Opposition Brief — Bellesfield v. Verniero
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No. 97-1808
—— -— =
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997
—_——— @ —________——__
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD,
Petitioner,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Respondents.
————————————————— 4- a EE
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals, Third Circuit
a . ee
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF MORRIS HILLS REGIONAL
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CHRIS BRADLEY
AND ROBERT STORM IN OPPOSITION
— —— e - secaniiiensieniiiabamtids
Purcett, Ries, SHANNON, SCHENCK, PRICE, SMITH
Mutcany & O'Net & KING
1 Pluckemin Way, Co-Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 754 10 Washington Street
Bedminster, NJ 07921 Morristown, NJ 07963
(908) 658-3800 (973) 539-1000
WiiwiAM P. Ries Srpney A. SAyYOvITz
Counsel of Record Of Counsel
~auL G. WirKo JOANNE BUTLER
On the Briet On the Brief
cs $a} SR a Sd De eT?
QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the federal courts below properly apply the
Younger Abstention Doctrine where:
a. There is an ongoing state proceeding involving
the same set of operative facts as here;
b. That state proceeding focuses on child welfare,
traditionally an area of state concern; and
c. Petitioner had the opportunity to raise any con-
Stitutional issues in that state proceeding, yet
chose not to do so?
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
WUSSIMUN PRESENTED... .. 2... 5.06... i
1 SP CAEN 25 cs. 3 ce ee ii
inn OF ROT. cs lil
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF MORRIS HILLS REGIONAL
BOARD OF EDUCATION, MR. BRADLEY AND
MR. STORM IN OPPOSITION ................... 1
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ............ 1
ORO. ca eee ee 1
Fences: Cele cs oe +
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................... 7
(ORRIN in S55 a re ee 8
THE COURTS BELOW CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ABS-
TAIN FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER
HONEe PRERIN 563058 o502scs PPS Pre eee 8
1. The Younger Doctrine of Abstention.......... 8
A. Pending State Proceeding ................ 10
B. Important State Interests ................. 1]
C. Opportunity to Raise Issues in State Court 12
CONCLURION ee 13
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,
ome eee eee POOR 10
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, reh’g denied,
ee ee Ea ace ic 9
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 Lg SSP RGAE RS Reece ae eo 9
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 ioe fle 2998) |... 2. 10
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
foe ee Be Oe C9082)... oc. 7, 10
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 tg, eRe oan le 10, 11
Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (Ct. App. OKI.
Re Gr eis. a 11
New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 RES CSc oa ee 9, 10
Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 | Bae ieee een ree 9
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 -. ys Baeeee 9,11
Port Authority PBA v. Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, 973 F.2d 169 tae Rae 290) 11
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Ce, 16S. Ct
Sg, HSER SPURS DS sed) nat aeetal aaa 10
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)............. passim
RuLES AND STATUTES
gE EASA SSR ph laa eee 8
REE ES eta ier ap rea a 4
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
ge tae ae DL: arene ue re rere eee ea ett 4
Pa ee ae oe eee oy ck os ee nh ee ee ee beeen 4
0S ee se oe ee he Gee ees Te 3
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF MORRIS HILLS REGIONAL
BOARD OF EDUCATION, MR. BRADLEY
AND MR. STORM IN OPPOSITION
Respondents, Morris Hills Regional Board of Educa-
tion, Chris Bradley and Robert Storm, respectfully
request that this Court deny the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari filed by petitioner, Michael Bellesfield, seeking
review of a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, entered February 6, 1998.
*
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Background
Eric Bellesfield is the minor son of Petitioner Michael
Bellesfield. The genesis of this federal court action ema-
nates from numerous investigations by the New Jersey
Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”) into
allegations that Michael Bellesfield had abused Eric
Bellesfield.
In February 1987, DYFS investigated reports that
Michael Bellesfield left Eric Bellesfield (then a young boy)
unsupervised.! Michael Bellesfield thereafter obtained a
babysitter and DYFS intervention ceased. (App. 13).
In March 1992, Eric Bellesfield ran away from home
and reported that Michael Bellesfield had hit him several
1 Respondent will cite to the materials contained within its
appendix as (App. ___).
times.* (A40). DYFS did not seek protective custody of
Eric Bellesfield at that time but, instead, recommended
that Michael Bellesfield and Eric Bellesfield seek therapy.
(A40).
On April 10, 1992, Eric Bellesfield again reported
being hit by Michael Bellesfield. (A40). DYFS, however,
again did not seek protective custody of Eric Bellesfield.
(A40).
In May 1992, Michael Bellesfield voluntarily entered
a hospital for psychiatric treatment. (A40). A month later,
a psychiatrist examined Eric Bellesfield and concluded
that he needed both “ ‘active sponsorship and an
endorsement in a therapeutic relationship.’ ” (A40).
On August 16, 1993, Eric Bellesfield reported to the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services that he was
again hit by Michael Bellesfield. (A40). Michael
Bellesfield refused to undergo therapy and would not
accept a counseling referral for his son. (A40).
On January 8, 1994, Eric Bellesfield reported to DYFS
that Michael Bellesfield had dragged him from a conve-
nience store and struck him across the chest. (A40). At
that time, Michael Bellesfield signed a voluntary place-
ment agreement, placing Eric Bellesfield in DYFS custody.
(A40-41).
On January 14, 1994, DYFS initiated an action in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, seek-
ing an Order placing Eric Bellesfield in its protective
2 Respondent will cite to the materials contained within
Michael Bellesfield’s appendix as (A __).
ee ee en eT ee te
‘ custody. (A39). Among other things, DYFS maintained
that Michael Bellesfield had abused Eric Bellesfield. See
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c); (A40).
Following the commencement of that action, DYFS
took Eric Bellesfield into protective custody. (A41). There-
after, contact between Michael Bellesfield and Eric
Bellesfield was limited to supervised church and counsel-
ing visits arranged through DYFS. (A41). Michael
Bellesfield was ordered to obtain psychological evalua-
tions, provide past psychological information, and pro-
vide information about other family members. (A41).
In July 1994, Michael Bellesfield sought an immediate
change of custody, claiming that the foster parents who
had been caring for Eric Bellesfield had physically disci-
plined him. (A41). Michael Bellesfield sued the foster
family and thereafter improperly attempted to communi-
cate with them. (A41).
Michael Bellesfield’s subsequent actions led to
restrictions on church and counseling visitation. (A41).
On one occasion, Michael Bellesfield handed a note to
Eric Bellesfield during a church service. (A41). That note
requested that Eric Bellesfield copy a letter prepared by
Michael Bellesfield which stated, in effect, that his foster
parents had hit him and that he wanted to go home to
Michael Bellesfield. (A41-42).
A trial of the custody issue took place on July 18,
1995 and July 19, 1995 in New Jersey Superior Court.
(A39). The Court interviewed Eric Bellesfield on August
4, 1995 and determined that he had been abused by
Michael Bellesfield. (A45). The Court further concluded
that Michael Bellesfield posed a high risk to abuse Eric
Bellesfield. (A45).
Since the issuance of the August 22, 1995 decision,
the Court entered several additional orders requiring that
Eric Bellesfield remain in DYFS protective custody and
directing Michael Bellesfield to enter into therapy.
The Superior Court action remains pending.
II. Proceedings Below
Michael Beilesfield filed his initial complaint in the
United States District, District of New Jersey on March
11, 1997. The Complaint purported to be a combination
habeas corpus petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and a civil
rights complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On March 18, 1997, the District Court entered an
order noting several deficiencies in the Complaint. Speci-
fically, the Complaint did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a), did not state a cause of action for habeas corpus
relief and sought to interrupt ongoing State Judicial pro-
ceedings. (App. 1-4). The Court gave Michael Bellesfield
leave to file an amended pleading that corrected the
noted deficiencies. (App. 4).
Also on March 18, 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed an
emergent order to show cause seeking a Federal Court
injunction to-_prevent a summary hearing scheduled to be
held in the Superior Court regarding the parental rights
of Michael Bellesfield. On March 26, 1997, the Court
denied the relief sought in the Michael Bellesfield order
to show cause, because Michael Bellesfield had not yet
complied with the March 18, 1997 order, and because the
NER Re ea eR eT LT em
“summary hearing” that Michael Bellesfield sought to
enjoin could be adjourned at the request of Michael
Bellesfield. (App. 5-6).
On March 26, 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed an
amended complaint seeking immediate release of Eric
Bellesfield from foster care, damages in the amount of $3
million, and a temporary injunction preventing New Jer-
sey from continuing the lower court action. (App. 7-39).
