Appendix — Vista Paint Corp. v. United States

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Order of the Court of Appeals,

a aceg og ge au EE TO ie ET la

Order of the Court of Appeals Denying

Petition for Rehearing, January 23,1998 .......... 3a

Opinion of the District Court, April 16, 1996........... 4a

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, September 24,

De aia haha bb as eae oe ue 34a

Declaration of Eddie R. Fischer. April 28,

oie RE OCIS OT ae ead TE ae a 46a

Amended Pretrial Conference Order.

I PP te rr cee te hy 64a

Opinion of the District Court, February 11,

cist ee PERE Ce OEE 6 1 roe a ae a 69a

Complaint, December 3, 1990 ..................... 73a

Supplemental Scheduling Order,

I aig oa a ey 80a

Transcript of District Court Proceedings,

vis, scale cosi Neha ORE Ee Oe RD ak AT 82a

Transcript of District Court Proceedings,

sce ihe oa BE OE Te ORES TEE cal 85a

Order Dismissing Defendant’s Counterclaim.

Dismissing Defendant’s Third Party

Complaint, and Striking Certain Affirmative

RN UN Ee SOE ee ee 89a

APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff-counter-defendant-Appellee

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION.

Defendant-counter-claimant-Appellant.

No. 96-55670.

D.C. No. CV-94-00127-RT

ORDER’

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Robert J. Timlin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted Oct. 6, 1997°°

Pasadena, California

Decided Nov. 4, 1997.

Before PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON, and HAWKINS.

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" This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to

or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-

™ The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral

argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4.

Circuit Judges

We affirm for the reasons stated in the district court’s

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered April 16,

1996

All motions pending before this Court are denied as moot.

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APPENDIX B

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-counter-defendant-Appellee,

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant-counter-claimant-Appellant.

No. 96-55670

D.C. NO. CV-94-00127-RT

Filed January 23, 1998

ORDER

BEFORE: PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON, and HAWKINS.

Circuit Judges.

lhe panel as constituted above has voted to deny the petition

for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for

rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has called for a

vote to rehear this matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for

rehearing en banc is rejected.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

ws

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CASE NO. EDCV 94-0127 RT.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Filed April 16, 1996.

The matter came on regularly for trial, United States District

Judge Robert J. Timlin presiding. After having heard the

arguments of counsel and examined the evidence presented, the

Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of

law:

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Amended Findings of Uncontroverted Facts and

Conclusions of Law.

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The following Findings of Fact are conclusively established

by the Amended Findings of Uncontroverted Facts and

Conclusions of Law, filed February 11, 1992 (“Amended

Findings”), and the Amended Pretrial Order, filed January 3,

1993 (“1/3/94 Court Order’’):

1. In 1984, as part of the State Implementation Plan

(“SIP”) for California to limit the VOC content of paint, the

South Coast Air Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”)

and the San Diego County Air Pollution Control District

(“SDCAPCD”) adopted SIP Rules 113["] and 67.0. These rules

regulate non-flat architectural coatings, otherwise known as

gloss or semi-gloss paints, which are commonly used to paint

structures, mobile homes or pavement. In order to control air

pollution from the manufacture and application of these

coatings, the rules limit their VOC content to no more than 250

grams of VOC per liter of coating (“250 g/1 VOC”), and forbid

the sale, offer for sale, or application of any such paint

exceeding these VOC limitations (“non-compliant coatings”).

2. As background, local and regional government

authorities under California law have primary responsibility for

control of air pollution. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40000 et

seq. Two of these local authorities are the SCAQMD, which

includes Los Angeles and Orange Counties, and the

SDCAPCD, which includes San Diego County. These districts

are empowered to adopt rules governing air pollution and to

independently enforce them as state law. Id. at § 40001. As for

the federal government, the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provides

the EPA with independent authority to enforce federally

approved air pollution control laws. Section 110 of the Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7410 (Section 7410), requires among other things that

each state submit rules for emission limitations to be

" [So in original and throughout remainder of opinion. The actual number

of the rule is 1113.]

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incorporated into the SIP, and enforced as federal law by the

EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413.

3. In 1985, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”), pursuant to the CAA, approved SCAQMD Rule 113

and SDCAPCD Rule 67.0 as part of the SIP for California, to

be enforced as federal law. 50 Fed. Reg. 3338 (January 24,

1985).

4. Vista’s president was aware of these rules and their

purpose in the time period between 1985 to 1987, to control

VOC emissions. Vista was both a long-time manufacturer and

seller of non-compliant coatings, having produced its “Trim-

Kote” and “Proformer” brands with VOC’s in excess of 250 g/1

for over ten years. Vista offered these non-compliant coatings

for sale for the five-year period preceding February 1987.

5. EPA met with industry trade associations in 1987,

including the National Paint & Coatings Association and the

Southern California Paint & Coatings Association, regarding its

strategy for taking enforcement action against companies

violating the 1985 VOC limitations set by law. EPA informed

the industry that it would, as a matter of enforcement

discretion, prioritize enforcement against those companies that

did not cease the manufacture of non-compliant coatings by

July 1, 1987, and who did not cease their sale of non- compliant

coatings by September 1, 1987. Thus, while EPA retained the

discretion to prosecute any company that violated the VOC

limitation after January 24, 1985, EPA announced that those

companies that persisted longest in their continuing violations

of the Clean Air Act would be the first to be prosecuted.

6. On March 19, 1987, in order to determine the

compliance status of the paint industry with the VOC

limitations of federal law, EPA issued a request for information

to a number of paint manufacturers, including Vista, pursuant

to Section 114 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (“Section 114

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Request”). EPA required that each company report the volume

of each non-architectural coating that it manufactured from

February to May 1987, and the VOC content of each coating.

Each company was given until April 7, 1987, to submit their

first reports, and warned that non-compliance would subject

them to civil penalties.

7. Vista did not respond to EPA’s March 19, 1987 request.

Vista’s president cannot recall why Vista did not respond.

Faced with Vista’s recalcitrance, EPA subsequently issued an

Administrative Order against Vista pursuant to Section

113(a)(3) of the CAA, finding that Vista had violated Section

114 of the CAA in failing to provide the requested information

to EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(A)(3)[], 7414. Per its Order, EPA

directed Vista to disclose by no later than April 16, 1987, the

VOC content of the architectural coatings that it manufactured

or distributed from February through May 1987.

8. Vista only partially complied with EPA’s

Administrative Order, responding in a letter postmarked April

20, 1987, by disclosing the VOC content of the architectural

coatings it manufactured in February and March 1987 only.

Vista’s letter disclosed that its monthly paint production was

approximately 25,000 gallons of coatings, with 55 percent by

volume of the identified coatings exceeding the 250 g/l VOC

limitation of federal law. Vista did not respond to EPA’s Order

regarding its coatings manufactured in April and May 1987,

and did not provide the requested information.

9. EPA subsequently sought more specific information

from the paint manufacturers regarding the trade name, volume

and VOC content of each non-compliant coating sold in each

California air quality district in March, April and May 1987.

On May 15, 1987, EPA sent Vista a modified request for more

* [So in original.]

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specific information to supplant its initial request for

information. Alternatively, EPA specified that the paint

manufacturer could stipulate that it sold and/or offered for sale

coatings in violation of the 250 g/l VOC limitation, and the

month and location where the non-compliant paint was sold.

Vista was advised that a failure to provide the requested

information would subject Vista to an enforcement action for

civil penalties of $25,000 per day of violation.

10. Vista responded by a letter dated June 12, 1987.

Without disclosing the months in which it sold non-compliant

coatings, Vista admitted to selling non-compliant coatings in

the SCAQMD and the SDCAPCD. Vista’s president also

confirmed Vista’s prior admissions in his sworn deposition

testimony. Yet the information regarding the volume of each

such non-compliant Vista coating sold and the location of their

sale was available to Vista in March, April and May of 1987.

11. Based upon Vista’s admission, EPA issued a Notice of

Violation to Vista on June 19, 1987, pursuant to Section

113(a)(1) of the CAA.

12. EPA, in its continuing effort to compel Vista to comply

with the law, sent Vista a second Section 114 request on June

19, 1987, requesting documentation of any quantities of Vista

non-compliant coatings manufactured and sold in the

subsequent July-October 1987 period. This request required

Vista to (1) establish and maintain records regarding their non-

compliant coatings; (2) report the volume of non-compliant

coatings sold in August through October 1987 and their

location of sale; (3) report the name and VOC content of the

coatings sold; and (4) report the identity of coatings

manufactured by Vista from July through October 1987.

13. The information requested by EPA’s June 19, 1987,

Section 114 request was available to Vista at the time of EPA’s

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request. EPA again warned Vista at that time of the $25,000

per day penalty if the requested information was not received.

14. In an effort to further accommodate the paint industry

and Vista, EPA by its letter dated July 22, 1987, modified its

second Section 114 request with a strictly tailored condition.

In this letter, EPA stipulated that if Vista would commit to (1)

the cessation of the manufacture of non-compliant coatings by

July 1, 1987, (2) the cessation of all sales of non-compliant

coatings by September 1, 1987 (a condition never fulfilled by

Vista, see below), and (3) disclose the time and location of

sales of non-compliant paint in August 1987 (another condition

never fulfilled by Vista), that Vista would be relieved of its

obligation to provide the other information requested by EPA

in its prior June 1987 letter. Vista was still required to

maintain all relevant records of its manufacture and sale of non-

compliant coatings. EPA was explicit, however, that all

conditions must be strictly complied with if Vista was to be

relieved of any of its reporting obligations.

15. Vista continued to manufacture, sell and offer for sale

its non-compliant coatings throughout April to October 1987,

but did not provide any reports to EPA. Vista continued to

manufacture non-compliant coatings in April, May and June of

1987, and continued to sell and offer for sale its non-compliant

coatings in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas throughout

June, July, August and September 1987. Although Vista

continued to sell non-compliant coatings, Vista submitted no

report of its August sales as requested in EPA’s July 22, 1987,

letter and no report as required by EPA’s June 19, 1987, letter.

EPA, per the CAA Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, gave notice

to the appropriate state air pollution control agency of this

enforcement action.

16. On August 19, 1987, Vista’s president, Eddie R.

Fischer, telephoned William Wruble of EPA Region IX to ask

for more time to sell his non-compliant coatings. After

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discussing Vista’s situation, Mr. Fischer stated that “he had no

choice but to sell the [non-compliant] paint past September 1,

and was planning to do so.” Mr. Fischer then stated that “he

would (could) litigate if he had to, since the option was to go

out of business.”

17. Mr. Wruble denied Vista’s request for additional time

to sell its non-compliant coatings, and explained that Vista’s

failure to take EPA’s enforcement authority seriously was not

a reason to grant it additional time to sell non-compliant

coatings. Mr. Fischer then said that he “didn’t think it was our

[EPA’s] intention to put him in jail, although he’d be willing to

pay a ‘reasonable’ fine to be able to continue to sell his

violating coatings.”

18. Vista was also warned by the local SDCAPCD to cease

its sale of non-compliant coatings by September 1, 1987, a

warning Vista received at least by July 28, 1987. Vista,

however, continued to sell non-compliant coatings throughout

September 1987. Vista admits that such non-compliant

coatings remained offered for sale throughout Vista’s San

Diego stores in September 1987. Vista also continued its

refusal to respond to EPA’s request for information.

19. Further evidence that Vista sold non-compliant coatings

after September 1, 1987, is provided where inspectors from the

SDCAPCD purchased the Vista-brand “Trim-Kote” coating, a

non-compliant coating, from Vista’s retail outlet on Kearney

Villa Road in San Diego, California, on September 2, 1987.

The SDCAPCD’s laboratory analysis revealed that the

purchased paint had a VOC concentration of 387 g/l, well

above the permissible 250 g/l permitted by SDCAPCD Rule

67.

20. The SDCAPCD inspectors purchased a second gallon

of non-compliant coating, a Vista paint under the brand name

“Proformer,” from the same Vista San Diego store on

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September 22, 1987. The SDCAPCD laboratory analysis

revealed that the purchased paint had a VOC concentration of

381 g/l, well above the permissible 250 g/l permitted by

SDCAPCD Rule 67.

21. Both Vista’s records and its president corroborate these

violations. Vista’s April 16, 1987, report to EPA identifies that

its “Trim-Kote” and “Proformer” paints as non-compliant

coatings, have a VOC concentration of 340 and 380 g/l,

respectively. Vista’s president confirmed that Vista’s “Trim-

Kote” and “Proformer” paints purchased by the SDCAPCD

inspectors would be expected to have VOC concentrations in

excess of 250 g/l. Mr. Fischer further admits that non-

compliant coatings were sold in San Diego on September 2,

1987. Based upon these illegal sales, the SDCAPCD cited

Vista with two misdemeanor Notices of Violation for its

violations of SDCAPCD Rule 67. Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 42400.

22. Faced in September 1987 with enforcement action from

the SDCAPCD (EPA had not yet taken its enforcement action

against Vista), Vista sought a variance from the SDCAPCD

Hearing Board.

23. As background, the variance procedure is a creation of

the California Health & Safety Code §§ 42350 et seq., and

provides the applicant with a procedure to obtain relief from a

local rule (not a federal rule) under certain strictly limited

conditions. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 42350. In part, an

applicant cannot obtain a variance unless the applicant attests

that it “is, or will be, in violation of Section 41701 or of any

rule, regulation, or order of the district.” Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 42352(a). Thus, by applying for a variance, Vista

further admitted that it was in violation of SDCAPCD Rule 67

and/or its intent to violate that rule for the express purpose of

selling the remainder of Vista’s non-compliant paints within

the next 90 days.

