Appendix — Bellesfield v. Verniero
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No. 9 F180 8 MAY 6 - 1998
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNTED STATES
October Term, 1998
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD,
Petitioner
¥.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, et.al.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD,
pro-se
P.O. BOX 112
26-15 FOX RUN DRIVE
PLAINSBORO, N.J. 08536
(609) 716-0616
APPENDIX
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
APPENDIX
ORDERS, OPINIONS, AND FINDINGS ENTERED
INCONJUNCTION WITH JUDGEMENT FOR REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
OTHER RELEVANT/ESSENTIAL EXHIBITS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 97-5467
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD; ERIC BELLESFIELD,
a minor
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PETER ALVINO, individually and in official capacity; NEW
JERSEY DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, WILLIAM
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official capacity only; DIVISION
OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES VALENTINE,
DAVID JOHNSTON, individually and in official capacities;
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM; MORRISTOWN
FORENSIC ASSOCIATES, MICHAEL SHEA, MICHAEL
FIORE, individually and in official capacities; MORRIS COUNTY
PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, JOEL HARRIS, individually
and in official capacity; RANDOLPH TWP. SCHOOL SYSTEM,
CARMINE GAITO, NORMA MIELE, SUSAN HERSCHMAN,
ERIC HERSCHMAN,, individually and in official capacities;
MORRIS HILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM, BRADLEY, MR..,
STORM, MR.., individually and in official capacities; CHILD
PLACEMENT REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE WARREN,
individually and in official capacity.
Michael Bellesfield,
Appellant.
Oe
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 97-cv-01181)
__ District Judge: The Honorable Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
a
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 5, 1998
Before: BECKER, ALITO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
ed
JUDGMENT
_
This cause came on to be considered on the record from the
United States District of New Jersey and was submitted under Third
Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on January 5, 1998.
On consideration whereof, it is now here ADJUDGED and
ORDERED by this court that the judgment of the district court
entered June 26, 1997, be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Costs taxed against the appellant.
Attest:
Dated: FEB 6 1998
O:\PRO.SEVAN.98\BELLESFI\MEMO.DIS Clerk
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 97-5467
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD; ERIC BELLESFIELD,
a minor
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PETER VERNIERO, in official capacity only; PETER ALVINO,
individually and in official capacity; NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF
HUMAN SERVICES, WILLIAM WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in
official capacity only; DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES, JAMES VALENTINE, DAVID JOHNSTON,
individually and in official capacities; FAMILY ENRICHMENT
PROGRAM; MORRISTOWN FORENSIC ASSOCIATES,
MICHAEL SHEA, MICHAEL FIORE, individually and in official
capacities; MORRIS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
JOEL HARRIS, individually and in official capacity; RANDOLPH
TWP. SCHOOL SYSTEM, CARMINE GAITO, NORMA
MIELE, SUSAN HERSCHMAN, ERIC HERSCHMAN,
individually and in official capacities; MORRIS HILLS SCHOOL
SYSTEM, BRADLEY, MR., STORM, MR.., individually and in
official capacities; CHILD PLACEMENT REVIEW BOARD,
SUZANNE WARREN, individually and in official capacity.
Michael Bellesfield,
Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 97-cv-01181)
District Judge: The Honorable Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 5, 1998
Before: BECKER, ALITO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed FEB 06 1998)
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
This pro se appeal by Michael Bellesfield requires us to decide
whether the district court properly applied the abstention doctrine of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to dismiss without
prejudice an action against various New Jersey agencies and -
SORE SS
officers. We have jurisdiction over the order dismissing the action
without prejudice because the order “ended this suit so far as the
District Court was concerned.: Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33
F.3d 217 220 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949) ). We will affirm the
judgment of the district court.
Michael Bellesfield filed a complaint in the district court to
challenge both the constitutionality of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.21,
which governs adjudication of allegations of child abuse and
neglect, and the manner in which the statute has been applied by the
New Jersey courts when his son, Eric Bellesfield, was removed
from his custody and placed in a foster home under the care and
supervision of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family
Services. In the district court, Bellesfield named numerous
defendants, including officials and agencies of the State of New
Jersey and Morris County involved in protective services. The
complaint purported to be a combination habeas corpus petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and a civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After some threshold proceedings, Bellesfield
filed an amended complaint, seeking to have the district court order
an immediate release of his son from the custody of the New Jersey
Division of Youth and Family Services. He also sought damages in
the amount of three million dollars and a temporary injunction
preventing New Jersey from going foraward with a state superior
court action. He also filed a separate Motion for Injunctive Relief.
In the response to Bellesfield’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, the
district court ordered him to show cause why the district court
should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction. The district court
concluded that in deference to New Jersey’s child welfare and
judicial systems it could not take any action which would interfere
with the child custody proceedings that are still pending in the
Superior Court of New Jersey and dismissed the complaint without
prejudice. this appeal followed.
We agree with the district court that, irthe long line of
abstention doctrine decisions beginning with Younger v. Harris, the
Supreme Court has enunciated a strong public policy against
interference with ongoing state judicial proceedings even when a
constitutional violation is alleged. Although Younger involved state
court criminal proceedings, the Court has extended the doctrine to
the civil context, including administrative proceedings. See Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S.
619 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Williams v. Redbank Bd. of Educ.,
662 F. 2d. 1008 (3d. Cir. 1981).
In Middlesex, the Court set forth a three-part test to determine
whether the , the Court set forth a three-part test to determine
whether the Younger abstention doctrine should be applied in a
particular case: (1) there must exist an ongoing state proceeding
which is judicial in nature; (2) the state proceeding should implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state proceeding must afford an
adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional challenges.
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
The district court engaged in a detailed analysis of this test and
concluded that the abstention doctrine should apply. Moreover, the
district curt also addressed the possibility of exceptions to the
doctrine, which should be made only on a “showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for
equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
II.
We do not deem it necessary to repeat the details of the district
court’s extensive analysis of the Younger abstention doctrine as
applied to this case, set forth in the district court’s 25-page opinion.
We are satisfied with the court’s reasoning.
The first prong of the test was established because there was a
pending state judicial proceeding. Bellesfield admits that this
ee a eT
“Complaint does seek the intervention of the Federal Court during
the course of state proceedings...., contrary to docirines of
federalism and abstention.” App. 1- App. 20. The pending state
action involves custody of Eric Bellesfield and the same set of
operative facts that apply here.
The second prong was also met. The important state issue still
being litigated focuses on child welfare. Questions of family
relations, including custody of children, have historically been an
area of state, not federal, concern. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
435 (1979).
the third prong requires an inquiry as to whether the state
proceeding affords an opportunity to raise any constitutional
challenges. Bellesfield had the opportunity to raise any
constitutional issues in the state court proceedings.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in
applying the Younger abstention doctrine and dismissing the
complaint without prejudice. We have considered all arguments
advanced by the parties and have concluded that no further
discussion is necessary. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court will be affirmed.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
A «
yj
DATED: FEB 6 1998 ° Wf Ma a ”
rat Judge
February 6, 1998
United States District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
To: Mr. Michael Bellesfield
Robert D. Kretzer, Esq.
Paul G. Witko, Esq.
Joanne Butler, Esq.
Benjamin E. Fleischner, Esq.
M. Diana Johnston, Esq.
Saju C. Mathew, Esq.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
This Court’s Opinion was filed and Judgment entered pursuant
to Rule 36, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, today in case.
No. 97-5467. A copy of the opinion and judgment are enclosed
herewith. Also enclosed is copy of Order filed today.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
(FRAP 40 and Third Circuit LAR 35 and IOP Chapter 9)
Rehearing by the Court in banc pursuant to Rule 40, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, is not favored. Third Circuit LAR
35.4. In regard to when rehearing by the court in banc might be
granted, your attention is specifically directed to Third Circuit IOP
Chapter 9:
IOP 9.3 Criteria for Rehearing in Banc.
1OP 9.3.1 This court strictly follows the precept of Rule 35(b),
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, that rehearing in
banc is not favored and will not be ordered unless
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or
maintain uniformity of its decision or the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance.
IOP 9.3.2 This court does not ordinarily grant rehearing in
banc when the panel’s statement of the law is correct
and the controverted issue is solely the application of
the law to the circumstances of the case.
IOP 9.3.3 Rehearing the banc is ordinarily not granted when
the only issue presented is one of state law.
Nor, except in rare cases, has the court granted rehearing in
banc where the case was decided by a judgment order, a
memorandum opinion, or unpublished per curiam opinion.
IOP 9.5 Rehearing In Banc on Petition by Party.
IOP 9.5.1 It is presumed that a petition for rehearing before the
panel or suggestion for in banc rehearing filed by a
party as provided by Rule 35(b) or 40(a), Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, requests both panel
rehearing and rehearing in banc, unless the petition for
panel rehearing under Rule 40(a) states explicitly that it
does not request in banc rehearing under Rule 35(b).
Statement Where the party petitioning for rehearing in banc is
of Counsel represented by counsel, pursuant to Third Circuit LAR
35.1 the petition shall contain, so far as is pertinent, the
following statement of counsel:
“I express a belief, based on a reasoned and
studied professional judgment, that the panel decision
is contrary to decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court
of the United States, and that consideration by the
full court is necessary to secure and maintain
uniformity of decisions in this Court, to-wit, the
panel’s decision is contrary to the decision of this
Court or the Supreme Court in [citing specifically the
case or cases],
Or, that this appeal involves a question of
exceptional importance, to-wit [set forth in one
sentence].”
The filing of petitions for rehearing or rehearing in banc
is not favored. Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Third Circuit LAR 35.4. Counsel is
- reminded that a duty is owed to the Court
commensurate with that owed to their clients not to file
petitions for rehearing in banc which do not meet the
rigorous requirements of Rule 35, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Third Circuit LAR 35.1.
Attach- Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 32.3(b) and 35.2
ments attached to each petition for rehearing must be a copy
of the judgment, order or decision of the Court as to
which rehearing is sought and any memorandum or
opinion of the court stating the reasons therefor.
Filing A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days
Time of the date of the Court’s judgment or final decision
was entered on the docket unless the appeal is a civil
case in which the United States is a part. Rule 40(a),
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In a civil case
in which the United States is a party, any petition for
rehearing must be filed within 45 days of entry of the
Court’s final judgment or decision. Id. These filing
deadlines are calculated from the date of this
notice. No extension will be granted save for the
most compelling reasons. The petition must be
received in the Clerk’s office within the time
permitted for filing a petition. A petition is filed as of
the date of receipt and not of mailing.
Pursuant to Rule 35(c), Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, any request for rehearing by the Court in
banc must be filed at the same time that a petition for
panel rehearing is filed. Neither the Court’s rules not
its Internal Operating Procedures allow a process in
which a subsequent request for rehearing in banc is
filed after a petition for panel rehearing has been
denied.
10
Form,
Answer
Number
of
Copies
Filing
Time
Form
The 15-page limit allowed by the Rule shall be
Strictly
observed. This page limit will also be applied to any
answer that the Court may request be filed.
A petition for rehearing, and any answer thereto,
must comply with the requirements of Rule 32(a),
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Third
Circuit LAR 32.1 as to form, typeface, spacing,
footnotes, etc. Colored covers are not required.
The petition shall state with particularity the points of
law or fact which in the opinion of the petitioner the
court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall
contain such argument in support of the petition as
the petitioner desires to present. No answer to a
petition for rehearing will be received unless
requested by the court. Rule 40(a), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Oral argument in support of
the petition will not be permitted.
An original and 15 copies of a petition for rehearing
before the Court in banc is required.
An original and 3 copies of a petition for rehearing
before the original panel is required.
Bill of Costs (FRAP 39 and Third Circuit LAR 39)
A party to who costs are allowed, who desires
taxation
of costs, shall file a bill of costs within 14 days after
judgment. The bill of costs must be received in the
Clerk’s office within the 14 day period.
Counsel desiring to have costs taxed against the
unsuccessful party under Rule 39, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, must include either and
itemized statement from a printer or an affidavit of
counsel, as required by the clerk’s bill of costs form.
Third Circuit LAR 39.4. Proof of service of the bill
must be attached.
Taxation of Costs (Third Circuit LAR 39.3)
Taxation The cost of printing or otherwise reproducing
necessary
of Costs copies of briefs and appendices shall be taxable
according the Third Circuit LAR 39.3. That rule
establishes specific amounts which will be allowed as
costs.
Certificate of Service for Institutional or Incarcerated Litigant
Certification In addition to including a certificate of service, all
of litigants who are currently institutionalized or
Service incarcerated would include the following statement on
all documents to be filed with this Court:
I certify that this document was given to prison
officials on [date] for forwarding to the Court of
Appeals. I certify under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec.
1746.
Mandate (FRAP 41(a) )
Issuance The mandate is issued 7 days after the time for
Time filing a petition for rehearing has expired. Rule
41(a). Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In
most cases (in the absence of the filing of a
petition for rehearing) the mandate will issue 21
days after entry of the Court’s final judgment or
decision. However, where the United States is a
party in a civil case and in the absence of a
timely filed petition for rehearing, the mandate
12
Motion to
Stay
Mandate
Enclosure
Rev. 1/95
will issue 52 days after entry of the Court’s final
judgment or decision. Id.
The filing of a motion to stay issuance of the
the mandate is not a prerequisite for filing a
petition for writ of certiorari. Such a motion is to
be filed only where issuance of the mandate will
have a substantive effect. Third Circuit IOP
Chapter 10.8.2. If issuance of the mandate will
have a substantive effect, a motion to stay the
mandate shall be filed promptly.
P. DOUGLAS SISK, Clerk
By: Carolyn Hicks
Case Manager
Direct Dial 215-597-3143
13
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 97-5467
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD; ERIC BELLESFIELD,
a minor
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
PETER ALVINO, individually and in official capacity; NEW
JERSEY DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, WILLIAM
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official capacity only; DIVISION
OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES VALENTINE.
