional circumstances exist in this case.

We note that we cannot review whether the

district court’ erred by dismissing the

complaint or by awarding sanctions. Oliver’s

notice of appeal was not filed in time to

trigger appellate review of the underlying

judgment, and thus, this court may only review

the order denying the Rule 60 motion. See Peake

V. First Nat’l Bank and rust Co., 717 F.2d

1016, 1019-20(6th Cir. 1983).

We conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Oliver’s

motion for relief from judgment. See Lewis v.

Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993);

Whitaker v. Associated Credit Servs., 946 F.2d

1222, 1223 (6th Cir. 1991). Oliver’s motion is

time-barred because a motion asserting fraud

must be brought within one year of the

judgment. Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b). As the judgment

was entered on August 10, 1992, Oliver had

until August 10, 1993, to file his motion.

Oliver did not file his motion within a year,

but instead waited over four years. Oliver

failed to cite any authority suggesting that

Rule 60(b) statue of limitations can_be tolled

by a continuing conspiracy.

We also conclude that Oliver has not

sufficiently alleged fraud upon the court such

that the district court should have entertained

an independent action under the Savings clause

of Rule 60(b). Oliver has not provided evidence

of conduct by any officer of the court that was

intentionally false, wilfully blind to the

App. 4

truth, or in reckless disregard of the truth.

See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348

(6th Cir. 1993), cert. Denied, 513 U.S. 914

(1994). Instead, he primarily made frivolous

allegations as to post-judgment events.

Although he refers to a 1996 letter from his

attorney alleging that defendant committed

perjury, he provides no evidence to support the

allegation of perjury. Futhermore, perjured

testimony alone does not constitute a fraud

upon the court. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. V.

Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944).

Accordingly, the request for oral argument

is denied, and the district court’s judgment is

affirmed. Rule 9(b) (3), Rules of the Sixth

Circuit.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Clerk

App. 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

FILED

Aug 10 10:24 Am’ 92

U.S.DISTRICT COURT

ERNEST OLIVER, )

)

Vv. ) EASTERN DIST. TENN.

)

Plaintiff

By _MG_ Dep.Clerk

HYDRO-VAC SERVICES, INC.

Et al., Civ. 1-91-0354

Defendants )

2) NIO

Plaintiff filed his complaint on August

26, 1991 setting forth three causes of action.

Count I seeks injunctive relief for violations

of “42 USC 6972 [sic]”,: which is obviously in

reference to the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6901, et.seq.

(“RCRA”). Count II of the complaint seeks

compensatory and punitive damages for

violations of plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant

tO 6"€2 USC iL963S"iaic}). Count iIrt of the

complaint seeks compensatory and punitive

damages under a “pendant [sic] state claim “

for “conspiracy.”

‘The Court notes at the outset that the

complaint is poorly drafted from a grammatical,

procedural, and substantive standpoint. In

Count I, for example, plaintiff alleges that

App. 6

This action was Originally filed against

87 defendants. All but four have been dismissed

pursuant to Rule 4(j), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, for plaintiff’s failure to serve a

copy of the summons and complaint upon them

this is a “whistleblower [sic] law suit [sic]

pursuant to 42 USC 6972" [sic]. However, 6972

embraces the citizen Suit provision of the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976

(“RCRA”) while the “whistle blower” provisions

f the RCRA are set forth at 42 U.S.c. 6971.

laintiff’s description of Count I is therefore

ambiguous. Nevertheless, because plaintiff

makes no mention whatsoever of any statue

except 6792 either in the complaint or on the

Civil cover sheet and because the relief he

seeks is relief he could only pursuant to 6972,

the court will treat Count I as a citizen suit

action brought pursuant to 6972. Moreover, it

must be emphasized that plaintiff has two

attorneys representing him and that this

ambiguity was pointed out in defendant’s

motions. Yet, plaintiff has made no motion to

amend his complaint, although his attorneys

make several vague references in their briefs

about reserving the right to do so in the event

that the court deems it necessary [see, for

example, Doc. 44, p.-10). This court does not

intend to advise plaintiff’s counsel regarding

what motions to file or when to file them any

counsel. In short, the court can only consider

those motions which have been filed.

Manageme

App.

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hired on March 19, 19909 to be the lab director

of HVSI. As such, plaintiff was responsible

for setting up HVSI’s new analytical laboratory

to analyze waste in accordance with the rules,

regulations and requirements ‘of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency, the

Tennessee Department of Health and Environment,

and the City of Chattanooga Waste Water

Treatment Department. According to Foxworth,

HVSI terminated plaintiff because he “was

to establish the analytical laboratory

in accordance with the appropriate rules and

ulations, and, Was a very disruptive

y [See Doc. 13, p.2]. Plaintiff

alleges that he was fired because the

defendants conspired to prevent him from

oo . ~ ~ “tr -

adisciosing to the media, government, or anyone

7 meer s :

€ise AVSl’s illegal dumping. it must be

action against the same defendants in the

nnessee, Eleventh Judicial

istrict, at Chattanooga The state claim

-Ontains two counts, which are identical to

~Ounts II and III of this action On January

28, 1992, motions to dismiss were heard by The

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App. 10

RCRA

Defendants move to dismiss Count I of the

complaint brought pursuant to $6972 of the

RCRA. Section 6972, the citizen Suit provision

of the RCRA, permits individuals to commence an

action in district court to enforce waste

disposal regulations promulgated under the Act.

See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,

22, 110 S.Ct. 304, 307, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989).

subsequently stricken in its entirety [see Doc.

34}. Nevertheless, the court allowed plaintiff

to file these papers because the court presumed

they would be exhibits to his brief [Doc. 26],

which was filed by his attorney of record, Mark

T. Light. However, a review of this 270-page

filing and plaintiff’s briefs indicates that

there is no specific reference in any brief to

any of the papers. For the most part, these

papers appear to be incomplete excerpts of

various files and records. As defense counsel

correctly points out, all defendants and the

court “are left with the near impossible task

of trying to match bald assertions in a Brief

to unsworn portions of incomplete Affidavits

not submitted by Counsel.” [See Doc. a9, ©.5).

Without any assistance from plaintiff’s

counsel, the court does not intend to scour

these disjointed records in order to Salvage

plaintiff’s case. Thus this filing will not be

considered in ruling on defendants’ pending

motions.

i a

fically, §6972(a) (1) permits any pers

nce a civil action against an al

violator of regulations established under

“[Lexcept] as provided in subsection

Subsection (b) (1) states:

(b) Actions prohibited

No action may be commenced under

paragraph (a) (1) of this section --

lor to sixty days a

> -

p a » ee Ir

the plaintiff has given notice of

lat;

the violation (A) to the

Administrator [of the Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”); (B) te

the State in which the alleged

violation occurs; and to any

The language of this provision

could not be clearer. A citi

not commence an action under RCRA

until 60 days after the citizen has

notified the EPA, the State in which

the alleged violation occurred, and

the alleged violator. Actions

commenced prior to 60 days after

notice are “prohibited.” Because

this language is expressly

incorporated by reference into

§$6972(a), it acts as a specific

limitation on a citizen’s right to

leged

RCRA

(3B).

ssing

App. 12

bring suit. Under a literal reading

of the statute, compliance with the

60-day notice provision is a

mandatory, not optional, condition

precedent for suit.

493 U.S. at 26, 110 S.Ct. At 308-09.

In the instant case, defendants contend

that plaintiff has not complied with this

tice and 60-day delay requirement before

commencing suit so that this count of the

complaint must be dismissed. The court agrees.

In fact, plaintiff admits in the complaint that

the defendants are entitled to 60 days notice

prior to filing this count of the complaint

[see Doc. l, 716]. Nevertheless, plaintiff

also contends that the filing of the suit is

intended to give defendants the 60 days notice

[see id., 418]. In the alternative, plaintiff

alleges, “that in the event this Honorable

Court finds this count premature, said count

will be refiled sixty days after said order of

Said court.” [See id., {20}.

The holding of Hallstrom, however, clearly

divests thi court of any discretio to

consider Count I of the complaint as proper

notice under the RCRA:

Therefore, we hold that the notic

and 60-day delay requirements are

mandatory conditions precedent to

commencing suit under the RCRA

citizen suit provision; a District

Court may not disregard these

- requirements at its discretion.

i i ek

App. 1

493 U.S. at 31, 110 S.Ct. At 311. Thus, the

Court concluded that because that action was

barred by the terms of the statute, it must be

dismissed. Id. It must be noted that the

dismissal in Hallstrom occurred after years of

litigation and a determination on the merits.

Although the Court was “sympathetic” to

plaintiff’s argument that dismissal would

“unnecessarily waste judicial resources”, the

Court observed that the statute itself put the

plaintiffs on notice of the requirements for

bringing suit. $93 U.S. at 32, 110 S.Ct. At

Lee 2 The Court further observed that its

holding would “further the Congressional

purpose of giving agencies and alleged

violators a 60-day non-adversarial period to

achieve compliance with RCRA regulations.” Id.

Although Hallstrom mandates that the court

dismiss this count of the complaint for

plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice

and 60-day delay requirement of the RCRA,

Hallstrom avoided deciding whether this notice

provision is jurisdictional or procedural.

However, the Sixth Circuit has held that this

notice provision is mandatory and

jurisdictional and must be alleged in any

complaint brought under the citizen suit

provision. Walls vV. Waste Resource

Corporation, 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985).

Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit, in analyzing a

Pplaintiff’s failu

requirement of t

remarkably simi

re to comply with the notice

he RCRA under circumstances

lar to the instant case, held

that the dismissal should be with prejudice and

commented as follows:

App. 14

Plaintiffs were put on notice, by

defendants’ motions to dismiss, that

defendants were asserting that

Plaintiffs had not sufficiently

alleged response costs and that they

had failed to allege compliance with

RCRA’s notice requirement. Yet

plaintiffs made absolutely no effort

to amend their complaints at any

time during the period of more than

a year that defendants’ motions to

dismiss were pending. In light of

this circumstance, dismissal with

prejudice was warranted.

McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc.,

856 F.2d 39, 44 (6th Cir. 1988). In the case

at hand, plaintiff was first put on notice on

January 8, 1992 by defendant Moose that he had

not complied with the notice and 60-day delay

requirements of the RCRA [see Doc. 7]. All

remaining defendants likewise incorporated this

argument in their respective motions and

briefs. Yet, plaintiff has made no motion to

amend or to dismiss without prejudice. In

fact, plaintiff continues to refuse to

recognize the plain holdings of Hallstrom,

Walls, and McGregor.‘ Plaintiff's obstinance

shall be rewarded accordingly and this count of

the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983

Defendants next move to dismiss Count II

of the complaint which alleges violations of

‘All of these cases were cited in

defendants’ briefs.