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24. Vista was subsequently unable to persuade a majority

of the SDCAPCD Hearing Board at its September 24, 1987,

hearing that a variance was warranted, and Vista obtained no

variance relief at any time from the SDCAPCD. Vista applied

to the SDCAPCD Hearing Board for reconsideration, then

dropped its request. Vista represented instead that it had

removed its non-compliant paint from its San Diego stores as

of October 12, 1987, but after the September 24, 1987, variance

hearing. Vista’s president explains that he removed the non-

compliant coating from his San Diego stores because those

coatings were not selling well. Vista subsequently paid a fine

to the SDCAPCD for its violations of their local rules.

25. The VOC’s emitted by Vista’s paint are a primary

precursor of ozone, or smog, which the EPA has designated as

a major air pollutant. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7450, 7451; 40

C.F.R. F9{"] 50.1, 50.9. The 13,000 gallons of coating offered

for sale in September 1987 in San Diego by Vista would release

approximately eight tons of VOC hydrocarbons.

26. Ozone pollution causes serious adverse health effects,

including coughing, reduced lung capacity, respiratory infection

and possible permanent lung damage. There is also evidence

that the young, the elderly, and those persons with respiratory

ailments (such as asthmatics) are among those who are

particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of ozone. At

certain concentration levels, ozone irritates the respiratory

system and causes coughing, wheezing, chest tightness and

headaches. Due to its irritation nature, ozone can aggravate

asthma, bronchitis and emphysema. Some studies indicate that

chronic exposure to fairly low levels of ozone may reduce

resistance to infection and alter blood chemistry or

chromosome structure. At higher concentrations [of ozone],

hospitalization becomes a possibility.

" [So in original.]

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27. Ozone also causes significant damage to the

environment, where ozone can destroy vegetation, reduce crop

yield, and damage exposed materials by causing cracking,

fading and weathering. Moreover, clear evidence shows that

ozone damages economically, ecologically and aesthetically

important plants. When exposed to ozone, major annual crops

produce reduced yields. Some tree species suffer injury to

needles or leaves, lowered productivity and, in severe cases.

individual trees can die.

28. EPA has through the federal Clean Air Act attempted to

control and regulate VOC emissions from a variety of sources,

including paint manufacturers. In 1987, EPA found that 40

paint companies, including Vista, were in violation of the

federal CAA’s limitation on VOC concentrations in their

coatings. All 40 paint companies received a Notice of

Violation, and 38 announced their intent to cease non-

compliant paint sales. Only one company announced its intent

to continue to violate the VOC restrictions, to intentionally

violate the law despite repeated warnings from the regulatory

agencies, and to disregard the effects of its violations on human

health and the environment: that company was Vista.

29. After EPA referred this matter to the U.S. Justice

Department for enforcement action, Vista for the first time

produced a letter it purportedly prepared on or about August 4,

1987, and sent to EPA, that represented that Vista had ceased

its manufacture of non-compliant coatings on June 30, 1987,

and “will not offer for sale any non-compliant coatings after

September 1, 1987.”

30. This representation has in fact proven to be false.

Vista’s president admits that sales of such coatings continued

well after September 1, 1987. In addition, there is no copy of

the letter in EPA’s files or any other indication that it was

received by EPA prior to the date it was produced to the U.S.

Department of Justice in 1989. Vista’s president testified that

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he cannot recall ever seeing the purported Vista August 4,

1987, letter before 1989, when it was first produced to the U.S.

Department of Justice.

31. Vista appears to have had no intention of ceasing its

sale of non-compliant coatings in August 1987, where Vista’s

president announced to EPA at precisely the same time that

Vista would continue its sales of non-compliant paint after

September 1, 1987, and Vista in fact did so. Vista’s president

said that Vista would go bankrupt if it could not sell its non-

compliant paint, a statement that again cannot be reconciled

with Vista’s purported August 1987 letter.

32. The United States propounded interrogatories and

requests for production of documents on May 1, 1991, seeking

this identical information requested by EPA in 1987. Vista

responded with groundless objections with no legal basis, and

flatly refused to provide the information or produce the relevant

documents. The United States then brought a motion to compel

Vista to comply with its discovery requests. As a result, this

Court ordered that Vista (1) specifically identify by September

27, 1991, the quantity of its non-compliant coatings

manufactured and sold in 1987, and (2) produce the requested

documents at the U.S. Attorney’s Office by no later than

October 25, 1991, again mirroring the information requested by

EPA in 1987.

33. Vista did not identify its non-compliant coatings with

a verified response per this Court’s Order, and as required by

Section 114 of the CAA, but instead directed the United States

to look through unidentified documents at its warehouse.

Moreover, Vista has refused to make those documents available

for inspection until October 25, 1991.

34. Vista has already provided its sworn response stating

unequivocally that no documents exist regarding its sale or

offer for sale of non-compliant coatings prior to August 30,

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1987. See Vista’s “Supplemental” Responses No. 2 and 3.

This unexplained disappearance of Vista’s documents is

directly contrary to EPA’s Section 114 requirement that Vista

retain those documents.

35. Vista’s sworn responses to the United States’ Requests

for Admission (“RFA”) cannot be reconciled with the

deposition testimony of Vista’s president, where he admits

precisely the same facts that Vista denies in its RFA responses.

For example, Vista’s president admits that he knew that Vista

was selling non-compliant coatings in September 1987.

Fischer Depo. p. 188. But see Vista RFA No. 27. There are

numerous other examples. See Vista RFA Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and

7. See especially Vista’s evasive response to RFA No. 13 and

14.

B. Memorandum of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

(Court of Appeals).

The following Findings of Fact are conclusively established

by the Memorandum in United States v. Vista Paint Corp., No.

92-55160 (9th Cir., Sept. 24, 1992) (“Memorandum”), and the

“1/3/94 Court Order.”

1. Vista had ample opportunity to submit comments on the

inclusion of the local rules in the California State

Implementation Plan (“SIP”) pursuant to Section 307(d) of the

CAA, and to challenge EPA’s approval of the inclusion of

those rules in the SIP pursuant to Section 307(b)(1) of the

CAA.

2. Vista admits that it did not halt the sale of non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987.

3. Vista was manufacturing, selling and offering for sale

non-complying coatings in 1985, when the volatile organic

compounds (“VOC”) limit became effective.

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4. In June 1987, Vista told EPA that it was selling non-

complying paint in the SCAQMD and the SDCAPCD.

5. Vista’s president, Eddie Fischer, admitted that Vista had

been violating the rules since 1985 and was doing so before and

after September 1, 1987.

6. Vista also admitted that these violations in the

SDCAPCD continued until October 12, 1987.

7. Fischer expressly testified in his deposition that non-

complying paint was offered for sale after September 1, 1987,

in San Diego.

8. EPA’s second information request required Vista to

establish and maintain certain records and to submit certain

reports. Vista’s president admitted that the kind of information

EPA sought was available when EPA requested it.

9. If Vista had stopped offering for sale and selling non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987, it would have been

relieved of some of the requirements in this request. However,

Vista continued to sell such paint after September 1, 1987.

Vista’s president understood that the requirements of the

second request were waived only if Vista stopped selling non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987. Although Vista

admittedly continued to sell non-complying paint after

September 1, 1987, it never provided the information requested

by EPA.

10. Vista [has a] history of full compliance.

11. The duration of violation [is settled].

12. SDCAPCD previously assessed a $500 penalty.

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13. The $500 Vista paid to the SDCAPCD [was] on a fine

originally set at $2,000.

14. Vista obtained a “significant economic benefit” that

supported a “substantial penalty.”

15. Vista has improperly failed to disclose information

which it has or had in its exclusive possession to assess the

precise economic benefit to it due to its illegal offer for sale and

sale of non-compliant coatings.

16. Vista failed to submit admissible evidence to controvert

the U.S.A.’s showing of Vista’s significant economic benefit.

17. EPA’s ability to gather information on potential

violations is vital to enforcement of the CAA. It is irrelevant

that no ozone was formed from Vista’s failure to supply the

information.

18. Vista’s president was told by EPA and the San Diego

District that, if it did not stop selling non-complying paint by

September 1, 1987, enforcement would follow. There was

nothing unusual or perplexing in these instructions to Vista.

C. Findings of Fact After Trial.

The following Findings of Fact are established by the

evidence at the trial on certain remanded civil penalty issues.

1. Vista isa company whose primary operation consists of

manufacturing and selling at retail paint and paint products. It

is the largest manufacturer, distributor and retail seller of paint

in Orange County, California. Vista manufactures

approximately 25,000 gallons of paint each month for sale at its

stores in California. It has 28 retail locations in Southern

California, including San Diego County. Its total sales in 1990,

1991 and 1992 exceeded $44,000,000 in each year, and its total

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sales in 1993 approximated $47,000,000. Its general office and

sole paint manufacturing plant are located in Fullerton,

California. It has 400 employees.

2. In 1994, Vista’s net worth was approximately

$12,000,000 and its net current assets were approximately

$8,553,000.

3. Eddie Fischer is the sole owner and president of Vista.

Mr. Fischer has ultimate control of all operational, financial

and managerial decisions of Vista. Vista is a Subchapter S

corporation for federal tax purposes, which causes all taxable

income of Vista to be allocated to Mr. Fischer and is taxed at

the appropriate individual tax rates.

4. For the years following the filing of this lawsuit for

which Vista has filed income tax returns, Vista’s gross profits

have remained relatively steady: $20,063,000 for 1990;

$19,543,000 for 1991; and $19,596,000 for 1992. Because of

certain transactions between Vista and Mr. Eddie Fischer, its

sole equity owner, Vista’s reportable net income since this

lawsuit was filed has been drastically reduced: $2,241,000 in

1990; $582,000 in 1991; and a net loss of $464,000 in 1992.

5. By reason of certain transactions between Vista and Mr.

Eddie Fischer, the total shareholder equity in Vista is $2.9

million.

6. However, Vista’s purported financial condition of only

$2.9 million in stockholder equity has not precluded Vista’s

ability to obtain a $3 million dollar letter of credit from Bank

of America posted with the District Court. See Vista’s motion

for release of Rule 62(d) security, filed on March 2, 1993. In

its financial analysis of Vista, exhibit 107, Bank of America

partly concludes at page 2 that Vista lowered its retained equity

because of the instant action:

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“In June 1991, Mr. Fischer was advised that it would be

advantageous for him to withdraw $7,950M in retained

earnings from Vista. This represented the Sub chapter S

earnings upon which he has paid income taxes, since

Vista became a Sub S corp. in 1986. This amount was

lent to the company and subordinated to the Bank. This

accounting action was also taken to lower the retained

earnings because of the EPA suit.” (Emphasis added).

7. On March 10, 1992, Vista posted with this Court a

Standby Letter of Credit from Bank of America in the amount

of $3,176,723 to secure the summary judgment in the amount

of $3,020,000 entered against Vista by Judge Real.

8. Bank of America concluded that Vista is easily capable

of financing a $3.02 million dollar judgment against it:

“Judge Manuel Real of the US District Court imposed a

$3MM fine . . . even if the total fine would be levied Vista

Paint could put together the financing to repay the fine

over a relatively short period of time.”

9. The Court of Appeals on page 10 of its Memorandum

discussed the seriousness of the violation factor as one of the

seven criteria provided in 42 U.S.C. 7413(e) for consideration

by the Court in determining the amount of penalty to be

assessed. It stated that as to the application of that factor to the

Section 110 violation (selling or offering for sale in violation

of SIP) there was a triable issue of material fact regarding how

many gallons of non-compliant coatings Vista was offering for

sale during September 1987 in San Diego County. The Court

finds that Vista offered for sale at least 13,000 gallons of non-

compliant coatings in San Diego in September 1987. It also

finds that Vista sold at least 70 gallons of non-compliant

coatings in San Diego during the period September 1, 1987 to

October 12, 1987.

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10. In August 1985, SCAQMD amended Rule 1113 to

extend to 1989 California paint companies’ ability to sell non-

compliant paint up to 380 g/1 VOC. SCAQMD’s decision was

known to Vista.

11. In January 1986, SDCAPCD amended its Rule 67.0 to

extend to September 1, 1986, California paint companies’

ability to sell non-compliant paint up to 380 g/l VOC in San

Diego. SDCAPCD’s decision was known to Vista.

12. Both districts subsequently submitted their new time

extension revisions to EPA as revisions to the federal SIP.

These proposed revisions to extend the time for compliance

with their local rules which imposed a 250 g/l VOC deadline

under state law, did not constitute federal law.

13. The SDCAPCD revision proposed to extend the

deadline for compliance with the 250 g/l VOC limitation to

September 1, 1986. The revision was submitted to the

California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), then to EPA on

August 12, 1986, with less than one month remaining before

September 1, 1986, when the proposed local rule extension

would expire by its own terms. Because of the short time

remaining before it became a moot proposal, EPA did not act

on SDCAPCD’s proposed extension of the federal SIP as to

non-compliant coatings. At all times, the federal SIP remained

in effect and required compliance with the 250 g/l VOC

limitation by all members of the coatings industry, including

Vista.

14. The SCAQMD proposed revision to Rule 1113 was

submitted to EPA and formally disapproved by EPA in 1989.

See 54 Fed. Reg. 5236 (February 2, 1989).

15. Vista’s violations continued in both the SCAQMD and

the SDCAPCD (in violation of the SDCAPCD rule) throughout

1986 and a portion of 1987, in violation of the federal SIP.

eee

2la

16. The Court finds that the August 4, 1987, letter by Vista,

addressed to EPA (Exhibit 13) as a response to EPA’s

information request of July 22, 1987 (Exhibit 12), was not sent

or delivered to EPA.

To the extent that any of the foregoing Findings of Fact are

deemed to be Conclusions of Law, they are incorporated into

the following Conclusions of Law stated in II.B below.

