Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Williams v. Pennsylvania

Ne Supreme Court. U.S.

OF, FILED

9718 98 may 26 198

woonstoneesaxemnrnn wants

IN THE

Suprente Gourt of the United States

OcTronEeR TERM, 1997

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN G. BERGDOLL

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN G. BERGDOLL

300 West Market Street

York, Pennsylvania 17401

( 717 ) 845-5131

Attorney for Petitioner

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether Petitioner’s Constitutional rights of Double

Jeopardy and Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated

due to the unconstitutional dual prosecution and penalty in this

case.

3

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

IN THE COURT BELOW

The caption of the case in this Court contains the names

of all parties to the proceedings in the appellate courts of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..........0.00.... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING. ........:sccssessssseesseses ii

I aaa chea ie saiiatcniesiscecincnsnse iii

po Be BN toy y |”, eae ne v

I as sivsslecespsszenoenestuncoies 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. .......cccscsssssessesscesss 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED....... 1

re MR cc titisccisnasccsndniensnsannassonsinihsvobachers 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..........c.ccsccsssscsssssessecsecoess 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT................... 7

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO DETERMINE WHETHER PETI-

TIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE

PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

WERE VIOLATED DUE TO THE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUAL

PROSECUTION AND PENALTY IN

REG SIR tC ee ae 7

ELT saiasicinipibdanentesiaiinlachineninsiiesisiessiiasinsvissivoniee 15

iv

APPENDIX

Page

A--Order of the Supreme Court of the Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania dated February 23,

1998 and filed February 24, 1998.................ccsessrees A-1

B--Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Superior

Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

dated August 28, 1997 affirming the trial Court’s

CI sisiitincrinccsninpeirnissiealasiisiiccdaidcniatentiestnsiadvebieiuieiaiinis B-1

C--Memorandum in Support of Order Pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) as filed by The Honorable

Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge, dated September

Fi Sh evcpacbichapeiniiinicuaeesiscastaniniesitiasebenisoailavniens C-1

D--Judgment of Sentence and Order Issued by

The Honorable Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge,

ER TE FR, Tei iitvescnitn initiate nsiitensteintneienninns D-1

E--Opinion and Order issued by the Honorable

Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge, York County

Court of Common Pleas, dated February 5,

1996 affirming the Summary Conviction

Appeal and Refusing and Denying the

I TE Be siiaiichahinin tasepinpdeaesisheciniiniasansessdnsiucienisanin E-1

G--License Suspension Letter from Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation dated

FOIE Ba, Wes tikiciesbetcnsentaicthasaccctanianin G-1

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases cited: Page

Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 547 Pa. 332,

690 A.2d 222 (1997), cert. den., U.S. _,

118 S.Ct. 98, 139 L.Ed.2d 53 (1997)............cccseseees 14

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct.

2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999).............ccscssssssssesseeees 13

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586,

oP RM PU MEE batedichihccsssceictatacniidescunias Sauccte ass 12

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056,

et RR FE Ga rrctivnicinevscnnntektsabmstiieakediscnciisies 9

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779,

Re Sng I Pin cinudinticcceacticblceleage el ee 10

Department of Revenue of Montana v, Kurth

Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937,

Se Ra Ee TI iiibetkstiss teens 12, 18, 14

Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct.

Fark Se Aa ET SD ccistechnidcitennpolaienabnnnosenmmenians 10

Hudson v. United States, U.S. _, 118 S.Ct 488,

RIP Rp: Ge CE i vicvncesnsorvnttiesinneeataiesctcntaninsandocs 9-12

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,

83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (19638)......00..00.. eee 11

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673,

Fe Re I icici i 10

Moore vy. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 HOW 13,

Se eae I i iiiiaitidtinii ae tn 10

United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109

S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)...........cccscseeee 10, 12, 14

vi

Page

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,

63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943)...........eeseereee 10

United States v. Ursery, 618 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct.

2135, 185 L.Ed.2d 549 (1906)..........crsrcecscosscserreees 14

United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct.

2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1080).........0rsssccscscescsrseecrssees 11

Constitutional Provisions Cited:

Ras GG TIE, Viscciscictiniciniccobessssinintineeiinnsieuiiainees 1

TE. COME. TROMINE, TEE Y ciccacesinanecnncnessnnsicinpuhtittmiunisiaes 2

Statutes Cited:

Be ais: FN a ceirenechcnieeineneiennicecitnscdbiuntincniandicidansbiianiocd 1

Be ns | Bi erciniichactinantipnhecsiinaneasnieianiqennbdgsscbasedasiahaneh 14

Fe ces Bi edieemscnsniricinsatanessnninicoensincnnsveniatiiieniieess 7

Miscellaneous:

1996 Pennsylvania Crash Facts and Statistics,

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,

Bureau of Highway Safety and Traffic

TIE ccc eccerennnevisevivtnnsrveaenniesanuanunniseesenataninen 13

1

The Petitioner, David L. Williams, respectfully prays that

a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the denial by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court of Petitioner’s Petition for

Allowance of Appeal therein as filed on February 24, 1998.

OPINIONS BELOW

On February 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania denied without opinion, Petitioner’s Petition for

Allowancz of Appeal. The Supreme Court Order (A-1) is cited at

___ Pa.__, 706 A.2d 1213 (1998). Said Petition was filed

based on the unpublished memorandum decision by the

Pennsylvania Superior Court (B-1) on August 28, 1997 as cited

at ___ Pa. Super. __, 704 A.2d 696 (1997) which affirmed the

Judgment of Sentence and Order issued by the trial court on

April 29, 1996 (C-1).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

On February 24, 1998, the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania entered its Order for which Petitioner seeks the

Writ of Certiorari.