DAVID JOHNSTON, individually and in official capacities;
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM: MORRISTOWN
FORENSIC ASSOCIATES, MICHAEL SHEA, MICHAEL
FIORE, individually and in official capacities; MORRIS COUNTY
PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, JOEL HARRIS, individually
and in official capacity, RANDOLPH TWP. SCHOOL SYSTEM,
CARMINE GASTO, NORMA MIELE, SUSAN HERSCHMAN,
ERIC HERSCHMAN, individually and in official capacities;
MORRIS HILLS SCHOOL SYSTEM, BRADLEY, MR..,
STORM, MR.., individually and in official capacities; CHILD
PLACEMENT REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE WARREN,
individually and in official capacity. -
14
a
Michael Bellesfield,
Appellant.
ORDER
The motion of stay for mandate is denied.
/f W a /
SS“ My MeY
Circuit Judge
cmh/cc: MB
15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD, ERIC )
BELLESFIELD, a minor, ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 97-1181 (AJL)
Plaintiffs, )
) ORDER
v. )
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF _)
NEW JERSEY, PETER VERNIERO, )
in official capacity only, PETER )
ALVINO, individually and in official )
capacity, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF )
HUMAN SERVICES WILLIAM )
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official )
capacity only, DIVISION OF YOUTH _)
AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES )
VALENTINE, DAVID JOHNSTON, )
individually and in official capacities )
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM, _)
MORRISTOWN FORENSIC )
ASSOCIATES MICHAEL SHEA, )
MICHAEL FIORE, individually and )
in official capacities, MORRIS COUNTY )
PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, JOEL )
HARRIS, individually and in official )
capacity, RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP )
SCHOOL SYSTEM, CARMINE )
GAITO, NORMA MIELE, SUSAN )
AND ERIC HERSCHMAN, individually )
and in official capacities, MORRIS HILLS)
SCHOOL SYSTEM, MR. BRADLEY, )
MR. STORM, individually and in )
official capacities, CHILD PLACEMENT )
REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE )
WARREN, individually and in official )
capacity, )
Defendants. )
16
a a aca caatt
This matter having come before the court upon an order to
show cause, filed 23 April 1997 (the “Order to Show Cause”), and
the parties having responded to the Order to Show Cause, and for
the reasons set forth in a Letter-Opinion, filed on this date,
IT IS, on this 26th day of June, 1997
ORDERED, that this court will abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over the instant case, and it is further
ORDERED, that the instant matter case be and hereby is
dismissed without prejudice.
a fan die
s/ “ W/, ty Vy ag
Ww
ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR. U.S.D.J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
26 JUNE 1997
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
LETTER-OPINION
ORIGINAL FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Michael Bellesfield
P.O. Box 112
Plainsboro, New Jersey 08536
(Pro se plaintiff)
Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
CN-112
Trenton, New Jersey 8625
(Counsel for defendants Attorney General of the State of New
Jersey, Peter Alvino, Department of Youth and Family Services,
New Jersey Department of Human Services and Family Enrichment
Program, Morristown Forensic Associates)
Joanne Butler, Esq.
Schenck, Price, Smith & King. LLP
10 Washington Street ~
P.O. Box 905
Morristown, New Jersey 07963-0905
(Co-Counsel for defendant Morris Hills School System)
Paul G. Witko, Esq.
~ Purcell, Ries, Shannon, Mulcahy & O’Neil
One Pluckemin Way
Crossroads Business Center
P.O. Box 754
Bedminister, New Jersey 07921
18
(Co-Counsel for defendant Morris Hills School System)
Robert D. Kretzer, Esq.
Lamb, Hartung, Kretzer, Reinman & DePascale
601 Pavonia Avenue
Jersey City, New Jersey 07306-2989
(Counsel for defendant Randolph School System)
RE: Michael Beilesfield, Eric Bellesfield v. Attorney
General of the State of New Jersey, et al.
Civil Action No. 97-1181 (AJL)
Mr. Bellesfield and Counsel:
Pro se plaintiff Michael Bellesfield (“Michaei Bellesfield”) has
brought the instant action on behalf of himself and his son Eric
Bellesfield (“Eric Bellesfield”), a minor (collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”)' against Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
Peter Verniero, in his official capacity only (the “Attorney
General”), Peter Alvino, individually and in his official capacity
(“Alvino”), New Jersey Department of Human Services< William
Waldman, Director, in his official capacity only (“Human
Services”), Division of Youth and Family Services, James
Valentine, David Johnston, individually and in their official
capacities (“DYFS”), Family Enrichment Program, Morristown
Forensic Associates, Michael Shea, Michael Fiore, individually and
in their official capacities (“Family Enrichment”), Randolph
Township School System, Carmine Gasto, Norma Miele, Susan and
Eric Herschman, individually and in their official capacities
(“Randolph School System”), Morris Hills School System, Mr.
Bradley, Mr. Storm, individually and in their official capacities
(“Morris School System”) and Child Placement Review Board,
Suzanne Warren, individually and in her official capacity (“Child
Michael Bellesfield may not act as legal counsel on behalf of his Eric
Bellesfield. See Amended Complaint, £2 1. A parent who is not an attorney
“must be represented by legal counsel in bring an action on behalf of his or her
minor children.” Osei-Afrive v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876,
878 (3d Cir. 1991).
Placement”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Jurisdiction is alleged
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, Amended Complaint, £2 1, and
appears proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
Currently pending is an order to show cause (the “Order to
Show Cause”) why this court should not abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over the instant case.* For the reasons set forth below,
this court will abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.
I. Background
A. State Court Action
On 8 January 1994, Eric Bellesfield reported to DYFS that
Michael Bellesfield had dragged him from a convenience store and
struck him across the chest. See DYFS v. Bellesfield, No. FN-14-
33-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. 22 August 1995) (the “22 August 1195
Decision”), attached as Exhibit A to the New Jersey Response;
Amended Complaint, &3 10. At that time, Michael Bellesfield
signed a voluntary placement agreement (the “Placement
Agreement”) placing Eric Bellesfield in DYFS custody. See 22
August 1995 Decision at 2. Michael Bellesfield later revoked the
Placement Agreement. See id.
On 14 January 1994, DYFS initiated an action (the “Superior
Court Action”) for an order placing Eric Bellesfield in its protective
custody. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 1,2. DYFS alleged
Michael Bellesfield had abused Eric Bellesfield, as defined by
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).? See id.
: Michael Bellesfield submitted: amended complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”); Letter Brief in Response to 23 April 1997 Order to Show Cause
(the “Bellesfield Response”).
The Attorney General, on behalf of the Attorney General, DYFS,
Alvino, Human Services and Family Enrichment submitted: letter of Sanju C.
Mathew, dated 29 May 1997 (the “New Jersey Response”).
Morris Hills School System submitted: letter of Paul G. Witko, dated
27 May 1997; letter of Joanne L. Butler, dated 15 May 1997.
Randolph School System submitted: letter of Robert D. Kretzer, dated
17 May 1997.
r N.J.S.A. 96-8.21(c), in pertinent part, provides:
20
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At the time the Superior Court Action was commenced, DYFS
had been required to intervene four times to protect Eric Bellesfield.
See 22 August 1995 Decision at 1-2. The first intervention
occurred in February 1987 when DYFS investigated reports that
Michael Bellesfield left Eric Bellesfield, who was a young boy at
that time, unsupervised. See Amended Complaint, 3 9. DYFS
intervention ceased once Michael Bellesfield obtained a baby-sitter.
See id. The second intervention occurred in March 1992 when Eric
Bellesfield ran away from home and reported Michael Bellesfield
had hit him several times. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 1-2. At
that time, DYFS determined not to seek protective custody of Eric
Bellesfield, but recommended that Michael and Eric Bellesfield seek
therapy. See id.
On 10 April 1992, Eric Bellesfield again reported being hit by
Michael Bellesfield. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 2. The
DYFS case worker assigned to the case observed that Michael
Bellesfield was hostile and angry. See id. DYFS, however, again
did not seek protective custody of Eric Bellesfield. See id. In May
1992, Michael Bellesfield voluntarily entered a hospital for
psychiatric treatment. See id. In June 1992, a psychiatrist
examined Eric Bellesfield and concluded he needed both “‘active
sponsorship and an endorsement in a therapeutic relationship.’” See
id.
On 16 August 1993, Eric Bellesfield reported being hit by
Michael Bellesfield to the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 2. At that time, Michael
Bellesfield refused therapy and also refused to accept a counseling
referral for Eric Bellesfield. See id.
a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or
is in imminent dange of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his
parent or guardian ... to exercise a minimum degree of care ... in providing
the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably
inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm or substantial risk thereof,
including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other
acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the Court.
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).
21
After DYFS commenced the Superior Court Action and Eric
Bellesfield was taken into protective custody, contact between
Michael Bellesfield and Eric Bellesfield was limited to supervised
church and counseling visits arranged through DYFS. See 22
August 1995 Decision at 2. Michael Bellesfield was ordered to
obtain psychological evaluations, provide past psychological
information and provide information about other family members.
See id.
In July 1994, Michael Bellesfield sought an immediate change
of custody alleging the foster parents caring for Eric Bellesfield had
physically disciplined him. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 2.
Michael Bellesfield sued the foster family and improperly attempted
communication with them. See id.
The failure of Michael Bellesfield to comply with rules
regarding church and counseling visitations led to restrictions on
such access. See 22 August 1995 Decision at 2. One event leading
to this restriction was when Michael Bellesfield handed a note to
Eric Bellesfield during a church service. See id. The note instructed
Eric Bellesfield to copy a letter prepared by Michael Bellesfield
which stated Eric Bellesfield had lied and that the foster parents had
hit him.* See id.
* — The note Michael Bellesfield passed to his son read:
THEY ARE TRYING TO RUIN THE YOU MUST WRITE
THE FOLLOWING RIGHT HERE - RIGHT NOW (I WILL
SHOW ONLY TO THE JUDGE)
DEAR DAD -
PLEASE DON’T TELL ANYONE I WROTE TO YOU. THEY
WILL HURT ME IF THEY FIND OUT ____ MADE ME FILL
OUT AN APPLICATION FOR RANDOLPH HIGH SCHOOL
BECAUSE THEY FOUND OUT I WANT TO GO TO
CATHOLIC SCHOOL. I HATE RANDOLPH. PLEASE DO
WHATEVER YOU HAVE TO SO I CAN COME HOME OR SO
1 CAN GO WITH . THEY WILL HIT ME AGAIN IF
YOU TELL THEM I WROTE. JUST PLEASE HELP ME
22
On 18 July 1995 and 19 July 1995, a trial was conducted by the
New Jersey Superior Court (the “Superior Court”). See 22 August
1995 Decision at 1; Amended Complaint, & 11. The Superior
Court interviewed Eric Bellesfield on 4 August 1995 and later filed
the 22 August 1995 Decision determining Eric Bellesfield had been
abused, as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) 22 August 1995
Decision at 5. Citing the psychological evaluations indicating
Michael Bellesfield suffers from “a predominantly paranoid and
passive-aggressive character disorder,” the court held Michael
Bellesfield posed a high risk to abuse Eric Bellesfield. Id. at 4-5.
Since 22 August 1995, a number of dispositional orders have
been entered by the Superior Court ordering that Eric Bellesfield
remain in DYFS protective custody and directing Michael
Bellesfield to enter into therapy. See New Jersey Response, Exh. B.
On 16 April 1997, venue in the Superior Court Action was
transferred from Morris County to Middlesex County because
Michael Bellesfield had recently moved to Middlesex County. See
16 April 1997 Superior Court Order (the “16 April 1997 Order”),
attached as Exhibit C to the New Jersey Response. It also appears
a Status review hearing was scheduled for 29 May 1997 in the
Middlesex Superior Court. See New Jersey Response at 6. The
Superior Court Action remains pending.
B. Procedural History
On 11 March 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed the complaint (the
“Complaint”) in the instant action. The paragraphs of the
Complaint were not numbered, the Complaint totaled thirty-nine
pages of legal and factual argument and included an appendix of
more than one hundred pages. The Complaint purported to be a
COME HOME. ILL NEVER LIE AGAIN. I LOVE YOU.
YOUR SON
IF YOU DON’T WRITE THIS WILL BE THE LAST TIME WE
SEE EACH OTHER. WE NEED THIS AS A WEAPON. IS
WILL BE CAREFUL WITH IT. KEEP SECRET!
22 August 1995 Decision at 3.
combination habeas corpus petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and a
Civil Rights complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint at 1.
On 18 March 1997, an order (the “18 March 1997 Order”) was
filed. The 18 March 1997 Order indicated several deficiencies of
the Complaint, including that the Complaint did not comply with
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), did not state a cause of action for habeas corpus
relief and “seeks to interrupt ongoing State Judicial proceedings.”
Id. Michael Bellesfield was given leave to file an amended pleading
that corrected the noted deficiencies. Id.
On 18 March 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed an emergent order
to show cause (the “Bellesfield Order to Show Cause”) seeking a
Federal court injunction to prevent a summary hearing scheduled to
be held in the Superior Court regarding the parental rights of
Michael Bellesfield. See Certification of Michael Bellesfield in
support to the Bellesfield Order to Show Cause, dated 17 March
1997. On 26 March 1997 Order denied the relief sought by the
Bellesfield Order to Show Cause because Michael Bellesfield had
not yet complied with the 18 March 1997 Order. See 26 March
1997 Order. The Bellesfield Order to Show Cause was also
dismissed because the “summary hearing” Michael Bellesfield
sought to enjoin could be adjourned at the request of Michael
Bellesfield and, accordingly, an injunction was not necessary. Id.
Cn 26 March 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed the Amended
Complaint seeking immediate release of Eric Bellesfield from foster
care, damages in the amount of $3,000,000 and a temporary
injunction preventing New Jersey from continuing the Superior
Court Action. Amended Complaint, (GQ 2, 25, 31, 66. On 23
April 1997, Michael Bellesfield filed a motion for injunctive relief
(the “Motion”). Also on 23 April 1997, the Order to Show Cause
was filed. The Order to Show Cause denied the relief sought in the
Motion because Bellesfield failed to provide proof the Motion has
been served upon Defendants and because it was filed prior to
service of the Amended Complaint. See Order to Show Cause.