IT.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. The following Conclusions of Law are the law of the case

by reason of the Conclusions of Law made in the Amended

Findings and the 1/3/94 Court Order.

1. Vista illegally offered for sale and sold non-compliant

coatings with a VOC content in excess of 250 g/l during the

time period between and including December 3, 1985, through

October 12, 1987, in violation of the SIP rules identified as

SCAQMD Rule 1113 and SDCAPCD Rule 67, and continued

to violate those rules more than 30 days after having received

a Notice of Violation from EPA on June 24. 1987.

2. Vista has, therefore, violated Section 110 and 113 of the

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7414, from December 3,

1985, to October 12, 1987, a total of 578 (sic) days of

violations and there being no genuine issue of material fact

remaining, the United States is entitled to summary judgment

thereon.

3. Vista illegally and unreasonably failed to respond to

EPA’s June 19, 1987, request for relevant information in

violation of Sections 113 and 114 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§

7413, 7414, by its failure to (a) establish and maintain records

regarding their non-compliant coatings, (b) report the volume

22a

of non-compliant coatings sold in August through October

1987 and their location of sale; (c) report the name and VOC

content of the coatings sold; and (d) report the identity of

coatings manufactured by Vista from July through October

1987.

4. Vista has, therefore, violated Sections 113 and 114 of

the Clean Air Act from August 26, 1987, to November 18,

1991, a total of 1177 (sic) days of violations and, there being no

genuine issue of material fact remaining, the United States is

entitled to summary judgment thereon.

5. Section 113 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), provides

for imposition of a civil penalty against Vista of not more than

$25,000 per day of violation for (1) the sale or offer for sale of

non-compliant VOC paint in violation of CAA Section 110,

and (2) for the failure to respond to EPA’s request for

information in violation of CAA Section 114. 42 U.S.C. §

7413(b)(2), (4). For purposes of computing the appropriate civil

penalty, the penalty period begins when the source first

commits the violation and not later when the NOV is issued.

This Court will first determine the maximum penalty allowable

and then consider any mitigating circumstances.

6. Vista’s failure to respond to EPA’s request for

information is equally serious. More than four years after the

information was requested by EPA, then by the USS.

Department of Justice in this lawsuit, Vista has not yet

responded to EPA’s request that Vista specify the quantity of

non-compliant paint manufactured and sold in the summer of

1987.

7. There is injury to the public when responsible parties

such as Vista do not respond to official inquiries pertaining to

its Clean Air Act compliance and liability. EPA must expend

a significant portion of its limited monies to prosecute these

actions, and the violator escapes effective regulation of its

L

23a

pollution by hiding its violation and challenging EPA to find

the information on its own, if it can. Where the regulatory

program is designed to protect public health, as with the Clean

Air Act, it is even more important to deter violators.

B. The Conclusions of Law stated in IIA above, and are

applicable to all of the foregoing F indings of Facts.

1. Jurisdiction and Venue.

a. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

this action pursuant to Section 1 13(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7413(b) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 1355, and personal

jurisdiction over the parties.

b. Venue in this district is proper pursuant 42

U.S.C. 7413 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

c. Vista is a corporation covered by the CAA, 42

U.S.C. § 7602(e).

d. EPA satisfied the requirement that notice of this

action be given to the proper state air pollution control agency

pursuant to the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 5.7413(b).["]

2. Generally Applicable Law Regarding Issues Remanded

For Trial.

a. The penalty criteria are set forth in CAA Section

113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (Section 7413(e)(1). In

assessing civil penalties, CAA Section 1 13(e)(1) provides that

the Court shall consider the following factors: (1) the size of

the business and the economic impact of the penalty on the

business; (2) the seriousness of the violation; (3) the violator’s

" [So in original.]

——

24a

full compliance history; (4) good faith efforts to comply; (5)

the duration of the violation as established by any credible

evidence; (6) payment by the violator of penalties previously

assessed for the same violation; (7) the economic benefit of

noncompliance, and such other factors as justice may require.

b. Neither statutory nor case law (which the Court

could find) dictates that the Court in weighing such factors

must give more weight to any one factor than to any of the

other factors.

C. Under Section 7413(e), civil penalties are

awardable for violations of Sections 7410 and 7414 on days

which precede the date a Notice of Violation is served by EPA

on the violator. U.S. v. SCM Corp., 667 Fed. Supp. 1110,

1122-1123 (D. Md.1987).

d. The general purposes of a civil penalty are three

fold: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, and (3) restitution. Tull v.

US., 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987).

e. In determining the civil penalty, the Court

“should give effect to the major purpose of a civil penalty:

deterrence.” United States v. T & S Brass and Bronze Works

Inc., 681 F. Supp. 314, 322 (D.S.C. 1988), affd. in relevant

part, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.1988), 28 ERC, 19 Envtl. L. Rep.

20, 857.

f. The Court of Appeals in its Memorandum

remanded this action for trial only as to the application of

certain Section 7413(e)(1) factors and then for a determination

of the civil penalty under Section 7413(b).

3. Penalty Factors Remanded For Trial.

The following three statutory penalty factors were remanded

for trial: (1) economic impact/size of business; (2) good-faith

25a

efforts to comply; and (3) seriousness of violation. In addition,

the interest of justice non-statutory factor of government delay

remained as an unresolved issue of fact.

a. Size Of Business/Economic Impact.

Regarding the Court’s consideration of the first two criteria

of Section 7413(e)(1): size of the business and the economic

impact of civil penalties on Vista’s business (sometimes

characterized collectively as the “ability to pay’’), the Court,

based on the facts and applicable law, considers them

inextricably interrelated in their application to Vista.

Vista is an expanding business with increasing annual gross

sales revenues in the range of 45 to 47 million dollars annually.

It has a healthy financial structure with considerable assets and

net worth, annual net income (see Findings of Fact I C 1 and 2

above). Its earning capacity and borrowing capacity are such

that the total civil penalties the Court adjudicates against it in

this case will not undermine its financial structure and place it

in jeopardy of “going out-of-business.” Vista is capable of

paying the penalties which will be ordered by the Court. The

Court concludes that those two factors do not support a non

substantial civil penalty.'

b. Vista’s Good Faith Efforts To Comply.

(i) Section 7410 Violations.

Although Vista had received on June 24, 1987, a Notice of

Violation from EPA regarding sales of non-compliant coatings

in violation of the architectural coatings rules contained in the

California federally approved State Implementation Plan

' This conclusion is made notwithstanding certain financial transactions

since 1990 between Vista and Mr. Eddie Fischer which cause Vista to

appear on financial statements to be less financially stable than it is.

26a

(“SIP”) (Exhibit 10), it proceeded to sell such non-compliant

coatings into November 1987. Vista’s president admitted that

in September 1987, it offered for sale in San Diego County

13,000 gallons of such coatings and sold 35 to 70 gallons of

those coatings in that county.

Vista knowingly and intentionally violated federal law from

at least December 3, 1985, to October 12, 1987, ignoring

during that period repeated warnings by EPA and the June 1987

Notice of Violation. Vista made a considered decision to offer

to sell and sell non-compliant coatings in violation of Section

7310 and risk penalties rather than obey the law.

During this time period, Vista knew of the federal law

regulating the VOC content of its coatings and prohibiting its

offering for sale and selling non-compliant coatings.

(ii) Section 7414 Violations.

Vista made no real good faith effort to comply with Section

7414 and respond to EPA’s information requests. It did not

respond to the March 19, 1987, request. Vista submitted

incomplete responses to EPA’s April 20, 1987, administrative

order and transmitted inadequate responses to EPA’s

information requests of June 19, 1987, and July 22, 1987, in

part by not providing the required reports. Vista never

responded to those portions of the information requests asking

for specific quantities of non-compliant paint manufactured and

sold in the summer of 1987.

Vista advised the EPA that it would litigate if it had to and

would continue to sell its non-compliant coatings regardless of

the law, even if it had to pay a “reasonable” fine for doing so.

The Court of Appeals at page 7 of its Memorandum pointed

to Mr. Fischer’s statement that Vista’s employees spent three

days attempting to compile the information sought by EPA’s

|

27a

Section 114 information request and this is evidence of good

faith. In fact, the documents which Vista’s employees

purportedly used to compile the information sought by EPA are

Vista’s sales receipts and such were inspected by the United

States. But, these receipts were not responsive to the

information requested.

Vista’s corporate state of mind was to engage in a pattern of

continued non-cooperation with Vista’s enforcement efforts by

withholding the documentation of its violations or by providing

incomplete information regarding such while it continued to

sell and offer to sell non-compliant coatings after the Notice of

Violation. The Court concludes that such non good faith

conduct supports a substantial penalty.

c. Seriousness of Vista’s Violations.

(i) Section 7410 Violations.

The unlawful emissions of VOC’s into the atmosphere of the

SCAQMD and SDCAPCD from the application of non-

compliant coatings sold by Vista between 1985 and 1987,

estimated to be 13 tons per month, exacerbated the ozone

problem in both districts. This calculation is based on an

estimate of Vista’s sale of 11,300 gallons of such coatings each

month. The government was not able to ascertain the actual

amount because Vista failed to comply with EPA’s information

requests for the actual volumes of such coatings sold or offered

for sale during that period.

Findings of Facts I A 25 through 27 above describe the

effects of ozone on human health and the environment. Vista’s

non-compliant coatings as sold and applied by its customers,

contributed appreciably to the ozone content in the two

districts. If Vista had complied with Section 7410, there would

have been a major reduction in atmospheric pollutants in

SCAQMD and SDCAPCD.

28a

Based on the uncontradicted testimony of doctors C. Shepard

Burton, Ph.d.["], and Jack D. Hackney, M.D., the VOC

emissions from the application of Vista’s non-compliant

coatings, however, would have no measurable negative impact

on human health and the environment of the SCAQMD and

SDCAPCD. Therefore, the seriousness of Vista’s 7410

violations support a moderate penalty.

(ii) Section 7414 Violations.

Based on Conclusion of Law II A 7 above, and CAA’s

statutory scheme which makes its effectiveness depend in large

part on the members of the regulated industries maintaining and

keeping required records of their operations and then

submitting complete, accurate and timely reports regarding

such to EPA when requested, the seriousness of the 7314

violations supports a moderate to substantial penalty.

d. Government Delay As An Interest of Justice

Mitigating Factor.

(i) | EPA Delays In Reviewing Proposed SIP

The period of time consumed by EPA in reviewing and

making its decision on the proposed revisions by SCAQMD

and SDCAPCD to extend the time to comply with SIP as to

manufacturing, offering to sell and selling non-compliant

coatings was not unreasonable. See General Motors Corp. v.

US., 496 U.S. 530, 541 n. 4, 110 L. Ed.2d 480, 110 S. Ct. 2528

(1990).

As to the proposed revision to Rule 113, SCAQMD

submitted it to EPA on November 12, 1985, and it was

" [So in original.]

29a

disapproved on February 2, 1989. In the period 1985 through

1989, EPA’s delay in processing and acting on proposed

revisions to SIP by local districts was attributable to statutory

ambiguities, policy issues not resolved on a national basis,

adverse court decisions affecting EPA’s ability to process

certain types of revisions and lack of resources. (See deposition

testimony of Mr. Howekamp).

Another important factor was whether the proposed revision

was controversial. The proposed revision to Rule 113 was very

controversial because it provided for a four year relaxation

period before it became effective. Many issues regarding this

proposed revision were being discussed in the coatings industry

and in the governmental agencies having regulatory authority

over pollutants emitted into the atmosphere. Further, the

SCAQMD had not provided enough information to support its

request. Consequently, EPA had to do its own investigative

work to clarify some of these issues. This slowed down the

review process. (See deposition testimony of Mr. John

Ungvarsky.) Additionally, as required by law, EPA submitted

the proposed Rule 113 revision and its recommended

disapproval to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)

on December 12, 1986, and OMB did not report its concurrence

until May 14, 1988.

Regarding SDCAPCD’s proposed revision to Rule 67.0.

there was no unreasonable delay by EPA in reviewing it. The

revision was submitted to EPA on August 12, 1986. Because

the revision became moot less than one month after it was

submitted to EPA, EPA did not act on it.

In any event, even if there were unreasonable delays in

acting on the proposed rule revisions, Vista was not prejudiced

by them because Vista violated federal law before and after the

rule revisions were submitted to EPA. Vista’s violations

continued in both the SCAQMD and the SDCAPCD (in

violation of the SDCAPCD rule) throughout 1986 and 1987.

30a

The effect of the local rule relaxation in the SCAQMD had no

effect on Vista’s violations of federal law in the SCAQMD by

virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 7416, and no effect on Vista’s violations

of both federal and local law in the SDCAPCD.

Further, Vista was aware as early as 1985 that EPA was not

inclined to allow the extensions as proposed by the districts.

Therefore, having concluded that the delays by EPA in

reviewing the proposed SIP revisions were reasonable, such

delays do not mitigate the amount of the civil penalties to be

imposed.

(ii) EPA/Department of Justice (DOS") Delay In Initiating

EPA’s delay in taking enforcement action against Vista for

its Sections 7410 violations during the period 1985 to October

12, 1987, was reasonable because during that period EPA was

collecting and evaluating a great amount of information,

including input from the coatings industry, and was engaged in

lengthy discussions with the local districts regarding

enforcement policy. Only in the Fall of 1987, did EPA refer the

matter to the Department of Justice for prosecutorial

consideration. Such delay caused no prejudice to Vista. See

Conclusions in II 3 d(i) above.

As to the Section 7414 violations, the prosecutorial delay

was unreasonable from June 21, 1989 through January 18,

1991. On June 21, 1989, the EPA and DOJ announced in a

press release that on that date the DOJ was going to file a civil

penalty enforcement action against Vista in U.S. District Court

(Exhibit 638). But, DOJ did not do so until December 5, 1990.

