Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Neira v. Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1

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Supreme Court, U.S.

rER RD

9% 2023 JUN 15 1999

No.

Se OF Te CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1997

Rudy NEIRA, Pro Se

Petitioner

¥<*

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1

On Petition For Review

To The Texas Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

3843 Barrington #138

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-7125 office

210 967-4726 home

This case is about a monthly water standby fee imposed on

Mr. Neira, and other vacant lot owners, by the Bandera County

Fresh Water Supply District # 1 (Bandera water district).

Mr. Neira’s federal question is that the Bandera water

district's water standby fee is a tax with sufficient disparity to

constitute taking of property from Neira, and from other vacant lot

owners, in violation of both the due process clause and equal

protection of the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

A secondary federal question is that Neira’s case dismissal

by the state’s highest court constitutes a decision for Court

jurisdiction purposes.

ll

14.1(b) LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner:

Rudy Neira, Pro Se, 3843 Barrington #138, San Antonio, Tx

78217 210 967-7125 office 210 967-4726 home

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District Board Members:

Wilbur L. Bradford, President, Rt 4 Box 4505,

Lakehills, Tx 78063

William C. Mooney, Rt Box 2426, Lakehills, Tx 78063

Kenneth W. Edwards, Rt Box 4561, Lakehills, Tx 78063

Gary V. Pickett, PO Box 672, Lakehills, Tx 78063

Respondent Attorney of Record:

Henry Steen, Jr.

Law Office of Henry Gates Steen, JR., P.C.

3001 North Lamar Blvd. Suite 306

Austin, Tx 78705

14.1(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

14.1(d) Citations of Official and Unofficial

Reports of Orders and Opinions Entered in the Case. l

14.1(e) Concise Statement of the Basis for Jurisdiction. 2

14.1(f) The Constitutional Provisions Violated. 2

14.1(g) Concise Statement of the Case Setting Out the Facts

Material to Consideration of the Questions Presented. 2

14.1(h) Concise Argument (per rule 10) that State’s Highest

Court has decided an important question of federal law in

a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of the Court. 4

Appendix

14.1(i)(i) Appendix-Judgment Sought to be Reviewed & In

Conjunction Documents (in descending date order):

Dismissal by State Highest Court 9

Petition to State Highest Court (partial) 10

Rehearing Denial by State Appeal Court 15

Rehearing Petition to State Appeal Court (partial) 16

Opinion of Judgment Sought to be Reviewed 20

Judgment Sought to be Reviewed 26

Appeal to State Appeal Court (partial) 9

Dismissal by State Lower Court 30

Neira’s Motion for New Trial (partial) 32

14.1(i)(ii) Appendix-Relevant Documents (in ascending Order):

9-5-90 Relevant Companion State Case 34

10-22-93 TNRCC State Agency Letter 35

10-2-97 TNRCC State Agency Letter 37

3-25-98 Public Interest Letter 39

For clarity to the Court, Neira uses bold style for text referenced

in appendix. Entry and filing dates are also in bold.

14.1(c) TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1930)

Furey v. Sacramento (1986, CA 9 Cal) 780 F2nd 1448

New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278, U.S. 63, 67 (1928).

Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 S.Ct 187, 43L.Ed.443(1898)

Rogers v. Alabama 192 U.S. 226, 230-31(1904)

Slochower v Board of Higher Education (1956) 350 US 551, 100

L Ed 692, 76 S Ct 637, reh den 351 US 944, 100 L Ed 1470, 76

S Ct 843.

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)

United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 422 (1977)

ee

]

14.1(d) CITATIONS OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL

REPORTS OF OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED IN THE

CASE BY COURTS OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (in

descending date order)

"Today. the Supreme Court of Texas. dismissed the

petitioner’s petition for review for want of Jurisdiction in the above

numbered and styled case." See 3-26-98 Dismissal by State Highest

Court Appendix page 9.

"After examination of the record in the above styled and

numbered cause the Court DENIES Appellant’s Motion for

Rehearing." See 11-25-97 Rehearing Denial by State Appeal Court

Appendix page 15.

"In our letter of September 5, 1997 we Suggested, as an

option, the discontinuance of the standby fee and the reaching of a

settlement with the property owners. We. again, encourage the

district to do that and to find an equitable revenue generating

alternative." See 10-2-97 TNRCC State Agency Letter Appendix

page 37.

"Additionally, the District maintained that its fee was

lawful. We agree.'" See 9-24-97 Opinion of Judgment Sought to

be Reviewed Appendix page 20.

"As modified, the judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED." See 9-24-97 Judgment Sought to be Reviewed.

Appendix page 26.

"ACCORDINGLY, the motion of Bandera County Fresh

Water Supply District #1 to dismiss the above numbered and

entitled case because the applicable statute of limitations had

expired prior to the inception of the case is hereby granted." See

5-20-96 Dismissal by State Lower Court Appendix page 30.

"As a general proposition, districts can exercise only that

authority clearly stated by the legislature. If such a position is

applied to the issue in question, we would conclude that FWSD’s

have no authority to assess standby fees." See 10-22-93 TNRCC

State Agency Letter Appendix page 35.

' We acknowledge Graham v. City of Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2nd 800. 804.

App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied), where the court found municipal water standby fees

to be an illegal tax. Graham is inapposite because the court relied on sections of the

Water Code and Local Government Code that are not applicable to this case. Id. at 802-

03

|

2

14.1(e)(i-iv) CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE BASIS FOR

JURISDICTION:

(i) The judgment wought to be reviewed is part of an

unpublished opinion by a state appellate court. Both are dated

September 24, 1997. See Judgment Sought to be Reviewed

Appendix page 26. (ii) Rehearing for the above judgment sought to

be reviewed was denied on November 25, 1997. See Rehearing

Denial by State Appeal Court, Appendix page 15.

Discretionary review by the state’s highest court was denied

on March 26, 1998. See Dismissal by State Highest Court

provision which confers on the Court jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C.

Section 1257. (v) Pursuant Rule 29(c), notification was made to the

Attorney General of Texas that 28 U.S.C. section 2403(b) may

apply and that the Constitutionality of a Texas statute has been

drawn into question.

14.1(f) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS VIOLATED:

The constitutional provisions violated are the due process

clause and the equal protection of the law clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment as follows:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

These provisions were violated through "taking of property” from

Mr. Neira and from other vacant lot owners.

14.1(g) CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE SETTING

OUT THE FACTS MATERIAL TO CONSIDERATION OF

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

Neira First Raises Federal Question:

The "taking of property" federal question was first raised by

Neira, at his first opportunity, on a rehearing petition to a state

appeal court. See point of error #7 of Rehearing Petition to State

Appeal Court, Appendix pages 17 &18.

3

The state appeal court denied Neira’s appeal. See

Rehearing Denial by State Appeal Court, Appendix page 15.