Accordingly, the Motion appeared to be an improper ex parte
communication.
24
aA Acct, natin Bland tls Wed 8A. hom Ng a Pe No eines eee tr tek wiht
The Order to Show Cause observed “that to grant the relief
sought would disrupt the integrity of the State judicial proceedings
and “would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as a
sovereign.”” Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369, (1989) ). Accordingly,
Michael Bellesfield was ordered to show cause why this court
should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Id.
Di ;
A. Standard of Review
Pro se submissions “must be held to ‘less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) (quoting
Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ); see also Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (holding pro se petitioner should be able
to present evidence on his Section 1983 claims unless the Conley v.
Gibson “appears beyond doubt” standard satisfies court claim
cannot be proved), reh’g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); McDowell v.
Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding pro se
petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by
i Gen. of United States, 878 F.2d 714,
722 (3d Cir. 1989).
B. Abstention
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), the Supreme
Court developed an abstention doctrine (the “Younger Abstention
Doctrine”) preventing Federal courts from interfering with pending
State court proceedings, even when there is an allegation of a
constitutional violation. Id. Although Younger addressed
abstention in the context of enjoining pending state criminal
prosecutions, the Supreme Court later extended the Younger
Abstention Doctrine to include state civil proceedings, in which
important state interests are implicated and where the Federal
claimant has an opportunity to raise his or her constitutional claims
in the state forum. See New Orleans Pub. Serv.. Inc., 491 U.S. at
368; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, reh’g denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); see
also Pennzoil Co. V. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1987); Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S.
619, 627-29 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 423 (1979); FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996); Marks v. Stinson,
19 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1993).
Abstention by Federal courts developed “out of deference to the
paramount interests of another state sovereign, ... the concern is
with principles of comity and Federalism.” Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins.Co., U.S. , 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1724 (1996)
(citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 45); see also Freehold
Cogeneration Assocs. v. Board of Regulatory Comm’rs, 44 F.3d
1178, 1187 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, U.S. , 116
S.Ct. 68 (1995). “For Younger purposes, the State’s trials and
appeals process is treated as a unitary system, and for a [F[ederal
court to disrupt its integrity by intervening in mid-process would
demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign.” New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 369.
The Court in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. articulated a
three-part test to determine whether the Younger Abstention
Doctrine should be applied in a particular case. 457 U.S. at 432.
Under this three-part test: (1) there must be a pending or ongoing
state proceeding which is judicial in nature, (2) the state
proceedings must implicate important state interests and (3) the
state proceeding must afford the plaintiff an opportunity to raise
any constitutional issues. see id.; FOCUS V. Allegheny County.
Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 843 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Port
Auth. PBA v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 973 F.2d
169, 173 (3d Cir. 1992) ); Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d
645, 655 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Marks, 19 F.3d at 882);
O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1994)
(citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432; Olde
Discount Corp. v. Tupman, | F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir.1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1065 (1994) ), cert. denied, US. ,115
26
Ce ee eT eT ome
S.Ct. 1355 (1995); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Franke
20 F.3d 1250, 1264 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885
F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v.
Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1992);
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm’n, 791 F.2d 1111, 116 (3d Cir. 1986).
If these three criteria are met, a Federal court should abstain
from hearing the matter unless there has been a “showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any unusual circumstances that would call for
equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 37; Olde Discount, 1 F.3d
at 213 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983) );
Schall, 885 F.2d at 106.
1. Ongoing State Proceedings
The Circuit has held when there is an ongoing proceeding in
state court which concerns the “very same parties and the very same
issues as the present [F]ederal suit, the first requirement for
Younger abstention - ongoing state proceedings of a judicial nature
- is satisfied{.]” Port Auth. PBA, 973 F.2d at 173.
As indicated in both the Amended Complaint and the exhibits
attached to the New Jersey Response, the Superior Court Action
involves the custody of Eric Bellesfield. Amended Complaint, £2
11; New Jersey Response, Exhs. A-C. A hearing date was
scheduled in the Superior Court Action as recently as 29 May 1997
and the case is ongoing. See New Jersey Response at 6. The
arguinent by Michael Bellesfield that the case is not ongoing
because of the change in venue, see Bellesfield Response at 3, is
without merit. The Superior Court Action was moved from Morris
County to Middlesex County because of the change of residence of
Michael Bellesfield; the move did not affect the ongoing nature of
the Superior Court Action. See 16 April 1997 Order.
The instant action has the same operative facts of the Superior
Court Action. The parental rights of Michael Bellesfield and the
custody of Eric Bellesfield are the core issues in both actions. See
Amended Complaint, £2 2. Accordingly, there is an ongoing state
27
proceeding which is based upon the same set of operative facts as
the instant action and the first requirement for Younger abstention is
met.
2. Important State Interests
To grant the relief desired would require this curt to interfere
with the State of New Jersey’s interest in family welfare. The
Circuit has stated “abstention reflects “a strong [Federal policy
against [F]ederal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Gwynedd
Properties, 970 F.2d at 1200 (quoting Middlesex County, 457 U.S.
at 431). The Circuit explained: “[T]he Supreme Court’s holding
in, 457 U.S. at 431). The Circuit explained: “[T]he Supreme
Court’s holding in Younger rested primarily on considerations of
‘comity,’ a concept which encompasses ‘a proper respect for state
functions.’” O’Neil, 32 F.3d at 791 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at
44). Abstention principles are applicable in civil actions “if the
State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of
[Federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the
States and the National Government.” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at
11; see also Schall, F.2d at 107.
The Supreme Court has explained:
— [W]hen we inquire into the substantiality of the
State’s interest in its proceedings we do not
look narrowly to its interest in the outcome of
the particular case — which could arguably be
offset by a substantial [F]ederal interest in the
opposite outcome. Rather what we look to is
the importance of the generic proceedings to
the state.
New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 365 (emphasis in the
original). The Supreme Court and the Circuit have applied this
reasoning in numerous contexts in determining that a particular
state interest was important enough to meet the second requirement
for Younger abstention. See, e.g., Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604
(holding that states have a substantial interest in enforcing a
28
ia ich SE Rel oR eRe Help a Pal, Didar Ah
OA APA yh Da
A TSN ele aa a be tte
CE I, ENE SS TLL TEP A id iy BONE DL PLAS TNS hcl eH
OE ST eS OO as IL Wt Set hg
nuisance statute which was closely related to a criminal
proceeding); see also, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at
365 (holding Louisiana has a substantial interest in regulating
intrastate retail rates); Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. at
628 (holding that the elimination of sex discrimination is an
important enough state interest to justify Younger abstention);
Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 434 (holding New
Jersey’s interest in maintaining and assuring the conduct of licensed
attorneys is an important state interest); Moore, 442 U.S. at 435
(holding family relations are a traditional area of state concern);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (holding
maintenance of the fiscal integrity of a public assistance program
satisfies the Younger state interest requirement); Juidice, 430 U.S.
at 335 (holding a state has an important interest in its contempt
process); O’Neill, 32 F.3d at 792 (holding a city has a significant
and substantial interest in the regulation of on-street parking and the
system implemented to adjudicate parking violations); Olde
Discount, 1 F.3d at 212 (holding a state has an interest in regulating
securities transactions); Port Auth. PBA, 973 F.2d at 174 (holding
state has an interest in enforcing its orders sufficient to satisfy
Younger abstention); Schall, 885 F.2d at 111 (holding state has an
interest in administering its judgment procedures).
Child welfare is a traditional state function. See Moore, 442
U.S. at 435. “Family relations are a traditional area of state
concern .... We are unwilling to conclude that state processes are
unequal to the task of accommodating various interests and deciding
the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare
litigation.” Id. Accordingly, the State of New Jersey has an
important interest in the instant matter.
Abstention in the instant case also protects the state interest in
maintaining the integrity of the state court system. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 369. Both comity and state court integrity
rest upon the importance of the states being able to enforce the
orders and judgments of their courts. Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 13;
Juidice, 430 U.S. at 334-35. "Pennzoil held that even if the state
court proceeding was between two private parties, the state’s
interest in ensuring that its orders and judgments not be rendered
nugatory was sufficient to require Younger test. See M 442
U.S. at 431.
In the instant matter, Michael Bellesfield seeks an order voiding
the custody decision of the Superior Court. Amended Complaint,
£4) 2. Such an order, however, would preempt the extensive fact
finding conducted over a three year period by the Superior Court
regarding the custody of Eric Bellesfield and other family-related
issues. Accordingly, because this case implicates two important
state interests, family welfare and integrity of the state court
system, the second prong of the 2. Such an order, however, would
preempt the extensive fact finding conducted over a three year
period by the Superior Court regarding the custody of Eric
Bellesfield and other family-related issues. Accordingly, because
this case implicates two important state interests, family welfare
and integrity of the state court system, the second prong of the
Younger abstention test is met.
3. The Ability to Litigate Constitutional Claims in State Court
If a plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his or her
Federal claims in state court, the third requirement for Ifa
plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to raise his or her Federal
claims in state court, the third requirement for Younger abstention
is met. Port Auth. PBA, 973 F.2d at 173 (explaining the third
requirement had been satisfied where “[n]o ‘state procedural law’ or
impediment of similar magnitude prevented, or now prevents, the
[plaintiffs] from raising their constitutional concerns in the state
courts.”); see also Juidice, 430 U.S. at 337 (“[I]t is abundantly
clear that appellees had an opportunity to present their [F Jederal
claims in the state proceedings. No more is required to invoke
Younger abstention.”); Olde Discount, 1 F.3d at 212 (stating it is
sufficient that plaintiff could bring constitutional claims in appeal
of administrative proceedings to court of chancery). Plaintiffs,
moreover, have the burden of showing that a state procedural bar
prevents them from presenting their Federal claims. Schall, 885
F.2d at 107.
Michael Bellesfield has not shown that New Jersey law
provided a procedural bar to his constitutional claims in the
Superior Court Action. It appears Michael Bellesfield could have
challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) in the
Superior Court Action or on appeal. See New Jersey Response at
10. It also appears Michael Bellesfield could have appealed the 22
August 1995 Decision to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court and challenged the custody of Eric Bellesfield in
that venue. See id. While it appears Michael Bellesfield is now
time-barred from raising his constitutional challenges to the 22
August 1995 Superior Court Decision, he did have an adequate
opportunity to raise these issues within the ongoing Superior Court
Action. Accordingly, the third requirement for Younger abstention
3 has been met in this case.
4. Bad Faith and Extraordinary Circumstances
Even if the three Middlesex requirements are met, Younger
abstention “is inappropriate where the state court proceedings are
{ being undertaken in bad faith to harass the [F Jederal plaintiffs.”
; Port Auth. PBA, 973 F.2d at 176. Abstention is also improper
under extraordinary circumstances, “such as where a challenged
5 statue is ‘flagrantly violative of express constitutional prohibitions
i in every clause, sentence and paragraph’ and [F Jederal abstention
would cause ‘irreparable injury.” Id. (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at
53). These exceptions are rarely applicable. See Kessler Inst. for
Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Essex Fells, 876
F.Supp. 641, 659 (D.N.J. 1995). These exceptions also require
more than conclusory allegations. See Vincenti v. Hymerling,
No.CIV.97-0411, 1997 WL 235126, at *7 (D.N.J. 6 May 1997)
(holding plaintiff did not defeat Younger abstention by alleging he
was “targeted” by the attorney disciplinary authorities).
: Michael Bellesfield alleges the Superior Court Action is part of
: “a ten year campaign of harassment...by the State agencies.”
: Bellesfield Brief at 3. To support his position, Michael Bellesfield
cites Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) where the
Supreme Court allowed intervention by the Federal court into state
court criminal proceedings. The Dombrowski Court, however,
31
recognized: “It is generally to be assumed that State courts and
prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by
this Court.” Id. at 484.
In Dombrowski, the appellants argued “the threats to enforce
the statutes against appellants are not made with any expectation of
securing valid convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ
arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the
statutes to harass appellants and discourage them and their
supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the
constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana.” Id. at 482.
Dombrowski concerned the 1960’s civil rights movement in the
south and is, therefore, factually distinct from the instant case.
Accordingly, the facts presented by Michael Bellesfield distinguish
his case from Dombrowski. In addition, the Younger Court later
held “the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having
upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly
the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal
prosecutions.” 401 U.S. at 53.
Michael Bellesfield, in support of his contention of bad faith,
provides only conclusory allegations and vague references to a
conspiracy involving the Attorney General, DYFS, various schools,
and the Public Defender. Michael Bellesfield has merely offered
conclusory allegations and has made no showing of band faith
which would require intervention by this court. See Vincenti, 1997
WL 235126, at *7.
The 22 August 1995 Decision, moreover, details the evidence
warranting the action taken by DYFS. There were four previous
reports of abuse, findings that Michael Bellesfield suffers from
psychological disorders and evidence Michael Bellesfield used his
visits to attempt to manipulate Eric Bellesfield. See id.
Accordingly, the bad faith exception of the Younger doctrine does
not apply in this case.
Michael Bellesfield alleges the statute violates the Constitution
because the lower court used the incorrect standard of review.
Bellesfield Response at 5 (citing Santofsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
32
© pee tihe bee TIA Sei SR ete om
ODay Fae
745 (1982) (holding New York child abuse statute
unconstitutional)). Michael Bellesfield’s argument is without merit
and his reliance on Santofsky is misplaced because the plaintiffs
who challenged the New York statute raise the constitutional issues
at the trial level, as well as at the appellate level. Id. at 751-52.
The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional only after
complete appellate adjudication in the New York state courts. Id.
In the instant case, Michael Bellesfield has not demonstrated
N.J.S.A. 9.6-8.21(c) is “flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph’ and [that Federal abstention would cause ‘irreparable
injury.”” Port. Auth. PBA, 973 F.2d at 176 (quoting Younger, 401
U.S. at 53). Accordingly, Michael Bellesfield’s challenge of the
statute does not justify the intervention of this court. The
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 9.6-8.21(c) could have been tested in
the Superior Court Action.