App. 15

42 U.S.C. §1983. That portion of the complaint

states as follows:

1. That Count II incorporates

all other allegations set forth in

the complaint by reference.

2. That Count II does not

apply to governmental Defendants.

3. That said Defendants acting

jointly and severally by and through

their conspiracy and by and through

their agents did knowingly and

intentionally while acting under

color of state law deprive said

Plaintiff of his rights as protected

under the laws of the Constitution

of the United States of America.

4. That said breech [sic] of

said duty did proximately cause said

Plaintiff to suffer damages in

excess of $10,000.00

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays

this Honorable Court to enter a

judgement against said Defendant in

the amount in excess of $10,000.00

(TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS) for actual

and punitive damages together with

interest, costs and attorney fees as

provided by law.

[See Doc. 1, p.7]). Thus, Count II alleges that

the nongovernmental defendants‘ engaged in a

According to plaintiff, the only original

“governmental” defendants were the Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority and the United States of

America [see Doc. 18, p.5].

App. 16

a conspiracy and acted under color of state law

to deprive plaintiff of some unspecified rights

guaranteed under the laws and Constitution of

the United States of America. No defendant is

specifically identified, no acts are

specifically identified, no specific state law

is identified, an no specific constitutionally-

protected rights are identified. In the

court’s opinion, this count does not meet the

mandates of Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief...” And should therefore

be dismissed for this reason alone.

Furthermore, even a brief foray into Count

III entitled “Pendant [sic] State Claim” in

order to salvage plaintiff’s §1983 claim is of

limited benefit. Count III does set forth the

objectives of the alleged conspiracy of the

defendants: (1) “the actual physical dumping of

hazardous and nonhazardous [sic] waste;” (2)

“to [sic] silencing of state and federal

investigators so that the illegal dumping would

go undetected;” and (3} “<5 silence,

intimidate, fire, harass, or otherwise silence

employees of [HVSI] so that it would not

disclose to the media, to the federal

government, or to other parties the illegal

dumping.” [See Doc. 1, pp.9-10]. Plaintiff

further alleges that all defendants “did cause

said Plaintiff to be harassed, intimidated, and

eventually fired.” However, Count III, like

Count II, does not specifically identify even

one constitutional right which has. been

violated. Thus, even the combination of Counts

i i se

App. 17

II and II falls short of satisfying the

requirements of Rule 8(a).°

Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff has

satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(a), the

court further finds that Count II should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b) (6) because plaintiff

has failed to state a claim for conspiracy

under §1983 under the law in the Sixth Circuit.

It is well settled that conspiracy claims must

be pled with some degree of specificity and

that vague and conclusory allegations

unsupported by material facts will not be

sufficient to state such a claim under §1983.

Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th

Car. 2967) See also Jaco v. Bloechle, 739

F.2d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 1984) (conspiracy claim

under §1985 properly dismissed where “complaint

merely alleged broad conclusory negligence

language void of the factual allegations

necessary to support a conspiracy theory”).

Applying this standard to the instant

complaint, this court likewise concludes that

plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are “vague and

conclusory” and fail to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

Similarly, defendants’ motions to dismiss

this count can be granted for another reason.

*Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)

is mot noticeable as to defendant Golden Gallon

which is not mentioned by name anywhere in the

complaint other than in the caption.

App. 18

In order to state a claim under §1983,

plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) the

plaintiff must show a deprivation of rights

secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the

United States; and (2) plaintiff must show that

the defendant deprived him of this federal

right “under color of law.” Jones v. Duncan,

840 F.2d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1988). In the

court’s opinion, plaintiff has not properly

pled the first element because he has yet to

identify which constitutional rights or laws

have been violated.

Finally, assuming, arguendo, that Count II

should not be dismissed under either Rule 8 (a)

or Rule 12(b)(6), the court concludes that

summary judgment must be entered in favor of

all defendants as to this count because

plaintiff has not demonstrated that the

defendants deprived him of any federal right

“under color of law,” a necessary element of a

$1983 action. This element insures the scope

of §1983 will not encompass purely private

conduct. See Lemmons v. Tranbraw, 425 F.Supp.

499, 498 {(E.D. Tenn. 1976). In analyzing

whether the allegations of the instant

complaint satisfy the requisite second element,

the principal inquiry in determining whether a

private party’s actions constitute “state

action” under the Fourteenth Amendment is

whether the party’s actions may be “fairly

attributable to the state.” Wolotsky v. Huhn,

960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937,

402 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 &.Bd.2d 462 (1962)).

App. 19

In the instant case, it is undisputed that

three of the remaining defendants are purely

private parties: HVSI, Foxworth, and Golden

Gallon. Arguably, defendant Moose is a state

actor because he is the Regional Director of

the Division of Solid Waste Management for the

Department of Environment and Conservation,

tate of Tennessee [see Doc. 25]. It therefore

follows that if Moose is a state actor, then

the complaint alleges “state action” by all

defendants because of the alleged conspiracy

among all defendants resulting in plaintiff’s

firing by HVSI. Nevertheless, even though the

complaint properly pleads state action, this

§1983 cause of action cannot survive

defendants’ motions for summary judgment for

the reasons that follow:

Defendant Moose has filed an affidavit in

support of his motion for summary judgment in

which he testifies, inter alia, as follows:

2. That my first meeting with

[plaintiff] was on July 3, 1990,

when he and Mr. Bill Foxworth

visited my office on Milne Street in

Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the

express purpose of discussing the

special waste procedures used by

[HVSI] and to introduce me to Mr.

Oliver. There was no discussion at

the meeting concerning any

termination of Mr. Oliver as an

employee of HVSI.

as On August 23, 1990, Mr.

Foxworth and Mr. Tom Cochran (both

App. 20

from HVSI) visited the Chattanooga

field office on Milne Street to

discuss a situation concerning Mr.

Oliver and to introduce Mr. Cochran

as the new Facility Manager. At

that time I was informed that Mr.

Oliver was being terminated as an

employee of HVSI and that I might be

contacted by Mr. Oliver with regard

to alleged environmental wrongdoing

on the part of HVSI. I made no

comment to either Foxworth or

Cochran concerning the foregoing

information.

ie. At no time from July 3,

1990, until the present time, have

I agreed to, attempted to, or

conspired to have Mr. Oliver

terminated with regard to employment

or in any way thwart his efforts to

have HVSI investigated by my

Division. Quite the contrary, his

unfounded allegations cost the State

of Tennessee substantial expenditure

of monies and man hours.

[See Doc. 25]. Moose’s testimony also sets

forth in detail various allegations made by

plaintiff concerning environmental wrongdoing

on the part of HVSI and, more importantly, sets

forth his investigations of plaintiff’s

allegations. Moose concludes that all of Mr.

Oliver’s allegations were “groundless” [see

id., 9}.

Likewise, in support of HVSI’s_ and

Foxworth’s motion for summary judgment,

4. Mr. Oliver did not have a

specific employment contract with

HVSI. No employee of the company

has a “pone contract. As with all

my empl retain the right to

any

+ a

Cime.

- Mr. Oliver’s terminatior

was effective August 27 1990

There were a number of reasons for

n the

subject of my testimony b

United States Department

Basically, during the course o

his termination which have b

€

employment, Mr. Oliver was unable to

establish the analytical laboratory

in accordance with the appropriate

rules and regulations, and, was a

very disruptive employee.

6. I personally made the

decision to terminate Mr. Oliver on

August 22 1990 following a

an was then

gene na! I made

this decision based on my

observation of Mr. Oliver’s

performance of his job, and his

history with the company I

consulted with no one except Tom

Cochran prior to making this

decision. I did discuss the

decision with Mr. Guy Moose of the

State Solid Waste Office after we

had decided to terminate Mr. Oliver.

The purpose of that discussion was

only to inform Mr. Moose of the

App. 22

termination, and that we expected

Mr. Oliver would be in contact with

him about alleged environmental

wrongdoing. We did not discuss any

other aspect of Mr. Oliver’s

employment or of his allegations of

environmental wrongdoing. The

meeting was also to introduce Mr.

Moose to Mr. Cochran, since they had

—

not met, and I expected Mr. Cochran

to be in close contact with Mr.

Moose concerning our permit

requirements.

In response to all pending motions,

plaintiff has filed his affidavit [Doc. 20] and

the affidavits of two other employees of HVSI,

Randal Blevins and Jerry Magness [see Docs. 19

and 21, respectively]. The court has carefully

reviewed these affidavits and finds that they

are totally unresponsive to the affidavits of

Moose and Foxworth regarding the purported

conspiracy to fire plaintiff and, in

particular, are void of any allegations of

“state action” by Moose or any other defendant

to terminate plaintiff.

Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment

shall be rendered when requested if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. It is the burden

g j n show

a _— - ~ = — »

the court that, under uncontradicted facts, the

~ . + > . 7

moving party 1s entitle to judgment as a

provide a quick,

there is no dispute

regarding the material facts. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). In assessing the

validity of a summary judgment motion, the

court views the pleadings, depositions, answe

to interrogatories, admissions, and compete

affidavits in a light most favorable to the

nent of the motion. However, an oppone

summary judgment may not re

tions or denials of his

rson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242

xistence of some alleged

en the parties will n

roperly supported motion

or summary judgment.” Id. at 247-4

Applying this standard to the facts of the

instant case as they have been develope

’

summary judgment must be entered in favor of

all remaining defendants as to Count II of the

complaint because the court concludes a a

matter of law, that there was no state action

involved in plaintiff’s termination by HVSI.

App. 24

Pendent State Claims

Where a district court exercises

jurisdiction over state law claims solely by

virtue of pendent jurisdiction and the federal

Claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state

law claims should Ordinarily be dismissed

without reaching their merits. Wolotsky, 960

F.2d at 1338 (citations omitted). Because both

Of plaintiff’s federal Claims have been

dismissed, the court will therefore dismiss

plaintiff’s pendent state Claims (in their

present nebulous form} in Count III without

prejudice.

Sanctions

All remaining defendants have moved the

court to impose sanctions on plaintiff and/or

his counsel for filing this complaint. It is

beyond dispute that plaintiff prematurely filed

Count I of his complaint and, after an

appropriate hearing, sanctions will be imposed

Pursuant to Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, in an amount to be determined. The

court will, of course, consider the factors

enunciated in Jackson v. Law Firm, 875 F.2d

1224, 1229-30 (€th Cir. 1989). See also

Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 61 (6th Cir.

