Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Smiland Paint Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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(i Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

No. 971817 may 111998

OFFICE OF FHE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM M. SMILAND

Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street

Seventh Floor

ts Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Attorneys for Petitioners

'NILSON - EPES PRINTING Co. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The two questions presented by this petition for writ of

certiorari are:

Where the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) has nondiscretionary duties under Section

183(e) of the Clean Air Act (the “AA ), 42 USC.

§ 7511b(e), initially to conduct a study of emissions of

organic compounds into the air from consumer and com-

mercial products in order to determine their potential to

contribute to ozone levels violating EPA’s standard and

establish criteria for regulating certain such products, and

to list in four groups the products to be regulated, and

subsequently to promulgate multiple regulations of such

products over an eight-year period based on such study

and list; where EPA has failed to perform the initial non-

discretionary study and listing duties; and where EPA

nevertheless threatens to propose and promulgate such

regulations without having first established the necessary

prerequisites:

(1) Is a US. district court impliedly prohibited from

ordering EPA to perform such study and listing duties

under CAA Section 304(a), the “citizen suit” provision,

42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), because it is possible that one or

more of the regulations scheduled to be adopted by EPA

in the future may be reviewed and reversed in the D.C.

Circuit Court of Appeals under CAA Section 307(a)(1),

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1)?

(2) Is a US. district court barred under the ripeness

doctrine from ordering EPA to perform such study and

listing duties under Section 304(a) because it is possible

that one or more of the regulations scheduled to be adopted

by EPA in the future may be reviewed and reversed in the

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals under Section 307(b)(1)?

(i)

li

RULE 29.6 LIST

None of the petitioners has a parent company or a

nonwholly owned subsidiary.

: TABLE OF CONTENTS

: Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 20...cccccccccccccccccnccesccccoseceesosces i

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SEs EE ET PUREE cicides tants cdcksovisecisnccendbicksnidbiniabinhdubs 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..... ARTS RG EME PEREIRA OR 4

| A. Ozone and Consumer and Commercial Products.. 4

B. EPA’s Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties...... 5

C. District Court Proceedings ..........................ecccc00..- g

D. Ninth Circuit Proceedings .................................... 10

E. Proposed Rulemaking by EPA ......000000000000 0... 12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................... 12

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT

THE POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT RE-

VIEW OF POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAK-

ING ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 307 FORE-

CLOSES THE AVAILABILITY OF IMMEDI-

ATE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF AC-

TUAL STUDY AND LISTING INACTION

UNDER SECTION 304, CONFLICTS WITH

THE DECISIONS OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT

SRLS RSPR Rein SRB a Re ee 12

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Il. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT

Il.

THE POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT

REVIEW OF POSSIBLE FUTURE RULE-

MAKING ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 307

RENDERS UNRIPE IMMEDIATE DISTRICT

COURT REVIEW OF ACTUAL STUDY AND

LISTING INACTION, CONFLICTS WITH DE-

CISIONS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT ......................

THE OPINION DECIDES IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH

SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT......

SPENCE ARIES G IN seresecinnsseanmntnnsrsicdsnseonnstcbelindillebterieslaldstibendadbeaiasiitl

Page

17

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 186

Rs. SERRE SPE A sh eaR aa NM SEE IF ed eo etiam ores 20

Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.

BN aici sincekcoialainbaiatericiecteiilas Le cctiicccarthaslltas aabiinini 23

' Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 428 F.2d 1301 (10th

ak auntinlin 13

Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715 (1980) —..................... 20

Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)...... 20

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ..........0-000..... 21

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645 (7th

OI I I cons kckditde’shachs <oscen chiens ngcecucanscapdiaiaa tain ole ashioaiiasiaies 21, 24

Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193

i CORRAUARRE SAREE ETE Rae CSE EEE a a EONAR WA SS 17

EDF v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).... 18, 19

Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F. 2d

892 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991

(1989) ......... cipal they Sec taciep Lana kaa erin Eda Musiiing asia ches sicte 14

Friends of the Earth v. Cary, 585 F.2d 165 (2nd

8 Ses. 5: GRRE ame EER FRAG scene Ie TSM Wear 21

Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

“hy | ——_ 5 SORRRRIEONRPES PaAae seRRETOLLeRAE E 17

Hawaiian Electric Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th

RI NE ceca ceca acacia eiomecioneas 18

Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d

BD CT Fs SOE Gai ince ddliininth nslenee 13, 23

Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir.

5 SOREN Ea aehapk ia a Teper SIO AM eM OA 12, 13, 23

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349

i asciaklat 11, 17,18

: Maryland National Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel,

Oe ie Oe Fe COP. TOD oo sscesccciine cnc ans 11

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. Costle,

647 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451

Bee EE iin ichns sas cc wncindetiacninhpeiassictilein 14, 15, 21

PCHRG v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ........ 19

Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3rd Cir.

S , SEECR REALE OAR ER LE is eaanes: 15, 16, 22

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)... 25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir.

ie ce eclanienlinienaisscimeaidians 19, 20

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 2538

Shs Rae HIRED kcakebachaicoscnigiandes ie ticinngilissadinshadialetclinnchadiccs 14

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir.

MET Gis ocstessai de aicrdesmnscencaandbiede keds Redsbasssule seca dlehabuomisetsn 18, 19

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, ——

U.S. ‘ei: G se B' Ft «5 Seeeemeeoneeenein 20

Statutes

Bik Leg 6: yb Reeeanlpmannate HRN a gael 25

ER yp SAINI aga aR rata teda use Decca ony Ohm 2

rr I 8a aches nintias cadnesenbcemaehncaouua cae ack dant ticees 8,5

REREAD PRE el ena Maem brte? selPans 3 3,5

Oe EO CAPE OR oii acemdccatres nan cedures 3, 8,9

| Spa apes ileal NGI se i, 4, 10, 22, 23

gL 6 5 en I ERs Ru aN wis actA 3.7,9

BE TED TED siscc sades Sehassnoce cn ciasbeniine 5, 6

MMI Sees Leal lke See ble 2 thet i, 3, 10, 22

GALT RR AER YARN INOS 4, 12, 23, 24

2, 4 t {26} Bnenenas Ba en Maite eons Tike i

6, SIRE Ft is TIE ons: skccrnstonccnppicindaidinaiininidididents 21

a, I TE CIR BEE iseecenecicrrivnsanseksiinedicoiunipieiabtcuadboe 21

Regulations

60 Federal Register 15264 (March 28, 1995)... ...... 9

61 Federal Register 14531 (April 2, 1996) 0000000. 12

61 Federal Register 19005 (April 30, 1996) ............. 12

61 Federal Register 32729 (June 25, 1996) ............. 12

61 Federal Register 46410 (September 3, 1996) ....... 12

Miscellaneous

Bryer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard Univ.