Vista was prejudiced by such delay because from June 21,

1989 to January 18, 1991, DOJ knew that Vista was

maintaining the legal position that it had complied with Section

7314 by timely and complete responses to EPA’s information

3la

requests. See the letter from Joseph J. Armao, Vista’s attorney,

to Gerald F. George, attorney, Enforcement Section.

Department of Justice. Such delay supports a moderate

reduction in the penalty for the period June 21. 1989 to January

18, 1991.

4. Penalty Factors Not Remanded F or Trial.

a. Vista’s Full Compliance History.

Although Vista had no history of non-compliance with the

CAA before its violations of Sections 7410 and 7414, the

extent and degree of such knowing and intentional violations

demonstrate a history of non-full compliance. The application

of this factor supports a substantial penalty.

b. Duration of Vista’s Violations.

Vista’s violations of Sections 7410 and/or 7414 spanned a

period of almost six years. Such duration of violations supports

a substantial penalty.

c. Vista's Payment of Penalties Previously y Assessed For

Vista was assessed by SDCAPCD $2.000.00 in penalties for

two separate sales of non-compliant paints in that district after

September 1, 1987, in violation of its Rule 67.0. Vista paid

only $500.00 towards the fine.

The fact that Vista paid $500.00 as a penalty to

SACAPCD[}] in regards to two sales. which this Court has

found also constitute violations by Vista of Section 7410, is

considered by this Court as a slightly mitigating factor

" [So in original.}

32a

respecting the penalty to be assessed against Vista for violation

of Section 7410.

d. Economic Benefit To Vista From Non-Compliance.

Vista received significant economic benefit from its

violations of Section 7410 by avoiding the cost of eliminating

the sale of non-compliant coatings, including nonsalability of

any inventory of non-compliant paint in stock. It also avoided

the manufacturing and marketing costs of switching certain of

its brands-to a compliant coating status. Although many of

Vista’s competitors also were selling non-compliant coatings

in the SCAQMD and SDCAPCD during the period December

3, 1985 to September 1, 1987, in violation of Section 7410 and,

therefore, Vista had no competitive advantage over them, other

coatings manufacturers and retailers were in compliance. As to

the latter group, Vista derived an economic benefit from its

non-compliance with Section 7410.

Further, Vista’s failure to comply with Section 7414 and

provide the information and records sought by EPA’s

information requests preclude the Court from determining the

actual economic benefit to it from violating Section 74109. The

Court infers from such non-disclosure that the records, which

were in the exclusive possession of Vista, would confirm this

Court’s conclusion that Vista obtained significant economic

benefit from its offering to sell and selling non-compliant

paints during December 3, 1985 to October 12, 1987, in

violation of Section 7410.

The application of this factor supports a substantial penalty.

5. Civil Penalty.

The Court has weighed all those factors in Section

7413(e)(1), as applied to the facts determined after trial and to

a ail

33a

the facts previously adjudicated by Judge Real’s summary

judgment and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It concludes:

a. Regarding Vista’s Section 7410 violations, the

Court assesses a civil penalty of $500.00 per day for each of

Vista’s 568 days of violations from December 3, 1985, to June

24, 1987 (the date Vista received its Notice of Violation from

EPA),’ and $2500.00 per day for each of Vista’s 110 days of

violation from June 24, 1987, to October 12, 1987. a total of

678 days. The total Section 7410 civil penalty is $559,000.00.

b. Regarding Vista’s Section 7414 violations, the

Court assesses a civil penalty of $500.00 for each of Vista’s

665 days of violations from August 26, 1987, through June 21,

1989 (the date of the EPA/DOJ’s press release), and $250.00

per day for each of Vista’s 879 days of violation from June 21.

1989, through November 18, 1991, a total of 1544 days.’ The

total Section 7414 civil penalty is $552,250.00.

To the extent that any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law

are deemed to be Findings of Fact. they are incorporated into

the Findings of Fact, as stated in I. C above.

DATED: April 16, 1996

/s/ Robert J. Timlin

ROBERT J. TIMLIN

United States District Judge

* Judge Real’s Amended Findings calculated the days covered by such

period to be 468 days.

’ Judge Real’s Amended Findings calculated the total days to be 1177 days.

34a

APPENDIX D

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION, Counterclaimant-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Counterdefendant-Appellee.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; SOUTH

COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT; SAN

DIEGO AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT; AIR

RESOURCES BOARD; TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP;

Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.

ieperereeeereeeeeneersenenesesiaineeeetaiiiiaiaiaiiaaal

35a

No. 92-55160.

D.C. No. CV-90-6449-R

MEMORANDUM’

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central

District of California, No. CV-90-6449-R; Manuel L. Real.

Chief District Judge, Presiding.

Argued and Submitted August 19, 1992

Pasadena, California

Filed September 24, 1992

Before: TANG and HALL, Circuit Judges, and WALKER.”

District Judge.

Vista Paint Corporation (“Vista”) appeals from the district

court’s summary judgment in favor of the government finding

Vista liable for violations of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and

awarding the United States (“USA”) civil penalties and

attorneys fees. Vista also appeals the dismissal of its

counterclaims and third-party complaint against the

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), California Air

Resources Board (“ARB”), South Coast Air Quality

Management District (SCAQMD”), and San Diego Air

Pollution Control District (“SDAPCD”).

The district court had jurisdiction over the enforcement

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1345, and 1355. Jurisdiction over the third-party complaint and

counterclaim was disputed. We have jurisdiction over this

' This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited

to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

™ The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Court Judge for

the Northern District of California. sitting by designation.

}

j

36a

timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand this action to the district court.

I,

Vista contends that the district court erred in granting

motions striking certain of Vista’s affirmative defenses and

dismissing Vista’s counterclaims and third-party claims for

want of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a

claim.

A. Invalidity claims and defenses.

As Vista had ample opportunity to submit comments on the

inclusion of the local rules in the California state

implementation plan (“SIP’’) pursuant to section 307(d) of the

CAA, and to challenge EPA’s approval of the inclusion of

those rules in the SIP pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the CAA,

the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

third-party complaint, the counterclaim, and the affirmative

defenses dealing with invalidity.

B. Estoppel claims and defenses.

Assuming that there was jurisdiction over the estoppel

claims and defenses, the district court correctly dismissed these

claims and defenses for failure to state a claim. Even if the

EPA had promised not to exercise its enforcement discretion

against those paint manufacturers who ceased sales of non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987, and that promise was

sufficient to estop EPA, Vista admits that it did not halt the sale

of non-complying paint by that date. Accordingly, any

“promise” would be inapplicable to Vista and it could not

37a

prevail on its estoppel theory as a matter of law. Accordingly,

the district court properly dismissed the claims and defenses

based on estoppel for failure to state a claim.

II.

Vista also contends that the district court erred in finding

that Vista violated the CAA by selling or offering for sale non-

complying paint, and by refusing to comply with EPA’s

information request.

A. Paint sale liability.

There was no genuine factual dispute precluding summary

judgment as to Vista’s liability for selling or offering for sale

non-complying paint. Vista was manufacturing, selling and

offering for sale non-complying coatings in 1985 when the

volatile organic compounds (“VOC”) limits became effective.

In June 1987, Vista told EPA that it was selling non-complying

paint in the SCAQMD and the SDAPCD. In his deposition,

Vista’s President, Eddie F ischer, admitted that Vista had been

violating the rules since 1985 and was doing so before and after

September 1, 1987. Vista also admitted that these violations in

the SDAPCD continued until October 12, 1987.

Vista did not raise the issue that the dates of the sales were

not proved for Sundays and holidays until after summary

judgment had been entered. In his declaration in Opposition to

summary judgment, Fischer denied that Vista offered for sale

thousands of gallons of non-complying paint. However.

Fischer expressly testified in his deposition that non-complying

paint was offered for sale after September 1, 1987, in San

Diego. A party may not recant sworn testimony in order to

]

Vista also argues that USA is estopped due to “EPA’s variance

representations.” However, Vista did not raise this argument until its post-

judgment motion. See infra Section IV.

a

38a

defeat a summary judgment motion. Juardo v. Eleven-Fifty

Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, as no

issue of fact or law remained, summary judgment as to liability

for non-complying paint sales was proper.

B. Compliance with information request.

There was no genuine factual dispute precluding summary

judgment as to Vista’s liability for refusing to comply with

EPA’s information request. EPA’s second information request

required Vista to establish and maintain certain records and to

submit certain reports. Vista’s President admitted that the kind

of information EPA sought was available when EPA requested

it. If Vista had stopped offering for sale and selling non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987, it would have been

relieved of some of the requirements in this request. However,

Vista continued to sell such paint after September 1, 1987.

Vista’s President understood that the requirements of the

second request were waived only if Vista stopped selling non-

complying paint by September 1, 1987. Although Vista

admittedly continued to sell non-complying paint after

September 1, 1987, it never provided the information requested

by EPA. Accordingly, the court did not err in granting

summary judgment as to liability for Vista’s refusal to comply

with EPA’s information request because no issue of fact or law

remained.”

Ill.

Vista also contends that the district court erred in summarily

awarding civil penalties. Due to the factual nature of many of

the factors the district court was required to consider in

* Vista’s argument that the EPA had no authority to require the sales data

and that it had sufficient cause to act as it did were only raised in its post-

judgment motion. See Section IV.

39a

determining the civil penalty, summary judgment was

improper.

Section 113(e)(1) of the Clean Air Act requires that:

In determining the amount of any penalty to be assessed

under this section . . . the Administrator or the court, as

appropriate, shall take into consideration (in addition to such

other factors as justice may require) the size of the business,

the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the

violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to

comply, the duration of the violation as established by any

credible evidence (including evidence other than the

applicable test method), payment by the violator of penalties

previously assessed for the same violation, the economic

benefit of noncompliance, and the seriousness of the

violation.

42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (1992 Supp).’

A. Section 113(e)(1) factors.

1. economic impact/size of business

In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that there

was a genuine factual dispute as to the economic impact of the

penalty on Vista’s business. The court below specifically noted

in its findings:

Vista is a major manufacturer, distributor and retail seller of

paint with its total sales last year exceeding 50 million

dollars .... Imposition of the penalty assessed below would

’ The 1990 Amendments became effective on November 15, 1990. USA

filed its complaint on December 3. 1990. Accordingly, the Amendments

apply to this case.

40a

amount to approximately six percent of Vista’s sales in a

single year of operation.

In his declaration, Fischer stated that Vista’s overall sales for

fiscal 1991 were about “$45 million and profits were

approximately two million dollars. Since then, sales have been

flat but profits have declined.” In addition, Fischer declared

that “[i]mposition of the fine sought by the government in this

case, would result in the destruction of my business and the loss

of 400 number of jobs [sic] in the Southern California area.”

USA contends that Fischer’s statements did not give the court

any financial information to help the court make its

determination. While Vista presented no business records, tax

returns, affidavits of accountants to controvert the USA claim

that the imposition of the full amount of the penalty would

amount to less than eleven percent of Vista’s sales in one year,

Fischer’s declarations raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment as

to this penalty factor.

2. full compliance history

The district court held that despite Vista’s history of full

compliance, a substantial penalty was warranted. As there was

no factual dispute, summary judgment as to this factor was

proper.

3. good faith efforts to comply

In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that there

was a genuine factual dispute as to its state of mind. A court

should be wary of granting summary judgment when good faith

is in question. See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1503-06

(9th Cir.1990); H t l ion Vv.

Rollison, 615 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1980). In his declaration,

Fischer stated that Vista made every attempt to cooperate with

the EPA. USA contends that there are no material facts in

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dispute regarding good faith. However, the mere fact that Vista

offered for sale and sold non-complying paint after September

1, 1987, does not establish that Vista acted in bad faith. As

there was a genuine issue of material fact. summary judgment

was improper as to this factor.

In addition, the court erred in summarily finding that Vista

acted in bad faith in failing to respond to the information

request. In his declaration, Fischer stated that Vista attempted

at all times to cooperate with the government’s request.

Fischer also stated that three Vista employees spent three days

trying to compile the requested data. There were contested

issues of material fact.’ Vista’s good faith was a question of

fact that should not have been decided on summary judgment.

4. duration of violation

The district court correctly ruled that the duration of

violation supported a substantial penalty. Vista’s argument that

any violation occurred only on the day of the deadline. but did

not continue thereafter, is meritless. The CAA explicitly

provides for penalties for each day that Vista fails to respond to

an information request. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1992 Supp).

* At summary judgment, Vista argued that the issue of state of mind was

“relevant to the seriousness of any violation.” As good faith is irrelevant as

to the seriousness of the violations, the court correctly refused to consider

good faith under that factor. Vista did not argue that its state of mind was

relevant to its good faith efforts to comply. This error is likely due to the

failure of USA to bring its complaint under the 1990 CAA Amendments.

As good faith is a factor that the district court was required to consider,

summary judgment as to this issue was not proper.

> Vista’s contention that EPA’s “promise” that any deficiencies in Vista’s

responses would excite “immediate” action, and its settlement letter that

told Vista that EPA had “enough information to make a settlement offer,”

led Vista to believe that it had satisfied the information request, was not

raised until the post-judgment motion.

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5. payment of penalties previously assessed

SDAPCD previously assessed a $500 penalty. Vista argues

that the court “appears to have given no weight to SDAPCD’s

evaluation of the proper penalty.” This argument is meritless.

The district court was not obligated to accept $500 as the

proper penalty. The district court considered the $500 Vista

paid to the SDAPCD on a fine originally set at $2,000.