1992). Similarly, sanctions may be appropriate

with regard to Count II of the complaint.

Again, this will be determined after an

appropriate hearing. At that time, the court

Will also consider whether fees should be

imposed against plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to

nouia

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UNITED

App. 26

STATE OF TENNESSEE)

COUNTY OF HAMILTON)

NOW COMES the undersigned, RANDALL

BLEVINS, and being first duly sworn, deposes

and says:

That I was employed by Hydro-Vac

Services, Inc. ("Hydro-Vac") in Chattanooga,

Tennessee, from the time Hydro-Vac first

started in 1988 until November of 1990.

y That during my employment at Hydro-

Vac, I observed or was involved in the

following circumstances/events:

3. All Roto-Rooter discharges that came

into Hydro-Vac were dumped into the City of

Chattanooga sewer system, either by-passing the

monitor or through some other entry into the

sewer system where no record of the dumping

would take place. Mainly, the Roto-Rooter

discharges took place behind the drum building

in a hole next to the back pit. Roto-Rooter

pumpings that came from the State of Georgia

also were dumped in this manner. Persons whom

I know who have discharged Roto-Rooter sewage

in this manner are:

a. Myself (Randall Blevins)

b. David Wilson

Ss; Jim Everton

4. There were times when Hydro-Vac was

dumping at the 23rd Street Dump in Chattanooga,

before Hydro-Vac's waste treatment business

began, that I was asked to drive an empty pump

truck to the 23rd Street Dump and appear to

dump the truck for the purpose of getting a

record. I was told to do this by Mr. Ray Dunn.

Ds I was asked to comingle latex,

gasoline dirt, and black waste oil together and

have observed Don McGee Jr. haul this mixture

away from Hydro-Vac. It was my understanding

that he was taking this mixture to the Summit

Landfill in Chattanooga.

6. I was laid off from Hydro-Vac in

November of 1990 and the oil processing plant

which was being built was not completed at that

time. Hydro-Vac had a large volume of oil

coming into the plant and had no way to process

it; therefore, I was told to comingle the oil

with latex and gasoline-contaminated dirt.

- All of the gasoline-contaminated

dirt which was brought in from the original

Golden Gallon delivery of 192 yards, that

Ernest A. Oliver was so upset about, was

comingled with latex and oil and then taken to

the Summit Landfill.

8. The dirt that was stored in the red

roll-off boxes after Ernest A. Oliver's firing

came from the back of Hydro-Vac where a large

oil spill had occurred. A large tank was being

brought into the plant for storage and, as the

tank was taken off the transport vehicle, a

large amount of oil spilled out of the tank

App. 28

onto the ground. Andy Hall ordered this oil to

be buried and the oil was buried at the spill

site by Don McGee Jr. Later, it was dug up and

placed into the red roll-off boxes.

9. All liquid wastes that came into

Hydro-Vac were dumped together into the large

concrete pits next to the weir pit. From

there, they would be pumped into holding tanks.

No liquid latex or liquid chemical waste was

processed separately.

10. All drum wastes that came into

Hydro-Vac were poured together into the back

pit and mixed with whatever was back there,

including oil and gasoline-contaminated dirt,

and hauled by Don McGee Jr. to the Summit

Landfill.

ie While I was employed at Hydro-Vac,

it is my belief, based on actual on-site

experience, that no more than twenty percent

(20%) of all liquid waste which came into

Hydro-Vac was treated before it was discharged

into the Chattanooga sewer system. It is also

my belief that eighty percent (80%) of all

liquid waste was placed into the Chattanooga

sewer system in a manner that by-passed the

monitoring system.

hes When a tanker truck containing

liquid waste came into Hydro-Vac, it would be

dumped into one of the concrete pits next to

the weir, and a sample taken to the lab during

the dumping. At no time to my knowledge was a

sample processed by the laboratory before the

truck was dumped. Also, in the case of drums,

en? ne ee ee ee me!

App. 29

random samples would be taken after the drums

were dumped into the back pit. The process of

checking a sample to see if it fit a profile,

before the waste was dumped and comingled with

other waste, did not occur.

i Often, liquid samples taken from a

large batch of treated water that was being

sent past the monitor would be brought into the

lab after the water had already been

discharged.

14. I have been told by Mr. Ray Dunn to

back a tanker up to the ditch which runs into

the Chattanooga Creek, and have observed him

allowing the untreated liquid waste to run into

the ditch and into the Chattanooga Creek. Two

(2) companies whose waste was handled in this

manner were Diversified Products of Opelika,

Alabama and Textile Rubber Company of Dalton,

Georgia.

ids There were a lot of instances where

a tanker came into Hydro-Vac and was dumped

into the “Chattanooga Creek, but I cannot

remember the name of the company the waste came

from. There were times when the tanks in the

back were full and we would just start them

siphoning and they would run into the ditch and

then into the Chattanooga Creek. Since we

comingled all liquid wastes together, I cannot

state the names of which companies whose wastes

were represented by these discharges into the

Chattanooga Creek.

16. From my experience, none of the

waste that came from Diversified Products of

App. 30

Opelika, Alabama ever went into the Chattanooga

sewer system. All of this waste was stored in

the back and dumped into the Chattanooga Creek.

es Don McGee Sr. was the truck driver

who hauled most, if not all, of the Diversified

Products waste. There have been times when Don

McGee Sr. had returned from Diversified

Products in Opelika, Alabama with an empty

SEUCE:

18. I have been told by Hydro-Vac's

management, including Bill Foxworth, Ray Dunn,

Tom Cochran, and Eric Miller to let untreated

waste water run into the Chattanooga sewer

system, by-passing the monitor. There were

also times when we pumped it to the back of the

drum building, and even pumped it into the

toilet in the drum building on top of the hill.

Any hole which was available that we could get

a hose into would be used.

19. We tried to treat what waste water

we could, but it was coming in so fast and once

all of the holding tanks were full, we were

toig to: “Let: i= 6c.*

20. There was a lot of waste water which

was brought into Hydro-Vac from a landfill run-

off outside of Nashville, Tennessee. It was

dirty water that was not checked by the lab and

was mixed with other liquid wastes and went

down the Chattanooga sewer system, by-passing

the monitor.

& A lot of times these discharges

happened after hours with the owner of Hydro-

Vac,

office

Foxworth to let untreated waste water run,

Bill Foxworth,

window.

App. 31

I have been

inside watching from his

told by Bill

by-

passing the monitor into the Chattanooga sewer

system.

leading into

sewage waste

the Chattanooga

sewer

I have been told by Bill Foxworth to

dump Roto-Rooter

into a hole

system,

located behind the drum building.

from

into

the monitor.

Further,

1991, before

Peachtree in Atlanta,

the Chattanooga

me,

in the two

Georg

sewer syste

Affiant

—ai+ ~ +

Saith not.

S /

large

All the waste water which was being

held by Hydro-Vac

clarifiers

ia was dumped

m, by-passing

Randall

lith day

Vera Hutson

Blevins

of September,

« Of

county aforesaid,

BLEVINS,

am personally acquainted

the basis of satisfactory evidence),

upon oath,

acknowledged that

the state and

personally appeared RANDALL

the within named Affiant,

(or proved to

with whom I

me on

and who,

executed the

foregoing Affidavit and that the statements

App. 32

contained therein are true to the best

knowledge and belief.

Vera Hutson

Notary Public

My commissio

—~

1 expires:

January 6, 1993 (S

ADD. S3

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

a i

alan et m =) a YMmL CI CiTT 7 nT aT TAM T

F'OR THE SIXT mn VULL Ad DEE eek J NI Ala

ERNEST A. OLIVER, * CIVIL ACTION

* CASE NO._97-5354

Plaintiff- Appellant ‘

av. *

HYDRO-VAC SERVIC

GOLDEN GALLON, INC.; ‘

GUY MOOSE; BILL FOXWORTH; "

LC INCORPORATED, et al., °

Defendants - Appellees. .

Appealing the January 31, 1997 Order of

Judge James H. Jarvis

In the United States District Court

for the Eastern District

of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Case No. 1:91-cv-354

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

ERNEST A. OLIVER William G. Colvin, Esq.

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/ SHUMACKER & THOMPSON

PRO SE 701 Market Street

58 Bohr Drive Suite 500

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App. 38

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AT CINCINNATI

ERNEST A. OLIVER, * CIVIL ACTION

* CASE NO._97-5354

Plaintiff- Appellant *

Vv. -

HYDRO-VAC SERVICES, INC.; "

GOLDEN GALLON, INC.; ad

GUY MOOSE; BILL FOXWORTH; °

ALC INCORPORATED, et al., .

Defendants - Appellees. °

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

Did the District Court incorrectly

decide the facts?

Do you think the District Court

applied the wrong law?

III. Do you feel that there are others

reasons why the District Court's

judgement was wrong?

App. 39

IV. What action do you want the Court to

take in this case?

V. What specific issues do you wish to

raise on appeal?

VI. The challenge of Judge Jarvis and

Defendants/Appellees as to the

timeliness of Plaintiff/Appellant's

Appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was commenced by the

Plaintiff/Appellant in August of 1991 agai

the Appellees and approximately (80) other

Defendants, charging that Defendants engaged in

an illegal hazardous waste dumping operation i

the City of Chattanooga and a conspiracy to

wrongfully terminate Plaintiff/Appellant from

his employment with Defendant/Appellee Hydro-

Vac Services, Inc., and to deprive him of

constitutionally protected rights, in violation

OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 «& 1985. When the

investigation of Plaintiff/Appellant's

allegations revealed that Defendant/Appellee

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. and its owner William

Foxworth had been illegally commingling the

wastes of over 80 companies and had

contaminated the unlined Chattanooga Summit

Landfill with at least 13 hazardous wastes in

huge amounts, the conspiracy to cover-up the

problem began. Foxworth had been operating

Hydro-Vac Services, Inc. for over 18 months in

direct violation of orders from the Air

Pollution Board, and in direct violation of

App. 40

regulations of the City of Chattanooga, and the

State and Federal environmental protection

agencies, when the violations were discovered.

Defendant/Appellee, State Solid Waste

Manager Guy M. Moose, conspired with attorneys

William Colvin, Frederick Hitchcock, and James

W. Gentry representing the Appellees herein, to

cover-up the facts in this case and to defraud

the Courts and the American Public as to the

damage to the Landfill and the threat to the

health and welfare of the general public.