II: FEUD chsciucsisan beechcusiaced cath cioeeidsabchaiasdaad cing tc inieadalte ts 21

Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case

of the Clean Air Act (Brookings Inst. 1988) ...... 21

Rogers, Environmental Law: Air and Water (West

1 RAIN Sa tne PSR SRNR SEL A HEMT UO Ne YK St BRI NEN TY ate 25

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No.

SMILAND PAINT COMPANY, et al.,

‘ Petitioners,

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Smiland Paint Company, Gemini Coatings,

Inc., Conco Paint Company, Triangle Coatings, Inc.,

Trinity Coatings Company, X-I-M Products, Wampler In-

dustrial Coatings, and Preservo Paint & Coatings Manu-

facturing pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review Part

I of the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Court of Appeals, reproduced as

Appendix A, is unpublished. Its order denying a petition

for rehearing, and rejecting a suggestion for rehearing

en banc, is reproduced as Appendix B. The ruling of the

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,

reproduced as Appendix C, is unpublished.

BSR i eas era vere UREN TTS IR CR MIS TESS MRE NOR aN oN NNT TIER TC TTT

2

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals decision was filed and judgment

entered on August 27, 1997. Its subsequent order was

filed on February 9, 1998. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 183(e)(2) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b

(e)(2) (as added November 15, 1990), provides as

follows:

“(A) The [EPA] Administrator shall conduct a

study of the emissions of volatile organic compounds

into the ambient air from consumer and commercial

products (or any combination thereof) in order to-—

(i) determine their potential to contribute to

ozone levels which violate the national ambient

air quality standard for ozone; and

(ii) establish criteria for regulating consumer

and commercial products or classes or categories

thereof which shall be subject to control under

this subsection.

The study shall be completed and a report submitted

to Congress not later than 3 years after November

15, 1990.

(B) In establishing the criteria under subparagraph

(A)(ii), the Administrator shall take into considera-

tion each of the following:

(i) The uses, benefits, and commercial de-

mand of consumer and commercial products.

(ii) The health or safety functions (if any)

served by such consumer and commercial prod-

ucts.

(iii) Those consumer and commercial prod-

ucts which emit highly reactive volatile organic

compounds into the ambient air.

3

(iv) Those consumer and commercial prod-

ucts which are subject to the most cost-effective

controls.

(v) The availability of alternatives (if any)

to such consumer and commercial products

which are of comparable costs, considering

health, safety, and environmental impacts.”

Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b

(e)(3)(A), provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“Upon submission of the final report under para-

graph (2), the Administrator shall list those cate-

gories of consumer or commercial products that the

Administrator determines, based on the study, ac-

count for at least 80 percent of VOC emissions, on

a reactivity-adjusted basis, from consumer or com-

mercial products in areas that violate the NAAQS

for ozone... . At such time, the Administrator shall

divide the list into 4 groups establishing priorities for

regulation based on the criteria established in para-

graph (2).”

Section 304(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), pro-

vides, in relevant part, as follows:

“[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his

own behalf—...

(2) against the Administrator where there is al-

leged a failure of the Administrator to perform any

act or duty under this chapter which is not discre-

tionary with the Adminitsrator .. .

The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to

order the Administrator to perform such act or

duty... .”

Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b

(e¢)(3)(A), also provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“Every 2 years after promulgating such list, the Ad-

ministrator shall regulate one group of categories

until all 4 groups are regulated. The regulations

shall require best available controls as defined in

this section. .. .

”

———

4

Section 183(e)(1)(A) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511b

(e)(1)(A), defines that term as follows:

“The term ‘best available controls’ means the degree

of emissions reduction that the Administrator deter-

mines, on the basis of technological and economic

feasibility, health, environmental, and energy impacts,

is achievable through the application of the most

effective equipment, measures, processes, methods,

systems or techniques, including chemical reformula-

tion, product or feedstock substitution, repackaging,

and directions for use, consumption, storage, or dis-

posal.”

Section 307 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607, provides,

in relevant part, as follows:

“(b)(1) A petition for review of . ... any other na-

tionally applicable regulations promulgated, or final

action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter

may be filed only in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia. .. .

“(d)(1) This subsection applies to—...

(QO) the promulgation of any regulation per-

taining to consumer and commercial products

under section 7511b(e) of this title... .

(9) In the case of review of any action of the

Administrator to which this subsection applies,

the court may reverse any such action... .

“(e) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to

authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of

the Administrator under this chapter, except as pro-

vided in this section.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Ozone and Consumer and Commercial Products

In 1990 Congress amended the CAA to add inter alia

certain measures regarding the control of ozone. Ozone,

the triatomic form of oxygen, has been designated by

5

EPA as a criteria pollutant and has been made subject by

EPA to a federal air quality standard. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408,

7409. Ozone is formed through the interaction of sunlight

and oxides of nitrogen.

Many thousands of products contain organic com-

pounds. These products, in turn, contain hundreds of

different kinds of organic compounds. Certain organic

compounds, including those emitted by certain products,

if sufficiently volatile and reactive, at certain times and

in certain places may contribute to nonattainment of the

ozone standard. Other organic compounds emitted by

products are neither sufficiently volatile, sufficiently re-

active, nor present at a time or place where they could

contribute to ozone nonattainment.

B. EPA’s Failure to Perform Mandatory Duties

Section 183(e)(2)(A)(i) mandates:

“The Administrator shall conduct a-study of the

emissions of volatile organic compounds into the

ambient air from consumer and commercial products

(or any combination thereof) in order to . . . deter-

mine their potential to contribute to ozone levels

which violate the national ambient air quality stand-

ard for ozone... .”

As to the first part of the required study, EPA has

never studied, let alone made the required determinations

about, the reactivity of the individual organic compounds

emitted by products, which vary enormously in their

potential to contribute to ozone nonattainment. EPA

never conducted an assessment of the relative reactivities

of the organic compound species emitted by consumer and

commercial products vis-a-vis the relative reactivities of

other organic compound species known to be emitted into

the atmosphere. CR 25 at 4. EPA also failed to assess

the relative volatility of any organic compound species

emitted by consumer and commercial products. Nor has

EPA ever determined such potential in any nonattainment

or attainment area, which differ widely as to weather con-

iii a i ei |

6

ditions, organic compound mix, and ratio of organic com-

pounds to the primary ozone precursor. Although specif-

ically instructed to assess the role of organic compounds

in fostering ozone nonattainment, EPA compared only

Organic compound emissions from consumer and commer-

cial products nation-wide with nation-wide man-made

organic compound emissions. CR 25 at 5. Further, EPA

gave no consideration to biogenic or natural organic com-

pounds which are recognized to be the major source of

organic compounds on a national basis and a significant

source within many nonattainment areas. CR 25 at 6.