Neira repeated his "taking of property” federal question with

issue #7 and issue #7 argument of his petition for review with the

state’s highest court. See Petition to State Highest Court, Appendix

pages 12 & 13.

The state’s highest court dismissed the case for want of

jurisdiction. See Dismissal by State Highest Court, Appendix page

9.

Neira’s rehearing petition to the state appeal court consti-

tutes the first chance to present the federal question.

State Appeal Court Raises Federal Question:

On its own initiative, the state appeals court raised the

federal question by ruling that the Bandera Water District standby

fee was legal. The state appeal court stated. in. its opinion,

"Additionally , the District maintained that its fee was lawful. We

agree." See Opinion of Judgment Sought to be Reviewed. Appendix

page 25.

Previously, the lower court had only ruled that the statute

of limitations had expired. See Dismissal by State Lower Court,

Appendix page 30. Neira appealed lower court’s dismissal with

five points of error all of which addressed only the limitations

issue. See Appeal to State Appeal Court, Appendix page 27 for

five points of error. See 14. 1(h) for Neira’s contentions on raising

federal question issues.

4

14.1(_h) PER RULE 10, CONCISE ARGUMENT THAT

STATE’S HIGHEST COURT HAS DECIDED AN IMPOR-

TANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW IN A WAY THAT

CONFLICTS WITH RELEVANT DECISIONS OF THE

COURT:

The state highest court has decided on Mr. Neira’s "taking

of property” federal question because Mr. Neira timely and proper-

ly raised the federal question.

Federal Question Raised Timely:

The "taking of property" federal question was timely

because it was created by an unexpected decision of the state appeal

court, giving Neira no prior opportunity to assert the federal

question. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill.

A lower court’s summary judgment was made at a pretrial

conference where Neira’s case was dismissed solely on expiration

of limitations. See Dismissal by State Lower Court, Appendix page

30. Only limitations, and not Neira’s three causes of action, was

decided in lower court. See Neira’s Motion for New Trial

Appendix page 32 for Neira’s three cause of actions.

After the lower court dismissal, Neira only appealed

limitations issues, with five points of error, to the state appeals

court. See Appeal to Appeal State Court, Appendix page 27. Neira

anticipated that regardless if limitations had expired or not, the

state appeals court would remand Neira’s three cause of actions to

the lower court for trial on merits.

The appeals court surprised Neira by ruling only on one of

his three cause of actions, by dismissing the case, and by leaving

two cause of actions unresolved. Appeal Court ruled that, based on

State statute, the water standby fee was lawful. The appeal court

opinion stated "Additionally, the District maintained that its fee was

lawful. We agree." See Opinion of Judgment Sought to be

Reviewed, Appendix page 25. The State Appeal court did not rule

or remand on Neira’s second cause of action "for declaring that the

fee is grossly unfair". Neira raised his second cause of action as

point of error #4 in his Rehearing Petition to the State Appeal

Court. See Rehearing Petition to State Appeal Court, Appendix

page 16.

Federal Question Raised Properly:

At his first opportunity, Neira raised the taking of property

federal question in point of error #7 of his Rehearing Petition to

State Appeal Court. See Appendix pages 17 & 18 for error #7.

Neira’s rehearing was denied. See Rehearing Denial by State

Appeal Court Appendix, page 15. Neira then raised the taking of

property federal question with the state highest court. See Issue#7

and issue#7 argument in Petition to State Highest Court, Appendix

pages 12 & 13.

Neira’s federal question was timely and properly raised but

both the state highest court and the state appeal court merely

evaded the federal question. And this mere evasion constitutes a

decision. See Rogers v. Alabama and Street v. New York.

Texas Appellate Procedure Rule 185 states:

"The Supreme Court will not affirm or reverse a

judgment or dismiss a writ of error for defects or

irregularities in appellate procedure, either of form

or substance, without allowing a reasonable time to

correct or amend such defects or irregularities."

Neira did not receive any notice of defects or irregularities from

either the Texas Supreme Court or the state appeal court. He was

diligent in following procedure.

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 132 states:

"In all cases where the Supreme Court is without

jurisdiction of the case as presented in the

application, it will dismiss the application with the

docket notation "Dismissed for Want of

Jurisdiction." The Court may accompany the denial

of an application with such explanatory remarks as

it may consider appropriate."

Texas Appellate Rules 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 specify

procedures for certified questions but not federal questions. As an

appeal from a small claims, the rules or more liberal. Texas Small

Claims Government Code section 28.051 states "Trial On appeal is

de novo. No further pleadings are required and the procedure is the

Same as in small claims court."

The state highest court has decided Neira’s taking of prop-

erty federal question. See New York ex rel, Bryant v. Zimmerman.

6

14.1(h) cont.-There is Conflict With the Court:

The state highest court decided on the “taking of property”

federal question in a way that conflicts with the Court.

Furey v. City of Sacramento states:

"In Norwood the Supreme Court held that a local

government takes private property without just

compensation when, through a special assessment on

land, it compels landowner to pay for a public

improvement in an amount "in substantial excess of

the special benefits accruing to him."

Slochower v. Board of Higher Education states:

"Protection of individual from arbitrary action is

very essence of due process of law".

Neira contends that the Bandera water district standby fee is a

special tax assessment. As a tax assessment, it is arbitrary,

excessive, and highly discriminatory to Mr. Neira (and other

owners of vacant lots who do not use water) as compared to

homeowners who use water. Neira and the other vacant lot owners

can not vote on the water fees/taxes or water usage rates. Home

owners pay a similar water standby fee/tax and get the first 5000

gallons of water free. Neira has no water meter and has never used

water. The Bandera water district has placed a lien on Neira’s

property for non payment of the standby fee.

Based on property valuations researched by Neira, the tax

assessment on Neira and other vacant lot owners is about 20 times

higher than the rate imposed on homeowners. Homeowners pay

$12 per month standby fee while non metered lot owners, such as

Neira, pay $10 per month. Home owners pay separately for use of

water.

The 20 times higher figure is based on Mr. Neira’s lot

value of $3,000 and an average water district’s board member

home/lot value of $77,000. Normal changes in valuations of lots

and homes will not significantly change the "20 times”

disparity .($10/$3000 divided by $12/$77000 is 21.34 rounded to

20.) Simply omitting the value of homes in assessing the standby

fee, discriminates against owners of vacant lots and constitutes

taking of property.

14.1(h) cont.-Important Federal Question Exists:

The 20 times higher tax assessment, which Neira contends,

constitutes an important federal question of taking of property in

violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

If not resolved, the state’s decision can adversely affect tax

payers in the same water district. taxpayers in many other taxing

entities, and the general public.

