Reply Brief — Smiland Paint Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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(3 \\ Supreme Court, U.S.

| FILED

No. 97-1817 | AUG 12 1998 |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONERS’ REPLY BRIEF

WILLIAM M. SMILAND

Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street,

Seventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Am Attorneys for Petitioners

WILSON - Eres Printrinc Co.. Inc. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

I slat recreated tac enced ep ecaiogek

I. RECHARACTERIZATION OF PETITION

Il. STATUTORY ISSUE

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IV. MOOTNESS POINT

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

: ; | ce nnn ne 4,6

Aero-Lineas Argentinas v. U.S., 77 F.3d 1564 (Fed.

+ | | eens enone eens nn 8 =

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,

et. @ Ft) |} ae 6

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d

729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) .........---...---.--2----0---------000--000--- 6

Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) . Roane oe 4

Chalmers v. U.S., 43 F.R.D. 286 (D. Kan. 1967)... 9

Conservation Law Foundation of New England v.

Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1992) -............. 9

Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 673 (3rd Cir.

| | | nee mtarmanenrn nen TO Se 10 .

Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization

Corp. v. EPA, 857 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C.

I ie cc cccisiteenntndeneneneelionamnenaiiniaaeans 7

Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization

Corp. v. EPA, F.Supp. , 1998 WL

408884 (M.D.N.C. 1998) ........-...-.--.-.--..----.------------ S

Group Against Smog & Pollution v. . EPA, 665 F.2d

1284 (D.C. Cir. 1981) . 9

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Iu. “446 US. 578

SUED sscenisats TE ee ae Bee NR a a aE ke Pon 4

International Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Von

~ Clemm, 301 F.2d 857 (2nd Cir. 1962) ................. Q

League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Trounday, 598 F.2d

1164 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943

I vice ccna cmtricieennenenmidienieiaeeneninoas 10

Maryland National Bank v. Madam Chapel, 46

F.8d 895 (9th Cir. 1995) .............-..........-.------------- x

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561

F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .........-..-..-------------------+- 9

Ohio Forestry Asociation v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct.

lo: | eee eee me 7

Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F. Supp.

1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991) affirmed, 952 F.2d

SOT (Sth Clr. 20018) n-nonane nee 8

popes 8 guage oy ey

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp.

1484 (W.D. Wash. 1992) affirmed sub nom.

Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699

(Oth Cir, 1908)... a... -2n-neeennoe-saconsnncencecnenneees 3

Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106 (5th Cir.

a ait sanininkibseinllaniaeneenteninoc tems on 9

Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977) .. 10

Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) .. 4

Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service

Corp., 810 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1987) ................. 10

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

GSE TIS. GID CAGTE) 02. nnn nanan nnvnetnsnce rene sonenenne 10

DOCKETED CASES

Sierra Club v. Browner, Civ. No. 97-1984-PLF

(D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 1997) -..........--------------------- 8

FEDERAL STATUTES

42 U.S.C.

Section 7511b(e) -...... piesa MEARE AE ee aa passim

"> Sa eieen pine ae SEENON oe passim

SS\— SEALE TT RET RE Oe passim

INTRODUCTION

In this reply brief, petitioners respond to four new

points raised by EPA in its opposition brief: (1) EPA

improperly attempts to recharacterize the petition; (2)

EPA’s new point about the statutory issue is erroneous,

(3) EPA’s new point about the ripeness issue is errone- —

ous; and (4) EPA incorrectly argues that the petition will

soon become moot.

I. RECHARACTERIZATION OF PETITION

EPA attempts to recharacterize the legislative mandates

and litigation claims involved in the case to such an ex-

tent that a reply is required.

Legislative Mandates. EPA generally construes Section

183(e) as a direction “to promulgate regulations” of, or

a requirement “to begin regulating,” products which emit

organic compounds. Opp. 2. It sees the Section 183(e)

process as a single “ongoing rulemaking.” Opp. I, 4, 7,

8, 12. It characterizes the study and list mandated by

Congress as preliminary steps taken “during the course of

a rulemaking.” Opp. 4, 7. In particular, EPA describes

-the required study as “an informational study on the po-

tential magnitude of the problem.” Opp. 3, 8, 10. Then,

EPA says, it must issue what it calls a “timetable” for

regulating. Opp. 3, 5, 7.

The study and the list mandated by Section 183(e) are

not simply preliminary steps of one “ongoing rulemaking.”

Instead, each is a mandatory step in a three-phase regula-

tory process, compliance with each of which is a neces-

sary prerequisite to commencement of the next. Indeed,

the final phase does not consist of one rulemaking, but

many, all based on the same omnibus study and list.