Michael Bellesfield sought injunctive relief via motion
filed on April 23, 1997.
On April 23, 1997, Judge Lechner issued an order to
show cause why the Federal District Court should not
abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the matter.
(A35-38). The order to show cause also denied the relief
sought in Michael Bellesfield’s motion, because he had
failed to provide proof that the motion had been served
upon defendants and because it was filed prior to the
service of the amended complaint. (A36-37).
On June 26, 1997, Judge Lechner issued a letter opin-
ion and order concluding that the court would abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over the case. (A18). The
court premised that conclusion on its application of the
Abstention Doctrine developed in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 1971 and its progeny. (A18).
The Doctrine of Abstention prevents federal courts
from interfering with pending state court proceedings
and is applied in a particular case only after analyzing a
three-part test. (A26). The district court here reviewed
each part of the test and concluded that abstention was
proper. (A27-31).
The first criteria addresses whether there is an ongo-
ing proceeding in the state court system involving the
same issues and parties as in federal court. (A27). In this
case, the federal court action concerned the identical
operative facts as in state court, i.e., the custody of Eric
Bellesfield and the parental rights of Michael Bellesfield.
(A27).
The district court further concluded that the second
prong, i.e., whether the state proceeding implicates
important state interests, had been met, as well. Citing
the history of decisions supporting the notion that fam-
ily/child welfare is-traditionally a strong state interest,
coupled with the need to maintain the integrity of the
state court system, the district court found that the sec-
ond factor had been satisfied here. (A28-30).
The third and final criteria focuses on whether the
plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate any constitutional
claims in state court. The district court held that plaintiff
could have raised various constitutional challenges in
state court, but failed to do so. (A30-31).
Finally, the district court concluded that Michael
Bellesfield had failed to establish “bad faith” by the var-
ious state agencies in the handling of his son’s custody
case, or that extraordinary circumstances existed to bring
the federal action outside the scope of Younger. Speci-
fically, the court held that Michael Bellesfield had pro-
vided “only conclusory allegations and vague references
to a conspiracy involving the Attorney General, DYFS,
various schools and the Public Defender.” (A32).
Michael Bellesfield thereafter appealed that ruling to
the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. On
February 6, 1998, Circuit Judge Ruggiero J. Aldiscert
issued a memorandum opinion affirming the judgment of
the District Court. (A4-7). The Circuit Court agreed with
the District Court’s analysis of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine and was “satisfied with the lower court's rea-
soning.” (A6).
—=®
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
properly analyzed the Younger Abstention Doctrine, as
well as the three-part test set forth in Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 459 U.S. 423 (1982).
Plaintiff admits that there is an ongoing proceeding in
state court involving the same parties and issues. New
Jersey’s interest in family matters is sufficiently strong to
require abstention. Finally, Michael Bellesfield had a
forum (the pending New Jersey state court action) to seek
redress for his constitutional and alleged other griev-
ances, yet chose not to utilize that forum.
Michael Bellesfield overlooks the clear applicability
of the Doctrine of Abstention and provides no facts or
case law in support of any exception to that doctrine.
Petitioner’s call for modification of Younger, based on the
facts on this case, should not be heard. The claims of
state-sponsored kidnapping, official misconduct, and
unlawful detention are premised only on petitioner’s
vague, conclusory and unsupported statements not borne
by the record in this matter. To the contrary, petitioner
has a forum in state court, chose to ignore visitation rules,
and ultimately was found to have abused his son.
Despite those findings, and even though he did not
raise any constitutional challenges in state court, Michael
Bellesfield now asks this Court to intervene in his pend-
ing state court action to “perhaps prevent an all out
rebellion on the part of millions of parents.” Such a bald
claim to overturn a fundamental maxim of federal juris-
prudence should not be granted further review. Because
the decisions of the District Court and Court of Appeals
are well-reasoned and soundly based, the petition for
certiorari should be denied.
ARGUMENT
THE COURTS BELOW CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ABSTAIN
FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER THIS
MATTER
1. The Younger Doctrine of Abstention
The original and amended complaints filed by
Michael Bellesfield contain allegations that various con-
Stitutional and civil rights have been violated. Plaintiff,
therefore, appears to premise jurisdiction for this matter
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The sole question raised by
this appeal, then, concerns whether the courts below
properly determined that the federal judiciary should
decline exercising jurisdiction over this case based on the
Younger Abstention Doctrine.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Harris was
indicted on various criminal offenses in California state
court. Harris thereafter filed a complaint in federal dis-
trict court, seeking to enjoin Younger (the California Dis-
trict Attorney) from prosecuting him. Specifically, Harris
alleged that the prosecution inhibited the exercise of his
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court recognized that Harris’ request
for an injunction, if granted, would undermine long-
standing principles of comity and federalism:
[Congress has historically] manifested a desire to
permit state courts to try state cases free from inter-
ference by federal courts.
* * »
The normal thing to do when federal courts are
asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state
courts is not to issue such injunctions.
[Id. at 43, 45 (emphasis added).]
As a result, the Court’s ruling became known as the
Younger Abstention Doctrine (“the Doctrine”), which pre-
vents federal courts from interfering with pending state
court proceedings, even when there is an allegation of a
constitutional violation. Id. at 43-44. The Doctrine now
also applies to pending state court civil actions, which
raise important state interests and where the claimant has
a forum to raise the claims for which redress is sought in
the federal system. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989); Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S.
592, 604, reh’g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); see also Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 US. 1, 10-14 (1987); Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 US.
10
619, 627-29 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Gar-
den State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982); Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); FOCUS v. Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996);
Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1993).
Federal courts developed the Doctrine of Abstention
out of deference to principles of comity and federalism.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1724
(1996) (citing Younger, supra, 401 U.S. at 44-45). As this
Court observed in New Orleans Public Service:
For Younger purposes, the State’s trials and
appeals process is treated as a unitary system,
and for a [F]ederal court to disrupt its integrity
by intervening in mid-process would demon-
strate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign.
[491 U.S. at 369].
The Supreme Court in New Orleans established a
three-part test in order to apply the Doctrine on a case-
by-case basis. First, there must be a pending state pro-
ceeding that is judicial in nature. Id. at 352. Next, the state
proceedings must raise issues of important interest.
Finally, plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to raise
any constitutional issues in the state forum. Ibid. A
review of each factor in this case makes clear that the
District Court decision was proper and should be
affirmed.
A. Pending State Proceeding
As to the first part of the test, even plaintiff admits
that his Complaint seeks the intervention of the Federal
Court during the course of a state proceeding, contrary to
11
doctrines of federalism and abstention. The pending state
action involves the custody of Eric Bellesfield, the same
set of operative facts as here. The courts below properly
reached that very conclusion. Clearly, then, the first
requirement for abstention under Younger has been satis-
fied.
B. Important State Interests
The second criteria of Younger has been met, as well.
This prong requires abstention if the state proceedings
implicate important state interests. The important state
issue still being litigated in state court of Younger here
focuses on child/family welfare. Questions of family rela-
tions (specifically, custody) have historically been an area
of state, not federal, concern. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (Ct.
App. Okl. 1996) (recognizing unique federal interest in
welfare of Indian children, but concluding that tradition
of state interest in family relationship was sufficiently
strong to apply the Doctrine).
The Court in Morrow also recognized another impor-
tant state interest at issue here that goes hand-in-hand
with that of family relations. The state has an interest in
ensuring that all family/child welfare matters proceed in
an orderly fashion so as to protect the interests of the
child. Ibid. Allowing plaintiffs such as Michael Bellesfield
an opportunity to re-litigate issues of child custody impli-
cate important principles of comity and federalism.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987). In
addition, intervention by the federal courts here would
12
potentially preempt years of fact-finding regarding the
appropriate care for Eric Bellesfield.
Accordingly, the state’s interest in adjudicating issues
of child welfare, coupled with long-standing maxims of
comity and federalism, result in the inescapable conclu-
sion that the second prong in Younger has been met here.
C. Opportunity to Raise Issues in State Court
Finally, the Doctrine of Abstention can be applied so
long as plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise
constitutional issues in state court. Port Authority PBA v.
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 973 F.2d 169,
173 (3d Cir. 1992). Although plaintiff may have been
dissatisfied with the decisions reached thus far by the
trial courts in the New Jersey state action, plaintiff in fact,
had the opportunity to raise any constitutional issues in
that forum or via appeal. His failure to do so should not
afford him a second opportunity in a different forum.
Bellesfield also claims the presence of bad faith or
extraordinary circumstances warrants reversal of the
opinions below. The Court in Younger recognized that
abstention is inappropriate if:
A) the state court proceedings are pursued in
bad faith to harass the federal claimant; or
B) extraordinary circumstances exist, such as
where a challenged statute flagrantly vio-
lates express constitutional prohibitions,
and where abstention would cause irrepar-
able injury.