When the case came before State Circuit

Court Judge Samuel H. Payne,

Plaintiff/Appellant tape recorded a

conversation with Judge Payne in order to prove

the overwhelming conspiracy and abuse of the

justice system in Tennessee. This tape

recording and transcript has been placed

before this Honorable Court in

Plaintiff/Appellant's Petition For writ Of

Prohibition, Court of Appeals Case No. 97-5611.

Judge Payne states he's not concerned about the

hazardous waste dumping operation going on in

his own district, and that he and other Judges

in Chattanooga are not public protectors.

When the case came before Federal District

Judge James H. Jarvis and revelations of the

political damage and the embarrassment that

could occur to over 80 companies, Judge Jarvis

joined the conspiracy as well. Judge Jarvis did

not foresee that his protection of the dumping

would have the potential to destroy the

wholesome image of North America's largest

private snack food company, Mckee Foods

App. 41

Corporation, manufacturers of Little Debbie®

products, whose baking plants are located

adjacent to the Landfill.

Judge Jarvis not only threw out the case

rendering an opinion based on fraud, but he

issued an injunction against

Plaintiff/Appellant preventing him from ever

refiling the case even though the dumping

operation is still going on. The conspiracy

has continued from 1990 through the present

time and has resulted not only in the loss of

Plaintiff/Appellant's chemistry teaching

position at Chattanooga State Technical

Community College (herein "CSTCC"), but also in

Slander and libel against Plaintiff/Appellant's

scientific abilities and expertise. A right to

sue letter was issued by the EEOC against CSTCC

on May Zs 1996 #resulting in the

Plaintiff/Appellant's Federal lawsuit at Case

No. 1:96-Cv-380 currently before the Honorable

Thomas G. Bull. Judge Hull dismissed

Plaintiff/Appellant's Count II alleging

conspiracy between CSTCC, Defendant/Appellees

and their attorneys, and others, for conspiracy

to violate Plaintiff/Appellant's civil rights.

Judge Hull stated Plaintiff/Appellant's Count

Ii was a collateral attack on Judge Jarvis's

previous order enjoining Plaintiff/Appellant

from:

"... filing any further pleadings

in this case and any further

pleadings in the United tates

District Court for the Eastern

District of Tennessee ari ing out of

the facts set forth in this

lawsuit..."

App. 42

However, Honorable Thomas G. Hull also

made the following statement in his order of

December 18, 1996 with respect to the case

before Judge Jarvis:

there is a suggestion in the

record that Judge Jarvis may have

relied upon a false affidavit in

dismissing the previous lawsuit..."

Plaintiff/Appellant then filed a Motion to

Set Aside Orders on January 17, 1997 in the

immediate case which was denied by Judge Jarvis

by his Final Order of January 31, 1997. This

Final Order was appealed by Plaintiff/Appellant

within 10 days under Rule 60, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Rule 4, Federal] Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

On May 19, 1997, Plaintiff/Appellant filed

a Petition For Writ Of Prohibition against

Judge Jarvis which is presently before this

Honorable Court as Court of Appeals Case No.

97-5611. Judge Jarvis was given the

Opportunity by this Honorable Court to respond

to the charges in said petition. On Friday,

June 6, 1997, Plaintiff/Appellant was informed

by the Clerk of the Court that Judge Jarvis had

returned the certified docket as requested by

this Court but had submitted no cover letter

and no response.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On August 27, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellant

Ernest A. Oliver ("Oliver") was fired from his

position of Lab Director at Hydro-Vac Services,

a sa

App. 43

SG os a Chattanooga, Tennessee based

nonhazardous waste water treatment facility

("Hydro-Vac"). Oliver was fired for blowing

the whistle on illegal activities regarding the

improper disposal of both hazardous’ and

nonhazardous wastes. Oliver requested an

investigation by the U.s. Department of Labor

which resulted in a hearing before ALJ

Honorable Ralph Musgrove on January 22 and

January 23, 1991. Following Oliver's appeal of

replacement ALJ's decision, On November 1,

1995, U.S. Secretary of Labor, Dr. Robert

Riech, ordered Hydro-Vac to reinstate Oliver

stating Hydro-Vac had illegally fired Oliver

from his lab director position. On February 19,

1997, Honorable Daniel A. Sarno, Jr. ordered

Hydro-Vac to pay Oliver $43,000.00 in back pay

and front pay plus interest for illegally

firing Oliver.

During Oliver's employment at Hydro-Vac

and after his termination, he gathered

Significant evidence in the form of documents,

pictures, tape recordings, and video tape to

prove not only his allegations of illegal

disposal of hazardous wastes, but moreover,

that a conspiracy which began in 1990 is still

continuing, and has today become so large as to

infect the Tennessee State and Federal Court

systems, the FBI, the Department of Justice and

Offices of U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno,

Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr., and the

Clinton Administration.

Defendant/Appellee, Guy M. Moose

("Moose"), is Director of the Southeast

App. 44

Regional Office, Division of Solid Waste

Management for the State of Tennessee, located

in Chattanooga. During the period of August

1990 through January 1991, Moose and his office

investigated Oliver's allegations of illegal

dumping of hazardous wastes by Hydro-Vac and

found that Hydro-Vac had violated the Tennessee

Hazardous Waste Management Act and_ the

Tennessee Solid Waste Management Act. (See

Exhibits 9 & 10, Docket 70). Moose cited

Hydro-Vac on at least three (3) different

occasions, which included allowing wastes

containing 40 C.F.R Subpart C hazardous wastes

to migrate into the Chattanooga Creek. Moose

withheld all of this information from Oliver at

the labor hearing before ALJ Musgrove and he

testified under oath at the Federal Labor

Hearing on January 23, 1991 that no hazardous

wastes were present at Hydro-Vac.

Attorney Frederick L. Hitchcock

("Hitchcock"), who represented Golden Gallon,

Inc. in the immediate case, had provided clear

proof to Judge Jarvis in his affidavit of

September ade 1992 at docket #76, that

Hitchcock was fully aware that his client

Golden Gallon's gasoline contaminated dirt had

become hazardous by Federal Standards, as more

Specifically defined in City of New york v

Exxon Corp., 766 F.Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

Hitchcock admits at paragraph 3(c) of his

affidavit that:

",..the petroleum-Contaminated Soil

was mixed with some waste other than

petroleum from an underground

storage tank installation..."

App. 45

Hitchcock also admits at paragraph 3(b)

that:

"Contaminated soil from underground

storage tank installations and other

materials such as absorbent pads

used to clean up petroleum spills

are not subject to regulation as

hazardous waste, even though the

petroleum in the soil or other

materials contains chemical

Substances, such as benzene and

toluene, that would separately

subject to regulation as hazardous

waste. 40 C.F.R. 261.4(b) (10) and

TDEC Rules 1200-1-11.02(1) (d) (vii)

(Copies attached as Exhibit 1.)".

Hitchcock further states that he hired a

geologic and environmental consulting firm to

examine the petroleum-contaminated soil, and

that it was determined that other constituents

were present other than contamination from

petroleum underground storage tanks. Hitchcock

states that the Golden Gallon contaminated soi]

was then placed in "roll-off boxes" on Hydro-

Vac's premises and that he had shared the

information from the consulting firm with the

Tennessee Department of Environment an

Conservation (i.e., Moose).

It is a fact that the City of Chattanooga

has identified hazardous wastes benzene and

dichloroethylene- and three metals- mercury,

Cadmium and barium in monitoring wells at the

Summit Landfill.

It is a fact that Moose and the Tennessee

Department of Environment and Conservation

App. 46

identified benzene, mercury, cadmium, and

barium at Hydro-Vac in wastes being prepared to

be landfilled at the Summit Landfill.

It is a fact that on September 21, 1990,

Jim Templeton with the City of Chattanooga

Summit Landfill, advised Hydro-vac that it

would no longer accept any waste unless

specifically authorized by the Division of

Solid Waste Management in writing. This

information in an inter-office memo of Moose,

was also withheld by Moose from Oliver at the

Federal Labor hearing held before ALJ Musgrove

on January 23-24, 1991.

It is a fact that Mr. Rick Brown, Solid

Waste Manager for the Tennessee Department of

Environment and Conservation in Knoxville, in

his letter to Hydro-Vac general manager Tom

Cochran on March 6, 1991, admonishes Hydro-Vac

for receiving hazardous wastes on at least two

(2) occasions and states:

"...your facility is not authorized

to receive and treat hazardous

wastes generated by others..."

This letter is part of the Record On Appeal and

can be found at Exhibit #11, Docket #70.

ARGUMENT

ae Did the District Court incorrectly decide

the facts?

a) It is a fact that Judge Jarvis

issued a fraudulent Memorandum Opinion on

‘4

-e

App. 47

August 10, 1992 stating on page 13 that:

"..-Moose concludes that all of Mr. Oliver's

allegations were “groundless"..." (emphasis

added). No where in the record of this case is

there any evidence whatsoever to even remotely

Support such a statement. In order for Judge

Jarvis to be able to Support his injunction

preventing Plaintiff/Appellant from refiling

his lawsuit, Judge Jarvis had to create a myth

which would suggest that Plaintiff/Appellant

was absolutely wrong in his actions of filing

a citizen's suit against 82 companies. Judge

Jarvis had to show that not even one allegation

made by Plaintiff/Appellant was true. To do

So, Judge Jarvis had to enter into a conspiracy

with defense Attorneys William Colvin,

Frederick Hitchcock, James Gentry, and State

Solid Waste Manager Guy Moose, to ignore the

;

overwhelming facts and document Signed by

Moose and his office, which Plaintiff/Appellant

Submitted as evidence. All four (4) men and

Judge Jarvis were fully aware that Judde

Jarvis's statement: ",..-Moose concludes that

all of Mr. Oliver's allegations were

"groundless". .." (emphasis added) was and is A

BLATANT MISSTATEMENT OF THE TRUTH !

allowed sanctions again

for Count I and he spe

Orders at page 3, li

transcript located at Docket #100. It is

that Plaintiff/Appellant's attorney, Bok

Bradshaw, specifically points out at page 70,

lines 13 and 20, that Moose was not part of

ee ede

App. 48

Count I and should not be entitled to receive

Sanctions. Judge Jarvis states at line «ia

They say they weren't involved in that Count",

however, Judge Jarvis awarded sanctions to

Moose anyway. ISN'T THIS RECEIVING MONIES

UNDER FALSE PRETENSES AND MAIL FRAUD?

II. Do you think the District Court applied

the wrong law?

Judge Jarvis incorrectly applied

Halistrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S.