EPA also ignored the role of emissions of oxides of nitro-

gen which are recognized to be the critical ingredient lim-

iting levels of ozone in many nonattainment areas. /d.’

aes

Petitioners formally requested the EPA Administrator

to conduct the mandated study of organic compound emis-

sions from consumer and commercial products and to |

make the required determinations of their potential to

contribute to ozone levels exceedimg the ozone standards,

and gave notice under Section 304(b). The Administra- ;

tor did not do so.

Section 183(e)(2)(A)(ii) additionally mandates that |

the Administrator shall also conduct the study “ in

! The study and determinations were to be completed and reported

by November 15, 1993. 42 U.S.C. § 751lb(e)(2)(A). EPA issued b

a report in March 1995 which did not contain the study nor the ;

determinations at issue (the “Report”). The Report concedes that i

it addressed grossly dissimilar compounds and grossly dissimilar '

geographic areas only “collectively.” CR 12 at 2-4. EPA admitted |

in the Report that it was neither “rigorous” nor “robust.” Jd. at

2-9. The Report acknowledged that any product’s potential to con-

tribute to ozone nonattainment is dependent, among other things,

on “how individual species . . . participate in the photochemical ‘

reactions which result in ozone formation.” Id. at 2-4. The Report ;

also acknowledged that “different VOC species have different ozone F

forming potentials.” Jd. at 3-2. The Report admitted that the ;

ozone-forming potential of any species is strongly influenced by

the “other VOC” in a given airshed, “the VOC-to-NO, ratio”

therein, and “irradiation conditions” therein. Jd. at 3-3.

7

order to . . . establish criteria for regulating consumer

and commercial products or classes or categories thereof

which shall be subject to control under this subsection.”

Section 183(e)(2)(B) further mandates:

“In establishing the criteria under subparagraph

(A) (il), the Administrator shall take into considera-

tion each of the following:

(i) The uses, benefits, and commercial de-

mand of consumer and commercial products.

(ii) The health or safety functions (if any)

served by such consumer and commercial prod-

ucts.

(iii) Those consumer and commercial prod-

ucts which emit highly reactive volatile organic

compounds into the ambient air.

(iv) Those consumer and commercial prod-

ucts which are subject to the most cost-effective

controls.

(v) The availability of alternatives (if any)

to such consumer and commercial products

which are of comparable costs, considering

health, safety, and environmental impacts.”

As to the second part of the study, EPA has never

taken into consideration three factors mandated by Section

183(e)(2). As stated above, EPA has not considered, as

required, those products which emit highly reactive com-

pounds. Furthermore, it has not considered the availability

of alternatives to such products which are of comparable

costs, nor those products which are subject to the most

cost-effective controls.

With respect to comparable costs, EPA did not consider

the cost of any possible regulation of any product. CR 25

at 16.

With respect to cost-effectiveness, EPA never attempted

to analyze which products or activities to regulate in con-

nection with the type and stringency of regulation to be

applied in any particular context. CR 25 at 13. EPA

8

completely ignored any assessment of the efficacy of alter-

native modes of regulation. CR 25 at 14.

Instead of considering the five statutory factors, EPA’s

Report gave controlling weight to two non-statutory fac-

tors, the volume or mass of emissions and previous regula-

tory actions.”

Petitioners demanded that the Administrator perform

her non-discriminatory duties to conduct that study and

establish those regulatory criteria, taking into considera-

tion each of those five statutory factors. The Administra-

tor did not do so.

Section 183(e)(3)(A) further mandates, as follows:

“Upon submission of the final report under para-

graph (2), the Administrator shall list those cate-

gories of consumer or commercial products that the

Administrator determines, based on the study, ac-

count for at least 80 percent of the VOC emissions,

on a reactivity-adjusted basis, from consumer or com-

mercial products in areas that violate the NAAQS

for ozone .... At such time, the Administrator shall

divide the list into 4 groups establishing priorities for

regulation based on the criteria established in para-

ergon (2)... .-

As discussed above, no statutory study exists on which

to establish, and divide, a statutory list. Furthermore,

most compounds emitted by products were never accounted

for by EPA on a reactivity-adjusted basis, as required.*

2The Report conceded that EPA "does not have information”

on the costs of regulations that effectively prohibit products. CR 12

at 4-8, 9. The Report admitted that, in developing control measures

for products, EPA must select “the most cost-effective controls.”

Id, at 2-2. It conceded that a product “must be able to be compared

with other products” with regard thereto. Jd. at 2-4. The Report

also formally established two non-statutory criteria and employed

those criteria in assessing potential regulations. Jd. at 4-12, 13.

3On March 23, 1995 EPA exempted 15 groups of products from

regulation and scheduled 21 groups of products, divided into four

groups, for regulation between 1997 and 2003, seven of which,

9

Petitioners demanded that the Administrator list cate-

gories based on a statutory study and divide the list based

On statutory criteria, and account for the emissions in ques-

tion on a reactivity-adjusted basis. The Administrator

did not do so.

C. District Court Proceedings

On September 10, 1996 petitioners, manufacturers of

architectural coatings, filed in the District Court a com-

plaint for mandatory injunctive relief against EPA, its

Administrator and certain individual employees of EPA

(collectively, ‘EPA”) under Section 304(a) based on

EPA’s failure to perform the above nondiscretionary statu-

tory duties. The unperformed duties included study, de-

termination, consideration and establishment duties under

Section 183(e)(2) of the CAA and listing, dividing and

accounting duties under Section 183(e)(3)(A) of the

CAA, which respect to all consumer and commercial

products.*

including “consumer products,” “autobody refinishing coatings,”

and “architectural coatings,” were included in the first group (the

“Schedule”). 60 Federal Register 15264. The Schedule acknowl-

edged that control of products should be based on data about “in-

dividual species” of organic compounds as well as conditions in

“specific airsheds.” Jd. at 15266. The Schedule acknowledged that

EPA had considered reactivity only “to a limited extent.” Jd. It also

conceded that EPA had “relatively limited” data about cost-effec-

tiveness of controls for most products. Jd. at 15265, 15268. The

Schedule admitted that EPA had ranked products for regulation

based on two non-statutory criteria. Jd. at 15266.

* Petitioners’ claims also included EPA’s failures to publish a

statement of basis and purpose under Section 307(d)(3) of the

CAA, failure to prepare a cost-benefit analysis under Section 202(a)

of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, and failure to

analyze small business impacts under the Regulatory Flexibility

Act, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act, with respect to a proposed architectural coatings rule

which is discussed in Section E below.