In discussing the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction before the

American Bar Association in 1949, Chief Justice Vinson Stated:

"Those of you whose petitions for certiorari are

granted by the Supreme Court will know, therefore.

that you are, in a sense, prosecuting or defending

Class actions; that you represent not only your

clients, but tremendously important principles, upon

which are based the plans, hopes and aspirations of

a great many people throughout the country."

Neira strongly believes that this case is about tremendously

important constitutional principles and that it is his civic duty to do

his part in protecting these principles.

14.1(h) cont.-Important Federal Question Exists (Other

Contentions)

United States v. Donavan states:

"In tax cases it can sometimes be shown that the

issue is one of continuing importance under

successive revenue acts and _ that widespread

litigation will continue until the point is settled by

the Supreme Court."

In 1990 a state appeal court ruled that a similar water

Standby fee was an "illegal tax", yet in Neira’s case, a different

State appeal court has ruled that the standby fee is legal. See

Opinion of Judgment Sought to be Reviewed, Appendix page 25 for

State ruling that standby fee is legal. See 9-05-90 Relevant

Companion State Case, Appendix page 34 for state court ruling that

standby fee is illegal tax.

Neira is aware of other litigations on this standby fee issue.

Widespread litigation may continue if this issue is not resolved by

8

the Court. An October 22, 1993 state agency letter by the Texas

Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC), states:

"The question of whether a fresh water supply

district ("FWSD") is authorized to impose standby

fees, has been presented to this agency on several

occasions. The unique challenges posed by this

question is evidenced by the myriad of opinions set

forth in past agency correspondence.” See 10-22-93

TNRCC State Agency Letter Appendix page 35.

A recent TNRCC letter has instructed the Bandera Water

District to discontinue the standby fee and has suggested imposing

an “equitable revenue generating alternative". See 10-2-97

TNRCC State Agency Letter, Appendix page 37.

A public interest letter from the Regional Clean Air and

Water Association states "This issue is of substantial continuing

importance since demand for clean water throughout the United

States appears to be increasing.” See Appendix page 39.

14.1(i)(i) APPENDIX

DISMISSAL BY STATE HIGHEST COURT:

The Supreme Court Of Texas

- Post Office Box 12248

Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-1312

March 26, 1998

Mr. Henry Steen, Jr.

3001 North Lamar Blvd. Suite 306

Austin, Tx 78705

RE: | Case Number 98-0015

Court of Appeals Number: 04-96-00739-CV

Trial Court Number 673-94

Style: Rudy Neira v. Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District

No. 1

Dear Counsel:

Today, the Supreme Court of Texas, dismissed the

petitioner’s petition for review for want of jurisdiction in the above

numbered and styled case.

Sincerely,

s/Courtland Crocker

John T. Adams, Clerk

by

Courtland Crocker, Deputy

ee: Mr. Herb Schaefer, Clerk

Ms. Bernice Bates

Mr. Rudy Neira

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

ee

10

PETITION TO STATE HIGHEST COURT (partial):

NO. 98-0015

In the Supreme Court of Texas

Rudy Neira, Pro Se, Petitioner

VS.

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District

No. 1, Respondent

On Appeal from 4th Supreme Judicial District of Texas in San

Antonio, Texas

as Number 04-96-00739-CV

and as county trial court Number 673-94

PETITION FOR REVIEW

Mailed certified to Texas Supreme Court

on: January 5, 1998

Filed by:

Rudy Neira, Petitioner Pro Se

3843 Barrington #138

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-4726 Home 210 967-7125 Home

Respondent Attorney of Record:

Henry Steen, Jr

Law Office of Henry Gates Steen, JR., P.C.

3001 North Lamar Blvd. Suite 306

Austin, Tx 78705

1]

53.2(f) ISSUES PRESENTED

ISSUE #1- Supreme Court review is justified to resolve

material construction of Texas law for the Water District’s standby

fees imposed prior to September 1, 1995. The court of appeals

ruled that the District’s standby fee is lawful while Mr. Neira

contends that the District’s standby fee is unlawful. for this period.

Mr. Neira contends that the court of appeals quotes old vague

Texas statute compared to Mr. Neira’s more specific and more

recent Texas statute. (See Appendix page 6 & 7 of Opinion for

court of appeals "ruling". )

ISSUE #2- Supreme Court review is justified to resolve

material construction of Texas law for the District’s standby fee

imposed after September 1, 1995. The court of appeals contends

that the Water District’s standby fee is lawful under the new

Chapter 49 of the Texas Water Code regardless if the Water

District has applied for authorization. While Mr. Neira contends

that the District’s fee is unlawful until it gets approval as required

by section 49.231 of the Water Code. (See Appendix page 6 & 7

of Opinion. )

ISSUE #3- Supreme Court review is justified to resolve true

conflict between courts of appeals. In this appeal, the fourth court

of appeals in San Antonio is ruling that the Water District’s standby

fee is lawful (Appendix page 6 of Opinion), while the Fort Worth

Court of Appeals ruled in 1990 that a similar water standby fee was

an illegal tax. See Graham v. City of Lakewood Village. Even if

the two above cases are not found sufficiently similar for a ruling

in favor to Mr. Neira, Supreme Court review is still needed for

establishing Texas constitutionality of the District’s water standby

fee. Mr. Neira contends that the District’s standby fee is a tax.

And as a tax, Mr. Neira contends that the District’s standby fee is

at a rate which is arbitrary, highly discriminatory, and in violation

of the Texas Constitution.

ISSUE #4- Supreme Court review is justified to resolve

material construction of Texas rule number 166a concerning

validity of Mr. Neira’s issue-of-fact cause of action that "District’s

standby fee is grossly unfair." The court of appeals has found that

"the issues are legal rather than factual" to support summary

judgment. (See Appendix first paragraph of page 3 of Opinion.)

i

12

aa

ISSUE #5- Concerning Mr. Neira’s $1433 billed and not

yet paid, Supreme Court review is justified to resolve construction

of Texas Rule 166a and limitations statute on Mr. Neira’s |

contention that he preserved a cause of action "for declaring that

the BCFWSD#1 standby fee is not authorized by law as required

by law." (See Mr. Neira’s first cause of action in “Plaintiff's

Original Petition" Record Index page 053.) The court of appeals,

on the other hand, contends that Mr. Neira "...does not seek

declaratory or injunctive relief..., has no damages and no cause of

action..." Mr. Neira contends that this cause of action is valid and

therefore the statute of limitations had not expired for his $1433

debt portion of his suit. (See Appendix page 6 of Opinion.)

ISSUE #6- Along similar lines as in issue #5 above,

Supreme Court review is justified to review construction of Texas

Statutes to show if the statute of limitations has expired for $721.35

standby fees which Mr. Neira paid on or about October 27, 1994

via Commerce Land Title Company.

