Appendix — Cousino v. Elliott
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FIL BD
Man 9 aMy
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED~SPATES
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
PAUL K. COUSINO, deceased
MACOMB COUNTY PROBATE COURT #86-96297-SE
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS #174253 & 184104
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT #109145 & 109145
APPENDIX
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT
SUBMITTED BY:
PAUL W. COUSINO, in propria persona
P.O. Box 46634
Mt. Clemens, Mich.
48046-6634
1-800-484-5422
security code: 3197
Pie ase
INDEX
Probate Court ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT dated
March 23,
} a page 3
Probate Court ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT dated
March 1,
NEY A page 3
Court of Appeals ORDER dated January 24,
Sol Wonnsnicshicanincenbiciees page 3-4
Court of Appeals ORDER dated April 9,
Rae Wosdiceenintivedininniis page 4-5
Michigan Supreme Court ORDER DATED December 30,
NOD Rciticheciieiictinsiisiai page 5
Michigan Court of Appeals decision appealed in this Court’s
ho page 5-10
Michigan Court of Appeals decision taxing
i iidianinlihanliniii page 10-14
14th Amendment, section 1.. page 14
28 USC 1257(a)............. page 14
3
ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT
Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased
Date of hearing: March 23, 1994 Judge: James F. Now‘cki
John B. Kiefer Temporary Personal Representative of the
estate has filed a petition requesting the allowance of First
Annual account
Notice of the hearing was given to or waived by all interested
arties.
e petitioner appeared.
It appears to the court after due examination of the account,
that the petition is correct and ought to be allowed, including
fiduciary and attorney fees.
IT IS ERED that the account be allowed.
March 23 1994 JAMES F. NOWICKI
Judge of Probate
ORDER ALLOWING ACCOUNT
Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased
Date of hearing: March 1, 1995 Judge: James F. Nowicki
John B. Kiefer, Temporary Personal Representative and
Personal Representative of the estate has filed a petition
requesting the allowance of Second Annual account.
Notice of hearing was given to or waived by all interested
arties.
e petitioner appeared.
It appears to the court, after due examination of the account,
that the petition is correct and ought to be allowed, including
fiduciary and attorney fees.
IT IS ORDERED that the account be allowed and the
Guardian Ad Litem fees be paid.
March 1, 1995 JAMES F. NOWICKI
Judge of Probate
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
In re Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased
Docket #174253 & 184104
L.C. #86-96297-SE
David H. Sawyer
hme, Ste e
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael J. Matuzak
Judges
Pursuant to MCR 7.214(E) and a the
Court dispenses with oral argument (in Docket No. 184104)
and S the March 23, 1994 and March 1, 1995 orders
of the Macomb Probate Court in this cause, to the extent
~ authorizing reimbursement from the estate for attorney fees
and costs expended by the personal representative in
oe his appointment on appeal. Attorney fees
incurred by an executor to defend against a petition for his
removal are properly chargeable against the estate where no
wron —'.. 1S — In re Hammond Estate, 215 Mich
App 379, 387 (1996).
A true copy entered and certified by Ella Williams, Chief
Clerk, on January 24, 1997 /s/
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
Estate of Paul K. Cousino, deceased
Docket #174253 & 184104
L.C. #86-96297-SE
David H. Sawyer
Presidin oat
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael J. Matuzak*
Judges
The Court orders that the motion for rehearing is DENIED.
*Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
5
A true rag entered and certified by Ella Williams, Chief
Clerk, on April 9, 1997 = /s/
ORDER Michigan — Court, Lansing, Michigan
Entered: December 30, 1997
109145-6
IN RE ESTATE OF COUSINO, SC: 109145-6
COA: 174253 & 184104
LC: 86-96297-SE
PAUL W. COUSINO,
Appellant
On order of the Court, the application for leave to
appeal is considered, and it is DE , because we are not
tegen that the questions presented should be reviewed
y this Court.
Taylor, J., not participating.
I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan
Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and
—" copy of the order entered at the direction of the
urt.
December 30, 1997 /s/
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate of PAUL K. COUSINO,
Deceased.