6. economic benefit of noncompliance

The district court found that Vista obtained a “significant

economic benefit” that supported a “substantial penalty.”

While there may have been a factual dispute as to this issue, the

district court recognized that “Vista has improperly failed to

disclose information which it has or had in its exclusive

possession to assess the precise economic benefit to it due to its

illegal offer for sale and sale of non-compliant coatings.” The

court also found that Vista failed to submit admissible evidence

to controvert USA’s showing of Vista’s significant economic

benefit. Therefore, summary judgment was proper as to this

penalty factor.

7. seriousness of the violation

The court found that the seriousness of the violation

supported a substantial penalty. In opposition to summary

judgment, Vista asserted that there was a genuine factual

dispute as to the effects of its emissions on human health. The

only document filed by Vista in opposition to summary

judgment was a declaration by Fischer. Vista offered no

documentary evidence related to the quantity of paint offered

for sale to controvert the government’s claims as to the

potential health effects of the 13,000 gallons of paint it alleged

Vista had offered for sale in San Diego in September 1987.

USA contends that its claim was based on Fischer’s sworn

testimony before the San Diego Hearing Board that he had

“13,000 gallons of paint in the San Diego district.”

In its opposition, Vista represented that it had only sold 34

gallons of paint in September 1987 in the SDAPCD. But, in

his supporting declaration, Fischer estimates that Vista sold at

least 70 gallons. Fischer’s declaration raises a genuine factual

dispute as to the number of gallons offered for sale. Therefore.

this element of the seriousness factor was not properly disposed

of on summary judgment.

Vista also argues that any delay or lack of completeness in

providing the 1987 sales data had no adverse impact on the

public. This argument is meritless. EPA’s ability to gather

information on potential violations is vital to enforcement of

the CAA. It is irrelevant that no ozone was formed from

Vista’s failure to supply the information. See United States v.

Z ‘ , 823 F.2d 685, 689 (Ist Cir.

1987) (importance of compliance with information requests).

B. Non-statutory factors.

1. governmental delay

In opposition to summary judgment, Vista asserted that there

was a genuine factual dispute as to the effect of EPA’s inaction

on the district’s proposed SIP revisions. Ip General Motors

Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 541 n. 4 (1990), the

Supreme Court found that “the Statutory remedies for EPA

inaction include .. . a request pursuant to § 113(b). . . for

reduction or elimination of penalties during any period in

which unreasonable agency delay results in prejudice.” See

also Uni tes v. S .» 667 F. Supp. 1110, 1128 (D.

Md 1987) (government delay should neither mitigate against

imposition of a substantial penalty nor act to enhance the

penalty amount). Vista made such a request at summary

judgment.

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Vista argues that EPA delayed from 1985 to 1987 in

notifying the industry that it would attempt to enforce the

federally approved, but locally superseded, rules. Vista also

argues that the district court failed to properly consider EPA’s

delay in acting on the proposed SIP revisions and in bringing

this action. Vista contends that had the EPA rejected the

revisions earlier, it would have made none of the paint sales.

The “mere failure by governmental agencies to prosecute . . .

does not allow a court to reduce a penalty.” Public Interest

New v. Pow

Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 81 Gel Cir. 1990). EPA is only

required to act on revisions of SIPs within a reasonable time,

not necessarily within four months. General Motors Corp., 496

U.S. at 536-42. USA contends that the EPA’s inaction on the

San Diego proposed revision was reasonable as it was

submitted less than a month before September 1, 1986.

Whether this and the other delays were reasonable was a

question of fact that precluded summary judgment as to this

factor.

2. unusual and perplexing nature of regulation

Vista did not bring up this argument until its post-judgment

motion. Vista cites only United States v. Louisiana-Pacific

Corp., 682 F. SUPP. 1122 (D. Colo. 1987), to support its

argument that its penalty should have been reduced because of

the “unusual and perplexing” nature of the regulatory scheme.

Whatever the complexity of the underlying legal basis for

EPA’s actions, Vista’s President was told by EPA and the San

Diego District that, if it did not stop selling non-complying

paint by September 1, enforcement would follow. There was

nothing unusual or perplexing in these instructions to Vista.

3. reliance

This argument was brought forth in Vista’s post-judgment

motion. The district court was not bound by Louisiana-Pacific

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to consider “justifiable and detrimental reliance.” Accordingly,

the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the post-

judgment motion as to this issue.

IV.

Unfortunately, Vista intertwined the distinct issues addressed

on summary judgment with those addressed Only in its post-

judgment motion.’ Vista never expressly argued in its opening

brief that the district court erred in denying its post-judgment

motion. Even in its reply brief, Vista’s arguments were, at best.

unclear. Vista did not even touch on any of these arguments in

its Opening brief. Accordingly, we refuse to consider these

arguments.

V.

We affirm the district court’s decision to grant motions

striking certain of Vista’s affirmative defenses and dismissing

Vista’s counterclaims and third-party claims for want of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. We also

affirm the district court’s summary judgment as to liability, and

its denial of Vista’s post-judgment motion. However. we

reverse the district court’s summary judgment as to the civil

penalty, and remand to the district court for trial on the penalty

issues.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

* After thorough review of the district court record, we conclude that the

following issues were raised for the first time in Vista’s post-judgment

motion: Vista's liability for pre-notice of violation sales, the burden of

proof regarding the dates of any sales, abuse of prosecutorial discretion.

USA’s failure to follow EPA’s penalty policy, constitutional excessiveness,

EPA’s authority to require the sales data, and Vista’s sufficient cause to act.

46a

APPENDIX E

D I . E

I, EDDIE R. FISCHER, hereby declare as follows:

1. 1 am the President and the sole shareholder of Vista

Paint Corporation (“Vista’’).

2. Vista began as a company in approximately 1957.

However, the original name of Vista was Paint & Masonry

Supply. It consisted of a small paint store located in Garden

Grove, California. I originally had a partner whose name was

Walt Jacobson. In about 1958, my partner and I began to

manufacture paint. Our first line of paint products was called

Kolor-Kote and was designed to be applied on concrete. Our

original manufacturing plant was in a small garage also located

in Garden Grove.

3. In approximately 1959, we moved our company to a

new location in Stanton, California. This new facility was

approximately 2,000 square feet in size. One half of it was

devoted to a store which sold paint products and related

materials. The rest of our facility was devoted to the

manufacture and production of paint products. At our new

location, in addition to manufacturing and selling Kolor-Kote,

we developed a new line of paint called Acri-Bond. This new

product line was designed for all purposes, including interior

and exterior, as well as dry wall, masonry and concrete. At

about that same time, we changed the name of the company to

Grove Paints.

4. In approximately 1965, we relocated to a new 7,00-

square foot facility also in Stanton, California. The new facility

was both a manufacturing plaint, as well as a retail store outlet.

During this time period, we continued to develop and

47a

manufacture new water-base paint products, such as Dura-Glide.

5. Approximately one year later, we opened a new factory

facility behind our retail store outlet in Stanton in order to

develop and manufacture future product lines.

6. In or about 1969, we opened our first satellite retail

outlet in Costa Mesa, California.

7. Throughout the 1970s, Vista enjoyed a moderate growth

pattern and continued to open up new retail locations in Orange

County.

8. In or about 1970, we changed the name of the company

to Vista Paint Corporation. Vista Paint Corporation was a “C”

corporation. The shareholders of the company were myself and

Walt Jacobson.

9. In approximately 1975, Walt Jacobson sold his interest

in Vista to me and I became the sole shareholder of Vista.

10. In the late 1970s, we began to make plans to open a new

factory, warehouse, general offices, as well asa retail store

outlet in Fullerton, California. This project took several years

to develop. In or about 1981, we opened our new facility in

Fullerton.

11. Our current operations are housed in a building of

approximately 134,000 square feet in size. Vista’s operations

initially took up approximately 80,000 square feet of that space

and currently we occupy approximately 110,00 square feet of

this building.

12. Approximately 12,000 square feet of our facility is now

devoted to our retail store. This store sells the Vista line of

architectural coatings and related products. In addition, we sell

Spray equipment and related components. Also. we sel] wall

48a

coverings, mini blinds, and related items from our retail

location. :

13. The balance of our facility is devoted to our general

offices, manufacturing and warehouse facilities. We take

special pride in the nature of our equipment, quality control and

environmental awareness at Vista. For example, when we first

moved into our new location in 1981, we put into place state-

of-the-art equipment for manufacturing and recycling. This

technology includes dust-recycling and water-recycling

systems. As far as I know, Vista was the first California paint

corporation to be involved in 100% recycling of waste products

which are generated during the manufacturing process.

14. Throughout the 1980s, Vista manufactured both water-

base and oil-base paints. Approximately 80% of our

production was in the water-base paint area. I believe that

Vista enjoyed technological superiority over its competitors in

the manufacturing of water-base paints based upon Vista’s

historical focus on this technology. In fact, our new plant in

Fullerton was almost exclusively designed for the research,

development, and manufacture of water-base architectural

coatings lines. In addition, solvent-based architectural coatings

are more difficult to deal with because solvent is flammable

and additional safety and environmental steps need to be taken

in the manufacturing process of solvent-base paints. As a

result, water-base paints tend to be slightly more profitable for

Vista to manufacture.

15. Asaconsequence, Vista had no particular incentive to

emphasize its manufacturing of solvent-base architectural

coatings during the 1980s. Indeed, the only reason for carrying

those product lines was because the market, especially paint

contractors, continued to demand solvent-based architectural

coatings for a variety of applications. I believe, and I think

painting contractors in Southern California concur, that there

si eeerceeeeeem imac iaiiiaiiiliaaiiaiaiiaaaiain

49a

are particular applications which can only be met by the use of

properly manufactured solvent-based coatings.

16. I have a vague memory that in or about the late 1970s,

the South Coast Air Quality management District

(“SCAQMD”) began to become involved in attempts to limit

the volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) in architectural

coatings. However, Vista’s compliance with these rules and

regulations was handled by Jerome Fischer, or Vice President

of Operations, as well as by Joe Ramirez who was our

Technical Director.

17. During the 1980s, Vista continued to expand into other

Southern California counties, including San Diego County,

Riverside County, San Bernardino, and Los Angeles County.

By 1987, Vista had approximately 14 retail outlets in these

various counties and $24 million in gross sales.

18. Until the early part of 1987, it was my clear

understanding that Vista was required to comply with

environmental guidelines which were imposed either by

SCAQMD or the San Diego Air Pollution Control District

(SDAPCD”). We rarely, if ever, heard anything about

requirements from the Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) or the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”).

19. In or about March 1987, I remember that I learned from

either Jerome Fischer and/or Joe Ramirez that, for the first

time, the EPA was demanding some manufacturing or sales

information from Vista. We were quite concerned at Vista

because we had historically never been required to answer to

EPA in terms of providing information or adjusting our product

lines to meet those requirements.

20. In addition, during the same time period, I had

occasional conversations with other executives of different

California paint companies, and they too expressed to me

50a

concern and confusion about these new demands from the EPA

for voluminous data from their companies as well.

21. Irelied on Jerome Fischer and Joe Ramirez to gather the

necessary data to comply with these EPA demands. It has

always been the policy of Vista to fully and immediately

comply with any information demand from any governmental

agency which has jurisdiction over our company.

22. Accordingly, | was quite concerned to receive Exhibit

504 on or about April 13, 1987. This document, addressed to

my attention, stated that somehow Vista was in violation for

failing to comply with an information request from the EPA.

| spoke with Jerome Fischer and Joe Ramirez to inquire about

the status of the EPA’s request. They told me that they were

doing their best to pull together the voluminous materials

demanded by the EPA and had hoped to receive an extension

of time within which to comply. Jerome Fischer further

advised me that he had attempted to reach Mr. Wruble at the

EPA for such an extension and Mr. Wruble had not returned his

telephone calls. I urged Jerome Fisher and Joe Ramirez to

immediately comply with EPA’s request. I was advised that

they did so on or about April 16, 1987. Joe Ramirez and

Jerome Fischer assured me that Vista would diligently comply

with all requests from EPA.

23. On or about May 15, 1987, I received another

information request from the EPA. This is Exhibit 507. I was

very bewildered and confused by this second information

request by EPA. First, the information request “withdrew” the

March 19 information request we had been working hard to

respond to and which, in my view, we had finally responded to

completely. Second, this information request made no mention

of the so-called “violation” which had been assessed against

Vista for failing to comply with the March 19, 1987, request.

Third, we were unclear about power and jurisdiction of the

EPA in this area. We had always looked to SCAQMD and, to

Sla

a lesser extent, SDAPCD, for guidance in complying with

environmental regulations. It was unclear to us, both at Vista

and in my conversations with other paint company executives.

what EPA was attempting to do in this area. Nevertheless, |

forwarded this second information request to Jerome Fischer

and Joe Ramirez and told them promptly to respond to the

EPA’s demands. 2

sales

24. On or about May 29, 1987. | drafted and mailed to the

EPA a letter which is Exhibit 508. The purpose of this letter

was to seek the assistance from the EPA which they had offered

to provide in their May 15, 1987, letter. I had been trying for

some time to contact Mr. William Wruble of the EPA who was

listed as the point of contact at that organization. However,

Mr. Wruble never returned my telephone calls. I had hoped to

receive from Mr. Wruble clarification of the second and highly

confusing information request from the EPA. Accordingly, my

May 29, 1987, letter was an attempt to receive a return

telephone call and/or assistance from the EPA. However, |

never received a telephone call or return letter from Mr.

Howekamp. Nor did I receive any follow-up communication

from Mr. Wruble, despite my request.