10

On September 30, 1996 petitioners filed a motion for

summary judgment on their claims. CR 6. In support of

their motion, petitioners submitted the declarations of

Professor William L. Chameides of the Georgia Institute

of Technology regarding Congress’ use of scientific terms

in Section 183(e) and Professor W. Kip Viscusi of the

Harvard Law School regarding its use of economic terms.

CR 25. On November 8, 1996 EPA filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment. CR 12. In its opposition to peti-

tioners’ motion for summary judgment EPA conceded the

district court’s jurisdiction under Section 304(a) to hear

petitioners’ claims for failure to obey Section 183(e) of

the CAA.®

During oral argument before the district court, EPA

expressly conceded on at least nine occasions that the

court had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ Section 183(e)

study and listing claims. CR 33 at_6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17,

18, 19, 23. Although EPA had conceded jurisdiction on

petitioners’ claims under Section 183(e), the district court

raised the issue, sua sponte, at oral argument, stating, “I

think there has to be a determination as to whether there

is jurisdiction on any of these claims before I start decid-

ing some of the claims.” CR 33 at 8.

On February 13, 1997, the district court granted EPA’s

cross-motion for summary judgment without findings of

fact, conclusions of law or opinion. On February 14,

1997 judgment was entered in favor of EPA.

D. Ninth Circuit Proceedings

Petitioners timely appealed arguing that the district

court had jurisdiction under Section 304(a)(2) of the

5 The Chemical Specialities Manufacturers Association and the

Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association, two national trade

associations, were granted leave to appear as amici curiae in opposi-

tion to petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. The trade asso-

ciations represented manufacturers of consumer products whose

products were listed in the first group scheduled for regulation, and

actually so proposed, as discussed in Section E below.

TAN ee

il

CAA to order EPA to perform its mandatory study and

listing duties, and that this claim for relief was ripe for

judicial review.

Part I of the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion, entered and filed

on August 27, 1997, holds: “We lack jurisdiction to

consider” petitioners’ claims seeking to order EPA to per-

form its nondiscretionary study and listing duties. The

Court disposed of the appeal, as follows: “DISMISSED

for lack of jurisdiction.” The Court dismissed the case for

lack of jurisdiction on two related grounds.

First, the Court held: “The EPA has not promulgated

final rules or otherwise taken any other final action that

is reviewable.” ©

Second, the Court held, as follows:

“Moreover, CAA Section 307(b)(1) provides that a

‘petition for review of ... any .. . nationally ap-

plicable regulations promulgated, or final action

taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may

be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia’ 42 U.S.C. § 7607

(b)(1), but Plaintiffs filed this petition for review in

the United States District Court for the Central Dis-

trict of California.” ”

On October 10, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for

partial rehearing and suggestion for partial rehearing en

banc with respect to Part I of the above Opinion. On

®The only case cited by the Court was the majority opinion in

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978).

In that case, the majority, in their alternative holding, set aside a

district court’s mandatory injunction on ripeness grounds. The

majority found that judiical interference in the administrative

proces at that stage was “premature.” Jd. at 1357.

™The Court also stated: “Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that

the EPA has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty.” How-

ever, because the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdic-

tion this statement, if construed as a statement about the merits,

is dictum. Maryland National Bank v. Vessel Madam Chapel, 46

F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1995).

12.

February 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals filed an order

denying the petition for rehearing and rejecting the sug-

gestion for rehearing en banc.

E. Proposed Rulemaking by EPA

On April 2, 1996 EPA had issued a proposed rule for

a wide variety of consumer products including hair sprays,

deodorants and nail polish removers. 61 Federal Register

14531. On April 30, 1996 EPA had issued a proposed

rule for motor vehicle refinish coatings. 61 Federal Regis-

ter 19005. On June 25, 1996 EPA published a preamble

to a proposed rule for architectural coatings. 61 Federal

Register 32729. On September 3, 1996 EPA had pub-

lished the text of a proposed rule for architectural coat-

ings. 61 Federal Register 46410.

To date, EPA has adopted no final rules regulating any

consumer or commercial product.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT THE

POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT REVIEW OF

POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAKING ACTIONS UN-

DER SECTION 307 FORECLOSES THE AVAILA-

BILITY OF IMMEDIATE DISTRICT COURT RE-

VIEW OF ACTUAL STUDY AND LISTING INAC-

TION UNDER SECTION 304, CONFLICTS WITH

THE DECISIONS OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT COURTS.

The Court of Appeals has decided the question of the

district court’s jurisdiction under Section 304 of the CAA

in a way that conflicts with the decisions of several other

circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit’s decision would fore-

close the present availability of jurisdiction under Section

304 whenever the present inaction may potentially be re-

viewed at some indeterminate time in the future under the

provisions of Section 307, which authorizes review and re-

versal of any regulation. This conflict should be resolved,

and in favor of early relief in a district court.

The Court of Appeals’ decision is consistent with the

holding of the Ninth Circuit in Kamp v. Hernandez, 752

13

F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1985). In Kamp, plaintiff had

challenged EPA’s approval of Arizona’s plan for the con-

trol of certain emissions from copper smelters, in part

because EPA had failed to require controls on fugitive

emissions from the smelters. EPA argued that the court

had no jurisdiction to review its failure to promulgate

a control strategy because such challenges must be brought

in the district court pursuant to Section 304. Id. at 1454.

The court rejected this argument holding that when a

challenge to agency inaction ‘is embedded in a challenge

to the validity” of subsequent final action jurisdiction lies

in the circuit court reviewing the final action. /d., quoting

Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d 489,

490 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, as long as the claimed failure

to act may be reviewed in connection with any subsequent

final action, the district courts have no jurisdiction to hear

an immediate challenge to the existing inaction.

This analysis of the CAA’s bifurcated jurisdictional

scheme is also followed by the Tenth Circuit. In Anaconda

Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 428 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973)

plaintiff sought an injunction in the district court against

EPA’s promulgation of a rule controlling emissions of

sulphur oxides in a portion of Montana until certain pre-

liminary steps were taken. The district court granted the

injunction. Jd. at 1303. In reversing the district court’s

ruling, the court of appeals held that because the circuit

court would have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to

EPA’s final rules, any alleged failures to take necessary

precursor steps to such rulemaking were also within the

circuit court’s jurisdiction. “It follows then that where, as

here, Congress has specifically designated a forum for judi-

cial review of administrative action and does so in unmis-

takable terms except under extraordinary conditions, that

forum is exclusive.” Jd. at 1304-05.

However, several other circuits allow immediate chal-

lenges to EPA’s failures to perform nondiscretionary acts

regardless of whether such acts are the preliminary steps

in future rulemaking procedures. In Sierra Club vy.