This Court has jurisdiction to review this case under 28

U.S.C. 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment

of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in the time of

War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,

nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.

2

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

STATUTE INVOLVED

75 Pa.C.S.A. 1543 (F-1)

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

David L. Williams, Petitioner herein, was stopped by

Patrolman Timothy Harvey of the Springettsbury Township

Police Department (York County, Pennsylvania) on November

20, 1994. Patrolman Harvey followed Mr. Williams who was

driving on Route 30 for approximately one-half mile before

activating his lights whereupon the Petitioner immediately and

properly pulled over his vehicle.

No citations were issued at the scene and Mr. Williams

was released.

Mr. Williams was charged with a violation of driving

under suspension under Section 1543(b) (F-1) of the

Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code by citation filed with the office

of District Justice Roy L. Lam in Springettsbury Township on

December 9, 1994.

The summary trial was held on January 25, 1995 before

District Justice Roy Lam, a lay justice sitting in a court not of

record, at which time the Petitioner was found guilty.

Notwithstanding that the Petitioner had a right to appeal

the decision to the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Pennsylvania and in fact timely and properly filed a summary

conviction appeal on February 24, 1995 for a De Novo Hearing,

District Justice Lam immediately notified the Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation of his finding of guilt.

In response to the certification by the District Justice of

the ruling as to guilt, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation, by notice dated February 24,

1995, notified the Petitioner that the Department was taking

action against him to suspend his driver’s license for one year on

the basis of the same acts and the "conviction" by the District

Justice of him for Driving Under Suspension (G-1).

The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation took

action to suspend and in fact the Petitioner’s Pennsylvania

4

driving privileges were suspended on March 23, 1995 for one

year.

The separate action by the Department of

Transportation proceeded without reference to the fact that the

Petitioner had in fact appealed the decision of the District

Justice to the Court of Common Pleas of York County, which

appeal was an Appeal De Novo to the Trial Court of Record in

this case.

The Petitioner, partially for financial reasons, attempted

pro se to respond to the Notice of action of Suspension from the

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation dated February 24,

1995 (G-1) by forwarding a copy of the appeal papers in this

summary criminal case to the Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation indicating to them that the Appeal De Novo had

been filed and that no Trial of Record had been held.

The Department in fact continued to prosecute the

stspension and Mr. Williams’ license was suspended in

accordance with the Notice of Action of Suspension for the acts

giving rise to this case of Driving Under Suspension on March

23, 1995 in that the Petitioner sent to the Department of

Transportation the wrong appeal papers, i.e. the Summary

Appeal papers and not those papers necessary to effect an

"appeal" in the suspension action by the Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation.

The Petitioner at the time of the De Novo trial of this

criminal case, on May 31, 1995, in fact was well into serving his

one-year license suspension penalty for the charge filed in this

case by Officer Harvey and yet had not been convicted of the

crime that was to bring about the suspension penalty.

In the Summary Conviction Appeal in the Common Pleas

Court of York County, Pennsylvania, Petitioner’s Motions were

filed on May 15, 1995. Said Motions as presented included

reference to constitutional violations of double jeopardy and due

process protections as provided in the United States

Constitution.

5

A hearing on said motions and a De Novo Summary Trial

were held before the Honorable Joseph E. Erb (York County,

Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas) on May 31, 1995. The

record of said hearing included a reference to the constitutional

violation of double jeopardy and resulting due process violations.

The Officer testified at the May 31, 1995 combined Pre-

trial Hearing and Trial of this case that he had pulled Mr.

Williams’ vehicle over after he had followed him from

approximately North Hills Road in Springettsbury Township,

York County, Pennsylvania for one-half mile to North Sherman

Street. The Officer testified as follows:

I observed that it was traveling approximately

30 to 35 miles an hour, and also that the right

wheels of the vehicle were juggling off the

roadway onto the berm, basically straddling the

white line by about one to two feet....

The Petitioner was cooperative with the Police Officer

and at the Officer’s request performed field sobriety tests which

the Officer determined that he passed. As was observed in the

factual Hearing of this case the Petitioner is blind in one eye.

At the time the Officer approached Mr. Williams’ vehicle

after having pulled him over, the Officer asked Mr. Williams for

his driver’s license and registration and at that time was told by

Mr. Williams that he did not have a license.

Petitioner’s Memorandum was filed in the trial court on

June 23, 1995 and included references to the double jeopardy

and due process violations of the United States Constitution.

The Commonwealth responded with their brief on July 24, 1995.

An Opinion and Order was issued by The Honorable

Joseph E. Erb of the York County, Pennsylvania Court of

Common Pleas, the Court of record, on February 5, 1996 (E-1)

denying and refusing Petitioner’s Motions and finding the

Petitioner guilty.

6

Sentencing was scheduled for March 25, 1996 and

continued to April 29, 1996 at which time Petitioner was

sentenced in this case to penalties including a $1,000.00 fine and

ninety days incarceration (D-1).

Before the time of sentencing, the Petitioner had fully

served the one-year suspension penalty in the action by the

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.

Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

was timely filed on May 24, 1996.

On May 29, 1996, The Honorable Joseph E. Erb filed a

Direction to Defendant to File a Statement of Matters

Complained of under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925(b) and said response was filed by the Petitioner on June 11,

1996, which again included assertions as to violations of due

process and double jeopardy as contained in the Federal and

State constitutions.