20,22,110 S.Ct. 304, 307, 107 L.Ed.2d 237

(1989), as the standard by which he bases his

Opinion, and his justification for sanctions

and dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that Hallstrom

specifically indicates it does not apply under

42 U.S.C. 6972(b) (1) (A) (iii) w h e n

“subchapter III violations” (i.e. RCRA Subpart

- violations) are occurring. In Dague vy, City

of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1991),

and in Martin v. Kansas Board of Regents, 32

Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1944 (D. Kan. Feb. 19,

1991), the courts held that no 60- day notice

was necessary when “RCRA Subpart C violations"

have occurred.

At pages 12 and 13 of Judge Jarvis's

Memorandum Opinion at Docket #56, Judge Jarvis

shows that he is not only capable of outright

lying in his opinion, but is also capable of

ignoring the most important part of Guy Moose's

affidavit found at Court Docket #25, in regard

to Plaintiff's rights. Judge Jarvis quotes

paragraphs 2 , 3, and 15 of Moose's affidavit

to support his outrageous statement that:

leg, 9th te a.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

, " r < os

it c , /¢ 2uUot ‘

VJ r ; y “— y ., ‘

a A : weit sd 41

HW ¥ t . 'T 2 TY ke ‘

4s = y= ree lta, ee - = +e

App. 50

Jarvis does not apply. The correct law should

have been the standard cases Dague v. City of

Burlington Supra, and Martin v. Kansas Board

of Regents Supra, where the courts held that no

60-day notice was necessary when "RCRA Subpart

C violations” had occurred.

ANYONE WITH ANY COMMON SENSE AT ALL WOULD

REALIZE THAT ALLOWING THE NAVIGABLE WATERS AND

THE GROUNDWATER OF A CITY LIKE CHATTANOOGA TO

BE POLLUTED WITH THE CANCER-CAUSING HAZARDOUS

WASTES BENZINE AND MERCURY FOR 60 DAYS BEFORE

ANY ACTION COULD BE TAKEN, WOULD BE CRIMINAL!

Plaintiff/Appellant specifically brought

this to the attention of Judge Jarvis on

September 16, 1992 at Docket #70. Judge Jarvis

confirms that he is aware of this information

when he states in his Memorandum Opinion of

December 28, 1992 at Docket #98 on doc. Nos. 70

and 83 that:

“...However, apparently unwilling to

acknowledge this fact, plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, has continued to

file pleadings arguing that Count I

is meritorious and that, therefore,

the complaint was not frivolous and

should not have been dismissed [see

Docs.No. 70 and 83].

On September 16, 1992 at Docket #70,

Oliver filed his Motion to Deny Defendant's

Motion For Sanctions with exhibits 1-17.

Exhibit #9 is the Notice of Violation under the

Solid Waste Management Act filed by Moose which

charges Hydro-Vac with allowing oil from UST

emp

yt nnessee

TY —

n VEC

—_

anooga

OLlati

were

ry ws

att

_ —~- *

naent

depe

dered

cons

are

vY)

~ +

App. 52

Plaintiff can establish that the defendant (1)

disposed of its hazardous substances, (2) at a

facility which now contains hazardous

substances of the sort disposed of by the

generator, (3) if there is a release of that or

some other type of hazardous substance, (4)

which causes the incurrence of response costs.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that there is

absolute proof that Hydro-Vac received and

commingled gasoline-contaminated soil with

hazardous “used oil" and also “waste oil”

along with wastes from over 80 companies. This

waste was- landfilled in the Chattanooga Summit

Landfill over a period of 18 months until

Plaintiff/Appellant blew the whistle in August

of 1990.

The fact that Moose cited Hydro-Vac for

having allowed this waste in "roll-off" boxes

to migrate into the Chattanooga Creek is a

second “RELEASE” in addition to the first

"RELEASE" into the Chattanooga Summit Landfill.

The fact that the City of Chattanooga has

identified the same hazardous wastes in wells

located at the Summit Landfill as_ these

hazardous wastes that Moose and the Department

Of Environment and Conservation had identified

at Hydro-Vac during their inspections of Hydro-

Vac in 1990, satisfies all the requirements

under CERCLA to require all 82 companies listed

in Plaintiff/Appellants complaint in the

immediate case to clean up the Landfill.

The Affidavit of Hydro-Vac employee,

Randall Blevins, found at Exhibit 12, Docket

#70, establishes the mixing of different

App. 53

wastes, and the landfilling of said wast

the Summit Landfill. Also, Mr

establishes just how outrageous and ille

operation was at Hydro-Vac.

III. Do you feel that there are others reasons

why the District Court's judgement was

wrong?

The answer to this question is a

resounding yes. The reasons and the methods

7 i +, rs —

useaqa to cover-up

the 1ilegal activities wil be

set forth here. When Judge Jarvis saw the

erazamT *ATT ACmrea + ae

STATEMENT OF FACTS at Do

attorney Mark Light (which was ordere

by Judge Jarvis at , Judge Jarvis

suddenly had a major problem. Judge Jarvis

had no intention whatsoever of allowing 8

companies, including Georgia Pacific, Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Company, Shaw Indust

Valvoline, Westinghouse, Penske Truck Lea

Amana Refrigera S

Army at Fort Lee, Virginia, to be required to

clean-up the contamin

Chattanooga Summit Landfill.

dge Jarvis arbitrarily decided that he

would throw out the laws established by the

U.S. Congress and the Environmental Protection

nd Signed into law by several

idents. Judge Jarvis decided that in this

“ase would be the law of the land.

09)

)

‘?

| aa

#7)

ct?

App. 54

Michigan attorney, Mark Light into an agreement

to abandon his client and to refuse to appeal

Jarvis's ruling. Throughout the 30-day time for

filing an appeal, Judge Jarvis maintained

pressure against any appeal by a rather unique

and equally outrageous scam which is part of

the record, which cannot be defended, and

should serve to provide grounds for the

disbarment of Knoxville Attorney John E.

Owings.

It was suggested that for the upcoming

Sanctions hearing, Attorney Mark Light hire a

second lawyer to represent «im other than his

primary attorney, Tricia Dennis. Mr. Light

needed a lawyer from Knoxville who had very

special qualifications--Knoxville Attorney John

E. Owings was a regular golfing partner of

Judge Jarvis.

Shortly after hiring Owings, Attorney

Light requested a postponement of the sanctions

hearing that was set for August 26, 1992. on

August 21, 1992 at Docket #57, Light asks for

and was granted his request. Judge Jarvis then

sets the sanction hearing for September 22,

1992, which is well past the time for an appeal

of his final order of the case.

Plaintiff/Appellant Oliver then demanded

that his attorney, Light appeal the outrageous

order of Judge Jarvis stating: "...Moose

concludes that al] of Mr. Oliver's allegations

were “groundless”..."(emphasis added)

Pe ee ee ee a

App. 55

Here Light refused, and stated that his

lawyer, John Owings in Knoxville, who plays

golf with Judge Jarvis regularly, has told him

(Light), that if we appeal, the Judge is going

to assess sanctions of $100,00.00 against

Oliver and $200.000.00 against Light.

Shortly afterward, Light withdrew his

representation and abandoned his client,

Oliver, forcing Oliver to represent himself Pro

Sse. Judge Jarvis approved this request for

Light to withdraw at Docket #78, without any

word whatsoever to Oliver.

On September 14, 1992 at District Court in

Winchester, Tennessee, (see Docket #59) , an

attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order

from Judge Jarvis, was devised by defense

attorneys William Colvin and Frederick

Hitchcock. The object was to gag

Plaintiff/Appellant Oliver who was about to

reveal that a fraudulent bank loan was in the

process of being made to Hydro-Vac backed by

the U.S. Small Business Administration.

Shortly before this hearing, Oliver was

approached by Attorney John BE. Owings who was

now representing Mark Light. Attorney Owings

assured Oliver that he (Owings) was close to

Judge Jarvis, and that he was going to see that

this sanction thing did not get out of hand. It

was emphasized to Oliver by both Attorney

Owings and Attorney Light that \no appeal should

be taken or Judge Jarvis would impose heavy

Sanctions. At the conclusion of the hearing,

Judge Jarvis stated from the bench (the record

was closed) "Mr. Owings, I want to see you in

chambers."

App. 56

On November 30, 1992 Chattanooga Attorney,

- Bob Bradshaw, contracted on a contingency basis

to represent Plaintiff/Appellant Oliver in the

scheduled December 16, 1992 sanctions hearing

before Judge Jarvis, and also to sue Attorney

Mark Light for malpractice. Attorney Bradshaw

had absolute proof that the sanctions which had

been imposed by Jarvis and awarded to Moose

were not warranted. (See page 70, lines 13 and

20, of the transcript at Docket #100, which

shows that Moose was not part of Count I and

should not receive sanctions.) At page 70,

line 23, of the transcript at Docket #100

Judge Jarvis states to attorney James W. Gentry

representing Moose, " They say they weren't

involved ir that count." Jarvis awarded

sanctions toe Moose anyway.

Judge Jarvis so intimidated Attorney

Bradshaw, a young attorney, who had requested

to represent Oliver pro hac vice (See Docket

#89), that Attorney Bradshaw breached and

withdrew his contracted representation of

Oliver, refused to appeal the order awarding

sanctions, and described in his letter of

January 29, 1993, to Oliver that: "...if he did

appeal under Rule 60(b), that the only logical

result would be the levying of further

Sanctions against both of us."

Judge Jarvis has exceeded his authority

and had ignored the laws established by the

Congress and the Environmental Protection

Agency. Judge Jarvis has joined a conspiracy

with the defense attorneys (and others) to

obstruct and debase the administration of

justice and to protect organized crime.

App. 57

Judge Jarvis's actions against the health

and welfare of the general public and his

Willing violation of the constitutional rights

of Plaintiff/Appellant are absolutely proven

herein.

Plaintiff/Appellant submits the facts

herein are more than sufficient to support the

definition of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors"

necessary for the process of Impeachment of

Judge Jarvis in the Congress of the United

States of America.

Iv. What action do you want the Court to take

in this case?

a) I respectfully request this

Honorable Court to set aside the Orders of

Judge James H. Jarvis in Case No. 1:91-cv-354,

and allow Plaintiff/Appellant to proceed with

his constitutional rights to protect his home

and city from the environmental disaster that

has occurred due to the Criminal actions of

Judge Jarvis and the other conspirators in this

matter.

b) I request the this Honorable Court

order my Count II presently dismissed by

Honorable Judge Thomas G. Hull in my Federal

Lawsuit against CSTCC, Case No. 1:96-cv-380, be

reinstated against all defendants who have

violated my constitutional rights under color

of law, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3).

c) I request this Honorable Court order

that a proper investigation be conducted into

App. 58

the criminal activities of all persons involved

in this matter.

