Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Smiland Paint Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency
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(i Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 971817 may 111998
OFFICE OF FHE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM M. SMILAND
Counsel of Record
SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN
601 West Fifth Street
Seventh Floor
ts Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 891-1010
Attorneys for Petitioners
'NILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The two questions presented by this petition for writ of
certiorari are:
Where the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) has nondiscretionary duties under Section
183(e) of the Clean Air Act (the “AA ), 42 USC.
§ 7511b(e), initially to conduct a study of emissions of
organic compounds into the air from consumer and com-
mercial products in order to determine their potential to
contribute to ozone levels violating EPA’s standard and
establish criteria for regulating certain such products, and
to list in four groups the products to be regulated, and
subsequently to promulgate multiple regulations of such
products over an eight-year period based on such study
and list; where EPA has failed to perform the initial non-
discretionary study and listing duties; and where EPA
nevertheless threatens to propose and promulgate such
regulations without having first established the necessary
prerequisites:
(1) Is a US. district court impliedly prohibited from
ordering EPA to perform such study and listing duties
under CAA Section 304(a), the “citizen suit” provision,
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), because it is possible that one or
more of the regulations scheduled to be adopted by EPA
in the future may be reviewed and reversed in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals under CAA Section 307(a)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1)?
(2) Is a US. district court barred under the ripeness
doctrine from ordering EPA to perform such study and
listing duties under Section 304(a) because it is possible
that one or more of the regulations scheduled to be adopted
by EPA in the future may be reviewed and reversed in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals under Section 307(b)(1)?
(i)
li
RULE 29.6 LIST
None of the petitioners has a parent company or a
nonwholly owned subsidiary.
: TABLE OF CONTENTS
: Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 20...cccccccccccccccccnccesccccoseceesosces i
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SEs EE ET PUREE cicides tants cdcksovisecisnccendbicksnidbiniabinhdubs 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..... ARTS RG EME PEREIRA OR 4
| A. Ozone and Consumer and Commercial Products.. 4
B. EPA’s Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties...... 5
C. District Court Proceedings ..........................ecccc00..- g
D. Ninth Circuit Proceedings .................................... 10
E. Proposed Rulemaking by EPA ......000000000000 0... 12
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................... 12
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT
THE POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT RE-
VIEW OF POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAK-
ING ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 307 FORE-
CLOSES THE AVAILABILITY OF IMMEDI-
ATE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF AC-
TUAL STUDY AND LISTING INACTION
UNDER SECTION 304, CONFLICTS WITH
THE DECISIONS OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT
SRLS RSPR Rein SRB a Re ee 12
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT
Il.
THE POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT
REVIEW OF POSSIBLE FUTURE RULE-
MAKING ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 307
RENDERS UNRIPE IMMEDIATE DISTRICT
COURT REVIEW OF ACTUAL STUDY AND
LISTING INACTION, CONFLICTS WITH DE-
CISIONS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT ......................
THE OPINION DECIDES IMPORTANT
QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT......
SPENCE ARIES G IN seresecinnsseanmntnnsrsicdsnseonnstcbelindillebterieslaldstibendadbeaiasiitl
Page
17
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 186
Rs. SERRE SPE A sh eaR aa NM SEE IF ed eo etiam ores 20
Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.
BN aici sincekcoialainbaiatericiecteiilas Le cctiicccarthaslltas aabiinini 23
' Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 428 F.2d 1301 (10th
ak auntinlin 13
Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715 (1980) —..................... 20
Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)...... 20
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ..........0-000..... 21
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645 (7th
OI I I cons kckditde’shachs <oscen chiens ngcecucanscapdiaiaa tain ole ashioaiiasiaies 21, 24
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193
i CORRAUARRE SAREE ETE Rae CSE EEE a a EONAR WA SS 17
EDF v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).... 18, 19
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F. 2d
892 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991
(1989) ......... cipal they Sec taciep Lana kaa erin Eda Musiiing asia ches sicte 14
Friends of the Earth v. Cary, 585 F.2d 165 (2nd
8 Ses. 5: GRRE ame EER FRAG scene Ie TSM Wear 21
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578
“hy | ——_ 5 SORRRRIEONRPES PaAae seRRETOLLeRAE E 17
Hawaiian Electric Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th
RI NE ceca ceca acacia eiomecioneas 18
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d
BD CT Fs SOE Gai ince ddliininth nslenee 13, 23
Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir.
5 SOREN Ea aehapk ia a Teper SIO AM eM OA 12, 13, 23
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349
i asciaklat 11, 17,18
: Maryland National Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel,
Oe ie Oe Fe COP. TOD oo sscesccciine cnc ans 11
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Costle,
647 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451
Bee EE iin ichns sas cc wncindetiacninhpeiassictilein 14, 15, 21
PCHRG v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ........ 19
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3rd Cir.
S , SEECR REALE OAR ER LE is eaanes: 15, 16, 22
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)... 25
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.
ie ce eclanienlinienaisscimeaidians 19, 20
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 2538
Shs Rae HIRED kcakebachaicoscnigiandes ie ticinngilissadinshadialetclinnchadiccs 14
Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.
MET Gis ocstessai de aicrdesmnscencaandbiede keds Redsbasssule seca dlehabuomisetsn 18, 19
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, ——
U.S. ‘ei: G se B' Ft «5 Seeeemeeoneeenein 20
Statutes
Bik Leg 6: yb Reeeanlpmannate HRN a gael 25
ER yp SAINI aga aR rata teda use Decca ony Ohm 2
rr I 8a aches nintias cadnesenbcemaehncaouua cae ack dant ticees 8,5
REREAD PRE el ena Maem brte? selPans 3 3,5
Oe EO CAPE OR oii acemdccatres nan cedures 3, 8,9
| Spa apes ileal NGI se i, 4, 10, 22, 23
gL 6 5 en I ERs Ru aN wis actA 3.7,9
BE TED TED siscc sades Sehassnoce cn ciasbeniine 5, 6
MMI Sees Leal lke See ble 2 thet i, 3, 10, 22
GALT RR AER YARN INOS 4, 12, 23, 24
2, 4 t {26} Bnenenas Ba en Maite eons Tike i
6, SIRE Ft is TIE ons: skccrnstonccnppicindaidinaiininidididents 21
a, I TE CIR BEE iseecenecicrrivnsanseksiinedicoiunipieiabtcuadboe 21
Regulations
60 Federal Register 15264 (March 28, 1995)... ...... 9
61 Federal Register 14531 (April 2, 1996) 0000000. 12
61 Federal Register 19005 (April 30, 1996) ............. 12
61 Federal Register 32729 (June 25, 1996) ............. 12
61 Federal Register 46410 (September 3, 1996) ....... 12
Miscellaneous
Bryer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard Univ.