[Port Authority, supra, 973 F.2d at 176]
13
Petitioner here asserts claims of bad faith, as well as
allegations that extraordinary circumstances exist here.
Those claims, focusing on purported harassment of the
Bellesfield family by DYFS and other state agencies, are
supported by nothing more than conclusory, bald allega-
tions. The courts below properly recognized that excep-
tions to Younger are rare, and that more than mere
conclusory allegations is necessary. (A31). Thus, Michael
Bellesfield’s “proofs” in the regard are patently deficient,
and petitioner has failed to establish the existence of
either bad faith or extraordinary circumstances.
Accordingly, the Doctrine of Abstention should apply
here.
CONCLUSION
The Courts below properly applied the Younger
Abstention Doctrine to this case. Petitioner concedes that
state proceedings are ongoing, that custody is an impor-
tant state issue, and that he failed to contest constitu-
tional issues in state court. Moreover, petitioner cannot
establish, beyond merely making conclusory allegations,
that bad faith or exceptional circumstances exist here.
Accordingly, there is no need for intervention by the
federal courts in this matter and, therefore, respondents
Morris Hills Regional School District, Robert Storm and
14
Chris Bradley respectfully request that the petition for a
writ of certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Purcett, Ries, SHANNON, MULCAHY
& O'NEILL
WittiAM P. Rigs, Esa.
Counsel of Record
Pau. G. Wirtxo, Esa.
On the Brief
SCHENCK, Price, SMITH & KING
Sipney A. Sayovitz, Esa.
Of Record
JoAnne L. Butter, Esa.
On the Brief
Dated: June 5, 1998
App. 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD, ERIC CIVIL ACTION
BELLESFIELD, a minor, NO. 97-1181
Plaintiffs, (AJL)
as ORDER
)
)
)
)
)
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF i (Entered 3-18-97)
NEW JERSEY, PETER VERNIERO, in) 4
official capacity only, PETER )
ALVINO, individually and in official )
capacity, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF )
HUMAN SERVICES WILLIAM )
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official)
capacity only, DIVISION OF YOUTH )
AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES )
VALENTINE, DAVID JOHNSTON, )
individually and in official capacities, )
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, _)
MORRISTOWN FORENSIC )
ASSOCIATES MICHAEL SHEA, )
MICHAEL FIORE, individually and )
in official capacities, MORRIS )
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S )
OFFICE, JOEL HARRIS, individually )
and in official capacity, RUDOLF )
TWNSP. SCHOOL SYSTEM, )
CARMINE GAITO, NORMA MIELE, )
SUSAN AND ERIC HERSCHMAN, _ )
individually and in official capacities, )
MORRIS HILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM, _ )
MR. BRADLEY, MR. STORM, )
individually and in official capacities, )
CHILD PLACEMENT REVIEW )
BOARD, SUZANNE WARREN, )
individually and in official capacity, )
)
Defendants.
App. 2
This matter having come before the court upon the
complaint (the “Complaint”) of pro se plaintiffs Michae!
Bellesfield and Eric Bellesfield, a minor (collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”), and it appearing
Plaintiffs’ purported habeas corpus petition fails to
state a cause of action because Eric Bellesfield is in
foster care, Complaint at 9, and is, therefore, not a
prisoner nor does he suffer any restrictions imposed
by State criminal justice system. Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511
(1982). Accordingly, it appears appropriate to dismiss
the Complaint to the extent it seeks habeas corpus
relief.
The Complaint seeks to disrupt ongoing State
judicial proceedings. See Complaint at 37. It appears
that to grant the relief sought in the Complaint would
disrupt the integrity of the State judicial proceedings
and “would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State
as a sovereign.” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989);
see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Accordingly, it
appears appropriate to dismiss the Complaint, as it is
now drafted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (“Rule 8(a)”)
requires that a pleading “shall contain... a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The purpose of
Rule 8(a) is to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intel-
ligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see
also In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696,
702 (3d Cir. 1996); Barnhart v. Compugraphic Corp., 936
F.2d 131, 135 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1991); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,
App. 3
861 F.2d 40, 42 (2nd Cir. 1988) (explaining purpose of
rule is to “give the adverse party fair notice of the
claim asserted so as to enable him [or her} to answer
and prepare for trial”); Mayor and Council of Borough of
Rockaway v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F.Supp. 1039, 1061
(D.N.J. 1993). Courts have discretion to dismiss a com-
plaint, sua sponte, where “the complaint is so confused,
ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its
true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin,
861 F.2d at 42 (holding court has power, on its own
initiative, to dismiss the complaint when it does not
comply with requirements of Rule 8); see also Frazier v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68
(3d Cir. 1986); Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 621 F.2d
556, 559 (3d Cir. 1980) (a court may dismiss a com-
plaint on its own initiative if the complaint affords a
sufficient basis for the court’s action); Wheeler v.
Nieves, 762 F.Supp. 617, 627 (D.N.J. 1991); Panek v.
Bogucz, 718 F.Supp. 1228, 1229 (D.N.J. 1989); King v.
Fayette County, 92 F.R.D. 457, 458 (W.D.Pa. 1981);
Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977).
Where a complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a),
however, a plaintiff is generally given leave to file an
amended pleading that conforms to the requirements
of Rule 8. Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.
In the instant matter, the Complaint consists of
thirty-nine pages of factual and legal argument. The
Plaintiffs have additionally submitted twenty-three
exhibits in support of the Complaint. The paragraphs
of the Complaint are not numbered. The Complaint
further purports to be a combination of a habeas corpus
petition and a civil rights complaint. See Complaint at
2. Plaintiffs allege violations of the “First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments” and allege numerous
causes of action including conspiracy to violate civil
rights, denial of due process, abuse of power, abuse of
App. 4
process, “[t]reatment [mJal-practice” (sic), “[uJ]ltra
[vjires [s]ubstantiation [d]Jefamation,” libel/slander
and alienation of affection. Complaint at 1-2. Plain-
tiffs’ claims are alleged in a disjointed and vague
manner and the Complaint is unnecessarily confusing.
The Complaint, therefore, fails to provide fair notice to
Defendants of the claims asserted by Plaintiffs.
and for good cause shown,
IT IS, on this 17th day of March, 1997,
ORDERED, that the Complaint will be dismissed pur-
suant to Rule 8(a) unless an amended complaint is filed
as permitted by this order, and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs are granted leave to file,
within fifteen (15) days of the date of this order, an
amended pleading which conforms with the requirements
of Rule 8(a) and addresses the other issues raised in this
Order, and it is further
ORDERED, that should Plaintiffs fail to respond to
this Order, as directed, the Complaint will be dismissed
for the reasons stated, and it is further
ORDERED, oral argument will not be heard; the deci-
sion will be based upon any written submissions
received, as permitted herein.
/s/ Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR., U.S.D.J.
App. 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR-THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD, ERIC
BELLESFIELD, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 97-1181
(AJL)
V. ORDER
)
)
)
)
)
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PETER VERNIERO, in ) (Entered 3-26-97)
official capacity only, PETER )
ALVINO, individually and in official )
capacity, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF )
HUMAN SERVICES WILLIAM )
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official)
capacity only, DIVISION OF YOUTH )
AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES )
VALENTINE, DAVID JOHNSTON, )
individually and in official capacities, )
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM,
MORRISTOWN FORENSIC )
ASSOCIATES MICHAEL SHEA, )
MICHAEL FIORE, individually and )
in official capacities, MORRIS )
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S )
OFFICE, JOEL HARRIS, individually _ )
and in official capacity, RUDOLF )
TWNSP. SCHOOL SYSTEM, )
CARMINE GAITO, NORMA MIELE, )
SUSAN AND ERIC HERSCHMAN, _ )
individually and in official capacities, )
MORRIS HILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM, _ )
MR. BRADLEY, MR. STORM, )
individually and in official capacities, )
CHILD PLACEMENT REVIEW )
BOARD, SUZANNE WARREN, )
individually and in official capacity, )
)
Defendants.