Michael Bellesfield also argues there is the threat of irreparable
harm because Eric Bellesfield may become emancipated prior to the
conclusion of the state court proceedings. This concern does not
justify the intervention of this court into the ongoing Superior Court
Action.
The Circuit has observed: “In most-- indeed, nearly all—
circumstances in which the elements of Younger abstention are
present, Younger counsels that such a delay is an appropriate price
to pay for the preservation of comity between the [F]ederal
government and the states.” Olde Discount, 1 F.3d at 214. It
appears if Michael Bellesfield complies with orders of the Superior
Court, the custody issue could be resolved in a year. New Jersey
Response at 6. Likewise, had Michael Bellesfield complied with the
numerous dispositional orders entered since the 22 August 1995
Superior Court Order, it is possible the custody issue may have
been resolved sooner. Accordingly, it does not appear there is
irreparable harm in the instant matter which would be resolved by
Federal court action.
33
(a
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court will abstain from the
exercise of jurisdiction over the instant matter. An order
accompanies this opinion.
“~ fy f
6f* £6 bred 2) Pee ”
ALFREDJ. LECHNER, JR., U.S.D.J.
Y
34
EES Relat
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHAEL BELLESFIELD, ERIC
BELLESFIELD, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PETER VERNIERO,
in official capacity only, PETER
ALVINO, individually and in official
capacity, NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF
HUMAN SERVICES WILLIAM
WALDMAN, DIRECTOR, in official
capacity only, DIVISION OF YOUTH
AND FAMILY SERVICES, JAMES
VALENTINE, DAVID JOHNSTON,
individually and in official capacities
FAMILY ENRICHMENT PROGRAM,
MORRISTOWN FORENSIC
ASSOCIATES MICHAEL SHEA,
MICHAEL FIORE, individually and
in official capacities, MORRIS COUNTY
PLUIBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, JOEL
HARRIS, individually and in official
capacity, RUDOLF TWNSP. SCHOOL
SYSTEM, CARMINE GAITO, NORMA
MIELE, SUSAN AND ERIC
HERSCHMAN, individually and in
official capacities, MORRIS HILLS
SCHOOL SYSTEM, MR. BRADLEY,
MR. STORM, individually and in
official capacities, CHILD PLACEMENT
REVIEW BOARD, SUZANNE
WARREN, individually and in official
capacity,
etl tlt tll i i a a a a a a a a eee
Defendants.
35
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 97-1181 (AJL)
ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
This matter having come before the court upon the “Motion
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief” (the “Motion”), filed on 22
April 1997, and it appearing
The instant action was commenced by the filing of the
complaint (the “Complaint”), on 11 March 1997, by pro se
plaintiff Michael Bellesfield (“Michael Bellesfield”) who has
also brought the instant action on behalf of his son Eric
Bellesfield (“Eric Bellesfield”), a minor (collectively, the
“Plaintiffs”). On 18 March 1997, an order (the “18 March
1997 Order”) was filed. The 18 March 1997, an order (the “18
March 1997 Order”) was filed. The 18 March 1997 Order
noted several deficiencies of the Complaint, including that the
Complaint did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (“Rule 8
(a)”) and that the Complaint “seeks to disrupt ongoing State
judicial proceedings.” Id. On 26 March 1996, Michael
Bellesfield filed an amended complaint (the “Amended
Complaint”).
A review of the docket reveals Michael Bellesfield has
failed to file proof that either the Complaint or the Amended
Complaint has been served upon any defendant. Accordingly, it
is impossible to determine whether the defendants have notice of
the instant action. Michael Bellesfield, moreover, has also
failed file proof the Motion has been served upon any
defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (requiring that “every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte” be served
upon every party to the action). The Motion, therefore, appears
to be an improper ex parte communication. Michael Bellesfield
is advised that future ex parte communications will not be
accepted.
Because the Motion has apparently been brought before
service of the Amended Complaint and apparently has not been
served upon defendants, it is denied.
36
° As indicated, the 18 March 1997 Order observed the
Complaint sought “to disrupt ongoing State judicial
proceedings.” Id. (citing New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). The Amended
Complaint similarly seeks to disrupt ongoing State judicial
proceedings. See Amended Complaint. It appears that to grant
the relief sought in the Amended Complaint would disrupt the
integrity of the State judicial proceedings and “would
demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as a sovereign.”
New Orleans Public Service, 491 U.S. at 369. Abstention is
appropriate where “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that
are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Schall v. Joyce,
885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982); Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Comm’n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In the instant case, all three factors appear present; accordingly,
it appears appropriate for the court to abstain from exercising
its jurisdiction.
and for good cause shown,
IT IS, on this 22nd day of April, 1997, ae
ORDERED, that the Motion is denied, and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs be and hereby are directed to show
cause, on 19 May 1997, why the court should not abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction over the instant case, and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs will forward to defendants a copy of
this Order to Show Cause, together with the Amended Complaint
within one business day of receipt of this Order to Show Cause, and
it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs shall file with this court an
appropriate brief stating their position in connection with this Order
to Show Cause, with a copy delivered each defendant, no later than
close of business 9 May 1997, and it is further
37
ORDERED, that should Plaintiffs fail to submit opposition to
this Order to show cause, as directed, this Order to Show Cause
shall be deemed unopposed and the instant case will be dismissed
and it is further 3
ORDERED, that defendants may submit briefs regarding this
Order to Show Cause and a response to Plaintiffs’ brief no later
than close of business on 16 May 1997, and it is further
ORDERED, oral argument will not be heard; the decision will
be based upon any written submissions received, as permitted
herein.
‘-“ / :
S / UAE HAY,
ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR. U.S.D.J.
38
" ee ee ee ee ay
oe «ee tt AN, OL alla, BN Shela hh, helt To ae
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Chambers of Courthouse
Catherine M. Langlois P.O. Box 900
Judge Morristown, New Jersey 07963-0900
(201) 285-6418
August 22, 1995
Jane A. Herchenroder, Esq. “Not for Publication without the
117 Lakeside Drive North Approval of the Committee
Piscataway, New Jersey 08854 on Opinions”
Joel M. Harris, Esq.
Deputy Public Defender
Office of the Public Defender
33 Market Street, 3rd floor
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Peter D. Alvino, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Law and Public Safety
Division of Law
P.O. Box 45029
Newark, New Jersey 07101
Re: DYFS v. Michael Bellesfield
Docket No. FN-14-33-94
Counsel:
This matter is before the court on the complaint for protective
services filed January 14, 1994 in the matter of Eric Bellesfield.
Trial was conducted on July 18 and 19, 1995. The court
interviewed Eric on August 4th. Counsel filed written findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
39
Findings of Fact
The complaint before the court was filed January 14, 1995. It
alleged, as did the testimony presented by the Division, that there
had been three previous reports of abuse of Eric by his father,
Michael. In 1992, the Division followed up upon Eric’s reports that
he had been hit several times by his father and that his father’s
behavior and demeanor was so menacing that Eric would crouch
and freeze. Eric had actually run away from his father at that time.
The Division spoke with Mr. Bellesfield and determined not to seek
protective services, however, there was the recommendation of
therapy for Eric and his father.
In April 1992, Eric again spoke with a division worker and
describe being hit. Mr. Lynch followed up with a discussion with
services. Mr. Bellesfield was described as angry and hostile to the
worker, the school, and Eric’s fearful responses were observed.
Indeed, Eric begged Mr. Lynch not to tell his father about his
report. In May 1992, Mr. Bellesfield voluntarily entered St. Clare’s
for psychiatric treatment. In June 1992, Dr. Goodman examined
Eric and concluded that “he needs active sponsorship and an
endorsement in a therapeutic relationship.”
In August 1993, there was a report from the Massachusetts
Department of Social Services that Eric reported being hit by his
father, his father’s overreaction to the incident and to other events in
the home. Ms. Pollak, the therapist who had worked with Eric and
his father for six months in 1993, also reported Eric’s explanation
of the event, however, just when Ms. Pollak was going to discuss
the matter, Mr. Bellesfield canceled sessions and did not accept any
referral for Eric. Ms. Pollak concluded that Eric certainly needed
counseling with his father, however, he was never returned for that
recommended therapy.
In January 1994, Eric reported that his father got very angry
over a shoveling incident, dragged him out of a convenience store,
and hit him across the chest. The Division intervened immediately
|
and Mr. Bellesfield at that time signed a voluntary placement
agreement. The voluntary placement was subsequently changed to
a court ordered placement with a foster family, with evaluations
ordered of both Eric and Mr. Bellesfield. Visitation was limited to
supervised visits through the Division. Subsequently orders
required Mr. Bellesfield to obtain psychological evaluations,
provide past psychological information, and provide information
about other family members. In July 1994, Mr. Bellesfield decided
to represent himself, and sought an immediate change in the custody
upon the report that the foster parent had physically disciplined
Eric. Mr. Bellesfield sued the foster family and attempted
communication with them. Although he was allowed to attend
religious services with Eric and see him in a supervised church and
therapeutic setting, subsequent orders had to be entered restricting
such access due to Mr. Bellesfield’s attitude and failure to comply
with restrictions. Orders were entered in late 1994 compelling Mr.
Bellesfield to comply with the restrictions on visitation and to
cooperate with the supervised therapy through FEP and Dr. Fiore.
One of the more serious events during this time was that Mr.
Bellesfield slipped a note to Eric at a church visitation. The note
read: ins
THEY ARE TRYING TO RUIN THE YOU
MUST WRITE THE FOLLOWING...RIGHT HERE -
RIGHT NOW (I WILL SHOW ONLY TO THE
JUDGE)
DEAR DAD -
PLEASE DON’T TELL ANYONE I WROTE TO YOU.
THEY WILL HURT ME IF THEY FIND OUT
MADE ME FILL OUT AN APPLICATION FOR
RANDOLPH HIGH SCHOOL BECAUSE THEY
FOUND OUT I WANT TO GO TO CATHOLIC
41
SCHOOL. I HATE RANDOLPH. PLEASE DO
WHATEVER YOU HAVE TO SO I CAN COME
HOME OR SO I CAN GO WITH . THEY
WILL HIT ME AGAIN IF YOU TELL THEM |!
WROTE. JUST PLEASE HELP ME COME HOME.
I'LL NEVER LIE AGAIN. I LOVE YOU. YOUR
SON
IF YOU DON’T WRITE THIS WILL BE THE LAST
TIME WE SEE EACH OTHER. WE NEED THIS AS
A WEAPON. I WILL BE CAREFUL WITH IT. KEEP
SECRET!
The Division has continued to recommend that Mr. Bellesfield
participate in therapy, in therapeutic visitation and meetings with
Eric, and comply with the recommendations with the goal of
reuniting Eric and his father. It contends that protective services
continue to be needed until these requirements are met.
As to Eric’s status, the Division’s testimony established that the
first foster family care was satisfactory. June 995 Eric’s home
placement was changed. He has continued in therapy with Dr.
Fiore. He will be entering high school this September. In his
interview with the court, Eric reported the January 1994 incident
where his father hit him in the chest; he has been afraid of his
father; he wants his father to participate with him in a therapeutic
setting, to continue counselling and work things out with him with
counselling and therapy for his father. Eric has good memories of
some years with his father, those in Hawaii particularly. Eric
understands that the purpose of the placement is not to stop all
relationship with his father, but to ultimately get him back with his
father. He does not want to attend Morris Catholic. Mr. Harris,
the guardian for Eric, contends that there should be a finding of
abuse and neglect, scheduling a dispositional hearing with the
current placement and conditions remaining intact until that hearing.
42
isciceeseieeniiaiiniiiiiiaiiiiiliiiaaiaii
Fed Wie intake TS
a ee eee | a te ee
The court finds that Eric is fragile in his relationship with his
father, and wants very much to see and know there is progress in his
father’s ability to control himself, his temper and his behavior
before there is either unsupervised visitation or a return to his
father’s home.
Conclusions of Law
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c¢ defines an “abused or neglected child” as
a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition
has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian
...tO exercise a minimum degree of care... in providing the
child with proper supervision or guardianship, by
unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm or
substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive
corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly
serious nature requiring the aid of the Court.
Findings of such abuse or neglect are on a case-by-case basis,
with the court directed to consider all the facts unique to the child,
the family, and the environment.
Here, the Division and Eric reported physical abuse on January
8, 1994, with an incident of his father’s anger being so explosive as
to drag his son from a store and hit him across the chest. The
incident is viewed particularly from the eyes of the child who had
experienced and related in prior DYFS reports fear of his father,
explosive and angry acts, a home of fear and “freezing” when his
father acted out, and overbearing parental demands not to talk to
school counsellors, to retract statements made to school personnel,
and to view the school’s efforts as a conspiracy.
It is also a factor that the court may consider events when the
parent either interferes with access by the Division, or has in the
43
past had Division intervention and failed to follow its
recommendations. See DYFS v. Huggins, 148 N.J. Super. 86
(Camden Cty. Ct. 1977). Parental unfitness is a personal
characteristic which, ordinarily, does not vanish overnight, or even
within weeks or months. An inference that such a quality persists,
in the absence of any evidence that it does not, is not unreasonable.
DYFS v. Wunnenburg, 167 N.J.Super. 578, 586 (App. Div. 1979)
the effect of neglect upon children is also dependent upon the
parent’s ability or willingness to change. DYFS v. C.M., 181 N.J.
Super. 190, 201 (Camden County Ct. 1981) (parent’s chronic
mental illness, with refusal for psychiatric treatment, and paranoia
considered factors in finding of abuse and neglect).
Here, after the prior investigations by the Division, Mr.
Bellesfield followed up only marginally as to counselling,
evaluations, and therapeutic involvement for himself and Eric. Even
after the January 8th incident, Mr. Bellesfield had to be under
persistent and constant orders to get evaluations, provide
information, limit access to Eric or the foster family, cooperate with
the mental health personnel, be restricted in even the church
environment. Most telling, he slipped that note to Eric, threatening
him to be silent, encouraging Eric to say he lied, imposing his
demands on Eric in a secretive and conspiratorial effort.