The initial part of the study is much more than “an in-

formational study of the potential magnitude of the prob-

lem.” It is to be a study of emissions of hundreds of

organic compounds from thousands of products in numer-

ous non-attainment areas to determine whether and to

what extent each such compound has the potential to

contribute to ozone non-attainment in any such area. The

other part of the mandated study is the establishment of

2

regulatory criteria, taking five specified factors into

account.

The mandated list is not merely a regulatory “time-

table,” but the methodology by which, based on a comply-

ing study, EPA is to determine which products will not be

subjected to any regulation at all and, as to all other

products, whether they will be regulated in the first, sec-

ond, third, or fourth group.

Petitioners’ Claims. EPA asserts that the claims de-

scribed in the petition are a “guise” for, and present

“merely a semantic recasting” of, petitioners’ true claims.

Opp. 12. In fact, petitioners’ claims are precisely as de-

scribed in the petition. It is EPA’s opposition brief which

mischaracterizes the claims petitioners attempt to present

for adjudication.

First, EPA tells this Court: “The claim here is not

that EPA has... refused to issue its study...” Opp. 11.

But petitioners do, in fact, charge that EPA refused to

issue the study (and the list) mandated by Congress.

Second, EPA contends that petitioners merely challenge

the “substance” of its 1995 report. Opp. 2, 12. It states

that petitioners allege that the report was “deficient,” “in

adequate,” or “[un]satisfactor[y].” Opp. 7, 11, 12, 13.

EPA argues that petitioners’ complaint “amounts to a

quarrel with [its] exercise of discretion in choosing an ap-

propriate methodology. [citation]” Opp. 12. In particular,

EPA asserts that petitioners charge that it did not “properly”

r “adequately” consider the five statutory factors. Opp.

6, 7. In fact, petitioners allege that EPA is guilty of

unlawful inaction which must be judicially compelled, not

inadequate action which must be judicially reversed.

Third, EPA represents that petitioners also challenge

the substance of the “proposed architectural coatings

rule,” itself. Opp. 2, 12. It states that petitioners attempt

to use Section 304(a)(2) to provide judicial review of

the “proposed rule.” Opp. 10, 13. EPA claims they al-

lege that the “proposed rule” is deficient. Opp. 7, 11.

EPA implies that petitioners sue because they are dissatis-

fied with its interpretation of its statutory duties in an-

3

nouncing “a proposed rule.” Opp. 7.1 EPA’s representa-

tions are false. Petitioners’ claims do not, and could not,

seek review, let alone reversal, of the non-existent archi-

tectural coatings rule.

Fourth, EPA states that petitioners are prosecuting their

suit “to enjoin EPA from proceeding with its rulemaking.”

Opp. 6. It contends that they attempt to use Section

304(a)(2) to “enjoin issuance of the final rule.” Opp.

10. (Emphasis in original). This, too, is misleading.

The District Court had explicit jurisdiction under Section

304 only “to order [EPA] to perform” its study and list-

ing duties. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Such a mandate is the

principal form of relief sought by petitioners.*

II. STATUTORY ISSUE

Conflict of Circuits. As to the question of the proper

interpretation of Section 304 in light of Section 307, EPA

argues that the interpretation applied in the Ninth Circuit

does not “conflict” with that applied in the D.C., Second,

Third, and Sixth Circuits, as none of the cases from those

circuits supports the principle that citizen suit jurisdiction

provides a basis for mandatory injunctive relief in the first-

step inaction context. Opp. 7, 9-10. In particular, EPA

1 As discussed below, EPA also bases its new mootness argu-

ment on the supposition that petitioners challenge the “proposed

rule.” Opp. 7, 13. Indeed, EPA even states the purported issue as

if petitioners seek judicial review of ‘ta proposed rule.” Opp. I.

2 Certain courts have held that, where nondiscretionary acts are

the initial steps in a multi-step process, a district court may com-

pel performance of the nondiscretionary duty and also enjoin the

subsequent steps until the mandated predicates have first been per-

formed. E.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, 771 F.Supp. 1081,

1096 (W.D. Wash. 1991) affirmed, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991)

(mandatory injunction requiring the Forest Service to adopt guide-

lines and prepare an EIS, supplemented by prohibitory injunction

forbidding the Forest Service from awarding timber sales in the

meantime); Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1484,

1493-94 (W.D. Wash. 1992) affirmed sub nom. Seattle Audubon

Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (mandatory injunc-

tion requiring Forest Service to cure EIS defects, supplemented by

prohibitory injunction preventing any timber sales in the mean-

time).