As required, the Criminal Docketing Statement was filed

with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on July 2, 1996 which

listed the issues for appeal and said issues contained reference

to the double jeopardy and due process violations under the

Federal and State Constitutions.

A Brief and accompanying Reproduced Record were filed

in support of the appeal on November 3, 1996 in the

Pennsylvania Superior Court. Said Brief also raised the due

process and double jeopardy violations of the Federal

Constitution.

On September 25, 1996, The Honorable Joseph E. Erb

filed a Memorandum in Support of Order Pursuant to

Pa.R.App.P. 1925(a) (C-1).

Following briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court

of Pennsylvania affirmed the Lower Court’s Opinion on August

28, 1997 (B-1) wherein the Court addressed the double jeopardy

issue.

oon enaaay

7

On September 26, 1997, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

which also referenced the aforesaid violations of the

Constitutions of the United States and of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.

Said Petition was denied by the Supreme Court, without

opinion, on February 24, 1998 (A-1).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION FOR WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE WHETHER

PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DOUBLE

JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED DUE TO THE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUAL PROSECUTION AND

PENALTY IN THIS CASE.

Petitioner’s rights of Due Process and Double J eopardy

under the Constitution of the United States were violated in that

the Petitioner was tried, convicted and sanctioned twice for the

same criminal offense.

Section 1543 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code

(F-1) is repugnant to the United States Constitution in that this

dual statute is unconstitutional in creating a duality of procedure

lacking due process, resulting in dual penalties for the same acts

and thus violating the Fifth Amendment as to Double J eopardy

and the Fourteenth Amendment as to deprivation of life, liberty

and the pursuit of happiness without due process of law. The

statute reads as follows:

75 PaC S.A. § 1543 TITLE, REGISTRATION,

LICENSING

$ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is

suspended or revoked

8

(a) Offense defined.- Except as provided in

subsection (b), any person who drives a motor

vehicle on any highway or traffic way of this

Commonwealth after the commencement of a

suspension, revocation or cancellation of the

operating privilege and before the operating

privilege has been restored is guilty of a

summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be

sentenced to pay a fine of $200.

(b) Certain offenses.-

(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on

any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth

at a time when their operating privilege is

suspended or revoked as a condition of

acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative

Disposition for a violation of section 3731

(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or

controlled substance) or because of a violation of

section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for

refusal) or 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty

of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to

pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo

imprisonment for a period of not less than 90

days.

(2) This subsection shall apply to any person

against whom one of these suspensions has been

imposed whether the person is currently serving

this suspension or whether the effective date of

suspension has been deferred under any of the

provisions of section 1544 (relating to additional

period of revocation or suspension). This

provision shall also apply until the person has

had the operating privilege restored. This

subsection shall also apply to any revocation

imposed pursuant to section 1542 (relating to

revocation of habitual offender’s license) if any

of the enumerated offenses was for a violation of

section 3731.

(c) Suspension or revocation of operating

privilege. - Upon receiving a certified record of

the conviction of any person under this section,

9

the department shall suspend or revoke that

person’s operating privilege as follows:

(1) If the department’s records show that the

person was under suspension, recall or

cancellation on the date of violation, and had not

been restored, the department shall suspend the

person’s operating privilege for an additional

one-year period.

(2) If the department’s records show that the

person was under revocation on the date of

violation, and had not been restored, the

department shall revoke the person’s operating

privilege for an additional two-year period.

(d) Citation of appropriate subsection. -Prior to

filing a citation for a violation of this section

with the issuing authority named in the citation,

the police officer shall verify the basis for the

suspension with the department. Upon

receiving the verification, the officer shall cite

the appropriate subsection of this section on the

citation.

1976, June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, imd.

effective. Amended 1982, Dec.15, P.L. 1268, No.

289, § 4, effective in 30 days; 1986, Dec. 11, P.L.

1530, No. 166, § 4, effective in 60 days; 1987,

Nov.23, P.L. 399, No. 82, § 3, effective in 60

days; 1994, Dec.12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, § 2,

effective in nine months.

This Court held in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89

S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) that the "double jeopardy

prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental

ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to

the States through the Fourteenth Amendment".

v. United States,

Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court in Hudson

(1997) that:

The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no

“person [shall] be subject for the same offence to

U.S. __, 118 S.Ct. 488, 189 L.Ed.2d 450

10

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." We

have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy

Clause does not prohibit the imposition of any

additional sanction that could, "in common

parlance,” be described as punishment. United

States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549,

87 L.Ed. 443, 63 S.Ct. 379 (1943) (quoting

Moore vy. lilinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 HOW 13, 19, 14

L.Ed. 306 (1852)). The Clause protects only

against the imposition of multiple criminal

punishments for the same offense, Helvering v.

Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 82 L.Ed. 917, 58

S.Ct. 630 (1938); see also Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-

549 ("Only" "criminal punishment” "subjects the

defendant to ’jeopardy’ within the constitutional

meaning"); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 44

L.Ed.2d 346, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975) ("In the

constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk

that is traditionally associated with a criminal

prosecution"), and then only when such occurs in

successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter,

459 U.S. 359, 366, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 103 S.Ct. 673

(1983).

Certainly, Section 1543 of the Pennsylvania Motor

Vehicle Code and the dual procedure and punishment set forth

therein for the same acts, which is most often successive

procedure and punishment, are criminal in nature under the

criteria set forth in Hudson, cited supra, (disavowing in part the

analysis in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104

L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) which analysis it is submitted would also

bring the conclusion that Section 1543 is an unconstitutionally

dual criminal procedure and penalty).