ER ead ee

14

Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987), plaintiff sought

to compel EPA to complete rulemaking regarding sources

of pollutants that would be subject to fugitive emissions

regulation. In discussing the type of “final agency action”

over which the circuit courts have jurisdiction under Sec-

tion 307 the D.C. Circuit stated:

“Under the Clear Air Act’s unusual, bifurcated juris-

dictional scheme, however, a claim of ‘agency recal-

citrance . . . in the face of a clear statutory duty’

would in most instances represent a claim that EPA

had failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty. As

we have indicated, such a claim must be brought in

the district court, under Section 304(a)(2).” ZId. at

794,

Thus, the district court’s jurisdiction over failures to

perform nondiscretionary duties exists even where final

action to follow may relate to those same duties. See

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255

(D.D.C. 1972).

Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,

870 F.2d 892, 899 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493

U.S. 991 (1989), the Second Circuit held that the district

court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that EPA had

a nondiscretionary duty to take some action regarding the

national standard for sulphur oxides even if the substance

of EPA’s eventual decision would be reviewable in the

circuit court. Foreclosing the district court’s jurisdiction

in such a situation would result in “leaving the matter in

a bureaucratic limbo” subject to neither district court nor

circuit court review. Id. at 900. The court found that

“creating such a bureaucratic twilight zone” could not

have been Congress’ intent in adopting Section 304(a)

the CAA. 7d.

The Sixth Circuit also follows this approach to the

CAA’s jurisdictional dichotomy. Motor Vehicle Manu-

facturers Assn. v. Costle, 647 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied 451 U.S. 907 (1981), arose out of CAA Sec-

tion 207. One subsection thereof mandated that auto

15

manufacturer part certificates shall be made only under

EPA part certification regulations promulgated to carry

Out the purposes of a second subsection and that EPA

shall. promulgate part certification regulations by a date

certain. The second subsection mandated that, if EPA

made certain determinations then it shall prescribe per-

formance warranty regulations which shall require manu-

facturers to warrant emission contol devices. The third

subsection mandated that manufacturers shall furnish

instructions which shall correspond to maintenance in-

struction regulations to be promulgated by EPA. EPA

failed to promulgate parts certification regulations or

maintenance instruction regulations, but nevertheless

proposed promulgation of performance warranty regula-

tions. Motor vehicle manufacturers brouglit suit in the

district court against the EPA Administrator charging

that the mandated parts certification and maintenance in-

struction regulations had not been promulgated by EPA

and seeking, among other forms of relief, an order direct-

ing EPA to issue both sets of regulations. The district

court held that it had jurisdiction under CAA Section

304(a), held that the parts certification and maintenance

instruction regulations were “necessary prerequisites” to

promulgation of the performance warranty regulations,

647 F.2d at 677, and rendered two of the other forms of

relief. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the

district court’s “. . . jurisdiction to grant relief for the

EPA’s alleged failure to issue the parts certification and

maintenance instruction regulations cannot be seriously

disputed.” Jd. at 678 (emphasis in original). While the

circuit court disapproved of the two forms of relief the

district court had awarded, it held that “Section 304 vests

the district court with jurisdiction to order the EPA to

perform non-discretionary duties.” Jd. Accordingly, the

court remanded the case to conduct proceedings to deter-

mine the appropriate order.

The rule in the Third Circuit is to similar effect. In

Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3rd Cir. 1980), the

16

court held that the question (whether EPA’s failure to

regulate post-mining discharges violated a Clean Water

Act mandate) was reviewable in the district court under

the citizen suit provision of the Act, Section 505, rather

than under the section authorizing circuit court review of

final action, Section 509. The court stated:

“... [A]n allegation of inadequacy of a set of regu-

lations is quite different from an allegation that a

needed regulation was nonexistent. The former case

is included within our authority to review under sec-

tion 509; the latter, however, must be reviewed under

section 505.” Id. at 996.

The court focused on the type of judicial relief necessary

to remedy EPA’s failure to perform the mandatory duty:

“We are here asked not to suspend regulations, but

to order the promulgation of completely new and

different regulations. We hold, therefore, that peti-

tioners are required to seek the relief they ask for

from the district court... .

“.. . [WJhere the only real relief sought is to com-

pel the adoption of an additional standard, the citi-

zens’ suit provisions in section 505 suffice.” Jd. at

997.

Thus, the Ninth and other Circuits require that citizens

aggrieved by agency inaction during the initial phase of

the regulatory process may not sue to compel performance

of the mandatory duty in the district court, but must await

final action, if any, in the last phase of that process and

raise the failure in connection with any circuit court re-

view of that action.

On the other hand, the D.C., Second, Third and Sixth

Circuits allow citizens to bring an immediate citizen suit

in the district court to compel the agency to perform its

nondiscretionary duty so that the necessary prerequisites

to subsequent regulatory action may come into being.

Am a tats oa

17

This Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve

this split in the Circuits.*

II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION, THAT THE

POTENTIAL FOR CIRCUIT COURT REVIEW OF

POSSIBLE FUTURE RULEMAKING ACTIONS UN-

DER SECTION 307 RENDERS UNRIPE IMMEDI-

ATE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF ACTUAL

STUDY AND LISTING INACTION, CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT.

A split between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits also exists

as to whether first-step inaction cases are ripe for judicial

review in view of possible future appellate court review of

any subsequent administrative actions. This split should

be resolved by this Court, and in favor of the ripeness

principles applied by the D.C. Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit actively applies the ripeness doctrine

to deny judicial review after inaction by an agency during

the first stage of a two-stage regulatory process. In Kenne-

cott, the only case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Part I

of its Opinion in the case at bar, the majority’s alterna-

tive holding was that “judicial intervention at this point

in the administrative process [was] inappropriate.” 572

F.2d at 1353. The majority held that it was premature

* As petitioners will show if certiorari is granted, allowing review

of present agency inaction regardless of its connection to potential

future action is consistent with this Court’s interpretation of the

bifurcated system of review Congress established. First, this Court

has acknowledged that a clear expression of congressional intent to

create a bifurcated jurisdiction scheme will not be disturbed. Crown

Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 197 (1980). Here, Sec-

tion 304(a) clearly expresses Congress’ intent that inaction be

remedied in a district court. Second, this Court has ruled that under

CAA Section 307, any final action of the Administrator is review-

able in the circuit courts. Harrison # PPG Industries, Inc., 446

U.S. 578, 587 (1980). In the same way, any failure of EPA to

perform a nondiscretionary duty should be immediately reviewable

by the district courts.