4

argues that foreclosing such relief does not create a

“bureaucratic limbo” or “twilight zone” where “EPA is

proceeding apace with promulgating” final rules, and that

seeking such relief “is designed to interfere with and dis-

rupt that process.” Opp. 10.

A bureaucratic limbo or twilight zone does, indeed,

exist here, and will continue to exist. It is EPA which is

interfering with and disrupting the three-phase process

mandated by Congress. It is doing so by proceeding apace

to the third phase without having performed, as man-

dated, the first two necessary prerequisites. The facts of

this case fall squarely within the interpretation followed

in the D.C., Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits and, there-

fore, a conflict of the circuits does exist.*

3QOn the merits of this jurisdictional question, should certiorari

be granted, EPA aserts that the statutory interpretation followed

by the Ninth Circuit is “correct.” Opp. 7, 12. It cites Bennett v.

Spear, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997). Opp. 8. But that case strongly sug-

gests that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is not correct. At issue

there was jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision of the En-

dangered Species Act which authorizes suit for failure to perform

~a nondiscretionary duty. The ESA mandated that the government

“shall” designate critical habitat in a biological opinion “on the

basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into

consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact,”

of specifying any particular area. Plaintiffs complained of the

“omission” of these impacts from the biological opinion. 117 S.Ct.

at 1166. This Court held that the district court had citizen suit

jurisdiction, saying: “It is rudimentary administrative law that

discretion as to the substance of the ultimate decision does not

confer discretion to ignore the required procedures of decision-

making. [citations]” Jd. In order to imply an exception to Section

304 jurisdiction covering the first two steps simply because any

action under the third step might be reversed under Section 307,

this Court would demand a far clearer expression of Congressional

intent. Stimpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 198, 197 (1980). The

expansive language offers no indication whatever that Congress in-

tended the limiting construction of Section 304. Harrison v. PPG

Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980). “. .. [I]t requires an

artificial statutory construction to read a general grant of a right

to judicial review begrudgingly, so as to cut out agency actions

that a literal reading would cover.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-

ner, 387 U.S. 136, 145 (1967).

5

Important Issue. EPA concedes that “Section 304 pro-

vides a basis for relief from agency inaction in the face

of a mandatory duty.” Opp. 4, 7-8. Yet it still suggests

that it is unimportant to decide whether potential Sec-

tion 307 jurisdiction trumps actual Section 304 jurisdic-

tion in the first-step inaction context. EPA asserts that

Section 307 “effectively ensures” that there will be a later

opportunity for judicial review of all final product regula-

tions. Opp. 3. EPA notes that Section 307(d)(9)(A)

allows review of a regulation which is “not in accordance

with law.” Opp. 3. The D. C. Circuit may “reverse” such

a regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9). But even if all

of the 21 product regulations EPA has scheduled for

promulagtion in the next eight years were to be reviewed

by the D.C. Circuit in 21 separate actions and all 21,

because they had not been based on a statutory study and

list, were reversed, the study and list mandated by Con-

gress would still not exist. The 15 groups of products

explicitly exempted from regulation in EPA’s 1995 sched-

ule, plus the numerous other products exempted sub

silentio, will never be the subject of regulation and, there-

fore, circuit court review. No court will ever pass on

EPA’s failure to study and list those products which

should have been, but were not, listed for regulation and

should, but will not, be regulated.

EPA also argues more specifically that petitioners “will

be able” to obtain judicial review of the final rule relating

to architectural coatings and that the D.C. Circuit will

have “ample authority” to consider (unspecified) substan-

tive and procedurz! challenges to that final rule. Opp. 9.

But, for the five reasons discussed in the petition, any

opportunity to obtain an effective order directing EPA to

perform its study and listing duties under Section 183(e)

is likely to prove illusory. Pet. 23-25.

III. RIPENESS ISSUE

Conflict of Circuits. EPA contends that the ripeness

rule applied by the Ninth Circuit in the first-step inaction

context does not “conflict” with the D.C. Circuit rule.

Opp. 7, 9, 11. EPA claims that the D.C. Circuit cases

6

cited in the petition deal with “a fundamentally different

type of legal claim than that of petitioners.” Opp. 11. It

States that petitioners are seeking “premature judicial re-

view of nonfinal agency action. [citation]” Opp. 1. EPA

contends that its 1995 report and schedule were “non-

final,” implying that it might later perform its as yet un-

performed study and listing duties. Opp. 5.

Self-serving statements by an agency to the effect that

inaction is not final and a mandatory duty may later be

performed are not binding on the courts. Albertson v.

subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 76

(1965); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d

729, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Adjudication is not pre-

mature where agency inaction has become “definitive” and

“effective.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151.