The statute with its dual procedure and punishment is

on its face criminal in nature and it is clear that the

Pennsylvania Legislature intended it as such. Both procedures,

that by the District Attorney in prosecuting this case under

1543(b) of the statute, and the Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation in prosecuting under 1543(c) do so based on a

"conviction". The language used by the Pennsylvania Legislature

11

is criminal in nature and intent. The conviction is that of a

summary criminal offense as defined in Section 1543(a) and

1543(b). The penalty of suspension under 1543(c)(2) is increased

if the defendant was under revocation at the time of the

"violation", a type of penalty enhancement and recidivism

deterrence.

The Legislature has clearly labeled and intended the

statute criminal and not civil. See United States v. Ward, 448

U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980).

Since the Pennsylvania Legislature has not "indicated an

intention to establish « civil penalty", it is submitted there should

be no need to apply the second stage of the Hudson and Ward

analysis, that is, to by the "clearest proof" override legislative

intent and transform...a civil remedy into a criminal penalty".

Ward, cited supra, at p. 249 and see Hudson, cited supra.

Moreover, even if the second stage of the Hudson and

Ward analysis would be applied that is:

(1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative

disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has

historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3)

“whether it comes into play only on a finding of

scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote

the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution

and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to

which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether

an alternative purpose to which it may rationally

be connected is assignalle for it"; and (7)

"whether it appears excessive in relation to the

alternative purpose assigned."

Hudson, cited supra, and Kennedy v. Mendoza-

Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d

644 (1963).

this dual criminal statute considered in relation to the statute on

its face involves (1) a clear disability and restraint in both the

incarceration of 1543(b) and the suspension penalty of 1543(c);

(2) has historically been considered punishment at least to the

12

extent of a requirement as to due process - see Bell v. Burson,

402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); (3) in 1543

there is scienter involved that is knowledge and criminal intent

to drive while under suspension; (4) certainly there is deterrence

and retribution in loss of license to Mr. Williams who is partially

disabled and lives alone and who is cut off from society for all

intent and purposes by the loss of the ability to drive because no

other means of transportation is available to him; (5) the

behavior penalized is clearly made a crime in 15493 itself; (6) the

only alternative purpose to which it might connect, that is, taking

those off the highway who drive while suspended, is hardly a

factor where the person has merely driven while under

suspension and not committed some heinous crime making her

or him a danger to society. The Petitioner, Mr. Williams, in the

case before the Court was not charged with any unsafe driving

and was not even involved in any accident or near an accident;

and (7) certainly, in light of the foregoing, dual punishment for

driving under suspension is not only excessive but unnecessary

and of no benefit to any alternative purpose of public safety the

Legislature might have considered if in fact it did.

The criteria in the Hudson case are clearly met showing

the dual procedure and penalties of 1543 to be both criminal in

nature and thereby clearly implicating double jeopardy and due

process provisions of the United States Constitution.

Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.

767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994).

The dual procedure in this case has overwhelmed Mr.

Williams, as it has many others in the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, with the necessity to defend two separate

prosecutions with different procedures in different hearings and

with different prosecutors all for the same single act of driving

while under suspension.

This is in violation of due process and protections as to

double jeopardy as provided in the Constitution of the United

States. See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,

cited supra; see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109

S.Ct. 1892, 104 S.Ct. 487 (1989), disavowed in part by Hudson

v. United States, U.S. __, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450

13

(1997) and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct.

2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993).

Clearly under the criteria set in Hudson, Kurth Ranch

and Halper, cited supra, jeopardy has attached and further

prosecution and penalty in this case would amount to excessive

and dual process and punishments for the same offense.

The action of the Department of Transportation in this

case was a separate action, brought for the purpose of exacting

a punishment and sanction. The procedure and punishment by

the Department’s action is clearly set forth in its notice of action

to suspend (G-1).

In most geographical areas of the United States,

including most areas of York County, Pennsylvania where this

offense occurred, the sole means of transportation is by

automobile. To the great number of persons in these places, the

inability to drive creates the inability to work, the inability to

obtain the necessities of life such as food and medical assistance

and the inability to exercise the constitutional rights of a citizen

to participate in government and to vote and, of course, social

isolation especially for those persons who live alone. Very clearly,

there is a deprivation of life, liberty and property.

On the other hand by comparison, incarceration takes

away few of these basic needs and rights and is for many persons

much less punitive and much less restrictive of liberty. A person

who is incarcerated is housed, fed, and cared for and he for the

most part maintains the ability to exercise his rights as a citizen,

can obtain all his necessities, and often can work in work release

at his place of employment.

As to whether there is any remedial benefit to the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a suspension imposed for

driving under suspension there is certainly room for great doubt,

as has been recognized in somewhat recent legislation in

Pennsylvania restoring the licenses of thousands of persons who

were too harshly penalized for driving under suspension (Section

4 of Act 1994, December 12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, 75 Pa.C.S.A.

14

1542 as amended).

It was by the enactment of this statute that the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania admitted and determined that

the Commonwealth was not served, yet made whole, by these

suspensions but in fact damaged by them.

Statistical data after the enactment and release of these

suspended drivers to drive again in fact showed a decrease in

accident fatalities per vehicle miles traveled. 1996 Pennsylvania

Crash Facts and Statistics, Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation, Bureau of Highway Safety and Traffic

Engineering, Page 11.