Vv. What specific issues do you wish to raise

on appeal?

a) Plaintiff/Appellant wishes to bring

to the attention that according to the

authority of the Annotation of the American Law

Review, 97 A.L.R. 137, all matters in this case

that could be challenged as untimely due to the

Statue Of Limitations, should be tolled due to

the continuing conspiracy that began in 1990

and is still continuing today.

There is documented facts and other

evidence including tape recordings of numerous

conspirators to prove that_the conspiracy began

by Defendant Solid Waste Manager Guy Moose and

Defendant Tennessee Department of Environment

and Conservation in January of 1991, was

continued by Federal Judge James H. Jarvis and

State Circuit Court Judge Samuel H. Payne and

Defendant William H. Colvin, Defendant

Frederick L. Hitchcock and Defendant James W.

Gentry in August of 1992 and also members of

the City Department of Public Works, was

continued by Defendant Mayor Gene Roberts and

members of the Chattanooga City Police

Department in 1993 and 1994, was continued by

Defendant Moose and Defendant State of

Tennessee Department of Environment and

Conservation in 1995, and is’ presently

continuing by the actions of the Defendant

Hamilton County Grand Jury Foreman Marsha

Crabtree, Defendant Assistant Hamilton County

Attorney General Bill West, Defendant Hamilton

Mth ia a ee

App. 59

County District Attorney Bill Cox, Defendant

State of Tennessee Department of Human Rights,

the Covernor of Tennessee, Don Sundquist, U.S.

Attorney Janet Reno, Vice-President Albert

Gore, a and members of the Clinton

Administration.

Many of these parties are named in

Plaintiff/Appellant's Count II before Honorable

Thomas G. Hull.

b) Plaintiff/Appellant wishes to raise

the issue of why Attorney James W. Gentry was

allowed to represent the State of Tennessee

before Judge Jarvis in a CLANDESTINE manner

‘without being required to record his appearance

On the Docket of Case No. 1:91-cv-354.

Plaintiff/Appellant believes that a conspiracy

to violate his right to sue the State of

Tennessee existed between Judge Jarvis, then

Tennessee Attorney General Charles Burson,

Attorney James W. Gentry, and Tennessee

Department of Environment and Conservation

Attorney E. Joseph Sanders.

c) Plaintiff/Appellant wishes to raise

the issue that the injunction of Judge Jarvis

on December 28, 1992 in which he states:

"Plaintiff Ernest A. Oliver

("Oliver") is ENJOINED from filing

any further pleadings in this case

and any further pleadings in the

United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Tennessee

arising out of the facts set forth

in this lawsuit;",

App. 60

has served to allow Defendant Appellees, and

especially their lawyers, to slander and libel

Plaintiff/Appellant leaving him with no legal

recourse to defend himself. Moreover no legal

recourse is available to defend the health and

welfare of his community from the ORGANIZED

CRIME of Defendants/Appellees.

d) Plaintiff/Appellant wishes to raise

the issue of why I was not allowed to speak at

the sanctions hearing to defend myself. Judge

Jarvis specifically stated at page 41, line 15,

of the transcript at Docket #100, that

Plaintiff/Appellant would not be allowed to

talk about anything but the sanctions. I was

never allowed to have any discovery of any kind

throughout the entire case. Furthermore my

attorney Bob Bradshaw did not object.

vI. The challenge of Judge Jarvis and

Defendants/Appellees as to the timeliness

of Plaintiff/Appellant's Appeal.

Judge Jarvis and Defendants/Appellees have

both stated that Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal

is untimely. Plaintiff/Appellant would like to

bring to the attention that Rule 60, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure specifically states

that:

",..This rule does not limit the

power of a court to entertain an

independent action to relieve a

party from a judgement, order, or

proceeding, or to grant relief to a

defendant not actually personally

notified as provided in Title

App. 61

28,U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside

a judgement for fraud upon the

court..."

Plaintiff/Appellant has charged Judge

Jarvis and Defendants/Appellees with fratid and

conspiracy against the Federal Court System and

Plaintiff/Appellant. The record herein shows

these allegations to be absolutely true. All

Statue of Limitation matters here are tolled

due to the continuing conspiracy, according to

the authority of the Annotation of the American

Law Review, 97 A.L.R. 137, where a Federal

Judge was indicted 14 years after a conspiracy

began because of an overt act which once again

tolled the statue.

CONCLUSION

I have charged Judge Jarvis

Defendants/Appellees with fraud and con

to violate my civil rights and of vering-up

the illegal dumping of eauaadiies wastes in

Chattanooga, Tennessee. My allegations of

illegal hazardous waste dumping and

environmental wrongdoing, have the support o

Secretary of Labor Dr. Robert Riech, o

Attorney Richard Jahn, Sr. and Attorney Tricia

Dennis, both officers of the court. Ms. Dennis

who represented my former ttorney Mark Light

at the sanctions heari ng of December 16, 1992,

filed her brief to Judge Jarvis on December 15,

1992 at Docket #92. Here, she quietly points

out all the evidence to show Judge Jarvis that

° ©

yw ow

his statement:

App. 62

"...Moose concludes that all of Mr.

Oliver's allegations were

"groundless"..."(emphasis added)

was false, and states that this evidence was

not considered by the Court. (See page 14 of

the brief of Attorney Tricia Dennis at Docket

#92).

Attorneys Dennis, Owings, and Light were

all fully aware of Plaintiff/Appellant's filing

at Docket #70 that clearly proves Judge

Jarvis had filed a fraudulent opinion, yet not

one lawyer would challenge the fraud and

conspiracy being perpetuated by Judge Jarvis on

Plaintiff/Appellant. Ms. Dennis, however, by

her filing and pointing out in her brief at

Docket #92, had quietly threatened Judge Jarvis

with the "hard evidence" should he sanction her

client Attorney Light. In turn, Judge Jarvis

did no require Attorney Light to pay any

monetary sanctions.

For the foregoing reasons, it is

respectfully requested that Judge Jarvis's

orders in my Case 1]:9]-cv-354 be set aside and

that I be allowed to pursue my original

citizen's suit to protect my community and

clean-up the damage to the Chattanooga Summit

Landfill.

It is also requested that my Count II in

my present lawsuit before Honorable Judge

Thomas G. Hull, Case No. :96-cv- ae

reinstated against all defendants.

App. 63

I further request that this Honorable

Court order an investigation into the fraud and

conspiracy perpetuated on me and the Tennessee

State and Federal Court system in this matter

by Judge Jarvis, Judge Payne, and ALL the

attorneys of record who joined the conspiracy

to violate my civil rights herein.

The health and welfare of the general

public both, nationally and internationally has

been placed at risk by this conspiracy. The

fact that the international community has been

duped by former Chattanooga Mayor Gene Roberts,

Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr. and the Clinton

Administration into believing that the City of

Chattanooga should be held out as an example of

Environmental Exceilence, is a disgrace.

The lessons of Watergate have yet to be

learned in Tennessee. It is pure irony that

twenty-five years ago this month, Watergate

began, and President Richard Nixon stated on

August 15, 1973 that:

"I had no prior knowledge of the

Watergate break-in. I neither took

part in nor knew about any of the

subsequent cover-up activities; I

neither authorized nor encouraged

subordinates to engage in illegal or

improper campaign tactics. That was

: and is the simple truth."

I submit to this Honorable Court that

Judge James H. Jarvis's statement: "...Moose

concludes that all of Mr. Oliver's allegations

were "groundless"...", (emphasis added) is just

en (ellen Ae ee wT. ee

5 oR

ON eae’ fe * le ced pita) ee

App. 64

as blatant a lie as was Richard Nixon's

statement above.

In 1977, I was the first Forensic

Scientist to blow the whistle on illegal

activities in a State Police Crime Lab in

Michigan. The Director of the Michigan State

Police, Gerald Hough, stated that my

allegations against the Michigan State Police

were untrue. Seven (7) years later the Michigan

Court of Appeals found that my allegations were

"substantially true", and ordered my

reinstatement with full back pay and

seniority. (See 132 Michigan Appeals 558). Just

before Colonel Gerald Hough was forced to

retire, he admitted that "ALL" my allegations

against the Michigan State Police were

"factually accurate”.

I submit that all of my allegations in

this case are "factually accurate" as well, and

deserve to be told and heard. The American

Public is sick and tired of seeing its public

officials lie, cheat, steal, and quibble about

matters that have a direct and adverse bearing

on the public's health and welfare. The

American Public is equally tired of a legal

system full of lawyers who have no integrity,

no honor, and no guts to stand up to tyranny

and wrongdoing. I expect to see justice served

in this matter before this Court.

This case, which I call “"TENNESSEEGATE",

has the potential to destroy the credibility of

the City of Chattanooga and its former Mayor

Gene Roberts, the credibility of the Governor

a bia as iad tw SiRt PT LS eta Ie i ASE set

App. 65

of Tennessee, Don Sundquist, the credibility of

the Tennessee State and Federal Court Systems,

the credibility of the offices of U.S. Attorney

Janet Reno, the FBI and Justice Department, and

the credibility of the offices of the Vice-

President and the Clinton Administration on a

national and international basis.

What right does Vice-President Gore, Janet

Reno, and the Clinton Administration have to

prosecute the Tobacco Companies for making a

product that causes cancer, while at the same

time they cover-up and protect the fact that

McKee Foods Corporation, manufacturers of

Little Debbie® products in Chattanooga, have

been doing the exact same thing?

I submit that the extraordinary efforts to

cover-up these facts including duping the

entire international community into believing

that Chattanooga is a City of Environmental

Excellent deserving international praise, will

soon be a matter of international scandal.

When William Colvin, Attorney for

Defendant/Appellee Hydro-Vac Services, lInc.,

ran to Judge Payne in March of 1993 to dismiss

his $5,000,000.00 "slap suit" in the face of

Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion For Summary

Judgement, Judge Payne stated on the tape

recorded conversation previously placed before

this Honorable Court in Plaintiff/Appellant's

Petition For Writ Of Prohibition, Court of

Appeals Case No. 97-5611, that: "...They want

to quit; we want to get out of this thing;

let'em go..."

App. 66

Plaintiff/Appellant submits that as a

member of the laboratory section of the

American Public Health Association, I have a

duty to the American Public "

The only chapter yet to be written in my

manuscript called "TENNESSEEGATE", is what the

Sixth Circuit Court Of Appeals decides to do

about my request for justice, and protection of

the general public.