As the psychological evaluations establish, Mr. Bellesfield
suffers from a predominantly paranoid and passive-aggressive
character disorder. He maintains a strong and continued belief in a
conspiracy or corruption theory by school system, the Division,
and/or the caregiving families involved in Eric’s life. This type of
disorder can lead to explosive and intimidating behaviors,
depression, decompensation, and a lack of any predictability of
behaviors.
As Doctors Shea and Fiore testified, there was a risk then and
risk now to Eric because Mr. Bellesfield’s behavior has not changed
most critically, that he still forces and expects Eric to admit that he
lied about the incidents. Resistance to change and modification of
iD sata ee ed edna:
Be een. Sc OU Me ReneS A Pets Sr
Ss
behavior, and the expectation of that recantation indicate the Mr.
Bellesfield had then, and has now, a high risk of abuse against Eric.
There was not testimony to respond to these serious concerns
and ongoing efforts by Mr. Bellesfield to intimidate and conspire
with his son. The two witnesses certainly provided their view of a
good father-son relationship, as it was so limited to church
involvement or friendships. There was no testimony from his
treating therapist or his psychiatrist. Mr. Bellesfield chose not to
testify, a right he has, yet with a result that having determined, at
the end of the State’s case, that the Division’s proof constituted
prima facia evidence of abuse or neglect, the burden shifted to him
to demonstrate non-culpability. DYFS v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173
(App. Div. 1994).
The court therefore finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that Eric is abused within the meaning of the statue. He has, as
particularly evidenced by the January 8, 1994 incident, been and
remains at substantial risk of physical, mental and emotional harm
by the lack of proper guardianship and failure of his father to
exercise even the minimum degree of care.
Counsel shall consult and advise the court as to the date they
are all available for a dispositional hearing as soon as possible.
Exhibits shall be retained with the curt file until that time. In
addition, Eric shall not be ordered to attend Morris Catholic at this
time. Mr. Alvino shall prepare an order consistent with this
decision.
{> oes ‘
Yan Ste Sauglpeed
CATHERINE M. LANGLOIS, REL.
CML;gg
45
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DECISION
SPECIAL EDUCATION SETTLEMENT
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 3837-93
AGENCY DKT. NO. 93-5306
M.B.,
Petitioner
v.
RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent
Keith Paterson, Esq., for petitioner
Ellen S. Bass, Esq., for respondent
(Rand, Algeier, Tosti & Woodruff, attorneys)
Record Closed: June 18, 1993 Decided: June 29, 1993
BEFORE JAMES A. OSPENSON, ALJ:
On April 3, 1993, the petitioner requested a hearing in this
matter. In accordance with 20 U.S.C 41415 and 34 C.F.R 00.500
(1986) et seq., the Commissioner of Education requested
OAL DKT. NO. EDS 3837-93
that administrative law judge be assigned to conduct a hearing. |
was assigned by the Director of the Office of Administrative Law,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14F-5So, to hear the matter.
Prior to the scheduled hearing date, the parties entered into
settlement discussions and advised that a settlement had been
reached. The settlement terms are set forth in the attached consent
order.
Based upon the consent order, | CONCLUDE:
1. The parties fully understand the settlement terms.
2. The parties have voluntarily agreed to the settlement terms.
3. The settlement fully disposes of all issues in controversy and
is consistent with the law.
Therefore, | ORDER that the parties comply with the
settlement terms and that these proceedings be and are hereby
CONCLUDED.
This order is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §1415(e) and 34
C.F.R. {300.509 (1986). If either party feels that the terms of the
settlement are not being fully implemented, this concern should be
communicated in writing to the Director of the Division of Special
Education.
A
June 29. 1993 ts WLLE: Pitstign. ”
DATE JAMES A. OSPENSON, ALJ
amr
47
KEITH E. PATERSON, ESQ.
1339 Tabor Road
P.O. Box 21
Mt. Tabor, NJ 07878
(201) 625-0044
Attorney for Plaintiff
MICHAEL W. BELLESFIELD, : OFFICE OF
: ADMINISTRATIVE
Plaintiff, : LAW
VS. : OAL NO. EDS
: 93-5306
RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION, : CONSENT ORDER
Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court by Keith E. Paterson,
Esq., attorney for the plaintiff Michael W. Bellesfield, and the
Court having witnessed the subscribed consent of counsel for both
parties, and it appearing to the Court that settlement has been
reached by and between the parties, and for good cause shown;
It is on this 29th day of June, 1993
ORDERED as follows:
1. Attached hereto is a certain Document Inventory, which lists
documents disputed by the plaintiff. Defendant agrees to destroy
each and every record listed thereon which is more than 18 months
old.
2. The remaining documents on the said list shall remain at the
office of Norma Miele, Randolph Township Director of Special
Services. No one shall have access to the said file, except upon two
days notice to the plaintiff.
3. Each of the said remaining documents shall be destroyed
when it is 18 months old.
48
BOER Ost 6 RE at BRM IN ENG Be BE ae till
4. Plaintiff's comments dated January 19, 1993 shall be kept in
and remain part of the said file.
Y bg (F, Op ten, 4
jALJ ‘s
We consent to the form and entry of the within Order.
RAND, ALGEIER, TOSTI and
g WOODRUFF, ESQS.
ae ae
s/ “/ du / l pe ~ ow z44M, ate ”
KEITH E. PATERSON, ESQ. ELLEN S. BASS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant
DOCUMENT INVENTORY
Name of Document
Intervention documentation
Mt. Carmel reports
Case process note
Case process note
Case process note
Memo
Case process note
Case process note
Case process note
Memo
Memo
Case process note - Mahoney
Case process note - Miele
Chronology
Case process note
Case process note
Letter
Letter
Fax
Hawaii Special Services Record
Discipline report
Discipline report
Discipline report
Incidents in music class
Amecdotal records
Anecdotal records
50
Date of Document
6/25/92
12/11/92
12/22/92
1/20/92
2/10/92
2/11/92
3/12/92
3/13/92
5/12/92
5/18/92
5/19/92
5/22/92
5/22/92
5/27/92
6/10/87
7/21/88
12/12/92
12/1/92
11/29/92
1990
1/24/92
2/24/92
3/24/92
1/10/92
1/10/
10/30/92
Health office visits
Referral to child study team
Record of student counseling
School attendance
School attendance
51
9/11/92
7/16-17/92
Undated
1987
1992
CONSTITUITIONAL PROVISIONS ANU STATUTES
RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 7. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
TITLE IV. GRANTS TO STATES FOR AID AND SERVICES
TO NEEDY FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN AND FOR
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
PARTE. FEDERAL PAYMENTS FOR FOSTER CARE
AND ADOPTION ASSISTANCE
42 USCS Sec. 671
§ 671. State plan for foster care and adoption assistance
(8) provides safeguards which restrict the use of or disclosure of
information concerning individuals assisted under the State plan to
purposes directly connected with
(A) the administration of the plan of the State approved under
this part, the plan or program of the State under part A, B, or D of
this subchapter (including activities under part F of this subchapter)
or under subchapter I, V, X, XIV, XVI (as in effect in Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands), XIX, or XX of this chapter, or the
supplemental security income program established by subchapter
XVI of this chapter,
(B) any investigation, prosecution, or criminal or civil
proceeding, conducted in connection with the administration of any
such plan or program,
(C) the administration of any other Federal or federally assisted
program which provides assistance, in cash or in kind, or services,
directly to individuals on the basis of need,
(D) any audit or similar activity conducted in connection with the
administration of any such plan or program by any governmental
52
agency which is authorized by law to conduct such audit or activity,
and
(E) reporting and providing information pursuant to paragraph 9
to appropriate authorities with respect to known or suspected child
abuse or neglect; and the safeguards so provided shall prohibit
disclosure, to any committee or legislative body (other than an
agency referred to in clause (D) with respect to an activity referred
to in such clause), of any information which identifies by name or
address any such applicant or recipient; except that nothing
contained herein shall preclude a State from providing standards
which restrict disclosures to purposes more limited than those
specified herein, or which, in the case of adoptions, prevent
disclosure entirely;
CHAPTER 21. CIVIL RIGHTS
GENERALLY
42 USCS Sec 1981
Sec. 1981. Equal Rights Under the Law.
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined.
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts"
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
53
The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment
under color of State law.
42 USCS Sec 1983
Sec. 1983. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 USCS Sec 1985
Sec. 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights
(1) Preventing officer from performing duties
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to
prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from
accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under
the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to
induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any
State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property
on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or
while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his
54
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the
discharge of his official duties;
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to
deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any
court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully,
or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on
account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the
verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any
such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on
account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented
to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or
more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice
in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal
protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class
of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more
persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or
advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of
any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to
injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support
55
or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if
one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another
is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.
CHAPTER 67. CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT AND ADOPTION REFORM
GENERAL PROGRAM
42 USCS Sec. 5101
§ 5101. Office on Child Abuse and Negelct
(a) Establishment. The Secretary of Health Education and
Human Services may establish an office to be known as the Office
on Child Abuse and Neglect.
(b) Purpose. The purpose of the Office established under
subsection (a) shall be to execute and coordinate the functions and
activities of this Act. In the event that such functions and activities
are performed by another entity or entities within the Department of
Health an Human Services, the Secretary shall ensure that such
functions and activities are executed with the necessary exoertise
and in a fully coordinated manner involving regular
intradepartmental and interdepartmental consultation with all
agencies involved in child abuse and neglect activities.
AMENDMENTS:
1975. Act Jan 4. 1975 added subsec.(c).
1978. Act April 24, 1978, in subsec.(b), in paras. (1) and (3),
substitutued “publish and diseminate” for “and publish”, in para.(5)
56
deleted “and” folowing the concluding semicolon in para.6,
substituted “and” for a period,and added para.7; in subsec.(c),
added “Grants may be made under subsection (b)\(5) for periods of
not more than three years. Any such grant shwil bw reviewed at
least annually by the Secretary utilizing peer review mechanisms to
assure the quality and progress of researchconducted under such
grant”, and added subsec.(d).
1984. Act Oct. 9, 1984, in subsec (a), substituted “of Health,
and Human Services” for “of Health, Education, and Welfare”; in
subsec.(b), substituted para.(6) for one which read: “make a
complete and full study and investigation of the national incidence
of child abuse and neglect, including determination of the extent to
which incidents of child abuse and neglect are increasing in the
number or severity; and”, and substituted para.(7) for one which
read: “inconsultation with Federal agencies serving on the Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect (established by section 6 of this
Act), prepare a comprehensive plan for seeking to bring about
maximum coordination of the goals, objectives, and activities of all
agencies and organizations which have responsibilities for programs
and actvities related to child abuse and neglect, and submit a plan to
such Advisory Board not ater than twelve months after the date of
enactment of this clause”; in subsec.(c), substituted “The functions
of the Secretary under subsection (b) of this section may be carried
out” for “The Secretary may carry out his functions under
subsection (b) of this section; and added subsec.(e).
1986. Act Aug. 27, 1986, in susec.(b), redesignated former
paras. (2)-(7) as paras.(3),(4),(6),(7),(8), and (9), respectively,
added new parras (2) and (5), substituted para (7) as redesignated
for one which read: “conduct research intom the causes of child
abuse and neglect, and into the prevention, identification, and
treatment thereof”, and added para.(10).
1988. Act April 25, 1988 substitutd then text of this section for
text which read:
“(a) The Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereinafter
referred to in this Act as the “Secretary”) shall establish an office to
be known as the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
(hereinafter referred to in this Act as the “Center”)
“(b) The Secretary, through the Center, shall--
57
“(1) compile, analyze, publish, and disseminate a summary annually
of recently conducted and currently conducted research on child
abuse and neglect;
“(2) compile, evaluate, publish, and disseminate to each State such
materials and inforamtion as may assist the States in achieving the
objectives of section 4(d), including an evaluation of various
methods and procedures for the investigation and prosecution of
child physical and sexual abuse cases and resultant psychological
trauma of the child victim;
“(3) develop and maintain an information clearing house on all
programs, including private programs, showing promise of success,
for prevention, identification, and treatment of child abuse and
neglect;
“(4) compile, publish, and disseminate training materials for
personnel who are engaged or intend to engage in the prevention,
‘dentification, and treatment of child abuse and neglect;
“(5) develop and disseminate, to appropriate State and local
officials, model training materilas to assist in training law
enforcement, legal, judicial, medical, mental health, and child
welfare personnel in appropriate methods of interacting during
investigative, administrative, and judicial proceedings with children
subjected to child abuse;
“(6) provide tehnical assistance (directly throug a grant or contract)
to public and non-profit private agencies and organizations to assist
them in planning, improving, developing, and carrying out programs
relating to the prevention, identification, and treatment of child
abuse and neglect;
“(7) conduct research on the causes, prevention, identification, and
treatment of child abuse and neglect, and on appropriate and
effective investigative, administrative, and judicial proceedings in
cases of child abuse;
“(§) make a complete and full study and investigation of the
national incidence of ,child abuse and neglect, including a
determination of the extent to which incidents of child abuse and
neglet are increasing in number or severity; and
“(9) in consultation with Federal agencies serving on the Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect (established by section 6 of this
58
Act), prepare a comprehensive plan for seeking to bring about
maximum coordination of the goals, objectives, and activities of
all agencies and organizations which have responsibilities for
programs and activities related to child abuse and neglect, and
submit such plan to such Advisory Board not later than twelve
months after the date of enactment of this clause;
“(10) not later than two years after the first fiscal year for which
funds are obligated under section 1404A of the Victims of Crime
Act of 1984, the Secretary shall--
“(A) evaluate the effectiveness of assisted programs in achieving the
objectives of section 4(d); and
“(B) submit a report ot the appropriate committees of the Congress
of such evaluation and of technical assistance in achieving the
objectives of such section provided to the States through the
National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect.