II: FEUD chsciucsisan beechcusiaced cath cioeeidsabchaiasdaad cing tc inieadalte ts 21
Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case
of the Clean Air Act (Brookings Inst. 1988) ...... 21
Rogers, Environmental Law: Air and Water (West
1 RAIN Sa tne PSR SRNR SEL A HEMT UO Ne YK St BRI NEN TY ate 25
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
No.
SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,
‘ Petitioners,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Smiland Paint Company, Gemini Coatings,
Inc., Conco Paint Company, Triangle Coatings, Inc.,
Trinity Coatings Company, X-I-M Products, Wampler In-
dustrial Coatings, and Preservo Paint & Coatings Manu-
facturing pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review Part
I of the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Court of Appeals, reproduced as
Appendix A, is unpublished. Its order denying a petition
for rehearing, and rejecting a suggestion for rehearing
en banc, is reproduced as Appendix B. The ruling of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
reproduced as Appendix C, is unpublished.
BSR i eas era vere UREN TTS IR CR MIS TESS MRE NOR aN oN NNT TIER TC TTT
2
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals decision was filed and judgment
entered on August 27, 1997. Its subsequent order was
filed on February 9, 1998. The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTES INVOLVED
Section 183(e)(2) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b
(e)(2) (as added November 15, 1990), provides as
follows:
“(A) The [EPA] Administrator shall conduct a
study of the emissions of volatile organic compounds
into the ambient air from consumer and commercial
products (or any combination thereof) in order to-—
(i) determine their potential to contribute to
ozone levels which violate the national ambient
air quality standard for ozone; and
(ii) establish criteria for regulating consumer
and commercial products or classes or categories
thereof which shall be subject to control under
this subsection.
The study shall be completed and a report submitted
to Congress not later than 3 years after November
15, 1990.
(B) In establishing the criteria under subparagraph
(A)(ii), the Administrator shall take into considera-
tion each of the following:
(i) The uses, benefits, and commercial de-
mand of consumer and commercial products.
(ii) The health or safety functions (if any)
served by such consumer and commercial prod-
ucts.
(iii) Those consumer and commercial prod-
ucts which emit highly reactive volatile organic
compounds into the ambient air.
3
(iv) Those consumer and commercial prod-
ucts which are subject to the most cost-effective
controls.
(v) The availability of alternatives (if any)
to such consumer and commercial products
which are of comparable costs, considering
health, safety, and environmental impacts.”
Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b
(e)(3)(A), provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Upon submission of the final report under para-
graph (2), the Administrator shall list those cate-
gories of consumer or commercial products that the
Administrator determines, based on the study, ac-
count for at least 80 percent of VOC emissions, on
a reactivity-adjusted basis, from consumer or com-
mercial products in areas that violate the NAAQS
for ozone... . At such time, the Administrator shall
divide the list into 4 groups establishing priorities for
regulation based on the criteria established in para-
graph (2).”
Section 304(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), pro-
vides, in relevant part, as follows:
“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf—...
(2) against the Administrator where there is al-
leged a failure of the Administrator to perform any
act or duty under this chapter which is not discre-
tionary with the Adminitsrator .. .
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to
order the Administrator to perform such act or
duty... .”
Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b
(e¢)(3)(A), also provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Every 2 years after promulgating such list, the Ad-
ministrator shall regulate one group of categories
until all 4 groups are regulated. The regulations
shall require best available controls as defined in
this section. .. .
”
———
4
Section 183(e)(1)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b
(e)(1)(A), defines that term as follows:
“The term ‘best available controls’ means the degree
of emissions reduction that the Administrator deter-
mines, on the basis of technological and economic
feasibility, health, environmental, and energy impacts,
is achievable through the application of the most
effective equipment, measures, processes, methods,
systems or techniques, including chemical reformula-
tion, product or feedstock substitution, repackaging,
and directions for use, consumption, storage, or dis-
posal.”
Section 307 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607, provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
“(b)(1) A petition for review of . ... any other na-
tionally applicable regulations promulgated, or final
action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter
may be filed only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. .. .
“(d)(1) This subsection applies to—...
(QO) the promulgation of any regulation per-
taining to consumer and commercial products
under section 7511b(e) of this title... .
(9) In the case of review of any action of the
Administrator to which this subsection applies,
the court may reverse any such action... .
“(e) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of
the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-
vided in this section.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Ozone and Consumer and Commercial Products
In 1990 Congress amended the CAA to add inter alia
certain measures regarding the control of ozone. Ozone,
the triatomic form of oxygen, has been designated by
5
EPA as a criteria pollutant and has been made subject by
EPA to a federal air quality standard. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408,
7409. Ozone is formed through the interaction of sunlight
and oxides of nitrogen.
Many thousands of products contain organic com-
pounds. These products, in turn, contain hundreds of
different kinds of organic compounds. Certain organic
compounds, including those emitted by certain products,
if sufficiently volatile and reactive, at certain times and
in certain places may contribute to nonattainment of the
ozone standard. Other organic compounds emitted by
products are neither sufficiently volatile, sufficiently re-
active, nor present at a time or place where they could
contribute to ozone nonattainment.
B. EPA’s Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties
Section 183(e)(2)(A)(i) mandates:
“The Administrator shall conduct a-study of the
emissions of volatile organic compounds into the
ambient air from consumer and commercial products
(or any combination thereof) in order to . . . deter-
mine their potential to contribute to ozone levels
which violate the national ambient air quality stand-
ard for ozone... .”
As to the first part of the required study, EPA has
never studied, let alone made the required determinations
about, the reactivity of the individual organic compounds
emitted by products, which vary enormously in their
potential to contribute to ozone nonattainment. EPA
never conducted an assessment of the relative reactivities
of the organic compound species emitted by consumer and
commercial products vis-a-vis the relative reactivities of
other organic compound species known to be emitted into
the atmosphere. CR 25 at 4. EPA also failed to assess
the relative volatility of any organic compound species
emitted by consumer and commercial products. Nor has
EPA ever determined such potential in any nonattainment
or attainment area, which differ widely as to weather con-
iii a i ei |
6
ditions, organic compound mix, and ratio of organic com-
pounds to the primary ozone precursor. Although specif-
ically instructed to assess the role of organic compounds
in fostering ozone nonattainment, EPA compared only
Organic compound emissions from consumer and commer-
cial products nation-wide with nation-wide man-made
organic compound emissions. CR 25 at 5. Further, EPA
gave no consideration to biogenic or natural organic com-
pounds which are recognized to be the major source of
organic compounds on a national basis and a significant
source within many nonattainment areas. CR 25 at 6.