I trust that the examples of justice shown

-to me by Tennessee State Circuit Court Judge

Samuel H. Payne, and Tennessee Senior Federal

District Court Judge James H. Jarvis, are not

acceptable, and do not meet the standards

required by this Honorable Court.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Ernest A. Oliver

Ernest A. Oliver

Plaintiff/Appellant, Pro Se

58 Bohr Drive, Chattanooga, TN 37415

(423) 877-8723

App. 6/7

PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a

true and exact copy of this pleading has been

served upon all parties and/or counsel listed

below by depositing a copy of same in the

United States Mail with sufficient postage

thereon to carry same to its destination,

addressed as follows:

William G. Colvin, Esq.

Attorney For Defendant/Appellee Hydro-Vac

Services, Inc.

SHUMACKER & THOMPSON

701 Market Street, Suite 500

Chattanooga, TN 37402-4800

William H. Horton, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Golden

Gallon, Inc.

Horton, Maddox & Anderson

One Central Plaza

Sixth Floor

835 Georgia Avenue

Chattanooga, TN 37402

James W. Gentry, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Guy M. Moose

Spears, Moore, Rebman & Williams

801 Broad Street, Sixth Floor

Chattanooga, TN 37402

This 11th day of June, 1997.

Ls/ Ernest A. Oliver

Ernest A. Oliver

Plaintiff/Appellant, Pro Se

App. 68

SHUMACKER & THOMPSON

Attorneys At Law

May 4, 1998

Mr. Ernest Oliver VIA HAND DELIVERY & UPS

58 Bohr Drive

Chattanooga, Tn 37415

RE: Ernest Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.

United States Department of Labor

Dear Mr. Oliver:

I enclose herewith a check drawn on the

Shumacker & Thompson trust account in the

amount of $25,018, payable to you. This check

is being delivered to you in satisfaction of

the Judgment entered in your favor in the

proceedings before the United States Department

of Labor in accordance with the Orders of

November 1, 1995; January 6, 1998; and,

February 5, 1998. I would appreciate it if you

would sign the enclosed self-addressed, stamped

envelope, acknowledging your receipt of this

payment, as satisfaction of said Judgment. I

want to take this opportunity to re-confirm our

earlier communications to you that we do pot

see any connection between the satisfaction of

this Judgment and your decisions with regard to

any pending appeals.

I have attached to this letter a summary sheet

which outlines how we calculated the amount

owing through May 5, 1998.

Yours very truly,

“oF “7

William G. Colvin

For the Firm

App. 69

WGC :mdd

Enclosure

I hereby acknowledge receipt of check number

010454, in the amount of $25,018.00, in

Satisfaction of the Judgment entered by the

United States Department of Labor.

“er “er

Ernest A.Oliver

App. 70

JAHN & WEEKS

Law Offices

620 LINDSAY STREET, CHATTANOOGA, TENN.37403

423-756-8473/fax 423-266-1124

RICHARD P. JAHN, Jr. RICHARD P. JAHN, Sr.

JERRY WOODS WEEKS* OF COUNSEL

PAICE A. SEALS _

*also licensed in GA

May 9, 1996

Mr. E. Joseph Sanders

Legal Services Director

Department of Environment & Conservation

401 Church Street

20th Floor

Nashville, Tennessee 37243-1548

Re: Your Faxed Letter to me of May 7, 1996

Regarding Ernest Oliver

Dear Mr. Sanders:

This will acknowledge receipt of your

above fax.

The writer has had a sustained illness and

only recently got out of Memorial Hospital in

Chattanooga. I will be returning to my office

shortly when I will deal in more detail with

your inquiry.

Suffice it to say, I have very carefully

looked into the matters set fourth in the

“proposed” complaint. Mr. Oliver will not be a

App. 71

Mr. E. Joseph Sanders

May 9, 1996

party to that litigation. I am well aware of my

obligation not to make unfounded or incorrect

allegations.

In my opinion, the record is clear that

your Mr. Moose has perjured himself when he

stated to Judge Jarvis that the allegations of

fact as their having been hazardous waste

present at the Hydro-Vac site which found its

way into the creek, was groundless. His record

of inspection which he concealed was made prior

to his sworn affidavit to Judge Jarvis, which

Judge Jarvis apparently relied upon in finding

that there was no basis for the historic

complaint by Mr. Oliver.

Mr. Oliver has now been sustained in his

allegations by the U.S. Secretary of Labor,

namely Mr. Robert Reich, who has declared that

Mr. Oliver is entitled to back pay or other

damages. This, of course is inconsistent with

the findings of Judge Jarvis, who never

examined the record on the merits but whose

opinion of December 20, 1992 was based on a

technicality. He relied on the sworn affidavit

of Moose that nothing was wrong, and this

became the law of the case.

In short, my investigation incidates that

Judge Jarvis was the victim of perjury and

fraud which he relied upon. The truth is to the

contrary. As a matter of law, his exsisting

opinion and injunction should be set aside.

I will be glad to discuss this in more

detail with you, including the sworn evidence

out of the mouths of the States’s own people,

upon my return to the office which will be

shortly.

App. 72

Mr. E. Joseph Sanders

May 9, 1996

Meanwhile, I wolud suggest that you

reviewthe record, including the extensive 280

pages of evidence contained in the so called

“Hydro-Vac” summary which was fully assembled

by Mr. Oliver and which we have found to be

fully supportable as accurate and the true set

of facyts involved.

As to whether or not a complaint in the

draft form which you have apparently seen will

be filed as such or whether there will be

further modification must also be kept in mind.

This is a study document based on what we

believe to be the truth, solidly grounded in

the law.

I am attaching herewith a copy of a Notice

of a Right to Sue to Mr. Oliver from the U.S.

Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division

dated May 2, 1996. Mr. Oliver fully intends to

pursue this right. You are hereby notified that

he will be taking a discovery deposition of Mr.

Guy Moose along with that of Mr. Ronald Balwin,

Loan Officer for First Tennessee Bank in the

course of these proceedings.

Very truly yours,

“as “

Richard P. Jahn, Sr.

RPJ,SR.,/lg

App. 73

Ernest A. Oliver

58 Bohr Drive

Chattanooga, Tennessee 37415

615/877-8723

CERTIFIED MAIL

#R 838 493 627

January 20, 1997

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

224 U.S. Post Office

and Courthouse Building

Knoxville, TN 37902

Re: Ernest Oliver v. Guy Moose, et al.,

Civil Action No. 1-91-0354

Dear Judge Jarvis:

I am writing this letter and attaching certain

documents thereto because I am unsure of how to

approach this matter.

In Case No. 1:96-CV-380, Honorable Thomas G.

Hull makes the following statement in his order

of December 18, 1996:

",...because there is a suggestion in

the record that Judge Jarvis may

have relied upon a false affidavit

in dismissing the previous

lawsuit..."

I am now faced with the same problem I had in

the State of Michigan in 1977 when I blew the

App. 74

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

whistle on illegal activities within the

Michigan Department of State Police, resulting

in case law at 132 Mich App 558. This

precedent-setting case resulted in collateral

damage to persons on the fringe areas of the

problem, by either loss of their jobs or loss

of seniority.

I truly hope that you can help to prevent

similar collateral damage here in Chattanooga,

which has the potential to be enormous. Let's

look at the facts.

de United States Secretary of Labor,

Dr. Robert Riech, has ruled in his November l,

1995 Order that my firing from Hydro-Vac

Services, Inc. was in violation of protected

activity. Secretary Reich also ordered Hydro-

Vac to reinstate me and pay damages to be

determined. Secretary Reich also confirmed

} ig ‘oper 1 | di

i In his letter to Mr. E. Joseph

Sanders, dated May 9, 1996, (attached for your

review), Attorney Richard Jahn Sr. accuses Guy

Moose of perjury when he states:

"The record is clear that your Mr.

Moose has perjured himself when

stated to Judge Jarvis that the

allegations of fact as to there

App. 75

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

having been hazardous waste present

at the Hydro-Vac site which found

its way into the creek, was

groundless."

7 It is a fact that Moose withheld

from Plaintiff and from this Court the fact

that Moose had cited Hydro-Vac Services for

allowing gasoline-contaminated soil, containing

hazardous waste benzene, to migrate into the

Chattanooga Creek. Just one (1) day later,

Moose testified under oath in the Federal Labor

hearing that there were no hazardous wastes

present. It is also a fact that Hydro-Vac was

cited by Moose's office on December 5, 1991,

for “violation of the Tennessee Hazardous Waste

Management Act", which is almost three (3)

months before Moose's affidavit to this Court

on February 21, 1992, wherein Moose stated

Plaintiff's allegations were groundless.

hazardous wastes, and in particular 40 CER

Subtitle C hazardous wastes, allows a citizen

suit to be filed without a 60-day notice. See

MARTIN v. KANSAS BOARD OF REGENTS, 32 Env't

Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1944 (D. Kan. February 19,

1991), where the court held that (1)

requirements for 60-day notice under Water Act

and CERCLA are not to be interpreted too

rigidly, and (2) no 60-day notice requirement

App. 76

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

Li ) 3

. At T69, line 22, of the Transcript

of the December 16, 1992 sanctions hearing,

Attorney Gentry establishes that he has

practiced before the environmental bar since

1968 and was counsel in the Walsh case that

established the 60-day notice. I ask you, who

would be better informed than Mr. Gentry that

50-d ‘ ; ; ; 1 FE

Subtitle C hazardous wastes are present?

6. Judge Jarvis, on page 13 of your

MEMORANDUM OPINION, filed in my case Civ. 1-91-

0354 on August 10, 1992, you state:

"Moose concludes that al] of Mr.

Oliver's allegations are

‘groundless'." (Emphasis added).

When confronted with the overwhelming hard

evidence which I filed with your Court as

substantial proof to the contrary, there are

only two (2) possibilities which could have

allowed you to make the sweeping statement that

ALL of my allegations were groundless, namely:

a) You did not read any of my

filings, which is the suggestion by senior

attorney and officer of the court Mr. Richard

Jahn, Sr., and which statement is also

App. 77

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

confirmed by Honorable Thomas G. Hull in his

order of December 18, 1996; or

b) You are the kingpin of State-

apne

ee ee er ore

Re On May 8, 1996, my Attorney, Richard

Jahn Sr., told me that because there is

absolute proof that Judge Jarvis's law school

classmate, State Circuit Court Judge Samuel H.

Payne, admits on a tape-recorded conversation

that he did not read what I had filed before

Judge Payne, there is a possibility that Judge

Jarvis may not have read my filings before him

as well. If this is true, Mr. Jahn sternly

told me that "JUDGE JARVIS MAY NOT HAVE KNOWN" .

