Appendix — Cousino v. Elliott

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FIL BD

Man 9 aMy

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED~SPATES

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

PAUL K. COUSINO, deceased

MACOMB COUNTY PROBATE COURT #86-96297-SE

MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS #174253 & 184104

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT #109145 & 109145

APPENDIX

IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT

SUBMITTED BY:

PAUL W. COUSINO, in propria persona

P.O. Box 46634

Mt. Clemens, Mich.

48046-6634

1-800-484-5422

security code: 3197

Pie ase

INDEX

Probate Court ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT dated

March 23,

} a page 3

Probate Court ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT dated

March 1,

NEY A page 3

Court of Appeals ORDER dated January 24,

Sol Wonnsnicshicanincenbiciees page 3-4

Court of Appeals ORDER dated April 9,

Rae Wosdiceenintivedininniis page 4-5

Michigan Supreme Court ORDER DATED December 30,

NOD Rciticheciieiictinsiisiai page 5

Michigan Court of Appeals decision appealed in this Court’s

ho page 5-10

Michigan Court of Appeals decision taxing

i iidianinlihanliniii page 10-14

14th Amendment, section 1.. page 14

28 USC 1257(a)............. page 14

3

ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT

Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased

Date of hearing: March 23, 1994 Judge: James F. Now‘cki

John B. Kiefer Temporary Personal Representative of the

estate has filed a petition requesting the allowance of First

Annual account

Notice of the hearing was given to or waived by all interested

arties.

e petitioner appeared.

It appears to the court after due examination of the account,

that the petition is correct and ought to be allowed, including

fiduciary and attorney fees.

IT IS ERED that the account be allowed.

March 23 1994 JAMES F. NOWICKI

Judge of Probate

ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT

Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased

Date of hearing: March 1, 1995 Judge: James F. Nowicki

John B. Kiefer, Temporary Personal Representative and

Personal Representative of the estate has filed a petition

requesting the allowance of Second Annual account.

Notice of hearing was given to or waived by all interested

arties.

e petitioner appeared.

It appears to the court, after due examination of the account,

that the petition is correct and ought to be allowed, including

fiduciary and attorney fees.

IT IS ORDERED that the account be allowed and the

Guardian Ad Litem fees be paid.

March 1, 1995 JAMES F. NOWICKI

Judge of Probate

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

In re Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased

Docket #174253 & 184104

L.C. #86-96297-SE

David H. Sawyer

hme, Ste e

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael J. Matuzak

Judges

Pursuant to MCR 7.214(E) and a the

Court dispenses with oral argument (in Docket No. 184104)

and S the March 23, 1994 and March 1, 1995 orders

of the Macomb Probate Court in this cause, to the extent

~ authorizing reimbursement from the estate for attorney fees

and costs expended by the personal representative in

oe his appointment on appeal. Attorney fees

incurred by an executor to defend against a petition for his

removal are properly chargeable against the estate where no

wron —'.. 1S — In re Hammond Estate, 215 Mich

App 379, 387 (1996).

A true copy entered and certified by Ella Williams, Chief

Clerk, on January 24, 1997 /s/

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased

Docket #174253 & 184104

L.C. #86-96297-SE

David H. Sawyer

Presidin oat

Clifford W. Taylor

Michael J. Matuzak*

Judges

The Court orders that the motion for rehearing is DENIED.

*Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

5

A true rag entered and certified by Ella Williams, Chief

Clerk, on April 9, 1997 = /s/

ORDER Michigan — Court, Lansing, Michigan

Entered: December 30, 1997

109145-6

IN RE ESTATE OF COUSINO, SC: 109145-6

COA: 174253 & 184104

LC: 86-96297-SE

PAUL W. COUSINO,

Appellant

On order of the Court, the application for leave to

appeal is considered, and it is DE , because we are not

tegen that the questions presented should be reviewed

y this Court.

Taylor, J., not participating.

I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan

Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and

—" copy of the order entered at the direction of the

urt.

December 30, 1997 /s/

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate of PAUL K. COUSINO,

Deceased.