App. 6
This matter having come before the court upon the
“Emergent Order to Show Cause” (the “Order to Show
Cause”), filed 26 March 1997, and it appearing a com-
plaint (the “Complaint”) was filed in the instant action,
on 11 March 1997, by pro se plaintiffs Michael Bellesfield
and Eric Bellesfield, a minor (collectively, the “Plain-
tiffs”), and an order having been filed in the instant
action on 18 March 1997 (the “18 March 1997 Order”),
and the 18 March 1997 Order having set forth the various
deficiencies of the Complaint and having given Plaintiffs
the opportunity to file an amended complaint which
addresses the deficiencies, and it appearing Plaintiffs
have not yet filed an amended complaint, and it further
appearing Plaintiffs assert the Order to Show Cause must
be addressed on an emergent basis because a summary
hearing before Hon. Stephen F. Smith, Jr., J.S.C., to
address plaintiff Michael Bellesfield’s parental rights, has
been scheduled for 1 April 1997, and it appearing Plain-
tiffs may request an adjournment and “a new date can be
set in [court on April 1, 1997,” Certification of Michael
Bellesfield in Support of Emergent Order to Show Cause,
dated 17 March 1997, Exh. E, and it appearing, therefore,
the Order to Show Cause need not be considered on an
emergent basis, and for the reasons set forth in the 18
March 1997 Order, and for good cause shown,
IT IS, on this 26th day of March, 1997,
ORDERED, that the relief sought by the Order to
Show Cause is denied.
s/ Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR., U.S.DJ.
App. 7
Michael Bellesfield, pro se
PO Box 112
Plainsboro, NJ] 08536
609-716-0616
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR -THE
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Michael Bellesfield
Eric Bellesfield a minor
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
Attorney General, State of New
Jersey, Peer Verniero in official
capacity only, Peter Alvino,
individual and official capacity.
New Jersey Dept. of Human
Services William Waldman,
Director, in Official capacity
only.
Division of Youth and Family
Services, James Valentine, David
Johnston, individually and in
official capacities.
Family Enrichment Program,
Morristown Forensic Associates
Michael Shea, Michael Fiore
individually and in official
capacities.
Morris County Public Defender’s .
Office, Joel Harris individually
and in official capacity.
CASE #97-1181
(AJL, Jr.)
AMENDED CIVIL
COMPLAINT
CONSPIRACY TO
VIOLATE CIVIL
RIGHTS
Denial of Due
Process
Abuse of Power
Abuse of Process
Treatment Mal-
practice
Ultra Vires
Substantiation
: Defamation, Libel /
Slander
Alienation of
affection
: Invasion of Privacy
: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional
Distress
JURY DEMAND
App. 8
Randolph Twnsp. School System,
Carmine Gaito, Norma Miele,
Susan and Eric Herschman
individually and in official
capacities.
Morris Hills School System, Mr.
Bradley, Mr. Storm, individually,
and in official capacities.
Child Placement Review Board,
Suzanne Warren, individually
and in official capacity.
Detendants.
Michael Bellesfield, and on behalf of his minor son
Eric Bellesfield, residents of of [sic] the State of New
Jersey by way of Complaint, say;
JURISDICTION
|. This is a civil rights action for damages, declaratory
judgement and injunctive relief to redress the deprivation
under color of law, of rights served by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteen Amendments to the United States Constitution,
and in violation of Title 42 USC Sections 1983 and 12131
et. seq. These are actions taken, under color of State Law,
by State Agencies and are also violative of the Constitu-
tion of the State of New Jersey and of its statutory provi-
sions and rules. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42
USC Section 1983. Plaintiffs have been deprived of Con-
stitutional Rights in violation of both substantive and
A pp. Y
procedural due process safeguards, accorded all Consti-
tutionally protected rights. Venue is pursuant to 28 USC
Section 1391, as this is the district wherein plaintiffs
reside and the claim arose. The amount in controversy,
excluding interest and costs, exceeds $100,000.00.
2. Although this Complaint does seek the intervention
of the Federal Court during the course of a state proceed-
ing, contrary to doctrines of federalism and abstention, it
is submitted that Federal intervention is not only justi-
fied, but absolutely necessary in order to prevent a bla-
tant and purposeful violation of fundamental
Constitutional rights and protections with particularly
grave consequences which will result in the erroneous
termination of parental rights and irreparable damage to
this family. Additionally the actions of the State have
been taken in bad faith, with a history of extraordinary
circumstances and harassment so as to require the Fed-
eral Court to intervene to vindicate Constitutional viola-
tions in State Court, when by reason of passion or
prejudice a full and fair hearing cannot be had in the
State Court and the imminent and irrevocable damage
which will befall this family if the Court does not do so.
Under these extraordinary circumstances plaintiffs
should have their opportunity to be heard in a Federal
Forum.
PARTIES
~
3. a. Plaintiffs Michael Bellesfield and his natural son,
Eric, are residents of the State of New Jersey, whose
Constitutional rights have been and continue to be vio-
lated by the State of New Jersey and the sanctity of their
App. 10
family, without due cause and in bad faith. They have
been denied due process and equal protection both sub-
stantive and procedural.
b. Defendant Peter Verniero, Attorney General for
the Department of Law and Public Safety for the State of
New Jersey, the body politic in whose name all actions
have been taken, and was at all times relevant in official
capacity.
c. Defendant William Waldman is the Director of
the New Jersey Department of Human Services and is
responsible for the supervision of the Division of Youth
and Family Services and was at all times relevant in
official capacity.
d. Defendants James Valentine and David Johnston
are employees of the Division of Youth and Family Ser-
vices, (hereinafter DYFS) and were at all times relevant
individually and in official capacities.
e. Defendants Michael Fiore and Michael Shea are
employees of the DYFS contracted agencies, the Family
Enrichment Center and Morristown Forensic Associate
and were at all times relevant individually and in official
capacities.
f. Defendant Joel Harris is an employee of the New
Jersey Public Defenders Office of Morris County and was
all times relevant individually and in official capacity.
g. Defendants Carmine Gaito, Norma Neile, Susan
and Eric Hershman are employees of the Randolph Town-
ship New Jersey School System were at all times relevant
individually and in their official capacities.
App. 11
h. Defendants Bradley and Storm are employees of
the Morris Knolls New Jersey School System and were at
all times relevant individually and in their official capaci-
ties.
i. Defendant Suzanne Warren is an employee of the
Child Placement Review Board which is also within the
Department of Human Services and was at all relevant
individually and in official capacity.
WRONGFUL CONDUCT
4. Upon information and belief, the defendants named
herein, have willfully engaged in a conspiracy consisting
of a pattern of escalating intrusion into the life of this
family, until they have finally succeeded in effectively
terminating the father’s right of access to his son. These
actions were taken under color of State Law and accom-
plished through abuse of their discretionary power and
process and by either violating applicable State Law, or in
the alternative, using State Law which is unconstitu-
tionally vague so as to permit them to destroy the sanc-
tity of this and other families, by violating the most
fundamental of liberty and property rights.
5. Generically, it is submitted that this conduct on the
part of DYFS and its affiliate and contracted agencies
named herein, has been a systemic pattern for at least a
decade using heavy handed “Gestapo” like tactics, DYFS
has followed the same custom and practice for over a
decade and the same scenario of insidious and progres-
sive escalation of a charge of abuse, which is perpetuated
by the agency itself. This custom and practice is a bureau-
cratic_process through which DYFS, with the aid of their
App. 12
contracted agencies, begins with intervention by means
of a “Voluntary Placement Agreement,” or other minimal
intervention, and then engage in a step by step escalation
of their intervention, using their experts to validate their
requests for same, which then progresses to more and
more intrusive intervention leading toward the end of
permanent State custody and/or termination of parental
rights. =
6. This is accomplished through a series of complex
actions and then using each preceding episode to justify
each successive one which eventually is carried by its
own momentum which is more fully explained infra. This
same scenario occurs with hundreds of families in the
State of New Jersey each year, wherein DYFS engages in
willful and pre-meditated violations of Constitutional
safeguards and parental rights, to illegally take children
from their natural parents without due cause, usually to
justify their own existence and funding and/or targeting
those parents who do not immediately succumb to their
authority and that in doing so, DYFS is violating their
own mission statement which includes due regard for the
rights of parents and a commitment to keeping natural
families intact whenever possible.
7. Such actions are taken under the guise of compelling
state interests, but are really unwarranted intrusions and
taken in wanton and reckless disregard for the welfare of
those people whom they are supposed to be protecting,
or in the alternative, with such gross negligence and
incompetence as to defy comprehension. These acts con-
sist of abuse of power, discretion and process. Many of
the tactics involve threats and intimidation and are so
App. 13
egregious that they even reach into the private profes-
sional community, so that many doctors, psychologists
and even lawyers will refuse to become involved in any
case which opposes DYFS. This is an agency fraught with
systemic corruption, drunk with power and out of con-
trol.