ISSUE #7- Supreme Court Review is justified to resolve

construction and application of the U S Constitution 14th

Amendment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the standby fee

is legal while Mr. Neira contends that this ruling is in violation

of the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Neira contends the District’s

standby fee is a tax and that it is at a rate about 20 times

higher on lot owners, such as Mr. Neira, compared to home

owners. (See Furey v. Sacramento for U.S. Constitutional

issue and see Opinion page 6 for Court of Appeals ruling that

standby fee is lawful.)

ISSUE #8- Supreme Court review is justified in order to

resolve construction of Texas limitations statute section 16.004.

Mr. Neira contends that he used sufficient diligence, through

administrative procedure to toll the statute of limitations for his

$650 water fees paid in 1986 and for his $1329 which he paid in

1988...

.. ISSUE #7 ARGUMENT- The Court of Appeals ruled

that the standby fee is legal while Mr. Neira contends that this

ruling is in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Neira

contends that the District’s standby fee is a tax and that it is at

a rate about 20 times higher on lot owners, such as Mr. Neira,

compared to home owners. (See Furey v. Sacramento for U.S.

13

Constitutional issue and see Opinion page 6 for Court of

Appeals ruling that standby fee is lawful.)

Section 109 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "Local

government takes private property without just compensation,

when, through special assessment on land, it compels

landowners to pay for public improvement in amount

substantially in excess of special benefits to him." Furey v.

Sacramento (1986, CA 9 Cal) 780 F2nd 1448.

Mr. Neira, as the Record shows, is claiming that the

fee/tax is at least 20 higher on him and other lot owners as

compared to the fee/tax imposed by the Water District on home

owners. As a non water user, Mr. Neira and other lot owners,

receive little benefit as compared to the benefits received by

home owners.

Section 21 of the US Fourteenth Amendment states:

"Violation of due process clause may be accomplished by state

judiciary in course of construing otherwise valid state statute."

Bouie v. Columbia (1964) 378 US 347,12 L Ed 2nd 894, 84S.

a

...53.2JJ) PRAYER FOR RELIEF- In conclusion, Mr.

Neira’s most significant argument is, first, that the Water District’s

standby fee is unlawful because in not only violates Texas Water

Code but more importantly it violates the Texas and United States

Constitutions. The standby fee is a tax and is grossly

discriminatory towards vacant lot owners, such as Mr. Neira.

Secondly, the statute of limitations has not expired, especially for

Mr. Neira’s $1433 owed and not yet paid and for accrued amounts.

Pursuant Rule 60.2 Mr. Neira respectfully requests that the

Texas Supreme Court reverse the lower courts judgments in whole

and render a judgment that the Water District’s standby fee:

(1) is a tax on land.

(2) does not include value of improvements on the land.

(3) is a grossly discriminatory tax against vacant lot owners such

as Mr. Neira as compared to home owners. and

(4) is in violation of the Texas Constitution.

or that the Supreme Court grant reverse the lower courts

judgments and remand the case for further proceedings.

or that the Supreme Court grant appropriate relief to which

Mr. Neira is entitled.

14

Petition for Review Respectfully Submitted,

s/Rudy Neira

Rudy Neira, Petitioner Jan 5-98

3843 Barrington St. #138 Date Signed

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-7125 Office 210 967-4726 Home

Rudy Neira, Pro Se |

15

REHEARING DENIAL BY STATE APPEAL COURT:

COURT OF APPEALS

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

300 DOLOROSA, SUITE 3200

BEXAR COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205-3037

HERB SCHAEFER, CLERK

November 25, 1997

Rudy Neira

3843 Barrington #138

San Antonio, Tx 78217

Henry Steen, Jr.

LAW OFFICES OF HENRY GATES STEEN. JR.P.C.

Steen Building, Suite 306

3001 N. Lamar Boulevard

Austin, Tx 78705

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 04-96-00739-CV

Trial Court Case Number: 673-94

Style: Rudy Neira

v.

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District #1

Dear Rudy Neira and Counsel:

After examination of the record in the above styled and

numbered cause the Court DENIES Appellant’s Motion for

Rehearing.

ORDERED the day and year first above written.

Very truly yours,

HERB SCHAEFER, CLERK

s/Joyce

JOYCE WIATREK, DEPUTY CLERK

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

ee ee

16

REHEARING PETITION TO STATE APPEAL COURT

(Partial):

No. 04-96-00739-CV

In the Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Supreme Judicial District of Texas

San Antonio, Texas

Rudy Neira, Pro Se, Appellant

VS.

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No.1, Appellee

On Appeal from Bandera County Court

Cause 673-94

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

Submitted on November 5, 1997

Appellant, Pro Se:

Rudy Neira

3843 Barrington #138

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-4726 Home 210 967-7125 Office

Appellee Current Attorney of Record:

Henry Steen, Jr.

Law Offices of Henry Gates Steen, JR.,P.C.

3001 North Lamar Blvd. Suite 306

Austin, Tx 78705

eT

17

... SUMMARY OF POINTS OF ERROR

(1) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Water

District’s fee is lawful--for the period prior to September 1, 1995

(See last paragraph of page 6 of Opinion)

(2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Water

District’s fee is lawful-- for the period after September 1, 1995

(See last paragraph of page 6 of Opinion. See Court’s holding in

Point of Error #1.)

(3) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the

District’s fee is not a tax. This holding is in contradiction to the

Fort Worth Court of Appeals holding. Graham v. City of -

Lakewood Village,796 S.W. 2nd 800, 804, App-Fort Worth 1990.

(See last paragraph of page 6 of Opinion for fee lawful ruling)

(4) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that "the issues

are legal rather than factual." Mr. Neira’s second cause of action.

for declaring that the fee is grossly unfair, is Clearly an issue of

fact. (See Ist paragraph of page 3 of Opinion for issues-are-legal

holding.)

(5) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Neira

-.. does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief..., has no

damages and no cause of action.." and that therefore Mr. Neira can

not sue for "the $1433 billed to him but not yet paid". (See page

6 of Opinion)

(6) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Neira

has not paid subsequent bills. (See page 6 of Opinion for mention

of not paying subsequent bills)

(7) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Water

District fee is lawful--in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

of the United States Constitution.

(8) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mr. Neira’s

use of administrative procedure failed to toll the statute of

limitations.

(9) The Court of Appeals erred in not granting Mr. Neira’s

motion for summary judgment. Instead, the Court granted the

Water District’s motion for summary judgment. (See Transcript

Index page 049 for Mr. Neira’s motion for summary judgment

titled "Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Motion for Summary

Judgment and Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Summary

Judgment”".)...

"

18

..-POINT OF ERROR #7

Point of Error #7 Summarized

The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Water District fee

is lawful--in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

Ruling that the Water District fee is lawful is in violation of the US

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Provision. Section 109 of the

Fourteenth Amendment states:

"Local government takes private property without just

compensation, when, through special assessment on land, it

compels landowners to pay for public improvement in amount

substantially in excess of special benefits to him.” Furey _v.

Sacramento (1986, CA 9 Cal) 780 F2nd 1448.