————

6

PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant

Vv

S. LEE ELLIOTT, Personal Representative of the Estate of

PAUL K. COUSINO, Deceased, and LORALEE

REKUCKI, Proponents-Appellees

and

HAROLD I. GACH, DAVID GRIEM, DAWN COUSINO,

and DALE S. ADAMS, Appellees

PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant

Vv

ARTHUR J. ROSE, III, Temporary Personal Representative

of the Estate of PAUL COUSINO, Deceased, and

LORALEE

REKUCKI, Proponents-Appellees

and

HAROLD I. GACH, S. LEE ELLIOTT, DAVID GRIEM,

DALE S. ADAMS and CHARLES H. EARL, JR, Appellees

PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant

Vv

LORALEE REKUCKI, Proponent-Appellee

November 14, 1991

Nos 112719, 115406, 115587

No. 118116

No 120943

7

Before: Neff, PJ, and Gillis and Michael J. Kelly, JJ

These five consolidated appeals involve the Estate of

Paul K. Cousino. Contestant Paul W. Cousino, son of the

decedent, successfully set aside in a separate action his

father’s 1985 will on the ground that it was a product of

undue influence exerted by the decedent’s daughter. and the

contestant’s sister, Loralee Rekucki. Consequently, the

decedent’s 1978 will was admitted to probate. at will is

the subject of the instant action.

e 1978 will nominated contestant to be the

rsonal representative of the Paul K. Cousino Estate.

ekucki, however, objected to the appointment on the basis

that the animosity between the contestant and herself would

interfere with the proper administration of the estate. The

robate court agreed and appointed a third party, S. Lee

lliott, as personal representative. The contestant appealed

the appointment and Elliott was then made the temporary

personal oo of the estate, pending outcome of the

appeal. ntestant again objected to the temporary

appointment, claiming that Elliott had a conflict of interest

because he was an associate of Rekucki’s counsel] in this

matter. The trial court this time stayed the order appointing

Elliott as —— a representative and in his place

appointed Arthur J.Rose III.

The probate court also entertained various motions

regarding the granting of attorney fees and the rental of

estate property. From the lower court’s rulings concerning

appointment of the personal representative as well as from

e holdings on the motions regarding attorney fees and

administration of the will, contestant appeals as of right. The

appeals have Ot ee by this Court.

The first issue presented is whether the probate court

abused its discretion in failing to appoint contestant as a

personal —— of the estate, and in failing to accept

certain evidence during the hearing on this matter.

The question of whether a personal representative

should be removed is one entrusted to the discretion of the

probate court. In re Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412,

423; 367 NW2d 873 (1985). In this case the probate court

found that contestant and Rekucki, the two primary

beneficiaries of the will, were unable to agree or cooperate

8

regarding the disposition of the estate, and that their

animosity would interfere with the contestant’s ability to

po administer the estate. The record before this

urt supports the probate court’s finding, and in light of the

inability of contestant and Rekucki to move forward without

constant bickering and objection, we find no abuse of

discretion in the court’s appointment of a third party to

represent the estate.

Neither do we find error in the court’s failure to hold

an evidentiary hearing concerning contestant’s suitability to

serv e€ as the estate’s personal representative. A hearing was

held on the petition for appointment of the personal

representative. The — gave oral argument and, as we

have found above, the court within its discretion found

contestant unsuitable to serve as personal representative of

the estate. Contestant relies on MCL 700.164; MSA

27.51264 and MCL 700.172; MSA 27.5172 for the LC epee

that he is entitled to a hearing at which he would have the

opportunity to submit evidence. We find no such requirement

mandated by these statutes. Furthermore, contestant fails to

allege any evidence that would be relevant to the issue at

hand. ”

The next issue is whether the trial court erred in

appointing Elliott as the personal representative of the

estate.

Contestant was not appointed personal —

of the estate, although nominated by the will, because the

animosity between himself and Rekucki would have

interfered with the administration of the estate. To ensure

an expedient disposition of the estate, the court indicated

that it would appoint an independent, third party personal

representative if the parties could not agree on such a

representative. When the parties could not reach an

agreement, the court on October 6, 1988, appointed Elliott.

March 13, 1989, Jerald R. Lovell, of counsel to Elliott’s

law firm, substituted for Charles H. Earl, Jr. as Rekucki’s

counsel on several matters involving the estate. Thus,

although no conflict existed at the time Elliott was 2 meen

personal representative, a potential or apparent conflict has

since arisen. Accordingly, we agree with contestant that

Elliott is not a suitable independent, third party personal

representative. This Court has found nothing improper in

ei

ither

9

Elliott’s or Rose’s administration of the estate, but in light of

the fact that the contestant was not appointed to represent

the estate in favor of someone who was to be a disinterested,

third-party personal] representative, that appointment should

go to a representative without ties to either party in order to

avoid the appearance of are and to —" the

closing of this troubled estate. We direct the probate court

to appoint a personal representative who is unaffiliated and

independent of the parties to this litigation.