EPA also ignored the role of emissions of oxides of nitro-
gen which are recognized to be the critical ingredient lim-
iting levels of ozone in many nonattainment areas. /d.’
aes
Petitioners formally requested the EPA Administrator
to conduct the mandated study of organic compound emis-
sions from consumer and commercial products and to |
make the required determinations of their potential to
contribute to ozone levels exceedimg the ozone standards,
and gave notice under Section 304(b). The Administra- ;
tor did not do so.
Section 183(e)(2)(A)(ii) additionally mandates that |
the Administrator shall also conduct the study “ in
! The study and determinations were to be completed and reported
by November 15, 1993. 42 U.S.C. § 751lb(e)(2)(A). EPA issued b
a report in March 1995 which did not contain the study nor the ;
determinations at issue (the “Report”). The Report concedes that i
it addressed grossly dissimilar compounds and grossly dissimilar '
geographic areas only “collectively.” CR 12 at 2-4. EPA admitted |
in the Report that it was neither “rigorous” nor “robust.” Jd. at
2-9. The Report acknowledged that any product’s potential to con-
tribute to ozone nonattainment is dependent, among other things,
on “how individual species . . . participate in the photochemical ‘
reactions which result in ozone formation.” Id. at 2-4. The Report ;
also acknowledged that “different VOC species have different ozone F
forming potentials.” Jd. at 3-2. The Report admitted that the ;
ozone-forming potential of any species is strongly influenced by
the “other VOC” in a given airshed, “the VOC-to-NO, ratio”
therein, and “irradiation conditions” therein. Jd. at 3-3.
7
order to . . . establish criteria for regulating consumer
and commercial products or classes or categories thereof
which shall be subject to control under this subsection.”
Section 183(e)(2)(B) further mandates:
“In establishing the criteria under subparagraph
(A) (il), the Administrator shall take into considera-
tion each of the following:
(i) The uses, benefits, and commercial de-
mand of consumer and commercial products.
(ii) The health or safety functions (if any)
served by such consumer and commercial prod-
ucts.
(iii) Those consumer and commercial prod-
ucts which emit highly reactive volatile organic
compounds into the ambient air.
(iv) Those consumer and commercial prod-
ucts which are subject to the most cost-effective
controls.
(v) The availability of alternatives (if any)
to such consumer and commercial products
which are of comparable costs, considering
health, safety, and environmental impacts.”
As to the second part of the study, EPA has never
taken into consideration three factors mandated by Section
183(e)(2). As stated above, EPA has not considered, as
required, those products which emit highly reactive com-
pounds. Furthermore, it has not considered the availability
of alternatives to such products which are of comparable
costs, nor those products which are subject to the most
cost-effective controls.
With respect to comparable costs, EPA did not consider
the cost of any possible regulation of any product. CR 25
at 16.
With respect to cost-effectiveness, EPA never attempted
to analyze which products or activities to regulate in con-
nection with the type and stringency of regulation to be
applied in any particular context. CR 25 at 13. EPA
8
completely ignored any assessment of the efficacy of alter-
native modes of regulation. CR 25 at 14.
Instead of considering the five statutory factors, EPA’s
Report gave controlling weight to two non-statutory fac-
tors, the volume or mass of emissions and previous regula-
tory actions.”
Petitioners demanded that the Administrator perform
her non-discriminatory duties to conduct that study and
establish those regulatory criteria, taking into considera-
tion each of those five statutory factors. The Administra-
tor did not do so.
Section 183(e)(3)(A) further mandates, as follows:
“Upon submission of the final report under para-
graph (2), the Administrator shall list those cate-
gories of consumer or commercial products that the
Administrator determines, based on the study, ac-
count for at least 80 percent of the VOC emissions,
on a reactivity-adjusted basis, from consumer or com-
mercial products in areas that violate the NAAQS
for ozone .... At such time, the Administrator shall
divide the list into 4 groups establishing priorities for
regulation based on the criteria established in para-
ergon (2)... .-
As discussed above, no statutory study exists on which
to establish, and divide, a statutory list. Furthermore,
most compounds emitted by products were never accounted
for by EPA on a reactivity-adjusted basis, as required.*
2The Report conceded that EPA "does not have information”
on the costs of regulations that effectively prohibit products. CR 12
at 4-8, 9. The Report admitted that, in developing control measures
for products, EPA must select “the most cost-effective controls.”
Id, at 2-2. It conceded that a product “must be able to be compared
with other products” with regard thereto. Jd. at 2-4. The Report
also formally established two non-statutory criteria and employed
those criteria in assessing potential regulations. Jd. at 4-12, 13.
3On March 23, 1995 EPA exempted 15 groups of products from
regulation and scheduled 21 groups of products, divided into four
groups, for regulation between 1997 and 2003, seven of which,
9
Petitioners demanded that the Administrator list cate-
gories based on a statutory study and divide the list based
On statutory criteria, and account for the emissions in ques-
tion on a reactivity-adjusted basis. The Administrator
did not do so.
C. District Court Proceedings
On September 10, 1996 petitioners, manufacturers of
architectural coatings, filed in the District Court a com-
plaint for mandatory injunctive relief against EPA, its
Administrator and certain individual employees of EPA
(collectively, ‘EPA”) under Section 304(a) based on
EPA’s failure to perform the above nondiscretionary statu-
tory duties. The unperformed duties included study, de-
termination, consideration and establishment duties under
Section 183(e)(2) of the CAA and listing, dividing and
accounting duties under Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the
CAA, which respect to all consumer and commercial
products.*
including “consumer products,” “autobody refinishing coatings,”
and “architectural coatings,” were included in the first group (the
“Schedule”). 60 Federal Register 15264. The Schedule acknowl-
edged that control of products should be based on data about “in-
dividual species” of organic compounds as well as conditions in
“specific airsheds.” Jd. at 15266. The Schedule acknowledged that
EPA had considered reactivity only “to a limited extent.” Jd. It also
conceded that EPA had “relatively limited” data about cost-effec-
tiveness of controls for most products. Jd. at 15265, 15268. The
Schedule admitted that EPA had ranked products for regulation
based on two non-statutory criteria. Jd. at 15266.