————
6
PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant
Vv
S. LEE ELLIOTT, Personal Representative of the Estate of
PAUL K. COUSINO, Deceased, and LORALEE
REKUCKI, Proponents-Appellees
and
HAROLD I. GACH, DAVID GRIEM, DAWN COUSINO,
and DALE S. ADAMS, Appellees
PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant
Vv
ARTHUR J. ROSE, III, Temporary Personal Representative
of the Estate of PAUL COUSINO, Deceased, and
LORALEE
REKUCKI, Proponents-Appellees
and
HAROLD I. GACH, S. LEE ELLIOTT, DAVID GRIEM,
DALE S. ADAMS and CHARLES H. EARL, JR, Appellees
PAUL W. COUSINO, Contestant-Appellant
Vv
LORALEE REKUCKI, Proponent-Appellee
November 14, 1991
Nos 112719, 115406, 115587
No. 118116
No 120943
7
Before: Neff, PJ, and Gillis and Michael J. Kelly, JJ
These five consolidated appeals involve the Estate of
Paul K. Cousino. Contestant Paul W. Cousino, son of the
decedent, successfully set aside in a separate action his
father’s 1985 will on the ground that it was a product of
undue influence exerted by the decedent’s daughter. and the
contestant’s sister, Loralee Rekucki. Consequently, the
decedent’s 1978 will was admitted to probate. at will is
the subject of the instant action.
e 1978 will nominated contestant to be the
rsonal representative of the Paul K. Cousino Estate.
ekucki, however, objected to the appointment on the basis
that the animosity between the contestant and herself would
interfere with the proper administration of the estate. The
robate court agreed and appointed a third party, S. Lee
lliott, as personal representative. The contestant appealed
the appointment and Elliott was then made the temporary
personal oo of the estate, pending outcome of the
appeal. ntestant again objected to the temporary
appointment, claiming that Elliott had a conflict of interest
because he was an associate of Rekucki’s counsel] in this
matter. The trial court this time stayed the order appointing
Elliott as —— a representative and in his place
appointed Arthur J.Rose III.
The probate court also entertained various motions
regarding the granting of attorney fees and the rental of
estate property. From the lower court’s rulings concerning
appointment of the personal representative as well as from
e holdings on the motions regarding attorney fees and
administration of the will, contestant appeals as of right. The
appeals have Ot ee by this Court.
The first issue presented is whether the probate court
abused its discretion in failing to appoint contestant as a
personal —— of the estate, and in failing to accept
certain evidence during the hearing on this matter.
The question of whether a personal representative
should be removed is one entrusted to the discretion of the
probate court. In re Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412,
423; 367 NW2d 873 (1985). In this case the probate court
found that contestant and Rekucki, the two primary
beneficiaries of the will, were unable to agree or cooperate
8
regarding the disposition of the estate, and that their
animosity would interfere with the contestant’s ability to
po administer the estate. The record before this
urt supports the probate court’s finding, and in light of the
inability of contestant and Rekucki to move forward without
constant bickering and objection, we find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s appointment of a third party to
represent the estate.
Neither do we find error in the court’s failure to hold
an evidentiary hearing concerning contestant’s suitability to
serv e€ as the estate’s personal representative. A hearing was
held on the petition for appointment of the personal
representative. The — gave oral argument and, as we
have found above, the court within its discretion found
contestant unsuitable to serve as personal representative of
the estate. Contestant relies on MCL 700.164; MSA
27.51264 and MCL 700.172; MSA 27.5172 for the LC epee
that he is entitled to a hearing at which he would have the
opportunity to submit evidence. We find no such requirement
mandated by these statutes. Furthermore, contestant fails to
allege any evidence that would be relevant to the issue at
hand. ”
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in
appointing Elliott as the personal representative of the
estate.
Contestant was not appointed personal —
of the estate, although nominated by the will, because the
animosity between himself and Rekucki would have
interfered with the administration of the estate. To ensure
an expedient disposition of the estate, the court indicated
that it would appoint an independent, third party personal
representative if the parties could not agree on such a
representative. When the parties could not reach an
agreement, the court on October 6, 1988, appointed Elliott.
March 13, 1989, Jerald R. Lovell, of counsel to Elliott’s
law firm, substituted for Charles H. Earl, Jr. as Rekucki’s
counsel on several matters involving the estate. Thus,
although no conflict existed at the time Elliott was 2 meen
personal representative, a potential or apparent conflict has
since arisen. Accordingly, we agree with contestant that
Elliott is not a suitable independent, third party personal
representative. This Court has found nothing improper in
ei
ither
9
Elliott’s or Rose’s administration of the estate, but in light of
the fact that the contestant was not appointed to represent
the estate in favor of someone who was to be a disinterested,
third-party personal] representative, that appointment should
go to a representative without ties to either party in order to
avoid the appearance of are and to —" the
closing of this troubled estate. We direct the probate court
to appoint a personal representative who is unaffiliated and
independent of the parties to this litigation.