The Secretary shall establish research prioritues for making
grants or contracts under clause (5) of this subsection and, not less
than sixty days before establishing such priorities, shall publish in
the Federal Register for public comment a statement of such
proposed priorities.
“(c) The functions of the Secretary under subsection (b) of this
section may be carried out either directly or by way of grant or
contract. Grants may be made under subsection (b)(5) for periods
of not more than three years. Any such grant shall be reviewed at
least annually by the Secretary, utilizing peer review mechanisms
to assure the quality of progress and research conducted under such
grant.
“(d) The Secretary shall make available to the Center such staff and
resources as are necessary for the Center to carry out effectively it’s
functions under this Act.
“(e) No fund appropriated under this Act for any grant or contract
may be used for any purpose other than that for which such funds
were specifically authorized”.
1996, Act Oct. 3, 1996 substituted this section for one which
read:
“National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
“(a) Establishment. The Secretary of Health Education and Human
Services may establish an office to be known as the Office on Child
Abuse and Neglect.
CHAPTER 126. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES
42 USCS Sec. 12101
§ 12101. Findings and purpose
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that -
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to
public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to
lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have
documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an
inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those
opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and
costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter -
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 USCS Sec. 12112
§ 12112. Discrimination
(a) General rule
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
(b) Construction
As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term "discriminate"
includes -
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status
of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such
applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or
relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's
qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the
discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship
includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor
union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of
the covered entity, or an organization providing training and
62
apprenticeship programs),
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are
subject to common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual
with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship
or association;
(5A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant
or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity
to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual
with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the
standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
consistent with business necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning
employment in the most effective manner to ensure that, when such
test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a
disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test
results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other
factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to
measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, manual, or
speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such
skills are the factors that the test purports to measure).
63
(c) Covered entities in foreign countries
(1) In general
It shall not be unlawful under this section for a covered entity
to take any action that constitutes discrimination under this section
with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if
compliance with this section would cause such covered entity to
violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is
located.
(2) Control of corporation
(A) Presumption
If an employer controls a corporation whose place of
incorporation is a foreign country, any practice that constitutes
discrimination under this section and is engaged in by such
corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such
employer.
(B) Exception
This section shall not apply with respect to the foreign
operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by
an American employer.
(C) Determination
For purposes of this paragraph, the determination of
whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based on -
(i) the interrelation of operations;
(ii) the common management,
(iii) the centralized control of labor relations; and
(iv) the common ownership or financial control, of the
employer and the corporation.
(d) Medical examinations and inquiries
(1) In general
The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in
subsection (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and
inquiries.
(2) Preemployment
(A) Prohibited examination or inquiry
Except as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity
shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job
applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.
(B) Acceptable inquiry
A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into
the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions.
(3) Employment entrance examination
A covered entity may require a medical examination after an
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to
the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant, and
may condition an offer of employment on the results of such
examination, if -
(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an
examination regardless of disability;
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition
or history of the applicant is collected and maintained on separate
forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential
medical record, except that -
(i) supervisors and managers may be informed
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the
employee and necessary accommodations;
(ii) first aid and safety personnel may be informed,
when appropriate, if the disability might require emergency
treatment; and
(iii) government officials investigating compliance with
this chapter shall be provided relevant information on request; and
(C) the results of such examination are used only in
accordance with this subchapter.
65
(4) Examination and inquiry
(A) Prohibited examinations and inquiries
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination
and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such
employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or
severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is
shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
(B) Acceptable examinations and inquiries
A covered entity may conduct voluntary medical
examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part
of an employee health program available to employees at that work
site. A covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an
employee to perform job-related functions.
(C) Requirement
Information obtained under subparagraph (B) regarding
the medical condition or history of any employee are subject to the
requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (3).
TITLE 18 USC SECTION 242
“Whoever under color of law, statute, or ordinance,
regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitants of
any state to the deprivation of any rights, priviledges, or
immunites secured or protected by the Constitution or Law
of the United States... shall be fined no more than $1000
or imprisoned for one year, or both.”.
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)
Defines an abused or nelected child as: a child whose physical,
mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired as the result of his parent or guardian
...to exercise a minimum degree of care...in providing the child with
the proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting
or allowing to be inflicted harm or substantial risk thereof, including
the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts
of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court.
66
[Naa no EN Sma ene cen eee
OTHER EXHIBITS RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
State of New Jersey
DEPT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Division of Youth and Family Svcs |Bellesfield_ | KC27381
Case Worker: Johnston
ASSESSMENT PART II Moms |
Period Covered 1-10-94 to 2-1-94
SERVICE HISTORY
Summarize previous DYFS involvment. The summary should address:
- reason(s) for prior involvment(s);
- number of 9-7(s) and finding(s);
- services provided including placements; and
- reason for the current involvement including subsequent referrals/reqs.
The Division has had seeral contacts with the Bellesfeilds in the
past, they were:
February 2 1987 - Substantiated neglect of Eric, lack of supervised
for long periods of time. Mr. Bellesfield corrected problem by
securing a sitter that the Division confirmed.
March 8, 1992 - Unsubstantaited physical abuse. Allegations were
that Mr. Bellesfield hit Eric. He ran away to the Fire Dept. seeking
help. Follow-up w/family stressed counseling and securing of Mr.
Bellesfield’s psychiatric records. Mr. Bellesfield continued to
resist DYFS intervention.
April 10, 1992 - Unsubstantiated physical abuse. This investigation
revealed a child that at once was both extremely fearful of his father
, then appeared to recant and defend his father. A referral to F.E.P.
was made on an emergent basis. Mr. Bellesfied did not follow thru.
Case was monitored. A consistant picture of this family having
significant mental health issues that impact on Mr. Bellesfield’s
ability to parent Eric is being drawn. During this case opening
Mr. Bellesfield engaged in a positive parenting class and enrolled
Eric in weekly counselling at the Dutton Counselling Center. Mr.
Bellesfield also contacted Dr. Gerome Goodman to do a psycho-
67
logical on Eric. This evaluationappeared to be superficial and
focused on issues of concern to Mr. Bellesfield. All collateral info.
given to Dr. Goodman by the Division received little, if no attention
in the evaluation. In May, Mr. Bellesfield paiced Eric privately w/
an aquaintance, Carol Hawthorne. Ms. Hawthorne is also a DYFS
foster parent. Ms. Hawthorne indicates this is the third time Eric
was place with her by his father, with each palcement lasting an
entire school year. In June of 1992 Mr. Bellesfeild took Eric from
the Hawthornes, ostensibly for a visit since he was just released
from St.Clare’s, however, he did not return Eric. Mr. Bellesfield
continued to resist DYFS services but made an appointment to see
a priest at Resurrection Parish. This illustrates Mr. Bellesfield’s
almost perfunctory compliance with services that probably cannot
meet their needs.
August 16, 1993 - Director of a Summer program in Massechusetts
alleged that Eric was kicked by his father recently. Eric revealed
this to the program during his stay. Once again therapy recommend
Mr. Bellesfield is still guarded and presents with the same paranoia
of being persecuted. He did ... Eric in therapy at ee
January 8, 1994 - Allegations that Mr. Bellesfield assaulted Eric
and child told neighbor wha.called police. Mr. Bellesfield cont’d
to display his same paranoid ... Eric was afraid to go home. Mr.
Bellesfield refused to utilize private placement and ultiately signed
a voluntary placement agreement. He revoked agreement on 1/10
and court papers were filed to continue the placement until more
comprehensive evaluations could be completed.
COMPENDIUM OF DYFS REPORTS FROM 1992 TO 1994
Initial Response/Incident Report
Summary of Findings Case Name Bellesfield
The father appeared relieved & told the child how frightened he had
been when the child was missing. Worker discussed negative
attention with both. Child agreed not to run away.
Conclusion: Abuse not substantiated —
Child had no marks/injuries consistent with abuse.
er f
g*2
”
arilyn Andersen
3/8/92
Initial Response/Incident Report
Summary of Findings Case Name Bellesfield
After meeting with briefly with Eric and his father together and
reviewing the agreement with Eric, I left. I placed a call to Rev.
Lindsey who returned my call about 9:30 pm. He agreed to keep in
touch with Eric and his father over the weekend, although he could
not have Eric over. He said he believes Eric exaggerates and has
never found Mr. Bellesfield to be inappropriate. I called OCAC and
left special instructions to be contacted in case the matter should be
called in over the weekend.
CONCLUSIONS
Eric revealed a consistent account of being slapped and pushed
down by his father. There were no marks or injuries from the
incident, however, Eric did appear terrified of his father and the
consequences of his disclosure. Upon his entry into the home Eric’s
account of events shifted dramatically to implicate the School in
causing his disclosure and blowing the story out of proportion. He
appeared intense and fearful while giving this account to his father.
Upon re-interview, Eric seemed to be recanting his story and his
affect was calm and happy. He showed no fear of his father, but
did verbalize he has some fear.
Mr. Bellesfield appeared preoccupied in implicating the school
as the cause of his son’s distress. He was guarded and intense
throughout the interview. At times he appeared hostile, but
remained in control.
I believe that both Eric and his father may have significant
mental health problems and that Eric may be at risk of emotional
abuse. There is no physical evidence of abuse to support a finding
of physical abuse. An emergency F.E.P. assessment of the family is
warranted to rule out emotional and physical abuse.
f
s“)4dm Lapectl- ;
Brian Lynch
4/20/92
Findings Report
There is a problem with Eric attempting to manipulate situations
that could get his father and himself in trouble. Worker
recommended counseling and Mr. Bellesfield agreed. Collateral
with the therapist indicates that Eric is not at risk. It appeared that
Mr. Bellesfield is in the process of following through with DYFS
recommendation. Worker recommends that this case be closed at
intake. wes
+ sue Apel °
Linda Apollo
9/29/93
REFERRAL RESPONSE REPORT
Case Number: KC273819 Case Name: Bellesfield Date: 1/8/94
Screening Worker ID: Assigned Worker ID:
Valentine Johnston
Supervisor: McCann Supervisor: Moore
70
Eric was out all day shoveling snow and he was located by his
father who was looking for him at Cumberland Farms. Eric states
that father yelled at him and punched him in the stomach. There
is no injury. Father denied that he hit child. Child is refusing to go
home... Police are looking for witnesses at the store. Case was
open preyiously for Lack of Suppert 1987, Child Abuse, 1993.
e* fall Se ” date:1/9/94 9am
Ss oe »”
"Sale Ana ” date:1/10/94 10am
SYNOPSIS OF ERIC BELLESFIELD CASE
PREPARED BY: DAVID JOHNSTON, FSS Il
3/17/94
The Division’s most recent referral regarding Eric Bellesfield
came on 1/8/94. This referral came from the Randolph Police
Department. The referrant stated that Eric was out shoveling snow
and was located by his father at Cumberland Farms. Eric told
police that his father yelled at him and punched him in the stomach
and chest area.
There is no injury. Father denies he hit child. Child refusing to
leave police station. Police called OCAC and SPRU worker
responded. Eric repeated his story that his father hit him and that
he was afraid to go home. After much discussion, Mr. Bellesfield
signed a voluntary placement agreement. Mr. Bellesfield offered no
other resources, so Eric was placed in foster care.
STATEMENT TAKEN BY DYFS FROM FOSTER MOTHER
July 12th incident with Eric Bellesfield
1. Overheard Eric yelling at Joey in the next room. while at
Vacation Bible School.
2. Went to see why Eric was yelling, he said Joey was hittng him
with the ball while they were palying the game. | told him that if he
71
wanted to play war ball that he would get hit with the ball and if the
game was too rough then he should leave.
3. Two minure later Joey came in crying and holding his neck. He
told me Eric hit him on the neck.
4. Told Eric to come inand asked why he hit Joey in the neck and
was this his way of showing revenge. He started yelling that he did
not hit Joey but that he threw the ball from at least five feet. I
shook him and placed him in as eat to calm down and told him to
stay there.
5. Took Joey to another class so he could calm down.
6. The Pastor of our church spotted me and asked if he could see
me upstairs.
7. He told me some money was missing from a teacher’s purse and
he wanted me to check with the boys. He also mentioned that
earlier h observed Eric, Joey and a friend named Richard on the
trampoline and Eric was beating Joey on the back with both fists
and then smelling his butt. He said Joey was crying.
8. Then while speaking to Pastor I could hear Eric in the
downstairs hallway yelling and screaming | didn’t do anything I was
just playing a game.
9. I proceeded out into the hallway where Eric was yelling and
screaming and asked Eric why he had left the room and who gave
him permission. He said he wanted to find me and tell me it was
just a game and that they were playing and I could ask Richard.
10. I started to take Eric back to my classroom struggling the
whole way to lead him there because he just would not calm down.
11. We arrived at my room and I tried to ask hm about the things
the Pastor had mentioned and he was just yelling and screaming the
entire time and | finally slapped him. This didn’t seem to help,
now we were both yelling so I decided to leave because_we were not
talking but yelling.
12. I sent him out the back way of the church and told him to get
into the car but he kept yelling he wanted to talk but J was not able
to talk over his screaming.
13. He proceeded out into the parking lot yelling and screaming and
now the whole church was observing him. I rushed out and put him
in the car hoping he would stop but now he was yelling out of the
Car.
14. I rushed and gathered my things and told Joey to go to the car
because we had to leave.
15. As soon as I arrived home I contacted DYFS and left an urgent
message for Dave Johnston to call me back.
16. Dave called me and I informed him of the situation and told
him I wanted the child removed he said he would come over to
speak with me which he did with two other workers.
Rosita Slocum
DYFS CASEWORKER NOTES RE: FOSTER ABUSE
State of New Jersey case name Bellesfield fase no.
DEPT of HUMAN SERVICES
Div. of Youth and Family Sves serene
CONTACT SHEET district office fost center no.
M contact | Type of Contact Place Participants
Vv} date (phone, in-person, (office, home, (names, relationships)
R written) etc.)