A license suspension proceeding is a very personal

proceeding involving a very personal punishment as personal and

as severe as incarceration and is not an in rem proceeding as

analyzed in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct.

2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) and Commonwealth v. Wingait

Farms, 547 Pa. 332, 690 A.2d 222 (1997), cert. denied, _—*US.

_., 118 S.Ct. 98, 139 L.Ed.2d 53 (1997).

The criteria set forth in Kurth Ranch, cited supra, are

certainly met by such a suspension. Herein the suspension in a

separate proceeding is conditioned on a crime, imposed after

arrest and the only person subject to suspension is the person

charged with the offense. See this Court’s interpretation in

Ursery, cited supra, of Kurth Ranch, cited supra, including also

an analysis of Halper, cited supra, with dissent by Justice

Stevens.

In that the Petitioner has already had his license

suspended for one year by the process initiated by the District

Justice and concluded with actual suspension of the Petitioner’s

license by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, the

case at bar should be dismissed on double jeopardy and/or due

process grounds, the Petitioner discharged, and the dual

procedure used to prosecute the Petitioner condemned.

15

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should be issued

to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to

review the question presented by this Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. BERGDOLL

Counsel of Record

Law Offices of John G. Bergdoll

300 West Market Street

York, Pennsylvania 17401

(717) 845-5131

Attorney for Petitioner

A-1

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH : No. 759

OF PENNSYLVANIA, : Middle District

: Allocatur Dkt. 1997

Respondent,

Vv.

: Petition for

DAVID L. WILLIAMS, : Allowance

: Appeal from

Petitioner. : Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 1998, the Petition

for Allowance of Appeal is hereby DENIED.

TRUE & CORRECT COPY

ATTEST:

FEB 24, 1998

/s/ Shirley Bailey

SHIRLEY BAILEY

CHIEF CLERK

B-1

APPENDIX B

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,

Appellant

)

)

)

v. )

)

) NO. 00481 HARRISBURG,

) 1996

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence in the

Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division, No. 70 SCA 1995

BEFORE: TAMILIA, J., HUDOCK, J. and CERCONE, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM:

This is an appeal of the judgment of sentence of ninety

(90) days’ incarceration and a $1,000 fine imposed following

appellant’s de novo summary trial. Appellant’s motion to dismiss

was denied and he was found guilty of driving while his license

was suspended for a DUI conviction.*

The following statement of facts was provided by the trial

court in its February 5, 1996 Opinion, which was adopted as its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.

Defendant was stopped by the Springettsbury

Township Police on November 20, 1994, after

following the defendant for approximately one-

half mile on the Route 30 by-pass. The

defendant was driving below the posted speed

limit of 40 m.p.h. and had its right tires

travelling on the berm.

175 Pa. C.S. § 1543(b).

B-2

The defendant, who is blind in one eye, passed

the field sobriety tests that were administered.

The defendant informed the officer that he did

not have a driver’s license because his had been

suspended as the result of a DUI conviction.

Defendant alleges that the officer violated his

rights when he neglected to inform the

defendant of the mandatory penalties under

§1543(b) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle

Code.

On December 9, 1994, a citation was issued. The

officer issued the citation after official

certification of the suspension from the

Department of Transportation which he received

on December 5, 1994.

The defendant was found guilty of driving

without a license by the District Justice, and a

timely appeal to the Court of Common Pleas

followed. Irrespective of this appeal, the

defendant’s conviction was transmitted to the

Department of Transportation. The Department

processed the conviction because the defendant

had submitted the wrong appeal papers.

(Slip Op., Erb, J., 2/5/96, pp. 1-3; footnote omitted.)

Appellant first argues the patrolman, Officer Harvey who

stopped his vehicle on November 20, 1994 did so without

articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that appellant had

committed a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Second,

appellant asserts Officer Harvey failed to properly and timely

initiate the instant proceeding, as a citation for driving with a

suspended license was not immediately issued at the scene of the

traffic stop. Third, appellant asserts the evidence presented was

insufficient to demonstrate that he was notified, prior to his stop

by the officer, of the penalty imposed for a violation of section

B-3

1543(b) and, as such, a verdict of not guilty, dismissal and/or

discharge of appellant is required. Lastly, appellant argues his

prosecution under section 1543(b) of the Pennsylvania Motor

Vehicle Code is violative of the double jeopardy clauses of the

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

Appellant’s first argument is without merit. An officer may

conduct a traffic stop if there is "articulable and reasonable

grounds to suspect" that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code

has occurred. Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa. Super. 69,

____, 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993). Because Officer Harvey observed

appellant driving erratically, articulable and reasonable grounds

to suspect that he was violating the Motor Vehicle Code were

established at trial. Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa. Super.

537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990). Therefore, the officer’s stop of

appellant’s vehicle was justified.

Next, appellant argues that, rather than filing the traffic

citation for driving with a suspended license on December 13,

1994, Officer Harvey should have immediately issued the citation

at the scene of the traffic stop on November 20, 1994. This

argument is also without merit. In filing the citation for the

summary offensé within thirty (30) days of its occurrence, Officer

Harvey followed proper procedure. The citation was timely fil

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5553, Summary offenses involving

vehicles (proceedings for summary offenses under Title 75 must

be commenced within 30 days after the commission of the alleged

offense), and was properly filed pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543

(d), Citation of appropriate subsection, as Officer Harvey verified

through the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation that

appellant’s license had been suspended due to a DUI conviction.