Mr. Neira, as the Record shows, is claiming that the fee/tax is at

least 20 higher on him and other lot owners as compared to the

fee/tax imposed by the Water District on home owners. As a non

water user, Mr. Neira and other lot owners, receive little benefit

as compared to the benefits received by home owners.

Section 21 of the US Fourteenth Amendment states:

"Violation of due process clause may be accomplished by state

judiciary in course of construing otherwise valid state statute."

Bouie v. Columbia (1964) 378 US 347,12 L Ed 2nd 894, 84 S.

8: aD

... RELIEF

Mr. Neira respectfully requests that this Honorable Court (1)

sustain the points of error in this Motion for Rehearing, (2) reverse

its Opinion, (3) hold all points of error in Mr. Neira’s Brief of

Appellant (4) reverse the Court Order requiring Mr. Neira to pay

appeal cost, (5) and hold that the Water District acted in bad faith

pursuant Texas Rule 166-A. Mr. Neira further requests all other

appropriate relief to which he may be entitled.

Appellant’s Motion For Re Hearing

Respectfully Submitted,

19

s/Rudy Neira

Rudy Neira, Appellant Nov 5-97

3843 Barrington St. #138 Date Signed

San Antonio, Tx 78217 ;

210 967-7125 Office 210 967-4726 Home

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

20

OPINION OF JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED:

COURT OF APPEALS

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO

OPINION

No. 04-96-00739-CV

Rudy NEIRA,

Appellant

v.

BANDERA COUNTY FRESH WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT #1

Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Bandera County, Texas

Trial Court No. 673-94

Honorable James C. Onion, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 24, 1997

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

The appellant, Rudy Neira, sued the Bandera County Fresh

Water Supply District No. 1 (the District), for assessing an illegal

and unfair “water standby fee.” The trial court granted the

Districts motion for summary judgment and dismissed Neira’s suit

based on limitations. In five points of error, Neira contends the

trial court erred because the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to establish his claim is barred by limitations. We

reform the judgment to indicate Neira take nothing by his suit and,

as modified, affirm the judgment.

21

Summary of Facts

In 1985, the District assessed a fee against Neira and other

Bandera County landowners for making water available, even if the

water was not used. Although Neira attended public hearings and

conducted an extensive letter-writing campaign, he was not able to

stop the District from charging him what he considered an illegal

and unfair standby fee. On March 22, 1994, Neira sued the

District in small claims court to recover both past and future fees.

Neira secured a default judgment, but the District obtained a new

trial. A jury subsequently awarded Neira $5028, which included

fees paid in 1988 for the years 1985 to 1988, $1433 for fees billed

but not paid as of October 1994, plus interest and expenses.

The District appealed to the county court where it filed a

motion for summary judgment claiming (1) Neira failed to state a

cause of action: (2) Neira’s suit was barred by limitations; (3)

Neira’s suit was barred by res judicata; > and (4) the fees were

lawful. The District prayed Neira’s suit be dismissed because "the

applicable statute of limitations had expired before the inception of

the case." Neira appealed that decision.

Standard and Scope of Review

We treat the dismissal in this case as a summary judgment

for purposes of appellate review. See Dearing v. Johnson, 947

S.W.2nd 641, 644 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997,n.w.h.); In re

A.L.J., 929 S.W.2nd 467,469-70(Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ

denied). We also decline to dismiss this appeal or affirm the

judgment based on the state of the record, as the District urges we

must do. Contrary to the District’s assertions, the transcript

contains both its motion for summary and Neira’s response.

Additionally, a statement of facts is not required. Morriss v.

Enron Oil & Gas Co., 948 S.W.2nd 858, 872 (Tex. App.-San

Antonio 1997, no writ). Furthermore, the presumption of

correctness cited by the District does not apply when, as here, the

issues are legal rather than factual. See Gupta v. Ritter Homes.

Inc., 633 S.W. 626, 628 (Tex. App.-Houston(14th Dist.)

1982), Aff’d in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 646 S.W.2nd

? The District apparently bases its res judicata argument on a suit to collect

delinquent fees it filed against Neira and settled in the late 1980's.

22

168 (Tex. 1983).

When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on

an affirmative defense, it must establish all elements of the defense

as a matter of law. Zale Corp. v. Rosembaum, 520 S.W.2nd 889,

891 (Tex. 1975). Once the movant/defendant has established a right

to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant/plaintiff

to present issues which preclude summary judgmert. City of

Houston v. Clear Basin Auth., 589 S.W. 2nd 671, 678 (Tex.

1979).b

A defendant seeking summary judgment on limitations must

prove when the cause of action accrued and must negate the

discovery rule whenever the plaintiff invokes it. Burns v. Thomas,

786 S.W.2nd 266,267 (Tex. 1990); Gregg v. Galo, 720 S.W.2nd

116, 119 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ). A cause of

action accrues is a question of law for the court to decide. Moreno

v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2nd 348,351 (Tex. 1990).

Similarly, the court decides the applicable statute of limitations as

a question of law. Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2nd 651,658

(Tex. 1990).

Discussion

1. Fees Paid

Neira contends the District failed to show that limitations -

barred his claim for $1329, the amount he paid for fees assessed

from 1985 to 1988. More specifically, Neira contends there is no

statute of limitations for illegal taxes. He also asserts that his cause

of action accrued on October 22, 1993 and that it was tolled while

he exhausted administrative remedies. We disagree with Neira’s

arguments.

Neira claims limitations do not apply in this case because

the District’s assessment is a tax to which Ratcliff v. City of Hurst,

593 S.W.end 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d

n.r.e.)applies. In Ratcliff, the court refused to apply the two-year

statute of limitations to taxpayers challenging a municipality’s ad

valorem taxes because, until the city’s property annexation was

invalidated, the taxpayers had no standing to sue. 593 S.W.2nd at

864. In other words the court did not hold that limitations were

inapplicable to illegal taxes. Id. at 865; see also Bowles v. Reed,

913 S.W.2nd 652, 657 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, writ denied)

a eg a

23

(declining to extend Ratcliff to collection of bail bond fees).

We therefore hold that limitations apply to Neira’s claims

and further hold that a two-year statute applies. See Bowles v.

Clipp, 920 S.W.2nd 752, 759-60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ

denied); Ratcliff, 593 S.W.2nd at 865. Before Applying the two-

year statute of limitations, we ask whether Neira’s cause of action

accrued on October 22, 1993, when he received a letter from the

Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) which

criticized the standby fees and "opened the door to file suit." The

letter states, in part:

"As a general proposition, districts can exercise only

that authority clearly stated by the legislature. If

such a position is applied to the issue in question,

we would conclude that (fresh water supply

district’s) have no authority to assess standby fees.