7/12 | T/C from Rosita Slocum - requested that worker come
to the house. She said that @ Vacation Bible School
today - the Pastor saw Eric hitting Joey on the back and
sniffing Joey’s butt. Joey later came to her crying
syaing that Eric was hitting him. Rosita also said that
a little girl was missing $10.00 @ the program - She
said that she probably accussed Eric of having the $
and while she realizes it was very wrong Eric was out
of control today. She felt that there was probably
nobody else in the program that would take the $.
Eric had been asked several times today to quiet
down and to stop making bazzare noises. He continued
yelling and denying he was hitting Joey or sniffing his
butt. She said she slapped him across the face -
She says that she realizes that this was wrong and she
does not need to be reacting this way. She said that it
was a reaction that was an accumulation of the last six
73
months. She was asking for Eric to be removed
because he continually lies and plays one person
against the other. He doesn’t follow thought with
chores then syas he does.
She asked for worker to come out and discuss the
issue with her.
Worker discussed this latest incident with Supv J
Moore who inturn spoke with Casework Supv D.
Vreiseme. Wkr was asked to respond to the home
along with Foster Home Provider Carol Harris.
It was determined that this was a quality of care
issue, not an abusive incident, and isolated in nature.
74
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
Christine Whitman EDISON DISTRICT OFFICE Wm. Waldman
Governor 100 Metroplex Drive, Suite 400 Commissioner
Edison, New Jersey 08817-2683
(908) 819-7003 Patricia Balasko-Barr
Director
February 26, 1997
Mr. Michael Bellesfield:
P.O. Box 112
Plainsboro, NJ 08536
Dear Mr. Bellesfield:
This is in response to your recent FAX to our attention and
telephone conversation with Mrs. Saba.
Enclosed you will find a copy of the court order dated January 23,
1997, signed by Judge Stephan Smith of Morris County.
As you will recall when Mrs. Saba requested an opportunity to meet
with you in your home, you refused to agree to a meeting. You
stated the Division has custody of Eric, not you. However you
appear to fail to understand that the Division has an obligation to
attempt to work with parents of any of the children under our
supervision.
As you will note in the order, you are directed to contact the
Division to schedule a psychiatric evaluation. However in Mrs.
Saba’s conversation with you, you said that this will not happen.
Please be reminded that you are violating the court order.
Although you indicated you wanted to discuss visitation
alternatives, you would not give Mrs. Saba any furhter information.
Please therfore be advised that per court order, if youn express an
interest in visiting Eric, the Family Enrichment Progrm remains the
designated site.
75
As you are also ordered to engage in therapy, we would suggest
you contact Mrs. Saba for names of agencies in this county.
Your son’s case was transferred to this District Office as you
moved to Middesex County. You will note that you were also
ordered to cooperate with the Division caseworker assigned from
the Edison District Office.
Enclosed you will find a redacted copy of Eric’s most recent school
record. For your information, Eric at present, does not attend
church.
As you indicated you had some questions about the Child Palcement
Review Board recommendation, please be reminded that ahy child
placement with the Division is reviewed by the the Child Palcement
Review Board twice a year. The communciation you received was
from Morris County Child Placement Review Board which
reviewed Eric’s placement on 2/6/97. The signature on the bottom
is a member of the Morris County Child Placement Review Board.
—-}t appears you were present at that review and were a party to the
recommendations made. Perhaps if you have any nissues to discuss
with the individual board members you should contact them
directly.
If you wish to discuss any of the further please feel free to call
(908) 819-7003 or write to me at my office.
Si el a os j
ad SM -
Ceil Saba
Family Seryice Specialist
una llw Herne
5 /“ MUNN ”
Marilyn Harris, Supervising
Family Service Specialist
CS:MH:ydh
76
REVIEW BOARD
RECOMMENDATION TO THE JUDGE
Superior Court ~ Family Division
(The Child Placement Review Act-NJSA 30:4C-50 et seq.)
Child: DOB: County: CPR Docket:
Eric Bellesfield | 7/25/80 Morris FC-14-65-94
DYFS Case Mgr: DYSF Supervisor: DYSF Case No:
Ceil Saba Marilyn Harris KC273819-11
Date Orig placement: | Date this placement: Review Date:
01/09/94 04/22/96 02/06/97
Review Type: Date of current assessment:
X_ 12 Month 08/08/96
Authority for placement: | Placement type Is this appropriate?
__ Voluntary (short term plan)
Review
X Court Ordered X Residential Board: X Yes
Facility
X_ Other (explain)
both
DYFS long term plan: X_ independent living
1.Date long term goal achieved: 2.Satisfies board:
8/08/97 NO
3.Board permanent arrangment date: 8/98
Board Findings:
__A. Continued placement outside home is not in childs best
interest.
_X B. Continued placement outside home is in childs best
interest on temporary basis until long term goal is achieved.
__C. Continued placement outside home on temporary basis is in
childs best interest, but there is not sufficient information...
Plan satisfies CPR Plan satisfies Is it necessary to
(NJSA:30 4-C-52) Review Board continue placement
x Yes No x Yes No x Yes No
righ x CPRB (signature):
Ss “ L L- Se ”
((signature forged by Suzanne Warren)) _ Date signed: 2/10/97
Psychological Evaluation: Eric Bellesfield
Morristown Forensic Associates
the Division has been involved with this family on several
occassions, the reader of this report is referred to the Division
records, as they contain information regarding these referrals of
Eric and his father, which will not be repeated here. It should be
noted that on September 27, 1993, Catherine Pollack, Eric’s
therapist, stated to the DYFS worker that Mr. Bellesfield and Eric
attended therapy and that she did not believe Mr. Bellesfield
presented a risk to Eric. At that time, she stated that Eric was a
manipulative child who did not get enough attention because of his
father’s work schedule. Mr. Bellesfield resumed counseling with
Ms. Pollack, and the Division closed the case. However, the case
was reopened on January 8, 1994, as a result of a referral from the
Randolph Police Department that alleged abuse of Eric by his
father. The DYFS worker who investigated the referral observed
that Mr. Bellesfield “was agitated and very interested inrelating the
history of his conflicts with the Randolph School District”. Mr.
Bellesfield denied he hit his son on this date. Eric reported that he
was afraid to go home, and wanted to return to the home of Carol
Hawthorne in Chester, NJ. At that time, Mr. Bellesfeild signed a
voluntary placement agreement and Eric was placed in a foster
home. [[BEGINNING FALSIFIED SECTION]] Approximately
three days later, the Randolph Police Department was called to the
Bellesfield home after reports were received that Mr. Bellesfield
threatened a male there with a bat. The patrolman who responded
determined that Mr. Bellesfield was a danger to himself and
transported him to the hospital for psychiatric observation. One day
prior to this incident, Mr. Bellesfield stated to the Division worker
that he wanted Eric returned to his care and custody.
[[END OF FALSIFIED SECTION]}
"oa iad d Lia ” Dated: 2/24/94
Michael Shea,
Morristown Forensic Associates
78
DYFS RESPONSE REPORT OF 1/8/94
Case Name:Bellesfield KC273819 Date:1/8/94 Worker: Valentine
Worker proceeded to Randolph PD & met with Sgt. Smith, Mr.
Bellesfield & Eric Bellesfield —- Mr. Bellesfield was interviewed
first. He was somewhat agitated and was very concerned with
relating stories about Eric in which the B of Ed. tried to classify
Eric so they could build up their Special Ed. enrollment. He related
a the story that this morning Eric went to walk the dog at 10 or 11
AM. He came back in & wanted to go shovel snow - ...
he told Eric if you find a shovel & if you shovel our drive then you
can shovel. Mr. Bellesfield explained that he lost track of time &
before he realized, it was 5 PM & Eric had not called, he went out
to find Eric and found him at Cumberland Farm. Eric was in the
back of the store talking to a store clerk so he told Eric to leave
right now - Mr. Bellesfield denied hitting or pushing Eric, But said
he was very upset since Eric did not call home all day and they have
a rule that Eric must call home every few hours when he is out.
Mr. Bellesfield further explained that he felt sorry for Eric who
had a shovel & broom with him so he gave his son a ride home &
yelled at him in the car saying “I'll break your arms and legs if you
go back in that store again because the clerks are drug dealers &
low lives” Mr. B. said that he would not really hurt Eric But used
this as a figure of speech. Mr. B. denies that he hit Eric But he did
say that he was very upset & he yelled at Eric & will punish Eric
By not allowing him to Earn money By shoveling snow & By not
allowing him into the Store Again. Wne Mr. B. & Eric returned
home Eric was sent next door to return a shovel he had Borrowed
and rather than just leave the Shovel Eric went into the home. Mr.
B. was concerned about this since he does not know the neighbors.
After waiting for Eric to return for about 30 minutes Mr. B. went to
the neighbors home to get Eric and when he walked into the home
the neighbor was calling the Randolph PD accusing Mr. B. of
abusing Eric today. The police arrived & took Eric to HQ & he
followed them to HQ he went home since they were calling DYFS
& Came Back when the police told him I was on my way. Mr.
Bellesfield appeared agitated and paranoid to some degree. He
79
repeated that the school was was in a conspiracy against him &
Eric, and all the administrators on the Board of Ed are against Him.
He did say that Eric does well in school & he follows his work
closely.
Worker next met with Eric who had been discussing the situation
with Sgt. Smith. Eric claimed that he was out today for 3 or 4
hours shoveling driveways & he Earned over 25 Dollars, he was at
Cumberland Farms converting small bills into $10 Bills when his
father came looking for him. Eric was very upset when I told him
that his father denied Hitting him, Eric claimed that he did not want
to go home with his father, & that I should call Mr. Lynch from
DYFS for Info...
At this point worker consulted with SPRU Sup who happened to
be Brian Lynch.SPRU Sup was well aware of this case...
SPRU Sup explained that Mr. Bellesfield is most volitile while
under stress & that losing a job is stree provoking to Mr. Bellesfield
as are situations between himself & Eric. Worker explained that |
will attempt to arrange a private placement with Mr. Bellesfield
with the Hawthornes since they are known to the family. &/or
Voluntary Foster Care - last resort will Be to return Eric if father
& Eric seem appropriate . SPRU Sup agreed with this plan.
Worker attempted to offer the option of private placement and a call
to the Hawthorne home Mr. Bellesfeild refused this option
At this point worker placed a call to CWS Morris DO. She was
also in agreement witht th option of Voluntary FC placement,
private placement or return home if parties can agree & therapy can
be arranged.
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO IMMINENT DANGER
IN THIS CASE PRESENTLY SO REMOVAL WAS NOT AN
OPTION.
Worker again tried to negotiate a private placement with Mr.
Bellesfield but he refused.
At this point I explained that Eric was very upset & should not
return to his home & Mr. Bellesfield in frustration agreed that |
could take Eric via court order —or- he could Sign a voluntary
Foster Care Agreement. See attached Signed Voluntary Foster
Care Agreement. Mr. Bellesfield stated that the system was
causing serious problems for he & his son & he felt like an abuse
victim. [[BEGINNING FALSIFIED PORTION]] | had Mr.
Bellesfield read & make sure that he understood the signed
placement agreement & his rights as legal responsible parent & our
obligation to work with him on Eric return —or- to go to court if we
feel that Eric or he are inappropriate for reunification. Mr.
Bellesfield stated that he understood . [[END OF FALSIFIED
PORTION]] But at this point he abruptly charged out of police
HQ. Worker conferenced status again with with CWS of Morris &
arrangements were made for Eric to receive a physical at Dover
General Hosp. (Since they called in another case)
Worker drove Eric to Dover Genral & he registerd & was given a
physical Exam By Dr. Ackerman — See attached Medical Report &
ER Report on Eric.
Worker consulted with on call SPRU Sup Since I could not locate
a family to take Eric at that hour & worker again tried to
re-contact emergency Foster Home & finally Eric was accepted for
placement in the West Morris Area — See SIS for name of Foster
Parents.
Worker drove Eric to Foster Home & Information is exchanged &
worker left the Foster Home.
Follow up needs to Be made on Monday or Tues re: clothing
check — Status of Mr. Bellesfield & Status of th Foster Home since
Parents requested that this must be short term since they have three
children in the Home & Babysitting 2 others.
Mr. Bellesfield’s status & Mental Health Condition must also Be
assessed since he was under extreme stress regarding his own
situation jobless & now — his separation from Eric. It is strongly
recommended that Mr. Bellesfield Be evaluated & that both he &
Eric receive ongoing Family &/or Individual therapy. It should be
mentioned that Eric’s condition was very Calm after his father left
& he was very at ease with the placement.
/\
attachments: 1. Voluntary Foster Car Agreement Signed by
Mr. Bellesfield.
- 2. Medical and ER reports.
81
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Morris and Sussex Counties
PO Box 910
Morristown, New Jersey 07963-0910
(201) 285-6389 FAX (201)538-7664
Michael J. Arnold Edie Larsen
Court Administrator Family Division Mgr
Suzanne Warren
July 20, 1994 Child Placement Review
Board Coordinator
Social Security Administration
OCRO Division of Certification and Coverage
330 North Greene Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Re: Terry Lorraine Kenny, Natural Mother
Patrick Kenny, Maternal Grandfather
Dear Sir or Madam,
Some time ago a letter from this office was sent to you in reference
to the above-named individuals. The Family Court of Morris
County, New Jersey and the Division of Youth and Family Services,
State of New Jersey are currently searching for these individuals.
Terry Lorraine Kenny is the natural mother of one of ur children
currently in protective custody. In order for the child in question to
be made available for adoption all efforts to locate existing relatives
must first be exhausted. Your cooperation in this matter is
therefore of the utmost importance, and any aid which can be given
in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Family Services has obtained Ms. Kenny’s birth certificate. |
enclose herewith a copy of same so that you may conduct your
search.
Should you need to contact me, I may be reached at (201)829-8081.