We reject as meritless contestant’s assertion that

Eliott bear the cost of the bond which he was required to

secure when appointed a: representative of the estate.

Contestant also raises a claim that the probate court

erred in declining jurisdiction over nonprobate assets

sr converted from the estate by Rekucki. We find no

error. A claim of wrongful conversion must be brought b

the Pe representative of the estate. MCL 700.171;

MSA 27.5171. A personal representative’s role in bringing

an action for conversion exemplifies the need in this case for

a disinterested a

The last issue raised by contestant concerns the

probate court’s disposition regarding attorney fees.

First, we find no merit in contestant’s argument that

the court abused its discretion in ordering the estate to pay

the attorney fees incurred by Rekucki to defend the 1985 wi

which was eventually set aside. The person nominated by a

will as personal represe: tive may, upon approval of the

court, retain counsel for ue p of sustaining the will.

MCL 790.148; MSA 27.5148; se also In re Sarras Estate, 148

Mich App 171; 384 NW2d 119 (1986).

ext, we disagree with contestant’s assertion that the

probate court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees

to Rose, as temporary personal representative, for services

performed in connection with the petition to rent estate

propery. Rose’s proposal regarding the property was made

in the interest of the estate, notwithstanding any derivative

benefits gained by Rekucki. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion.

We do, however, agree with contestant that the court

abused its discretion in denying attorney fees for contestant’s

successful challenge of the 1985 will. Attorney fees are

10

chargeable to the estate when the services rendered were

beneficial to the estate as a whole rather than to an

individual or a gros of individuals interested therein. Becht

v. Miller, 279 Mich 629; 273 NW 294 (1937); In re Valentino

Estate, 128 Mich App 87, 96; 339 NWW 698 (1983). We

conclude that it is beneficial to the estate as a whole to strike

a will which has been obtained under undue influence and

therefore oo the inclination and volition of the testator.

To find otherwise would be to disparage the policy of

distributing the estate according to the decedent’s true intent.

The attorney fees incurred by contestant in challenging the

1985 will are chargeable to the estate.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain

Jurisdiction. y

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the matter of PAUL K. COUSINO, deceased

JOHN B. KIEFER, Temporary Personal Representative of

the Estate of PAUL K. COUSINO, Deceased, Petitioner-

Appellee

Vv

PAUL W. COUSINO, Respondent-Appellant

October 10, 1997

Nos. 194005; 194118

Macomb Probate Court

LC No. 89-96297-SE

Before: Smolenski,PJ and Fitzgerald and Gage, JJ

11

PER CURIAM

In Docket No. 194005, respondent appeals a probate

court order authorizing petitioner to list and sell the real

estate and a mobile home owned by the estate. In Docket

No. 194889, respondent appeals as of right from two orders

entered by the probate court: an order allowing petitioner’s

third annual account and an order imposing sanctions in the

amount of $63,232 against respondent for vexatious

roceedings, the reasonable expenses incurred, includin

uciary and attorney fees, and $500 in costs for an unpai

sanction imposed in a previous appeal. |

We affirm the orders ing the account and

authorizing petitioner to list and sell the real estate. We also

affirm the order imposing sanctions to the extent that those

sanctions include expenses for frivolous claims filed in the

probate court pursuant to MCR 2.114(F). To the extent that

the order included sanctions for vexatious ——_ before this

Court, we note that the probate court lacked authority to

impose sanctions. However, this Court, , bese such

authority, sanctions respondent pursuant to MCR 7216(C)()

for vexatious appeals and proceedings in this Court

remands pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(2) for a determination

of actual and punitive damages.

This case concerns the estate of respondent’s father,

Paul K. Cousino. Respondent and his sister are the two

principal beneficiaries of the estate. The petition for

commencement of probate proceedings was filed on July 7,

1986. However, because of numerous objections and —

filed by respondent, the case has not yet been concluded

Petitioner was appointed as personal representative

in October 1992 and cg ag personal representative in

April 1993. In February 196, ¥ pee sot filed petitions with

the probate court seeking authorization to list and sell the

real estate, allowance of the third account, and sanctions

against respondent for filing frivolous appeals. The probate

court granted the petitions.