8. In this case, the State has wrongfully taken a child
from the only parent he has ever known. These actions
were taken in bad faith and part of a long term campaign
of harassment against this family. A father is without his
son and the son without his father, because of the discre-
tionary acts of mid level State officials, who have wrong-
fully deprived them of the most precious of liberty rights,
under color of state law by abusing the discretionary
powers given them to protect these very persons, in a
most egregious manner, repugnant to the very ideals of
the Constitution they supposedly serve.
CAUSE OF ACTION
9. This case dates back to early 1987, when DYFS made
the first intervention with the family. On February 2,
1987, when it first came to DYFS attention that petitioner
was a single parent and was leaving his son Eric alone in
the home for lack of an adequate baby-sitter. Mr.
Bellesfield on his own had raised cared for and supported
Eric, since he was an infant. At that time, DYFS did their
first investigation and following the petitioner's procur-
ing a baby-sitter, found the problem had been corrected
and saw no need for any further intervention.
10. On March 8, 1992, there was an allegation of physi-
cal abuse, which was investigated by DYFS and found
App. 14
again to be unsubstantiated. On April 10 that same year
there was another DYFS investigation of physical abuse,
which again was found to be unsubstantiated. On August
16, 1993 another report was made and the results of the _
DYFS investigation were the same. On January 8, 1994
another allegation was made and investigated. Appar-
ently, virtually all these events were sparked by state-
ments made by Eric Bellesfield, but no physical abuse
was ever substantiated in any of them.
11. On that same date, however, because Eric did not
want to go home, Michael Bellesfield ultimately signed a
“voluntary placement agreement.” In January, Mr.
Bellesfield revoked that agreement. As a result, DYFS
filed a petition for protective custody on January 14, 1994.
Although several review hearings were held in 1994 and
1995, resulting in several Orders extending protective
custody, and Eric was placed in foster care, a fact finding
hearing was not held until July 18, 1995.
12. During two days of testimony before the Honorable
Catherine Langlois, testimony was taken from a variety
of DYFS workers and their experts. It was alleged by
DYFS that Mr. Bellesfield violated NJSA 9:6-8, which
defines an abused or neglected child and the court
entered a finding that Eric Bellesfield fit the description
of an abused or neglected child under the aforementioned
statute. This finding was based not on any real incidents
of abuse, but by the “risk assessment,” done by Drs. Shea
and Fiore as well as the DYFS workers. These “predic-
tions” are at best, educated guesses, which are not an
acceptable standard of treatment for any practicing pro-
fessional, especially the doctors and certainly not a basis
App. 15
for taking a child from a parent with no evidence of any ~
substantiated abuse.
13. This testimony, however, resulted in an Order that
Eric remain in DYFS custody indefinitely. At this point it
is assumed that the minor is being held by the State
against his own and his father’s will. DYFS will not
reveal the minor child’s whereabouts to his father and
will not confirm that the parents wishes with respect to
Eric’s religious upbringing are being adhered to and will
not permit Mr. Bellesfield access to his child, except in a
DYFS supervised setting. These defendants, under color
of State law, conspired in bad faith to achieve these ends
in violation of the most precious and sanctified of rights,
privileges and safeguards of the United States Constitu-
tion.
COUNT ONE
Conspiracy to violate civil rights, malicious prosecution
Abuse of power and process, Intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Alienation of affection.
14. In the instant case, there was never any substantia-
tion of abuse in any of the multitude of the DYFS inter-
ventions referenced, supra. Although at the time this
Complaint was initially being drafted, there had not, as
yet, been any formal petition to terminate parental rights
filed. It is submitted that DYFS and the other defendants
named herein, had already, for all practical purposes,
conspired to do exactly that, through use of the tactics
described. They have effectively already accomplished
same, in that Michael Bellesfield has no say whatever in
App. 16
any decisions regarding the care and custody of his natu-
ral son whom he raised as a single parent, since the child
was an infant.
15. Indeed he does not know where his son is going to
school or how he is doing academically. Mr. Bellesfield
has no idea whether the child is attending the church of
his choice, and has no input as to his religious upbring-
ing, a clearly defined area, in which the State has no right
to interfere. Indeed, at this very moment, he does not
even know where his son is. This is effectively the termi-
nation of parental rights, no matter what it is called.
16. Further DYFS and the defendants named herein are
following the long established custom and practice, using
fraudulent means and abuse of power and process, to
follow a classical and typical scenario of increasingly
escalating intrusion into the family, from the initial
wrongful usage of the so called “voluntarily” placement
form, through several other legal stages, infra, toward the
end of formally terminating of parental rights. This is
especially true with respect to the misuse of the “volun-
tary” Placement Agreement is, by itself, sufficient to
establish a prima facie case.
17. Upon information and belief it is submitted that
both the general customs and practices of this agency and
its affiliates and the end toward which they strive, is
clearly the termination of parental rights and as dis-
cussed herein, infra, and that the instant case is a perfect
illustration of tragic consequences of such a scenario and
through official documentation will show that these
App. 17
practices are systemic and violative of state law, or alter-
natively the statutes which govern these agencies are
unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad.
18. In each of the incidents described supra, there was
never once a finding or substantiation of abuse or neglect, -
a fact which is not contested by the defendants. This is
reflected in the State’s records. In fact, in each of the
instances of DYFS intervention, the workers themselves
stated there was no indication of physical abuse, injuries,
black and blue marks etc., as reflected in their own
records. There was never once a substantiation of any
abuse by these agencies. Yet they were able to take the
minor child away from his natural parent and lawful
guardian for almost two years without such charges ever
substantiated, with arrogant disregard for the rights of
this family.
19. In the January 8, 1994 incident, which triggered the
current proceedings, the worker Defendant Valentine
wrote in his Referral Response Report, “There is no inju-
ry ... no imminent danger to Eric and no need for
intervention,” Then, because Eric said he did not want to
go home, he urged Mr. Bellesfield to sign a “Voluntary
Placement Agreement,” through use of deceptive state-
ments and heavy handed threats, intimidation and
harassment.
20. Mr. Bellesfield was given the usual ultimatum by the
worker, which causes the abuse of that agreement; that he
could either sign the “voluntary” agreement and main-
tain custodial control over his son, or DYFS would get a
Court Order to take him anyway. They were aided in this
cause, since Eric as a normal rebellious teenager, who had
App. 18
learned he could manipulate his-father through state-
ments to DYFS, as was reported to DYFS by his therapist
Catherine Pollack and is also reflected in the DYFS
records as well, wherein they state that such manipula-
tion was taking place. Many teens have now learned this
and have taken to doing so when they are angry or upset.
21. Clearly, however, when the long standing DYFS
record has NEVER once substantiated any abuse, there is
no good faith basis for any further State intrusion. It is
obvious from the facts, that DYFS used their approach of
escalating intervention to then finally employ the “if
there is smoke there is fire” method of developing purely
circumstantial evidence, which barely met the minimal
threshold to petition the Court for “temporary place-
ment,” and only then with the aid of evaluations and
reports from their contracted agents, including the Child
Placement Review Board, Morristown Forensic Associates
and the Family_Enrichment Program. In order to accom-
plish this, all of these agencies crossed the line between
cooperating with each other to conspiring with one
another because Mr. Bellesfield tried to assert his most
fundamental Constitutional rights, would not succumb to
their authority and let them take his son for no good
reason.
22. Upon information and belief, it was for this reason
the defendants conspired with one another in order to
continue the escalation process, to change the initial goal
of the temporarv placement which went from “volun-
tarily, placement” to “short term placement” to “long
term placement,” all within the course of two years and
all of which was in opposition to the wishes of both the
father and son, that Eric be allowed to go home. Few
App. 19
cases could be more illustrative of the abuse of power
and process in the use of this custom and practice of
bureaucratic escalation.
23. The evidence of this progressive tangled web
weaved by the defendants, with no just cause and despite
the fact that, by their own admission, there was never any
indication of abuse, is overwhelming, according to their
own records. In fact, the only documented abuse which
took place was while Eric was in foster care and was
slapped across the face by the foster mother. But never
once did any agency document abuse on the part of the
natural father, nor was there any judicial determination
of same. There was no basis for the continuing intrusion
into this family, other than the bad faith and outrageous
actions of the defendants.
24. The deprivations here, which occurred under color
of state law are egregious in the extreme. These actions
were willful, wanton and committed with reckless disre-
gard or are, in the alternative, grossly negligent and/or
incompetent. As a direct and proximate result of these
actions the plaintiffs have been wrongfully deprived of
their most fundamental rights, have had the sanctity of
their family- violated without cause. Both have experi-
enced extreme emotional and psychological distress and
have been damaged thereby.