25. Ihave reviewed Exhibit 541, the Minutes of the June 8.

1987, Architectural Coatings Task Force meeting. This

refreshes my memory that in or about June 1987, we at Vista

became aware from various industry sources that we could no

longer manufacture non-flat, non-specialty architectural

coatings with a VOC level in excess of 250 g/l. We further

learned that we could no longer sell such coatings after

September 1, 1987. Accordingly, we made a corporate

decision at vista to discontinue those lines of non-flat, non-

* [So in original. }

52a

specialty architectural coatings which had 380 g/l VOC as of

July 1, 1987.

26. In or about June 1987, we made a corporate decision to

respond to the May 15, 1987, information request by stipulating

as we believed we were permitted to do. I have reviewed

Exhibit 509 which is a letter from Philip S. Patterson, Vista’s

Chief Financial Office in June 1987. This document further

refreshes my memory that we determined to cease the

manufacture and sale of 380 g/l non-flat, non-specialty

architectural coatings as the EPA demanded we do.

27. I was very concerned and confused when, on or about

June 19, 1987, I received a second notice of violation from the

EPA, Exhibit 511. We were quite surprised to learn that, by

stipulating to the EPA May 15, 1987, information request, we

would then be found to be in violation of EPA regulations.

28. We were even more confused when we received Exhibit

512, a June 19, 1987, third information request from EPA.

This third request demanded information about the manufacture

and sale of our paint products for the months of August,

September and October 1987. In addition, the third

information request demanded manufacturing information for

380 g/l VOC coatings for the months of July though October

1987. This did not seem to pertain to Vista because we had

already determined to cease the manufacture of those coatings

as of July 1, 1987.

29. The third information request from EPA was modified

by the EPA’s fourth information request, dated July 22, 1987,

Exhibit 513. This was also the first official written order from

EPA to cease manufacture of 380 g/L VOC coatings by July 1,

1987, an and to cease sales of such coatings by September 1,

1987. At Vista, we decided that the stipulation proposed in this

fourth information request was appropriate and we determined

that, rather than complying with the confusing and conflicting

53a

demands for information in the June and July information

requests, we would stipulate as provided for on page two of

Exhibit 513.

30. Accordingly, Jerome Fischer, on or about August 4,

1987, mailed to the EPA our stipulation in response to the J uly

22, 1987, EPA letter. We believed at the time that this

stipulation answered all of EPA’s concerns. We heard nothing

further from EPA about the June 19 and July 22, 1987,

information requests from EPA in 1987, throughout 1988 and

until May 1989.

31. In or about July or August 1987, I became aware that

there was a possibility that Vista could continue to sell it 380

g/l VOC coatings in San Diego County even after September 1,

1987. This was important to Vista because it has retail outlets

only in SCAQMD and SDAPCD which were the only Districts

of California which were prohibiting 380 g/L VOC coatings.

Therefore, absent a variance, Vista would be unable to sell its

inventory of 380 g/L coatings. This information came to me

though conversations in the industry and perhaps through

advisories which we occasionally obtained from SDAPCD. As

President of Vista, I was very concerned about our excess

inventory of 380 VOC paint. I was concerned for two reasons.

First, the disposal of several thousand gallons of 380 VOC

paint would be a waste disposal problem that we would have to

deal with at Vista. Secondly, Vista had approximately $60,000

of raw materials coast invested in this 380 g/L VOC paint. |

estimate that our total inventory at Vista of the 380 VOC paint

was approximately 13,000 gallons at this time. Importantly,

these 13,000 gallons consisted of slow-moving inventory which

Vista was unlikely to sell for many months, if not longer.

32. I have reviewed Exhibit 15. This was a letter that |

authored and Vista sent to its customers to described our

changes in our product line in order to comply with the new

EPA directives.

54a

33. I have reviewed Exhibit 193. These are notes from a

meeting conducted on August 19, 1987, and attended by

Jerome Fischer, Joe Ramirez, and myself. The purpose of this

meeting was to make a management decision on which of our

product lines had to be pulled from the he Vista inventory by

the September 1, 1987, deadline. In addition, the meting was

in order to discuss new labels for our products, as well as other

information to be put on the he paint containers so that our

customers cold also comply with the new EPA regulations.

Finally, we were reviewing certain of our product lines to

determine whether we would continue to manufacture them at

the lower VOC limits mandated by EPA, or whether we would

discontinue those lines entirely. Ultimately, as to Vista’s slow-

moving product lines, a corporate decision was made to not

reformulate them, but rather to discontinue the product line

entirely.

34. In or about August 1987, after many additional

attempts, I was finally able to talk to William Wruble of the

EPA by telephone. My primary reason for attempting to

contact Mr. Wruble was to try to obtain from EPA permission

or a variance to sell our inventory of approximately 13,000

gallons of 380 g/L VOC paint. | was particularly concerned

because the EPA had given Vista and the other paint companies

only two months to dispose of substantial excess inventory. |

emphasized to Mr. Wruble that we did take EPA’s deadline

seriously and that we had in fact ceased manufacturing of 380

VOC paint by July 1. However, a deadline of September 1,

1987, was simply too short a time period for a small paint

company like Vista to be able to properly dispose of its excess

inventory without suffering severe economic consequences.

During the conversation, Mr. Wruble mentioned that the

SDAPCD separately enforced its regulation, and that I might

wish to try to obtain a variance from SDAPCD. However, he

held out little hope that I would be able to obtain such a

variance. I emphasized to Mr. Wruble that it was important

that Vista obtain some sort of variance so that we could sell our

ee ee ee |

5Sa

excess inventory of 380 g/L VOC coatings. Based upon some

prior information I had received from EPA and other

environmental agencies, | was aware that the EPA and other

regulatory agencies would on occasion allow companies and/or

industry to pay a disposal fee or other compensation for the

privilege of selling out-of-date products and/or Causing other

emissions of pollution. I discussed this with Mr. Wruble and

inquired about the possibility of Vista paying a fee or some

dollar amount to dispose of our products. Mr. Wruble said that

he would check with his staff and EPA attorneys, but he did not

hold out much hope that such a fee or penalty could be paid.

Mr. Wruble never called me back to determine what he had

learned from his conversations with staff and/or EPA lawyers

about this issue.

35. I have examined Exhibit 16. This is an August 24.

1987, memorandum from myself and Mr. Jerome Fischer to al]

Vista Personnel. These were our instructions to our personnel

to advise them of our compliance with the new EPA

restrictions. The memorandum was designed t prevent the sale

of 380 g/L VOC coatings after September 1. 1987, and further

to advise our personnel as to which coatings could continue to

be sold after that date.

36. In order to attempt to obtain a variance to sell our

remaining inventory in San Diego County, I contacted

SDAPCD sometime in August 1987. Eventually, I believe |

talked to Mr. George Seidel. Mr. Seidel advised me that we did

not have to remove our “nonconforming paint” from our

inventory and that, while we were applying for a variance.

SDAPCD would not “shop our stores.” In other words, they

would just disregard that we had that paint there. Mr. Seidel.

or someone else from SDAPCD. provided us with a form with

which to apply for a variance to sell our 380 G/L VOC paints

in SDAPCD. Exhibit 20 is a copy of that form which was

filled out in our offices in Fullerton and signed by me on

August 31, 1987. I believe the documents was also filed on

ee ee

56a

August 31, 1987, in San Diego. Exhibit A to the variance

application is a listing of the four Vista retail paint stores in San

Diego County. Exhibit A to the variance application is a listing

of the four Vista retail paint stores in San Diego County.

Exhibit B once again shows our certification that we had ceased

the manufacture of 380 g/L VOC paint by July 1, 1987.

37. I have examined Exhibit 764 which is a copy of the

notice I received from the County of San Diego scheduling

Vista’s variance petition hearing for September 24, 1987.

38. I have reviewed Exhibit 19, which is a September 2,

1987, receipt from Vista’s San Diego retail store. It appears to

reflect the purchase of a one-gallon can of Trim-Kote

mahogany paint. Our Trim-Kote mahogany for sale in our San

Diego outlets during that time was 380 G/L VOC. However,

I had understood from George Seidel that while our variance

application was pending, we would not be found to be in

violation of SDAPCD Rule 67. Exhibit 19 also has a

handwritten note purportedly dated 9/18/87 and signed by

George Seidel which claims to reflect a conversation between

myself and Mr. Seidel. I do not recall this telephone

conversation. Nor do I recall specifying the number of gallons

or so-called non-complaint paint as 5,200 in San Diego County

after September 1987. However, this seems to be a good

approximation of the number of gallons of 380 G/L VOC paint

which were on our shelves in our four San Diego stores in

September 1987.

39. I have examined Exhibit 191 which purports to show

that Vista sold a gallon of “Proformer” paint which had in

excess of 250 g/L VOCs in the Los Angeles area in September

1987. However, the Proformer quick-dry enamel which was

purchased and tested was a “quick-dry enamel” which the EPA

allowed to have up to 400 g/l VOC. Therefore, Vista was not

in violation of Rule 1113 by the sale of this gallon of Proformer

paint.

57a

40. On September 24, 1987, I attended a hearing by the

SDAPCD to consider Vista’s application for a variance to sell

its remaining inventory in San Diego County. The Board

deadlocked one vote to one vote and no decision was taken on

my application. Therefore, we made a corporate decision not

to further proceed with the variance application and instead

immediately to remove the remainder of our 380 g/L VOC

paints from our store shelves in our four retail locations in San

Diego County. That inventory was then returned to our

warehouse in Fullerton, California.

41. I have examined Exhibit 42, a September 29, 1987,

violation from SDAPCD. I do not recall having received this

violation on or about the date it bears. I am very certain that |

did not receive this notice of violation by October 12, 1987,

when I sent to Mr. Edward Slater at SDAPCD Exhibit 24

certifying that Vista had removed all of the 380 g/l non-

conforming VOC paint from our four San Diego stores.

42. On or about October 14, 1987, I received a notice of

violation from SDAPCD. This was a result of one of our stores

being shopped and one gallon of 380 g/L VOC enamel being

purchased from that store. I have examined Exhibit 21, and I

recall receiving only the first page of this Exhibit. I did not

receive the narrative statement which comprises the last page

of this exhibit.

43. I have examined Exhibit 44 which is a copy of an

October 19, 1987, letter from myself to Mr. Edward Slater at

the SDAPCD. This letter was sent to Mr. Slater because I had

just received the October 14, 1987, notice of violation which

reflected that one of our San Diego stores had been shipped in

September 1987. I was concerned because it had been my

understanding, as reflected in the October 19, 1987, letter, that

while our variance application was pending in San Diego we

would not be held to be in violation of SDAPCD Rule 67. I

58a

heard nothing further from Mr. Slater following my

correspondence of October 19, 1987.

44. The reason we did not remove our 380 g/L VOC paints

from our store shelves in San Diego immediately following the

SDAPCD hearing on September 24, 1987, is because that

Board did not reach a decision on my variance application. |

felt, therefore, that the application was still pending. In fact, a

further hearing on my application was scheduled for November

5, 1987. However, on October 30, 1987, after all of the 380

g/L VOC coatings had been taken from the store shelves in San

Diego, I sent a letter to Mr. F.A.M. Buck advising him that

Vista did not wish to pursue the variance application further.

This is Exhibit 97.

45. I have examined Exhibits 25, 773, 27 and 28. These

documents reflect correspondence between myself and

SDAPCD. Ultimately, my dispute with SDAPCD for having

sold two gallons of 380 g/L VOC paint was resolved by Vista

paying $500 in full settlement for the violation. Following my

letter to SDAPCD on February 4, 1988 (Ex. 28), I heard

nothing further from SDAPCD.

46. On May 11, 1989, I was very surprised to receive

Exhibit 562. This letter advised me for the first time in almost

two years that the EPA was concerned about our efforts to

comply with its series of confusing information requests in

1987. I was advised to contact Department of Justice attorney

Gerald George to give him Vista’s explanation. Immediately

upon my receipt of that letter, | telephoned Mr. George to

discuss the matter. I wanted to know what it would take to

resolve this dispute. Mr. George insisted that I “give him a

number” to resolve the case. I believed I offered $500 to settle

the case. Mr. George did not accept the offer, but demanded

further information from Vista.

oo) a

59a

47. At about that same time, I hired the San Francisco law

firm of Heller, Erhman, White & McAuliffe to assist me in this

matter. My then-attorney, Joseph Armao, was able to obtain

from EPA attorney Gerald George a demand of $30,000 to

resolve the case. Both Mr. Armao and | felt that this amount

was far too much and we countered with an offer of $5,000. |

had emphasized to Mr. George that I believed my dispute with

the environmental agencies had been resolved with the payment

of my $500 fine to SDAPCD in early 1988.

48. In response to Mr. George’s further demand for

information from Vista, I sent him a letter dated June 19, 1989

(Ex. 29). In addition, I provided him with a copy of the August

4, 1987, letter which we had sent previously to EPA (Ex. 13).

49. In addition, my attorney Mr. Armao provided Exhibit

783, a June 21, 1989, letter to Gerald George with a further

response to questions Mr. George had about the substance of

Vista’s compliance with the 1987 information request. This

letter further reflects the legal advice I was being given by Mr.

Armao at this time that Vista had in fact fully complied with

the EPA information requests dated in March, May, June and

July 1987.

See eer

50. On or about June 23, 1989, in a further attempt to

provide EPA with all of the information it was apparently

seeking, Mr. Armao at my direction sent a letter, Exhibit 784,

to Mr. George. This letter also included a listing of our sales

from Vista store No. 9 (our largest San Diego Vista retail store)

and the number of gallons and a listing of the 380 g/L VOC

paint which was sold during the month of September 1987.

These figures had been compiled by Vista personnel over a

* [So in original. ]

60a

several day period by reviewing thousands of sales invoices and

receipts. In sum, the document established that no more than

35 gallons of so-called non-compliant paint was sold by this

one store during that time. By extrapolation, I estimated that

Vista sold no more than 70 gallons of non-compliant paints in

its four San Diego retail stores.