“2 pond bit 5
S « y, , ”
Sharon Arnold - CPR Investigator
[State’s Test Results of Father]
T™
MMPI-2
T™
MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY-2
By Starke R. Hathaway and J. Charnley McKinley
T™™
THE MINNESOTA REPORT:
ADULT CLINICAL SYSTEM
INTERPRETIVE REPORT
By James N. Butcher
Client ID: 000001040
Report Date: 05-SEP-94
Age: 41
Sex: Male
Education: 14
Marital Status: Divorced
MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY-2
Copyright © by The Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota
1942, 1943 (renewed 1970), 1989. This report 1991.
All Rights Reserved.
83
Dist. Exclusively by NATIONAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.
Under License to The University of Minnesota
MMPI-2 page |
THE MINNESOTA REPORT:
ADULT CLINICAL SYSTEM ID: 000001040
INTERPRETIVE REPORT DATE: 05-SEP-94
PROFILE VALIDITY:
This is a valid MMPI-2 profile. The client’s responses to the
MMPI-2 validity items suggest that he cooperated with the
evaluation enough to provide useful interpretive information. The
resulting clinical profile is an adequate indication of his present
personality functioning.
The clinical setting in which this MMPI-2 was taken has not been
indicated on the answer form. The report has been processed as
though “Outpatient Mental Health Program” has been indicated.
The report may not be as specific as it would have been if the actual
assessment setting had been designated.
SYMPTOMATIC PATTERNS:
This MMPI-2 clinical profile is within normal limits. This client
did not report psychological conflicts or situational stresses that are
producing great difficulty for him at this time. He appears to be
dealing effectively with his life situation, and seems to be obtaining
sufficient satisfaction out of life at this point. He appears to have
no sex-role conflicts.
In addition the following description is suggested by the content of
this client’s responses. The client does not appear to be an overly
anxious person prone to be developing unrealistic fears. Any fears
he reports are more likely to be reality-based than internally
generated. His item content suggests he is ratrher non-competitive
and passive, generally easygoing, and uncritical of interpersonal
situations. He appears to be happy with life and feels positive
about the future. His response content reflects a high degree of self-
confidence and the ability to deal with life tasks. He considers
himself in good health and does not complain of somatic difficulties.
He reports that his work situation in generally satisfactory. No
significant negative work attitudes requiring treatment attention
were noted in his item content.
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS:
Quite outgoing and sociable, he has a strong need to be around
others. He is gregarious and enjoys interpersonal attention.
AGNOSTIC CONDIDERATIONS:
This profile is within normal limits and no clinical diagnosis is
provided.
MMPI-2 page 2
THE MINNESOTA REPORT:
ADULT CLINICAL SYSTEM ID: 000001040
INTERPRETIVE REPORT DATE: 05-SEP-94
NOTE: This MMPI-2 interpretation can serve as a useful source
of hypotheses about clients. This report is based on objectively
derived scale indexes and scale interpretations that have been
developed in diverse groups of patients. The personality
descriptions, inferences and recommendations contained herein need
to be verified by other sources of clinical information since
individual clients may not fully match the prototype. The
information in this report should most appropriately be used by a
trained, qualified test interpreter. The information contained in this
report should be considered confidential.
85
ROBERT J. CHALEMIAN, M.D., P.A.
- Telephone (201) 848-0088
301 Sicomac Avenue 315 East 69" Street
Wycoff, New Jersey 07481 New York, New York 10021
September 16, 1994
Grace T. Meyer
669 W. Westwood Ave
Rivervale, New Jersey 07675
Re: MICHAEL BELLESFIELD
Dear Ms. Meyer:
The following is an addendum to my original letter of July 10,
1994. The beginning and middle of this letter is the same as the
original one; however, with the inclusion of Dr. Donald Skinner’s
report and conclusions, I have added a new summary and
recommendations. Also included is the complete psychological test
report of Dr. Skinner.
At both your and the above named individual’s request, 1 conducted
a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Bellesfield, a 41 year old man who
is involved in litigation against the Department of Youth and Family
Services (DYFS). It is Mr. Bellesfield’s assertion that there has
been numerous instances of abuse of discretion on the part of
personnel at DYFS as it has related toward Mr. Bellesfield’s
parental authority over hios current 13 year old son, that authority
of which has been abrogated since January, 1994, at which time
Eric, Mr. Bellesfield’s son, was taken away and placed in foster
care. The allegations of DYFS have centered around emotional and
physical abuse at the hands of Mr. Bellesfield, all of which are
faltly denied by Mr. Bellesfield. The history of DYFS involvement
covers about 8 years, and revolve around “their (Local School.
Board) attempt to place [Eric] in special ed”. Mr. Bellesfield stated
that he has never seem any reason to do so, and he has been battling
the Board of Education ever since. He has felt that there has been a
conspiracy against him because he has resisted to follow their
86
advice. In Decmber, 1992, Mr. Bellesfield filed a formal complaint
against DYFS and the School, and “they took no action”.
Pertinent history revealed that Mr. Bellesfield grew up in Warren
County, one of three children. His parents apparently still live in
Warren County, but Mr. Bellesfield has no contact with them. He
stated “I decided to create a life of my own”. He graduated from
Phillipsburg Catholic High School in 1970, and atended Mercer
County Community College for two years, receiving an A.A>
degree in 1972. He then studied at several different colleges, but
received no further degree.
With regard to Mr. Bellesfield’s son, Eric, apparently his natural
mother abandoned the family when Eric was 15 months old, and her
wherabouts have never been known. Mr. Bellesfiled has been the
sole custodian and guardian of Eric. He had been laid off in
November, 1993, and he stated that there were more problems with
his son since then. Mr. Bellesfield, however, did not percieve that
the problems were of any sever intensity.
Pychiatrically, Mr. Bellesfield has been hospitalized on two
separate occasions, first in Hawaii at Castle Medical Center in
September, 1990, the second in New Jersey at St. Claire’s Hospital
in May, 1992. The diagnosis in 1992 was Brief Reactive
Psychosis, but in 1990, there may have been some depressive
elements with paranoia, with the final diagnosis being Major
Depressive Disorder with psychotic features and suicidal ideation.
I had the following records at my perusal:
1) St. Claire’s Riverside Discharge Summary dated 6/3/92
2) Court Report dated 3/25/94 Morris County Sup. Court
3) Discharge Summary, Castle Medical Center dated 9/17/90
4) Consultation Record Castle Medical Center dated 9/19/90
5) Psychological Test Report dated 7/30/92
6) Therapist Summary, Eric, dated 1/20/94
7) Michael Bellesfield’s letter dated 2/7/94
8) Michael Bellesfield’s letter dated 2/17/94
9) Ironia Elementary School report dated 2/11/92
87
10) Morristown Forensic Associates reports dated 3/2/93;
2/24/94
| saw Michael Bellesfield in my office on two occassions, each for
approximately 45 minutes. Mental status revealed a tall, well
dressed, cooperative man appearing his stated age. There was no
evidence of a thinking disorder, and his speech was well modulated
and goal oriented. He denied visual or auditory hallucinations, but
did admit that in the past, when he was greatly stressed, he would
have difficulty perceiving reality (as documented in both hospital
summaries). He tended to overreact to stresses and interpret some
as threatening when there may have been other opitons he did not
consider. He admitted that this occassionally happens, that he had
to work on them. He did not appear overtly delusional, however.
He realized that the “system” he is fighting against is not inherently
evil, but that they are not looking out fore the best interests of his
child; and, as such, he feels compelled to proceed on this course of
litigation. He denied depressions, but stated that he has gotten
depressed in the past, and had suicidal ideation, but denied any
active plan. He ststaed that his sleep and appetitie are adequate.
He has had a several year History of chronic, mild depression, pri
arily due to the stresses in his life, that of rearing a child alone,
along with maintaining a full-time job. He is fully oriented, with
immediate, recent, and remote memory intact. His concentration
ability was intact, as he was able to do a series 7’s quickly and
accurately. His abstraction ability was good. His insight and
judgement appeared to be non-psychotic, although at times his
judgement was colored by suspiciousness, and a tendancy toward a
paranoid stance (without overt breaks in reality).
Psychological Testing: On July 15 and 18, 1994, Mr. Bellesfieid
underwent psychological testing by Donald Skinner, PhD. Test
administered were Clinical Interview, Draw-A-Person, Sixteen
Personality Factor Questionaire, Clinical Analysis Questionaire,
Thematic Apperception Test, and Rorschach Ink Blot Test. His
report is appended to this report. Several pertinent observations are
of interest: 1) “On the Rorschach...(he) produced 20 rich, hghly
diferentiated, original, complex, and non-psychotic responses”;
88
“Dynamically, he tends to approach the world in a suspicious
manner but he tends to have a playful, sincere, almost needy side to
him”; Conclusion: “Mr. Bellesfield is an extremely intelligent,
resourceful, single parent, who has managed to raise a child despite
some acute psychiatric hospitalizations and financial difficulties.
This present evaluation indicated that he is currently stable, aware
of his problems and has a healthy, clear vision of his parental
responsiblity”.
In summary, it is clear from a reasonable degree of medical
probablitiy perspective that Mr. Bellesfield’s psychiatric issues
have been used inappropriately from the vantage point of the
Division of Youth and Family Services. I can state this
categorically because of the many and varied allegations of
instability of Mr. Bellesfield, all of which are in the most general
terms, and some of which are within the parameters of normal
parenting authority (eg. letter of July 27, 1994, from Michael Shea,
counsellor of Eric Bellesfield): “As you are aware Eric began
therapy with this therapist to address the emotional and physical
abuse that he experienced while in the care of his father...” This
type of innuendo is reprehensible. Clearly Mr. Bellesfield had
difficulties with maintaining appropriate authority over his son, but
such classification of abuse subsumes and assumes severe
imbalance on Mr. Bellesfield’s part--which he does not have--or
malevolent motives toward his son--which is not probable. Mr.
Bellesfield does not have a psychotic disorder which renders hom
and parent.
It is my clinical opinion that Mr. Bellesfield should immediately be
reunited with his son, and his parental authority be reinstated fully.
Doing otherwise lacks wisdom and is believed to be detrimental to
the present and future wellbeing of his son Eric.
Impression:
AXIS 1: Status Post Brief Reactive Psychosis Adjustment
Disorder with Mixed Emotional Features
AXIX 2: Mixed Character Disorder, with Avoidant,
Depressive and Paranoid Features.
AXIS 3: No diagnosis
AXIS 4: Stressors: Severe s /“ ‘ee
AXIS 5: Functioning: 75 Rob’t J Chalemian,MD
89
DR. DONALD SKINNER
PSYCHOLOGIST
550 MAPLE AVE.
RIDGEWOOD, NJ 07450
September 27, 1994
Re: Eric Bellesfield
To Whom It May Concern:
The undersigned was recently presented with a copy of a letter
written to Mr. Johnston [DYFS] by Mr. Shea, Psychotherapist, re:
Eric Bellesfield.
The undersigned was alarmed by the shocking content matter and
recommendations of this letter. The accusations were as follows:
It was reported that Eric began therapy to address emotional and
physical abuse he experienced while in the care of his father. It
emphasized that Eric’s therapy focusing on his adjusting to foster
care and that he is currently experiencing behavioral problems, one
of which includes lying. Finally, Mr. Bellesfiled is portrayed as an
intrusive, controlling tyrant, who tells Eric what to say, think, and
feel. The recommendations were that Eric must be protected and
further visitation must be supervised.
As a clinical specialist in child, adolescent, and family therapy the
undersigned is aware that it is the duty of both counselors and state
institutions to protect the interests of a child. In the current climate
of abuse and victimization, however, these concerns have in some
cases blinded us to the real and best interest of the child.
First, the undersigned was not aware that Mr. Bellesfield has been
found guilty of committing abusive actions against his son, yet he is
being treated as a convicted and dangerous criminal.
Second, the undersigned conducted a complete psychological
evaluation, in which he was assessed to be a competent and caring
parent.
Third, even if the state strongly felt Mr. Bellesfield and his son
required guidance and counseling, why does he continue to remain
in foster care? Moreover, there are now reports of problems in the
current foster home. Does that mean if it does not work out for
Eric, he will be placed in another foster home or maybe a
psychiatric institution? Certainly, we are all aware of the tragedy of
a child lost in the state system which has so limited resources these
days.
The undersigned seriously questions whether or not this case is
therapeutically moving in the healthiest direction.
In contrast, the undersigned recommends that Mr. Bellesfield be
granted full custody of Eric. Eric should be returned home
immediately. It is further recommended that the resources expended
to undermine should be instead utilized to support Mr. Bellesfield
with respect to being a successful parent.
ij Org ae
a* f a 22:
Donald Skinner, Ph.D.
DS/kms
91
JEROME D. GOODMAN
Grace T. Meyer page 4
Re: Bellesfield 6/15/92
On a number of occassions | asked him questions about how he
got along with his father, and he claimed that their relationship was
quite good. I asked him as to why the State agencies were involved,
and Eric immediately blamed the school stating: “ The school called
them in.” I asked him directly as to whether his father had in any
way abused or threatened him or overly punished him. Eric stated:
“ They want me to say that, but I told you the truth - my father is
there for me.”
His House-Tree-Person was very unusual. It was of a large
temple-like church. Two spires and coluns dwarfed the figure who
is coming up the stairs toward the front. Gargoyles are perched on
the roof. Both the sun and the moon are in the picture. The Tree is
both in leaf and partially dead with a large hole. This was described
as a total conception in which the human figure “is waiting for
church to begin”. Thre is both joy and sadness, awe and mystery.
The overall impression in this examination which lasted more
than one hour was conducted privately with only the child, was that
Eric is a very intelligent chid who has superior perceptual abilities.
He has a creative and imaginative mind and appears to be a very
bright child who is not being handled properly in school. | can find
no evidence of active psychiatric symtomatology such as
depression, phobias or anxiety. The waters run deep, however, in
this child and he needs active sponsorship and an endorsement in a
therapeutic relationship. From the facts that I have at my disposal,
| think it is counterproductive to be continually asking this child as
to whether he is being abused at home. This examination does not
support that contention.
I trust that this summary of my examination of Eric is helpful
for your purposes.
Sincerely,
JDG:pam s/ «\ irene Asan”
Jerome D. Goodman, MD
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.