18

to intervene before EPA had a chance to act on the pend-

ing proposals for the following reason:

“Although it is likely the Administrator will act in

due course to reject the proposed revision and vari-

ance on the ground that constant emission controls

are not being employed to the ‘maximum extent pos-

sible,’ we believe it unwise presently to proceed on

that assumption. We cannot close our eyes to the

fact that this opinion is being written in the year

1978 and that in 1977 the Clean Air Act was sig-

nificantly amended. Circumstances have changed; we

should not assume that both Kennecott and the EPA

are unchanged. In any event, at this point we are

convinced the judiciary should stand aside. [Cita-

tions.]” Jd. at 1357.

The Ninth Circuit followed a similar approach in Ha-

waiian Electric Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.

1984). EPA refused to modify a utility’s permit, even

though modification was merited, without the utility’s fil-

ing additional data and undergoing a more formal in-

vestigation. The utility petitioned the Ninth Circuit for

review of that refusal. The court denied the petition hold-

ing that review was “not ripe.” Jd. at 1441. The court

ruled:

. . . Review of the merits of the air pollution con-

trol demanded of HECO, which is what review of

the PSD permit involves, would entangle the court

in an uncompleted administrative action whose ulti-

mate resolution will depend on contested factual

issues of a technical nature.

é

= . . . These contentions [of environmental inter-

venors] combined with EPA’s request for more data

from HECO indicate numerous factual disputes

which an appellate court is ill prepared to assess

without the more developed record that will exist

following administrative determination of these issues.

[Citation.]” Id. at 1445,

The D.C. Circuit takes a less restrictive approach to

ripeness in the instant context. For example, in EDF v.

19

Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) environmental

groups asked the agency to issue notices of possible can-

cellation of DDT registrations and to suspend them pend-

ing administrative review. The agency took no action on

parts of the request, and the groups petitioned the D.C. Cir-

cuit for review of that failure. The court rejected the

agency’s ripeness defense. Jd. at 1098-1100. It held that an

agency’s “faiure to act” under exigent circumstances is

“equivalent to a final denial of petitioners’ request,” and

thus, ripe. Jd. at 1098. Finding such circumstances in the

case before it, the court announced this principle: “. . .

[W]hen administrative inaction has precisely the same

impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an

agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its

decision in the form of inaction rather than in the form

of an order denying relief.” Id. at 1099. As to the interim

suspension, the court found that “inaction is tantamount

to an order denying suspension.” Jd. As to the cancella-

tion notice, the court ruled: “At some point administra-

tive delay amounts to a refusal to act, with sufficient

finality and ripeness to permit judicial review.” 7d. at

1100.

In Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 792-94, the D.C.

Circuit stated that review of EPA “inaction” was appropri-

ate in situations where a court had the “ability to provide

effective review of final action.” Td. at 793. First, citing

Hardin, the court stated that inaction may “effectively”

be ripe when the agency “has not frankly acknowledged”

its decision. Id. Second, it stated that an inaction claim

is ripe if it represents “agency recalcitrance . . . in the

face of a clear statutory duty . . . of such magnitude

that it amounts to an abdication of statutory responsi-

bility” (quoting PCHRG v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 32 (D.C.

Cir. 1984)). Id. -

In Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337 (BL; : Cie.

1993), EPA performed its statutory duty as to municipal

20

hazardous waste facilities but not non-municipal facili-

ties. EPA stated its “intention to issue revised criteria

for non-municipal faculties when it has the data necessary

to do so.” Id. at 347. The court held that this was a

failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty which was

presently ripe for adjudication. Id.

Thus, the Ninth Circuit holds that a failure to perform

nondiscretionary duties in the initial phase of a multi-

phase regulatory process is not ripe for judicial review

if the agency may take action in the future which will,

itself, be reviewable and reversible.

The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, finds such inaction

presently ripe for judicial review even if the agency may

later take further action which, itself, may be subject to

judicial review and reversal.

This Court should grant certiorari in order to resolve

this conflict in the Circuits.”

1© Should this case be accepted for review, petitioners intend to

argue that this Court’s ripeness jurisprudence compels rejection of

the Ninth Circuit’s view. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 148-54 (1967) (whether agency rule, resulting in dilemma

of complying or risking penalties, complies with statuory require-

ment is ripe issue fit for review and imposing hardship, even before

possible future enforcement actions); Babbitt v. Farm Workers,

442 U.S. 289, 297-303 (1979) (constitutional challenge to statutory

provisions relating to election procedures and consumer publicity

reviewable before the challenged provisions are actually applied to

specific cases); Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715, 722-25 (1980)

(whether agency had mandatory statutory duty to withdraw lands

for state, was reviewable, even though state’s application was pend-

ing and agency had not yet decided it); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, —— U.S. ——, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 1669-70 (1997)

(taking claim ripe where agency determined question of applica-

bility and only discretionary step left was approval of particular

transfer applications).

21

Ill. THE OPINION DECIDES IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

OF FEDERAL LAW WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED

BY THIS COURT.

Whether a citizen can institute a district court citizen

suit after agency inaction in the initial regulatory phase,

and before threatened future action, rather than awaiting

any such possible action and seeking to reverse it in the

circuit court, is an important and recurring matter war-

ranting this Court’s review.

These statutory and ripeness issues bear on whether or

not the salutary role of citizen suits is to be unduly

truncated. “. . . [C]itizen groups are not to be treated

as nuisances or trouble makers but rather as welcomed

participants in the vindication of environmental interests

.... Friends of the Earth v. Cary, 535 F.2d 165, 172

(2nd Cir. 1976). There is no basis for saying that a

citizen suit statute “applies to environmentalists alone.”

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163

(1997). It applies to claims against the government which

assert “overenforcement” as well as “underenforcement”

of environmental laws. Jd. The “welcomed participants,”

therefore, must include business groups. E.g. Motor Ve-

hicle Manufacturers, 647 F.2d at 677. This should be

especially true of small businesses. See, Section 202, P.L.

104-121, 110 Stat. 857, Section 2, P.L. 96-354, 94 Stat.

1164; see also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform

(Harvard Univ. Press 1982) at 269-70, R. Shep Melnick,

Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air

Act (Brookings Inst. 1983) at 365.

Jurisdiction in a U.S. district court, where extra-record

evidence can be introduced and factual disputes resolved,

is often necessary in a failure-to-study case. The “district

court has the authority” and “the practical ability” to

compile any necessary record relating to such inaction.

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 656 (7th

Cir. 1986). For example, in the case at bar, petitioners

introduced, without objection or contradition by EPA,

22

expert testimony by Professor Chameides about Congress’

use of scientific terms in Section 183(e) and that of Pro-

fessor Viscusi about its use of economic terms. Further-

more, EPA had the opportunity, which it did not utilize

below, to further explain why it did not, or could not, per-

form its nondiscretionary study and listing duties.