We reject as meritless contestant’s assertion that
Eliott bear the cost of the bond which he was required to
secure when appointed a: representative of the estate.
Contestant also raises a claim that the probate court
erred in declining jurisdiction over nonprobate assets
sr converted from the estate by Rekucki. We find no
error. A claim of wrongful conversion must be brought b
the Pe representative of the estate. MCL 700.171;
MSA 27.5171. A personal representative’s role in bringing
an action for conversion exemplifies the need in this case for
a disinterested a
The last issue raised by contestant concerns the
probate court’s disposition regarding attorney fees.
First, we find no merit in contestant’s argument that
the court abused its discretion in ordering the estate to pay
the attorney fees incurred by Rekucki to defend the 1985 wi
which was eventually set aside. The person nominated by a
will as personal represe: tive may, upon approval of the
court, retain counsel for ue p of sustaining the will.
MCL 790.148; MSA 27.5148; se also In re Sarras Estate, 148
Mich App 171; 384 NW2d 119 (1986).
ext, we disagree with contestant’s assertion that the
probate court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees
to Rose, as temporary personal representative, for services
performed in connection with the petition to rent estate
propery. Rose’s proposal regarding the property was made
in the interest of the estate, notwithstanding any derivative
benefits gained by Rekucki. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
We do, however, agree with contestant that the court
abused its discretion in denying attorney fees for contestant’s
successful challenge of the 1985 will. Attorney fees are
10
chargeable to the estate when the services rendered were
beneficial to the estate as a whole rather than to an
individual or a gros of individuals interested therein. Becht
v. Miller, 279 Mich 629; 273 NW 294 (1937); In re Valentino
Estate, 128 Mich App 87, 96; 339 NWW 698 (1983). We
conclude that it is beneficial to the estate as a whole to strike
a will which has been obtained under undue influence and
therefore oo the inclination and volition of the testator.
To find otherwise would be to disparage the policy of
distributing the estate according to the decedent’s true intent.
The attorney fees incurred by contestant in challenging the
1985 will are chargeable to the estate.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
Jurisdiction. y
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the matter of PAUL K. COUSINO, deceased
JOHN B. KIEFER, Temporary Personal Representative of
the Estate of PAUL K. COUSINO, Deceased, Petitioner-
Appellee
Vv
PAUL W. COUSINO, Respondent-Appellant
October 10, 1997
Nos. 194005; 194118
Macomb Probate Court
LC No. 89-96297-SE
Before: Smolenski,PJ and Fitzgerald and Gage, JJ
11
PER CURIAM
In Docket No. 194005, respondent appeals a probate
court order authorizing petitioner to list and sell the real
estate and a mobile home owned by the estate. In Docket
No. 194889, respondent appeals as of right from two orders
entered by the probate court: an order allowing petitioner’s
third annual account and an order imposing sanctions in the
amount of $63,232 against respondent for vexatious
roceedings, the reasonable expenses incurred, includin
uciary and attorney fees, and $500 in costs for an unpai
sanction imposed in a previous appeal. |
We affirm the orders ing the account and
authorizing petitioner to list and sell the real estate. We also
affirm the order imposing sanctions to the extent that those
sanctions include expenses for frivolous claims filed in the
probate court pursuant to MCR 2.114(F). To the extent that
the order included sanctions for vexatious ——_ before this
Court, we note that the probate court lacked authority to
impose sanctions. However, this Court, , bese such
authority, sanctions respondent pursuant to MCR 7216(C)()
for vexatious appeals and proceedings in this Court
remands pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(2) for a determination
of actual and punitive damages.
This case concerns the estate of respondent’s father,
Paul K. Cousino. Respondent and his sister are the two
principal beneficiaries of the estate. The petition for
commencement of probate proceedings was filed on July 7,
1986. However, because of numerous objections and —
filed by respondent, the case has not yet been concluded
Petitioner was appointed as personal representative
in October 1992 and cg ag personal representative in
April 1993. In February 196, ¥ pee sot filed petitions with
the probate court seeking authorization to list and sell the
real estate, allowance of the third account, and sanctions
against respondent for filing frivolous appeals. The probate
court granted the petitions.