51. On or about June 23, 1987, I was advised by my

attorney Joseph Armao that he had received a letter from

Gerald George, Exhibit 522. I understood then that this letter

finally showed that the EPA was satisfied with the information

that they had been purportedly seeking since June 1987.

However, I was very surprised to learn that the EPA’s $30,000

demand had risen substantially to a new demand of $192,000.

I was very confused about the alleged “economic benefit” that

Vista had supposedly enjoyed from the sale of 70 gallons of so-

called non-complying paint. I was further confused about

EPA’s application of various other penalty factors which had

not been previously made known to me.

sialiadindind

+ oo OF

52. I had further discussions with Mr. Armao and he

advised me that this settlement demand was exorbitant and

should not be paid.

53. I did not formally reject the demand of Mr. George. |

did not hear anything further from the EPA or the Department

of Justice until December 1990 when Vista was served with the

instant lawsuit. I was stunned to find that the EPA continued

to allege that they had not received the information they had

* [So in original.]

* [So in original.]

ooo

6la

represented in June 1989 that the EPA had received all the

information it had been demanding.

54. In or about January 1991, Vista retained the law firm of

Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Smiland in order to represent Vista

in its litigation with the EPA and the Department of Justice.

During the course of the litigation over the next |] months, |

course of the litigation in 1991, I learned from Messrs.

Smiland and/or Newell of the Donnelly, Clark firm that the

had been seeking in its June 1987 information request, Mr.

Newell and/or Mr. Smiland advised me that, in their view, the

to respond to the June 1987 information request. However,

based upon the advice of Our attorneys, Vista made a decision

to give government attorneys and their staff full access to all of

the business records of Vista.

specified particular records that they wanted copied and we

made copies for them. | assigned a Vista employee to assist

AUSAs Hsiao and Park in whatever way he could for a full

day.

56. During the visit to our facility by AUSAs Hsiao and

Park, I had several conversations with AUSA Hsiao. During

those conversation, AUSA Hsiao said that in his view the case

62a

was worth $100,000 and he urged me to pay that amount to

resolve the dispute. I replied that the case was not worth

$100,000, but that $40,000 was a figure that Vista might be

willing to pay. AUSA Hsiao said that he felt that might be an

appropriate figure, but that other government officials would

not accept less than $100,000.

57. During his visit to the Fullerton facility in October

1987, Mr. Hsiao and/or Mr. Park never advised me that there

were missing documents. Never did they advise me that there

were “missing” sales receipts. Indeed, none of the gentlemen

representing the government who were at our facility that day

ever indicated that there were any documents which they were

seeking which were not made available to them. To this day,

I do not believe that there are any incomplete or missing

documents.

58. In or about October 1991, I traveled to San Francisco to

meet with EPA attorney Letitia Moore. I believe one other

individual was also present at that meeting, although I do not

remember that person’s name. Once again, I offered to settle

this matter for $40,000, but Ms. Moore demanded a “six

figure” settlement.

59. On or about October 25, 1991, I was advised by my

attorneys that the government had filed a motion for summary

judgment against Vista. At some point, I was advised that one

of the bases for the summary judgment motion was that Vista

was supposedly continuing to withhold information from the

government. This was especially surprising to me because we

had just provided AUSAs Hsiao and Park with full access to all

Vista documents.

60. Between October 25, 1991, and November 18, 1991, I

was out of the Los Angeles area for a good part of that time.

However, my attorneys assured me that there were so many

63a

substantial and triable issues of fact that it was highly unlikely

that a summary judgment would be entered against Vista.

61. I was advised by telephone on or about November 18,

1991, that a $3.1 million summary judgment had been entered

against Vista. I was completely stunned by that result. Asa

result of that judgment and the publicity which followed,

morale at Vista dropped tremendously. Employees were

concerned that Vista might be driven out of business and that

they would lose their jobs. Customers also contacted me and

other Vista employees and suggested that they could no longer

do business with us because of the adverse publicity. In fact,

our business was very slow in November and December 199]

and this slow period continued into the early parts of 1992.

Fullerton.

62. Atall times, it was Vista’s policy to fully, completely

and promptly reply to any and all government demands for

information, whether from environmental agencies or from the

Department of Justice.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the

United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 28 day of April 1994 at Los Angeles,

California.

/

Eddie R. Fischer

64a

APPENDIX F

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Acting Assistant Attorney General

GERALD F. GEORGE

KENNETH RIEMER

Environmental Enforcement Section

Environment and Natural Resources Division

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 7611, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

Telephone: (202) 514-4080

TERREE A. BOWERS

United States Attorney

LEON W. WEIDMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

PETER HSIAO

Assistant United States Attorney

Room 7516 Federal Building

300 North Los Angeles Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

Telephone: (213) 894-6117

LETITIA D. MOORE

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 744-1358

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Sa

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Detendant.

No. CV 90-6449-A WT(GHKx)

{PROPOSED AMENDED]

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER

Pre-Trial Conference

Date: December 20, 1993

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Local Rule 9 of the Central District of California,

'T IS ORDERED:

1. The parties are plaintiff United States of America

(“United States”) and defendant Vista Paint Corporation

(“Vista”). Vista has been served and has appeared by filing its

ariswer in this case. The pleadings and court orders which raise

the issues are:

(1) the Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Civil

Penalties, filed December 3, 1990:

(2) the Answer to Complaint for Injunctive Relief

and Civil Penalties and Counterclaim for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief, filed March 28, 1991;

2

|

66a

(3) Amended Findings of Uncontroverted Facts and

Conclusions of Law in Support of United States Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed February 11, 1992; and

(4) the Ninth Circuit Memorandum Opinion, filed

September 24, 1992.

The United States contends that the District Court’s Order

Dismissing Defendant’s Counterclaim, Dismissing Defendant’s

Third Party Complaint, and Striking Certain Affirmative

Defenses, filed July 23, 1991, also applies here.

2. Federal jurisdiction and venue are invoked upon the

grounds: |

(1) — This Court has subject matter jurisdictions over

this action pursuant to Section 113(b) of the federal Clean

Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1345 and 1355, and personal jurisdiction over the

parties herein. Vista does not contest this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction.

(2) Venue in this district is proper pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 7413 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) in that Vista’s

principal place of business is in this district.

3. The United States estimates that the trial will require

three days or less, with the use of narrative statements for direct

testimony with the declarant made available for cross

examination. Vista estimates that the trial will take

approximately six court days.

4. The trial is to be a non-jury trial. At least one (1) week

prior to the trial date, each counsel shall submit to the court and

opposing counsel the findings of fact and conclusions of law

which the party expects the Court to make upon proof at the

time of trial as required by Local Rule 13.5.

67a

* * *

DATED: JAN 03 1994, 1993["]

/s/ A. Wallace Tashima

A. WALLACE TASHIMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

DATED: 12/13/93

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Acting Assistant Attorney General

GERALD F. GEORGE

KENNETH RIEMER

TERREE A. BOWERS

United States Attorney

LEON W. WEIDMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

/s/ Peter Hsiao

PETER HSIAO

Assistant United States Attorney

LETITIA D. MOORE

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

* [Original includes erroneous reference to 1993.]

68a

DATED: 12/10/93

DONALD C. SMALTZ

WILLIAM F. FAHEY

LELAND A. WAHL

~' ANDREW M. ROSENFELD

SMALTZ & ANDERSON

A Professional Law Corporation

and

WILLIAM M. SMILAND

ROBERT M. NEWELL, JR.

DONNELLY, CLARK, CHASE & SMILAND

By /s/ William F. Fahey

William F. Fahey,

Attorneys for Defendant

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION

69a

APPENDIX G

BARRY M. HARTMAN

Acting Assistant Attorney General

GERALD F. GEORGE

Trial Attorney

Environmental Enforcement Section

Environment and Natural Resources Division

United States Department of Justice

301 Howard Street, Suite 870

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 744-6484

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

LEON W. WEIDMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

PETER HSIAO

Assistant United States Attorney

SCOTT H. PARK

Assistant United States Attorney

Room 7516 Federal Building

300 North Los Angeles Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

Telephone: (213) 894-2285

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

70a

Plaintiff,

v.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

NO. CV 90-6449-R

Date: February 3, 1991

Time: 10:00 a.m.

[PROPOSED] __ AMENDED __ FINDINGS __OF

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff United States of America’s motion for summary

judgment came on regularly for hearing on November 18, 1991,

Chief United States District Court Judge Manuel L. Real

presiding. Subsequently, defendant’s Motion for Findings Of

Fact and For Relief From And Amendment Of The Judgment

came on regularly for hearing on February 3, 1992. After

having heard the arguments of counsel and examined the

pleadings, memorandum and exhibits presented by the plaintiff

and defendants, the Court makes the following amended

findings of fact and conclusions of law:

STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

1. Vista is a major manufacturer, distributor and retail

seller of paint. It manufactures approximately 25,000 gallons

of paint each month for sale at its stores in California, and its

total sales last year exceeded 50 million dollars. Vista’s

general office and its sole paint manufacturing plant are located

in Fullerton, California. Vista sells its paint at its own stores in

|

7la

Stanton, Costa Mesa, La Habra, Orange, Mission Viejo,

Ontario, Riverside, E] Cajon, Chula Vista, Huntington Beach,

and San Diego, California.

2. In 1984, as part of the State Implementation Plan

(“SIP”) for California to limit the VOC content of paint, the

South Coast Air Quality Management District (“SCAQMD”)

and the San Diego County Air Pollution Control District

_ SDCAPCD”) adopted SIP Rules 1113 and 67.0. These rules

regulate non-flat architectural coatings, otherwise known as

gloss or semi-gloss paints, which are commonly used to paint

structures, mobile home or pavement. In order to control air

pollution from the manufacture and application of these

coatings, the rules limit their VOC content to no more than 250

grams of VOC per liter of coating (“250 g/l VOC”), and forbid

the sale, offer for sale, or application of any such paint

exceeding these VOC limitations (“non-compliant coatings”).

**k*

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: 2-11-92

[

HON. MANUEL L. REAL

CHIEF UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

Presented by:

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

LEON W. WEIDMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

SCOTT PARK

72a

Assistant United States Attorney

/e/ P “ter Hsiao

PETER HSIAO

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

73a

APPENDIX H

RICHARD B. STEWART

Assistant Attorney General

GERALD F. GEORGE

Senior Counsel

Environmental Enforcement Section

Environment and Natural Resources division

United States Department of Justice

301 Howard Street, Suite 870

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 744-649]

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

LEON W. WEIDMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

IAN FAN

Assistant United States Attorney

1100 U.S. Courthouse

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles, CA 90012

Telephone: (213) 894-2445

Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERIC A,

Plaintiff,

74a

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

NO. CV 90 6449 R

COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND CIVIL

PENALTIES

(CLEAN AIR ACT, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.)

Filed December 3, 1990 -

COMPLAINT

The United States of America (“Plaintiff”), by and through

its undersigned attorneys, by the authority of the Attorney

General of the United States, and at the request of the

Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”), alleges that:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a civil action for injunctive relief and for civil

penalties for violations by Vista Paint Corporation (“Vista”), of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seg. (“the Act”), EPA

regulations promulgated under the Act, and applicable portions

of the federally approved California State Implementation Plan

(“SIP”) regulating emissions of volatile organic compounds

(“VOCs”).

2. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Vista from violating the SIP at

its California facilities which are located in the South Coast Air

Quality Management District (““SCAQMD”) and the San Diego-

Air Pollution Control district (“SDAPCD”).

75a

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

3. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to

Section 113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), and pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 and 1355.

4. Venue properly lies in this District pursuant to Section

113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7413(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

5. Pursuant to Section 113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.

7413(b), notice of the commencement of this action has been

given to the State of California through the California Air

Resources Board.

6. Vista is a corporation organized under the laws of the

State of California, with its headquarters located in F ullerton,

California. Vista owns and operates an architectural coatings

manufacturing facility in Fullerton, California, and numerous

retail sales facilities throughout the SDAPCD and SCAQMD.

7. Atall times relevant hereto, Vista has sold and offered

for sale within the SCAQMD and SDAPCD architectural

coatings which contain volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”).

_ VOCs are precursors to ozone, an air pollutant.

8. Vista is a “person” within the meaning of Section

302(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e).

STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

9. Section 109 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, requires the

EPA Administrator (“Administrator”) to promulgate primary

and secondary ambient air quality standards for air pollutants,

including ozone. On February 8, 1979, primary and secondary

National Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for ozone were

promulgated and published at 40 C.F.R. § 50.9.

76a

10. Vista’s manufacturing facility and its sales facilities for -

architectural coatings are located in areas in which the primary

NAAQS for ozone has not been attained. 40 C.F.R. § 81.305.

11. Section 110 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410, requires the

Administrator to approve any SIP for the implementation,

maintenance and enforcement of such ambient air quality

standards within specified time limits. Upon approval, the SIP

can be enforced by the federal government under Section

113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).

12. On January 24, 1985, the Administrator approved

SDAPCD Rule 67.0 and SCAQMD Rule 1113 as part of the

SIP submitted by the State of California. 50 Fed. Reg. 3338

(January 24, 1985).

13. SDAPCD Rule 67.0 and SCAQMD Rule 1113 set

limits on the VOC content of architectural coatings

manufactured after September 2, 1985 that are sold and offered

for sale within those districts.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

14. Paragraphs 1-13 of this Complaint are incorporated

herein by reference as if fully alleged below.