8. On October 12, 1995, Ms. Alice Ford,

a black investigator for the State of Tennessee

Human Rights Commission, ruled that my civil

rights had been violated by Chattanooga State

Technical Community College ("CSTCC"), and

ordered a "Cause" recommendation against CSTCC

on October 13, 1995. On that same date, after

being ordered to change her opinion to a "No-

Cause", Alice Ford was fired and the entire

Human Rights Office in Chattanooga was closed

with only 25 minutes" notice.

App. 78

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

9. Ms. Alice Ford is a true hero, much

in the same light as Martin Luther King, Medgar

Evers, and Rosa Parks. However, in Alice

Ford's case a totally different perspective

exists--no where in modern American history to

my knowledge has a black person lost his/her

job and had his/her civil rights violated as a

result of defending a white man! You can just

visualize this story on the Oprah Winfrey show!

10. Senator Fred Thompson has promised

to investigate Alice Ford's “situation™ (see

enclosed letter), but so far he has done

nothing and Ms. Ford is still out of her job.

11. In his Memorandum filed as docket

#75, on September 23, 1992, Attorney Frederick

Hitchcock attached a portion of a transcript

from the deposition taken of me, where

Hitchcock asks regarding my employment at

CSTCC: "Who is your supervisor?” My answer:

we ", (see enclosed transcript).

From that point on, my teaching position at

CSTCC began to deteriorate. Attorney

Hitchcock was the co-Chairperson along with Dr.

James Catanzaro, President of CSTCC, at the

International Conference on Environmental

Commerce "CONEC”™ held in Chattanooga in 1993.

In addition, Attorney James L. Catanzaro, Jr.

is the assistant counsel for Golden Gallon with

Attorney Hitchcock. I can prove a conspiracy

App. 79

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

exists to take away my teaching position at

CSTCC, which is the subject of my Count I

before Judge Hull.

AZo Your order of December 20, 1992,

enjoining me from "ever filing a lawsuit

arising out of the facts set forth in this

lawsuit” has provided a blank check for any

defendant to violate my rights for the rest of

my entire life, with no legal recourse. This

is especially "chilling" in view of the fact

that Moose lied in the Labor hearing and in his

affidavit file in your Court, coupled with the

findings of the U.S. Secretary of Labor that my

allegations are true, and most importantly the

health and welfare of the public continues to

be threatened.

sm On May 17, 1995, Mr. Gary Lander,

Counsel for McKee Foods Corporation, who bakes

and distributes Little Debbie® products from

the Chattanooga area, called me at my home

requesting a meeting. The baking plants are

directly adjacent to the Summit Landfill where

benzene, mercury, and other hazardous wastes

have been detected in the test wells at the

Landfill.

Mr. Lander admits, on the tape-recorded

conversation, that he has been aware of the

contamination in the water but was not aware it

App. €@9

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

was in the air too. McKee was getting its

water to make Little Debbie® products from

wells closely situated to the Summit Landfill

from 1990 thru 1995. Only late last year was

the Eastside Utility ordered to take the water

from the less-polluted Tennessee River.

Mr. Lander admits he had not seen the last two

letters I mailed to Mr. Jack C. McKee,

Executive Vice-President & COO of McKee Baking

Company, which letters suggest Mr. Mckee did

not take any action on the problem. Mr.

Lander also confirms that I was in contact with

Governor Don Sundquist on the matter as well.

14. On July 6, 1995, I wrote the

enclosed letter to President Clinton,

Registered Mail #R 429 878 846. It details some

of the problems I have encountered trying to

obtain justice here in the City of Chattanooga

and Hamilton County. It also describes the

situation involving the death of Larry Powell,

a black motorist, at the hands of eight white

Chattanooga police officers.

Again, some of the same persons who have

violated my rights, are directly related to

criminal activity which is being protected by

your order of December 28, 1992.

App. 81

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

15. As stated in my letter to President

Clinton, Defendants Marsha Crabtree and

Assistant District Attorney Bill West are on

electronically unbroken tape recording

admitting to violating the Tennessee Code in

direct violation of my civil rights, and unless

you set aside your December 28, 1992 Order and

reinstate my Count II before Judge Hull, I will

have no other recourse but to take this entire

matter to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

and to an International audience.

16. I have attached for your review, the

recent news article regarding the Clinton

Administration and the Environmental Protection

Agency. The EPA charges that:

"Pennsylvania and some other big

industrial states are reporting only

a few major pollution violations,

suggesting that inspectors in those

states may be turning a blind eye to

pollution problems”.

I can prove categorically that the same

situation exists in the State of Tennessee,

specifically in Chattanooga (Hamilton County),

the so-called "Environmental City", which is

also the former District of Vice President Al

Gore and the present District of Senator Fred

Thompson (of Watergate fame) --both of these

men are presently being named as opposing

presidential candidates in 2000.

App. 82

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

y The fact that the Clinton

Administration has unknowingly awarded the City

of Chattanooga and Mayor Gene Roberts an

environmental award for Sustainable Development

which is not deserved, could prove a major

international embarrassment for the President.

18. The fact that Chattanooga Mayor Gene

Roberts accepted an international award in

Istanbul for Environmental Excellence with 90

other countries competing, and also a similar

award from former U.N Secretary General Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, despite the Mayor's full

knowledge, protection, and cover-up of the

illegal dumping operation of William Foxworth

and Hydro-Vac, is REPREHENSIBLE and has the

makings of an international scandal for

international fraud!

I do not believe that this Chattanooga

Environmental City "myth” would be well

received in the international community today,

especially by the friends of Boutros Boutros-

Ghali.

19. The Collateral Damage to the City of

Chattanooga, the so-called "Environmental City”

could be especially embarrassing to President

Clinton who vetoed the second term of U.N

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali shortly

App. 83

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

after Mayor Roberts received the award from the

United Nations.

20. In a January 9, 1992 letter to me

(enclosed) Vice President Al Gore instructs me

to contact the Tennessee Department of

Environment and Conservation--MOQSE'S OFFICE--

the exact same office which has committed

perjury regarding the illegal activity.

21. in a May 15, 1995 letter to me

(enclosed with the President Clinton letter),

Governor Don Sundquist, through his counsel,

hides behind your December 28, 1992 Order and

states:

"After consulting with the

Department of Environment and

Conservation, we are satisfied that

the issues that you have raised have

been appropriately addressed by the

Department and by the judiciary."

aa « The attitudes which z have

encountered from all supposedly responsible

persons here in the State of Tennessee, is one

of cover-up, silence, deception, and outright

conspiracy to defraud and endanger the health

and welfare of the general public. THE STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS HAS BEEN TOLLED MANY TIMES (see

77 ALR3d 725). As a member of the United

States Public Health Service, I have a duty to

App. 84

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

see that persons such as William Foxworth and

Hydro-Vac, who have been allowed to illegally

dump in the Chattanooga Area for the past eight

years, answer for these criminal activities.

Attached for your review is the latest evidence

by Defendant Eugene "Bunky" Wright catching

Foxworth's illegal activities on Sunday, June

9, 1996. Mr. Wright's statement was:

"The recent events at Hydro-Vac

Services, Inc. seem to indicate a

facility that is being haphazardly

managed. Previous attempts have been

made to ensure efficient operation,

however, long term efficiency has

not been achieved. Accordingly, the

time has come to replace the “band

aid" remedy approach with a

permanent solution satisfactory to

this office ensuring environmental

safeguards to adequately protect the

safety of the Publicly Owned

Treatment Works (POTW), and, to

prevent similar incidents that have

occurred recently at Hydro-Vac

Services, Inc."

y+ On November 20, 1996, I met with Mr.

Bob Diehl, Chairman of the Hamilton County

Local Emergency Planning Committee

("Committee"), and other Committee members, who

are responsible for enforcement of Federal SARA

Title III, and discussed and provided absolute

App. 85

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

proof of the continuing violations of William

Foxworth and Hydro-Vac. In the agreed-to taped

recorded meeting, I presented evidence to the

Mr. Diehl and other Committee members of the 8-

year illegal dumping operation which has been

protected by Chattanooga Mayor Gene Roberts,

the Chattanooga Police Department, the Hamilton

County Air Pollution Board, the County

Executive's Office, the Hamilton County

Prosecutor's Office, the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Office of the Governor of

Tennessee, the State and Federal Court System,

3rd District Congressman Zack Wamp, Tennessee

Senator Fred Thompson (of Watergate fame), and

worst of all Mr. John Hankinson Jr. EPA Region

IV Administrator in Atlanta--all of whom are

CHATTANOOGA PROTECTORS .

24. The last monthly meeting of the

Committee was held at Hydro-Vac Services, Inc.

and lunch was personally catered by William

Foxworth, the dumper! I have attached a copy

of the reply of the Committee meeting and their

Minutes for your review.

25. This leaves the following questions:

(A) DID YOU READ THE INFORMATION

FILED TO YOU BY PLAINTIFF OLIVER?

App. 86

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

(B) DID YOU KNOW THAT YOU WERE

BEING LIED TO BY MOOSE AND THE THREE (3)

LAWYERS: GENTRY, HITCHCOCK, AND COLVIN?

Conclusion:

SOMEONE is going to jail here. I am perfectly

willing to be first if that is what it takes to

focus the proper attention on this matter to

see that justice is served and the public is

protected from the illegal dumping-== and

conspiracy.

To quote the words of Attorney Gentry in his

letter to you of October 2, 1992 (enclosed),

and who was allowed to represent the State of

Tennessee in your Court without an APPEARANCE,

I also “realize this correspondence does not

constitute a pleading and I do not intend that

it should”.

I have filed the enclosed Notice of Appeal of

Judge Hull's Order dismissing my Count II in

Case No. 1:96-CV-380. If I do not hear from

you before the time when I must file my brief

with the Sixth Circuit, I will proceed outside

the borders of Tennessee to obtain justice in

this matter, including the international

audience.

App. 8/7

Honorable James H. Jarvis

United States District Judge

January 20, 1997

Let no person say that Plaintiff Ernest A.

Oliver did not make every effort to limit the

collateral damage which is inevitable in this

matter.

Very truly yours,

bel “er

Ernest A. Oliver

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Encs.

cc: (All with Enclosures)

Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.

HAND DELIVERED

Senator Fred Thompson, U.S.Senate,

Cert. Mail #P 491 956 430

Mr. Gary Lander, Attorney, McKee Foods

Corporation, Cert. Mail #P 491 956 431

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.