Here, EPA’s report was formally published a year-and-

a-half after the statutory deadline for a complying study.

That report merely stated that, “collectively,” products

contribute to ozone non-attainment, a fact assumed by

Congress in enacting Section 183(e). It purported to

establish regulatory criteria, considering only two of the

five statutory factors and relying mainly on two non-

Statutory factors. The report was used to prepare EPA’s

schedule, which determines which products are to be reg-

ulated, and when, and which ones are to be exempted.

That schedule, which ignores reactivity, was then pub-

lished in the Federal Register. EPA published the report

and schedule more than three years ago. Since that time,

EPA has done nothing to perform the nondiscretionary

study and listing duties at issue in this case. What it has

done is propose, without having first performed such

duties, three of the regulations set out in the first group

in the schedule.

The D.C. Circuit would have held EPA’s inaction to be

ripe for judicial review. The Ninth Circuit regards such

inaction as unripe. This conflict of the circuits should be

resolved.*

4As to the merits of the ripeness issue, should certiorari be

granted, EPA aserts that the Ninth Circuit rule is “correct.” Opp.

7

Important Issue. Despite EPA’s suggestions to the con-

trary, whether claims to compel the mandatory initial

steps in a multi-step governmental process are ripe is an

important issue. Both parties discuss this Court’s exten-

Sive ripeness jurisprudence. Pet. 20; Opp. 7-9. Whether

petitioners’ study and listing inaction claims are ripe prior

to regulation is of comparable importance to the other

ripeness issues this Court has previously heard, and should

now be decided to fill a large lacuna in existing law.

7. The case on which it mainly relies, Ohio Forestry Assn. v. Sierra

Club, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 1670, 1672 (1990), is readily distinguish-

able. First, Ohio Forestry found that withholding court considera-

tion of the general plan until after specific projects were approved

would not cause hardship to the environmental plaintiffs. Jd. at

1670-71. Here, by contrast, the placement of products, including

architectural coatings, on EPA’s schedule, especially in the first

group (not to mention the proposal of a rule) gravely stigmatizes

petitioners’ products, alters research and development, and affects

market choices. Second, Ohio Forestry concluded that there was a

real possibility that the government might “revis[e]” and “correct”

the mistakes in the plan. Jd. at 1671. Here, it is manifest that EPA

has no intention to perform the study and listing duties omitted

from its 1995 report and schedule. Third, Ohio Forestry noted that

the environmentalists’ claim that the plan’s analysis was “errone-

ous” would enmesh the court in “time-consuming judicial considera-

tion of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan.” Jd. at

1669, 1671. In the case at bar, petitioners merely claim that certain

analyses mandated by Congress have never been performed and

were totally omitted from the report and schedule. Fourth, Ohio

Forestry did not involve a statute which “guarantees a particular

procedure.” Jd. at 1672. Here, Section 183(e) mandates a par-

ticular study and-list as necessary prerequisites to making any

specific regulatory decisions. Where EPA fails to perform study

or listing duties mandated in clean air legislation as a prelude to

government regulation, judicial intervention is not premature. Flue-

Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 857 F.Supp.

1137, 1141-45 (M.D.N.C. 1994).

SEPA suggests that if certiorari is granted and the Court re-

verses the Ninth Circuit’s two jurisdictional holdings, petitioners

will nevertheless lose their substantive claims in the district court

on the merits. EPA asserts that it acted “in accordance with the

congressional directives.” Opp. 4. It repeatedly asserts that it

completed the “study” mandated by Congress. Opp. 2, 4, 5, 7, 11,

8

IV. MOOTNESS POINT

Finally, EPA makes this new point: “EPA intends to

promulgate the final architectural coatings rule in the

near future, and once the final rule is issued, petitioners’

challenge to the proposed rule will become moot. Further

review by this Court is therefore not warranted.” Opp. 7,

13. EPA’s new mootness point is erroneous.

In particular, EPA refers to the case of Sierra Club v.

Browner, Civ. No. 97-1984-PLE (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29,

1997). Opp. 13. In that case Sierra Club sued EPA, in

the District Court for the District of Columbia to compel

it to adopt three proposed regulations, including one relat-

-ing to architectural coatings, and others identified in the

first group of EPA’s schedule. On March 3, 1998 peti-

tioners moved to intervene in that case as a party de-

fendant in an effort to insure that the District Court did

not order EPA to promulgate any regulations unless and

until EPA had first performed its study and listing duties.