15. On or about June 19, 1987, and pursuant to Section

113(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1), EPA issued to Vista

a Notice of Violation (“NOV”) informing Vista that it was in

violation of SDAPCD Rule 67.0 and SCAQMD Rule 1113. A

true and correct copy of that NOV is attached hereto as Exhibit

A and incorporated herein.

77a

16. Vista has continued to violated[*] SDAPCD Rules 67.0

and SCAQMD Rule 1113 more than thirty (30) days after

issuance and receipt of the NOV.

17. Under Section | 13(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),

Vista is liable for civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each day

of violation of either SDAPCD Rule 67.00 or SCAQMD Rule

1113.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

18. The allegations of Paragraphs 1-13 of this Complaint

are incorporated by reference herein as if fully alleged below.

19. On or about June 19, 1987, the Administrator sent a

demand for information to Vista, pursuant to Section 114 of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414. On or about June 24, 1987, Vista

received this information demand from the Administrator.

20. Vista has failed to supply the information specified by

the Administrator in EPA’s June 19, 1987 information demand

to Vista.

21. Under Section | 13(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b),

Vista is liable for civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each day

of failure to comply with the Administrator’s information

demand.

RELIEF REQUESTED

Wherefore, Plaintiff United States of America respectfully

prays this Court to grant the following relief:

" [So in original.]

78a

A. Imposition of civil penalties of $25,000 per violation for

each day Vista has violated the Clean Air Act, SDAPCD Rule

67.0 and SCAQMD Rule 1113;

B. Entry of a permanent injunction against Vista requiring

it to cease violating the Clean Air Act and regulations

promulgated thereunder, including SCAQMD Rule 1113 and

SDAPCD Rule 67.0;

C. Award of the costs of this action against defendant and

in favor of the United States of America; and

D. Such further relief as this Court may deem just and

proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ [illegible] for

RICHARD B. STEWART

Assistant Attorney General

Environment and Natural Resources

Division

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

/s/ Gerald F. George

GERALD F. GEORGE

Senior Counsel

Environmental Enforcement Section

Environment and Natural Resources

mn Division

U.S. Department of Justice

301 Howard Street, Suite 870

San Francisco, California 94105

79a

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

FREDERICK M. BROSIO, JR.

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Civil Division

/s/ lan Fan

IAN FAN

Assistant United States Attorney

1100 U.S. Courthouse

312 North Spring Street

Los Angeles, CA 90012

OF COUNSEL:

ALLAN ZABEL

Office of Regional Counsel

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9

1235 Mission Street

San Francisco, CA 94103

RACHEL HOPP

Office of Enforcement

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

80a

APPENDIX I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

NO. CV 90-6449 AWT

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULING ORDER

This order supplements the pretrial conference order

and the order re further pretrial conference, both filed January

3, 1996.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. All in limine motions shall be filed and served by

March 25, and shall be noticed for hearing on April 18, 1994,

at 10:00 a.m.

2. A status conference to discuss readiness for trial shall

also be held on said date and time.

3. Trial is set to commence on May 23, 1994, at 1:30 p.m.

4. The direct testimony of all non-adverse witnesses shall

be presented by declaration or deposition extract. The

8la

testimony of adverse witnesses may be presented by deposition

(or the witnesses called in person). All such direct testimony

declarations and deposition transcript excerpts shall be filed

and served not later than May 2. This requirement does not

apply to rebuttal witnesses.

5. Any party desiring to cross-examine any witness whose

direct testimony has been presented by declaration shall, not

later than May 16, file and serve a Notice of Request To Cross-

Examine Witness(es), listing the witnesses the party desires to

cross-examine. All witnesses so designated in a timely Notice

of Request to Cross-Examine shall be made available at trial

for cross-examination. If not so made available, the direct

testimony of such witness shall be stricken. Witnesses not so

designated need not be produced at trial.

The designation of witnesses for cross-examination shall be

made in good faith. Any designation not made in good faith or

which is found to be frivolous may subject designating counsel

to sanctions. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Dated: February 28, 1994

/

A. WALLACE TASHIMA

United States District Judge

82a

APPENDIX J

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE ROBERT J. TIMLIN,

DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. ED CV 94-127-RT

VOLUME IV

COURT TRIAL

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1995

DOROTHY BABYKIN

PRO TEM COURT REPORTER

419J - U.S. DISTRICT COURTHOUSE

312 NORTH SPRING STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

83a

MR. WAHL: IT SEEMS FUNDAMENTALLY

UNFAIR. THEY’VE HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW OUR

DECLARATIONS AND PRESENT A WITNESS ON THE

POINT, BUT WE CAN’T DO THAT.

I MEAN, I GUESS WHAT’S SUGGESTED HERE BY

ANALOGY IS THAT WE CAN’T USE MR. MAHAN FOR

THE VERY REASON THAT HE WAS ONE OF OUR

WITNESSES FOR OUR CASE IN CHIEF. BUT IF WE HAD

CALLED ANOTHER ECONOMIST, AS THEY HAVE

CALLED THEIR DR. MC KEE, THE SCIENTIST, THAT

THAT ECONOMIST COULD HAVE BEEN A REBUTTAL

WITNESS.

SO SOMEHOW WE’VE USED MR. MAHAN IN

OUR CASE IN CHIEF, BUT NOW HE’S PRECLUDED

FROM BEING THE SO-CALLED REBUTTAL WITNESS.

THAT DOESN’T RING FAIR, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ALLICAN SAY IS THE WAY THIS

PROCESS HAS UNRAVELED IN THIS CASE, THIS IS MY

FIRST EXPERIENCE WITH EVIDENCE ON

DECLARATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY FILED. THIS ISA

CLASSIC PILOT PROGRAM FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF ALLOWING TESTIMONY BY DECLARATIONS. BUT

THAT’S THE WAY IT IS.

IT WASN’T WRITTED. HIS RULING WASN’T

TAKEN UP TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT FOR REVIEW AS

TO WHETHER IT WAS APPROPRIATE. BUT MAYBE

YOU'LL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY -- WHOEVER WANTS

TO APPEAL WHATEVER THE RESULTS ARE BY THIS

ee

84a

COURT, YOU CAN RAISE THAT ON APPEAL. IT’S A

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM.

** *

85a :

APPENDIX K

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE ROBERT J. TIMLIN,

DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

VS.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

DEFENDANT.

CASE NO. ED CV 94-127-RT

VOLUME VII

COURT TRIAL

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995

DOROTHY BABYKIN

PRO TEM COURT REPORTER

429) - U. S. DISTRICT COURTHOUSE

312 NORTH SPRING STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

86a

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1995; 8:40 A.M.

**

THE COURT: CALL THE CASE OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA VERSUS VISTA PAINT

CORPORATION. THE PARTIES -- ALL COUNSEL ARE

PRESENT AS WELL AS MR. EDDIE FISCHER.

BEFORE WE RETURN TO RULING ON

OBJECTIONS TO THE REMAINING EXHIBITS, TO

WHICH OBJECTIONS ARE STILL PENDING, THE

COURT'S GOING TO NOW STATE ITS RULING ON THE

ISSUE WHICH WAS BRIEF BY THE PARTIES

REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE’S A

BURDEN OF PROOF AT THE TRIAL OF PENALTIES --

PENALTY.

MS. BREMER: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY.

THE COURT: YES.

MS. BREMER: I THINK THE QUESTION --

CERTAINLY TO THE EXTENT THAT WE UNDERSTOOD

AND BRIEFED IT -- WAS THE QUESTION OF

STANDARD OF PROOF.

THE COURT: THAT’S CORRECT. AND

READING THE CASES, ?'VE CONCLUDED THAT IF

THERE IS NO BURDEN OF PROOF, THERE’S NO

STANDARD.

(LAUGHTER.)

THE COURT: I’M BROADENING THE ISSUE TO

GIVE YOU A BROADER RULING.

87a

THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE PENALTIES

PROVIDED IN THE CLEAN AIR ACT FOR VIOLATIONS

OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT ARE CIVIL IN NATURE. THEY

ARE NOT CRIMINAL OR QUASI CRIMINAL.

THE COURT FURTHER CONCLUDES THAT

UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, THERE IS NO BURDEN

OF PROOF ON EITHER PARTY IN A TRIAL, WHICH IS

SOLELY ON THE ISSUE OF THE AMOUNT OF CIVIL

PENALTIES, IF ANY, WHICH THE COURT WILL ORDER

THE DEFENDANT TO PAY.

BASED ON THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE’S

NO BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS PARTICULAR TRIAL.

THE COURT DEEMS THE ISSUE OF THE STANDARD OF

THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO BE MOOT.

ONCE THE LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF THE

PENALTY IS DETERMINED BY THE COURT, AND THE

COURT AT A LATER TRIAL ON THE PENALTY ISSUE

RECEIVES ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE FROM BOTH SIDES,

AND THEN EXERCISES ITS DISCRETION IN

DETERMINING THE AMOUNT, IF ANY, OF THE

PENALTY AFTER WEIGHING AND BALANCING THE

PROPER STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FACTORS

AGAINST THE FACTS WHICH IT FINDS FROM ALL THE

EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL, IS THE GOVERNING

PRINCIPLE AS TO HOW THE COURT CONSIDERS THE

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND ALSO HAS GUIDED

THE COURT IN ARRIVING AT ITS CONCLUSION THAT

THERE’S NO BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS PARTICULAR

TRIAL.

NOW, THAT WILL IMPACT THE ORDER OF

ARGUMENT. THERE WILL BE CLOSING ARGUMENT.

BUT THERE WILL BE ONLY TWO CLOSING

ARGUMENTS. AND IT’S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT

88a

THE ARRANGEMENT’S ARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT

WILL MAKE THE FIRST CLOSING ARGUMENT.

* * *

89a

APPENDIX L

RICHARD B. STEWART

Assistant Attorney General

STEPHEN JOHNSON

Trial Attorney

Environmental Defense Section

Environment and Natural Resources Division

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 23986

Washington, D.C. 20026-3986

Telephone: (202) 514-0375

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

PETER HSIAO

Assistant United States Attorney

SCOTT H. PARK

Assistant United States Attorney

Room 7516, Federal Building

300 North Los Angeles Street

Los Angeles, California 90012

Telephone: (213) 894-2285

Attorneys for Third Party Defendant

Environmental Protection Agency and

Plaintiff United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

90a

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Counterclaimant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Counterdefendant.

VISTA PAINT CORPORATION,

Third Party Plaintiff,

V.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;

CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD;

TECHNICAL REVIEW GROUP; SOUTH

COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT; SAN DIEGO AIR POLLUTION

CONTROL DISTRICT,

Third Party Defendants.

No. CV 90-6449 (R)

PROPOSED ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S

COUNTERCLAIM, DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, AND STRIKING

CERTAIN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

9la

The motion of plaintiff United States of America to dismiss

defendant Vista Paint Corporation’s counterclaim and to strike

certain affirmative defenses in this action, and the motions of

the third party defendants, Environmental Protection Agency,

California Air Resources Board, Technical Review Group,

South Coast Air Quality Management District and San Diego

Air Pollution Control District, to dismiss defendant’s third

party complaint in this action, came on regularly for hearing

before this Court on June 17, 1991. Appearing on behalf of

plaintiff United States of America and third party defendant

Environmental Protection Agency were Stephen M. Johnson

and Peter Hsiao. Appearing on behalf of the third party

defendant South Coast Air Quality Management District was

Barbara Baird. Appearing on behalf of the third party

defendant San Diego Air Pollution Control District was Miriam

Milich. Appearing on behalf of the third party defendants

Technical Review Group and California Air Resources Board

was Norman N. Flette. Appearing on behalf of the defendant

and third party plaintiff was William H. Smiland. After

considering the moving and opposition papers, the arguments

of counsel and all other matters presented to the Court:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motions of the third party defendants

Environmental Protection Agency, South Coast Air Quality

Management District, San Diego Air Pollution Control District,

California Air Resources Board and Technical Review Group

to dismiss defendant Vista Pain["] Corporation’s third party

complaint are granted in their entirety and the third party

complaint is dismissed with prejudice with respect to all third

party defendants based upon the following grounds:

* [So in original. ]

92a

a. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review

the claims raised in the third party complaint;

b. The claims asserted by the defendant in the third party

complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

2. Plaintiff United States of America’s motion to dismiss

defendant’s counterclaim is granted in its entirety and ihe

counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice based upon the

following grounds:

a. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review

the claims raised in the counterclaim;

b. The claims asserted by the defendant in the

counterclaim fail to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted;

3. Defendant’s First through Sixth, Eighth, Twelfth,

Thirteenth, and Fifteenth through Eighteenth purported

affirmative defense, inclusive, are stricken in their entirety.

DATED: This 23rd day of une, 1991

July

/stamp/ MANUEL L. REAL ____

MANUEL L. REAL

Chief United States District Judge

Submitted by:

LOURDES G. BAIRD

United States Attorney

SCOTT H. PARK

Assistant United States Attorney

93a

/s/ Peter Hsiao Date 6-21-91

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America and

Third Party Defendant Environmental Protection Agency

PETER M. GREENWALD

District Counsel

/s/ Peter Hsiao for Barbara Baird

les dati lstonal

BARBARA BAIRD

Principal Deputy District Counsel

Attorneys for Third Party Defendant South Coast Air

Quality Management District

Date 6-21-91

LLOYD M. HARMON, JR.

County Counsel

by telephone authorization Date 6-21-91]

MIRIAM MILICH, Deputy

Attorneys for Third Party Defendant San Diego Air Pollution

Control District

DANIEL F. LUNGREN

Attorney General

R. H. CONNETT

Assistant Attorney General

by telephone authorization Date 6-21-91

NORMAN N. FLETTE

Deputy Attorney General

Attorneys for Third Party Defendants Technical Review Group

California Air Resources Board

* * *

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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