* Petitioners’ claims also included EPA’s failures to publish a
statement of basis and purpose under Section 307(d)(3) of the
CAA, failure to prepare a cost-benefit analysis under Section 202(a)
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, and failure to
analyze small business impacts under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act, with respect to a proposed architectural coatings rule
which is discussed in Section E below.
10
On September 30, 1996 petitioners filed a motion for
summary judgment on their claims. CR 6. In support of
their motion, petitioners submitted the declarations of
Professor William L. Chameides of the Georgia Institute
of Technology regarding Congress’ use of scientific terms
in Section 183(e) and Professor W. Kip Viscusi of the
Harvard Law School regarding its use of economic terms.
CR 25. On November 8, 1996 EPA filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment. CR 12. In its opposition to peti-
tioners’ motion for summary judgment EPA conceded the
district court’s jurisdiction under Section 304(a) to hear
petitioners’ claims for failure to obey Section 183(e) of
the CAA.®
During oral argument before the district court, EPA
expressly conceded on at least nine occasions that the
court had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ Section 183(e)
study and listing claims. CR 33 at_6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17,
18, 19, 23. Although EPA had conceded jurisdiction on
petitioners’ claims under Section 183(e), the district court
raised the issue, sua sponte, at oral argument, stating, “I
think there has to be a determination as to whether there
is jurisdiction on any of these claims before I start decid-
ing some of the claims.” CR 33 at 8.
On February 13, 1997, the district court granted EPA’s
cross-motion for summary judgment without findings of
fact, conclusions of law or opinion. On February 14,
1997 judgment was entered in favor of EPA.
D. Ninth Circuit Proceedings
Petitioners timely appealed arguing that the district
court had jurisdiction under Section 304(a)(2) of the
5 The Chemical Specialities Manufacturers Association and the
Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association, two national trade
associations, were granted leave to appear as amici curiae in opposi-
tion to petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. The trade asso-
ciations represented manufacturers of consumer products whose
products were listed in the first group scheduled for regulation, and
actually so proposed, as discussed in Section E below.
TAN ee
il
CAA to order EPA to perform its mandatory study and
listing duties, and that this claim for relief was ripe for
judicial review.
Part I of the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion, entered and filed
on August 27, 1997, holds: “We lack jurisdiction to
consider” petitioners’ claims seeking to order EPA to per-
form its nondiscretionary study and listing duties. The
Court disposed of the appeal, as follows: “DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.” The Court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction on two related grounds.
First, the Court held: “The EPA has not promulgated
final rules or otherwise taken any other final action that
is reviewable.” ©
Second, the Court held, as follows:
“Moreover, CAA Section 307(b)(1) provides that a
‘petition for review of ... any .. . nationally ap-
plicable regulations promulgated, or final action
taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may
be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia’ 42 U.S.C. § 7607
(b)(1), but Plaintiffs filed this petition for review in
the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California.” ”
On October 10, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for
partial rehearing and suggestion for partial rehearing en
banc with respect to Part I of the above Opinion. On
®The only case cited by the Court was the majority opinion in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978).
In that case, the majority, in their alternative holding, set aside a
district court’s mandatory injunction on ripeness grounds. The
majority found that judiical interference in the administrative
proces at that stage was “premature.” Jd. at 1357.
™The Court also stated: “Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
the EPA has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty.” How-
ever, because the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion this statement, if construed as a statement about the merits,
is dictum. Maryland National Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel, 46
F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1995).
12.
February 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals filed an order
denying the petition for rehearing and rejecting the sug-
gestion for rehearing en banc.
E. Proposed Rulemaking by EPA
On April 2, 1996 EPA had issued a proposed rule for
a wide variety of consumer products including hair sprays,
deodorants and nail polish removers. 61 Federal Register
14531. On April 30, 1996 EPA had issued a proposed
rule for motor vehicle refinish coatings. 61 Federal Regis-
ter 19005. On June 25, 1996 EPA published a preamble
to a proposed rule for architectural coatings. 61 Federal
Register 32729. On September 3, 1996 EPA had pub-
lished the text of a proposed rule for architectural coat-
ings. 61 Federal Register 46410.
To date, EPA has adopted no final rules regulating any
consumer or commercial product.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT THE
POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT REVIEW OF
POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAKING ACTIONS UN-
DER SECTION 307 FORECLOSES THE AVAILA-
BILITY OF IMMEDIATE DISTRICT COURT RE-
VIEW OF ACTUAL STUDY AND LISTING INAC-
TION UNDER SECTION 304, CONFLICTS WITH
THE DECISIONS OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT COURTS.
The Court of Appeals has decided the question of the
district court’s jurisdiction under Section 304 of the CAA
in a way that conflicts with the decisions of several other
circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit’s decision would fore-
close the present availability of jurisdiction under Section
304 whenever the present inaction may potentially be re-
viewed at some indeterminate time in the future under the
provisions of Section 307, which authorizes review and re-
versal of any regulation. This conflict should be resolved,
and in favor of early relief in a district court.
The Court of Appeals’ decision is consistent with the
holding of the Ninth Circuit in Kamp v. Hernandez, 752
13
F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1985). In Kamp, plaintiff had
challenged EPA’s approval of Arizona’s plan for the con-
trol of certain emissions from copper smelters, in part
because EPA had failed to require controls on fugitive
emissions from the smelters. EPA argued that the court
had no jurisdiction to review its failure to promulgate
a control strategy because such challenges must be brought
in the district court pursuant to Section 304. Id. at 1454.
The court rejected this argument holding that when a
challenge to agency inaction ‘is embedded in a challenge
to the validity” of subsequent final action jurisdiction lies
in the circuit court reviewing the final action. /d., quoting
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489,
490 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, as long as the claimed failure
to act may be reviewed in connection with any subsequent
final action, the district courts have no jurisdiction to hear
an immediate challenge to the existing inaction.
This analysis of the CAA’s bifurcated jurisdictional
scheme is also followed by the Tenth Circuit. In Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 428 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973)
plaintiff sought an injunction in the district court against
EPA’s promulgation of a rule controlling emissions of
sulphur oxides in a portion of Montana until certain pre-
liminary steps were taken. The district court granted the
injunction. Jd. at 1303. In reversing the district court’s
ruling, the court of appeals held that because the circuit
court would have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to
EPA’s final rules, any alleged failures to take necessary
precursor steps to such rulemaking were also within the
circuit court’s jurisdiction. “It follows then that where, as
here, Congress has specifically designated a forum for judi-
cial review of administrative action and does so in unmis-
takable terms except under extraordinary conditions, that
forum is exclusive.” Jd. at 1304-05.