Petitioners argued that they, as parties threatened with

regulation, were entitled to intervene under Rule 24 of

12. Specifically, EPA states that its report concluded that emissions

of organic compounds of all types from all “products” as a group

have the potential to contribute to ozone non-attainment in at least

some non-attainment areas. Opp. 4. It asserts that, in establishing

regulatory criteria in its report, it “explained how it evaluated each

of the five factors” specified by Congress. Opp. 4. Finally, the EPA

claims that it published a “list.” Opp. 5. However, the undisputed

evidence in the District Court, testimony of leading scientific and

economic experts, showed that the study and list mandated by Con-

gress do not exist. Judicial relief will be granted where EPA fails to

obey congressional study mandates under clean air legislation as a

prelude to governmental regulation of products. Flue-Cured Tobacco

Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, F.Supp. , 1998

WL 408884 (M.D.N.C. 1998). EPA twice notes that the Ninth Cir-

cuit stated that petitioners “have not demonstrated that the EPA

has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty. [citation]” Opp.

6-7, 12. But where, as here, a case is dismissed for lack of juris-

diction, any statement about the merits is “dicta and therefore not

persuasive.” Maryland National Bank v. Medem Chapel, 46 F.3d

895 (9th Cir. 1995). In such event, “there can be no preclusive

findings or conclusions on the merits.” Aero-Lineas Argentinas

v. U.S., 177 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

9

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Natural Resources

Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 908-11 (D.C.

Cir. 1977); Conservation Law Foundation of New Eng-

land v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1992);

Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109-10 (Sth Cir.

1996). Petitioners further argued that district courts have

supplemental jurisdiction to entertain intervenors’ defenses

in suits against the government. I/nternational Mortgage

& Investment Corp. v. Von Clemm, 301 F.2d 857, 863-

64 (2nd Cir. 1962); Chalmers v. U.S., 43 F.RD. 286,

291 (D. Kan. 1967). On July 15, 1998 the District

Court denied intervention, holding that regulated parties

have no “protected interest in the defendant’s side.” Peti-

tioners filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit on

July 24, 1998.

On July 15, 1998 the District Court also filed a con-

sent decree signed by Sierra Club and EPA ordering EPA

to “promulgate” the three proposed regulations, including

the one relating to architectural coatings, “no later than

August 15, 1998,” and three other regulations, no later

than December 1, 1998. However, the decree provides

that EPA may modify such dates or amend its schedule.

As discussed above, petitioners did not challenge, and

could not have challenged, “the proposed rule” in the Dis-

trict Court below, as EPA erroneously asserts in the moot-

hess context. Opp. 7, 13. They sought—and seek—an

order directing EPA to perform its study and listing

duties, because rational rulemaking as to any product is

impossible unless EPA first does so. Even if EPA really

means that petitioners’ actual claims below, as opposed to

the claims EPA here invents, are “moot,” then EPA is

mistaken for the following reasons.

The possibility that a subsequent mooting action will

occur does not, itself, render a claim moot. Group A gainst

Smog & Pollution v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1284 n. 58 (D.C.

Cir. 1981). Here, no rule promulgation has yet occurred,

and it may not occur.

In any event, a claim against EPA is not mooted by its

subsequent action where the alleged violation may continue

Le

ence eee ne ee

10

unabated thereafter. Dow Chemical Co. v. EPA, 605 F.2d

673, 679-80 (3rd Cir. 1979). Here, even if EPA promul-

gates a final regulation outlawing architectural coatings,

its unlawful inactions (failures to conduct the mandated

study and establish the mandated list) will continue un-

abated thereafter. Performing such duties will continue

to be a necessary prerequisite to corrective amendments

to any prematurely adopted rules and also to adoption of

all future rules.

Furthermore, a suit against EPA is not mooted by EPA

action giving rise to a second suit when the second is not

certain to afford the full measure of relief available in

the first. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 535 n. 14 (1978); League to Save

Lake Tahoe v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); Sierra Club

v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488 (Sth Cir. 1977). Here, for

the five reasons stated in the petition, EPA’s failure to per-

form its study and listing duties under Section 183(e)

may not be adequately remedied by subsequent review

and reversal of the architectural coatings ban, or any

other regulations, under Section 307. Pet. 23-25.

Finally, agency action forcing a piaintiff to institute a

second suit in another forum does not moot the first case

instituted in the plaintiff's choice of forum. Ten Mile In-

dustrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d

1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1987). In the case at bar, it was

petitioners’ desire to pursue this claim in a Section 304

action in California and, if that section authorized the suit

and it was ripe, as they will show if certiorari is granted,

then their choice of forum cannot be negated by adminis-

trative action taken by EPA in the interim.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the new points in EPA’s opposition

brief lack merit.

Dated: August 12, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM M. SMILAND

Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street,

Seventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Attorneys for Petitioners

|

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