District court jurisdiction over first-step inaction cases

is important also, because Section 304(a) expressly gives

such a court remedial power to “order [EPA] to perform

such .. . duty.” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). Thus, here, the

District Court had explicit statutory power to issue a

mandatory injunction directing EPA to perform its un-

performed study and listing duties. See Pennsylvania v.

EPA, 618 F.2d at 997.

EPA’s proceeding to the final phase of the Section

183(e) regulatory process, the proposal and promulgation

of 21 scheduled regulations over an eight-year period, with-

out having first performed the necessary prerequisites, the

study and the list, will insure that a massive new rulemaking

program will fail to realize its promise. Absent the eco-

nomic and scientific foundation mandated by Congress,

EPA’s future regulations are certain to produce four

perverse outcomes. First, certain socially valuable prod-

ucts which do not materially contribute to ozone non-

attainment in any area will be outlawed without any need

to do so. Second, other products will be unnecessarily

over-regulated, resulting in impaired quality, increased

cost, or both. Third, still other products will be under-

regulated denying the public the benefit of emission re-

ductions which could have contributed to ozone attain-

ment and been achieved cost-effectively. Fourth, some

products which merit some form of regulation in one of

the four groups will escape any control whatsoever. In

short, for eight years EPA will have been regulating thou-

sands of products as part of a massive new regulatory

program, but doing so totally blind.

a

3

2

*

%

24

3

4

:

ae

ie I

23

EPA’s failure to perform its Study and listing duties

under Section 183(e) cannot be adequately reviewed and

remedied by later review and reversal of one Or more

regulations by the D.C. Circuit. This is so for five reasons.

First, there is a substantial risk that EPA will, as

Stated in the Schedule, adopt 21 major product regula-

tions during the next eight years without ever having

done the homework commanded by Congiess and without

any judicial review of that failure. Petitioners constitute

the only group in the country which has sued to date to

compel performance of EPA’s Section 183(e) study and

listing duties, Obviously, companies whose products are

not within the 21 groups presently scheduled for regula-

lation cannot be expected to take any action. Nor can

those which are within one of the 21 groups, but are

Satisfied (or even delighted) with the regulations to be

adopted, or otherwise unwilling or unable to challenge

them. Even as to architectural coatings, there is no cer-

tainty that EPA will adopt a regulation in the future

and that it will be challenged by petitioners or anyone else

in the D.C. Circuit under Section 307. Thus, it is possible

that no Section 307 petition will ever be filed in the

D.C. Circuit asserting the study and listing claims at

issue here and that EPA’s inactions will never be re-

viewed, let alone remedied.

Second, if any such claims are ever raised in the D.C.

Circuit, EPA can be expected to argue that the D.C.

Circuit lacks jurisdiction thereof under Section 307. In

cases where failures to perform mandatory duties are

followed by final action, EPA often argues in the circuit

court that failures to act cannot be reached under Section

307. E.g., Abramowitz y. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1075

(9th Cir. 1987); Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d at 1454:

Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 733 F.2d at

490. Thus, petitioners—and the public—may never have

their day in court to challenge EPA’s breaches of nondis-

cretionary duty at issue here.

24

Third, if any product regulation is ever reviewed and

reversed by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that EPA

had failed ab initio to perform its study and listing duties,

that Court may lack statutory power to order EPA to

perform those duties, or be unwilling to exercise any such

power. CAA Section 307(d)(9) authorizes the D.C. Cir-

cuit Court to “reverse” EPA’s rulemaking “action.” The

Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that it has no au-

thority to compel EPA to perform nondiscretionary duties.

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d at 654-56. Even

if a circuit court had such authority, it might be reluctant

to exercise it to issue mandatory injunctive relief. E.g.,

id. at 649-50, 656. Thus, the public would be denied the

benefit of a court order compelling EPA to perform the

initial study and listing duties.

Fourth, even if any one regulation is reversed, all the

regulations adopted by EPA prior thereto may neverthe-

less remain in effect even though the necessary predicates

therefore will have been lacking. Any person aggrieved

by a prior regulation may theoretically file his own peti-

tion for review and reversal of such regulation in the D.C.

Circuit and attempt to assert collateral estoppel. But, in

all probability, the 60 day statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(b)(1), will already have run, negating the prac-

tical effectiveness of that possibility. Thus, as many as

20 major rules—adopted illegally and without the factual

foundation mandated by Congress—would remain the law

of the land.

Fifth, it is possible that EPA would time rule adoptions

and challengers would time petitions so that mupltiple

D.C. Circuit Court petitions attempting to raise the study

and listing failures will be timely filed. But this, of course,

necessarily involves the specter of multiple litigation. It

would be far more officient to resolve the study and listing

issues in one early district court case, rather than in

multiple circuit court cases after-the-fact.

25

Accordingly, one early district court suit to compel

EPA to perform its study and listing duties before start-

ing to propose and adopt regulations is far superior to

any of the alternatives—no later circuit court petition, one

such petition, or multiple such petitions.

The jurisdictional issues petitioners ask the Court to re-

view are important, not just to Carry out the manifest will

of Congress behind Section 193(e), but behind numerous

other CAA provisions which mandate that EPA study

sources of pollution before regulating them. See Rogers,

Environmental Law: Air and Water (West 1986) § 3.1(3).

And CAA Section 304(a) was only the first of at least 16

environmental citizen suit statutes Congress adopted.

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682-83 n.1

(1983). Even absent an environmental statute with a

bifurcated jurisdictional scheme, the question of when

action becomes ripe for review frequently arises under

the Administratve Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

(court shall “compel agency action unlawfully with-

Bias

Thus, it is important that this Court determine whether,

after EPA has failed to perform nondiscretionary duties

in the initial phase of a regulatory process, an aggrieved

citizen can sue in a district court to compel performance

of those duties, even though there is a potential that he

may be able to sue later in a circuit court to review and

reverse one of the many regulations which will have been

adopted during the final phases of that process without

the benefit of compliance with the necessary predicates.

CONCLUSION

The decision below improperly restricts the split juris-

dictional system of the CAA and denies petitioners the im-

mediate opportunity to challenge EPA’s failure to perform

nondiscretionary duties. Requiring petitioners to wait un-

tial any final rule is adopted in order to challenge the

failure to complete required precursors thereto subverts

26

Congress’ intent in bifurcating jurisdiction between the

district and circuit courts. Only by allowing an immediate

review of EPA’s failures can the orderly process of rule-

making be maintained. Unless such challenges are per-

mitted, EPA will continue to engage in rulemaking that is

the equivalent of constructing houses without first complet-

ing the foundations. Because this inverted sequence is not

unique to EPA, the questions of when and where chal-

lenges to inaction may be brought are of great importance.