This Court reviews the actions of the probate court
for an abuse of discretion. In re Rice Estate, 138 Mich App
261, 270; 360 NW2d 587 (1984). Because a trial court's
decision to award sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114 involves
findings of fact, this Court reviews the trial court’s ruling to
determine whether it was e- erroneous. Conte] —
v. Gores, 183 Mich App 706, 711; 455 NW2d 398 (1990).
ga
12
Respondent first argues that petitioner cannot recover
his fees because an executor cannot be paid from the estate
for following a case to higher courts. MCL 700.543; MSA
27.5543 enables a fiduciary of an estate to employ an
attorney to or legal services on behalf of the estate and
provides that the attorney shall receive reasonable
compensation for these services. To be chargeable to the
estate, the services must have been beneficial to and on
behalf of the estate. In re Valentino, 128 Mich App 87, 94 -
95; 339 NW2d 698 (1983). For example, this Court has
allowed an executor to recover from the estate fees incurred
in defending his position as executor, provided that there was
no wron 5 Oing on the part of the executor. In re Hammond
Estate, 215 Mich App 379, 387; 547 NW2d 36 Neen ; In re
Humphrey Estate, 141 Mich App 412, 441; 36 2d 873
1985). erefore, the probate court did not abuse its
iscretion in allowing petitioner’s third annual account,
including fiduciary and attorney fees for services rendered
while defending his position as personal representative.
This Court has also concluded that MCL 700.543;
MSA 27.5543 does not allow the estate to pay attorney fees
incurred in defending a petition for attorney fees. In re
Sloan Estate, 212 Mich App 357, 360 - 361; 538 NW2d 47
1995). These “fees for fees" claims are normally not
recoverable because they do not benefit the estate b
increasing or —— the estate’s assets. Id at 365.
However, this Court also noted that the probate court may
be authorized to award these costs in exceptional
circumstances:
Nonetheless, where extraordinary fees and costs
are incurred because of an y cory bong by frau d,
unjustified objections raised in bad faith, or
other extrao ey circumstance, the probate
court is authorized to impose appropriate sanctions
via various fee-shifting mechanisms. See, e.g., MCR
5.114; MCR 2.114(B)-(F). [Id at 363, n2.]
We conclude that the present case presents extraordinary
circumstances in which it is appropriate to award fees and
costs as a sanction against respondent pursuant to MCR
2.114(F). Respondent’s actions in this case have turned a
straightforward matter into a proceeding which has lasted
more than ten years. Respondent has appealed almost every
order entered by the probate court during that period, filin
some eleven appeals in this Court alone. MCR 2114(E}
13
allows the court to impose sanctions for frivolous claims.
Costs awarded may include court costs and reasonable
attorney fees. MCL 600.2591(2); MSA 27A.2591(2).
Therefore, we conclude that w fees for fees are not
recoverable under MCL 700.543; MSA 27.5543, the probate
court neither abused its discretion nor clearly erred in
imposing sanctions against respondent for frivolous claims
filed in probate court.
owever, the probate court did not have authority to
Er sanctions for vexatious appeals pursuant to
: oe That authority lies with this Court. We find
that —_—_ filed by respondent have been taken to
delay the closing of the estate without any reasonable basis
for believing a meritorious issue was involved and were
grossly lacking in the requirements of propriety. Therefore,
is Court sanctions respondent for the reasonable expenses
incurred by respondent’s vexatious appeals. Pursuant to
MCR 7.2 6(C)2), we remand to probate court to
determine actual costs incurred by the estate, including
reasonable attorney fees. We also award punitive damages
in an added amount equaling the amount of actual damages.
Respondent also argues that the probate court could
not authorize the sale of real estate. First, respondent
suggests that authorizing the sale after respondent and his
sister failed to reach an agreement concerning the os
of bo real — va se vy! his right to ms get oever,
authority cite res ent does not support thi ition,
and rao Boon abs = nt is without teal Thus Court
will not search for authority to support or reject a gh
sition. Hover v. Chrysler Corp. Mich hes 314, 319;
30 NW2d 96 (1995).
Second, respondent contends that by authorizing the
sale, the probate court is, in essence, rewriting the to
reflect the intent of the court instead of that of the testator.
We disagree. The language contained in the will indicated
only a desire to keep the real estate in the family for as
along as practicable. It did not create a command that the
Mich 282, 285; 264 NW 372 (1936) (language indicating 2
c : a
desire that something be done ’ pouceteey meen By
Petitioner presented sufficient evidence to the probate court
that maintaining the real estate has cost the estate
5 guar worn 300 annually. Therefore, we conclude that
e probate court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing
14
petitioner to list and sell the real estate.
Affirmed and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/
Amendment 14, section 1
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due a of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
28 USC 1257(a)
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari wines
the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or
where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set
up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or
statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States."
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