However, because of the history of standby fee

legislation for other types of districts, we have

previously taken the position that the imposition of

standby fees by a (fresh water supply district) would

not require approval by the Commission, but may be

subject to review pursuant to the Commission’s

general supervisory powers."

The TNRCC letter did not change the facts surrounding the

assessment but rather offered Neira his first glimpse at a favorable

legal position. In other words, the letter did not raise material

facts issues about when Neira’s right to seek a legal remedy arose.

Thus, Neira’s cause of action came into existence in 1988 when he

paid the fees.

We conclude Neira’s cause of action was barred by

limitations when he filed suit in 1994, unless the accrual date was

tolled. Neira argues without authority specific to his situation, that

he was required to exhaust administrative remedies with the Water

Commission and TNRCC before bring suit. Such is not the case,

however. Cf. Glasscock Underground Water Conservation Dist.

v. Pruit, 915 S.W.2nd 577, 580 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ)

(explaining exhaustion of administrative remedies not applicable

when the issue involves only question of law or statutory

24

interpretation); Martinez v. Hardy, 864 S.W.2nd 767, 774-74(Tex.

App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1993, no writ) (stating doctrine of

exhaustion of remedies does not preclude suit "(w)here the

legislature has elected not to require resort to an administrative

agency"); Hoover v. Gregory, 835 S.W.2nd 668, 673-74(Tex.

App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (starting limitations when a tax

deficiency was assessed, not when it was affirmed by the

administrative body). Neira is not entitled to tolling or a later

accrual date based on his complaints to the Water Commissiou and

TNRCC.

The trial court did not err in granting the District summary

judgment on Neira’s claims for fees paid because they were barred

by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we overrule

Neira’s third point of error specifically addressing limitations, as

well as Neira’s fifth point of error addressing administrative

remedies. We also overrule Neira’s fourth point of error,

regarding whether he properly paid the fees under protest, because

the issue is not relevant to limitations.

th Fees Not Paid

In his first point of error, Neira maintains the District failed

to show that limitations barred his claim for $1,433, which

represents a bill for fees he owed but did not pay through October

1994. In his second point of error, Neira contends the District

tailed to show that limitations barred his claim for any debt beyond

the $1,433. In reply, the District maintains Neira’s suit is restricted

to the recovery of money already paid. To the contrary, while

Neira’s petition does not seek declaratory or injunctive relief, he

prays for recovery of the $1,433 billed to him but not yet paid.

The District’s summary judgment proof failed to address which fees

were applicable to which year. Therefore, the trial court erred in

applying limitations and granting the District summary judgment on

Neira’s claim for $1,433. Accordingly, we sustain Neira’s first

and second points of error.

However, we need no reverse he summary judgment; we

can affirm the summary judgment on any meritorious theory

advanced in the motion for summary judgment. For example, the

District argued that Neira failed to state a cause of action. We

agree. If Neira did not pay his 1994 bill (or subsequent bills), then

|

ee

F

:

J

25

he has no damages and no cause of action).

Additionally, the District maintained that its fee was

lawful. We agree.’ Under the Water Code applicable until 1995,

the District was empowered to assess fees against water users. Act

of July 19, 1919, 36 Leg., 2d C.S.,ch 48, section 16, 1919 Tex.

Gen. Laws 107, 111, repealed by Act of May 25, 1995, 74th

Leg.,R.S., ch. 715, section 42, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3755, 3803

(effective Sept.1, 1995) (former TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

section 53.107). The current Water Code clearly defines "users"

as those to whom water is made available. TEX. WATER CODE

ANN. section 49.212(a)(Vernon Supp. 1997)(stating water districts

"may adopt and enforce all necessary charges, fees, or rental, in

addition to taxes, for providing or making available any district

facility or service"); id. section 49.231 (discussing standby fees).*

Conclusion

Although we sustain two points of error, we hold the trial

court did not err in granting the District summary judgment.

However, we note limitations is an affirmative defense which,

when sustained, requires a take-nothing judgment. See Rhodes v.

McCarron, 763 S.W.2d 518, 521(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ

denied). Accordingly, we reform the trial court’s dismissal

judgment to indicate Neira take nothing by his suit against the

District and, as reformed, we affirm the judgment.

PAUL W. GREEN,

JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

> We acknowledge Graham v. City of Lakewood Village, 796 S.W.2nd 800, 804.

App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied), where the court found municipal water standby fees

to be an illegal tax. Graham is inapposite because the court relied on sections of the

Water Code and Local Government Code that are not applicable to this case. Id. at 802-

03

*"(A) curative statute enacted by the Legislature, and becoming effective during the

pendency of an appeal, writ of error, or even a motion for rehearing on a case to which

it applies, cures the defect the same as if such act had become effective before the

institution of the suit.” Brown v. Truscott Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 $.W.2d 837, 840(Tex.

Comm'n App. 1931, judjm’t. adopted).

26

JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED:

COURT OF APPEALS

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO

JUDGMENT

No. 04-96-00739-CV

Rudy NEIRA,

Appellant

Vv.

BANDERA COUNTY FRESH WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT

NO. 1, Appellee

From the County Court at Law, Bandera County, Texas

Trial Court No. 673-94

Honorable James C. Onion, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE STONE, JUSTICE GREEN, AND JUSTICE

ANGELINI

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the

judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows to substitute

all references to summary judgment. The decretal language is

modified as follows:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE that

Rudy Neira take nothing from his suit against

Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1.

As modified, the judgment of the trial is AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee, Bandera County Fresh Water

Supply District No. 1, recover its cost of this appeal from

appellant, Rudy Neira, and from American Bankers Insurance

Company of Florida as surety on appeliant’s cost bond.

SIGNED September 24, 1997

s/ PAUL W. GREEN

PAUL W. GREEN

JUSTICE

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

APPEAL TO STATE APPEAL COURT (partial):

NO. 04-96-00739-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

RUDY NEIRA, PRO SE, APPELLANT

Vv.

BANDERA COUNTY FRESH WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT #1

APPELLEE

On appeal from the Bandera County Court

Cause 673-94

The Honorable James C. Onion Presiding

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUBMITTED ON OCTOBER 10-96

Appellant, Pro Se:

Rudy Neira 3843 Barrington #138

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-4726 Home 210 967-7125 Office

Appellee Current Attorney of Record:

Vilhelm Hesness

100 Congress Avenue #2000

Austin, Tx 78701

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED...

28

...Five Points of Error

Point of Error #1. The trial court erred in rendering

expiration of statute of limitations and rendering case dismissal,

because the water district did not establish as a matter of law nor

with sufficient evidence that the statute of limitations had expired

for $1,433 debt, an amount being billed by the water district to

appellant at time of original September 30, 1994 trial. (See "29-

Page Statement of Facts" pages 6,7,8, & 13. See Transcript Index

page 236 and page 37 of “Attachments” for copy of bills. See

Transcript Index page 224 motion for new trial document bottom

of page 7 and top of page 8 for reference to billed amount.)