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM M. SMILAND

Counsel of Record

SMILAND & KHACHIGIAN

601 West Fifth Street

Seventh Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 891-1010

Attorneys for Petitioners

APPENDICES

la

APPENDIX A

[Filed Feb. 13, 1997]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. CV 96-6306 WMB (CWx)

DuNN-EpDwarps CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT Com-

PANY; GEMINI COATINGS; INC.; HANLEY PAINT MANU-

FACTURING Co., INC.; JENNISON INDUSTRIES; CONCO

PAINT COMPANY; TRIANGLE CoaTINGs, INC.; TRINITY

COATINGS COMPANY; WELLBORN PAINT CORPORATION;

X-I-M Propucts, INc.; HIRSCHFIELD’s PAINT MANU-

FACTURING, INC., WAMPLER INDUSTRIAL COATINGS;

PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS MANUFACTURING; KUSH

PAINT COMPANY; FARRELL-CALHOUN PAINT; THE

FLoop CoMPANY; INDURON CoaTINGs, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

V.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;

Caro. M. BRowner, Administrator, MARY D. NICHOLS,

Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, JoHn S.

SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and

Standards; BRUCE JorDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-

ards Division, THoMas E. KELLY, Small Business Ad-

vocacy Chairperson,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment hav-

ing come on regularly for hearing on December 16, 1996

before the Honorable Wm. Matthew Byrne, Chief Judge of

2a

the United States District Court for the Central District of

California, Defendants appearing through their counsel,

and Defendants appearing through their counsel, the Court

having considered the pleadings, evidence presented, and

the oral argument at the time of the hearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DE-

CREED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment be granted and judgment is hereby entered for

Defendants.

DATED: This 13 day of Feb., 1997.

/s/ Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr.

WM. MATTHEW Byrne, JR.

Chief Judge

United States District Court

PRESENTED BY:

Lois J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

Environment and Natural Resources

Division

/s/ Katherine A. Dreyfus

KATHERINE A. DREYFUS

Trial Attorney

Environmental Defense Section

Environment and Natural Resources

Division

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 23986

Washington, D.C. 20026-3986

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS |

3a

APPENDIX B

[Filed Aug. 27, 1997]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-55561

D.C. No. CV-96-06306-WMB

DUNN-EDWARDS CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT Co.;

GEMINI CoaTINGs INC.; CoNCO PAINT COMPANY;

TRIANGLE COATINGS, INC.; TRINITY COATINGS Co.;

WELLBORN PAINT Corp.; X-I-M Propucts, INC.;

HIRSHFIELDS PAINT MANUFACTURING INC.; WAMPLER

INDUSTRIAL COATINGS; PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS

MANUFACTURING; KusH PAINT COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;

CarOoL M. BRowNER, Administrator, MARY D. NICHOLS,

Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, JoHNn S.

SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and

Standards; BRUCE JorDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-

ards Division, THoMas E. KELLy, Small Business Ad-

vocacy Chairperson,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

William Matthew Byrne, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding

4a

Argued and Submitted August 5, 1997

Pasadena, California

Before: BROWNING, _ BRUNETTI, and Trott, Circuit

Judges.

ORDER *

I.

Plaintiffs challenge various aspects of the rulemaking

process governed by Section 183(e) of the Clean Air Act

(“CAA”), which directs the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) to conduct a study and then

to promulgate regulations to control emissions of volatile

organic compounds from consumer and commercial prod-

ucts. We lack jurisdiction to consider these challenges.

The EPA has not promulgated final rules or otherwise

taken any other final action that is reviewable. Although

CAA Section 304(a)(2) authorizes citizen suits against

the EPA when the agency fails to perform “any act or

duty . . . which is not discretionary,” 42 U.S.C. § 7604

(a)(2), Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the EPA

has failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty. See Ken-

necott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th

Cir. 1978).

Moreover, CAA Section 307(b)(1) provides that a “pe-

tition for review of ... any . . . nationally applicable regu-

lations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Admin-

istrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,” 42

U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), but Plaintiffs filed this petition for

review in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California.

* This order is not appropriate for publication and may not be

cited to or by the courts of this circuit, except as provided by 9th

Cir. R. 36-3.

Pe Eh ee, eee ees :

shF oe * aw ka

, EME PARE Oe ees ee, ee eee OT

5a

IL.

Plaintiffs challenge the proposed architectural coatings

rule for alleged violations of statutes establishing proce-

dural requirements for rulemaking in this area. We lack

jurisdiction to consider these challenges as well.

Even if we assume the EPA failed to perform the non-

discretionary duty of publishing a statement of basis and

purpose as required by CAA Section 307(d)(3), the dis-

trict court lacked jurisdiction to consider such a claim

because Plaintiffs failed to provide the EPA with the 60-

day notice required for a Section 304(a)(2) citizen suit.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2).

The judicial review section of the Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act of 1995 (“UMRA”) provides that with re-

gard to a petition for review of an agency’s compliance

with UMRA’s requirements, “the provisions of such other

Federal law shall control all other matter, such as .. . the

time for and manner of seeking review and venue... .”

2 U.S.C. § 1571(a)(5). Thus, jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

UMRA claim is governed by the CAA’s judicial review

provisions, which limit review to final agency action.

Finally, the judicial review provision of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, as amended by the Small Business Regu-

latory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, does not pro-

vide for judicial review of agency compliance with the

particular requirements allegedly violated here. See -5

U.S.C. § 611(a).

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

6a

APPENDIX C

[Filed Feb. 9, 1998]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-55561

D.C. No. CV-96-06306-WMB

DuUNN-EDWARDS CORPORATION; SMILAND PAINT CoO.;

GEMINI CoaTINGsS INC.; CONCO PAINT COMPANY;

TRIANGLE COATINGS, INC.; TRINITY COATINGS CO.;

WELLBORN PAINT Corp.; X-I-M Propucts, INC.;

HIRSHFIELDS PAINT MANUFACTURING INC.; WAMPLER

INDUSTRIAL COATINGS; PRESERVO PAINT & COATINGS

MANUFACTURING; KUSH PAINT COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-A ppellants,

a Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;

CaROL M. BROWNER, Administrator; MARY D. NICHOLS,

Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation; JoHNn S.

SEITZ, Director of Office of Air Quality Planning and

Standards; BRUCE JORDAN, Director of Emissions Stand-

ards Division; THOMAS E. KELLY, Small Business Ad-

vocacy Chairperson,

Defendants-A ppellees.

ORDER

Before: BROWNING, BRUNETTI, and TroTT, Circuit

Judges.

Ta

The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing

and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for

an en banc rehearing, and no judge of the court has re-

quested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion

for rehearing en banc is rejected.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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