Appellant contends in his third argument that a dismissal,

discharge and/or verdict of not guilty is required because the

evidence presented was insufficient to demonstrate he had notice

of the nature and extent of the mandatory penalty under section

1543(b). The case of Commonwealth v. Gamble, 376 Pa. Super.

590, 546 A.2d 681 (1988), is cited by appellant for the proposition

that, in order to be subject to the section 1543(b) penalty, a

B-4

defendant must be made aware of the fact that the penalty

consists of a $1,000 fine and ninety (90) days’ incarceration.

Appellant’s understanding of that case, however, is incorrect. In

Gamble, as was subsequently explained in Commonwealth v.

Crockford, 443 Pa. Super. 23, 660 A.2d 1326 (1995),

this court ruled that although evidence of

mailing (to a prior, stale address) was

presented and appellant was under the belief

that his license was suspended, judgment was

nevertheless properly arrested. Appellant

believed that his license was suspended for

failure to respond to citations. In fact, it was

suspended for driving under the influence.

Appellant claimed he was unaware of the nature

of his suspension. This court held that

appellant not only had to have actual notice of

his suspension, but actual notice of the true

nature of the suspension. The court refused to

subject appellant to the more severe penalties of

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b).

Id. at _, - 660 A.2d at 1329 n. 2. As indicated above, the

holding of Gamble, supra, is helpful to appellant’s case only if he

did not have actual notice of the nature of his suspension. Jd. It

is not necessary that a defendant be given notice of potential

penalties that will accompany subsequent convictions of driving

while under a license suspension.

In the instant case, appellant did have actual notice that his

license was suspended due to his DUI conviction. The Bureau

of Driver Licensing Certification Statement, which outlined the

chronology of appellant’s violations and departmental actions,

was made a part of the record in order to demonstrate that

appellant’s license was under suspension for a DUI conviction as

of March 23, 1994, and official notice of that suspension was

mailed to his correct address on April 12, 1994. Furthermore,

appellant admitted to Officer Harvey and to the trial court that

he was aware of his license suspension for his DUI conviction at

B-5

the time he was stopped (T.T., 5/31/95, pp. 18-21). Therefore,

sufficient evidence was presented to sustain appellant’s

conviction.

Lastly, appellant contends the suspension of his driver’s

license for driving while already under a suspension for his DUI

conviction constituted punishment, and any subsequent criminal

prosecution under section 1543(b) is violative of the double

jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania

Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend V; Pa. Const. art. 1, section

10. Our Court recently addressed this issue in Commonwealth

v. Wolfe, 454 Pa. Super. 93, 684 A.2d 642 (1996), wherein we

held that double jeopardy principles are not violated when a

criminal conviction is accompanied by a motorist’s license

suspension. Id. Although suspensions may have an "incidental

deterrent or punitive effect", the court held "the primary purpose

of such suspensions is not to punish the individual but to protect

the public." Id. at _, 684 A.2d at 646.

In the same respect, while the Commonwealth seeks to

punish appellant with the sentence of 90 days’ incarceration and

a $1,000 fine for driving with a suspended license, his 12-month

suspension by the Department of Transportation on March 23,

1995 was imposed to protect the public from a motorist who

had been recently adjudicated guilty of DUI and who the

Department of Transportation had recently determined was an

unsafe driver. The Department of Transportation had not, as of

the date appellant was pulled over by Officer Harvey, received

from appellant proof that he had obtained insurance and

successfully completed a DUI treatment program, as was required

for restoration of appellant’s operating privileges. Pursuant to

this Court’s reasoning in Wolfe, supra, we conclude that

appellant’s consecutive suspension by the Department of

Transportation did not constitute punishment triggering

protection from a subsequent criminal prosecution.

Accordingly, the prosecution of appellant for driving while

B-6

under a license suspension is not barred by the double jeopardy

clauses of either the United States Constitution or the

Pennsylvania Constitution, and the trial court properly refused

to dismiss the charges.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

B-7

COMMONWEALTH OF IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

PENNSYLVANIA OF PENNSYLVANIA

¥.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS,

Appellant

No. 00481 HARRISBURG,

1996

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence in the

Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division, No. 70 SCA 1995

JUDGMENT

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of York County, be, and the same is

hereby Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ David A. Szewezak

Prothonotary

Dated: August 28, 1997

C-1

APPENDIX C

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF

YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of : No. 70 8.C.A. 1995

Pennsylvania :

Vv. °

: Driving/Suspension

David L. Williams : D.U.L. Related

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ORDER

PURSUANT TO Pa.R.App.P. 1925(a)

Defendant, David L. Williams, has filed an Appeal to the

Superior Court from the Order of this Court dated February 5,

1996. Pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 1925(b), the Trial Court directed

Defendant to file a concise statement of matters complained of

on appeal. Said statement was filed by David L. Williams on

June 11, 1996.

We have reviewed the 1925(b) issues assigned by David

L. Williams as issues to be raised on appeal and we refer the

Superior Court to the Trial Court’s Opinion and Order of

February 5, 1996.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Joseph E. Erb

Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

Dated: September 25, 1996

D-1

APPENDIX D

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH : No. 70 SCA 1995

VS.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS : Driving Under Suspension

York, Pa., Monday, April 29, 1996

Before the Honorable Joseph E. Erb, Sr. Judge

APPEARANCES:

CRAIG R. MILSTEN, Esquire

Assistant District Attorney

for the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, Esquire

for the Defendant

MR. MILSTEN: This is Commonwealth versus

David L. Williams, 70 SCA 1995, Defendant was charged with

driving under suspended license, DUI-related. This is the date

set for his sentencing.