However, several other circuits allow immediate chal-
lenges to EPA’s failures to perform nondiscretionary acts
regardless of whether such acts are the preliminary steps
in future rulemaking procedures. In Sierra Club vy.
ER ead ee
14
Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987), plaintiff sought
to compel EPA to complete rulemaking regarding sources
of pollutants that would be subject to fugitive emissions
regulation. In discussing the type of “final agency action”
over which the circuit courts have jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 307 the D.C. Circuit stated:
“Under the Clear Air Act’s unusual, bifurcated juris-
dictional scheme, however, a claim of ‘agency recal-
citrance . . . in the face of a clear statutory duty’
would in most instances represent a claim that EPA
had failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty. As
we have indicated, such a claim must be brought in
the district court, under Section 304(a)(2).” ZId. at
794,
Thus, the district court’s jurisdiction over failures to
perform nondiscretionary duties exists even where final
action to follow may relate to those same duties. See
Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255
(D.D.C. 1972).
Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
870 F.2d 892, 899 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493
U.S. 991 (1989), the Second Circuit held that the district
court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that EPA had
a nondiscretionary duty to take some action regarding the
national standard for sulphur oxides even if the substance
of EPA’s eventual decision would be reviewable in the
circuit court. Foreclosing the district court’s jurisdiction
in such a situation would result in “leaving the matter in
a bureaucratic limbo” subject to neither district court nor
circuit court review. Id. at 900. The court found that
“creating such a bureaucratic twilight zone” could not
have been Congress’ intent in adopting Section 304(a)
the CAA. 7d.
The Sixth Circuit also follows this approach to the
CAA’s jurisdictional dichotomy. Motor Vehicle Manu-
facturers Assn. v. Costle, 647 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 451 U.S. 907 (1981), arose out of CAA Sec-
tion 207. One subsection thereof mandated that auto
15
manufacturer part certificates shall be made only under
EPA part certification regulations promulgated to carry
Out the purposes of a second subsection and that EPA
shall. promulgate part certification regulations by a date
certain. The second subsection mandated that, if EPA
made certain determinations then it shall prescribe per-
formance warranty regulations which shall require manu-
facturers to warrant emission contol devices. The third
subsection mandated that manufacturers shall furnish
instructions which shall correspond to maintenance in-
struction regulations to be promulgated by EPA. EPA
failed to promulgate parts certification regulations or
maintenance instruction regulations, but nevertheless
proposed promulgation of performance warranty regula-
tions. Motor vehicle manufacturers brouglit suit in the
district court against the EPA Administrator charging
that the mandated parts certification and maintenance in-
struction regulations had not been promulgated by EPA
and seeking, among other forms of relief, an order direct-
ing EPA to issue both sets of regulations. The district
court held that it had jurisdiction under CAA Section
304(a), held that the parts certification and maintenance
instruction regulations were “necessary prerequisites” to
promulgation of the performance warranty regulations,
647 F.2d at 677, and rendered two of the other forms of
relief. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the
district court’s “. . . jurisdiction to grant relief for the
EPA’s alleged failure to issue the parts certification and
maintenance instruction regulations cannot be seriously
disputed.” Jd. at 678 (emphasis in original). While the
circuit court disapproved of the two forms of relief the
district court had awarded, it held that “Section 304 vests
the district court with jurisdiction to order the EPA to
perform non-discretionary duties.” Jd. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to conduct proceedings to deter-
mine the appropriate order.
The rule in the Third Circuit is to similar effect. In
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3rd Cir. 1980), the
16
court held that the question (whether EPA’s failure to
regulate post-mining discharges violated a Clean Water
Act mandate) was reviewable in the district court under
the citizen suit provision of the Act, Section 505, rather
than under the section authorizing circuit court review of
final action, Section 509. The court stated:
“... [A]n allegation of inadequacy of a set of regu-
lations is quite different from an allegation that a
needed regulation was nonexistent. The former case
is included within our authority to review under sec-
tion 509; the latter, however, must be reviewed under
section 505.” Id. at 996.
The court focused on the type of judicial relief necessary
to remedy EPA’s failure to perform the mandatory duty:
“We are here asked not to suspend regulations, but
to order the promulgation of completely new and
different regulations. We hold, therefore, that peti-
tioners are required to seek the relief they ask for
from the district court... .
“.. . [WJhere the only real relief sought is to com-
pel the adoption of an additional standard, the citi-
zens’ suit provisions in section 505 suffice.” Jd. at
997.
Thus, the Ninth and other Circuits require that citizens
aggrieved by agency inaction during the initial phase of
the regulatory process may not sue to compel performance
of the mandatory duty in the district court, but must await
final action, if any, in the last phase of that process and
raise the failure in connection with any circuit court re-
view of that action.
On the other hand, the D.C., Second, Third and Sixth
Circuits allow citizens to bring an immediate citizen suit
in the district court to compel the agency to perform its
nondiscretionary duty so that the necessary prerequisites
to subsequent regulatory action may come into being.
Am a tats oa
17
This Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve
this split in the Circuits.*
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT THE
POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT REVIEW OF
POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAKING ACTIONS UN-
DER SECTION 307 RENDERS UNRIPE IMMEDI-
ATE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF ACTUAL
STUDY AND LISTING INACTION, CONFLICTS
WITH DECISIONS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT.
A split between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits also exists
as to whether first-step inaction cases are ripe for judicial
review in view of possible future appellate court review of
any subsequent administrative actions. This split should
be resolved by this Court, and in favor of the ripeness
principles applied by the D.C. Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit actively applies the ripeness doctrine
to deny judicial review after inaction by an agency during
the first stage of a two-stage regulatory process. In Kenne-
cott, the only case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Part I
of its Opinion in the case at bar, the majority’s alterna-
tive holding was that “judicial intervention at this point
in the administrative process [was] inappropriate.” 572
F.2d at 1353. The majority held that it was premature
* As petitioners will show if certiorari is granted, allowing review
of present agency inaction regardless of its connection to potential
future action is consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the
bifurcated system of review Congress established. First, this Court
has acknowledged that a clear expression of congressional intent to
create a bifurcated jurisdiction scheme will not be disturbed. Crown
Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 197 (1980). Here, Sec-
tion 304(a) clearly expresses Congress’ intent that inaction be
remedied in a district court. Second, this Court has ruled that under
CAA Section 307, any final action of the Administrator is review-
able in the circuit courts. Harrison # PPG Industries, Inc., 446
U.S. 578, 587 (1980). In the same way, any failure of EPA to
perform a nondiscretionary duty should be immediately reviewable
by the district courts.