Point of Error #2. The trial court erred in rendering

expiration of statute of limitations and rendering case dismissal,

because the water district did not establish as a matter of law nor

with sufficient evidence that the statute of limitations had expired

for that portion of appellant’s(Neira’s) debt which has accrued

beyond the $1,433 debt amount. (Same references and arguments

are use here as in above Point of Error #1.)

Point of Error #3. The trial court erred in rendering

expiration of statute of limitations and rendering case dismissal,

because the water district did not establish as a matter of law nor

with sufficient evidence that the statute of limitations had expired

for $1,329, and amount paid by the appellant(Neira) to appellee in

1988. (See "29-Page Statement of Facts" pages 14,16,17,&18. See

Transcript Index page 224 and item "(1) bottom of page 5, all of

page 6, and most of page 7.)

Point of Error #4. The trial court erred in rendering

expiration of statute of limitations and rendering case dismissal,

because the water district did not establish as a matter of law nor

with sufficient evidence that appellant(Neira) is required by law to

protest and that appellant failed to properly "protest" the $1329

paid by appellant to water district in 1988. (See Transcript Index

page 236 page 6 of Index document titled "Attachment" to motion

for new trial for Slaughter v. Sundown. Also, see Transcript Index

page 224, motion for new trial document, item "(b)" on page 6 for

several paragraphs on appellant paying in protest and not

voluntarily arguments. )

29

Point of Error #5. The trial court erred in rendering

expiration of statute of limitations and rendering case dismissal,

because the water district did not establish as a matter of law nor

with sufficient evidence that appellant’s pursuing of administrative

procedure, failed to toll the statute of limitations. (See "29-Page

Statement of Facts" middle of page 27 for October 22-93 TNRCC

letter.)...

...Prayer for Relief

Appellant, Rudy Neira, prays that this curt reverse the case

dismissal granted by the trial court and remand this cause to the

trial county court for further proceedings and for such other and

further relief to which appellant may show himself justly entitled.

Appellant further prays that, to further administration of justice, the

trial court be changed from Bandera County to another county.

The appellee is a public water utility and consists of many water

users, all of whom will be adversely affected by a judgment in

favor of appellant.

Appellant’s Brief Respectfully Submitted,

s/Rudy Neira

Rudy Neira, Appellant _Oct 10,1996

3843 Barrington #138 Date Signed

San Antonio, Tx 78217

210 967-7125 Office 210 967-4726 Home

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

30

DISMISSAL BY STATE LOWER COURT:

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

On April 17, 1996, the motion of plaintiff for a pre-trial

conference under Rule 166 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

came on before the Court. At the time and place scheduled for

such conference the defendant, in accordance with Rule 166(a),

urged the Court to consider whether the case should be dismissed

because the statute of limitations had expired prior to the inception

of the case. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel for

defendant and the pro se plaintiff, and having reviewed the

pleadings herein, finds:

a That this case is before the Court on appeal from a

September 30, 1994, judgment entered in the Justice Court of

Bandera County, Precinct No. 1.

ze That the judgment was based on a claim to recover water

fees paid since 1985, related court cost, and 10% interest since

1985 on the water fees.

3. That the underlying fee was paid on December 27, 1988.

4. That the petition initiating this case was filed on March 22,

1994, -

>. That the longest applicable statute of limitations, under

Section 16.004(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code, is four years from the date the contested fee (or tax) was

paid.

6. That the case was filed after the statute of limitations had

expired.

rs That the plaintiff has not established directly or indirectly

that any reason for tolling the statute of limitations exists.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion of Bandera County Fresh

Water Supply District #1 to dismiss the above numbered and

entitled case because the applicable statute of limitations had

expired prior to the inception of the case is hereby granted. It is

therefore,

aaa.

31

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above

numbered and entitled case be the same is hereby DISMISSED.

SIGNED: May 20, 1996

s/James C. Onion

Judge Presiding

APPROVED AND ENTRY REQUESTED:

s/ Vilhelm Hesness

State Bar No. 09548300

Attorney for Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District #1

100 Congress Ave., Suite 2000

Austin, TX 78701

(512) 469-5500

(512) 469-6306 (FAX)

APPROVED AS TO FORM ONLY:

Rudy Neira, pro se

2250 Holly Hall, No. 167

Houston, Tx 77054

(713) 799-1340

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

32

NEIRA’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (partial):

Cause No. 673-94

Rudy Neira In the County Court

Vv. Bandera County Texas

Bandera County Fresh

Water Supply District

#1 (BCFWSD#1)

Plaintiff's Motion To Vacate Judgment

And For New Trial

Comes now, Rudy Neira, plaintiff, and files this Motion to

vacate judgment and grant a new trial. An oral judgment dismissing

this case was rendered by this court at the April 17,1996 pre-trial

conference for above captioned case. This judgment dismissed this

case on defendant’s oral pleading that the four-year statute of

limitations had run out. Plaintiff (Neira) assumes that Leslie v. City

of Dallas, a case personally handed to plaintiff (Neira) by defendant

during this pre-trial conference, was also provided to the court as

part of pleading. (For copy of Leslie v. City of Dallas see

"Neira’s Right to Sue” sections of Attachments.

In support of his motion plaintiff (Neira) would show as

follows:

I.

Background Prior To The

April 17, 1996 Pre-Trial Conference

Background and Court Jurisdiction:

This case is on appeal from a plaintiff’s (Neira’s) suit filed

in the Bandera County Justice of the Peace as a Sall Claims suit.

Plaintiff was granted a judgment in his favor in Small Claims Court

on September 30, 1994 and plaintiff was awarded $5028 of which

$65 was for court costs. Then on October 11,1994 defendant

(BCFWSD#1) filed an appeal of the Small Claims judgment.

During the April 17, 1996 Pre-Trial Conference, the court

eee ee

questioned the jurisdiction of this court over plaintiff's cause of

actions. At this time it appears appropriate to repeat plaintiff's prior

causes of action and to repeat court cases which support that this

court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's causes of action. On or about

May 8, 1996 plaintiff filed "Plaintiff's Original Petition" which

listed three causes of action as follows:

(1) "Plaintiff (Neira) files first cause of action for declaring that

the BCFWSD¢#1 standby fee is not authorized by law and is

therefore illegal."

(2) "Plaintiff files second cause of action for declaring that the

BCFWSDé#1 standby fee is grossly unfair to plaintiff."

(3) "Plaintiff files a third cause of action for declaring that

BCFWSDé#1 presented a motion for summary judgment in bad

faith."

The first two cause of actions are the same as the September

30, 1994 Small Claims cause of actions...