MR. BERGDOLL: If the Court please, we

understand that there’s a mandatory sentence involved here,

Your Honor. We will ask for a continuation of bail, so we might

have an opportunity to appeal the decision made by the Court.

I do understand at this point that there are no

options available for house arrest or any intermediate punish-

D-2

ment, so I think we’re prepared to proceed with sentencing.

I have explained to my client the various rights

of appeal, and the rights that he would have in reference to this

sentence.

THE COURT: The mandatory sentence is.

MR. MILSTEN: I’m sorry, I don’t have that

information.

MR. BERGDOLL: 90 days.

ORDER

Under the circumstances, we will direct that the

Defendant will undergo imprisonment in York County Jail for a

period of 90 days, pay $1,000 fine, and the costs, $10 under Act

45.

We direct that the execution of sentence will be

withheld until an appeal can be taken by the Defendant. If an

appeal is not taken within ten days, he will report to York

County Jail.

MR. BERGDOLL: Your Honor, there’s a 30 day

appeal period. It is a direct appeal.

THE COURT: Within 30 days.

MR. BERGDOLL: Thank you.

THE COURT: If an appeal is taken, the Court

will direct counsel to advise the Court if the appeal is dismissed,

or the Commonwealth’s position is upheld on appeal, so that the

Court then will set a date for the Defendant to begin his

incarceration.

**. *

blw 5/30/96

E-1

APPENDIX E

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH OF : 70 SCA 1995

PENNSYLVANIA

V.

: Driving/Suspension

DAVID L. WILLIAMS : DUI Related

APPEARANCES:

JONELLE L. HARTER, ESQUIRE

For the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant

OPINION

This matter comes before the court on the motion of the

defendant, David L. Williams, seeking that the case be dismissed.

For the following reasons, the defendant’s request will be

refused and denied.

Defendant was stopped by the Springettsbury Township

police on November 20, 1994, after following the defendant for

approximately one-half mile on the Route 30 bypass. The

defendant was driving below the posted speed limit of 40 m.p.h.

and had its right tires travelling on the berm.

The defendant, who is blind in one eye, passed the field

sobriety tests that were administered. The defendant informed

the officer that he did not have a driver’s license because his had

been suspended as the result of a DUI conviction. Defendant

alleges that the officer violated his rights when he neglected to

E-2

inform the defendant of the mandatory penalties under

§1543(b)! of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.

On December 9, 1994, a citation was issued. The officer

issued the citation after official certification of the suspension

from the Department of Transportation which he received on

December 5, 1994.

The defendant was found guilty of driving without a

license by the District Justice, and a timely appeal to the Court

of Common Pleas followed. Irrespective of this appeal, the

defendant’s conviction was transmitted to the Department of

Transportation. The Department processed the conviction

because the defendant had submitted the wrong appeal papers.

First we address whether the officer had reasonable and

articulable grounds to support the stop of the defendant on the

evening of November 20, 1994. The court finds that the erratic

driving of the defendant was sufficient to cause the officer to

stop the defendant. Accordingly we will refuse and deny this

alleged insufficiency.

Next, we determine whether the charges were properly

initiated by the officer. The law requires that a citation in a

summary case shall be filed within thirty days of the date of the

‘The relevant portion of 75 §1543 Driving while

operating privilege is suspended or revoked is as

follows:

1543(b)(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on

any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a

time when their operating privilege is suspended or

revoked ...as a violation of section 3731 (relating to

driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled

substance) ...shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a

summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine

of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of

not less than 90 days.

E-3

offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §5553(a)*. The record supports that the

date of the offense was November 20, 1994 and that the citation

was filed on December 13, 1994. The suspension was properly

authenticated prior to issuance, as is required by 75 Pa. C.S.A.

$1543(d)?. Accordingly, we determine that the charges were

properly initiated by the officer.

Next, we discuss the issue of "actual notice" to the

defendant of the penalties under §1543(b) of the Pennsylvania

Motor Vehicle Code. The Commonwealth has the burden of

proving that the defendant had actual notice of driver's

suspension or revocation for a DUlI-related offense. See,

Commonwealth v. Crockford, _ Pa. Super. _, 660 A.2d 1326,

1329 (1995). The record reveals that the defendant had actual

notice of his DUI related suspension. The defendant informed

the officer as the time of the stop that he had no license because

of the DUI related suspension. The defendant surrendered his

license in open court at the time of the conviction, and the

official notice was sent to his verified correct address by the

Department, mailed April 12, 1994. Accordingly, we determine

that the record supports sufficient evidence of the actual notice

75 Pa.C.S. §5553 Summary offense involving vehicles

(a) General rule.- Except as provided in subsection (b)

or (c), proceedings for summary offenses under Title

75 (relating to vehicles) must be commenced within 30

days after the commission of the alleged offense or

within 30 days after the discovery of the commission

of the offense or the identity of the offender,

whichever is later, and not thereafter.

31543(d) Citation of appropriate subsection.- Prior to

filing a citation for a violation of this section with

the issuing authority named in the citation, the police

officer shall verify the basis for the suspension with

the department. Upon receiving the verification, the

officer shall cite the appropriate subsection of this

section on the citation. Amended 1894, Dec. 12, P.L.

1048, No. 143, §2.

E-4

to the defendant under 75 Pa. C.S.A. §1543(b).