18
to intervene before EPA had a chance to act on the pend-
ing proposals for the following reason:
“Although it is likely the Administrator will act in
due course to reject the proposed revision and vari-
ance on the ground that constant emission controls
are not being employed to the ‘maximum extent pos-
sible,’ we believe it unwise presently to proceed on
that assumption. We cannot close our eyes to the
fact that this opinion is being written in the year
1978 and that in 1977 the Clean Air Act was sig-
nificantly amended. Circumstances have changed; we
should not assume that both Kennecott and the EPA
are unchanged. In any event, at this point we are
convinced the judiciary should stand aside. [Cita-
tions.]” Jd. at 1357.
The Ninth Circuit followed a similar approach in Ha-
waiian Electric Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1984). EPA refused to modify a utility’s permit, even
though modification was merited, without the utility’s fil-
ing additional data and undergoing a more formal in-
vestigation. The utility petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review of that refusal. The court denied the petition hold-
ing that review was “not ripe.” Jd. at 1441. The court
ruled:
. . . Review of the merits of the air pollution con-
trol demanded of HECO, which is what review of
the PSD permit involves, would entangle the court
in an uncompleted administrative action whose ulti-
mate resolution will depend on contested factual
issues of a technical nature.
é
= . . . These contentions [of environmental inter-
venors] combined with EPA’s request for more data
from HECO indicate numerous factual disputes
which an appellate court is ill prepared to assess
without the more developed record that will exist
following administrative determination of these issues.
[Citation.]” Id. at 1445,
The D.C. Circuit takes a less restrictive approach to
ripeness in the instant context. For example, in EDF v.
19
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) environmental
groups asked the agency to issue notices of possible can-
cellation of DDT registrations and to suspend them pend-
ing administrative review. The agency took no action on
parts of the request, and the groups petitioned the D.C. Cir-
cuit for review of that failure. The court rejected the
agency’s ripeness defense. Jd. at 1098-1100. It held that an
agency’s “faiure to act” under exigent circumstances is
“equivalent to a final denial of petitioners’ request,” and
thus, ripe. Jd. at 1098. Finding such circumstances in the
case before it, the court announced this principle: “. . .
[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same
impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an
agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its
decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form
of an order denying relief.” Id. at 1099. As to the interim
suspension, the court found that “inaction is tantamount
to an order denying suspension.” Jd. As to the cancella-
tion notice, the court ruled: “At some point administra-
tive delay amounts to a refusal to act, with sufficient
finality and ripeness to permit judicial review.” 7d. at
1100.
In Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 792-94, the D.C.
Circuit stated that review of EPA “inaction” was appropri-
ate in situations where a court had the “ability to provide
effective review of final action.” Td. at 793. First, citing
Hardin, the court stated that inaction may “effectively”
be ripe when the agency “has not frankly acknowledged”
its decision. Id. Second, it stated that an inaction claim
is ripe if it represents “agency recalcitrance . . . in the
face of a clear statutory duty . . . of such magnitude
that it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsi-
bility” (quoting PCHRG v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 32 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)). Id. -
In Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337 (BL; : Cie.
1993), EPA performed its statutory duty as to municipal
20
hazardous waste facilities but not non-municipal facili-
ties. EPA stated its “intention to issue revised criteria
for non-municipal faculties when it has the data necessary
to do so.” Id. at 347. The court held that this was a
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty which was
presently ripe for adjudication. Id.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit holds that a failure to perform
nondiscretionary duties in the initial phase of a multi-
phase regulatory process is not ripe for judicial review
if the agency may take action in the future which will,
itself, be reviewable and reversible.
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, finds such inaction
presently ripe for judicial review even if the agency may
later take further action which, itself, may be subject to
judicial review and reversal.
This Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve
this conflict in the Circuits.”
1© Should this case be accepted for review, petitioners intend to
argue that this Court’s ripeness jurisprudence compels rejection of
the Ninth Circuit’s view. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 148-54 (1967) (whether agency rule, resulting in dilemma
of complying or risking penalties, complies with statuory require-
ment is ripe issue fit for review and imposing hardship, even before
possible future enforcement actions); Babbitt v. Farm Workers,
442 U.S. 289, 297-303 (1979) (constitutional challenge to statutory
provisions relating to election procedures and consumer publicity
reviewable before the challenged provisions are actually applied to
specific cases); Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715, 722-25 (1980)
(whether agency had mandatory statutory duty to withdraw lands
for state, was reviewable, even though state’s application was pend-
ing and agency had not yet decided it); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, —— U.S. ——, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1669-70 (1997)
(taking claim ripe where agency determined question of applica-
bility and only discretionary step left was approval of particular
transfer applications).
21
Ill. THE OPINION DECIDES IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED
BY THIS COURT.
Whether a citizen can institute a district court citizen
suit after agency inaction in the initial regulatory phase,
and before threatened future action, rather than awaiting
any such possible action and seeking to reverse it in the
circuit court, is an important and recurring matter war-
ranting this Court’s review.
These statutory and ripeness issues bear on whether or
not the salutary role of citizen suits is to be unduly
truncated. “. . . [C]itizen groups are not to be treated
as nuisances or trouble makers but rather as welcomed
participants in the vindication of environmental interests
.... Friends of the Earth v. Cary, 535 F.2d 165, 172
(2nd Cir. 1976). There is no basis for saying that a
citizen suit statute “applies to environmentalists alone.”
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163
(1997). It applies to claims against the government which
assert “overenforcement” as well as “underenforcement”
of environmental laws. Jd. The “welcomed participants,”
therefore, must include business groups. E.g. Motor Ve-
hicle Manufacturers, 647 F.2d at 677. This should be
especially true of small businesses. See, Section 202, P.L.
104-121, 110 Stat. 857, Section 2, P.L. 96-354, 94 Stat.
1164; see also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform
(Harvard Univ. Press 1982) at 269-70, R. Shep Melnick,
Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air
Act (Brookings Inst. 1983) at 365.
Jurisdiction in a U.S. district court, where extra-record
evidence can be introduced and factual disputes resolved,
is often necessary in a failure-to-study case. The “district
court has the authority” and “the practical ability” to
compile any necessary record relating to such inaction.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 656 (7th
Cir. 1986). For example, in the case at bar, petitioners
introduced, without objection or contradition by EPA,
22
expert testimony by Professor Chameides about Congress’
use of scientific terms in Section 183(e) and that of Pro-
fessor Viscusi about its use of economic terms. Further-
more, EPA had the opportunity, which it did not utilize
below, to further explain why it did not, or could not, per-
form its nondiscretionary study and listing duties.