25. There are aggravating circumstances here, of a most
egregious nature, in that these are Sstate [sic] officials
abusing their positions and power and acted knowingly
and willfully to violate the most sanctified Constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs with wanton and reckless disre-
gard for their well being, for their own ulterior motives,
App. 20
simply because Mr. Bellesfield would not succumb to
their authority and because he fought for his rights as a
parent.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners demand the immediate
release of Eric Bellesfield from State Custody to his natu-
ral father and compensatory judgements against the
defendants jointly and severally in an amount not less
than $3,000,000.00 and such punitive damages as the
Court deems appropriate, along with costs of this action.
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this cause.
COUNT TWO
Conspiracy, Invasion of privacy, Treatment mal-practice
[sic], Ultra Vires Substantiation, libel/slander, intentional
infliction of emotionai distress, abuse of power and proc-
ess.
26. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-25 herein and incor-
porate same as if more fully set forth herein.
27. In addition to their own intrusions into this family,
DYFS workers appeared at Eric’s schools on numerous
occasions, unannounced and without Mr. Bellesfield’s
knowledge and consent. They took Eric out of his class-
room and interviewed him repeatedly, consistently pres-
suring him to make statements about being mis-treated
[sic], which for the most part, he refused to do. They
conspired with the defendants from the school systems
named herein, to encourage these school officials to regu-
larly interrogate Eric and on one occasion strip searched
App. 21
the child, causing him extreme humiliation and embar-
rassment, as well as ostracism from his peers. Still there
was no substantiation of abuse.
28. Notwithstanding, at each review hearing, the State
requested extension of the continued temporary custody,
until they finally built up to “more long term placement”
in the hearing in June of 1995. This request was not based
on any documented abuse, but was primarily based on
the observation of DYFS workers and/or defendants
Fiore and Shea, and the agencies for which they work, the
Family Enrichment Center, and Morristown Forensic
Associates, which are both contracted to do evaluations
and/or psychological counseling for DYFS and are, in
that sense, merely an extension of same.
29. This father and son were separated from each other
for all this time, based solely on the “opinions” of the
above named defendants, who without any evidence of
abuse, enabled the State to take custody of the child
anyway, by their “risk assessment” which is the same as
forecasting the future or gazing into a crystal ball. There
are no substantiated and accepted scientific or clinical
techniques capable of such predictions. This would be
like allowing the police to arrest someone because they, in
their expertise, “thought” he was going to commit a
crime at some time in the future. It is preposterous in
light of the rights and safeguards provided for citizens of
this country. They then added insult to injury and assert
that Mr. Bellesfield was only “marginally cooperating in
counseling and visitation.” For him to cooperate with this
charade would be like cooperating with the snake that bit
him.
App. 22
30. Such a scenario only buttresses the conspiracy which
is perpetuated upon the unsuspecting parent who is con-
fronted by therapists who demand that the parent admit
to the alleged abuse and submit to their authority. If they
do not, then they are said to be exhibiting denial, which
enables DYFS and their appointed therapists to state that
the parent is not cooperating. This is quite a Catch 22 for
the parent who is innocent of the charges.
31. Further, the visitations at the DYFS appointed loca-
tions are put under a microscope in a very artificial, stiff
and institutional atmosphere, making normal parent/
child interactions difficult at best. This then enables the
therapist’s and DYFS worker’s observations and evalua-
tions of same to be critical of various aspects of the
interaction, which are then used against the parent in
Court. If the parent objects to the visitation site, or
requests a different site or supervisor, then once again
they [sic] “not cooperating.” If the parent refuses to con-
tinue in this vicious cycle, then they are simply denied all
contact with their child, which leads to termination pro-
cedures.
32. The true motives and clear indication of the effort to
confirm their intentions are illustrated in their attempt to
locate Mr. Bellesfield’s sister, their real goal is clearly
stated in the letter written by Sharon Arnold an investiga-
tor supervised by defendant Warren, as seen in exhibit |,
annexed hereto, in which she states “In order for the
child in question to be made available for adoption all
efforts to locate existing relatives must be exhausted.” It
is submitted that this is nothing less than a smoking gun.
Nothing more is needed to sustain the prima facie case
that this was, in fact, their ultimate goal from the outset.
App. 23
Obviously, before the child can be adopted the natural
parents rights must be terminated. This was done prior to
any finding of abuse and given the opportunity can be
proven by strong documentary evidence from the defen-
dants own records.
33. There are aggravating circumstances here. In light of
the history and case law, regarding the protections
accorded to parental and family rights throughout the
history of this country, the defendants named herein,
through use of the tactics described above have pur-
posely and recklessly circumvented and violated state
and federal law and long standing public policy and
through fraudulent means, have willfully violated the
petitioners rights to due process and equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. Here all of these were violated under color
of State law by mid-level State officials who feel it is
within their power to deny these rights, based solely on
their opinion, without evidence of abuse or neglect or a
judicial finding of same.
31. The deprivations here, which occurred under color
of state law are egregious in the extreme. These actions
were willful, wanton and committed with reckless disre-
gard or are, in the alternative, grossly negligent and/or
incompetent. As a direct and proximate result of these
actions the petitioners have been wrongfully deprived of
their most fundamental rights, have experienced extreme
emotional, physical and financial distress, have had their
good names impugned and suffered public humiliation
and stigma and ostracism and have been damaged
thereby.
App. 24
Wherefore, the petitioners demand the immediate
release of Eric Bellesfield from State Custody to his natu-
ral father and compensatory judgements against the
defendants jointly and severally in an amount not less
than $3,000,000.00 and such punitive damages as the
Court deems appropriate, along with costs of this action.
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury in this cause.
COUNT THREE
Conspiracy to violate civil rights, Denial of due process
and equal protection, Abuse of power and discretion
under color of State law, Ultra vires substantiation,
Incompetence, Influence peddling, Defamation of charac-
ter.
32. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-31 herein and incor-
porate same as if more fully set forth herein.
33. The plaintiff’s now find themselves in State Court in
a situation where their most fundamental rights continue
to be violated and are without a remedy within the State
system, as a result of the defendants abuse of power and
process. In the instant case, these deprivations went on
for almost two years, with no substantiated abuse, and
without so much as a full hearing and/or a finding made
by judicial Order. For the period of time prior to the 1995
Court Hearing before Judge Langlois, the petitioners
were denied their due process rights, and their inalien-
able right to each other. Eric Bellesfield was wrongfully
deprived of his liberty right and Michael Bellesfield was
wrongfully denied his parental rights among others.
ey ection
App. 25
34. The rigorous application and importance of due
process is extremely important in any case which
involves a liberty interest or where Constitutional safe-
guards are threatened. The laws which have been imple-
mented to serve as a means of enforcing the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are not
abstractions but are clear expressions of policy. These
petitioners were not accorded due process or equal pro-
tection. This is confirmed by the record and is clearly
violative of long standing judicial and public policy. Due
process is required where there exists the possibility
“grievous loss.” One of the plaintiffs here has been
deprived of his freedom and his father, the other has been
deprived of his child, without so much as a trial, or even
a full hearing.
35. Here we are concerned with the liberty interest of a
minor as well as his father. There is no difference in the
liberty interest of an individual whether he is a child or
an adult. In this case neither the child nor the adult
received due process and the actions which were viola-
tive of same led to an ultra vires substantiation of abuse.
It should also be noted, that the reason Mr. Bellesfield
lost his job was a result of faxes which DYFS sent to him
at work several times, and which contained confidential
medical information. Not only is this also a violation of
Fourteenth amendment provisions of the right to privacy
but is violative of the Americans With Disabilities Act 42
USC 12131 et seq. but the DYFS rule of confidentiality as
well.
36. The burden of the State in order to intervene into the
sanctity of the familial relationships is a heavy one, as it
should be. A vast majority of states continue to recognize
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App. 26
the common law rule of “parental privilege.” Twenty nine
states have expressly incorporated this privilege by stat-
ute, including New Jersey, NJSA 2C:3-8, (1994). When
considering what is reasonable in the circumstances
courts have traditionally drawn a line somewhere
between moderate spankings that leave no long-term or
permanent marks and beatings where permanent injuries
and scars are incurred. Yet in the instant case no bruises,
marks or any other indication of abuse was ever found.
37. A recognition of the importance of limiting of State
power over the family is provided in 42 USC Sec.