Finally, we address the issue of double jeopardy as it

applies to the separate processing of the violation by the

Department of Motor Vehicles. Defendant relies on a line of

cases which lend some support to his contention that a DUI

prosecution is barred after the civil penalty of license suspension

has been effected. However, the cases are distinguishable. In

Pennsylvania, §1543(b) is a criminal statute that has the license

suspension included in the statute. The penalty is triggered by

the finding of guilty of the defendant. See, Helt v. Pennsylvania

D.O.T., 69 Pa. Cmwlth. 333, 452 A.2d 74 (1982).

Under the facts of this case, the suspension processing

was premature in light of the failure of the defendant to properly

give the Department notice of his intention to appeal his

conviction. The procedural flaw cannot trigger a double jeopardy

violation for the underlying conviction as a separate or successive

proceeding. Accordingly, we will refuse and deny all alleged

error and will affirm the summary judgement conviction.

BY THE COURT,

(s/ Joseph E. Erb

Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

E-5

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY,

PENNSYLVANIA

COMMONWEALTH OF : 70 SCA 1995

PENNSYLVANIA :

V. :

: Driving/Suspension

DAVID L. WILLIAMS : DUI Related

APPEARANCES:

JONELLE L. HARTER, ESQUIRE

For the Commonwealth

JOHN G. BERGDOLL, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant

ORDER

AND NOW, TO WIT, This 5th day of February, 1996,

the summary conviction appeal of the defendant, David L.

Williams is hereby affirmed. The alleged points of error are

refused and denied.

The defendant is directed to appear for sentencing on

Monday, March 25, 1996, 9:30 a.m.

BY THE COURT,

(s/ Joseph E. Erb

Joseph E. Erb, Senior Judge

F-1

APPENDIX F

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543 TITLE, REGISTRATION, LICENSING

§ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is suspended or

revoked

(a) Offense defined.- Except as provided in subsection (b), any

person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or traffic

way of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a

suspension, revocation or cancellation of the operating privilege

and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty

of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced

to pay a fine of $200.

(b) Certain offenses.-

(1) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway

or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when their

operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of

acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a

violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of

alcohol or controlled substance) or because of a violation of

section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3731

shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and

Shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo

imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.

(2) This subsection shall apply to any person against whom

one of these suspensions has been imposed whether the person

is currently serving this suspension or whether the effective

date of suspension has been deferred under any of the

provisions of section 1544 (relating to additional period of

revocation or suspension). This provision shall also apply until

the person has had the operating privilege restored. This

subsection shall also apply to any revocation imposed pursuant

to section 1542 (relating to revocation of habitual offender’s

license) if any of the enumerated offenses was for a violation

of section 3731.

F-2

(c) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege. - Upon

receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person

under this section, the department shall suspend or revoke

that person’s operating privilege as follows:

(1) If the department’s records show that the person was

under suspension, recall or cancellation on the date of

violation, and had not been restored, the department shall

suspend the person’s operating privilege for an additional one-

year period.

(2) If the department’s records show that the person was

under revocation on the date of violation, and had not been

restored, the department shall revoke the person’s operating

privilege for an additional two-year period.

(d) Citation of appropriate subsection. -Prior to filing a

citation for a violation of this section with the issuing authority

named in the citation, the police officer shall verify the basis

for the suspension with the department. Upon receiving the

verification, the officer shall cite the appropriate subsection of

this section on the citation.

1976, June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, imd. effective. Amended

1982, Dec.15, P.L. 1268, No. 289, § 4, effective in 30 days;

1986, Dec. 11, P.L. 1530, No. 166, § 4, effective in 60 days;

1987, Nov.23, P.L. 399, No. 82, § 3, effective in 60 days; 1994,

Dec.12, P.L. 1048, No. 143, § 2, effective in nine months.

G-1

APPENDIX G

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Bureau of Driver Licensing

Harrisburg, PA 17123

FEBRUARY 24, 1995

DAVID L. WILLIAMS 950489283815557 001

R D 4 BOX 4555 02/17/1995

13523414

SPRING GROVE PA 17362 07/21/1948

LICENSE IN BUREAU

Dear Motorist:

As a result of your conviction on 01/25/1995 of violating

Section 1543 of the Vehicle Code, DRIVING WHILE

SUSP/REVOKE on 11/20/1994, your driving privilege is being

SUSPENDED for a period of 1 YEAR(S) as mandated by Section

1543 of the Vehicle Code.

Effective Date of Suspension: 03/23/1995, 12:01 a.m.

The above mentioned sanction is in addition to any

previously issued sanction(s).

You will be notified of any outstanding restoration

requirements approximately 30 days before the eligibility date of

the restoration of your driving privilege. You must follow those

instructions very carefully in order to have your driving privilege

restored.

You have the right to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of

the county of your residence within 30 days of the mail date

(February 24, 1995) of this Notice. Sending a copy to this

department of a timely, filed appeal will stay the department’s

action pending a final decision by the court. The copy must be

sent by certified mail to:

G-2

Room 103

Transportation and Safety Building

Harrisburg, PA 17120

9504892838 15557

Sincerely,

/s/ Douglas K. Tobin

Douglas K. Tobin, Director

Bureau of Driver Licensing

SEND FEE/LICENSE/DL-16LC/TO:

Department of Transportation

Bureau of Driver Licensing

P. O. Box 68693

Harrisburg, PA 17106-8693

‘INFORMATION (7:00 AM TO 6:30 PM)

Pittsburgh Area - 412-565-5670

Philadelphia Area - 215-698-8100

Harrisburg Area - 717-787-3130

Toll Free 1 - 800-932-4600