District court jurisdiction over first-step inaction cases
is important also, because Section 304(a) expressly gives
such a court remedial power to “order [EPA] to perform
such .. . duty.” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Thus, here, the
District Court had explicit statutory power to issue a
mandatory injunction directing EPA to perform its un-
performed study and listing duties. See Pennsylvania v.
EPA, 618 F.2d at 997.
EPA’s proceeding to the final phase of the Section
183(e) regulatory process, the proposal and promulgation
of 21 scheduled regulations over an eight-year period, with-
out having first performed the necessary prerequisites, the
study and the list, will insure that a massive new rulemaking
program will fail to realize its promise. Absent the eco-
nomic and scientific foundation mandated by Congress,
EPA’s future regulations are certain to produce four
perverse outcomes. First, certain socially valuable prod-
ucts which do not materially contribute to ozone non-
attainment in any area will be outlawed without any need
to do so. Second, other products will be unnecessarily
over-regulated, resulting in impaired quality, increased
cost, or both. Third, still other products will be under-
regulated denying the public the benefit of emission re-
ductions which could have contributed to ozone attain-
ment and been achieved cost-effectively. Fourth, some
products which merit some form of regulation in one of
the four groups will escape any control whatsoever. In
short, for eight years EPA will have been regulating thou-
sands of products as part of a massive new regulatory
program, but doing so totally blind.
a
3
2
*
%
24
3
4
:
ae
ie I
23
EPA’s failure to perform its Study and listing duties
under Section 183(e) cannot be adequately reviewed and
remedied by later review and reversal of one Or more
regulations by the D.C. Circuit. This is so for five reasons.
First, there is a substantial risk that EPA will, as
Stated in the Schedule, adopt 21 major product regula-
tions during the next eight years without ever having
done the homework commanded by Congiess and without
any judicial review of that failure. Petitioners constitute
the only group in the country which has sued to date to
compel performance of EPA’s Section 183(e) study and
listing duties, Obviously, companies whose products are
not within the 21 groups presently scheduled for regula-
lation cannot be expected to take any action. Nor can
those which are within one of the 21 groups, but are
Satisfied (or even delighted) with the regulations to be
adopted, or otherwise unwilling or unable to challenge
them. Even as to architectural coatings, there is no cer-
tainty that EPA will adopt a regulation in the future
and that it will be challenged by petitioners or anyone else
in the D.C. Circuit under Section 307. Thus, it is possible
that no Section 307 petition will ever be filed in the
D.C. Circuit asserting the study and listing claims at
issue here and that EPA’s inactions will never be re-
viewed, let alone remedied.
Second, if any such claims are ever raised in the D.C.
Circuit, EPA can be expected to argue that the D.C.
Circuit lacks jurisdiction thereof under Section 307. In
cases where failures to perform mandatory duties are
followed by final action, EPA often argues in the circuit
court that failures to act cannot be reached under Section
307. E.g., Abramowitz y. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1075
(9th Cir. 1987); Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d at 1454:
Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d at
490. Thus, petitioners—and the public—may never have
their day in court to challenge EPA’s breaches of nondis-
cretionary duty at issue here.
24
Third, if any product regulation is ever reviewed and
reversed by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that EPA
had failed ab initio to perform its study and listing duties,
that Court may lack statutory power to order EPA to
perform those duties, or be unwilling to exercise any such
power. CAA Section 307(d)(9) authorizes the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court to “reverse” EPA’s rulemaking “action.” The
Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that it has no au-
thority to compel EPA to perform nondiscretionary duties.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d at 654-56. Even
if a circuit court had such authority, it might be reluctant
to exercise it to issue mandatory injunctive relief. E.g.,
id. at 649-50, 656. Thus, the public would be denied the
benefit of a court order compelling EPA to perform the
initial study and listing duties.
Fourth, even if any one regulation is reversed, all the
regulations adopted by EPA prior thereto may neverthe-
less remain in effect even though the necessary predicates
therefore will have been lacking. Any person aggrieved
by a prior regulation may theoretically file his own peti-
tion for review and reversal of such regulation in the D.C.
Circuit and attempt to assert collateral estoppel. But, in
all probability, the 60 day statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1), will already have run, negating the prac-
tical effectiveness of that possibility. Thus, as many as
20 major rules—adopted illegally and without the factual
foundation mandated by Congress—would remain the law
of the land.
Fifth, it is possible that EPA would time rule adoptions
and challengers would time petitions so that mupltiple
D.C. Circuit Court petitions attempting to raise the study
and listing failures will be timely filed. But this, of course,
necessarily involves the specter of multiple litigation. It
would be far more officient to resolve the study and listing
issues in one early district court case, rather than in
multiple circuit court cases after-the-fact.
25
Accordingly, one early district court suit to compel
EPA to perform its study and listing duties before start-
ing to propose and adopt regulations is far superior to
any of the alternatives—no later circuit court petition, one
such petition, or multiple such petitions.
The jurisdictional issues petitioners ask the Court to re-
view are important, not just to Carry out the manifest will
of Congress behind Section 193(e), but behind numerous
other CAA provisions which mandate that EPA study
sources of pollution before regulating them. See Rogers,
Environmental Law: Air and Water (West 1986) § 3.1(3).
And CAA Section 304(a) was only the first of at least 16
environmental citizen suit statutes Congress adopted.
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682-83 n.1
(1983). Even absent an environmental statute with a
bifurcated jurisdictional scheme, the question of when
action becomes ripe for review frequently arises under
the Administratve Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(court shall “compel agency action unlawfully with-
Bias
Thus, it is important that this Court determine whether,
after EPA has failed to perform nondiscretionary duties
in the initial phase of a regulatory process, an aggrieved
citizen can sue in a district court to compel performance
of those duties, even though there is a potential that he
may be able to sue later in a circuit court to review and
reverse one of the many regulations which will have been
adopted during the final phases of that process without
the benefit of compliance with the necessary predicates.
CONCLUSION
The decision below improperly restricts the split juris-
dictional system of the CAA and denies petitioners the im-
mediate opportunity to challenge EPA’s failure to perform
nondiscretionary duties. Requiring petitioners to wait un-
tial any final rule is adopted in order to challenge the
failure to complete required precursors thereto subverts
26
Congress’ intent in bifurcating jurisdiction between the
district and circuit courts. Only by allowing an immediate
review of EPA’s failures can the orderly process of rule-
making be maintained. Unless such challenges are per-
mitted, EPA will continue to engage in rulemaking that is
the equivalent of constructing houses without first complet-
ing the foundations. Because this inverted sequence is not
unique to EPA, the questions of when and where chal-
lenges to inaction may be brought are of great importance.