671(a)(15), which requires that, as a condition for receiv-
ing Federal funds to reimburse States for a portion of the
cost for foster care, State agencies must make reasonable
efforts to re-unite the child with the parent. Yet in the
instant case, it would seem that every effort has been
directed at doing exactly the opposite and their burden
has not been met. NJSA 9:6-8.21c in pertinent part defines
an “abused or neglected child” as;
“A child whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired... ”
38. There can be no question here that the defendants
violated these statute [sic], or in the alternative the stat-
utes must be construed as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. A full fact finding hearing was not even held
until July of 1995. During that hearing there was testi-
mony from several of the defendants named herein, vir-
tually all of whom are affiliated in some manner with
DYFS and it is submitted that they and the Deputy Attor-
ney General, Peter Alvino, together with the law Guard-
ian appointed for Eric, Joel Harris, also crossed the line
App. 27
between cooperating and conspiring with respect to the
preparation and “tailoring” of testimony in bad faith.
Together they planned, coordinated effort to orchestrate
such improper testimony, so as to convince the judge that
the State should keep custody of Eric without good cause.
39. This testimony was based on “predictions” which
have no basis in science, medicine, or psychology without
any evidence of actual abuse. During the hearing vir-
tually all of the defendants testified and/or took part in
the proceedings as advocates. It is apparent from the
record that defendants Alvino and Harris worked in con-
cert to elicit the supposed “evidence,” from the array of
defendants named herein, all of whom despite no evi-
dence of abuse, suggested their own predictions and per-
ceptions should take precedence over same.
40. These included defendants Fiore and Shea, who
improperly used their professional expertise to contribute
to the ultra vires substantiation, with reckless disregard
for the welfare and consequences to their patients. They
followed no accepted or discernable clinical or scientific
protocol in their report and evaluation, which was done
in conjunction with DYFS worker Dave Johnston. They
relied on second hand information, unconfirmed inci-
dents, innuendo and leaps of faith which do not meet
acceptable standards of treatment. They willfully
engaged blurring the fundamental boundary which
should exist between counselor and evaluator, as evi-
denced in the report of the Governor’s Task Force On
Child Abuse and Neglect, of which defendant Fiore was
member, and which so states that such a boundary should
be maintained.
App. 28
41. As professionals, they had an obligation to act in
their patients best interests, not to distort and skew their
interpretations of test results and distorting their obser-
vations of behaviors. They quite clearly made statements
about both petitioners which are not supported by any
data or clinical or diagnostic tools and which constitutes
not only unacceptable standards of care and treatment
mal-practice, but are defamatory as well.
42. They further attempted to use two prior short term
hospitalizations of Mr. Bellesfield, which he voluntarily
gave them permission to obtain his records, to infer that
he was an unfit parent. These were for acute depression,
each, of which were just a matter of days in duration, and
other than those days, as can be seen in the reports of the
three doctors, infra, clearly did not impact on his ability
to parent, and the use of these records for the purposes
which the State used them in this manner would seem to
be a clear violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and significantly prejudiced Mr. Bellesfield.
43. Three separate experts, Dr. Goodman, Dr. Skinner,
Dr. Chalemian wrote reports which not only disagreed
with Fiore and Shea, but were severely critical of the
manner in which DYFS and their contractors had handled
this case. Each of their reports are annexed hereto as
exhibits L, M and N respectively and are supported by
Fiore’s MMPI test results annexed hereto as exhibit O,
which indicate that Mr. Bellesfield’s personality was in
the normal range.
44. The experts statements ranged from indicating that
continued pressure on the child was unwarranted, to the
fact that they were appalled and that the treatment the
Pee MEY Mh ant a a a ee
App. 29 -g
Bellesfields received was reprehensible. Yet each of these
experts would not, of their own volition, come to court to
testify, not wanting to get involved with DYFS. This
serves only to reinforce the perception of this agency as
discussed, supra.
45. It is submitted herein, that both of the school sys-
tems named herein and DYFS treatment of Eric while in
their custody, making derogatory statements about his
father and attempts to brainwash Eric amounts to a form
of institutional child abuse and meets the burden under
NJSA 9:6-8.21. DYFS visited the schools on numerous
occasions to “interview” Eric without his father’s knowl-
edge or consent. Further they encouraged the school
counselors to continue these “looking for abuse” inter-
views. It was at the urging of DYFS the boy was strip
searched and humiliated by a school counselor, which is a
totally inappropriate and unacceptable practice. Eric’s
grades, his emotional, physical and psychological health
have markedly deteriorated during the period he was in
State custody.
46. The Randolph Schools did not destroy the false
records related to Eric and his father as Ordered by the
Office of Administrative Law. Mr. Bellesfield saw those
records after the date they were supposed to be
destroyed, and further discovered that these same
records were forwarded to the Morris Knolls School sys-
tem, who also kept them in defiance of the ALJ Order.
They continued the interrogations of Eric at the urging of
DYFS.
47. Despite the fact that each and every witness admit-
ted that they had found no signs of abuse, and despite
App. 30
the warning of manipulation as reflected in the DYFS
notes, these defendants, working in concert offered
biased, skewed and fraudulent evidence and interpreta-
tions which they supplanted for documented incidents of
abuse. The evidence was not only cumulative, but dis-
torted and in some cases outright falsifications. This spe-
cifically refers to perjured report and testimony of
defendant Shea, that Mr. Bellesfield was hospitalized 3
days after Eric’s placement. This is an outright lie as the
hospital records show. This is grossly unprofessional,
willful and malicious or in the alternative grossly incom-
petent.
48. The Judge’s findings of fact, were issued August 22,
1995. In it she seems to have shifted the burden of proof
to the petitioner citing a prior New jlsicjersey case as
precedent for doing so, when the cases are as different as
night and day. n [sic] her findings she states that based on
a preponderance of the evidence that Eric was abused
within the meaning of the statute and therefore the bur-
den should shift. It would seem that the judge construed
the prior New Jersey case to stand for the proposition of
burden shifting as a broad precedent and an exception to
the fifth amendment privilege in cases of alleged abuse,
when in fact, the decision in that case, which has been
upheld on appeal, created only a limited exception, with
specific predicates.
49. A Constitutional privilege, however, cannot be eas-
ily overcome. The petitioner must first show “injuries to
the child which are substantial in nature .. . ,” consistent
with abuse. This includes broken bones, evidence of
serious injury or neglect, or IMMINENT DANGER of
same, according to the New Jersey statutes in question. In
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App. 31
this case, according to the DYFS records themselves,
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ABUSE: Not only does it
flow from this that therefore there could not have been a
prima facie case made, but certainly if there was no abuse
reported, it could not be substantiated. There is no estab-
lished precedent to waive Constitutional rights and privi-
leges upon the mere filing of a petition.
50. Nor does it mean that a parent can be deprived
access to their child by the mere act of filing such a
petition, which not only fails to establish a prima facie
case, but one which is not supported by any EVIDENCE
of abuse by admission of the agency itself. There must be
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE of injury. In the instant case it
is not even disputed that there has never been any evi-
dence of injury, despite Eric’s report that his father struck
him on January 8, 1994, which he later recanted.
51. No excessive force was used by Mr. Bellesfield, there
was no injury, let alone substantial injury; only accusa-
tions, second hand statements and innuendo. Mr.
Bellesfield did not testify himself during the hearing
upon advice of Counsel and barely put on an affirmative
defense for two reasons. First his attorney felt, rightfully
so, that DYFS had not met its burden, secondly, he could
not get those professionals who wrote reports to come
and testify, because they were intimidated by DYFS, also
rightfully so. Many professionals in this state who have
done so, have ended up losing their licenses. Mr.
Bellesfield’s attorney did not want to Subpoena them,
fearing that they would then be hostile. Indeed, the plain-
tiffs had difficulty finding an attorney who was willing to
take on DYFS, as a result of the unbridled power and
heavy handed tactics of this agency.
a
App. 32
52. Additionally, as stated in the judge’s finding, supra,
the finding was made at the level of preponderance, and
although this level of proof may normally be appropriate
according to State law, with respect to State intervention.
It is the petitioners contention, supported by the evi-
dence, that this was more than State intervention and in
cases which follow the escalation scenario described
herein, the preponderance threshold is unconstitutional
and should be re-examined. This was a clear effort to
prevent access and ultimately to terminate parental
rights.
53. The judge had access to the DYFS file which con-
tained the letter regarding efforts at making Eric available
for adoption. She knew that Mr. Bellesfield would no
longer subject himself or Eric to visitation in a DYFS
supervised environment and was aware of the progres-
sive escalation of DYFS custody. At this very hearing the
DYFS goal was changed from short term to long term
placement. Indeed it would seem that DYFS and the
DAG’s who represent them seem to wield considerable
power and have extraordinary access within the State
Court system. This case is replete with many ex parte
communications between the judge and DYFS or their
agents.