...Plaintiff’ Motion to Vacate Judgment and For New Trial

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Rudy Neira April 22, 1996

Rudy Neira

Home 713 799-1340

Office 210 871-7072

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

34

14.1(i)(ii) APPENDIX

9-05-90 RELEVANT COMPANION STATE CASE:

GRAHAM v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE

Cite as 796 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990)

Frank D. GRAHAM, Judith Futerfas, William A. Graham, Frank

Hardy, Steve Konahison, and Betty Kittleson, Appellants,

Wa

CITY OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE, Texas, a

General Law Municipality,

Appellee.

No. 2-89-276-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas

Fort Worth.

Sept. 5, 1990

Owners of vacant lots brought suit seeking declaratory

judgment that ordinance imposing "standby fee" of $25 per month

for vacant lots that have water and sewer service immediately

available was unconstitutional. The 211th District Court, Denton

County, R.C. Vaughan, J., ruled in favor of city, and owners

appealed. The Court of Appeals, Ashworth, J. (Retired), held that

monthly fee which city charged to owners of vacant lots because of

the availability , as opposed to actual use, of water and sewer

services constituted an illegal tax.

Reversed and remanded.

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

35

10-22-93 TNRCC STATE AGENCY LETTER:

John Hall, Chairman Pam Reed, Commissioner

Peggy Garner, Commissioner

Anthony Grigsby, Executive Director

TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE

CONSERVATION COMMISSION

Protecting Texas by Reducing and Preventing Pollution

October 22, 1993

Rudy Neira

2250 Holly Hall #167

Houston, Texas 77054

Re: Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1

Investigation No. 9306218

Dear Mr. Neira:

Thank you for your inquiry by way of Senator Rodney Ellis with

regard to standby fees imposed by the Bandera County Fresh Water

Supply District No. 1 ("District"). We have reviewed the statutes

and prior agency correspondence related to this practice and are

now able to provide the following information.

The question of whether a fresh water supply district

("FWSD") is authorized to impose standby fees, sometimes

referred to as water availability fees, has been presented to this

agency on several occasions. The unique challenge posed by this

question is evidenced by the myriad of opinions set forth in past

agency correspondence.

As a general proposition, districts can exercise only that

authority clearly stated by the legislature. If such a position is

applied to the issue in question, we would conclude that FWSD’s

have no authority to assess standby fees.

However, because of the history of standby fee legislation

for other types of districts, we have previously taken the position

that the imposition of standby fees by a FWSD would not require

36

prior approval by the Commissions’s general supervisory powers.

We have never referred this matter to the Commission because we

have received no specific request to do so.

The fact that compelling arguments can be made to support

and refute the authority regarding this practice speaks to an

apparent necessity of clear, authoritative guidance on the issue.

This may only be obtained through legislation or by a formal

opinion rendered by the office of the Attorney General, or both.

We have been made aware of a recent request by

Representative David Counts for an Attorney General Opinion with

regard to the authority of a municipal utility districts to assess

standby fees outside its designated boundaries. It may be

appropriate to broaden this request to include the question of a

FWSD’s authority to impose standby fees.

Since both Senator Rodney Ellis and Representative Scott

Hochberg are tracking this issue, it may be appropriate to request

legislative assistance in this manner. Our office will continue to

provide assistance as necessary.

I hope that you find this information helpful. If I may

provide additional information, you may contact me at (512) 908-

6100.

Sincerely,

s/Patrick King

Patrick King, Management Auditor

Water Utilities Division

cc:

Senator Rodney Ellis, Texas Senate

Representative David Counts, Texas House of R.

Representative Scott Hochberg, Texas House of R.

Wilbur Bradford, President, Bandera County FWSD

David Duncan, Director, Policy Research Division, TNRCC

Irene Montelongo, Senior Attorney, TNRCC

Sam Jones, P.E. Districts Administration, TNRCC

PO Box 13087 Austin, Tx 78711-3087 512 908-1000

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

37

10-2-97 TNRCC STATE AGENCY LETTER:

Barry R. McBee, Chairman

R.B."Ralph" Marquez, Commissioner

John M. Baker, Commissioner

Dan Pearson, Executive Director

Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission

Protecting Texas by Reducing and Preventing Pollution

October 2, 1997

Mr. Wilbur L. Bradford

c/o Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District

9504 HWY i283, Box 130.

Lakehills, Texas 78063

Mr. Henry Steen, Jr. Attorney

Henry Gates Steen, Jr., P.C.

Steen Building Suite 306

3001 N. Lamar Biv.

Austin, Tx 78705

Re: Bandera County Fresh Water Supply District No. 1 (District):

Standby Fees

Dear Sirs:

We have received your respective letters dated September 15, 1997

and September 17, 1997. Thank you for the additional information

and comments concerning the District’s standby fees and financial

viability.

With respect to the documentation submitted with the letters, it

does on seem sufficient to support the existence of the standby fee.

The Contract of Deed from the Texas Land Co. does not show

evidence of being recorded as a deed restriction which inures to the

District. Neither of documents submitted has the capacity to negate

the 1995 legislation which requires that the Commission approve

38

standby fees.

In our letter of September 5, 1997 we suggested, as an option, the

discontinuance of the standby fee and the reaching of a settlement

with the property owners. We, again, encourage the district to do

that and to find an equitable revenue generating alternative. please

contact Mr. Diego Abrego at 512 239-6170 if you have any

questions.

Sincerely,

s/Samuel W. Jones, Manager

District Administration Section

Water Utilities Division

SWJ/DA/da

cc: Patrick Lindner

PO Box 13087 Austin, Texas 78711-3087 512/239-1000

Internet: www.tnrcc.state.tx.us

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

39

MARCH 25-98 PUBLIC INTEREST LETTER FROM THE

REGIONAL CLEAN AIR & WATER ASSOCIATION:

REGIONAL CLEAN AIR AND WATER ASSOCIATION

PO BOX 6949

SAN ANTONIO, TX 7820

March 25, 1998

TO: SUPREME COURTS OF TEXAS AND THE UNITED

STATES

The purpose of this letter is to express strong support for Supreme

Court review of Neira v. Bandera County Fresh Water Supply #1

(District). (See Texas Supreme Court case #98-0015 and Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals case #04-96-00739-CV. )

The District’s water standby fee, currently imposed on Mr.

Neira and other lot owners, appears to be a tax in disguise which

is 20 times higher on vacant lot owners (who do not use water) as

compared to home owners (who use water). This is a gross

disparity.

The recent September 24, 1997 Texas Fourth Court of

appeal ruling that "the District water standby fee is legal", is in

serious conflict with both the Texas Constitution and the United

States Constitution. This ruling, if left standing, could be a

significant obstacle to fair water development.

This issue is of substantial continuing importance since

demand for clean water throughout the United States appears to be

increasing. Other taxing entities for water and other public

services may similarly disguise unfair taxes as fees unless this point

is settled by the Supreme Court.

s/Han Helland

Hans Helland, President

Regional Clean Air and Water Association

Rudy Neira, Pro Se

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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