For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM M. SMILAND
Counsel of Record
SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN
601 West Fifth Street
Seventh Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 891-1010
Attorneys for Petitioners
APPENDICES
la
APPENDIX A
[Filed Feb. 13, 1997]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No. CV 96-6306 WMB (CWx)
DuNN-EpDwarps CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT Com-
PANY; GEMINI COATINGS; INC.; HANLEY PAINT MANU-
FACTURING Co., INC.; JENNISON INDUSTRIES; CONCO
PAINT COMPANY; TRIANGLE CoaTINGs, INC.; TRINITY
COATINGS COMPANY; WELLBORN PAINT CORPORATION;
X-I-M Propucts, INc.; HIRSCHFIELD’s PAINT MANU-
FACTURING, INC., WAMPLER INDUSTRIAL COATINGS;
PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS MANUFACTURING; KUSH
PAINT COMPANY; FARRELL-CALHOUN PAINT; THE
FLoop CoMPANY; INDURON CoaTINGs, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;
Caro. M. BRowner, Administrator, MARY D. NICHOLS,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, JoHn S.
SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards; BRUCE JorDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-
ards Division, THoMas E. KELLY, Small Business Ad-
vocacy Chairperson,
Defendants.
JUDGMENT
Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment hav-
ing come on regularly for hearing on December 16, 1996
before the Honorable Wm. Matthew Byrne, Chief Judge of
2a
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Defendants appearing through their counsel,
and Defendants appearing through their counsel, the Court
having considered the pleadings, evidence presented, and
the oral argument at the time of the hearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DE-
CREED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted and judgment is hereby entered for
Defendants.
DATED: This 13 day of Feb., 1997.
/s/ Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr.
WM. MATTHEW Byrne, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
PRESENTED BY:
Lois J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
Environment and Natural Resources
Division
/s/ Katherine A. Dreyfus
KATHERINE A. DREYFUS
Trial Attorney
Environmental Defense Section
Environment and Natural Resources
Division
United States Department of Justice
P.O. Box 23986
Washington, D.C. 20026-3986
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS |
3a
APPENDIX B
[Filed Aug. 27, 1997]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-55561
D.C. No. CV-96-06306-WMB
DUNN-EDWARDS CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT Co.;
GEMINI CoaTINGs INC.; CoNCO PAINT COMPANY;
TRIANGLE COATINGS, INC.; TRINITY COATINGS Co.;
WELLBORN PAINT Corp.; X-I-M Propucts, INC.;
HIRSHFIELDS PAINT MANUFACTURING INC.; WAMPLER
INDUSTRIAL COATINGS; PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS
MANUFACTURING; KusH PAINT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;
CarOoL M. BRowNER, Administrator, MARY D. NICHOLS,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, JoHNn S.
SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards; BRUCE JorDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-
ards Division, THoMas E. KELLy, Small Business Ad-
vocacy Chairperson,
Defendants-A ppellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
William Matthew Byrne, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding
4a
Argued and Submitted August 5, 1997
Pasadena, California
Before: BROWNING, _ BRUNETTI, and Trott, Circuit
Judges.
ORDER *
I.
Plaintiffs challenge various aspects of the rulemaking
process governed by Section 183(e) of the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”), which directs the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to conduct a study and then
to promulgate regulations to control emissions of volatile
organic compounds from consumer and commercial prod-
ucts. We lack jurisdiction to consider these challenges.
The EPA has not promulgated final rules or otherwise
taken any other final action that is reviewable. Although
CAA Section 304(a)(2) authorizes citizen suits against
the EPA when the agency fails to perform “any act or
duty . . . which is not discretionary,” 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(a)(2), Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the EPA
has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty. See Ken-
necott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th
Cir. 1978).
Moreover, CAA Section 307(b)(1) provides that a “pe-
tition for review of ... any . . . nationally applicable regu-
lations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Admin-
istrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,” 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), but Plaintiffs filed this petition for
review in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.
* This order is not appropriate for publication and may not be
cited to or by the courts of this circuit, except as provided by 9th
Cir. R. 36-3.
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5a
IL.
Plaintiffs challenge the proposed architectural coatings
rule for alleged violations of statutes establishing proce-
dural requirements for rulemaking in this area. We lack
jurisdiction to consider these challenges as well.
Even if we assume the EPA failed to perform the non-
discretionary duty of publishing a statement of basis and
purpose as required by CAA Section 307(d)(3), the dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction to consider such a claim
because Plaintiffs failed to provide the EPA with the 60-
day notice required for a Section 304(a)(2) citizen suit.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2).
The judicial review section of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (“UMRA”) provides that with re-
gard to a petition for review of an agency’s compliance
with UMRA’s requirements, “the provisions of such other
Federal law shall control all other matter, such as .. . the
time for and manner of seeking review and venue... .”
2 U.S.C. § 1571(a)(5). Thus, jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
UMRA claim is governed by the CAA’s judicial review
provisions, which limit review to final agency action.
Finally, the judicial review provision of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regu-
latory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, does not pro-
vide for judicial review of agency compliance with the
particular requirements allegedly violated here. See -5
U.S.C. § 611(a).
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
6a
APPENDIX C
[Filed Feb. 9, 1998]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-55561
D.C. No. CV-96-06306-WMB
DuUNN-EDWARDS CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT CoO.;
GEMINI CoaTINGsS INC.; CONCO PAINT COMPANY;
TRIANGLE COATINGS, INC.; TRINITY COATINGS CO.;
WELLBORN PAINT Corp.; X-I-M Propucts, INC.;
HIRSHFIELDS PAINT MANUFACTURING INC.; WAMPLER
INDUSTRIAL COATINGS; PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS
MANUFACTURING; KUSH PAINT COMPANY,
Plaintiffs-A ppellants,
a Vv.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;
CaROL M. BROWNER, Administrator; MARY D. NICHOLS,
Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation; JoHNn S.
SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards; BRUCE JORDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-
ards Division; THOMAS E. KELLY, Small Business Ad-
vocacy Chairperson,
Defendants-A ppellees.
ORDER
Before: BROWNING, BRUNETTI, and TroTT, Circuit
Judges.
Ta
The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing
and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for
an en banc rehearing, and no judge of the court has re-
quested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion
for rehearing en banc is rejected.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.