This Court reviews the actions of the probate court

for an abuse of discretion. In re Rice Estate, 138 Mich App

261, 270; 360 NW2d 587 (1984). Because a trial court's

decision to award sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114 involves

findings of fact, this Court reviews the trial court’s ruling to

determine whether it was e- erroneous. Conte] —

v. Gores, 183 Mich App 706, 711; 455 NW2d 398 (1990).

ga

12

Respondent first argues that petitioner cannot recover

his fees because an executor cannot be paid from the estate

for following a case to higher courts. MCL 700.543; MSA

27.5543 enables a fiduciary of an estate to employ an

attorney to or legal services on behalf of the estate and

provides that the attorney shall receive reasonable

compensation for these services. To be chargeable to the

estate, the services must have been beneficial to and on

behalf of the estate. In re Valentino, 128 Mich App 87, 94 -

95; 339 NW2d 698 (1983). For example, this Court has

allowed an executor to recover from the estate fees incurred

in defending his position as executor, provided that there was

no wron 5 Oing on the part of the executor. In re Hammond

Estate, 215 Mich App 379, 387; 547 NW2d 36 Neen ; In re

Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412, 441; 36 2d 873

1985). erefore, the probate court did not abuse its

iscretion in allowing petitioner’s third annual account,

including fiduciary and attorney fees for services rendered

while defending his position as personal representative.

This Court has also concluded that MCL 700.543;

MSA 27.5543 does not allow the estate to pay attorney fees

incurred in defending a petition for attorney fees. In re

Sloan Estate, 212 Mich App 357, 360 - 361; 538 NW2d 47

1995). These “fees for fees" claims are normally not

recoverable because they do not benefit the estate b

increasing or —— the estate’s assets. Id at 365.

However, this Court also noted that the probate court may

be authorized to award these costs in exceptional

circumstances:

Nonetheless, where extraordinary fees and costs

are incurred because of an y cory bong by frau d,

unjustified objections raised in bad faith, or

other extrao ey circumstance, the probate

court is authorized to impose appropriate sanctions

via various fee-shifting mechanisms. See, e.g., MCR

5.114; MCR 2.114(B)-(F). [Id at 363, n2.]

We conclude that the present case presents extraordinary

circumstances in which it is appropriate to award fees and

costs as a sanction against respondent pursuant to MCR

2.114(F). Respondent’s actions in this case have turned a

straightforward matter into a proceeding which has lasted

more than ten years. Respondent has appealed almost every

order entered by the probate court during that period, filin

some eleven appeals in this Court alone. MCR 2114(E}

13

allows the court to impose sanctions for frivolous claims.

Costs awarded may include court costs and reasonable

attorney fees. MCL 600.2591(2); MSA 27A.2591(2).

Therefore, we conclude that w fees for fees are not

recoverable under MCL 700.543; MSA 27.5543, the probate

court neither abused its discretion nor clearly erred in

imposing sanctions against respondent for frivolous claims

filed in probate court.

owever, the probate court did not have authority to

Er sanctions for vexatious appeals pursuant to

: oe That authority lies with this Court. We find

that —_—_ filed by respondent have been taken to

delay the closing of the estate without any reasonable basis

for believing a meritorious issue was involved and were

grossly lacking in the requirements of propriety. Therefore,

is Court sanctions respondent for the reasonable expenses

incurred by respondent’s vexatious appeals. Pursuant to

MCR 7.2 6(C)2), we remand to probate court to

determine actual costs incurred by the estate, including

reasonable attorney fees. We also award punitive damages

in an added amount equaling the amount of actual damages.

Respondent also argues that the probate court could

not authorize the sale of real estate. First, respondent

suggests that authorizing the sale after respondent and his

sister failed to reach an agreement concerning the os

of bo real — va se vy! his right to ms get oever,

authority cite res ent does not support thi ition,

and rao Boon abs = nt is without teal Thus Court

will not search for authority to support or reject a gh

sition. Hover v. Chrysler Corp. Mich hes 314, 319;

30 NW2d 96 (1995).

Second, respondent contends that by authorizing the

sale, the probate court is, in essence, rewriting the to

reflect the intent of the court instead of that of the testator.

We disagree. The language contained in the will indicated

only a desire to keep the real estate in the family for as

along as practicable. It did not create a command that the

Mich 282, 285; 264 NW 372 (1936) (language indicating 2

c : a

desire that something be done ’ pouceteey meen By

Petitioner presented sufficient evidence to the probate court

that maintaining the real estate has cost the estate

5 guar worn 300 annually. Therefore, we conclude that

e probate court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing

14

petitioner to list and sell the real estate.

Affirmed and remanded for proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/

Amendment 14, section 1

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due a of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

28 USC 1257(a)

"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari wines

the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is

drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to

the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or

where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set

up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or

statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised

under, the United States."

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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