54. The judge seemed particularly disturbed at a note
which Mr. Bellesfield attempted to have Eric sign, while
they were together in church, which stated that Eric
wanted to return home. This fact is not in dispute. It was
the act of loving parent, caught in this web of escalation,
desperate to have his child back home. Nothing more,
nothing less. Perhaps it was not the best of judgments,
but it is hardly an appropriate basis for a finding of child
App. 33
abuse. If the statute permits this kind of judgment and
; travesty to stand, then the statute is clearly so vague as to
be unconstitutional.
55. It is submitted that as a result, the petitioners did
not receive a fair hearing, were deprived of due process
and that the Court erred both in shifting the burden and
in the application of the preponderance standard. Since
this Order has been in effect, Mr. Bellesfield has been
i virtually eradicated from the life of his child. On April 22,
} 1996, the findings were memorialized in an Order signed
by a different judge, who had no prior knowledge of the
case. The Order, however, permitted Mr. Bellesfield to
submit to defendant Alvino an alternate visitation site.
Mr. Bellesfield sent a certified letter to Alvino, suggesting
that visits occur at the office of Dr. Richard Gardner, a
highly respected expert in the field of child abuse, which
was delivered on February 18, and which requested a
reply within ten days of receipt, Defendant Alvino did
not even bother to respond. This has also occurred on
other occasions in the past.
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56. On February 6, 1997 the Child Placement Review
Board made recommendations to the Judge. They have
accepted the new DYFS goal for Eric, which has now
become “self sufficiency and preparation for college.”
After keeping Eric from his father for over two years,
‘ clearly they now intend to keep Eric until his emancipa-
tion, thus effectively terminating this father’s access to
his son, during his last years of adolescence.
57. Additionally, Ms. Warren admitted to forging the
DYFS Supervisor’s signature to that form, to Mr.
Bellesfield, when he confronted her with the fact that the
Catt Nee MP Moe Se
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App. 34
DYFS Supervisor was not even at the meeting. All of this
is simply more evidence of the escalation process and
termination is termination no matter what it is called and
it is clear that termination has effectively already
occurred.
58. Just prior to March 1, 1997, as this Complaint was
being readied for filing, three important documents were
received by Mr. Bellesfield, which transformed all of the
allegations in this petition into fact, and shows quite
clearly that the scenarios alleged herein were all a build
up to an attempt to terminate Mr. Bellesfield. The first is a
recent letter he received from Eric, compared with his
prior letters. One must question what could cause such a
shift in such a short period of time. This is, by itself,
ample illustration that Eric is being programed [sic], in
that he now echoes and endorses, virtually every state-
ment of DYFS. Such a radical change must be seriously
questioned, especially when other behavioral indicators
and Eric’s badly declining academic performance con-
tinue to deteriorate during the same period of time.
59. It is clear from the recent letter, that not only are
these written in age inappropriate language, but many
are age inappropriate issues and ideas, a child Eric’s age
would not normally be interested or engaged with. They
are clearly the urging of the DYFS personnel and “thera-
pists” using a common technique of brainwashing in
urging the child to “get his feelings out in writing to his
father.
60. It is no coincidence that almost simultaneously, Mr.
Bellesfield received the documents annexed hereto as
exhibits V and W. The first is the letter from DYFS dated
App. 35
February 26, 1997 and his response to same. The second is
the Summary Hearing Notice from DYFS and submitted
by defendant Warren, indicating the submission of
review board findings, and requesting a hearing in
Morris County Superior Court, to recommend the initia-
tion of termination proceedings, once again before
another judge!
61. This would seem to be a response to Mr. Bellesfield’s
letter to request visitation and information regarding
Eric. The letter he received in return states unequivocally
that Eric is not attending church. No other information or
visitation was discussed. Obviously this so because they
were aware of the Notice in exhibit W was being pre-
pared, to begin the final step of the escalation described
herein, namely the termination of parental rights, despite
the fact that there is still no evidence of abuse.
62. On this issue the Supreme Court has clearly spoken,
recently and unequivocally. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US
745 (1982) the court clearly stated:
4é
. . . freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment .. . there
must be conclusive evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt (not merely a preponderance of evi-
dence) to terminate a parent’s right of access to
their child.”
63. Just this past December of 1996, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsberg wrote:
“We place decrees forever terminating parental rights
in the category of cases in which the state may not bolt
the door to equal justice . . . Parental termination decrees
App. 36
are among the most severe forms of state action .. . The
Mississippi woman seeking to appeal is endeavoring to
defend against the state’s destruction of her family
bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental
unfitness adjudication (cite omitted).”
It is clear that the defendants here acted in total and
willful disregard for same.
64. Clearly such a right deserves due process. Yet this
father and son have been forcibly and fraudulently sepa-
rated, deprived of each other for over three years without
so much as a full and fair hearing. That is all this father
and son are requesting on a good faith basis, and to
which they are entitled. It is for these reasons that the
current petition was filed in this Court.
65. In the face of the long term pattern of harassment,
the flagrant abuse of power and process and clear evi-
dence of bad faith and fraud, the plaintiffs must be
accorded at least a hearing in their choice of a Federal
Forum, to vindicate their Constitutional rights, especially
when, the State statute is being properly attacked on its
face, and no other avenue to enforce those safeguards is
available. The State is not prejudiced by such a review,
but the alternative if such is not granted, will be the
wrongful termination of a parents right to his natural
child. The statutes under 42 USC 1983 are designed as
exactly such a mechanism, under these circumstances to
vindicate those rights. The principle of abstention cannot
simply be used to give State Courts the first opportunity
to vindicate a Federal claim of such gravity and in the
face of such gross violations on the part of the State. It is
Se ae
App. 37
the function of the Federal Court to provide such access
and oversight.
66. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of
these defendants, the petitioners, have been unlawfully
deprived of each others affection, they have suffered
public humiliation and ridicule and their good names
have been impugned and have been subjected to extreme
emotional, physical and financial problems which are
now overwhelming and have been damaged thereby.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners demand the immediate
release of Eric Bellesfield from State Custody to his natu-
ral father and compensatory judgments against the defen-
dants jointly and severally in an amount not less than
3,000,000.00 and such punitive damages as the Court
deems appropriate, along with costs of this action.
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on this cause.
WHEREBY, plaintiffs seek an expedited hearing
before this Court, for declaratory and injunctive relief
from these acts, the issuance of a temporary injunction to
prevent the State from going ahead with the termination
proceedings pending such a hearing in this Court on the
Constitutionality of same. Considering the bad faith enu-
merated herein, and the immediate and irreparable dam-
age to the plaintiffs if such a proceeding were permitted
to go fourth [sic] and therefore meets the requisite criteria
for such intervention on the part of the Federal Court.
Petitioners also request the issuance of a permanent
injunction to stop the current and prevent future tres-
passes by the defendants, except as provided for by
proper construction of State law and without further
App. 38
violation of petitioners Constitutional rights and safe-
guards to which they are entitled. The acts of the defen-
dants are continuing, and petitioners have no other legal
remedy to prevent further trespass. This Court must act
immediately to put a stop to the illegal intrusion into this
family and the severance of the father/son relationship.
The acts of the Defendants are so egregious and commit-
ted with such willful disregard for law and public policy
that such extraordinary relief is justified.
Should the defendants assert a defense of statutory,
sovereign or qualified immunity declare that such statues
are inapplicable herein due to the level of bad faith
shown. State officials cannot use a shield of qualified
immunity in this or any other case, unless they are acting
in good faith, and not convoluting and circumventing the
law and public policy in bad faith. In the event the
defendants assert a defense of abstention, collateral
estoppel, comity, entire controversy or res judicata,
declare same inapplicable herein or in the alternative
unconstitutional and violative of petitioners due process,
both the procedural and substantive.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Pro Se Plaintiff, pur-
suant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65(a), respect-
fully moves for an expedited hearing before this Court
for the granting the injunctive and declaratory relief
requested herein; that the State of New Jersey be required
to produce the person of Eric Bellesfield, now in State
custody before this Court; that in addition to the other
relief that the State of New Jersey be required to bear the
costs of any counseling or “deprogramming” deemed
necessary by experts appointed by the Court and that all
records related to this matter from any and all State
App. 39
agencies be extracted, sealed and expunged; and that the
State be required to bear the cost of any educational
remedial instruction or tutoring, and grant Plaintiffs
attorney fees and costs incurred in this action, pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d).
—_—
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury in this cause,
as to all such issues herein, which are so triable.
/s/ Michael Bellesfield 3/25/97
Michael Bellesfield, ex-rel Date
Eric Bellesfield, Petitioners
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